1 J 4 5 15

Instructors Reading this Documet; Sign Below Name (Fil Date _

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS A. P. O. 650

314. ? SUBJECT:
TO

27 Se^te.nber 1945 H i s t o r i c a l Documents. Commanding General, Command & General Staff Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. School,

1. Forwarded herewith i s Part I I I of the History of 'Am A. A.J'. , covering the period 9 Play 1945 15 October 1945, 2. Part I I I constitutes to epilogue to the history, dealing p r i n c i p a l l y with redeployment in AAF/i<IT0, but con sidering also the dissolution of combined commands and the closing and consolidation of American headquarters leading to the discontinuance of Headquarters, JLAF/MTO. For the Commanding General:

C; '0. BAIRD, JR. Colonel, A G D Adjutant General 1 Incl: As above.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS A. P. O. 650

27 September 1945
t f

SUBJECT;
TO ;

H i s t o r i c a l Documents.
Conunandirxg G e n e r a l , CJomraand & G e n e r a l 3 t a f f School,

F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas, 1. Forwarded herewith la P a r t I I I of the History of M, At Al!'it, oovering the period 9 May 1945 15 October1946. 2. P a r t I I I c o n s t i t u t e s to epilogue to the h i s t o r y , dealing p r i n c i p a l l y with redeployment i n AAF/MTOf but oon^ 1doring also the d i s s o l u t i o n of combined commands and tho closing and consolidation of American headquarters leading to the discontinuance of Headquarters, AAF/MTO. For the Commanding Generals

1 Inol:

As above.

C. 0 SAT.AD, JH. Oolonel, MB Adjutant General

i iftS,

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEHH r^ E_ 1 I I ' SABS.

mm

.M.

^mk

ALLZBD AI&

9> Max

in

PREFACE

The following narrative and the accompanying four

volumes of supporting documents ooapplae Fart I I I of the history of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Parts I

and XI told the story from the date of M A activation* A *a ' 10 December 1943* to the end of the European war on 8 Hay IMo* Part III constitutes the epilogue to the story>

covering- redeployment* clean-up and dlsbandment of the command and oi AAlVHTO. Pages* chapters, and supporting voluutes BP numbered consecutively throughout the three parts* # In redeployment this Headquarters was Tar less basic directives

than usual a policy-making organizations

were promulgated in Washington and implemented by Theater circulars. The energies of the Army Air Force in the

Theater were absorbed, in th lore anonymous but none the loti-s J3Stntl2 iaslci ol over*13 >lannlni with h l ^ e r levels of command* of detailed planning with lower levels* and ot coordinating efiorts on a l l levels. Much of the work

which went Into these tasks cannot be shown directly* lait I t Is reflected in the over*all s t a t i s t i c s on the redeployment of the Mr force, and i t will be shown indirectly in the histories of subordinate Army Air Force commands.

'

3#

Since the inception of t h i s study an event has

occurred which ha changed the whole complexion of the world s i t u a t i o n i n which Redeployment w so v i t a l a f a c t o r & Since tfJ Day the ei&phasis i n the program ha been slraplitle and the o b j e c t i v e is now to r e t u r n personnel to the United S t a t e s and to r e l e a s e them as e^pedltiously as p o s s i b l e . This study, however, has r e t a i n e d i t s o r i g i n a l emphasis, for whatever i s to be learned about redeployment must be learned from an examination of the long- and short-range* planning! of the dlrctiVv38, and of the actual redeployment of personnel, u n i t e , and equipment. 4 Five copies, ol" t h i s h i s t o r y have oeen prepared, This

of which only the f i r s t i s supported by documents.

flvevolume master copy i s being dispatched to the A0 H i s t o r i c a l Archives i n Washington* Distribution of the

carbon copies l a as f o l l o v e s - l ) Hq AA&'/MTO; 2) L t , Gen, I>a C S&kerj 3) Command & General staff School, F r r t # Leavenworth, Kansas; 4) Air Ministry, London.

ALdSRT H6XIK Major, Air Cterpa Historian Gaserta, Italy 1M5

111

-- L

HXSTOHX Of M.A.A.F. 9 Hay 1048 . 15 October 1945

>EX 01 C Ohapter XXX Chapter X X

UNITS mnt ptGV X I I Chapter XXI11 FINALS

PLANKING

Fag 421
Page 437

Ol S SUIPMSST

Page 458
Page 468

OOHfAOTS WITH FAR BASfEHS

IAT

8f

108

Pag 4?3
Page 506

IV

'

' *

'

"

3 Kay 1948 ,. 15 October 1945

IfflMBX OF ANNgXR.8

Volume I I Velum LIV

NARRATIVE

3 A Including ?j 1) 2) .3) 4) 5) 6) 7} <'.>.* AM', KTOUSAi AAF/MTO s i g n s l e correspondence on Redeployment Planning A I Policies and Procedures A and l e t t e r s (0) 55-3 Committee reports on ' jf Planning Oi policies ana Procedure*? l e t t e r s with Annexe? tnclosures and I / i oorres-pondenae on Personnel ' and special Reports on fraining ty i ar coofflitteei in K O T Oerreepondenoeon Pre-R D^y merit
taoltidlftg

Volume LV

EBBSPLOXHSKf DXHBOrZVGSi

1) 3) 4) LVI
1} 2)

D Readjustment Fiegulationsi R 1-1 H through nk 1-6 with changes m \emr*totiMm$ * MTOUSA Redeployment through 16 with g tJSA Supply a Surplus Property directive a A i ./. "i- Section Keportfl A1%Q General O r d e r s oo tublned oo u;.iarid8 \ MTOUSA and AAt'/MTO X n a c t i ^ t i o n l e t t e r * ^ ifeneral Orders \ AAf/MTO General Orders Special Orders 01;; t l B 11 eal Oontrol Oharta rio 3 i p2 o y e n t F o re oaf t

3) 4) 5) Vj 1) 8)

IW ial ...

IS

VT V

XIX

'3-

Preamble* tfben on 14 M y 1946 Redeploymant .Day a The pol

was declared, M Ol A became an inactive theater. T iS

i c i e s and procedures Tor redeployment and readjust -rant of the Army which then became eiieetive were those prescribed in theater redeployment circulars and in War Department cir culars, a l l of which are append.?! to this study. The fact thftt final directives emanated from other

than Air Force headquarters tends to obscure the very active part which those headquarter played in the planning of re deploy lent both in the field and in Washington. The deep

concern and the active part which & T T had in the entire M/ O M matter of p o e t - h o s t i l i t i e s arrangements i s reflected in a l e t t e r of 9 October 1944 from general Raker to the Chief of Air Staff. 0 that l e t t e r refers to the assistance which

AAfe/ f O had given in redeployraent study and planning in T Washington and reemphasizes oonsideratlins which* in the opinion of the General* closely tied redeployment policy to the successful prosecution of the war in the Far East, 5 That Same persistence in subordinating every other

consideration to it bearing on the war against Japan i s evident in the inter-theater investigations and reports sponsored by the various Air Force and the mutual exchange of ideas and information involved therein. These reports

1.

FX 73210 from Ci: # M O S to 15 Arrny Group, A-^/MTO e T UA al## 12 M y 1^45 l i s t e d applicable regulations, 3ee a Tolurne LXV. knmxes, In general, follow the sequence established in the text, out Headjuatnent Hegulatinns and M O S Circulars have been brought together in one T UA Volume.

2. -421

? n
. i

dealt in large ^ a s u r e with oondiNsidras-likely &> be en* countered by redeploying unite and with training for their theaters of destination. 3 4. But a l l these reports were of relatively l a t e origin ana secondary in importance to the task of working out polioiee and plans in anticipation of formal directives* I t i s difficult to say when such plans were not in vi@w Certainly by late 1943 the Mr Forces were already consider ing poat~hostllitl$g problems of various kinds* and by February planning for redeployment had begun to take v i s i ble form, b rom that time tor^avd communication was so constant and planning wa so aotive en a l l levels that i t i s difficult to show the development in any ordered sequence* Some of the more salient aspects of that planning can be Indicated. 5* The tfaylor Committee, On 1? February 1944 Colonel Joseph W Saylor and a committee of of I leers sent out ivom # th Gomraitmenta and Requirements Branch of the A F Bead* A quarters in Washington reported to th Commanding General* Army Air Forces* Mediterranean Theater of Operations. One of the primary tasks of this group was to collect inform** tion in this Theater* &n& snake recommendations on the basis of local conditions which would be useful to staff officers in Washington charged with the responsibility of planning the redeployment of European a i r forces at the time of the capitulation of Germany. At the tin of their arrival a "Proposed Ultimate Troop Basle Aftefr Capitulation of Ge* many11 had already been worked out for "North Africa* as of 9 February* and by 23 February they were able to corktribute toward the development of a rough schedule for 5 redeployment of t a c t i c a l organisations.
3# 4. 5. See Chapter XXIX * See Volume LIV7 I b i d . * Memorandum* General I . H. Edwards to Chief of ,~ ' and attached schedule. ^ n .^''-.- H RL E
1

fills committee spent some time in the Mediter

ranean and European Theaters* returning to the United States about 1 April to submit an official report to the 6 War Department. In his report Colonel Baylor summarised the steps he had taken with regard to redeployment under the terms of his directives U) H had obtained a l i s t e

of units which on the basis oi present plane would remain in the Theater a l t e r the defeat of Germany, He had also

obtained detailed tabulations showing unite in this Theater* date of departure from the United States* present assign ments and duties, ability to move quickly to another theater* (2) Colonel Baylor further set up a tentative procedure In this

for prooee ing and trans-shipment of 4Af units.

connection he had made arrangeaents with the s t a t i s t i c a l Control Unit to keep a current tabulation of units in the Theater ana to supply the War Penartment with up-to-date information oi the kind described in (1) above. 7# The report recommended that two officers Xpert

in these matters be supplied Headquarters AAP/HfQ by.the War Department to help in furnishing aooarate Information in the form which would be most helpful to both the Theater and 'the War Department when the time oarae for making del in* i t e redeployment plane and implementing them, 8 In the meantime the War Department was occupied

with, outlining the general polioiee to govern- redeployment plans 9, The A F Planning. Menoran^uai, 'The principlee A

governing the redeployment o the Army Air Forces were set forth in a memorandum of ? April 1944 which had as i t s problem *To outline and recom-;en<! policies and ^rooe^ure^

to be used by the A i in ltaplenenting a r^lan for the re A ?

6.

The Baylor Report was not available in full during the preparation of this feA -423

...,;-' 4 " v ' v

V"J

of MM units and personnel after the i&ftkfl pi Germany,a with the idea of getting as many effective

u n i t s from t h i s Theater a speedily a possible* the memo @ randum set forth, certain assumptions and policies as a basis fa* planning both In Washington and out in the Thea ters. 6'or planning purposes i t waa assumed that V Day would Xn addition to this ana other assumptions*

be 1 October 1^44.

p o l i c i e s , and procedures, in Tab *A* estimates of strength of a l l type of aircraft were shown along with speciflo numbers to go to the various theaters at specified strength* 10f A F Letter (C) 55-3, 10 April 1944,tf designated A

the &bov ''leraorandluni the approved AAJ? policy for implement ing JCJS 531/&, and on 19 Hay the War Department forwarded the outline, which had been approved l o r planning purposes* ;$ 'with the "Jr'irst Edition of the Redeployment S . QX AM' Unit i o r Planning Purposes. " From April 1 :*44 u n t i l

February l'i*45 this directive, as modified to aeet current situations, w the guide lor most oi the redeployment a planning In the 4rraj Air B'oroe. !! As directed in the above-mentioned l e t t e r and

the 1st Indorsement ot M T U A 25 May, A^/^TO having A0 5 * consulted i t s ^najor elements* compiled and submitted on 50 June the f i r s t of a series o data sheets In the form of the "Redeployment Schedule's including numerical 10 ' ignatlnns* This i s ^ivan as an instanoe of the

pendence of a l l echelons of the Air Forces in the planning oi redeploy>ient nd the peculiar, iriportance of ?. i 9* 10f f/$
f

"Policies and Procedures lor HeAeployf.oent of Army Air f#90Hi " 3ee Volume LIV, "Policies end! Prooedurea for Hefle^loyroent of Arny Air Forces. 8 See Volu:ae UIV Inclosuras to Letter OPD 320*2 fS (8 May 1344), He deploywent o Arriiy Air Forces Unite Upon the Defeat of Oer^any.rt Bee Volume LIV# Under cover of Latter 320,3, *fleaeployment of Army Air Forces Upon Defeat of Germany. * Bee Volunie LIV*
-434

- -.,7

intermediary position. In the l e t t e r inclosing the t mentioned schedule, General Saker oomrsenued on the importance oi- rest and refitting in the United Statei as a morale factor, on the desirability ot redeploying intact units headquarters which had bo en wording together, and on the T success which MG had experienced in the iiloilian and Kith two-echelon movements, HeannhiXo the l a t e s t approved policies of A 9 h*d been embodied in a Memorandum from General A P a t r i c k w. Tinberlafcei Deputy Cfaief of Air Staff# x'or General Eaker tfhlch outlined staff action to be trken under the headings Personnel, I n t e l l i g e n c e , Operations,"and 11 Supply And on fedtieeday, 14 June, & meeting was hold &t Headquarters AAF/MTC on both t h i s plan and the proposed <$uling ox unite X'or redeployment Present were rep re*

e e n t s t i v e e of the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces an 1 the

AAi? Service I . -r. ginring : tandsi .*

th general nr cure of the o v e r - a l l plan fry l a t e

June i s summed up i n a nesaage iro;n General Arnold to ^4 June l->4.4, which rea-?. in. parti

3nt proposed plans are> upon the defeat of Oermany, to return to the United States 35l/3jt of a l l units in the European &> --diterranean Theaters n* for tho U.3 Strategic Reserve, have an oooup&tinnal foroe -aaintalneti, of approadmately 20 groups, whltih will be selected fro;; your Theater and ?5TO, and re deploy the rest of the units to active theaters. This plan of redeployment will make i t possible to 3or$en units and reassign personnel so that the wajo* ity of war-weary personnel oan be concentrated In certain specific units, the veteran units would then be returned to the U.S. Strategic aeserve where* proper leaves and furloughs and readjustments of personnel can take place. "The personnel to remain as an occupational force should oe that which hai had the next longest tour of duty in your theater, thus you would re deploy to ootabat theaters thst nerunnel, ground a'ir# which h#8 had the ahorteet tour of tfuty.
11. "Action to be t s k e n by the Cornaand General of 4 i r t o roe 8 i n STO and KfOi" IS Hay 1^4-. ^ee Volume L I ? . See Volume WTi -435-

14

Thug by Bummer 1

-lans Tor redeployftient

Otgan tn take form!

preliminary p o l i c i e s had been laid

the two important Batters 01 apportioning able unit strength to active theaters an<3 of adjusting personnel no re already In the foreground of planning a l i i had been formed for planning on the ooramana! l e v e l .
15

flfe* Machinist-Qrane report,

on 8 June 1944

General Arnold wired Oenernl Saker that In aooordanae with Colonel 3aylor*s reoo tion to the War Department he

WtmXd HKe to aencl out two ofiioera, Lt. Colonel Milton 'Machinist and Hajor tf*d9 Orne, f o r the purpose of a

ing sind maint&iniag ^rmy Air Force- information neoesaary to ae kept currently aradlabl to this Headquarters for t Implementation of redeployment p l a n s . * General SaJ

oonourred in the euggeatlori and Colonel Machinist aad, Major Gran arrived in tl ifl theater eaJ?l5 In July ./ith a .aireotive i'rom the Offioe of the C3hief of Air ^taff. graph it) ol the l e t t e r defines In ;;.- 1 the duties of

"Xn general, your niesion i s to exnmlne the plans* procedures & < ;ae.chinery established and n3 h O d i p the Oosssanding Orenerv.l# ^ray ' l ^ Foroes# lleilterrane&fi Theater f operation* to die ib the latter of rtdeploymeat ol Army Air Foroefl Unite to other theaters of Operation on the flefe^t of dermanyj and obtain uoh information aa will provide this Headquarters with a sound and reliable l i e Tor both current ^eoleionB an^ future plane l o r redeployTtent CL tem$ Air Foroes Units in other phases of the present war, You will -mice such re* oomaeadationa to this R < tartera with respect to plans! proceduree and Machinery en all phae of reder>loynent or 4riy Air Fordti Units in the i?eflit errahoan Ther ter ol Dperationi ai your stufly ;'nay indicate to be Aediraole* iurther* you w i l l famil la r i s e yourself in general with the current problems afieoting AAF/tTO which, by their nature relate to redeployment of Ar^y Air Foroe Units and report thereon" to t h i s Headquarters, H" 16, Oolonel Machinist found that some of the prin

cipal Air Force eoamandfl had already sub fitted preliminary 13* 14 IfARX 476281 See VolttBS IiY. Letter # "Mission to Theater of Operations 11 , 21 June 1944 Se Volume LIV -426

3 ;:

plane on re deploy -tent, bused apparently on tHe 1 * ?--.y-:i.. BfcBoranama i o r General Kaker. He en , . In a series cf sections

oonferenoee with a l l general ?-TK\ special stafi

;

in Headquarters, AAF/ T i ' was a&Le to pass on to Obi* p. P. Leseig a pre *eport on 12 July 1944* That

r -ort covered AAF/WO sftntirnts r

ireening* e tagingj

KOVmnt d i r e c t i v e s , movement i^y wingsf logistlo&l prob }5 . other raatter. On 21 July Col. Haohiniet and ajo* "> m z out to v i s i t the 17 lajor oc i i rids* aoblaist eeat =->aok a

On 10 Aaguet 1 "'-' ODlonel

detailed report to the Ohiel of Air Staff summarizing the statue of redeploy ent planning in the Kediterrftneaa fbti 36 ter# At that time i t looked ac t>iough th defeat ol any might be aooorapliehed during the autuan# The tone of the report reflects the urgency ot the time and opens with suggestions l o r 'mere iirsn and definite Alreotives from the War
;

irtsient" to enable the staffe ! erely tentative

. resprneible to sake definite infcte plane* 18*

The original A F rae loran^uai of 7 April 1944 had A l i o l e e i but by the any ! the aesumptioni

been dttf 5.lev. in I t s ttfi8u?3ptionfl .end of the BUI aer i t wae t3 t t

shouln be ssodifled ana t i m e d into definite instnioti-

Ae they etood they Sl^l not take c/.re of a l l oontlngenolea and were too f r a i l ft foundation upon which to ere at the f i n a l structure. The following concrete tuggeetiona ior r Department were l i s t e d la Para

firm dlrectlvee vy the graph 1 of the reports

rt

a.

Actual unit requirements for r to the i?ar Eastern Theaters.

15 # 16.

Informal Memorandum. See folant Letter 200.3 "Mission11 to Arny Air Fnroes*
3e volume LIV
of Operations.
-427

b.

Yardsticks to f a c i l i t a t e an adjustment of personnel among unit organisations with a view towards returning certain categories of w&r-weary personnel in units er<parked fo* the strategic reserve in the United States. Require "tent a and plan lor P M inspectors O of u n i t s b moved* *

c.

lift

One ot the headaches, of redeployment planning was

the conflict between methods of redeploying units as a whole anri individuals within the units. tft basis of screening

individual8 was one of the si&jor concerns of planners and the Kaohlnlst report emphasizes the necessity Tor a firm War Dep&rtaent decision on methods ot catenarizing personnel. The report also makes r*emendations en the factors to be considered In adjusting personnel* farther in regard to

personnel the report outlines the f a c i l i t i e s and data either existing or planned, to f a c i l i t a t e the screening of personnel when definite instructions? giro received from the War Depart ment* 20. On the operational side ol redeployment* the

request of the Fifteenth Air Fore that the integrity of the Wing organizations be laintained insofar as possible when the move was ;;:R&e required synchronization with tlie problems oi individual redeployment. Trie recommendation was m d a

bear use I t was i"elt Chat the organisational structure of the wing and I t s service units would be rreserved and the wing be operationally effective in the new theater almost upon arrival* The Bormle ol the constituent units was another In the same con

strong factor which favored this doctrine.

nection i t was suggested that service units which had been associated with specific combat units oe moved at the same priority level in order that they might continue to serve t h e i r oo!3tw>t units* The *-lurrying* of service and comb- t The Theater fur

outfits was considered highly desirable.

ther suggested that the War Department OPII for units by

-428

type and number of units required rather than request ?oeci f l c groups or wings by numerical designation. The report

l i s t s these and other suggestions for the Wnr !>e"oart^>u.t to consider in se&lng up Us final directive to tie Theater and explains the machinery which had been set up in A fM O A/ T to keep up-to-date information on unit designation** troop basis* and shipping requirements available for use when directives are issued and aotive redeployment co.'n-jencea. Colonel [aohlnlst enn Nta^or Orane had been, i n

structs ' b their *irectiv<5 to investigate the or^aniza* y tlenal seVup in A^/MTO in i t s relation to re deploy swat pttoi&eme* Their verdict was that though there were oertain

exoeptiona to standard Tablea ot Organisation end Squlpisinf these would not unduly interfere with smooth operation of redeployment pi ana* The no i>-standard units wore designated

to meet conditions peculiar to the t h e a t e r and could be reorganised quickly and e a s i l y in t! I >erlod between G&S& t i o n o t h o s t i l i t i e s and actual stovement of troops 22. o | only a superficial inveetlgation of the problem ' i aiproent , / detailed report

was the duty or another age nay.

