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Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac
Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac
Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac
Audiobook32 hours

Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac

Written by Stephen W. Sears

Narrated by George Guidall

Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

4.5/5

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About this audiobook

From the best-selling author of Gettysburg, a multilayered group biography of the commanders who led the Army of the Potomac The high command of the Army of the Potomac was a changeable, often dysfunctional band of brothers, going through the fires of war under seven commanding generals in three years, until Grant came east in 1864. The men in charge all too frequently appeared to be fighting against the administration in Washington instead of for it, increasingly cast as political pawns facing down a vindictive congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. President Lincoln oversaw, argued with, and finally tamed his unruly team of generals as the eastern army was stabilized by an unsung supporting cast of corps, division, and brigade generals. With characteristic style and insight, Stephen Sears brings these courageous, determined officers, who rose through the ranks and led from the front, to life.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateApr 25, 2017
ISBN9781501957529
Author

Stephen W. Sears

STEPHEN W. SEARS is the author of many award-winning books on the Civil War, including Gettysburg and Landscape Turned Red. A former editor at American Heritage, he lives in Connecticut.,

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Rating: 4.367647029411764 out of 5 stars
4.5/5

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  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    This is an excellent recounting of the Army of the Potomac. I enjoyed it thoroughly. It has enough of the politics of the war for perspective, but as in all Sears writings is excellent on the actual battles of the war.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    This book about the Army of the Potomac’s high command — its own commanders, its corps commanders, division commanders, brigade commanders — is generally excellent. I have only two complaints. One is with the maps. While fairly numerous, they do not show unit positions, making it sometimes difficult to follow the action described in the text. The second is with the balance of the book in terms of time. Five sevenths of the book is devoted to the first half of the war, while only two sevenths is devoted to the second half. Of that second half, incidentally, one takeaway is that Grant frequently undermined his own operations by his own impatience, demanding that operations get under way without allowing sufficient time for preparations. On the other hand, it was well known to the troops in the field that the Confederates could be allowed at most a few hours to occupy their chosen ground before they had dug the most formidable entrenchments.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    While I'm giving this book four stars if I could give it three & three-quarters that would be about right, as while there is nothing else quite like it in terms of following the twists and turns of how Union's main field force in Virginia evolved over time, and I'm inclined to trust Sears' judgement on military matters, I'm not so sure in regards to the flying of sparks when political and military matters clashed. To put it another way, while Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and the congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War might not be the most attractive people in the world, it's understandable why at the time there would be chronic distrust of an officer corps dominated by conservative Democrats. To cut to the chase Sears gives fellow historian William Marvel his first acknowledgment and my impression of Marvel's biography of Stanton was that it was a caricature of the man; and it's not as though I hold any particular brief for Stanton. With that in mind though this work does serve well as a good overview of the war in the east.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    The book Lincoln's Lieutenant by Stephen W Sears narrated by George Guidall was an audiobook on CD I received from LibraryThing as an early review. Let me start by stating it can be quite overwhelming to see 26 compact discs in total on one book. On average one should finish listening to the cd's in 32 hours give or take an hour or two, but it took me a little more time due to interruptions. A well-researched and written book I found it very interesting and informative. An interesting fact that surprised me was so much leaking of information to the newspapers. Also, the general‘s writing their dissatisfaction to members of the Congress and Governors about the war. Author Sears gives a fascinating looking at the military campaign of the northern army with President Lincoln making the strategic decisions, while the Secretary of War Edwin McMasters Stanton was doing everything in his power to oppose them. Also, most if not all of the general's were only being appointed because of the people they knew, not by their military experience making for little knowledge on the battlefield. Stephen Sears gives authentically long-lasting historical accuracy of the Civil War struggle, and I would highly recommend for anyone interested in this subject.