Brand Portfolio Strategy: Creating Relevance, Differentiation, Energy, Leverage, and Clarity

CLICK HERE TO SIGN UP

To Tom DeJonghe, a real friend who enhances my life with his remarkable ability to be stimulating, adventurous, enthusiastic, humorous, and fun.

Always design a thing by considering it in its next larger context—a chair in a room, a room in a house, a house in an environment, an environment in a city plan.

—FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT

PREFACE

Firms are motivated to be concerned with brand portfolio strategy because it provides the structure and discipline needed to have a successful business strategy. A brand portfolio strategy that is confused and incoherent can handicap and sometimes doom a business strategy. One that fosters organizational and market synergies, creates relevant, differentiated and energized brand assets, and leverages those brand assets, on the other hand, will support and enable business strategies.

The need to review brand portfolio strategy tends to become acute when the business becomes stressed because of scenarios such as the following:

• A business needs growth to achieve organizational vitality and to realize the objectives of investors. Most growth directions involve either leveraging an existing brand asset and/or creating new brand assets. In either, tools and methods need to be employed to develop and support the strategy.

• A business needs to stay relevant in a dynamic market. Subbrands and endorsed brands can help reduce the risk and difficulty of pursuing a new direction.

• A business is drifting toward being (or has basically become) a commodity, with very few points of differentiation and an emphasis on price. The challenge is to create a brand or brands that can drive differentiation and fit that brand or brands into the brand team.

• A brand has lost energy, perhaps because it is in a mature category. There is a need for a branded program, product, sponsorship, or something to create interest and energy.

• An acquisition or the emergence of several strong brands forces a firm to make tough choices to avoid confusion and waste.

• A firm’s long-standing pride in being decentralized and entrepreneurial has led to a proliferation of brands and subbrands and, as a result, total confusion. Customers and employees alike become frustrated trying to determine not only what the firm stands for in the various product-market settings, but even how to order a product or service. Serious pruning, restructuring, and prioritizing are needed.

• Brand management simply cannot cope with the complexities of the marketplace with the reality of multiple products, segments, geographies, and distribution channels. In one sense, brand portfolio strategy is part of the problem, because the explosion of brands, subbrands, and endorsed brands in organizations spanning a variety of product-markets has inhibited the ability of firms to articulate coherent strategies, much less implement them. It is also part of the solution, though, because a reasoned, articulated brand structure can support a business strategy by replacing waste with synergy, confusion with clarity, and missed opportunities with leveraged assets.

This book will be the first to explicitly define the scope and structure of brand portfolio strategy. It will identify underlying concepts and tools and structure them into meaningful and related groupings. It will also illustrate how brand portfolio strategy can solve very relevant problems facing business strategists, including the following:

How to grow by expanding the product-market scope through brand extensions.

How to participate in value and premium niches with vertical brand extensions.

How to keep your brand relevant while facing a dynamic market where what is being purchased is changing.

How to energize and differentiate your brand using brand portfolio tools.

How to make brand alliances work.

How to leverage the corporate brand.

How to manage the brand issues surrounding corporate restructuring.

How to improve the clarity of the offerings and provide focus to the brand-building activities.

Developing brand portfolio strategy is complex and situation specific. There are no cookbook-style rules that are guaranteed to produce perfect strategies. The purpose of this book is to introduce options and issues, rather than easy answers.

This is my fourth book on brands and brand strategy. The initial book, Managing Brand Equity, was the first effort to define and structure the concept of brand equity. The second book, Building Strong Brands, introduced brand identity, the brand’s aspirational associations, and encouraged managers to look beyond product attributes to brand personality, organizational associations, and brand symbols. The third book, Brand Leadership (written with Erich Joachimsthaler), extended the brand identity concept, discussed global brand management, and showed how to break out of media clutter by developing brand-building programs that extend beyond media advertising.

This book draws on the material relevant to brand portfolio strategy from the other three books. Most notably, Chapters 1 and 2 draw from Brand Leadership, and Chapters 7 and 8 draw from Building Strong Brands and Managing Brand Equity—but even these four chapters are updated with added case studies, new concepts, and new or extended conceptual models. Providing an integrated treatment of brand portfolio strategy has been a major reason for me to write this book. The remaining chapters contain largely new material; in total, there is about a 20 percent overlap with the other three books.