A-4 kMf/WSC -':- compiler? complete

However i t ^as noted that

data on t h e s h i p p i n g

tonnages involved in the movement oi unite from this Theater to a new one, and the document with t h i s information was appended to the Machinist report. In a3'Ution tc tfeis data

& few generr,liz-?itionfi were ade on -atters the War D6part~ ment might consider in i t s plannlnj ZZm Brief mention was t & e of other factors a A redeployment: affecting

Stp.glftf and Movement! Inspeoti^n, ana Tr^iiv*

ing* tfith r8gard to the xlrst* i t was considered that t--e Theater S S Should continue to carry the res-nonsibillt.y for O operating Staging Areas because of their experience and the available f a c i l i t i e s . P M Inspection i s tiie province ot O

"' ^2 C ! / ill., J "

' :? -i

['; ?!

k .

the Tneater A i r Inspector G e n e r a and FCM l i t

be d l r e o t l y responsible U- Mm* In general the overall d i t i o n ot AM u n i t s in t.-.ie Theater was eatiefaotory an

iir

- -

/roblo/ns */re to rje

$ted

Oolonel

9] i n

1 s t aiid Itajor Gran reoom en&e<a thi t persona e x p s r i e n o e d i n ombat fcaotloa In OBI and tto I , n i o T h e a t e r s bouia be

sent to t r l s Theater to eat Klist a t r unl / oheaulod t o r i p bao aoc ' . TI The ber# '

a lor
B

l a clr slngj the report 1 H : lhat

baed on a

ad ol exparienoe obtained during many movements Llshed in this Theateri i t le generally believed t h a t

redeployment ohould not present anj problems toe d l f f i o u l t tc overc m once an overall redeploy.'.at .plani including a df basis for . .; bment oi ver^cnnei, hi tea

ed by the Har Depertment* * K Toli^t P l a n n i n g AAJ7 g . ._ . deneral I#

rdSi Deputy 06amander# AAfc/MTO i n an indorsement to

Hie aboT# l l Augusti asserted that ^eadquarteri AAi/;TO wae In e s s e n t i a l agreement with the i ohlniet-Orane report

on redeployment matters* but pointed &ut the desirability of . integration of redeployment planning ol1 a l l Ar ,
Air Foroea u n i t G blng a g & i n e t Germany* k>ae

Intention had b^en Indloated as early as the maiBor&ndus) of 7 April In whioh STO was defined aa Including t o t h ti ittVOpean arid .'le^lt^rranean Tl.es-terai though khere was noth 1., 1..; 6 a to Indicate dei'initely more than General Arnoia'3 l e t t e r 19 oi ci^. Jun had l e f t U831Mi in doubt Upon the p o i n t . .iy 3 Augueti however* General a 9p; sits and S tod oonolude^ that the necessary or-, p<51 nation couli be ettooted 17. 18. 19 # only by oentrallaing in USSTiff ':'-.vrters the n for planning prpoee

See a i a n t a r x See Volume LIV. <J U3br/a- -Jo ?-ants and Heoon lendatloM on Redeployment Problems," 19 July 1944i

control and planning l o r redeploy tent of a l l A F unftY A a t l n g against; Europe.~ Oi t i ;ie over,.:,;; ft, ? .i ..-. ,:r, -,: based Ln

- '-t;

latter o e^uit&aly redeploying persoanel on the >.-:.sia X usneml "moid, i . - ^ i . U : ] , ; aakaowledged Shat the *
rt

proposed c e n t r a l i z a t i o n was being oosi< AM planning l e t t e r ox1 15 August s t a t e d , li terrains an Theaters oi Operation

Indeed the

The Suropean i I

U oeuo:;a$ one th^/.t^r He^erthelese i t

under unified comsuand en or before ^ day# *

was x*uietf oa 30 September that U3S1 . ana WU?VMTOi the* t o r o idersi woulc3. oe responsible Qoordination of

C redeployment oi' A I u n i t s under feheir oom A e l i a i s o n f o r planning waa reoommeMe^. e f f o r t in planning re diplouiatlot p o l l t i o a l f Ined fc&e order of the lay thrcujd^cut llltax3r advantages of a co-ruined Inj of the two

the planning periodi thoug] ,.;.> in in the spring of 1Mb t l w ae well as the oonsequent saving in manpower 3 8ra3 Eisenhower to reooas '.no th t e r ^ upon the cessation oi eombi ted c e r ; ,. u L iTO# n The force ot General ^oKarne2rf opinion that the merger not feaaibl jocaueo i t woul^ delay redeployment in MO J 25 howevert to r^v^nt i t sxieotuati t t i WMlo a. deoiiion on this nsatter waa 8 t i l l In abeyance n the iaahlniet report wae In >reparatloni t;

. fting of plans ontinue^ ai oe In both theatera on the basis oi oxlstifig directive? andf in faot# on a hi;.:;Va:/ 20 # UX 6SS06, tr Arnold infor W t e r from Spaa12. See Volume LSV ^1* VJC-T5601i fcc ISA e^t a l . i r o .-. > 4 fag* 44 * . dee Volume 1'iv. 8a L e t t e r , tC) &&Si *Pollolei 1 pooedares f o r a# tieployiaent oi' Ar;-iy Air Foroe# * 3eotioo XXI par^ raph 16. 0 n&e r 00 ve r of 1 e 110 r 1 rt He Ae ] 1 oyfl& n t Polieieet 1 1 Hq- USSJITIBi 9 Sept. i <U. 3.-? VolUiV' 23. W R 33439* to Eisenhower *.r AX tz from Arnol-; tahall See Volume Liv # 34* ".<;-; 7463?, A8WAB tmm :??ir-a. 11 to Elsenhower ana ?X 88882, KoMftrnty to law A f o r Marshall, 5 May H See Volura LIV# ,. _ , ^
' : . : :

coordinated basis.

On 11 August M jor General C.

C&mmoey of AAT/MTO provided the Ooara&nding General, U3STAF with a complete set of logletlc&l data, covering very type of Air Force unit in this theater, for use in oofspgtiag neoe&ry shipping requirements for re deployment.26 At tlie

s r e t i >e an early decision was requested through the agency &a a of U 8 A with respect to the following reoora-jendationsi ST F (1) that faoveiaents take rlaoe under i ard Operating

Procedure and under Air Force control, (3) that re-equipping preparation for* movement, and final inspections occur on Air *"rce bases (3) that liaison personnel be provided at SOS ports of embarkation to insure adherence to Air Force policies and standards, (4) that the fifteenth Air Force be redeployed by wings, (5) that unless guarantees could be provided ~ units be redeployed looi equipped. Seme of the

same points, i t will be observed* were covered in the Machinist r e r c r t . Col. Millard Lewis of USST^' was able to Indicate a limited concurrence with these reooni t#ndation8 b^it i t waft apparent that to f a c i l i t a t e further rOLamiing taore intimate oont&ot had to be maintained between the two theater . On 19 August Golonel 3aylor arrived in London for conference at USBTAI'- Headquwrterfl. He w,rote on the 23rd to General

* S T i Headquarter concept Qt rede ploy nent 1 U S Af basically in keeping with that ot HM&* Many queries are being made here that are identic.*! with three raised by KJMF and u n t i l answers are provided by tb$ War Department i t le apparent t>iat sound planning must of necessity give way to aeaumptional Planning* "Oertain factors conaidorer! essential in providing a framework son which to build the redeployment etruc* tit re ftg M j have ften considered raore or le@ camially A$ here# liot^ever* upon resentr'tlon of pertinent facts f u l l appreciation of the problems baa been obtained snd the overall planning by. this headquarters will incorporate these i'aotore providing a sound b&sle Tor the screening of personnel. <f^B Letter* -220.3* "Hedeployment of Air Feroee to Other The a te rs * Be e V lu m LI V o To D/C Adinin. and D/S Plans, ao August

27,

o\j* i n the i n t e r e s t oi' g0i*& oo-^lete ooawltnntti^. 23 August Golonel iayloy ^.e^artea London for oorapeiiy vlth a committee haAd by Colonel Jr of fs/TAff*. i LagtoaT , loolffl D. Jonc.?,

Tbe oommlttte was prepare.i| among othfti1

matters, to sonfar upon th$ iat oi wdtploji atnti autborit/ to jpeor^aniae uniti rpiorlt^ oi*. gaov^manitsi presbirvnent of <|uipioent iro?n the United s t a t e s to th tb^&ttrs instead, ot from C oi? ^TO, personnel a<5Jutmeat and! the responsibility J X 29 of US.\TAF in the redeployment of i A l e t t e r went out on the same 3.&t from Colonel H. '$\ Soherer w^iioh X# Si * ;ter answered Tor tbe Air iforoes with War

General Kuter's reply indicated that the'War designate Be<1eploy.iant Dav, that authority forthcoming to reorganize units to ntet requir'e aentft of the current redeployment flohe^ulei that -in.-Uonted r r i o r l t l t woul^i i n i t i a l l y be adhered to but probably "lodif led l a t e r by the WAJP Departiaenti that screening would accord wltti WIFH and E 1-1, awl that a l l Alf units being redeployed H to ooiaHat areas ^nn, 00 aircraft) T/o and S# woMld be re-equipped (except for

to the extent possible in the E C an^ WHO to T Shortages in p#joanl and equipment of p

u n i t s would ise au plied. from stooke or fjpoB other units* Any additional shortages would be reported to receiving theaters whioh would requisition frors the United st&tva dlreot. ZZm Xn Eshington the com l t t ^ e began ^ e t l n g s on ^6

August and found redeployment planning to be both acoelerat and, in & stete of flux. In a iaeraor&n&ua 1 S

30

Letter, Col. H. t* Soherer to Ooi* Malcolm D. Jones, "Ji Post-Hoetilities Plaanlngt* 3? August 1^44. So Volume LIV# Letter, *PoBt-Hoetilities Plan* rt undated* See Volume LI 7.

, ;;^

31 Colon! Baylor gave General Bdvardi a rre-view of Washington18 attitude on the pre-ehipruent of O L equipment* S the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of Air Oorpe spool*! purpose vehicles* screening, and the concept of V-30.* e requested certain

data on A Q planning and mentioned the projected temporary T duty of Mfijor f. B. Lat.ting of A T to collaborate with Major A Crane in UtO. dear out decisions were difficult to obtain

beo&usa oi differences of opinion between various staff section of Headquarters A F ana the War Department. A At

the time a revised AM' polio? l e t t e r *ras before the War Department and expeoted to cle*r .fsovnentarily. Baylor18 report to General 'Edwards* dated 6 Colonel i ftmber

19441'1 was irt i t s aajor points anticipated by the ne# A P A l e t t e r 5b-3 published 'fc>efore hie return* about 24 ^pte^oer to USSfAf from Washington. 33. In September l H4 the period of preliminary plan**

ning C Ut to an end with the publication of two planning Mf i guldesi the one by the W and the other by the War Depart* merit* the succeeding months were to witness measures t o r

the imp lemon t a t ion oi these po Holes on the part of the Air Force commands and the preparation of the iin&l directives by the &ar Department and the Theater, 34 A i Letter 55^5 \Q) - dated 15 August though i t

was held up for revision well into September represents the maturation oi Air Foroe planning through the o efforts oi liea^quarters* the ooromMe and the oom^ltteee 34 51. 32. See also, Hemorandiin for Major General F. U Anderson from Col. Jones, "Glarliication oi Redeployment 10 Sept. 1944* both in Volume LIf, On 14 September* Headquarters A eliminated the / W oert of V-30 from further 001 ration and inUerted that V Day would be the day so designated by tie War Department. Memorandum, Hq. USfiAFIS* f i l e number 323. See Volu^ie LI. " P o l i c i e s and Proceduree for Redeployment of araqr Air Forces* * as amended 21 and ZZ August and 13 Kov. 1 44* I t vae superseded on 33 ^ebruory 1-H6 by another l e t tor* came s u b j e c t . See Volume lIV.

33. 3 '

L ft '

ra " ?

I t was expected that upon the basis oi this l e t t e r and forthcoming War Department Instructions on personnel &4Jui meat, a l l decisions could be ^ade in the theatersj thue leaving A F Headquarters free to concentrate on the %^r in A the P&oiflo. Outlined in some detail were certain aera

tions, policiesi and. procedures &n4 I October was fe for planning purposes* to be V Day. 35. The War Department message or 13 September

bodying approved redeployment policies arid procedures was furnished also for information and planning guidance. 35 I t assumed a date between 1 September and 1 November for the oe?nation ol h o s t i l i t i e s in Surope. I t s swpe was somewhat

broader that that of the JUF directive* 36. Another significant development of the period

was the publ.ioat.ion or A F Regulation No. 30-45, ^Control A of 'tetieployroent Progrms* on 13 September 1944. I t s pur

pose vai to "establish an organization, to insure the oetagl* tion of t h i s complex task." I t provider! for the e s t a b l i s h

ment of an agency within Headquarters A F which would be A responsible ior the translation'oi approved redeployment plane Into integrated programs ano schedules. Thos ^r>^roved

plans ware largely* as has been seid War Departnient &n& Theater directives. 8y 9 October the ^irinoiples were rather

well eeteblishedi though General Baker was somewhat d i s s a t i s fied v/ith the rerieployment oi long-experienoed units direct to the Pacific .T7. Between t h i s date t h e w was

communication i n coi;ferenoe on a l l --^ases of the personnel and u n i t adJURtment nd which a r e the s u b j e c t s of m o t h e r c h a p t e r . Other

35. 36

W 29970, to Gn^nert, P r a t t , ejt a l . X 13 September 1944* See Volume LTV. L e t t e r to dineral (Hie, oj^. cijt. -435}\ : .

A W R from O A

iall#

"
:

I ff tF

-,

\ Mil ware under Sevelorvient during the period, such

"AJ

notably as those i n which ATC and Ml 30/ T were involved, f O separately o r j o i n t l y , under the d i r e c t i o n or AAF/MTO. Zfta . a those two agencies were the executants of AAF/

M O redeployment* t h i s Headquarters was o&lled on frequently T in matters aff toting routes* staging areae* inspections, a c the approval or plans. nX These matters, except lor the Green11 and "White11 projects, an? left to the histories of
the Q K B n a aot i n t i m a t e l y O H && ccnoerned.

.38,

Ik> attempt I s made here to follow the f u l l

of rseetinge an^l all th correspondence involved In the planning period* By 9 December HfOtlSA had published the

"Outline Plan for the Redeployment ol HtOOSA ^orce* a f t e r the F a l l of Germany (Hevieeri to 25 Kovenber 1944)* which o u t l i n e d the epeciflo r e e p o n R l b i l i t i e e of the Commanding

Senerali AilF/MTO in addition to o t h e r redeployment matters. This Headquarters was ^rep&v^fi, in I t s turn, to publish to

i t f subordinate O K : .- the so? for redeployment of u n i t s O r e t u r n i n g to the United Statei ni on 29 Deoember i t was

declfletf tht the diigtribution of the tfar Department 'flt* deployment Hovemente" Bade i t superfluoae. Thereafter I t

to a ^re?st extent the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of ifar Depar MfOUSA dix^otivee which oooapi ! tie a t t e n t i o n of quartern* AAF/MTC^ the l a t t e r having been prepared with the a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n or *3, t h i s Headquarters.

- - - Ml

mm m
1 ^

sas

;L J

u ITS
8 principal

the i?erg_on_nel _Af^1 ujjbiH.0-1lii!l

Pi IJ >-./ ent wae to s h i f t force In such, n m, ' rei ;, e

to bear unon

oonitent with oontinulng rqujl3Eteiants in the l o r ooccupational purpoaee. In tbe -.roc.. t re

o r i e n t i n g the AIM;/ to 8 ainfjle oomplex of theaters* i t #a found aooess^ry to e f i e o t oertain reorganiaatl< ns in i m i t a , ana. 'poeicible to reduce th overfall mov a it. el2 of the ftimy wrlle

I t had long been reoognl&ed as desirable that a

plan oe perfected whore by the redeployment &n^ the reduction might la flooted with the greatest -iixla conBiol.orp,tion militar
;

oi the individual* oonoerned within the l i m i t s of necessity.

For i t wafi understood that rotation an^ re

.,oe

53nt Alone had aiad It inequitable to adjust the Arniy e o l e l y she slfi oi surplus elements B U ox units* That f a c t hw.i been re - length oi Lsed In t service .-' Irdst

Or^ ne report * 10

tstj even before the k*& policy l o t tar ii lit dated Zl i ust

* of August 1944 WAS- i s s u e d . * 4n

contained tihe statement oE policy t at ground per J w i l l - b e reassigned and Inaol fcff&neferred u Lti so t &t# u ^nt

os Lblej u n i t s sohedulea l o r 'llreot reaep]

w i l l be coHipoae<3 oi personnel having lowest r e l a t i v e e l i g i b i l i t y l o r return to (! S; unity scheduled f o r occupation l o r o e w i l l be oorapoeed ol personnel having intermediate r e l a t i v e e l i g i b i l i t y ; u n i t s or csu&3 groups scheduled f o r

1#

See 0 Readjusfnent ogul&tinns W, l(- l , "15 I' v 1940 ana changes; RR, 1-5, ipril 1 ^o; an rtedeployment Oirottlar Ro 3i 1^46 ana changes

Volume LV

fc.
i

return to U.S. for Strategic RsearvjNh* reWi be composed 01 personnel having higT!S% w l a t i v e lity. * t was needed was a scale of values on the

o waioh personnel U) :nlght be Shifted among units so as to give a kind of uniformity to those units with regard to personnel* and vi) sight >a released > > aervioe when

iounci not only sumlus to the needs ox their respective ao.raands or theaters* but ?dao non-essential to the Ar^sy/* 2# The question of what would constitute a proper

and equitable yardstick tor adjusting personnel hatf been from tno f i r s t subject tor dissuasion anri reoommendfttlon* On that subject* as noted previously, the Machinist Commit* tee had made reoo^tenaatlona* having found In the MO a T oonslfterable weight at opinion that meaioal factors physical and mentr,! health and length oi' foreign should be the principal determining factors, with marital 4 and dependency statue secondary in importance. There was aggreement that the lever factors considered the better* and th precedence oi military necessity over every other factor was stressed. 3 With these bases in mind A*l, A . . 0 began to

compile datA on length at service* age* and isarltftl and dependency status. (Statistical Control wt-e then keeping The nersonnel audit

date, on length of overseas service.)

vas begun on 20 July I#44 l a anticipation of s ?^uch-needed forimla by which the War Departftient would indicate the con siderations to be ua@d in the adjustment of personnel and. 3 Doe R 1*11 folttM LV. The Comaandlng Generals of the H Air* Groundi and Service Forces were eventually to &9 ter^ine the iSentlallty or non-assentl-nlity of the m plus Individuals returned to the United States tjy the tiie&ters and the surpluses within the najor oommandi* I t was the aim of the readjustment plan that all enlisted personnel with scores equal to or above the c r i t i c a l score be f i r s t declared surplus and than declared non-sflrtentl subject to the availability of replace .vmta and ail I t necessity. Provisions for officers were less sircple* me Memorandum, Gol. -Hiohard A. Wagner, Fifteenth Mr Force* to Lt. Col. Machinist* 2? July 1944, Volume LI^

4#

-4*8-

ffirni

;ff

r e l a t i v e weight. Juste4.

That formula WAS found In the Ad*

. '-.rice Rating Score* Yho Adjusted Bervloe Rating Score AS outlined in

War Department readjustment fttgtilt tlon R 1-1, vas d e c e R as a Gorrelation oi lour faotora which the Amy i t s e l f re garded as v cunt in signlfioanoeg length of service, Colonel

over-as service* corn twit aervlee, n.rui parenthood.

& a* 8 Baylor In h i s nemoranuum to General w * & # 1 September 5 I thought that se-arate J es would, be adopted for 1 ' personnel t^r l a t e r a l transfer among units and demobilisation.
r

At that time I t had seemed certain that

<

^tors ooneidered would be length of overseas

vico cm i medical faotora. ^ t by 86 3eptrabrj in a i u r t h e r 6 ? to the sarae* he r^?vealefl bhat Ctenaral Arnold had d to use the same yardstick Tor both adjustments a ! the faotore were the four aentl< HAT above* O 27 Sept' n

sent out the tentative War Department plan tor r e

adjusting personnel on tne basis oi: the saiat four factors* Ail haa completed a weighted rating scale for uee in
v

1J .:..' ! transfers though t

ounoed 00 multiplee* 5

^* Department r

u yet

Sventuallyj eaoh factor was assigned a r iultiple B (he t o t r l "point* oredit I

wMoh was used in arrlvij each person as of R %-y. pointsJ

The multiples were exoressed in

5, 6, 7. 8.

Bes Chapter >Cfx. Bee Chapter XI x. Letter AS 3*0.01/418 A-o, 'War department Plan for adjustment i Military Personnel,'' at waended by Letter A 370.01/418 A-0 dated 30 Sepfc* 1944 G The weights < aetually becm assigned as early as 3 9#r in a message f r o : 11 B ^isenho^er. o (l) eaoh nonth oi Army eervlo lues were as follows: slne^ 16 Sept* 1M0 1 polnti (2) overseas oredit, per rjionth - - 1 pointi (-3) oombat credits* each 4 points* (4) parenthood oredlti caoh child to total :i three 8 points* Volume L V 1

-433

1} 2) 3) 4j 6,

Service Credit (the number ol months served in the Army since 16 September 1940), 1 point. Overseas Credit (the mis&er at months served, overseas)! 1 point. Combat Credit" (the number o* decorations and bronze star- service &U.rs)i 5 points. Parenthood Grsdit (the number1 or children under IS years old* to ft maxlmm of three)* 12 points.