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    Thick tomes relating in great detail the history of the American Civil War or even the Army of the Potomac are not hard to come by. There have been enough published to fill a good-sized library. So what makes Stephen W. Sears’ history of ‘Lincoln’s Lieutenants’ unique? After spending 32 hours listening to an audio recording of this excellent book, I can safely say that it is all in the perspective. If you were to describe a tree trunk you wouldn’t have too much difficulty. You would describe its width, its color, its texture. Is it straight or crooked? Is it easy to climb? But if you were to move up into the tree, the task of describing each of its hundreds and then thousands of branches becomes daunting. Many people would be tempted to say they were all similar. But that would not be entirely true. So it is with the task that Sears undertook. Before George Meade took over command of the Army of the Potomac in 1863, shortly before Gettysburg, the position was held by six other officers, all of whom found the much smaller, ill-equipped Army of Northern Virginia more than they could handle. One would think that with an army of a hundred thousand soldiers it would be a simple matter to march on and seize Richmond, but one would be wrong. An army is made up of several corps. Each corps is made up of several divisions which are, made up of several regiments which are, in turn made up of brigades. Each of these units needed a commander and the sad truth was that Lincoln’s army suffered from a severe lack of experienced officers. The pre-war standing army was a fraction of the size of what was needed and the majority of the qualified officers came from the southern states with their almost feudal agrarian society that left younger sons little opportunities other than the military. Sears does an excellent job of describing how these many sub-commanders worked together, or didn’t, and how their actions contributed to or detracted from the war effort. Few had any military experience. Many were politicians with typical politician’s shortcomings. Some were vain, petty, ignorant, venial and just plain despicable. Others, though, found themselves in a challenging position and rose to the occasion. Sears’ book was ably narrated by the incomparable George Guidall. Unfortunately, I have come to the conclusion that audio recordings are not the best medium for most nonfiction books. Often when reading a nonfiction book, I like to highlight certain passages and refer back to them in the future. This is not convenient in audio. Also, I would like to how characters names are spelled so that I can do further research on them. Finally, many nonfiction books include photographs and maps of the subjects that missing from an audio recording. I must give cudos to the great folks at Recorded Books though. When I discovered that two of the 26 discs in this book were blank, they quickly sent me replacements and they were in my mailbox within a week. *Quotations are cited from an advanced reading copy and may not be the same as appears in the final published edition. The review was based on an advanced reading copy obtained at no cost from the publisher in exchange for an unbiased review. While this does take any ‘not worth what I paid for it’ statements out of my review, it otherwise has no impact on the content of my review.FYI: On a 5-point scale I assign stars based on my assessment of what the book needs in the way of improvements:*5 Stars – Nothing at all. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.*4 Stars – It could stand for a few tweaks here and there but it’s pretty good as it is.*3 Stars – A solid C grade. Some serious rewriting would be needed in order for this book to be considered great or memorable.*2 Stars – This book needs a lot of work. A good start would be to change the plot, the character development, the writing style and the ending. *1 Star - The only thing that would improve this book is a good bonfire.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    This is a great book but I could not take it with me when traveling as it was too large. Especially good if you are from the North.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    This is a great book covering the major players in the Union Army. I listened to the audio edition which consists of 26 disks. The work and the reading remained consistent from start to finish. George Guidall does a great job of narration and is easy to listen to. He Stephen Sears work to life. Sears presents a logical and follow able history of the stream of command in the Union Army. Centering initially around George McClellan and leading to the final solution in U. S. Grant. The men that these men commanded were pretty much a self seeking bunch of junior and senior officers all clawing to make it to the next step up. It would be interesting to see what the Confederate Army was like. The beauty of this book is that it was written at a personal level. Letters, diaries and journals expose the thoughts and motives of these officers and tells their stories personally while weaving in the broader scope of the war. Interaction with President Lincoln both the good and the bad is presented as well. I especially enjoyed the first chapters the laid the backdrop for the war. There are a number of stories and facts that are presented that I knew nothing about.....for example, Union Soldiers in the Washington D.C. area were ordered to round up run away slaves and return them to their owners. General Porters long drawn out fight to regain his honor after he was used as a scapegoat for another officer's advancement. I also enjoyed the epilogue which presented the lives of all these officers after the war was over......what an interesting ending to a very well researched and presented book!