As both a confession and apology, I should note that the topic label has changed. In Building Strong Brands, I wrote of brand systems to emphasize that the portfolio brands must work together to form a coherent whole. However, systems seemed to become an overused engineering term. In Brand Leadership, we changed to brand architecture, a nice metaphor that suggested foundations, structures, roles, relationships, and even the concept of upgrading and refurbishing. Brand architecture was an opaque concept for some, though, and for others suggested the more limited problem of naming brands and developing logos. Thus, in this book a new label, brand portfolio strategy, is used. It is more holistic, strategic, and compatible with the book’s thrust—how to optimize and leverage a brand portfolio to enhance and enable business strategy.

The book includes ten chapters and an epilogue. Chapters 1 and 2 provide a description of the scope of brand portfolio strategy. Chapter 3 examines some inputs that will identify options and issues facing a brand portfolio. How to stay relevant in increasingly dynamic markets is treated in Chapter 4. The tools of branded differentiators and branded energizers are presented for the first time in Chapter 5. Ways to harness the power of brand alliances are discussed in Chapter 6. Growing by leveraging brand assets horizontally and vertically is explored in Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 9 discusses why and how to leverage the corporate brand. Avoiding complexity and confusion is presented in Chapter 10. The epilogue provides a set of 20 takeaways.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am in debt to a host of people. In particular, my colleague at Prophet, Valerie Wilson, was a huge help throughout. She managed the process of getting illustrative material, reviewed all the chapters, helped get others to assist us, and provided incredible support. Her greatest contribution, however, was to challenge ideas, organization, flow, concepts, cases—pretty much everything. Her insight was always productive and resulted in some breakthrough changes.

The Prophet team was extremely helpful. Their consistently brilliant brand portfolio work for many dozens of clients over three continents was both inspirational and informative. Cindy Levine comprehensively reviewed the manuscript and was never shy about pointing out weaknesses and pushing me to rethink ideas. Kevin O’Donnell, with whom I have worked for four years and I know firsthand to be a world-class brand strategist, will see his ideas sprinkled throughout the book. I also received help and suggestions from many others, including Matt Reback, Claudia Fisher-Buttinger, Mike Leiser, Ben Machtiger, Jill Steele, Andy Flynn, Kristiane Blomqvest, Jenni Chang, and Trevor Wade. And I owe a final word of acknowledgment for Prophet CEO Michael Dunn—a friend, gifted brand strategist, and brilliant organization builder who provided encouragement and resources for this project.

I also benefited from interacting with several strategists from Japan. The team at Dentsu’s Brand Creation Center, who have elevated brand strategy in Japan, have been wonderful, stimulating colleagues. I owe a debt to the insight and support of three close friends: Hotaka Katahira, Japan’s brand guru; Toshi Akutsu, the future brand guru of Japan and the translator of this book; and Hiro Takeuchi, the dean of Hitotsubashi.

Several people from a variety of firms helped me with ideas and illustrative figures. Among that group was Susan Rockrise, Rhonda Walker and Todd Peters from Intel, Paul Kein from GE, Matt Ryan from Disney, Tricia Higgins from P&G, Anne MacDonald from Citigroup, Joanne Cuthbertson from Schwab, Akio Asada from Sony, Fiona Rouch from Unilever, Lisa O’Connor and Dee Lu Jackson from Ford, Mike Dwyer from Unilever, Duhe Leslie from UPS, and Al Steffle and Daniel Hachard from Nestlé. A special word of thanks to Matt Ryan of Disney, David Webster from Microsoft, Mary Ann Villanueva from Citigroup, Cindy Vallar from PowerBar, and Scott Helberg from Dell, all of whom generously helped polish brand stories.

I have had the pleasure to work with a host of insightful brand strategists over the years who have stimulated and expanded my thinking. Scott Talgo, who is as good as it gets on branding, gave me some help on this book as he had on the others. Kevin Keller, my research colleague and the author of a superb brand strategy book, helped get me started on branding in the first place. Roberto Alvarez, one of the top brand experts in Europe and the translator of many of my books, has supported me through the years. My friend, colleague, and daughter, Jennifer Aaker, an authority on brand personality and cross-cultural marketing, pushed me to be rigorous in my thinking. My friend and colleague Erich Joachimsthaler, the CEO of Vivaldi Partners (a management consultancy with offices in New York and Germany), helped me develop many of the ideas in the book during the time when we were a consulting team and we created the Brand Leadership book. He is an insightful brand strategist who shares my passion for brands and is a delight to be around. There are many others as well.

My friend Mike Kelly, who runs the Techtel Company, had initial insights that led to my beginning to think about relevance. He and I tested and refined the concept over many bike rides.