On the basis ox the e;ccumulated and tabulated

suoree o! a l l enlisted personnel ol the Array, the WBT Depart ment was able to announce a c r i t i c a l ooore which served In

gencrfl to aooord with the new troop basis after H Bay and iti particular tc a s s i s t In classifying and readjusting person nel, lor the broad aim of the " u u : to 6^olare

< 11 enlisted personnel with Adjusted Service R&ting _<al to or above the o r l t i o c l r>coro an<3 to replace fiem In Loyable eloaents it] those having lower scores. c r i t i c a l Soore announce7: vac 85 points as ot 12 Way 1 points l o r the W O At 7. In the selection n
BUI^>1US

offieersj aii

SttOftoeity vas daen.od oy V .r. mr Be of primary 1; ^ortanoe. 3ut r

' nt to " e the faotor b . icienoyi physioal

oonditioni attitadttti need for speo^altlssi and a v a i l a b i l i t y of assignments whlob >roul<3 make ; 1 "military neoeselty* rt s t use of the c^pabll** s r"i an o f f i c e r were also important considerations in It was desired that the

s e l e c t i v e proces:- be performed in a manner that woulc* In no sense i ply prejudice !out would .- C er 'V^sitively indiat* the appreciation which the " -r Ptpartment he3 for the servioe et-.ci o n i c e r h&s rendered.' 1 Other faotoJM WVQ t . . leslrei oi the otfio^r as

to retention and the a d j u s t s service rating Bocre,

The lat>

. i was not; a oontrolling faotori but an Ri ani t-ulde in a d#oiaion r eolally those of:icr. r ^ vith

| servloa oversea*

long ana hazardous oc tbat ^^

440

She WO S plan to U t UA a

ft

ettf D*p&*faan | *

regulations sneoii'iecl how the plan would work," As units wore elaaslfled in one or tgoHeOf ., 6 >r ru the lour

-in.jor oomaiandeps were 'liroct^d fco effect reas

ments and readjustments of personnel within their oo;:;an&s on K f a^aia of the plan outlined a core and with the iollo> hl ln ol&s si 1 cation < per* nnol In mind) > ^^ ^pgulg^d Snliatod Pgraonrifl - hill stool nel whoge" "Adjusted iSISrlSS Elating Card (A 3<ior9fl are .)elr>w the c^rltloal soore# ftstd whose Inrilvlr'.uril services and quallilo&tlons art oaa^ntial bo th oommnd ^ e to military .H necessity a even though tl\eir A3 C scores may be equ.nl to or abova ohe critloril 000r* peraonnel ImcTii ! 00res are equal to or above the critical score and whoae Individual aervloe^ and qualj blona are not easentla). to the J - md as a taatter at -aiiitary it; . 1 iie au I re >. Ox i i o ? r Pe reo nn.^X Those, wltJ-i low ASEC sooreaj and those whoea individ ual iervio6s and quallfication* ^re eseantlal to the ooBuaand aa a watt^r or uilite.ry lt^ even though tnsy may have high 4SR0 Hon mfinquired Of xloer Peraonne^ * Oil.leer personnel with the highest S3K3 scores, in&ivJ ial Bervlo&i. and qualifl oatIons ^ro not n t i a l to lh eomaand as a matter of military naoeseity rr lor whoa a qualilied replace.n: nt i s available or is not required; and those office I S for whoffl an an M is not availablt

53

4}

10*

Special provisions ware outlined for special

olassos tot personm-jli such as the ' A , and for ovcrse WC separation andfih<3return of dependents* sick* and woundodt

larger and more important 30n

in redeployment was the allocation of ioroes In p
?

with Army nm&.t and to this end certain In a iaeaorandura of 17 Ka from Oolonel T, L.

or elements Tt-ero ierined.

osley for Ctelonel Baylor five

been eonfceaplated!

Category

I - Unit" to oe r e t Inea in the Theater.

9#

s n t C i r c u l a r Ho* i .
(

roiume
111.

fa

: ' / X - U n i t e t o bt? p t X Lned I n t : n \ -^r

at raduoetf s t Ca-.- i l l - tfnlta to be tr a c t i v e theater* >ry

feh. irred d i r e c t to an

IV - )rUt,? to oe r s t u r n o ' . . <<uted State . V - Units tr> be inaotlvated.

ing to ftH 1-1, aowevex> tho ooia&andlng gene rale ol tli waters and majo a oo i ad ? >uld . ;nat speolfio e l e

ments to be plaoed in 9&cb ol jioui* oategox*ie@l ayy I - Those * o be retained for cjontinuod c h *vlae In ; < Ly currenti o " ids. Category II - T ; w t . >rx^d fro? P or to the U . S States to

theater fco i '. 6ate$j or from v &tep Oat -: III - Those flu 1

nits In the theater to

> converted ox* jpQorg&nlzed (to inolude y neoe. > i n ^ o t l v a t l o n s io ri "lone)

ani i on oo pletion thereof | to beoome category I or II elements. I i off li. IV - fhoee to " a demotollixe o

The principle underlying the categorizing of u n i t s a feasible, unite that hare been in the tiortest length of time w i n oe r o deployed to the wBl and P - o i t i o co;soat a.reas* d t i re tu rned to the !i 8 til 11 > a 1 eoted f re o those u n i t * that have been In the uiTG the longest [en th oJ tle Tiie require lanta for the foroet of ooupatlo .111 be drawn from the remainder* * ^

ten stated i n the A S '..'-'Hoy l e t t e r of 15 ftuguet ii>44| A

15* the War

The same prlnol '

nwiolated i n refined f o m

tit on 27 I ebrufery 1 ; 45:

11. 2#

K inolude both Bt . it
..
;--T{

"In goners.1, effeotive p- ? f it% | i i ^ j of units ror retention In or isoveraent rroif pope an-Mediterranean Theaters and other in active areas will be governed by the i'c-11 owing r i l l as in : mentetf In HK 1-1, 19 February in order that tha 1. 6 amount ox personnel readjustment i i l l be i - it; te I with* Ltaj ';. . for redeplo; ; to then ,~ctiv therter without; st I .: rdu t a Unit fcatee, unite she ; : p ! iarlly be seleefca I p | sa tiaviftg Che l e a s t ^rie number oi sen ' I : I s ijuate ; ra 11 ng 0 eo re s fVfter the eel - units required
in i a DOve, fc] .e u ni 10 to ^e ' re tu m ed 10

*u

**o.

*d

the unlta ' featee for conversioni OP m h a b i l i t a t l o n and reocndltiming prior to jpe&eployraentj w i l l op^lin&plly bi tl^oee units reaaalning wbiofe have fche leaet number . en with high adjut I I rvlce p&ting cores. After eelection ol unite required la ^ above 1 unite to be s ned to oocupft* tlonal forces dLll ordinarily be t?ir>ee units remalnin ich JIRVQ th l e a s t number m nen ! adjusted servic rating 0CM?res* 3 : Jnerali Beleotion of units to : e > rs tii rne 5 to tv;e U ai 19 3 State ^ t o r i ! Ueposition will be t^s*? unit:- aving th< al hert number of men v l t h h l |3 1 " I* ' adjusted service rating s lent upon p

t ] 9 c^.te^'crising of units wa *

and the t?<o Aime were not at warj bwt c" ."* " ! > . i > 14 begory I and II el woul^ m oompoe<3

required personnel an^ volunteer noiwrequlred personnel* |oi ooamandere were directed* to the extent BU] ly readjuetraent re >osible# to

nts to Category 1 and II al .

:

from available requlr*?^ personnel within their oota priiAarily xn? * Category IV el^wentsj tvm-raqulred p i n Category I &n& ll IV eleoenta or the 15, e3

its would be tTV*nsarrefl to

^r simile p type*

Upon completion ol the tnaxlmura poeeible repdjust

of Category X and II elemnt0 irithin the sajor eaitaaiidi# to be made or* the G m a < o mn ! Oenerali the

S80#
&edures*#i( tUifii LXV

0 . 5 r < . )
War
:

C ^
- ; '

i f t .- i t #

^itg

Replacement and Training Command, MT0U3A, lor required per sonnel to replace non~required personnel remaining in Ort egory 1 and X element anc! to bring Category II elements X up to specified strength. 16f i i r e t priority for readjustment was to be given f

Category XX elements and among then in the order in whioh they were to be redeployed. Ideally all personnel adjust

ments would be made before redeployment but movement dates fixed for those elements and the availability of qualified repl&oenente had to influence the scope of their personnel readjustments before movement. The finpl determinant of

the extent of such changes was the requirement that the ory rational efficiency of those elements " e not 1 rap aired and b that they be qualified to perform their primary mission .upon departure for their new assignments. Provisions were

therefore made whereby rule-of-thumb readjustment in '<kte gory I I might be made prior to the reoelpt oi full lnforma* tion cu readjustment or Pegttlar readjustnient after aove ment Briefly$ those provisions were as followss 1) Subject to operational efiioienoy require

ments and time permitting* personnel with long periods of service overseas might be transferred out of units sioving before reoelpt of Adjusted Service feting multiples or c r i t i c a l scores. 2) Subject to the s m lin&tationei individuals e

with high scores might m transferred from units mnring after the receipt of multiples, but before the announcement of the c r i t i c a l 8ore. 3) Again subject to the Same limitations! the

fflaxismm number oi individuals with scores equal to and above the c r i t i c a l score would be transferred out of those elements in Category I I moving after the receipt of critical

scores.
-444-

1?.

I t was provided iurther that In c&aee oi

mvemnt

before adjustment, the plan ox readjustment would oe applied after arrival In the new commands on the same basic as l o r other personnel in such comn&nds. Subject to the availabil

i t y of replacements with scores belov the c r i t i c s ! score, m lament were permitted to move with as a oh as 10 percent overetrength In order tc permit the su&tequent release of personnel with scores equal to or above the c r i t i c a l score who could not be released before sailing. I t was

however* that maximum personnel adjustments were to be prior to sailing. 18. The general qualification that suitable replace-

merits be available was supplemented by a M 0 3 memorandum TUA of 12 June 1945 specifying certain "Critical *O not Subject i S e to P l e a s e under the H adjustment Be gal at lone, " The memo

randum included specialties not identifiable by an S3H and gave Instructions on unearthing and recovering personnel in e m degree skilled in but not operating under c r i t i c a l K 0 o S3 19. Category 1X1 eleaients upon reorganization or re-

designation were to be placed in Category I or I I ana then be processed In the manner prescribed for the readjustment of those categories ot elements. 20m Category IV elements would be oo^poeed fr>r the moet part of non*inquired personnel $ though required pereofr nel of Category IV elements were not to be transferred un less required as replacements in Category I or XI elements or u n t i l called l o r by the Commanding 0-eneral, The Replace* meat and Training (3omaaad fcfon-required personnel of Cate gory I and I I elements were to be tr&nsferred to Category I? eleraents of the same or a similar type. Thus when rea4

ied for snovement the Category IV element would becn?ie the principal vehicle (except for epeelr.l c see) tor the return -446

oi surplus personnel to tha Unifced^t&tee, and I t was an* tldrafted that suoh unite would return considerably over the T/0 strength. I t was peco amended that the over strength

not exceed i i t y percent. Cn 3-3 May, Headquarters H T T ordered the i&mefli W/ O M enlisted ate readjustment; of /personnel on the basis ol the c r i t i c a l score oi' 85 points and! the assignment of personnel to units 14 scheduled for redeployment on that oasis. S & Actual disposition ot the elements in the Tour 21.

eategories was made on the basis of schedules of &otion ii> dloated in "Redeployment > re oast s, l | planning for whioh had in the Theater about fifteen months prior to R Day. ore oasts. Aiaong other matters '' Baylor CJommittde v i s i t i n g the Mediterranean Theater oi1 Op erations early in 1944 :nade a study oi the troop basis pro posed to* the The a tor after the defeat o! Germanyv whioh was to aonre as the spado worls for soheduling the redeploy 15 Colonel Baylor also obt&.lned ment of Ariy ( \ir Forces. suoh opaoii'lo data on units as their dates of departure from the United States. That information* together with

strategic oonilderatiori6| was fundamental to th formulation of estimates of whet units were rederloyable and vhere they mist be sent. Other jnatters* suoh as shipping oapaoity,

would sX'feot ths tim sohe<%ulo 34 On 23 February 1 '44i General I . H. Edwards, Deputy

Ooamaaderj AAF/'TO wrote a memorandum for the information of Oener; 1 SSiiker in which he said, " T e Baylor Jonunittee and *h our iW3 r working on this matter with a view to setting up the Tactical Units and their Supporting Service Units

15#

Letter* "readjustment of Enlisted Personnel*" 1946. See Voltt'ae LIV. The "Proposeri Ultimate Troop Basis Alter Capitulation of Gerraany North Afrioa# * 9 February 1944. Op.olt. See Volume LIV.

HPBa K1-**

"T^\ w

v h l o h w o u l d m o v e w i t h e a o h i n c r e m i m t r ^ *e---*tie

required to designate the Units to remain in this Theater, 8 1 6 25, ;*@erred to traa a breakdown of groups and separate

squadrons by tyr and number with tha.tr destinations during the months V+i through v>6j the United s t a t e s , the Southwest Pacific, *h Central Pacific, ana Ghii fcirma India.. Includ

ed also were certain unite earmarked for shipment to the United Statei l o r conversion to V B Transports L (allocated

to the Southwest Pacific) and others for conversion to V H tambsre for the "Southwest P^citic. This w e one of the f i r s t &

of aany stops in the eoheduling of redeployment moveraenta# each of vhioh must be re ferried ae a phase et planning, either or ebort- r^nge. For even when eventually the scheduled

been made more or Xesa firm, they were subject to constant revision. 26 The A f intentions to readjust combat units in A c

Europe in conformftnoe with projected R*U troop bases and redeployment n @5 were Included in summary fashion in a @ < A series of Taba *A- beginning with the f i r s t A F ^Policiee and Prose&ures* memoran<5u n in April 1044 aad ending with that of *a suw.iary 17 the of the sohedules of redeployment of oomtoat units,' 1 Tabs wore published, in l a c t ,
H

28 M y 1^45. a

Though referred to in r-ne oas &B

as a guide ror aircraft and They therefore oori

orw requirr5nt for pedisployssent* *

tala#d estimates of total strength in aircraft of various tyros expressed in terns of groups. wliloh would be in both theatere on apeciflea dates, and they Indicated the number o group a to petaain in BtO and the number to be redeployed by theater of destination. 1 6 . 17. 18. They set no time

OD. o i t . See Volume UV, Op S"t, IS August 1944, paragraph V,J5. See volutne LIV. L e t t e r A 822 TS (28 May 45) OB-S-E-AFOaVM, Ra.t0ploy* O A c D aisnt of A f^ T a c t i c a l Units, * W # 28 May 1946# p a r , This l a t t e r supersedes Tab h* to A F L e t t e r (0) 5 A 23 Feb. 1945. " 8kie Volume LIV.
i a w y

i\

LIILII

v'. -1 ^ i-f"'' f l ^>:s ^'i

27.

Between Anril 1^44, and Kay 1045 a

amount of variation w,a observable in these summary r redeployment days wew re-aet> of course, &B the w e on, and Tab * of 26 M y 1/45 reflected * change A * In strength due to redeployment i t s e l f . In addition to

changes In the numbers of groups e*ivmr.r3ee<i for various theaters thore wast, particularly between .August 1044 &n M y l$45 f a simplification of the thre^ Pacific ai?eas to a
OTiOm

. ,

Insofar aa Air Forces in the K O alone were nan T

oernea.t the peoiie plans f^>r the igoheaulin^ of rmnt novetoenta wore set forth In two aeries or the one emanating from the Operations D!vi<?ion War Depart ment Cteneral Staff and the other prepared in the to i plement i t . T two series refleoti largely, h

6ivo detailed adjustments on tut) levele of a plan whioh was early established in i t s broad outline. The function of

AAf/HTO w#e in Tnany cases to adjust the requirements of the War Department to tv.e potentiftlitie? of the Air Forces and to f i l l them. On 19 M y 19441 the War Department iorwaraea to a the Q adlng General i 8S# Arny Forces in the North

African Thar-ter of Operations> tfce "First Edition of the Hedeploynent 3cherile of Ak Units for Planning Purr^oseai rt JF 19 dnte^ 1 M i 1944. iy Thl schedule was a tentative l i s t of units whlehi in aoocrAanoe with JOB 531/5 of 2 April 1944* w i l d be mad* available in the Thenter for movement to other theaters of operations upon the f a l l of Germany* Accompanying the schedule was a request lor Information as to the availability ad# Insofar as possible* the numerical InoloBura to Letter O U 3^0,a fa (8 M y 19*4)f o< P a j.
-44S

designation of ty-e of unite for s: and the U.S. Str thirty <*ay interval?,. 30 Juno 1 30. \U40

- it Sc

* P v e bo;lnnlng ^tth V - 3 This infor-.r.tio* Intended for

eo^Mination with vt m i r i n g theaters was furnish*a on Planning tnt**e<3 the mature stage in the l a t t * .' -ae

half of 1 >44 on the ^basis of preliminary plans suofci s juat aentloned and a 'Second B&ition11 of the summer of $M
:

Pti in a l e t t e r to the fwtlftfe ?iv* fifteenth

Air Foroofl an4 iMFSO/lfPOi <5ireotefl those commands V aubmit > pooommendationa l o r ohangea in ths current i Xr: norannual of 18 ^epto^er 1^44# r > the

i United States ^fray -Mr Forces in the North African was requested by the Was? Departujent to prepare a set of work sheets l i s t i n g a l l types of Air Fcroe units then in the Theater and tabulating the nunber* of units and strengths which ould be na<3e available for redeployment doling the tow qtuartera indicated on the inclosed fom# The l a t t e r (jjr (J21/0 ^nd 04:3/3 allowed no fcKF units for H T ori' AO a f t e r oesaatlon ^r h o a t l l l t i e s with Bt;rau$y*) to be f i l l e d in n^on receipt of a tentative plan ihoift* in/r the veqttlfsathti oi' Air forc$ units to oe redeployed to u Bera It was ^o^ire-i that one Rtttnerloal p:

l i s t be set p by quarters. 31. On 30 ^epte^ber 1944 that Infonaatlon i which w.--e to p?erv as the

ll/vble in the *Thiri Edition of Redtployiaent Soh#3ul ^ r > A". Unite for Planning !*tarposes#

3;. 83.

330,3 rm. Lette r 3:30.3, oo- oVt. Letter 30.3 ""Stodo^loyTaont* * wian*ins 530.3 TS d a Stpt. s V l 9 LIV. see Volu9 LIV Inolosure to Heraorandtam C 3 8 TOOp Schedule in Oonsonano*? i If 30 B e t e o e r 1 ^
4/ 9b

dated 19 July 1^44. i4)i opof 18 3#pt 44 ;. i V$ 120 ept with JOB 531/6#

r_ ^ ,

basis of tbe firut detailed foreoast for Air Force units MC Tu to . In early October Oolonele Jones in

in

Baylor preceded

quarters, \A*/.rrc i o r the purpose of coordinating

She scheduling of unite, ay the two theaters in oonfornity "third Sditiont ' A n : it i time represent*

J atiVQS cf the Tvolith and Fifteenth U r Foroes ana AU V met at Oaeert*x tc review the schedule in terms of their - n

The product of these conferences was the " < $ f o r Redeployment of kxmp Mr Fores '.'nits in M O a8 of 11 T" October 1 '-"", " ' which e'rsbo^l-el Sotae departures from tho Edition* * The l a t t e r had not eomprehonde^ any allowance

T participation in the Doot&pational -Mr B'oroe; 'but M O &M Irs to participate and in the oonferenoee wit3 ;hed an agreement ihei*Rb;!,' eaoh Air l^oros would make Is ; johe<!lul9 tc reflect that desire. I t was further

"eed In reference to Tvnlfth Air Ferae units rewaiaJ ut&Lern France that the i r force to which units '/ere -er^ attached w u o

Igned n'3 not that tr whioh tl 3 n ancl effect t h e i r redeployment. 33.

Tha resultant schedule tabulated tho fcllovlng (1) Type of Unit* {) Table of Orr,aitflMo

ng other items?

tion and Equipment (inoluding Strength wherR not variable) # (3) T 3i i s , (4) Wnlti to be Re deploy edf and (55 Fteraaxfte. linger Unite to he Redeployed were given tho f o l lowixj i (1) the number .rrv"3 strength of units of each type (3) the number to go

to go tc the Occupational Air fcroe;

i B tihina Burma Indiai to the Far aet, to the Gen* o ifloj to the Nr>x*th Pacific* and to the United Statesj (3) the number and p r i o r i t y of unite redeploying in each of tiiree iaartera f with the number of u n i t s and source shown

S4#

Bee Volume LVII.

FS3,

'< ' :

by aonth

I t I s to be notea that units were apaciflea In

a l l oasoe only as to type and as %c aouroe* i.,0. the Twelfth o r Fifteenth Air Forces t o r the moat r>art 35 The allotment of priority rmnserq by quarters w&i In accordance with War Depi rtraent instructional but t I covering l e t t e r of General Halter to the Commanding C l 25 KAT0U3A express^., In addition to the bove-^ientlonea. ^Teoments, the view that each unit should have an lna.1 Ti&iaX priority nu-nber S>a84 on montha in ortfar to oont with the ninthly b r e a M o ^ & lndic--to- In the proposed a redeployment schec&tle. 36* Finally, In requesting that the schedule toe fox*. wrj^.etf. to the War Dapartmant for epprevalj the Oeneinal .urgently reque^t^" oertalc ohnnpres of Aetr.ll In t'-e "Third Edition. * These changes concerned fha need to delay movonont ot certain Air Depot Groupe, Quarterrnaeter
Corranler, and Ord.nance and Signal Oompattiei ftaoauaa of a

oontlnulnr^ need for them In the Theater* the Impossibility of activating certain Signal Companies (Avn) from personnel i n tS;e Theater^ and the desirability of early chlr,ment of Photo Rooonnalssanoe Groims. 3?. When Headquarters f ^ FM O forwarded the "Third A/ T Edition*' schedule and thr.t of 11 October to the oo oaandaj i t naa tfith the request that recommendations for char held to a -.inimun until the War Department sight clarify the status of H O In the Oooupatlonal Air Faroe* E address^ was desired to furnish eetimatea of the number and. types of units that oould bo caada available for movo meat In the f i r s t forty-fivo day a ol redeployents PXanr/. proceeded at t h i s He&dquartera* on the basis of Information Letter 32Q#3 "Sohe&ile tw Bedeployment of Force Units in M O after Defeat of Germany*" 14 T 1 44. See Volume LIV.