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    A thoroughly exhaustive review of the North's premiere army during the Civil War. Charged with protecting Washington, DC and prosecuting the war against Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, the Army of the Potomac was beset with incompetent political appointees across all levels of command. At their best, they often did nothing, at their worst, they were a menace to their own side, costing thousands of lives. It wasn't until US Grant became Major General of the entire Northern army that fortunes began to change. This book is so one sided though that in spite of it's length, it feels like an incomplete story. Operations of other armies are rarely mentioned, and battle descriptions rarely speak in detail of the enemy army . We know how and why the Army of the Potomac came to be where they were and what their general strategy was, but not so much of the enemy.If you're only going read one civil war book, go with Shelby Foote over this book. If you're already familiar with ebb and flow of the war and want a deep dive into one of the key armies of the war, then Sears is for you.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    The Army of the Potomac’s failures was the source of great frustration for President Lincoln, the Congress and the nation. The North had significant war-making advantages over the Confederacy in manpower and material, but what it didn’t have – at least until the arrival of U.S. Grant in the spring of 1864 – was inspired, effective generalship. Sears’s book gives insight into the weaknesses of military leadership that unquestionably led to lengthening the duration of the war.At the war’s onset the regular army was small and mostly deployed in the western territories. Its commanding general was the aging Winfield Scott, first serving in the War of 1812 and admired for his leadership in the Mexican War. Scott devised a strategic approach to conducting the war – the “Anaconda” plan that called for encircling (constricting) the South at the Mississippi and the Atlantic coast. From a broad-term perspective this was, in essence, what transpired over the war years. Scott drew criticism by offering his views on the political aims he felt should underlie the North’s goals for reunification. Despite his military reputation Scott, now in his mid-60’s, no longer had the physical capacity to lead the army in the field. After several minor engagements that did not bring satisfaction to the North, the two armies faced off in Manassas, practically at the back door of Washington. Here began a pattern of Northern failures in which the Federal forces were out maneuvered and outgeneraled by the rebel opponents. In the ensuring search for new leadership after Manassas, George McClellan emerged. McClellan had had several small-scale victories in western Virginia and was perceived to be the fresh and vigorous leader the army needed. McClellan proved to be excellent at organizing his army, now expanded to many times its prewar size, but he soon evidenced several characteristics that would hugely frustrate the North’s political leadership. He was utterly dismissive of the views of his civilian superiors and displayed an arrogance and disdain toward Lincoln and war secretary Stanton that, probably in their desperation for military success, they tolerated. Plausible suggestions for attacking Confederate forces encamped within miles of Washington were rejected outright and, instead, an elaborate and complex plan to attack the Confederate capital at Richmond was advanced by McClellan. Contained in this strategy was a notion that dominated military thinking for quite a long time – that the war could be won by capturing the capital of the Confederacy. Lincoln fairly quickly realized that it was not the “place” of the Confederacy that was important; it was the “army”; that by destroying the army of the South the rebellion would be suppressed.McClellan’s other command deficiency appeared in the Peninsula campaign. He grossly overestimated the size of his opponent and exercised slowness and caution instead of aggressiveness. His constant complaints about the need for additional troops were a pretext for inaction. It was at the end of the campaign along the York and James Rivers that Lincoln relieved McClellan from overall command of the Federal armies, replacing him with Henry Halleck, who had achieved some success in the West directing field generals. Halleck proved as ineffective in directing McClellan as Lincoln (more on Halleck later). McClellan was directed to take forces north to aid Gen. John Pope’s efforts around Manassas. His failure to do so, combined with Pope’s ineptitude that led to the second defeat at Manassas. Robert E. Lee determined to invade Maryland and the Federals followed him, always shielding Washington from the rebel army. In central Maryland, the armies collided at Antietam. McClellan