This is the fourth brand book that the Free Press has published. Again, it was a superb job. My thanks to my longtime editor and friend, Bob Wallace, who got the book off to a good start and made his usual insightful suggestions as it progressed. Wylie O’Sullivan was incredibly helpful during the whole process, always cheerful even during the several crises that occurred. Dominick Anfuso is a talented and supportive editor. Because of their outstanding work on past books, I requested the help of Chris Kelley, a wonderful copyeditor, and Celia Knight, a special person who kept the production moving and made sure that a host of errors did not get into the final product. They both made significant contributions.

Finally, my thanks to my wife, who allowed me time for yet another writing project, and the rest of my family—Jan, Jolyn, Jennifer, Semantha, Mylee, Devon, and Cooper—who inspire.

PART I

What Is Brand Portfolio Strategy?

CHAPTER 1

BRAND PORTFOLIO STRATEGY

We hire eagles and teach them to fly in formation.

—D. WAYNE CALLOWAY, FORMER CEO OF PEPSICO

You don’t get harmony when everyone sings the same note.

—DOUG FLOYD

Nobody has ever bet enough on a winning horse.

—RICHARD SASULY

THE INTEL CASE

During the 1990s, Intel achieved remarkable success in terms of increase in sales, stock return, and market capitalization.I

Sales of its microprocessors went from $1.2 billion in 1989 to more than $33 billion in 2000. Its market capitalization grew to more than $400 billion in just over thirty years. Intel’s ability and willingness to reinvent its product line again and again—making obsolete business areas in which it had big investments—certainly played a key role in its success. Its operational excellence in creating complex new products with breathtaking speed and operating microprocessor fabrication plants efficiently and effectively was also critical.

Intel’s brand portfolio strategy, however, played a critical role as well. And this brand portfolio strategy could not have emerged without the brilliance of Dennis Carter, Intel’s marketing guru during the 1990s, and the support of Andy Grove at the very top of the organization. Few organizations, particularly in the high-tech sector, are blessed with such assets.

Intel’s brand story really starts in 1978, when it created the 8086 microprocessor chip, which won IBM’s approval to power its first personal computer. The Intel chip and its subsequent generations (the 286 in 1982, the 386 in 1985, and the 486 in 1989) defined the industry standard and was the dominant brand.

In early 1991, Intel was facing pressure from competitors exploiting the fact that Intel failed to obtain trademark protection on the X86 series. These firms created confusion by calling their clone products names like the AMD386, implying that they were as effective as any other 386-powered PC.

To respond to this business challenge, Intel in the spring of 1991 began a remarkable ingredient-branding program (Intel Inside), with an initial budget of around $100 million. This decision was very controversial within Intel—such a large sum of money could have been used for R&D, and many argued that brand building was irrelevant for a firm that only sold its products to a handful of computer manufacturers. Within a relatively short time, however, the Intel Inside logo became ubiquitous, and the program became an incredible success. The logo, shown in Figure 1-1

, has a light, personal touch, as if someone wrote it on an informal note—a sharp departure from the formal corporate logo (Intel with a dropped e).

The Intel Inside program involved a tightly controlled partnership between Intel and computer manufacturers. Each partner received a 6 percent rebate on its purchases of Intel microprocessors, which was deposited into a market development fund that paid for up to 50 percent of the partner’s advertising. (To qualify, the advertising needed to pass certain tests, the main one being to present the Intel Inside logo correctly on product and in the ad.) Computer partners were required to create subbrands for products using a competing microprocessor so buyers would realize that they were buying a computer without Intel Inside. Although the program became expensive—its structure caused the budget to grow to well over $1 billion per year as sales rose—it also created a huge differential advantage over competitors trying to make inroads with computer manufacturers.

The bottom line was that for many years, Intel Inside meant a roughly 10 percent premium on the sales price of a computer featuring the logo. Because of the exposure of the branding program, Intel was given credit for creating products that were reliable, compatible with software products, and innovative, and for being an organization of substance and leadership. All this happened even though most computer users had no idea what a microprocessor was or why Intel’s were better.

There were important secondary benefits. The Intel Inside program caused advertising for computers to explode. Ironically, advertising agencies, at first unhappy having their artistry compromised by foreign logos, became creatively flexible when they realized that advertising billings were going to skyrocket. In addition, the computer partner firms became attached to the advertising allowance; in fact, with margins squeezed, they had a hard time competing without it. The program thus became a significant loyalty incentive for Intel. Intel Inside became one of the most important brands in their portfolio.