Ti:j|||fl"

received from the command, of a schedule dttelgnatiena of unitn to be redeployed, toility fhe ooozvana tion of requirements with available units was the responsi of A-31 hm/Wfo$ out RDB&natlona had to me * n the gem&A&i ooncerne.% so that throughout t g planning phase the rocn^nenriRtions nf the Air Forces an<9 Co tanda In G >-reno and by correspondence had to carry considerable 38 t* ^uooeeAing fore- iti reflect the suooeea of tug picture ot strength ana requirement0 up to and the method 1 ' n eatatollflhed in I t s weight. pl&nmr on the sever-1 loveli to adjust the eohe^ulei to beyond R Day and their perfection of t i e methods employe But twnCrfatally 30. at aspects by the foil rf 194 '. Thi Therter &roupi oper&tione tiivleion of the War r:.rtnent Generrl Stfitff publiohe3 en 20 February 1945 the ^First Edition of the Redeployraent Forecast (Atlantic Section). |3 I t tftbftl&ted for 4AF/:rT^ the numbar of unitof each typ in the troop basis then In effsot; the total nunsber of each to be transferred to BfOj to the Pacific Ooean Aroasi China Barme Xnaiat the Southwest Faoifio# the United States 1 the ^nitert Btatee for tnmotlvationj am" the total number to be &eti?&ted# ina^tivotedi or reorg^hiaed! in the theater. The tabulation was given by month ai 1 i* ** ' Day* a l l Air Fores units but one Hes Iqu :-*ter& and Re< months. Units wre aeationed only by typee except for

ters Sqttadfofif Air Force to be -disposed of In the f i r s t nine taetioal tinlts> whioh pried in addition the type of a i r craft esqployed. 40. On the bnsiB of the above forecast* the *Me<tttorw

The Pacific Section forecast waa intended to be i t e oounterparti to include unit requirements both iron the theaters of origin and from the Zone oi Interior,

ranoan Theater of Operations! ."^eiplnytont Forecast" of Hafrch 1945 was i s s u e d . 5 7 It; wae 9t I the Bamfl pi i & a Frinci

that of 11 Ooto >er 1 >44 4 t h ohangas in -letail.

among them ware the Insertion of ape elf lo unit designatl in p%9M of numbers of units an* Air ?o*oe or origin* and an indication by reference l e t t e r oi the correlation of /ouiQntja of tactical an<t aer/loe units, T.e l a t t e r ware

I to )o redeploying thirty daya ^rior to the shipping of their taotloal unite* Type8 of alro.rri.ft were A,

p r i o r i t i e s omitted, ana -irtstinations shown as (;T0# Pi and 0 . 41.

The "Stooaa Bdltlon of ie aedeployment Forec

(Atlantic* "action)," publiahec! by the Way Department on 15 , 194$* differed f*eai the T l r a t Ration 11 insofar aa Air #opoe wac eonoemadl In r; C -e rarleploy^ent of

was redistributed ovei1 eix taonths lnateafl of nine, v i t h Juae 1945| and In that I I /xly direct redeployment vaa that to ?- (Paolfia Areas). Unite were s t i l l

to Bserely by type an^ number rq\ilr#<1 in harmony on early AAF/'HO re, mr f l a x l l d l i t y . 42 J ../ w: In foxv the tt>-tTc %^eplo>- Tent Forecast* of 25 "lay - ft1.nil a ted to t."'e *Seaon<3 Edition 1 Atlantic ? . t differed by tbe tubatltutlon of apeolfic 3thw em&atlon in the interest oi

. leslgnationa for the mal?er of units hy type, wise fir .

cheduliny of redeployment nee on that d^tc ae It could be. T;..e

rt

T}iird Edition Redeployment Forecast, ff i

July 1"45 or the Operfltlons W.vision# War DftpaJ^tiWftt Ge;, Staff superflodod both the Atlantic and Pacific Seotione of **Seoond lOaition* H In format i t was the same ae the

2? 3S

3e Volume Lvil. ^ 0 Volume LVXI* -453-

jtti

publications; out it'was drawn \vo in vlth the 1 June 194 Troop U a t for Overseas Supply ana It was so arranged m to aho*t (1) Initial

of units then In the Inactive t:-\e-tope, antf (3) ultimate destination in the active theaters of anit -eployInr from the Zone of Interior and redeploying from inactive 44. 29 n( by th table in (Sisipter v"Xi whioh nhow 'both ftiv^. actual redeployment, montb by rv>nth That *uoh eoheflulee wore never inflexible i s by the l*ter pu&loatlon of the fowo*.t of 0

Over an<3 above the remilrply sohe^le^ rrsovement of u n i t s t>y category from the Theatepj a oonsiderable A m of pe^.eployTent iraa efi'eote^! un1er sptolal ppovllon v'ith respect to sxxoh i*tdeployment? the province of Air Tr^ne^ort Oommand tcmehes that of M?/WtQ *mA- i t s cr . >---t the following r (1) TYe plan for flying frmwna an^ A,ir Force O T personnel' fawn W ani WO to the United. States the oesnation of h o s t i l i t i e s in ffitm* i s known as the "O-reen Project. " (Z) The plan for turning over to Air Transport Ob'Wintf. certain ^r-'-.^niaatlonft from MF/KfO to augment the personnel and equipment resouroe of' <\fu p.nd mpJce i t ^os-lble to cr^rry out the "Green Project' 1 on a worthwhile aoele. This i s known as the *Qm&n Support Project. * ) The pi an to fly r.lrornft and ere via to the United State to? redeployment a u n i t s . This i known as the ^ ^ i t e Projeot, * i n i t i a t e d by a caol^ from Marshall to ^isenhowo?*i KoHarnay and o t h e r tefSJBaftdeWi on 15 April 1 H6. 1*he com^naoro were to '?alce ^lans for returning to the ?*. *

2%
3c#

See volume
See Volume l2Vi Xnatruotloaa *o** -ieturn 01 from K O and W on Green Project, * 4 M y 1^45; and T O a "Allooation rt ox Bosponsloilltios wit! Heepeot to 'Green1 P * o j a o t . . . , 16 Hay 1 45. -454

nam'nere of personnel with high ser^^e^jrnxtings aftor h o s t i l i t i e s in Europe cease*!. .The plana were'not !t&:

i n t e r ! e r e with redeployment ana the prosecution of the with Japan, and vere to take into consideration both and a i r transport. M&/HXQ, oi course, *&9 oonoemed only

wit:-, problema or the l a t t e r type of transport. 4?. The responsibility on the s i r aide of snaking*

implementing, an* coordinating the plan with pertinent noiea and Headquarters ir&a delegated to the fifteenth Air Force under polieiea laid down in conference between reaentativee oi ;& Ml (AAff*/ To), r ana Air Transport

Colonel j . ?. Burwell ol the Pirns Section*

was designated Monitor of the project In this Theater. ftou, .hly the div i alo a of re eponai b i l l 6y for carrylng citt "G-rdon Project** was- thiaj P U A was to ore en OS

to ftiapdronea dealgnated by the Fifteenth Mr Foroe high vc-j unlisted nn and >ffioen Unite feates. si ted for return tc the

The Fifteenth M.r Force undertook to deliver

thepassengers tc Port Ltfautey "vith the highest p decree of safety; with the greatest practicable comfortj and vitJ: the l e a s t poselfcCU trouble and aonoern to the troops transported _ tengera. From this point the

A*T*Ct took oommana and ferried them aoroea the South t i c , ?!a DtakaJP and Itfttalj tc the United State** 48* As a result of t directive of this fche Bound T&ak Force was

to the Fifteenth Mr Force,

founded to crrr^ out the obligations of the fcAF in tr-.e project. I i s Force was rwde up of the 463rd and ^83rd one oir tinea groupa took ore* an

kberdment flroupa (H).

sclrom in the Pisa area and the other w 8 etationed at & Pomigliano, With the help of l i a i s o n partiea Tron A,T.C. jngeri to Port l.yautey every riay on

groups eont

a plan to Tly aporoxliaataly lZtmQ

man a month back to

Direct ooaumtnleatioa en the operational side was authorised between &.TCt and the Headquarter* of the "1 F :T i n order fchat t r a f f i c Blight be regulated e f f i c i e n t l y , ) : > lo'.-s avoided, a t e .
50

froa Port tyautey to the ho*e airdrome

CU l c i n aotumand*

^ ^ Q Support Project.

: |] the necessity of

ferrying large number* of people between Gaa&blanoa (Port and ftjeal -.,:feedf i e l d s in t,: e Oaltta s t a t e s , the T#&aepoit Ctew t&nd naturally found i t s e l f short of some d:? of equipment and pei*sonnel, rive heavy bomb groupsi troop oatwler groups tvom s Fifteenth Air F :lnug aircraft an<3 In addition/
m

to the inpport of the Oreen Frojeot.

Tc, now stationed in Trinl<idi

'outK Atlantic ma as part of the A?#G. soi^edule* these l a t t e r ^rotipe were turner! ever to i*?*0 mifnifl only gliderfl and glider pllote* The above tr^nsaotinn Tnea.nt# that fehe u n i t s in nest oetea l o s t 6he.lr i d e n t i t y and they were the re a l t e r in no way a l i i a* to the fifteenth Air Force or the Twelfth ^ i r Force. ct ifi tbe cr>norn of
Atf.C* and AAT/MfO only on tl>e p o l i c y l e v e l * MF/MTO

t i l l e d the servioe oom iwid to build* or arrange

tov,

a i r f i e l d * a Air Embarkation points from Whiojh airoraft and csrevs r e t u r n i n g to the States aa u n i t s would assemble, b headquartera a t their home ixiees were responsible f o r orereeeing the training of plXote and n^yiKators ^r^. tb servloin-: of airarafti all in aooordanoe with etana.^rde s e t forth by M r Transport O i and* o ' ^ the u n i t s assembled

p o i n t s boti pereonntl and a l r o r a f t were to examination by /i#T 0. authorities, from the

mowont th p l l o t e entered the briefing room before taking

4.56

otf

for America they and their

r

an- o m i t were under

*m?a*nd oi
4#T#0i

.. r..;.

They civ iron xtu.^ to the fr.s

Bohe5l8| and by '-. - .

r o u t e S | on A., T. J.

31.

See A-l Section Report, Chapter 001 and Volume I.VI, l o r the e f f e c t of the defeat ot Jpan on the polioiee governing the re deploy.-sent of :>rsonnel

Chapter K:a ^

. _

^"f

0*

Xm In order to reaioe the strain on the logistic f a c i l i t i e s oi* Uie United states in the internets ol Una war against *Japant the deputy Jniet oi 3tsuu, Urn* Departaat -iphtesizedi ae the - European wt.r drew to a close, the iiaport&aoe oi oRncellation and uuptailmtnt 01 requisitions by the thtattr on tl^c ^one oi Interior. In a l e t t e r dated 30 April 1 -4-v, the Commanding eneral# M O S i u r t h o r ruled T UA tliat equipuient was not to oe requisitioned irom the 2oni o^ Interior merely to prevent shortages ior redeploying units* actual disposition ol r to oka on hand* however* was the * iubject oi Most ox the regulations oa redeploying equipment and ftupply. All oofaraanda and organisations were aireoted to eiiect a reduction to ainimum essential stocks and re serves of supply and equip&ent# as soon as operational ro permitted* At that time exoeesea would be
g

turned in; and new oonstructionj re GO deling* and

f:

ixv rectuaed to a a i n i ay

^#

Subsequently# AAF/MTO directed adherence lay I t s to policies outlined by higher echelons.

i- ..tedl&tely* a l l units were directed to turn in to Ihe ropriate depots a l l equipmentt not currently required* in excess of T/0 and Se.1" 5, The growth oi eupply Aftd equipment policy had been . steady. In the policy en09iuidun of 7 April

51

17 April 1 45. L e t t e r A 400.688, *PolloiP G t;e He deployment Phase. " let Ind. .770.01* dated ? Kay 1 <45, to L e t t e r A0- 400,688 .roUBA, dated 50 April 1^4d. -458

t&e A T had inttoa-ted the disposition of aircraft by A and theaters and nad Indicated specific reserves in eaoh oas as well as where they v/nulc* be modified or recrndition e& ana bow noved* I t vat further -rovlde.1 that units being

redeployed to oombat area* voitlri bi re-equipped (exoept for aircraft) to the extent neeea ary in the Theater to full T/0 &uld be supplied from

Rj shortage a of priority unite

etoolce or units in the theater; BUpply levels vere set up and T-re-vision made for the littpoeltion of exoetsea* 4. j . en the :laQhlnlGi>-ararie com i t tee Tl sited the i t found Ideal planning in a rather a7anoe4 iW4 had r,lrea^ aeaplled fairly oonplete

data covering shipping and &a&-wight tonnage f o r movementi and ;:o'i of the A i r Foro oomman&u ;had alx*$&dy anbodttsd preliiffiaary plani apparently on the basis o (k? m pal Ti a b e r l ake f s meino pandu ra of 13 Sayj plane* 5, In i t s f i n a l report on 10 AuguetSj though ^nly a i n o l u a i a g supply

. i o l a l Investigation oi supply and equipment had been M4ej the oo-.rdttee iade the following gtnepallxsLtlonei (1) Sqalpme&t ihould Je moved with the organization to vhioh it jelongfl and not ahipped on ahead* fhe risji of dolay **nd

ultimate fteparation i s too grer.u,

(3) Jnlta fthould be

allowed to take quipBient tiicih tshey have "invented" or modified to met Bpeoial needs, and not included In standard fablea oi Batata.i2iaat* t3) ihipaent of e^ttip

i She tr.3, eoneigned to unit a In Eastern fheateri l e on fjpd i ipyaotioable ror the r-);;.;3one nrter? under (1)

7,

XI# Q III# paragraphs 6 and B ee Chapter K & E See Chapter :<XX# Infoi*mal ieao^ai^teiai to Col 12 July 1^44. 4 5 9 *

above an* because units In this i f i H t r ^ e equipped

In tha

At the a^,:no tlste# General Oh&nnoi

s t r e s s i n g tho view, based on nearly two years of perience in the Theater, that unleae fruarantees could b9 'ingt separation o2 u n i t s from thoir equipment, u n i t s should be redeployed 10Q# equipped, 1 0 6 When A F L e t t e r A (0) 65-3 dated 15 August 1M4 vafl

liflU#dj i t s supply provisions were aioh the ftaflss as tho# o* Uie orl{.;inal nemopandots with some changes in the -p graph on reserves, questions vre s t i l l while publication wae sending* two beine? mooted, which Ool* Baylor

on his return to London from Washington! 1) "Shortages in . . . equipment of p r i o r i t y u n i t e will be supplied i re, t stooXs or ot'r^r units* Any additional shortages will be reported to receiving t eater whioh will requisition t the United 3tr-tea "AM1 special purpose vehicle? and power 1 e q, i i p 1 0 n t -fill be re p : i ino di over- hau lad and . 0 . in the t h e a t e r . , . rtH

3)

?#

Othr matters required settlement thereafter* such

a General t a k e r ' s re or r-i-^ndat ion that vehiolB b surtpll@d @ tvoi Btooks in the United StRtes<k*' whloh was not followed

f o r planning purposes, however# the groundwork had been laldf and in smah suooeeflinr/ meetings 88 that held at

quarters $W&Q/HTQ on 50 October* the d#t&lla plans worked out. At that meeting* representatives of the

met with i^presentatlvee oi the O I Theater and &>! Baylor B to dlsouflB shipping aohe^jilo^t preI Mat* Rfl other

At f a i r s in the realm of the 3@rv.ioe Coa landi tt 8, The general prinoir-le govern!n^ the redeployment

- . mterfao.Z, 533 ox- ii*i ^ - : 11. tenioranduri to General HSdwardBi

1 ;#

olU

390 Volume

oj>* l U Hq, U S Ae f ST f '

1 Pert. 1 >44, 0 - 34863 to A VAt for Arnold f | a ?Saker> 81 0ot f O i i ' ; - &1587# I i . ^ ; i Arnold signed torshall tso HoNarney for Saker# 24 Oot. 1-44.

.460
f
- t .

Of Materiel was stated In a War Department l e t t e r , 2? Feb.

-

ruary

14

"With a view to utilising to the maximum extent a l l types of military equipment already produced and to reduce requirements tor additional production for the war against JAPAft, the following r>rinoirles will govern: *a. Organizational equipment ammunition and Class IV supplies will be t r a n s i e n t fro h the Surope; n-Mediterranean anfl other inact ive theaters to the Paolfio to the maxl?pura extent practicable. As a general rule* minimum essential equip ment (including such critical items needed Wr for training as may be directed toy the T a Department) will aocjompany units to OQ re turned to the United States prior to rede ployment. Insofar as i s practicable within the capabilities of theater stocks* the balance of T/E equipment required will be shipped direct to the theater of destina tion. Items of equipment needed to meet the fore going requirements (^ and t> above) may be recovered from unit returned to the United States for inaotivatlon or conversion. Other equipment of these units will be dieposed of in accordance with War Departrnent inetructionB then in effect**

*b.

*c.

Specifically i t was directed that the theater

com landers of the Suropean# Mediterranean* and other inac tive areas determine theater requirements on all supplies and equipment (except aircraft, requirements ior which would be determined by the C m -anding Oeneral* Arnyr Air Forces) o All other equipment would be disposed of with redeploy 1, units or according to special provisions* including those regarding excesses and surpluses* 10. Both Category II and Category IV element includ ing reception station groups returning to the United States X4t L e t t e r A 320.& (15 *eb. 45) OB~3-i3~Mf "Policies and G Procedures Governing the ^deployment of the Array upon the Cessation of H o s t i l i t i e s i n Surope, w War Department* a? February 1^45. See Volume LIV. tetter AO 320* 115 i? etu 45) 03.3-&.M, ^Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeploy ent of the Amy upon the Cessation of H o s t i l i t i e s In SuroT?et * War Department# 27 Fabruery 1 H 5 .

HUD1:,,;

H- /:;.;:,;, g-.^Ffi
/;;j|-:^:;^:

were to carry with them only such items ox organ!zatlonal equipment and clothing as prescribed in War Department lists. All other item were to be turned in to the eur ly

agencies designated by the oversea oo u-anrler concerned p r i o r to the departure o units and groups* and presentable clothing was to be provided each enlisted person before
a

embarkation.

Equipment over the f/S was turned in to

AAFSG/MTG depots, in the o*ee ot Air Corps Supplies, and to the B&ae Section, i n the ease oi on on ite^is. 11. Category I I elements being redeployed to another

t h e a t e r without staging through the United s t a t e s would b aoooJitpanied by ftinltourc E s s e n t i a l Equipment as prescribed 17 i n MAT0U3A Redeployment Giroul&r Number 14. The bal&noe o the u n i t s ' organizational equipment would be shippefli along with sixty days of J l a s s IV IS supplies for Air Gorps u n i t s * 18 so as to a r r i v e a t approximately the same time as the u n i t s . 411 o t h e r replacement supplies would be bulk

chipped as d i r e c t e d by Headquarters # MTOU8A. 14m Category I I u n i t s being redeployed to another t h e a t e r through o r returned to the United s t a t e s would be equipped only with Minimus Essential Equipment as prescribed i n MT0U3A Hedeployment Uirctilar Number 14 The balance

Ort 1-1 ^.c-ragl*ipfe !& Paragraph 10b provides: (1) that such u n i t s be ee&* p l e t e l y ' equipped i n accordance with the l a t e s t auth orized W T/o & % and/or 3L0S and MTOUSA discretionary items available Xrora t h e a t e r stocks} and (<2) t h a t clothing and individual equipment be as prescribed i n T/& Zl and as modified in MI I i Movement Order* Appendix "0" ll&fcs? Minimum S s e e n t l a l Kquipment to ao co nip any the troops. 18# As l i s t e d In tJf Uomfoat Supply Tables. 19 # aedeployaent Circular Number 6, Inclosure Number 1. ZQ* Paragraph lOo provide*! (1) t h a t equipment be based on the l a t e s t W T/0 ^ B and/er BLOB unless otherwise p d i r e c t e d i n MTOUS ., Movement Orderj and (2) that clotb ing and equipment be as prescribed in W Circular D lumber ? 3 | 194d# with rnodirio^tions shown i n Movement Order. Aprendix "T>J| e changed l i s t s Minitnum E s s e n t i a l tqptlpnent* lb. 1?. -463
.

of th organizational equipment would be lore marked and shipped to arrive in the Pacific prior to or at the same tiisie as the unlt, IZm Category IV units aw&itfFv~l-nnctivatlcn In K1OUSA * return to the United states for demobilization would be provided with individual clothing and equipment && outlined
22

i n KfOOSA Redeployment Circular Efumber 15. 14, Saoees and Surplus Property In addition to

property shipped with or l o r redeploying units* there was a great naAf of materiel remaining! the disposition of which depended largely on two definition*! 1) Excess property i s serviceable or repairable property above the definitely foreseeable needs oi the the ter or repairable property for which repair f a c i l i t i e s are not avail able in the theater* rvooa,,rt^L i s aervioeable or repairable property which S i She '...r Department has to be beyond the foreseeable needs of any War Department ?ctivitfcv within or without the continental l i m i t s oi the United States* 15* When a l l foreseeaole needs had i^een provided for

except in cases of conflict with A F dlreotivest AAf A property deter;dnea to oe excess in the Theater by the Coi3'anding Oener^l AjyP/HfO was reported and diepoaed off (1) to the United s t a t e s , 2 4 U) to Air Forces in other theaters, or (3) (in case of items not so disposed of and not peouliar to aircraft) reported to Headquarters* KTO0SA f o r determination of items whioh mi^cht be u t i l i s e d Dy Army Service f o r c e s . Air Force requirements, however, took

precedence over a l l others. 21* 22* 23 # aTOU3A ite deploy taent Circular dumber 6, In closure tenendix "I - (bases on. R l-;i, Append!oee V vl,
R and ITS Circular Ko* 7<J# iW) a modified in .ftve

MTOUSA*Supply Directive Humber 1* 26 Jan. 194&i

raph 4*
Um l i s t e d in T/C 00-35A-.3S. M O S Supply Directive No* 1# paragrapn i i i a i . T UA ^463

16.