had the great fortune of coming across a lost copy of Lee’s battle plan, but did not take full advantage of his good luck principally by not engaging his forces enmasse. What followed was Lee’s withdrawal after devastating losses on both sides. This was perceived by the administration to be enough of a victory to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, but Lincoln’s hope that McClellan would pursue Lee’s army was frustrated by his inaction.At long last Lincoln could no longer abide with McClellan’s temerity. He searched for a replacement, settling on Ambrose Burnside who protested that he had not the capacity for so great an assignment. He was correct in his self-assessment. The catastrophe of the Fredericksburg campaign and the subsequent ludicrous “mud march” in the mire away from the Rappahannock prompted Lincoln to select Joseph Hooker for overall command. “Fighting Joe” Hooker had performed well at Antietam and better that most at Fredericksburg and had a reputation for the kind of aggressiveness sought by Lincoln. In early 1863 Hooker conceived a sound plan to outflank Lee near Chancellorsville, but following a bold counter flanking maneuver by Stonewall Jackson and a near miss from cannon fire that left Hooker temporarily incapacitated, the rebels again prevailed.Lee again forayed North and on the eve of a great engagement Lincoln switched leadership by appointing George Meade to command. At Gettysburg Meade determined to fight Lee on the defensive and through the combination of strong defensive positions and good luck was able to repel Lee. Here again, though, was the lack of pursuit of the defeated rebel army that so frustrated Lincoln. Meade probably wisely eschewed attacking Lee’s strongly fortified position at Williamsport, MD and the rebel army made its reentry into Virginia.Throughout the fall and early winter of 1863 there were desultory Federal campaign efforts that came to nothing. In the spring of 1864 Lincoln determined to appoint Grant as general-in-chief. Grant had received praise for his fighting in the West, notably Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Halleck was demoted the chief of staff to Lincoln. Grant wisely decided to exercise command leadership from the field, retaining Meade in charge of the Army of the Potomac. This proved to be a great success as the two men had a good working relationship and, most importantly, being away from Washington buffered Grant from the intrusions of politicians. Grant had a straight-ahead approach that brought huge casualties to the army, but ultimately forced the rebels to defensive positions outside Petersburg. (It was in the late war years that the value of entrenchment in combating offensive action became the preferred method of resistance.) Petersburg was a stalemate throughout the remainder of 1864 and early 1865 until the Federals were finally able to sever rebel communications lines and outflank Lee’s lines causing his retreat and ultimate capture at Appomattox.Sears devotes considerable space to the army’s corps and division commanders. He finds most of them wanting in leadership skill. The top command was stacked with political generals, most of whom were ineffective military leaders. (Some of these political generals retained command because of their purported political influence on pending elections, e.g. Butler, Banks and Siegel.) Two of the most promising corps leaders – Reynolds and Sedgwick – were killed. Slocum was reasonably effective; Warren was not; Burnside in a corps command role was not. Overall, the casualty rate among division and brigade leaders was quite high. Sears gives most praise to Winfield Scott Hancock and Philp Sheridan.A fascinating element of this account is the interplay between the military commanders themselves and with the political sphere and the press. There were intense and dysfunctional jealousies among the generals. Their hubris led to undercutting of peers and superiors, often by appeals to political sponsors and directly to the press. We think today of military commanders as being politically neutral and professionally committed to following a chain of command without political intrigue, but this was decidedly not the case during the Civil War years. There were even instances of vague references to military action to depose the “incompetents” in Washington, probably not seriously contemplated but even the rumor is disquieting to consider.A word about Halleck who, since he is a native of my hometown, I have studied. Sears’s treatment of Halleck is fair. Halleck did not live up to expectations Lincoln had for his role as commanding general. Halleck was generally reticent to overrule his field generals, but when he tried to do so was ineffective in having his direction followed. In is interesting to consider that Halleck did not succeed where Lincoln could not, i.e. in getting aggressive actions by McClellan and others. The political atmosphere in Washington was debilitating to Halleck, an atmosphere so charged and vicious that Grant’s decision to stay away from Washington was indeed wise. Halleck ended his war service as largely the administrative chief of the army and as Lincoln’s military adviser, roles that he performed quite well.Although I was not interested so much in the movements of the battles as in Sears’s assessment of the military leaders, I found his descriptions hard to follow. The maps accompanying the battle narratives were not helpful.