In the fall of 1992, Intel was ready to announce the successor to the 486 chip in the face of increasing competitor confusion, even given the Intel Inside campaign. A huge decision loomed. Should the successor be called Intel 586, thereby leveraging the Intel Inside brand and providing a familiar and logical roadmap to customers who had adapted the X86 progression? Or should it be given a new name, such as Pentium? It was a very difficult decision.

Four key issues guided the decision to develop the Pentium brand. First, despite the success of the Intel Inside program, the basic confusion issue would remain if the product was named Intel 586, thanks to market entries such as AMD586. Second, the cost of creating a new brand and transitioning customers to it, although huge, was within the capacity and will of Intel—few new products in any industry are so blessed. The fact that a new brand had news value would make the job easier. Third, the Intel Inside equity and program, rather than being wasted, could be leveraged by linking the two brands. A visual presentation of the Pentium brand was integrated into the Intel Inside logo, as shown in Figure 1-1

; in essence the Intel Inside brand became an endorser for the Pentium brand. Finally, the new product was judged to be substantive enough to justify a new name, even though a new name for every future generation would ultimately be costly and confusing. Because a costly new fabrication plant needed healthy initial demand to pay off, one motivation for the new brand was to signal to customers that the new generation was worth an upgrade.

Intel subsequently developed an improvement to the Pentium that provided superior graphic capability. Rather than naming the chip a Pentium II, or giving it an entirely new name, the branded technology name MMX was added to the Pentium brand (the graphical representation is shown in Figure 1-1

). The Pentium brand would thus have more time to repay its investment, and a new-generation impact could be reserved for a time in which the advance was more substantial. Later generations did emerge, leveraging the Pentium brand and equity with names like Pentium Pro (1995), Pentium II (1997), Pentium III (1999), and Pentium 4 (2000). The advent of the Pentium 4 ushered in a new visual design (shown in Figure 1-1

) to emphasize its newness and to provide a look that suggested substance, reliability, and quality.

Clearly, a crucial, ongoing brand portfolio strategy issue is how to use branding to identify product improvements. When the improvements are minor or involve corrections of prior mistakes, then it is not appropriate or worthwhile to signal a change. When the improvements are significant, the choice lies between a branded feature (like MMX), a new generation (like Pentium III), or a totally new brand (like the replacement of the X86 series with Pentium). The communication cost, the risk of freezing sales of the existing brand, and the degree of preempting the news value of future technological developments will all depend on which of the three brand signals is used.

In 1998 Intel decided that it needed to participate in the market for mid-range and higher servers and workstations. To address this market, Intel developed features that allowed four or eight processors to be linked to supply the power needed for these higher-end machines. A branding issue then arose. On one hand, the Pentium brand was strongly associated with lower-end personal computers for homes as well as businesses, and as such it would not be regarded as suitable for servers and workstations. On the other hand, the market would not support developing yet another standalone brand alongside Intel Inside and Pentium. The solution was to introduce a subbrand, the Pentium II Xeon. The subbrand distanced the new microprocessor enough from Pentium to make it palatable for the higher-end users. It had the secondary advantage of enhancing the Pentium brand. Another practical consideration was that the use of the Xeon name by itself had some trademark complications that disappeared when it was merged with the Pentium II name.

In 1999 another problem—or opportunity—emerged. As the PC market matured, a value segment emerged, led by some Intel competitors eager to find a niche and willing to undercut the price points of the premium microprocessor business. Intel needed to compete in this market, if only defensively, but using the Pentium brand (even with a subbrand) would have been extremely risky. The solution was a stand-alone brand, Celeron, that was not directly linked to Pentium (as Figure 1-1

shows). The brand-building budget, like that of many value brands, was minimal: the target market found the brand, rather than the other way around.

A decision was made to link the Celeron to Intel Inside, so there was an indirect link to Pentium. The trade-off was the need for the Intel endorsement to provide credibility to Celeron, versus the need to protect the Pentium brand from the image tarnishment of the lower-end entry.

In 2001, the Intel Xeon processor was introduced with the logo shown in Figure 1-1

. Several factors combined to allow the subbrand to step out from behind the Pentium brand. Technological advances such as NetBurst architecture rather dramatically improved the processor’s power, and now that the Xeon brand had been established it was thus more feasible to support it as a stand-alone brand (the initial trademark issues over the use of the brand name had been resolved). Finally, the target market became even more important to Intel, and having a brand devoted to it became a strategic imperative.