Aircraft -ieterTdneflbf^^ n exists.*, in the i i U-a, S*/JW!D were if

theater by the Oostntfm in 26 portable* or if

disposed or as directed by the War Depart

"noa-reportable" disposed oi in accordance with

current theater directive* on the disposal oi surplus property. 1?, Such items of swpliee and equipment ae were

not disposed of as presort bed i c r excess property were considered to & surplus to the needs of the War Department e anrt. were reported. *nd diipoeed or in accordance with current theater directives anidei otherwise directed by the War

Department
18. All serviceable or repairable property peculiar

to the A F was disposed of as follows when declare3 surplus! A (1) All reportable aireraft* a l l non-reports >le liaison, cargo* and u t i l i t y alrorTt# and 11 property peculiar to

aircraft nere .reported to the Chief Disposal Oriicar, Foreign Economic Adndnistr^tion. (2) All nonreportr.ble

combat s i r oraft were delivered to a Ja.se Section Quarter^ master salvage officer for disposal in accordance with tl lation 66^85. (3) All property nnt peculiar tn

craft was delivered to or reported to anf accepted ;3y the nearest appropriate base section. Fhyeical transfer was (4) All

ae agreed between Air force and base section. surplus property exoept aircr t

tnd property peculiar

thereto was reported by the Qomman&lng General, W/MtO to the Field Oorraaissioner, Army-Navy liquidation Ooimission* Coiato&t i\ateril accessories, and oorxponents thereof were not so reported unless specifically authorized by Head-

i U As define :' in A T Regulation 66-85, u ly ifcrectlve Ho. 1# pATAgrspb 1121 3.

^# 29

iik** paragraph I I I , s. MTBUSA a r o u l a r Bo. ' 2$ June 1'45,

-484
Sf ^ Sill

WOtm.30
1 '. faction '^arte^aastoi 1 sal 8r^'

'

Itli

Property beyond economical repair or which con*

X>Qtont authority declared salva-oV-; w 8 Slivered to a i&ae p Installatioii after the reniov&l irable oriticr,i or oo^v

l e or economically r-

meroi-": valus >ls parts.

Scrap i i aste were returned to

the United States or offered for . . , tnder pa>vlsioiMi of

tment r tmen r
30.

61

.
th;

Suoh ft ^evle^ of

. ' /y

:.].: t h

"e- " -

nt of piHjpertj iSoee l i t t l e tc reveal th part T)1

\yj Chia Headquarters In fehat tovemi it As in c t of redfliploymehti oveiwall plane < anated x ;ic: ' -re; i gplemented by T 3 reflection through far Depj 3 - ; requirements t forecasts and specific n

1 ordert oi V e :/: i 1 I e; lore of destination*

JMF/HTO vrae i t s e l f not < ctivel^ engaged in the neohanlei t redeploy me nti i , t responnlbtllty at other

-fc hlstorlei

Lll ccver that aspect ot re<ie

ploj sent In le i l . 21i Yet i t la correct to say that no ltets and - o n

;

oi &ir --roe equSjjpiaent i. ii i ... ii '

[UJ rter

trc
B UC C^

U i s Theater l ti aur

afi not in ifon

elite apart fross t

Bntionea sontrlbutloa to la this rispe.it i

plannlngj t : peefoldi

The Xuno':iorA oi . f/ \ (1) the

E , ^.tion of continuing require i nts

In the Theater (;:)

nd oJ property ayailabls for redeploy riU su K rdinata i - i t: - ii ...j^r at of

. ue<? planning in conjunction

mari-^; and (") the ooordinatio i -

ancles in t^o ai*poltion oi property a all

AIJI)C:.

:: . ;

itle

resulted U a multitude of rulings

In SDtelflo situation! - i 30 Ibid* paragraph 3 .

paragraph 7.
-465

P of Lnterest on the Air

Foro and Command level rather thanig Z&* The estimation of antloi^rted requirement t for instance, reqwire-n-nts ot items such & botsfei a a d s t e e l plank t o r the Oeoupatlonal Air Force m one oi the basic considerations in the r^ogram of redtp] iaent Only when such estimates had oe^n f a 4 was i t @&

to know what was *,vailble, and in what aiaountfl* for reclo ployrosnt. This was the r enonaiblllty of 17 TO, iU3

beinr-; oonce^ne^ with aircraft and A-4 with other of materiel. S3 As indicated above, the War Department a

the redeployment of aircraft* indicating planned dlapoeltloft by type and amount, and specifying a in the QR?S of th bombers* the intent to redeploy them within 60 day a. no over-all order of redeployment existerl. move "lent orders were laeued from t i to t i ttut auy

Instead* epeoiflO by the War aircraft

Department on the oasis of precise inventories of furnished t^y ./US. A0/HTO* These 1

i tedi at the re qua i t K>dli

of Washington; how awanj aircraft ol specifio typesi I flying hour3 were available.

In general, the priority

of aircraft i n i t i a l l y set wa followed in the ienuanoe of move-MO nt orders, heavy borabere t : r ince ever ot;

24.

With the i ami since or aovesaent orders on

th function of A FMf was to ooordlnate the efforta i f

A / fO 3C/WVO in the actual preparation of the .-.ircr&ft for nvc;nent and those ot A O in handlingfchmen route. T Liovanient wae effected nn ordera of t h l i HeadquarterRt :. The funotiona of /W4 were similar to those of Mter adequate allow* All

A*3 with regard to ot3 \T - t e r i e l .

(Mioei had been * for antloipated needs in Europe Again notably the .very tabstatttial tonnages require^ for

a El -V : 4 :

I .

the Occupational Air Force exbftA*ft | a l l tyres oi and equipment were co-Tputea end th*n r s r o r t e d to the M r ;M Actual disposition ot aaterlel so reporter1. . % redevl'

26.

holly on the b^aia of s p d f i o tnatruotiona i n rdturn. 9uoh 9xo0fl8 Ittiai &i were da

^jpid ahlppdd In specif lea amount* e i t h e r to otr>er of o p e r a t i o n ! or to the United s t a t e s ; those wVdoh considered surplus tc the needs ol th ^ Dep^.ytment ordered diapostd of l o c a l l y . la the l a t t e r o&se instruotlone as to actual disposition vtre avaittd from either the foreign E 00 no mi c Admlniftratlon or the Arasy^HaTy Liquidation Oommission, In any or.set the re.?ponslbtllty of f/HtO ceased at this p o i n t , the operaticnai phases of the redeployment being in the realm of
AA*3C/MTG

See A-4 Section Keportt CS-iapter XCIV and Volume , f o r the e f i e c t oi' the defeat of Japan on the p r o r r ^ f o r thQ redeployment of equipment.

-467*

Chapter XXII

1.

In view of the very considerable differences in

conditions between the European- Mediterranean and the various Far Eastern Theaters of Operationsj I t was reco$~ nlzed that the time available between the capitulation of Germany and actual redeployment could efi actively be u t i l l aed in the training of units sn<3 individuals (especially

combat orews) to meet the standards of training required by the receiving theaters. la orner to f a c i l i t a t e t/: e

preparation of training planfl by E O and MO Arniy Air Foroe T T Commanders> Pacil'io and Asiatic Theaters were authorised to send representatives familiar with their tr-lnio --

quire m nte to aesist ia tftie training of units ultimat?l.y o 1 destined to* t h e i r raspeotive th Z, In a.coor<3.anoe with thlfl fttthority# on 1?

1945, L t . Ools. 3 GI# 411en of th VII Bombep Oommand and H U iijAfee of the VII Fighter to nd| pe^ peaenting A?*->y Air inroes; Pacific Ooean Areasj peported in to AAF/HfO for , I orary duty In oonnectlon v/ith redeployment natters* Following oon/erenoes vfith A3 of A^/MTO, a mifvey w made or aniti l i tely to toe deployed to the Central a r i l y taotloal units were visited; but these in 8?th Soab Wing an^ i t s gpoups# tX T O a < A n of i t s y

pln certain other units under the Twelfth Mr t the fifteenth! X Fighter floaraandi two Fighter V Wing8> one heavy oo.-.nber vingi ftnd various other units W E 37642, ^le&nhower lor %aatz # to Devers for ^X i e t c *B Sept. 1^44. See Volunw LIV. Heporte mentioned ^ to be xound in Velum LIV.

visited.

Almost the sole eon tact with service elements over, rose minendatlon

c m in s v i s i t to Kq# AAF8C/.MTG*

was ftad* that special study be given to -.ratters of supply and maintenance by persons well versed in those natters* 3 &s a result of these v i s i t s a report was sub

-:.: ' : : 6 3O| A.\*7 if , which embodied the followj suggestions for further oonelderationi * Since the -Jentral PftOifio la a growing theater with oo -<pamatively snail Army Air Forces oore ra^nte -until now, i t is evident lhat problamfl enoounterer' t\ ere will be aonBtantly cshangin^ as the war d3velons. Ho wave ri in the llrjht of what iss known irom past o^arstions^ certain recommendations aan be aade that will likely hold true i o r the future* The following items A are aoae which A i / -'.TO units eohecluled Tor ^e deployment to A & O should give consideration APA ' to in training : a. o. o. d# e. f. g Qvepwwater Navigation (Stressing l e s t l a l work for bombers and a i r r ; , for fig tters*) ; Smerg6nq> Frooedure (Partioularly ditailing and survival at sea.) Operating Independencse and Versatility oi l l e s t Unit* Air Defense and S :. Uer Control.

Identification of Surface Orafti and. Japanese Aircrai t. Familiarization with Naval Study of Japanese Tactics.

In addition to the abovr certain problems .nay rr^ise through lack ol1 relief i rr * boredom in the base areas* in this respect* i t 1? rooom?nendd that insofar iraotioablej unit "> prooeesed through the United states re prior to being sent to the Central p-poifie Area* since rntf-tlon would oe isipraoticable for those Juet arriving in the theater oven though they , have 'oeen lr>ng overseas in another theater* * 4 A somewhat mrv, oo tprehensive survey was made by

a group of four offloers froa the fourteenth Air Force in China* headed oy Brigadier deneral Winslow 0. Morse, and iaoludlng Col* R. J. Koshlandj Lt. Ool* J* ;. f . J. Durkes. 'ountrin, &nft

This group arrived in the Mediterranean Two d i s t i n c t survey were

Theater t>n 28 December 1H4,

-ej tv . i - s t on ths : l > ke

i visit to iifteen vartc Pysltth an : I

\ and t a c t i c a l units at - I jsrvles units.

:

Air ^or^es; and the ssoond on the >asis ^^ visits to sixteen Various : . lquarter 5 it: Two reports wre :aado*
''OFSV
;

a first# on Z i' -1 sa^hasis should M

^ '-.# -\i Srigadler tSenaral

had a l i s t r f speoiric > .

annsxsd to i t on whioi' t r contained also the follc

All units o be ssnt to China should bs n redeployei through the United Statss h#rt tra Ini ngi re~oPj ;ani ze tion and can so laost efieotively limits tn be redeployed should be bron f t to full T'-",; * : -trongth with 100 ^ overs ; in oo'Tbat orews and a 80^ overags in aisw plants* H negro units should > ordered to CDiina* o e (0#iierali8 Imo Qhlang Kai-Shek has pqust e'l that no Negro ttoopa be used in Qhlm)* d. All personnel Phmil'i. be thoroughly and no individual8 should be sent to <lhina have over nine raontha overseas duty <n* than X'ix'teen oombat nisslons without fir?3t reoeivinp; suitable leave or furloi in the United 'it la ted oil iaers, one for eaoh unit to ne redeployei, should r ordered on duty with the unit at their plaoo ot tr indc strl natio n, l o I t i oe pg should ae ! experienced sjsaberfl of the fourteenth 41r Foroe. f. 6 Dfinit tr;inin,. \ rds should up an<9 aooo'"r*lifllj,e l : See Appendix A for - i lead U : - f*
in^ In niMer to facilitate training i

The seocnd r^r rtj v/ritten by flbl Koshlan$

his v i s i t s to the service uriits^ dealt wilBh that Bids of survey and contained the following reoomraendationsj "a. I t i s roc imended tl ny organization^ scheduled l o r redeployment and having than 50jJ o i t s personntl wit)* (nors than X one (1) year in oversfl aervioSi be jurenation prior to redeploy;1?nt This "* ox aourse* prtdieatsd on a tactio-1 situs* tion ptnnltting
to the Zone ot Interior tor rest and re

irij

-xMblt #V-1 (attached hereto) \ that in the X ATSC only 36.6^ of it V personnel i 6 less than one (1; year overseas service. The .37th tsa i s the only organisation with more than half o i t s rer^onnel Lng within this oatego . i >it A-a Bhcwa that in the e . - t U there i s no organization with bO> ot i t s personnel having l e s s than one (1) year overseas eervioe. It i the Qcnsitfererf opinion of BO 01 the highest ^ffioiala at -^\i/ that a l l units scheduled i'op redep ivt should > eent to the Zone e Interior for no l e s s than SO dayB rer.t plus the additional tim neott for rehabilitation and re-eqtiirnent. (4) A oompronnlee alternative* oi breaking up existing units toy withdrawln e l i g i b l e personnel therefrom in ofde^ to oonaolidate - ersonnel in unit! i o r redeployment! ! not t.vorably m 1'; t n t diia01w ?ue 00na 1r]ered ei-fict en mo Pale would mow than counterbalance be benefits obtained through thie plan* Bapplt de oorns le &9 ential to the suooeai an<1 oon tinutty or unit peitfowaaaoe*

b.

further orientation of units scheduled l o r redeployment to the China Theater fthould not be neoess^ry r^rior to their arrival in the Tr.e^ter. I t i s reoo!87nendedj however* tih&t the usual arlvano echelon 1 ^recede eaoh should uni t * a a P r 1 va 3. by 0 ne 1 no nth nrovlde ample tls both for orientation i&te preparation of f a e l l i t l e e ' ' " r ofrioers oi the Fourteenth Mr >
#

?. .

Thia surve;

, oe WR amplified lay a further suiwey tnade :. y Cfolonel i

B# Keese of the Fifteenth Air To roe* who departed i'm dlterranean Theater on 4 February 134 and vi^ite^i s A erioe oi n r iorce i n s t a l l a t l o is in In-lia, 8urm< , China* His reporti dated 1 aroh 194Si contained tl

l 10 i 3 M n g re co rrae nda tlons: 11 units destined for redeployment in China she ad be rtdeployed throu^j the United States for training* re-organization an 6 re- qu ipment J In the event, that units are sent direct no -rsonnel should be ordered to China ho ,ve over 9 Months cjurrent oversea! duty or raore ths.n 16 oombat raisslons without

d&>

f i r s t receiving suiM$tfs/leav0 ioi*_

in the United t a w l f s l ^

'

all.

A advance party consisting of the If olio* n ing officers (or qualified substitutes) should precede eaoh group by 15 dayaj Oroup eoranian&er* 3-1, S2f S~3* S~4, G isr and Flight B, A p i l o t staff offlees* fro & similar type of unit with reoent oomdat experienoe i n ' Ohina should be r:.ttaehed to eaoh group destined for Ohina to f a o i l i t a t e training and aiaiiiarl2 -ersonnel with operating and living oondltlone* Training for a l l types of units to be re deployed should oonsiBt primarily of dead reckoning navigation* night flying* lnstntRient flyingi practice in the ue of- radio aids particularly the radio o ? p s and o & orulte control. Training in (jpeoiftlized taatlos should o suggested and supervised by the of fleer nentloned in paragraph P above, *

S.

B #

While thea were the only two iurveyi Tiade In the

Mediterranean Theater by representatives from the Far Eastern Theaters* extracts from reports made by representatives of the Fifth and Seventh /U,r Forcest who visited units in ^ e These

European 'Theater* were forwarded to M A for study. AF

@xtiaots did not embody any specific reoom?aendation# but dl<l servo to point up in detail the vast difference* in praoedures and conditions existing between the two stress, 9.' On 20 Haroh 1946* Headquarters* A FM O forwarded A/ T

t the Twelfth nd Fifteenth Air Forces for information the * M Training Program after the Defeat of Germany* of 6 A December 1944. I t outlined the objectives of the training

program* directed the fullest use of experience gained in tfoo Pacific theater?* and set forth in som detail the training desired. 2 Inaflsmoh as the conclusion of the war

deprived much of that training of i t s fin?OL test in co bat* i t i s difficult to make a final appraisal of it success* The whole asries of reports is partioulari*edi however, as an instance of the high degree of coordination of a l l the Air Forces in the redeployment period. | See also & Q S Redeployment Circular Ho. 5* Volume LV. T UA

 , -. .

Chapter XXIII

-H Day Jiedeploymen.t*1

In spite or the fact

that a Bay was declared as of 13 M y 1^45* on that date, a hM/mo had already redeployed 1? combat units and 6 service
p

organizations.

A further 5 combat units and 10 service

units were already in staging areas; and 35 combat and 26 service units had received warning orders. Z* The xiret unite to be redeployed from the Mediter r&nean Theater under the then-existin?? redeployment r.lans ware the 319th Bomb aroui-, KeAlUttf and the 514th Mr Service Group (Special). These grouos departed the theater on 14

January 1946 to return to the 'jt&tee for re-outf i t ting and r e s t before being further aeployed to the Paoifio. Insofar

as was then feasible these units were moved under the current methods for redeployment. A detailed discussion i s to be

found in the Twelfth Air icro History, but i t Is notable that reports a to a l l stages of their raovementt including their reception and processing on arrival in the States were sent to U FMO by observers stationed for that pui*~ &/ f pose* This movement constituted a tyre of t r i a l oase and

on the basis of experience gathered from this and a few smaller examples the Twelfth'was by March able to formulate a orltique of the existing redeployment methods. 3# The taost important example of pr~i\ Day redeploy

ment ytuB thpt of the entii*e 4?th Bombard me nt Wing (H) from

1,

Mel M 41182 to A - A for Arnold from Saker 1? I>oc X G f Wt 44; Heraorandum ^Observations of Debarkation*. rt30 Jan. 45; and. Letter* "Movement Orders* w Hq., Twelfth Air 1'oroe, 1? March 1945, Volume LIV. This does not Include movements to B O under the "Gold T flake* Plan or to Casablanca on assignment to A U T .

- 4 >5-r

- -

the Fifteenth Air Force,

The four groups involved,

9Bth# 3?6th, 449thi and. 4SGth, were a l l 3-24 groups located In the heel of I t a l y an-1 inoluded the two oldest 8*24 groups in the theater. These four groups* plus the 485th

Bomb&rdraent Group, which was under orders to mvv on H 3)ey, wore a l l redeployed less aircraft and ore&m but with their a l l i e d service u n i t s , since they were assigned to A O for T use in the Green %pport Projeoti as described elsewhere* 4 The redeployment of this Wing was considered ^y

AAF/HTO to he the re^l beginning of t h e i r redeployment prograa* despite the fact- th.at scattered exanples of e a r l i e r njV8Tnentfl had taken pl^oe. However* i t i s true that be

ginning In April with the reassignment of these groups and the active implementation of the 'fr&n .Support Project* rudeployment in the Mediterranean Theater got off to the s t a r t of a genuine program* The designation of 12 May ae

H Day w?s a purely arbitrary and academic raasure as far as li Theater was concerned. The decision that only one

over-all R Day should be named* rather than a separate an early one for the Eighth and Fifteenth Air lorces* wes in FQ response to a request by A H on 31 April 1^45 or morale reasons. That request was oonourred in by the War Depart

aent on 24 April. & jje deploy m n t 3ta t l s 11 oe. e The following tables

derived from B U charts present the actual redeployment nt C units* personnel, arid materiel, and are broken down insofar as possible to show monthly progress under as precise headings as possible. Ml of them are self-explanatory,

but the importance of the f i r s t two series warrants tone

G A FX 63340 from tfc#arney( to A W i tor Marshall, and W 73S80 from A - A signed Marshall for MoKarney. G H W Volume U ^

"

Tables hejRded "Sohedulad and Aotual:Uni-t

menf* are based upon Hede-oloyaent Schedule* corrected to 6 1945* All t a c t i c a l ar*a Air Service aroupi. (%>) The column*

be understood to include a l l squadrons.

*+/- inoltide u n i t s Activated or* transferred Into or out of the soaaand In question. lnaotivatlons (marked aa blcw both scheduled anrl. aotual. Departures Include both and redeployment ~~

not8<1)

Inasmuch as aotual dop^rturoa

frequently did not; agree with aohfdaleli departures, both planned and the aotual balances have been the l a t t e r be lag iupersox^bea thus: o, o being the planned "balance, 3 the aotual balance. m previously unsoho-iuled

laaotlvatsloni hmvofe>endlroted# they have been entered only as Aotual Departure8 and the next planned balance aooopdlngly adjusted. r . use or aaterisks* 7# Tl\e tables in question Ape woet Blgni^leant up All inaotlTatlona arrs lnloat#<! l}y

to tLha ninth month, for not only were Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces and AAPI20/KT0 and AM/WHO residues turned over to the Service Ce t . and 1 y 1 Ootobeii but the- oozing of VJ ? Units began to be

-neanwhlle changed the picture*

1th high acore personnel for return to the States* und the return ot personnel as casuali thereafter took a tp rise* As of 19 September all )ut a few actions

mauled for fel t month had oeen accoa^lithed. 8, Tables liea.de TI

C3ui-Tulati7e Aotual Strength of

Personnel ^deployed* ehow for eacl. oommand not ^nly monthly t o t a l s of eaoh kind but also cumulative totals at each 8K>nth9e end. Grnd Totals are arrived at by the addition

ol fotal by Air anr! Total by ^o.ter in ^ e t o.se* exoept in noteri inatanoee when there are redeployments by land* In any cas the addition of Totsl Units and Total Casuals gives the proper sum*

I ^

The apparent and- actual incomplet^niisCof -e##

'

I
. . , . - ' .

of the tables reflects both changed plans and the fact that the reporting function passed to M S / f from this Head T OMO quarters before i t s actual close. 10* As long as there remain in the Theater units,

personnel, and stores of supplies and equipment other than those- intended for the Occupational Air Force, the story of Redeployment cannot be completely told in figures; nor considering the changes wrought oy the cessation of the Pacific war can Redeployment effort he balancer? against i t s effectiveness as indicated by military success in the Far Seat. Nevertheless the pure, raw s t a t i s t i c s themselves

t e l l an lmcresslve story of the movement of over one hundred and twenty-four thousand, personnel, close to lour hundred units, and their equlr-ment amounting to ^ell over two hundred and fifty thousand short tons* exclusive of aircraft. These figures are all the rnore impressive when i t is considered that they represent movement* covering a l i t t l e more than four months.