That same year, the Itanium processor was introduced as a successor to the Pentium series. Why not call it the Pentium 5? The processor had been built from the ground up with an entirely new architecture, with 64-bit power (as opposed to the 32-bit Pentiums) based on a branded design termed Explicitly Parallel Instruction Computing (EPIC). Capable of delivering a new level of performance for high-end enterprise-class servers, a new name was needed to signal that this processor was qualitatively different than the Pentium. The logo for the second generation of Itanium is shown in Figure 1-1

.

In 2003, Intel introduced the Intel Centrino mobile technology, which provided laptops with enhanced performance, extended battery life, integrated wireless connectivity, and thinner, lighter designs. Its promise is to fundamentally affect personal lifestyles and business productively by enabling people to unconnect, to Unwire Your Life. The new Centrino logo (shown in Figure 1-1

) reflects the Intel vision of the convergence of communication and computing, and it also represented a new approach to product development. Rather than simply pushing the performance envelope, for this product Intel responded to real customer needs as determined by market research.

The most dramatic element of the Centrino logo is its shape, a sharp departure from the rectangular design family that preceded it. The two wings suggest a merger of technology and lifestyle, a forward-looking perspective, and the freedom to go where you will. The magenta color used for the Centrino wings balances the Intel blue and visually provides energy and excitement while suggesting a connection between technology and passion, logic and emotions. The Intel Inside logo has evolved as well. More precise, sophisticated, and confident, it now provides a link to the classic dropped-e Intel corporate logo and reflects a world in which the positives of the corporate connection and the loyalty program can be dialed up.

Intel used its brand name to enter other business areas. One of the most important was in the communications sector. A branding problem common to any firm with a strong well-defined brand is that it is confining; Intel is so closely associated with microprocessors and Pentium that creating credibility in other areas can be a challenge. Subbrands and branded components can help combat this problem. Intel operates an important segment of its business under the brand Intel Network Processor, with the Intel Inside brand nowhere to be found. In addition branded components such as the Intel Xscale microarchitecture processor (which provides the ability to tailor a general-purpose processor to specific tasks, avoiding the need for special-purpose processors) are developed.

Intel over the years has purchased many firms, and in each case it has had to make judgments about what to do with the brands that accompanied those firms. Retaining the brands in their present roles would capitalize on their equity and the customer relationships that they represented, while dropping them would allow for transferring the business areas to the Intel brand or one of the brands in the Intel portfolio. Finally, another role could be found for the brands, perhaps as a subbrand for a defined segment or as a value brand.

For example, in 1999 Intel bought Dialogic, a company providing building blocks relevant to the converging Internet and telecommunication markets. The new organization was initially Dialogic, an Intel company, but then changed to become a product brand within the Intel Communication Systems Products organization (for example, Intel Dialogic Boards).

FIGURE 1-1 INTEL’S BRAND ROLES EXPRESSED V ISUALLY

It is clear that a host of critical brand portfolio decisions were made at Intel. New brands enabled the firm to address competitive threats and enter new markets. The relationships between brands were particularly important in defining new and transitioning business arenas, while the umbrella Intel Inside brand provided an essential synergetic force in the portfolio. Many of the branding decisions were difficult and internally controversial. But again and again, the portfolio structure reflected and enabled the business strategy, thereby enhancing the firm’s chance to succeed. At times, it influenced the market environment and actually defined product categories. In doing so, Intel’s effort to position itself as a differentiated leader brand was enhanced.

Too often, the implicit assumption is made that brand strategy involves the creation and management of a strong brand like HP, Viao, 3M, Ford, or Tide. Yet virtually all firms face the portfolio challenges created by multiple brands. Intel, for example, has a host of important brands, including Intel Inside, Pentium, Xeon, Centrino, Xscale, and Dialogic. For too many firms, the management of their portfolio is often deficient or nonexistent, despite the fact that there is often a huge competitive upside to getting it done better.

There are at least five reasons why understanding and managing the brand portfolio can be a key to both the development of a winning business strategy and its successful implementation. First, a portfolio in which each brand executes a clear role can create competitively decisive synergies. A key element of brand portfolio management is to make sure that each brand has a well-defined scope and role(s) to play in each context in which it is expected to contribute. Another is to make sure that the brands, acting within their roles, actively reinforce and support each other to provide a consistent synergistic team. Looking at brands as stand-alone silos is a recipe for suboptimization and inefficiency.