.
-476

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CUMULATIVE /CTEAT. f.TTFMT'H OF FHtSCWH-T, T-tPTPLOTi D

APRIL

Units by Air
H q . , AAF/TO T o t a l

Units by Water

Total Unjte 2 43 g Total 486 531

Casuals by ^Jx

Casuals by
0 IM

Total CasuiHa Total

m -

T9tl Vr Air a * * 2&lil

Iff t i l
43 478

by Walter

Grand Total O 478 27 1944

1 2

E Total M 488 531

0 332

ToM 1396 2280 3676

IBS 2724

Twelfth A.F. Total Fifteenth A.F. Total

}SC/ TO T o t a l

latftl 531 3202

4rr
2724 701 6193

Petal 531 3202 728 8137

478 2724 3202 27 701 728 548 3913 4461

478 2724 3202 27 701 728 548 3913 4461

248 580

AAFI'C/ T^ Total / T O

1064 2032 3096

Mfc

24*

580

27 1612

701 728 5945 7557

Caauala Cumulative Twelfth A.F. Casuals *hite Projrt Siren SupjtHrtt $ther Jotal ay Cumulative Fifteenth P#F. Osuala ?ihite Projwobt Other Total -'ay Cusrulative

43 . 175 36 211 211

48S 531 . . 2606 2781 296 332 2902 3113 2902 3U3 .

43

. . . 488 531

4 / 5C 46
m

4 4 59
111 ?70

43 41

117 117

158 158

45 45

117 117

162 162

> 9 65
^/

4 4 59 111 1333

41 605

531 689

43 8? 263 46 BOB 36 1153 1153 l?06 1006 88 P60

488 605
1073 3286

*>31

C93
1336

633 680 1313 633 680 1313 633 680 1313 41 2664 2705 41 2664 2705 41 2664 2705

BOB 3286 4094 36 296 332 84/, 3582 4426 844 3582 4426 . . .

9 65
74 74

96

17C

213 1064 1277 > 213 IO64 1277 213 1064 1277 1636 4754 6390 1636 4754 6-390 1636 4754 6390

263 1073 1336 46 65 111 m. m m 309 1138 3447 309 1138 U47 1806 4804 6610 1006 1654 2860 2812 6658 9470 2812 6656 9470

754 14^3 754 U83

213 1064 1277 B 175 2606 2781 332 36 296 424 5966 439C 424 3966 439G
K-36

65

296
4720 472C

111 4C94 337 5873 5873

Green 5>upjfO7tt

. . 47 1121 1168 860 7231 8091 907 8352 9259 138511C7612461

8E 3785 3873

17C 50 220 1006 1854 2860 m.

1 Wo '" 50 r
l M < 554

220

^64
\t

^ stsiLC

2f^0 27C5
5785 57S5

860 7231 8f91 9481D16IB64 14261374015166

1176 19C4 3080 1176 1904 3O8Q

lM7

47 860 2543 3021

4754 6390 > 1121 1162 7231 8091 13106 15649 15830 18851

4BC4 c^lO 1854 2860 37P5 3B73 7231 rc9i 3760 17674 21434 4238 20398 ^4636

cu ITI^TIVK AC:;U'.J r r y-cn? T ; T ^ V " L

"AY C"'V"T, Units by Air

Units by

Total

bv Air " Tots!

Casuals by Vatcr 6 H Total 270 276 d 11 17 17 124 124 124 8225 2X25 10(3 6?fi6 1^33 125 27? U 278 25 303 303

Total by Air

Total bs- Watey

0.

ELI*

2 To

II

0 2
11

ffl
270 276 38.0 730 730

2 n
3 11 f4 272 .278 25 380

U 33
33 33 AA 37 ?7 64 Total / Casoals vh 4 t<fcj Project 707 370? 4409 854 HS/, 1555 37 37 854 6/ 1555 891 1619 4 ir/3 3798 13717 1717 16/61 18176 j 9/4 750C *V32 F.75C 9694 163<5 22/3 707 707 3702 4409 3702 /.4C9

.?
25 391 418 418
5!

358
358 35*

391
391 391

3 11 U

71 369 /,^0

36 380

33 796 798
11 11 ?7 16 6 6 5 270 27C 319 119 119 1901 6324 44 44

14 358 374 374

11 20

71 369 71C 710

369 1084

"691

m" ^%
i

1
1 ?P6

&\ 62

124 891 973 3015 69 1674 1743 19C" 6324 8225

5 37

854 974 1675

?91 3016 1744

77L

1933

1C63 1933 2996 707 3702 4/^9 lr94 5697 7691 2326 5945 8271

^25

932 944 7rr-8 7500 8432 8750 9C?/. 37770

ay ati^e

ri

19C1 63^/ P225 2965 356 11321

U i f 319 13'507 4*8* lf-509

379* 4023 944 875C 9694 3070 18672 21942 4682 24H7 29/99

CtKEUTITC ACTTOX STTiUCTE OFLTEPSOIBTX FTDEPIOTED

U n i t s by A i r

Unita by Water

Total Units

Caanala by Air

br Water

Total

g
34 34 75

mm&k
134 168 134 168 251 326 35
89 '4 3 2* 173

Eiaao.
ufc
18$ 80 413 530 3 09
4 94 98

HZfiill
U 185
80 279 279

43

488 531

43

488 531

1 14 15 89 185 274 4 80 84 94 279 373 98 279 377 45 476 a Jk 79 387 863 337 378 7 7
at

15 274
84 373 377

34 34 118
215

134 168 134 168 739 857 1631

35 148 183 B9 185 274 4 80 84 128 413 5a 216 mm 1234 260 476 41 1 303 1061 2234 475 2881 43 294 133 3626 1450 1710 387 863 337 378 24 25 1339 1642 3537 4618 8257 10491 1373 1U* 5313 8194 854 897 3905 4199 1896 2029 133a 17167 33739 41803

7*3

215 1416 I63I

260 1A5D

476 215 1416 1631 428 2480 2908 399 1258 1657
777

3m
?^ t:\

mi
3*8 7

781

144 292 144 292 824 1605

1 17 18 155 1195 1350 156 1212 1368 367 4114 4481

1 17 18 303 1339 1642 304 1356 1660 1148 4938 60*5

41 33V - . 7 rtifc 3339 475

45 476 a 348 710 H39 76 2881

562 658

765 1327 839 1497

34 79 37 863 337 378 7 7 144 292 909 1619 1663 3102 115 191 5313 81Q4

1 17 18 155 1195 1350 371 2628 2999 795 6^94 7389 399 1258 1657 294 133 826 3847 3790 4084 196 2029 6944 T77O 22774 26621

Project Support Green Support Other Total June CunulatiT*

41 2664 2705

294 3790 4084 133 1896 2029 427 5686 6113 16762 18574

294 133 427 1853

3790 4084 1896 2029 5686 6113 19426 21279

76 115 191 2881 5313 8194 43 654 897 115 115 3000 6597 9397 4176 8301 12477

5*3
115

194
115

399 1258 1657 2035 6012 8047

7655 6211 1/313

3000 6397 9397 4217 10965 15182

ACTUAL STFEHGTH CF PBRSONKEL

i
Units bv Air
s b r llisa

ToUa Uni1to

C '" f

ls bi^ sater

t fljim IHHHP*PBJ*1

TptaJ [ |re ^ i r
8

f^tor Total br 1

prafa* Tot*I

S
AAFSC/kTO Casual* Tfhlte P r o j e c t Green P r o j e c t *A*Mk Support

BMl
-

MUtM ieo
-

it

B -

fi

B Ifett
21

a BSdtt
13 * 13 19 11
m -

.fi

n:
358

as fetal
21 72 72 23 127 81

8
13
m

2stA

a
358 373 15 55 72 127 72 81 9 103 3 100 27 785 812 109 1307 U96 173 2^71 2644

^5ti*j*7 (p^Rsf ^une

33

358 391

3 103 27 785 P12 30 885 915 44 1325 13*$

m

55 66 77

103 3 812 27 785 30 8?5 915 77 1683 1760

100

72 72 165 181 17 6 163 186 187

23 127 81 231 258 17 7 174 198 199

337 - * 337 607

350 m

171

9
79

72 5T2 78f

'' *

2 55 9

337 m

350
m

350 626

96
11 1

66 165 1231 110 539 .649

;
:

2?

100 785 43 1222 63 1932 11

m

103 812 1265 1995 399 . n 399 199

;>.

1
. ;
;

>

%
i f

Cagals
' Wilt* Project Grefn Project TcsSl June CtiSalatl**
BHMAsj^nala

m. mm

p T I f t e Project mmikw90 Project

Total Jtme
* *' XJ^Hb]|V*J - -'

^ a 4fc

m,

^Ba*j*jB*ii Support *****

'

14* 155

144 292 3346 47C1

298 315 613 2330

m 1555 1619

64 1555

* 1619 4205

1
11 12 12

507

11 16 672

gti

399 523

40? C

11
j. ^ 3

163
C04S

722
* *

1 11 12 12

169

186
187

7 17A 198 199 325 9458 1621 122

or

388
m

n
1 11 23 92 796 $503 109 298 463 5167 12175

1L 388 80 2062 672

m

416 405 7 6 163 174 574 597 2249 23a 3734 557 1512 4029 4C20 19252 50014 4530 9458 1651 4327 4483 24419 62189

3907 3876 7783 24244

4205 4191 8396 26574

124 3501 109

3907 463 4020 1493 761 7927 B60C 3185 28090 31275

201 325 5857 9458 1512 If 122 122

. 3734 7792 11526 5353 10035

3533 4205 m m m 672 3533 4205 3637 11S89 15526

796
35T1

''T)4 4530 1512

1

"09

Cf '
r

,:

'TfO.^

8990

; -v 3 7 325

124 201 3501 5957 109 1512 122 148 144 3882 7936 6208 19881

3533 4205 3907 4205 3876 41W 11316 12601 361)3 42100
m m

11818 20009

298 315 1285 5967

Btttel

2
4 2 49 100 4' 47 8 U 9 51 17

1
23

M*1
53 149 51

2 6 49 4 59 157

at Tet^i
2 8 100 149
47 51
149 208 428 585

a u
17 10 27 U5 37 51 34 M 85 112 824 969 831 868

2
53 74 100 149 47 51 34 44 86 234 320 302 1252 1554 12 835 877 673 431 1104 22 388 410 258 2395 2653
995 4049 5044

10 10
521

u 14
582

U 44
575

10
53

JL
i

59 157

76 / m

58$

92

302 f 31 868 42 673 22 18t3

"276 979

23 49 4 10

24 34

15 15 *J9

39 39

23/ 2380 234 2380

3 8 2J95
2395 7333

44*t

5 4 9 73 431 1*4 22 38* 410 *J88 88f 1398

835 877

868 3J0U 3776 51 506 557

4796

5 4 9 673 UJl 1104 22 388 410

24 15 39
724 t * 1562 2163 2f01 4664 5 18 83 911 1712 9623 33 580 613 949 2319 1*59
5166 132711*41

234 2380 2614 271 32U 3482 1066 9805 10871 51 506 557

3229 12306 15535 56 9H 33 399 1899 9963 524 1712 580 11564 LU00 48139 5801 2623 613 12483 16299 5L02

5 33 9*
CtMl|tll 2664 2705 2711

23

613 51 506 557

2086 6518 8604

899

33

12483 12483 41057

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F-5
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221
281
293

68
60
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352
362
376
381
389
392
428

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INVKETOEY

TTPE OF AIFCKAIT

tfly

Au^u 8 t

(B-17)

Repairable
Serviceable
Installed Total

317 99? 2312 |621

2376 3692

2983

271.
717
1744
2732

252
613
1508
2373

Pepalrable Serviceable Installed Total

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8034

653
300

50 2029
1280
3359 (B-25)

259
530

U41

84
50
I
138

F-pnairable ServioeaWrI ins tallTotal

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28 282 998 1308

55 121
682

52
115
407

88
178
331

(A-26)

airable Installed Total

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3
151 276 426

88
54 142

7
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16
96

49

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Total

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' 195 317 520

27 161

9
74
112

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57

129

195
(P-51)

I erairable Serv3 ceable Installed Total

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86 531 586 3 203

8
317 558 883 (P-38)

251
363
636

168
103
195
466

Repairable Serviceable Installed Total

237

856
710

11 9 li 3 676

162P

158 805 666 1629

105
362
622

178

120
188
486

(C-47 & C-53)

Repairable Installed Total

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62 993
ZGB

260 370 671.

34
167
328
r >29

58
107
284
449

FNGIWF
End of Month ^prll. Hay (Other Serviceable Installed Total 100 678 1099 1877 108 619 1041 1968

CTE OF AIRCRAFT COS*!

161 632 900 1693

131
340
770
1241

102

$8?
926

1030
1415
3032
5/77

(Total All Engines)

Repairable Serviceable Installed Total

U52
6777 12203 2043?

1559 6456 10566

576

5244
6S47 12669

2632
4*U7

* "Other Aircraft" includes engines for following typrs:

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Chapter

The l a s t chapter in the -history of the Air forces

In tho Mediterranean Is to t large extent the history of t h e i r measures of self tfestruction. For the period follow

ing VS Day was taken up not only with the severing of British-American a i r liaison but also* on the American Bid.Q9 with the rapid redeployment of forces and, the gr,r-<ual closing out ot headquarters. among the section reports. Zm The s p i r i t of the tine i s represented by nothing so well as by the swift procession of changes on both the oonn&nd and the staff levels in H A and. AAF/MTO. AS On 17 Exceptions will be noted

May Major General James '% Sevens became CJhlef of Staff# M A and .'Brigadier General Thomas 0. 0&rcy become Director* AF 0?>er?tion# and Intelligence* M A . A F Hoxle 'became H A Historian. Af On 8 June Major Albert

Less than two weeks after HUUPi General 3ev?.tn*

his appointment ae Chief of Staffi

became <Josmn<3.ing General hMt/WSO* On 3 Mgust* Brigadier General James A. M 111 son* formerly C3ommanding General of o the Fifteenth Air Force, succeeded General Bevane &n& was .

hlniBeli succeeded on 14 August by 3rlgadler General Charles T Wjf9W*$ Commanding General of the Twelfth Air Force u n t i l 5 i t s dissolution. Meanwhile the Staff of Headquarters A f / T haa be AeM Q ' to undergo a s e r i e s of changes which continued nearly to the end of i t s existence! lt a* 5. 4 5. Both fry authority HUM 00 # 9, 17 Hay 1945* Volume LV1. Per M A a.O. # 14, 8 June 1^45, Volume LVT. AF Per AAi?/HTO a.O. # 58* 89 May 1^45. Volume LVI. P e r AAF/MTO a . O . # 8 4 | 3 Aug. 1 9 4 5 . Volume LVI. P e r AAF/MTQ G.O. # 88 f 14 Aug 1 9 4 5 . /olusae LVI. -506

Authority Deputy (foaataadev i'or

A&mi ni s t ra t i o n

g. Gzn* Arthur AAF/HTO 0? # 48 Thomas 17 May 1946 O i r i g . Oen. Arthur AAF/MTO G # 59 Thoraas 30 May 1945 Brig. tten. Arthur AAF/MTO 00 # 64 g
14 June 1945 Thomas
>3rig. Oen, M# Lowe
0ol Ja ses
AJff'/MTO GO ? 94

Acting Chief of 3taff

Ghlef or Staff ( e i . 9 June)

or
Chief of Staff Deputy Chief of Staff AotJln:;; AQ/S, A~l AC/3, A-l AO/S, AQ/S, JW2 (off. 9 Sept.)

10
/ ^ 0 j 102 3 15 Sept. 1946
AAP/MTO GO # 1 0 4

Gol* Milton Townep I.t, Ool. % : > Gha.ll'ant Ool. S a r i J Hesbltt

19 Sept. 1345

am/
I

ITO

oo # 5i

lay 1945

AAF/MTO GO # 5&

24 May 1945

Majop toward Ark AAF/MTO 00 # 61 19 May 1945 rjor Walter J# Col. Kilton
Towner
Ool. John F
Lt. Col , a; Ok

AAF/MTO 00 # 102 15 Sept. l/>45 AAF/.^TO G # 48 O 17 May 1946

/S* A*4
AC/2, V 5 Deputy AC/S, A-5 Staff Judge Advocate Staff Jttdg Advocate (efi 10 Juno) Alp I n s p e c t o r Xf. 2 Aug.) y njinlontions Officer (off. 9 Hept.}

AAF/MTO 00 # 102

15 Sept. MF/UTO C ) # 104 X 15 Sept. 1943

AAf/MfO 0 0 # >1

H* Alston Capt. Louie S

WilJaipson
L t . Ool* Freder iok w. KLey l t n-eorge F

19 May 1946 AAF/MTO G # 74 O 2 ^July 1945 AAF/MTO 00 5 Sept. 1 AAF/MTO G # 104 O 15 S e r t . 1946 AAF/KTO C M 26 June AAF/MTO 00 # 86 8 Aug. 1946
AAF/MTO

tflaton

L t . Col. Daniel Cr. Hay nee

Cr.ntrol O f f i c e r L t . Ool. Joseph 12th Weather Region Carey Regional Control Officer 12th Weather Region Atr Surgeon Frovoet Marshal (eft, 15 Aug.) John I Gol. Miohael a.
Healy
L t . Col. (then Hajop) Robert E# Mason -507

00

5 June
AAF/MTO G # 90 O 16 Aug. 1 H5

Hq. Commandant
U, O.j Maroianese Air Id and Hq# flight

Jol. Clare Sartain

M.

<x> # 1
1 9 iiay 1945 AAF/MTO G # 5 9 O 30 May 1945

Ool. (then Lt. Ool.) John W. Laoey

Photo mtlmw
Historian

Major SSlwood H. AAF/MTG G # 6 9 O Haniroersley* J r . 30 May 194b

j Albert Hoxio

00 # 14 8 June 1945

& 9eotlon Ao11vlties.

The arrival of Vf Day meant fi

AAT/:3TQ

a variety of things to the various Staff sections of whose report may be consulted in Volume LVI.

and led indirectly to the creation of a new Section JW5 To some i t meant an immediate plunge into redeployment duties as i t did to A-l# A-3# A-4# SOU; to others, such af Combat Intelligence! the war was not over until the last duties connected with i t were carried out. To s t i l l others* the i t meant new era meant a direct involvement in neither:

an additional opportunity for service to an Ar?y a large part of which was in a sense out of work; but i t raeant service under difficulties. 4. Information and Education* Prominent among the latter was *! and S* the scope and importance of whose post* h o s t i l i t i e s program warrants some detailed attention. Colonel Ames summarizes i t and the situation in which l t had to work: *The Initial phase of the program got off to a flying start* with hair-trigger timing In the distribution of War Department films 'Two Down and One to Go1 and 'On to Tokyo1 * &nrl other materials published by M O S , and in the launch T UA ing of the eight weeks orientation course. After showing the W victory film and discussing D It tnesnlng, the course went on to cover, in the second week* the operation of the readjustment program &n& how i t affected the individual} the third and fourth weeks reviewed the African and Italian campaigns with eitphasls on the unit's participation an1 contribution; the fifth and sixth weeks analysed the Pacific Theater and i t s problems, and the last two weeks discussed the 'home front*. The aethod of group discussion was encouraged and in a majority of oases used
-508

- ,_ in the execution oi this course* as the moet effective means 01 arriving ht truth synthesized irora a free conflict o opinions. It soon became apparent, however* that p went* Instead or mltiplylng the oprortunities tor the ior lation of unit and technical schools* succeeded only In nultlplying che dlfi ieultles In the w#y oi carrying out ASP, and the story of X activity during the redeployment period i s K primarily a story at losing "oatties against a rising sea oi' obstacles, * Security regulations forbidding advice on a u n i t ' s exact fate g y greatly hampered the p g i f AB Category IX units were specifically AP C X tiion of B exempt irom the provisions of this program* ait E of unite were not informd an>out their a-te^ry* a tt deetination* or date oi movement* so that any unit nli ht expect s<v nex or later* to oe designated as category IX. The setting up oi schools, with a l l of the involved oomaltaentf at to personnel and equipment* and all of the elaborate steps in surveying the educational needs aad oi the men and the available teaching oec?-.Me so insecure a rropoaitlon aa to altogether unworthwhile* Technical and on-theJob training were heuflpered by lack or men tbs*ough troop ?nove!nent9> B.n6 lack oi f a c i l i t i e s through equipment processing. Release of high score inB true tors decapitated school staffs and prac t i c a l l y doomed iany schools. Separation oi 1-E and 33 personnel above the squadron level beoaate virtually Impossible because of uanpower dlffl* cultles. The A * and A3*- technical schools Q offered a quota of 113 places in 37 courses* of which only o in 28 courses were f i l l e d . Q The Twelfth Air Force offered 3 courses an^ cancelled one. Many units *ere s t i l l too operational to participate in the progya i. The following facts* ooapplied as of ^1 g in AM' units below, ^ajor command level show clearly the extent to which Redeployment brought about a rapid turnover in leadership* and helped to undermine the continuity and effectiveness O ASP. f (a) only 4 ofileers (3 2nd lieutenants# 1 1st lieutenant) were engaged in I-S as a primary activity. (b) 82 o i i i c e r s lifted as unit 1-E of floe re were unit com zanderst d this group included almost a l l oi the rank. (o) A high percentage of unit l~t officers were engaged in important administrative Jobs, and i t appears that uany of thorn were | I officers only by virtue of their re s e n s i b i l i t y to get out reports. (d) 83 out of 132 unit I-K officers were on the Job le&& than a r?ionth; more than half (71 out ol l.i.) lea* than three rion'.hfj phont one fifth (38 out of 122) were on the job for six months or longer*
4 l H

! t r tint

:;

, .