It is like an American football team with dozens of people playing different positions, each with its own role. On the defensive line, there are pass rushers and run stoppers. The strong safety has a different role to play than the free safety. The outside linebacker’s role differs from that of the middle linebacker. One of the coach’s jobs is to place each player in the right position. The very best offensive lineman may fail as a defensive lineman, just as a great endorser brand may make a weak master brand in a particular context. Another coaching task is to teach technique and create drills to make sure that each player plays up to his capabilities. On successful teams, every player is assigned to a role in which he can succeed, understands the role, and is well prepared to execute that role. Brands similarly need to be placed in roles to which they are suited, and given the resources needed to succeed.

The football team also needs to work together, with players executing in tandem to achieve success. The defensive line needs to work with the linebackers, and the linebackers with the defensive backs, to reflect the strategy that is in the game plan. Often the team that best works together wins, rather than the most talented team. The successful coaches strive to make teamwork a priority and make sure that individuals do not focus on their statistics to the detriment of the team. Similarly, strategic brand leadership requires that brand team goals be optimized as well as those of the individual brand players.

Second, a portfolio view can ensure that the brands of the future get the resources they need to succeed. In a silo organization, high-potential brands are often starved of resources, in part because their business is still small. The assignment of clear brand roles will help guide brand-building resources in the most productive directions to create future brand assets.

On any successful football team, coaches will devote the most resources to impact players and potential future impact players. The 320-pound freshman tackle, for example, may be a weak performer now, but could be a star if given extra coaching and opportunities to play. A sophomore who already plays well may have the potential to become a dominant force on the field if properly trained and motivated. The star player can, with work, become even better. High-potential brands need similar attention and resources; all brands and all brand roles are not created equal.

Third, understanding the perspectives, tools, and methods of brand portfolios can enable organizations to address competitive challenges by adjusting strategies. One branding challenge is to maintain or recapture points of differentiation and energy, without which a branded offering will be vulnerable. Portfolio tools such as subbrands and branded features can provide avenues to achieving this goal. Responsive strategies to create or maintain relevance within a market that is changing (perhaps at a rapid rate) can be enabled by the use of subbrands, endorsed brands, or co-brands, or by the development of new brand platforms. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will detail the portfolio approach to these challenges.

A football team may need to adapt when it senses a deficiency. If, for example, a weakness is found among the offensive linemen, a team response might address the problem. A new player might be acquired from another team, or perhaps a strong defensive lineman might be shifted to offense. An adjacent lineman could be called on to compensate by playing a different role, or the offensive strategy could be changed to make the point of vulnerability less visible. The brand portfolio needs to be similarly flexible and dynamic to respond to dynamic markets.

Fourth, strategic growth challenges can be addressed through portfolio tools. Virtually all organizations eventually run into a wall and need to find new sources of growth. Strategically, this usually means entering new markets, offering new products, or moving into upscale or value arenas. Any such strategy will need to be enabled with brand assets, however, whether by leveraging existing brands (perhaps with the use of subbrands or endorsed brands) or acquiring or developing new brands. Chapters 7 and 8 will discuss the brand portfolio as a device to enable growth.

A football coach needs to have a vision of the team’s style, character, and strategy. Will it be a finesse or power team? Will it emphasize passing, running, or defense? Has it assembled the right set of players to execute the strategy? It is not enough to have the best players; a team must have the players that fit its strategy. A brand portfolio likewise will need to develop brands that will enable the business strategy.

Winning football coaches will fully exploit the talents of their players. If a team has an outstanding linebacker, the defense might be designed so that opposing running backs are funneled to that linebacker. If a defensive back is extremely fast, he might be asked to also play wide receiver at times, to get him on the field so that he can make plays. An offensive tackle might add size to the defensive front in goal-line situations. Similarly, a key of portfolio management is to identify key facets of strong brands and leverage them through brand extensions and added role responsibilities.

Fifth, an offering can get too complex, confusing customers and even employees. The result can be damaging to the customer relationship. More visibly, it can cause waste in brand-building efforts because the message is too cluttered to be retained. Chapters 9 and 10 will discuss ways to gain focus and clarity in the brand portfolio.

A football team can easily create an offensive strategy that provides so many options, and counters so many competitor actions, that it ends up confusing the team. The players end up thinking so much about the complexity that they do a poor job of their more basic tasks of running, blocking, and passing. Simplifying the offense—reducing it to a few basic plays that are well executed—can result in dramatic performance improvements.

Brand portfolio strategy becomes especially critical as brand contexts are complicated by multiple segments, multiple products, varied competitor types, complex distribution channels, multiple brand extensions, and the wider use of endorsed brands and subbrands. Brands such as Coca-Cola, Bank of America, Procter & Gamble, HP,