(e5 Relative Tank w*s low were lieutenants (13 oi these 2nd or \*rrpnt ofi'ioers* junior grad). In the ma,jor commands* though separate & o f f i c e r s M6I*6 {isslgftftdj rcink was g9H< low, with only two Lt* Qolonels and cue Major. *ftevertheleesi whenever and wherever possibSLAf classes continued to fe# organized e < during the t 3 H month of July activity probably reeohed i t s postwar peak* after which i t cieclinec! further with oontinuin^ utnpower* losses And shipment oi unite. * The following figures give the educational i-^ictiire July i Enroll meats Correspondence . -.-.
J out) 4o ii!o

Applications

Courses

Certificates

1047

372 6

39

c-rotv.- Study Jl a a sec i Z 43

lumber or students enrolled 5 3960

^Orientation* reoeiving top prtLorlty "oeoouae of i t s slgnillop.nce in nn.'pari5tlon for txxrzh^r military tat ska a* demo ol 11 nation, gra^ttally asauisftd rnore on^ IWJW inportanoe In the I*S pioture* Stjiphaaii waa plaoed on the erection ol' unit news canters as oart oi r,he oveivall prografflj whioh vat stimulated partly by trip ft to the i'ieli mp.de foF the purpose of .areot.inf a number oi these (Uaplaysi atv" partly by the publication of a 3-color, 13 page oo^Xlet on the building and maintenance of unit news oentei*. "The big urpa?l<ie paokag In the p o s t - h o s t i l i t i e s period w.8 6h popularity of the Army University Study J^nter at i lore no. '&r* more applications were reoelV-ed than could ever " e handlefl by the o existing facilities?. The original A f / T quota A*M O of 356 was inore&aefl by 300; there were 317 applications ex whioh <24^t* canje-from the Fifteenth Air Fnroej one wing along wished to send 2100 len.' Hany oi the dl'a who attended one at the Center o m bacsk t o r aeoonfl? and &@ In ad<iltion oonsiderabla interest was shown in study at civilian u n i v e r s i t i e s , notably the University of i'lor*no, the original quotn of i 115 bo ing increased to 16^. Sudden victory in the Paoifio diminished greatly the ^edeployiaeiit demr.n^ "out inoreaeed the terapo of ^emobillf^ti^ and remaining hopes for an expander* efluoption pro pram wore f rwst rated. The nsjor 1 question of the "hour bao-rae 'When do we go hornet an<i & objective oircumstanoe of the aonwnt one ot Aooelerating Aiilftttg^atioa of all Air B'orae units.

510

"The vast educational orogram as originally planned* grille not exaotly i t l l l - b o rni never9 had a real chance. Cat trie conception of such a program and the attempts to carry It out are faots of outstanding historical import- noej they are a rei'laotlr,/] oi Che ie no or at la a l ^ and character of this war; they poak eloquently of armyf at Its root] they mark a break with a l l previous tradition a that viewed war afl an; 6h5 but an atifcorront necessity, and the individual soldier as anything but a o i v l l l in who unwill ingly dens the uniform; they place the strongest emphasis on the- oonetruotlve aspeota of pea efttime pursuits* p conclusively proves the worth oi' the Information : and Education Prograa (inolu 11 np: the >o8twar Ar' iy B&ttc :J tion Progym), a mI plaanl * i j for the r>ea<3etiia armyi wnorev^r sltuatedg should ct oertainl^ envislou a strong and permanent organlafttiont bdiern warfar ^ beoaus* U It* highly teohnlo&l nature requires individuals with n the highest poftelhle ordey oi Intel11genoe t O means of attracting suoh lndiriduala i s an Inforraation-ISduoatlon eorvioe which ie rlgorottti aeademioally worthwhile, and administered toy a bran oh o r oo rpa of pecialLite sl d1or to the Kedloal Corps* Ohaplaina Jorps, a to, 'In spite of shortooialngsi Enformatioj>-BdueaHof In i t s broadest aftpeota prorlded an 1 iportant praotidal weapon during wartiae and a daring erizaent in the transition to peace. a & Special ^QryioeTfv, Similar to I Bind ^ in nrw The vi^or and the ?uoctet8 respect was Special Service whioh w&B confronted oy the need ivtvirta for an Army at peaoe* of the measure a undertaken are indicated by Oolonel "a. The Isle of Capri and 'feme ^s&t havo operate i for the ueneflt oi Army Mr personnel since the ocoupation of Southern It;ly# / - - Pay brought 1about the opening oi the Lido a peraonneli su at Venio* .- ,.- ^lr I b i l l e t s ware aade available for 100 ofJ toea? 450 enllnteri een* Xn addition to these f a o l l l t i e i b i l l e t s have been allooated to k$/WQ personnel at Gftnnes and Mloe on the Frenoh Rlvidrai and at Alexandria* Egypt* Two tours weekly oi three and four <Vyp"i^ve been developed ror personnel of AAf/MTO to London and Paris and to Athena* Allocations, to Beet QfinpiB and tours have been based upon the changing trengthe of th various jor A U / '0 oo a lands* Xn June, ^l t 446 oientbers oi AAT/HfO u t i l i z e d 64,893 days at the I s l e I Capri* Rome# Venioe* and 3 >vies and iilce, fi r-nnoej In July, 36,333 utilize--' 33378 rest day*5 Theee figures represented June and July increases of -511

the oorreepoadiagly deaooratlo nature of our

5,7;1 &nd 12. 4$ ovr t h e i r respective preceding month** In Juno ma. July, the above figures represented attendance of 21.7;S and 34.1,*, r e spectively, of Army Air Foroea p reonnel strej. In the Theater. In addition to' the abovei a Swiss Tour has aaoonuso&ated 96 n e p e r s oi the Army tor Forces each dey sinoe 25 July 145| and i t l i estimated th&t (luring tlhe month of Au.ojt approximately 2,700 members of the Army Air Forces u t i l i z e - : 18, 900 Souring &ay in Switzer land* *b A conierence of Speol&l 3ervice :V?st J *.* representatives ox & raajor eubordinat h* oo^u&nds of AAf/MTO was held by t h i s Section on 16 August 1946. Weed* for Btst Oaap foilitlfi and tours ^rere considered i n l i g h t of changes in strength statusj new allooationis vere flnd to 8&oh of the A-rruy Air Forces oommands ting; plana ere dlisceased for closing VATiouf Aeat p oeyause of reduoed personnel strength in AAty ;. , ia well a; bher oonditlona sit ye re lo cato 1. 3ase 6 whloh re s t aoilitits these disc3U8Slonj the gradual closing ?HV1 duotion oi f a o i l l t i e a new determined upon* and plans to aooornpliah same itere made*

j.: the T?erio*i oovered 3y t h i s report $ c o 9 t u i t i o n was placed on the development a t h l e t i c csonipetition on an i n t e r - u n i t afld r vide scale in track, tennis, base ball % b&ekeV ball i and swim.; in .. performance a of AAty personnel in these t h e a t e r meets have ben noteWorthy. Prior to '/-Ti 2i:/, area ooni'erenoea held of Special Service personnel within A/u / to stin;ul-''te the rroAuction oi s o l d i e r shows, Ae a r e s u l t , soldier show programs increased fBateri ll.y. During Ihe nontb of June fourteen such productions performed in AAF/MTC#
t>(

"In the cio nth P. before '/-3 Pay, Specir.l ;ervlce adopted the policy of accumulating a reserve lov post Vi^ Da^ a c t i v i t i e s . Thie rr, serva has been &dvant&geouly weed in the d#* Telopment oi orgARi*ed competition la various aajor s o o r t s . 0] aci&l "arvlce supply k l t i . oeen i'urnlahed lo unite departing i rom t h l i rheatert in aooordano with t h e i r particular requirements. Radio! were brought into K/ and eupplled on the basis oi one ra<iio for eaoh i i i t y enlisted mefu These l a c i l i t i e e haTi oi definite BIO rale value to our troops* and policy has been follower] of placing them where o l a r g e s t number oi troops oan benefited. The ilow of Special Service iuppllftf to Air i?oroes parioanel in the major su'bordlnate ooromandi

:i

^h:k A
of A^F/MTO has b&n continuously adjusted a the redeployment period, in aooord&nae Kit changing needs. In order that needed 3reoial Service items oould ) obtained locally i* avail able, the Special Service Supply Officer, AAF3Q/ ffl?O$ was designated ?rooure.-K>ht and Purchasing A/ T Officer ior A FM O in aooord&nce witJs authority t bar iTOUSA, " 6. T a Oo-nb^t Intelligence h_ (<v-.?, Gbufcat) Seotlon le.

than many others found Itself

Involved in redeployment,

though thft aissolution of VUKM' n e c e s s i t a t e a reorlents-tion of American p9ronnl to v-2 ana a dianga or t i t l e to *&- Combatrt as well ef - .; tl disposal of Joint f i l e s . deraile a!K>unt of attention to the Under a succession of Sxooutivi
:

Intelligence Offloera Lt. Ool* Arthur

:. "van, J r . , 1st

Li;. Leigh Ger&inej Oapt Tn ion :i. '/ebr?ter3 and 'iajor Frederiok J . Haa the Section carried on auoh work of dontlBnlng value &n& i n t e r e s t . its soner, of j / \ r lnr'ty -ax*o^: .tIon TS With the f'o'rWi surrender' ot J the {>er nan A ''W >rcea in Italy on % Itay 1 " 4b the collection of operational intelligence in the I t a l i a n Theater oeasen. However* i t was realized at the a&Bi time that the thoufiandi of dtpnan prisoners tlxon aTailable offflu**d an uupa^aedonted source of im'ormation regarding feha ^ixect oi Allied Air Po wer o n e nemy war p xo du ot 1 o n, oo r unl oatl o tu$ u eupolyt and. troop aJ the EallltAryi econoiiilc# and industrial reasons for ^raany'e defeat; the failure o! the Luftvali'e; the enemy's advanoeraent in the employasent oi Hadar n<i Ha/3ar aontrolle^ l*lak: and the oounter-aieaiup^fl and oquipment he developed to oombat our aerial attack . "In order that ftfi uoh! oi' t-his in from the ene~iy himself I be recorded i r Tama continued to preserve'' our I screen knowledgeable and high ranking prisoners at th forward etcok = -> at the 5th Array I Q&gi and at Averaa, performing detailed int d rogations tliere, or sendinj tl :; -rlBouers l o r that purpose to OSDIOj Some, 14/ny of the high ranking ofxic^rp developed a spirit oi coope ra tion* which re#ulte<3 in extended interrogations and t\o issue DI iextensive reporta based on their xpe r i e D ce an 9 rep are d i a co 11 n. r st tio n wi th o their ataffa R d aesooiates* B F.lelfT IutGlllp;eiioe Unit, Pursuing i t s lunotion of examining onptured eneiny a i r iorce equipmenti the M A Fitl^ Intelligence Ar -51.V
tf

3 ptaln ^ r ebeter

Unit had followed the ; rapid Allied advance the Po Valley, Party at&lalng Gcntaot !1 IV Uorps and Party B with D I * ooTeriag ene ,y A a i r lields* radar installations* &~.:..-.J duasp and industries whloh* as oontrt'outoro to the /Vxis war eiiort* nan been attacked b the Allied Air y ioroes. Into rro gat ions of directors oi suoh 1 lirms as Fiat# i$*JUX#i ^apronii Maoohi Breda* as well as of the heavy stedl -n--l iron usuries 01 dlani Turinj and G-enoa Sanded to diminish our eat 1 mate of the contribution of Italian industry to the German *ar naohine. In praotioully a l l oases attention was aAiled to low rate- 01 p ix) duo tie a -lue to aota 01 pai Ive saootage on the part 01 tl e I t a l i a n laoorers who resentar? working tor the " Tar go 6 Aaal,VBiB _ joo vioru With the oi hos t i l l tiers the operational .'in t i e s D the Target Unalyaia Motion were Fulfilled* JUT; th.ere remained o^nsirlerable palnstaklag work in the preparation of the Section's intagrate^ i i l e s and liop&ry for miapofliming. I t was decided oy Av Q that bhe original f l l e i and iH library should rsraaln intaot in the Theater snci in the custody Of the Allle-l nation having the larger interests an^ ooramitments in the Medit erranean theater. Hencei after the ntiorDrilming oi th f i l e s an^ of those -nortlona of the library not hol-i by ooth the A m Air Forces and the Air r y Hinistry* tho originals will be turned over to 'viu and taiorofilra Gopiea w i l l be forwarded to ooth Headquartera Aray Air iores, and the Air iniscry QatlOBfl. ^inoe V-S Day lour publiGntlone have b9a undertruten oy the Sootion. ' -A'* "urrendBi* Doauaeatffii ^0 June 194$i oontains statensents oy high German oxTioera relative b the ai^eot ol Allied o Air Power and i t s role in the defeat of as well aa reports on interviews wltsb auoh mlnent personalities as Hjaimar Sohaoht and Thy3 sen. A seonnd oubllQA biom* 'Fiat* 8 * 1 i*$ht f roa Air Power1 i s based on interviews with 1 the directors of Fiat and photographs ox the company a various plants, depicting the harassed and Ineffeottt&l Hxlatanoe oi Ifegly' i large st alreral t nan.ul so fcurer in the iaoe of growing Allied Air Power. "f Defeat1 > which i s sohedulerj to be completed by 1 CetoOQp will contain statements oy high ranking German of fleers on the role or air i IP dernany's mis take Si suggestions t o r the future of (>er;n&ny> and aisoellanaoua r e i v r t s of s i r interest. * complete History ol the I t a l i a n \ir ? A the fourth book of the series undertaken by the Prisoner ol >;ar laterrogatlon Seotioni i being rr^pfcred in R r a ana H'111 be r>u"jlished oa in " 514
1 1

,' ; : ' * f g

> - ',

'

??,

^T**

Several staff

sections were 06nc#in^d The formation of

directly with redeployment a c t i v i t i e s .

the Redeployment Sub-Section wae in fact the major event In A-l between 1 May and the end of September. tions of the Sub-Section were: The main func

(a) the return to the U &

of high score personnel, and (b) the formulation of plans and directives on the screening of units in order that personnel might be assigned in accordance with M S and A3HS, O 8# In the l a t t e r connection* policies before and Before that day individuals were

after VJ Day differed.

assigned to units according to the following priority: (a) lowest scores to units redeploying direct to Pacific Theaters, (b) next lowest to O F (c) next higher to unite A* redeploying through the U.S.* and (d) highest* to unite re turn! ng to the U.S. for He *e rve. 9. After tfJ Day the policy was simplified to provide

for the return to the United States In the greatest possible numbers of high score personnel and for the retention in the theater of lowest score individuals. 10. During the final period* A-l underwent a number

of internal personnel changes* of which the appointment of Oolonel Earl J. Nesbitt on 24 M y was the major one. a 11. A2. Under the new Assistant Chief of Staff A*2

Hajor Howard Ark* A^2 also waa Involved in redeployment being charged with the supervision oi security surveys in connection with the movement of Air Force units from MO T in this period. In order to insure full compliance with

security directives in redeployment* 010 conducted p r e l i minary and final surveys under the air ction of 4-2. Uniformly excellent security conditions In the moves re sulted from such close supervision. 12. Activities and accomplishments, 1 M y 1 '45 to a

P,
F)

si /**. _
i 4
\A

p.

/ '

,.:

p~-^~

S August 1945 are summarized as follows: L Censorship Security Hatters Marriage Investigations Loyalty Checks Security lectures in connection rapatrlates 13.
43

ii

Zone 6, OIC Detachment, AAF/MTO, attached to

this section, has In this period completed 3,533 investi gations made UP of casee classified as follows: Espionage Sabo tage A 380-5 H Personnel Subversion Disaffection Security Surveys Civil Disturbances Miscellaneous 14. &g.
i"

388 365 187 16,917 173 76 309 S 320

The activities of the iW3 Section in the those under the direction

final period f e l l into two groups;

of Colonel 3. A. Karoos who had men designated Hedeployment Officer, A rM O in December, ana those having to do with A/ T Training and Equipment. The Section was therefore above

a l l others the key organization in the redeployment scheme* Colonel Savage summarised the responsibilities of the two sub-sections as follows. 15. fourfold: The Redeployment responsibilities of A-3 were "a. Preparation of a Redeployment Forecast* This lore oast was baser! over a period of twelve HZ) months, the date of the f i r s t month to be designated by the War Department upon oomole-1Ion of h o s t i l i t i e s with Germany. Subject forecast would indicate the numerical designation &nd. destination of each unit in the theater and the :ftonth that this unit would depart for i t s new destination. The torecast was to govern Army Air forces movements from Italy. The skeleton of a chart or forecast was later prepared by the War Department Indicating the number of units which were to be redeployed, consequently Aivldk Ing the theater units into the appropriate oate* gory. I t was the duty of this office to place the proper organizations in the correct category thus noainatlng this unit l o r redeployment.

. wb. In order to conform with redeploying units as designated by the chart in the preceding paragraph* this office operated largely as a liaison section lor the War Department; Mediter ranean Theater of Operations, United States Armyj Army Air Forces Service Command; Mediter ranean Air Transport Service; Army Air Forces Engineering Ooanand# Mediterranean Theater of Operations; the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces. Although redeployment directive were not issued front A FM O instructing lower oomraande &.B to A/ T their duties and regarding relations concerning employment, Colonel Harcoe actively participated in the preparation of sixteen (18) M O S cir T UA culars, governing the policies and procedures tor redeployment oi Italian based, units upon cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s with Germany. These circulars received theater-wide distribution and were the bible for lower commands during the processing of ail organizations for re deploysent. ^c. In order to expedite the redeployment of aircraft* staging airdromes were set up and all fly-away aircraft departed irora these staging ^lrdroraes. This entailed processing of aircraft and crews* orior to embarkation* in coup 11 anae with the existing War Department regulations. '*d. The Redeployment Section's immediate duties were: (1) Maintain files on a l l redeployment matters. {Z) Advise all Stafi Sections on matters pertaining to redeployment. (3) 16. Monitor all redeployment planning.

The Training sub-section assumed the responsibility This m\>*

for Training and Status Heporte on 12 M y 1945. a

eeotion is further divided into two minor sections* & Periodic Training Reports Section. "This section was charged with submitting a serai-"iionthly training report on all units being transferred from this theater to other theaters either direct or indirect. These reports were submitted by these units to this headquarters* who in turn processed them before passing on to Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army.* b. Status Report Section. *Thls section charged with the suomitting oi' status reports on all units? being transferred VOK this theater to another ther.ter either direct or indirect. Alter being processed by this headquarters and Mediterranean Theater of Operations* United States Arniy, these reports were forwarded to the War Department. ft There were several changes In A*3 personnel during the period.

 - -

Ajr4.

sn Brigadier General Thomas became

Deputy Commander, Colonel lilton K Towner took over as the * * new 40/s* A . 4; and aoout the same t l e the primary function of the Section changed from that of supply to that of r e deployment and salvage, as well a policy tanking in the release of airfields* In the redeployment oi lies and

equipment the closest supervision vaS required, and equally close supervision WF.S required to Insure correct preparation and pao&ine for oversees shipment. 18 A farther change of emphasis in the work oi A*4

ftgUM v/ith the defeat of Jr.r-.an, whereupon i t became obvious that the great bulls: or Air Force material In the theater would have to be disposed, of locally* Colonel Towner remarks: "To accomplish this dlfllcult task i t has been necessary to secure authority from the X and to obtain from the theater commander a suitable delegation oi the authorities conferred upon hiau It has been further necessary to assist in the formation and operation of local civilian agencies* I t i s a source or genuine regret to t h i s section that although the theoretical difficulties Inherent in local disposal have been -Jioderately well overcome, the specific steps necessary to aocouiDliah Physical dispo sition have been unsuccessful to dates* 1^ atetis11 o&1 Cont ro 1. The most notable departure In that connection

from no ratal S O procedure during the oerlod was c setting C h up of the He deployment R o where section chiefs daily om coordinated plane and which must > regarded as an Importante contribution to the Kq#, Mi'/MTO effort in redeployment* though the iW3 Section was in supervision oi rederloyraent# 50th S t a t i s t i c a l Contrcl Unit prepared a series of displays which raaterlally assisted in the work* These displays

consisted oi* charts indicating redeployment schedulesi standard procedures* projected and actual movements! status* strength* and. inventories; they dealt with supplies t equipment, personnel* aBd units.

C?! . :

> Perhaps the most elaborate as well as spectacular display was the? gff&t wall pinboard, be.sed on the current redeployment forecast, the i l e g i b i l i t y of which permitted an accurate & d clear picture of the redeployment situation n at any lint. JSaoh unit in each sub-command or Mf/X90 waft

indicated by & tag colored to indicate i t s planned disposi tion and hung according to the month of i t s planned departure* As a unit L n e into i staging area th corresponding tag B va moved into * section marked "In Staging .Area11 and cfateAt th unit departed i t s tag was moved into a section l g i t s destination* and another date was added. Thus

the board was under constant revision, always up to d^te# 31# Other oharts were not merely aids to redeploy

ment planning, but also direct reflections of the normal functions of SOtI in aomniling analysing, an^ disseminating information* "In order to keep account of personnel, aircraft, and eupplies as they were planner? to move, and as they actually move, 50th S O had a series of charts C made and compiled the figures to keep these charts up to date.*. "There were also charts plotorially presenting the different steps thr.t were neoese&ry in procuring tanTement orders for units and casual personnel, disposal of alrcr&ft, and routes oi travel. Btati8tioal charts graphed the projected person nel strength aooordlng to the forecast and monthly actual strength figure* Bliomd the progress with a breakdown by command! an6 eategorietf cunsulative actual strength of redenloyed personnel as to Off ice ra and Enlisted M n categorized ae :to departures by e units or casuals and ^y r^ir ftfi6 oy water under 6Xt ent types of projeot.o 9VL0h ai the White or Green project which gave added f i b r e s of an often re nature. *Charts shoving planned and actual disposition of Aircraft *f to oovement oy IT, by water, to the Occupational Air Force, or salvage were kept on a ten dr.y basis with other charts showing dally the number aid kind of aircraft in tactical units by type of plane and by Airfield location.. "Additional charts showed daily by project numberi type plane, number of nersnnnel, and scheduled and actual departure dates, the aircraft and person nel flown as excess from AAF/MTO.# A similar chart -519
l1

showed air-echelon movements of redeployed u n i t s ^ giving the same type ol information let another chart showed the flow of excess aircraft by water shipjaent. A group of Status Report Charts showed the condition at es.cn unit as rated by the command & d & by A FH O as to i t s readiness to be deployed. Weekly A/ T and ounsulrtive s u n d r i e s of P.O. ;*. Inspections and Security Surveys were posted on other charts. " series of charts showing the status of various A important a i r force supply items were kept on i p thl y b a sii s . . . Added was a series of Engine Invert b tory charts showing- by tyt^e engine and t o t a l , the engines installed, serviceable* w& reparable in tli entire theater. "Other s t a t i s t i c a l charts not having direct connection with redeploy nenti out a re suit of redeploys raent* showerl tlie ratio of Doctor anr* rentist to personnel in the various commandsi showing the ohangftS over the periods Courts-Martial rates were graphed. Speolrl 3ervioe iiguree showed distribution of supplies and u t i l i z a t i o n ol rest oemp tittt as well as the iiumber oi performances and the attendance at niovies# 030 and O " shows, anfl athletics, 1 1 X 22* In addition to these and other routine and epeoial
W

studies and activities* 30th 803 found i t s duties increased with the departure of 83rd 3 I from the Twelfth Airfroroe* GJ and during July and August Keadqurrters OAF, then un^er the Jurisdiction of Headquarters, A f / T , rendered a l l AcM O required ftt&tistlo&l reports to the Section. 23. With the gradual filesing of commands* i t became

advisable to transfer various reporting a c t i v i t i e s to Ser vice fhwumn&$ thereby centralizing reporting in i t s noit logieal plaoe. As.of 8 Septesberi all reporting functions

formerly exerciser? by 30th 001! were transferred to A F C& O AS / T * 34. AdJutant. (teneral.# The A Section wns not O
COJ>

oern^d with redeployment as such* though i t suffered a notable decrease of personnel and the loss of i t s post-1 function in the redeployment period. similarly affected. Other functions w r @

The Air Voices records disposal program

f e l l within the province of A& which was charged with the duty of interpreting &nd promulgating War Department and M Cl A directive on the subject and the supervision of T iS -520

sectional crating and inventory o! ; ^BWfe ; .

th/tMH?

oonnection, A has Baifttalaed oloee liaison with the Histori G cal Section on the natter of the microfliming of combined W11 ah- A e r i oan re en rds. m 5 One oi. the most significant changes in the Section was that occasioned oy the dissolution of H A S whereupon AS the American ocraponent of the combined Message Center was formed into the MF/HfO AO Gables Section* with the British* 26, Air Inspector* With the conclusion of th war* Aa Gables operates on a twenty-four hotar schedulet and aaintalna close liaison

the urgency passed which had caused the great enlargeras&t of the Section, and by 1 September the new Air Inspector* Colonel George ? Winton headed s Section of 6 officers and enlisted personnel, %% All regular inspections ceaserf with the ces^;. tion of h o s t i l i t i e s and, though special investigations end. inspect ions were continued* all inspection personnel v/ore S n dtted to P H and Hederloyment Inspections (PiU) mm the & O foremost functions of the department*
M

Colonel winton

Since VS-Day ax\A up to and including 7 September 194b, this office had supervised 481 P M Inspection* throughout the Army Air Forces O in the Mediterranean and had conducted a total of seventeen (1?) informal inspections of Air POS Processing* In addition* there have been <>7#516 casuals prooessed through the 7th Replace ment Depot ari-i 16#991 excess crews processed Inspections, I t ia further pointed out that inspections of a G-roup or battalion were counted as s single inspection* although the report covered the Inspection of three (3) or four (4) Squadrons or Ooatp&nlsSi Trie effectiveness of the redeployment plan '.a convert regular Inspeo* O tc rs into P M Inspectors la bcrne out by the fact that within the short space of 3J- months, the Army AL force? have been able to redeploy Jr close to 75 per oent of i t s personnel* an aooon plishment which speaks well for the ooot?eration of a l l concerned, who were engaged in redeploy ment aotlvltiea.*
through Air FOEe* which r e q u i r e d ? n l Comniand

The Stafi Judge Advocate and hia Section continued to function in tha usual manner* not being .IM'J.eoi> ad directly by either redeployment or the dissolution of ^' In t'aot toe primary functions oi the Section were -,o the American personnel -llkerson as The only changes were occasion always almost entirely In r and organizations of K A Al

ed by the appointment of Obtain Louis Ool. *'rede rick W Slay on 10 July. . 3.)*

staff Judge Advocate on 19 June and or his successor Lt. I t is interesting to note, in Tie* oi the stress

plaoed upon nsorale problems and disoinllne in re deploy neat planning! that oourt-martlal rates slightly decreased during the period. This indicated a healthy dis<3ipllnar*y situation J G statistics Athroughout the air icroes in this theater^

Xrcm ujtooer 1944 ahow, in faoti a preponderance of sm over general oourt-*martlaifl which indlcntei the exercri of good leadership in all echelons* 30. Finance^ As previously no tod the Finance S * Hq# AAf/MtO was a late~oo ner to this Heaaquarters f i t s i'unotions having been otherwles carried out previous to ;';r-.voh 194i The scope and Importance of those functions stia indicated i n the following sumraaiy by Colonel K. R, fando oi tho Finance Office! '1. During the peak of operations in this Theater the Finance Department ot tho Army Air roroea consisted of 33 disbursing units and 3 Administrative Sections having a total strength of 87 officers and 531 enlisted nen Redeploy^ rnent oi' organisations and release of personnel necessitated the rerUetributlon of remaining finance personnel into 8 disbursing units and 1 ArV'dnistrative section with organizations Ignated to rea&ln In the Theater, *%$ ?ro the beginning or operations throu^i 31 August 1946 Mr i' orce Plnanoe Officers dls* ^ureis'? i563|19&f0i#63 for the payment of -till tary personnel, civilian labor* aalntenance , nd constn;otion of air* fields and the payment of olvili&n labor and purchase of local supplies and services.

it

"3. One- of the oiltstsnrfing ^ohievonentr oi the it inanoe Department of the Mr Forces the eetabliehment of i Jasualty Section to i n i t i a t e the processing o a l l accounts i o r d@ X ceased personnel immediately after casualties were reported, e finance Department over 30,000 of these ac Though the redeployment of chaplains was nn Important phase of the worte of the section tori .. lj the normal religious ana other duties of the ': Ins continued to receive the greatest attentloiii 9P the guidanoe of the Staff (Siaplain there was a ^>nlderable Intensification of activity alter VE Day, asls upon the spiritual ministry and responsibilityi but also in some oases in the Aireotlon of cultural e-^ji tionalj and other aeirvloes. 3 2, before VJ Dayi ohaplain /in twenty taonths or :,ioro overseas were placed with home-bound unite; w%tt loss t i te were assigned tr oeoupatlon forces t it lose tfith only four nonths were designated for units ., . '. direct to another fcheater* Alter VJ " o e l i g i b l e Dy ins were sent home as easti&ls by being included in quotas allotted unite* but necessary adjustss&ts ware mad to insure jample ohaplain over
:

The chaplains remain-

on 15 September were to go to oocupotion forces or

AWBQ/HTQ*

33.

provost .-farshal.

Like rny another* this Seotion

in the l a s t months of i t s existence had a history o*f s in Action Ohief and s declining soale of a c t i v i t i e s , 15 August Robert $ . f ason, now Lieutenant Oolonol, beo^ Provost Marshal* 34# During the months of Haji June, and July, und#9 ,\'!# the Section - ; Oolonel Deans, then Provost on

in a study ol' the R F Provost and Security organisation A with & view to the eventual improvement of the KM? Polioe Cor|>s, The ensuing report resulted not only in reooanend**

- i:

tiona to the Ohl.f of staff, but a l ^ i r a T o f "

H T and M9 police. A 36. With the iaaotivatien of the Twelfth & d Fif n

teenth Mr Foroe? r.rv3 the transfer of all but two of the MHitayy Police Q n > allies a o$ becsuie r a h lighter* mo ad AAF/f'.To, p

B l^Septe

p all military r.ni

an*i security troops except on G pi uy ueve eeelgno^ to O along vith the responsibility of t h e i r prop allotment* 86* ;'j-HP Diirltt^; the redeplcym^nt perlodi the

' . tlone of l i c e operated! with a reduced Btr.li a < vlth a n5 change la personnel! ht. Col. c. n* Hoot and Kajor Al -ert tin lng appointed I a < Deputy PBT', r^epcotlvely. n3

Th.e" ohangs of g^reatest elgnlftcanoe in the functions of 01 ice were brought about by the end of h o s t i l i t y t nd a oonse-Jtient deorease In spot nev/s s t r r l e s and by aontuatd a c t i v i t i e s In oonneotlon with rdeployant & & !^ure stories^ 37# , in % The highest priority project during t h i s tine >rdfl of Colonel Root,
M

the establishment of

a redeployment publicity program 3eIgned in.) to pls.ce before the American publloj ani In particular the relatives and rien<ls o service personnel, a olear r-nd. understand* X i-.>V nt, of the ptirpo0fl ot V-e early redeployment

ot M r forces u n i t s , and (b) to capitalize on the attention fooused on the Air Foroos &a a result of early redeploy m-at by fusaajarlllng in terms of ipeolflo ?coo;^lishi]ients whet T the a i r program has meant in K O " 58t In the aeoGMpHahfflent of those objeatlrei f

prepared anfl released stories to nofltown ^F.r-erR of Air foroes personnel OTlng iron the theater, the individual being the point of departure for the story of his unit ana i t s place In the Mediterranean war. -524 Also prepared

released to redeploying Individuals were packets of rhcto* graphs and histories of their unite, of their Air or cornmancls, and of MAM. Finally the of floe the Her Department with appropriate publicity material for release when the unit landed, 89 In addition to the above and to the preparation

of Special materials for anr? brielinr of visitors, the i afcure Section conducted an accentuated program of pub l i c i t y In connection with pre-redeployment recreation and with "now i t can be told11 stories,
'^* Headquarter* Squadron. Under . new Commanding

Offloer,

Gap tain Aloyaluu Gaaey (subsequently promoted to

the grade of Major) nd a new F i r s t Sergeant, Leo D. Fibler> the Headquarters Squadron In t h i s period underwent a nunber ol changes* both i n the appearance of the Area and in personnel. The closing weeks of i t s stay in OasertA vere . "feed by the rapid demolition 01 whole rows of t e n t s &n& by a great turnover In nereonnel aa n qualified for* r e turn to the Unlt<3 States under the point system and over* a^ m l i n 9 were replaced by low BOO re BWU from the Tweilth and Fifteenth Air Foroea* 41. Strength during the period was as lo
1 May 1 June 1 July 1 September 534 552 479 484

1 August

45 9

During a. period In which the Section was oloelng nut and losing personnel, i t not only carried on routine Activities In the Photographic Labora tory &n$. the Section i t s e l i : in addition i t traf engaged

in several Iraport.mt speclrl projeotB, not the least of which was the technical end ol the microfilm project, the administrative and routine functions of which were controlled

by the Historical "action.

Tide technical control

in supervision ol the aottt&l photography and the process or the output ni fcha two 16-ralllimeter out! i t s eventually used in the project. 43. One ol the f i r s t Jobs to ccrne under the control

oi the new Section Ohiei* Major SI wood H. Hammer s 1 ey, ' Jr. > the processing, oaptlofting* and shipment oi vast t i l e s ol ooffibat pictures to the States with the end ol hostili ties* 44. Immediately a l t e r disposal ol the f i l e s , attention sixth

tmg turned to raotion picture pro&uotlon by the Fiffcfcf tbftt Camera Units.

venth Motion Picture Unite and the i-iret and Ninth The Seventh Motion r i c t u r e Unit was Upon oomple* the aft signed the task ol malting a short movie of the Army Air Force reat cantp located on the Isle oi' Capri, tion (U this ^aovie the three motion picture units were put to worr. on a l l phases ox" the redeployment program# Fifth Motion Picture Unit working In Northern Italy while both the Sixth and Seventh Motion Picture Units concentre ted c > redeployment activities in the Naplee-Gaeerta and oiola areae. oefore the m vie could be c^rrleterl, howeveri the e Gixtii and Seventh Motion Picture Units were redeployed to the United States, leaving the I i i t h notion Picture Unit to complete the task of preparing a oonprehensive picture of the woric involved in the redeployment of the Army Air S'nroas tron the Mediterranean Theftter of Operations. 4&, During thlo time the two 36-oil! 11 m ter out*it*# e

F i r s t and id nth Goafeat Camera Units* covered a l l histor i c a l and news-ret>l events that t^rose. Soth units averaged

between b#000 an"; iOiOOO teot per aontb of ialsoellaneous subjects.

46

Historical.

.tf/tar V'iZ Do/j thrfc* W&Jpr 9Gtl#n . , .

oe corapleted by the ttAAi . ,aibr<n

i8 were: (1) the completion of the M A Hiettoryi c o . j p r i s AS ri-narlly s t u d i e s oi redeployment and t h e c l o s i n g of ^

e

pi&r^eysj

(i) the completion of the? c&lorollsi

p r o j e o t j and (3) tho redeployment oi the h i s t o r i c a l

nel in the theater to the Historical Division* Hq.

The aqaotaplishaent oi these tasks was & e responsibility of h 'iXuert Hoxie, whose appoint .^nt as K A Historian irai Ai Xlrst oi' a amltitude ot pereonnel ohaiigefl in the Section. 47. The completion oi til History p re son ted etope

or lea a routine diiiloultiea, and the redeployment oi histsori* 0 I peraonnel vaa osset oy a very oonaiderable amount o X

unoertaiaty aa to the latentione oi Washington which made i t a proDXea out oi pioportion to i t s inherent diiiloulty* 3y far she greatest probleia was the rdoroi'il i projeot whiohf though i t had oeen begun In early November 1944* was on Day only one-third oomplete. GhleX among the d l f i i k i l t i e s

responsible i o r that delay were the lnadequaoy oi' the person* nel allotiaentj the inadequacy o^ the equipment on hand, the harassuaent and delay oause<i cy ti.o f a i l u r e ot t h e r a to'ii^ns ot I'iles to waJte thea available* and. the oonx'uslon uncertainty raaulting trom the creation ot the At'n:l ndoroi"ilm project. 48* The solution oi these proDlonis was the result

01 tenacity on the part ox' Major Hoxiej the oooperation of iiAr/'i'si'/^.- Historical Section^ and the exports oi a l l mioroiiln personnel. All these worked to suoh good

defect that the nrojaat was eloaed out even before the olose oX the HistorioAl 3eotion on 1 Outooer 1946. 49, Such section reports as become availaole a l t e r

a the writing oi t h i s chapter m y be found in Volume L.V1.

50.

The Dissolution of HhM\

The end of h o s t i l i t i e s

in the Mediterranean Theater sr>eit the end ot com Dined British-American operations and hence of oombined h*&& qnrrters* although l i a i s o n was oontintitd. itt one activity - the ttleroflla coordination ir&s require'-' as never before* In the Spring. Curiously enough The s p l i t h & & project - Ke/^quarters

oe,.un with W O in the f a l l of It44# eoBtlraitd with M F W Ai H AK In the present perlodi the Uscontinuanoe Of KJ&AFf effective 8400 hour?: on 8 July, narked the f i r s t severance of the Allied tle; CJ the discontinuance of M T AS as as Allied organixatloni eireotive 25&9B hours on 31 7 fci :v. rked to the best of available information the last* I Ltes oc 51 After that date -AT *ai subject solely to United ndf The iost significant step in the partition of

the Irltish and American internets l,owever# wat the dis solution of -TA/i as the highest combined headquarters for Forces. ttis Brougtit together by the geographioal f^ots of the rtdlter - Uterranean theater on 10 December 1945j

Allied A5r Foroes were after approximately a year and a halt of successful ooabined operations parttd at 2359B hoursi 31 July 1
J

4J?,

the two oo iponents maintaining their

:

Integrity as Hq., R I A by staff aeetlng* e:c -

D E md Hq, ' M / tTO. U :

Formerly

l n t p i t K sections were direoted to tain tain ooordl nation p 3 thus ended one of the Boat Gi^nifleant B in this war of International oooperatlon* T - . TLo.slnp; \nd Consolidation of Headauarf.^iii ? p with the redeployment of Air Foroes units and
p AAF d. . : 1 8 # 6 July 1945. Ifolttae LVI. Per AFHCl G-.O. # 15# 2i> August 1545. Volume L*. See 3 C/8 ea^l 0/". ^546 and WK &.O. * 57, 30 Deo.
PQ 194-3 Volume I I .
: | .,.;'. j 12i 81 July 1948 ani HAF a . 0 . f
ftr July 1 H5. Volume LVI.

r3# ? !

-533

p e r s o n n e l , plans were nad lookifcs: towsr* * oon t r a c t i o n of the M l o r g a n i s a t i o n in the Theater. By-Si August ;_*

dsploy-ient had nrogreBseri. to such art extent that the Head-* qur.rterr aad ?!er;<?quarters Sqn^aron, Twelfth Air F^roe, be i n a c t i v a t e d fci of 23693 hours. * Hamaining r e 1&BQ/W&

t i e s and u n i t s were turner? over to

the residual elements of lh* F i f t e e n t h Air Fere were gmf*# t o th e Servic e Oo^nn-S rTn 1 2 W]:. the Service Oo^nn-S W ]:.en at 335*1 t i 15 September the i n r o t i v a t i o n ot that

ali<9 B#ftd4ttrt9Vi Squadron became e f f e c t i v e . $04 The nbr ve~taontionen inf.ctivatlon^ bad been

o r l6Ai ns planned in the Hea^quprtera* AAF/ffPC l e t t e r of 3. " tagttBt] bktt i t hftd nrt oeen planned to inr<ctivate the i n e e r Cbmmand u n t i l about 51 Ccto>er, though i t s r e s p o n s i o n t i e s voulrl bo shift<3 to the Servioe Command about 15 October. Th aiomcntua of re deployaftiat was miahj

' ever, that on Ih September the dl0Oontina*ilA4 of the -. -rters kM Engineer 0oaHn5>nd) iv'TO wap. n.nnounoo^, to 14 telie niierit f t 23S9A hours 25 September, 54. All fehat Ptfaailiefl wr-s f o r

to s h i f t i t s r8ponibllltia to MP Service OoaitaA| whercnron, i n a-ocprdance idtto fthe l e t t e r r.f 14 Augusta that I onl^l oo^e un^er the JUPlftaiotloll of MTOUSA u n t i l thfl l n a o t i v r t i o n of the l a t t e r Dr A ohangi i n t h e a t e r boundaries, 55* I t luUS bt-ll plftlMiSd to i n p c t l v a t e thl- c

10* 11. 13# l,i #

v r| Pe r L e t t e r 522/02 j Hq# A ^ '// ? 0 , 1 Inactivation of Hq q Hq Squadron, t w f l f t h Ai F * 1 30 August 1^45. Air Force,* e A t 1rt4 5 WSe Volume LVI, L e t t e r 5 3 2 / 1 , Kq MT/MfOi WSe Volume LVI, MT/MfOi Deaotivatlon Deaotivatlon H d r t s i A g 19 and CJonaolldation ol Air *'oroe Headquarters. 14 Aug 1945, l Ai *' * >

B#e""Volum LVI# L e t t e r $22/03* Hq AAf/NfOj "Inaotivfttlon of Hq & Hq Bquadron, F i f t e e n t h Air Force, * 14 Sept 1 Ho 3e^ Volune LVI, L e t t e r 3S2/02, Tiq / T , ioontl of Hqa. A f Engineer Oomaand, KfO| l a Sept. 1 Ac

q u a r t e r s on 1 Koveaberi but tho aoaelerating p.aoa of r e . .riant and i n a c t i v a t e

1

&de i t

oi ible to announee

13 September the ad of fche mission oi Ml / TOS l . Ef^eotive 301 i h ursj 1 October 1 481 Headquarters# wpay Airi^roe;7, 8fO i s non~opv~ a t i c rial % Srfeotive 0001B hours, 15 0 Headquarters, Array Air Forces# WO i s f

tinned*
!t

r, STfeetive -arfij 1 October I Headquarters, Army M r Force ro la relieved Strom assignment to Aray Air i o r o e e , CTOj i s aseigntsd to Headquarters '0U3A and 1^ oonetitutod as a :iajor
of NIOtlSA.

Volume LVI* L e t t e r A 323/030 00| Hq. MT0U3A, G IS Sept, 1945* -550