.~::~y<!~~~.

,
I" "1 \ .

,"!"

.jl%~l;\;~[;;:,;L;.;.()OM~~=~-=:; 7
j,t~;Vi;~,:;~,'~~I:J,l:'::':~~urces' used inci~de

:,il(?':"Ii~~~!~i~{,?~;,~~t~,ur*~~;"i~tl;'"
eV,~l~ates ""w;"!;"':l,~.:",;ih'of .pHUNG HOANG Program the Province"~po~ts
. };,"""
i r-

September

:if~;~~;=~~
'1972 . P',

'MAeeORDS 34':'Oi'i:~';;'
, '... ,' .... ,.,.

"'~:~;:;t:"":;'\I;;;:\:\i';';,,'.'"

.:,\.' ',::,'i

'

c,

' ......

:i~~:",<;::.:, ,,~;,~:::,;\;:,,:.~:q:t',.

and S.~ptember ,1972 and ~sel~~!~<;l.,}~ ,~"f~\;~;;:~J!~;(;::::~~': ;"\'t;,;): ,;;!:r~~,';\:':':h'':,' \,~~?n~:#';y;;:;<::'i"\6,~l;;~:"""., ; ,.', ,,;,;,~,,'y';i(SYJ " ;'i\?~:'l;:"~i~:;L;):~I.:J;':W/~~~~:fi~~;t(~::'ii4{;~~~~~rtf,: , " ;\."',;:,':!~. .';',.,.,GVN documents. Informal evaluatlons based on appllcable "!J:~~i;q1~~',;;,:, .:?-{k;~~.~~< ':' -:~,~~tJ,,~.. .. ,~,;.~,.,~-, " :/:'c.<~:-:~.~'t';~"':' -. ., . , .' ' -.' ~.~,;~ ., ~~':~(~::~._: ;'j~',~:,<:, \:< criteria ,: were prepared by the Senior PHUNG HOANG Advisors of , ';';.',:,
t ,.' p ,.'

';:':',?i~:<;:,,'~<~:,:;:;;,'~i.R3)for' ,the morrt hajof ,

,August

".,~~,,:ti,.',:,'.:.'\';'.,\' ,.... ' :.{: -. '.,',

~.'>:'f:'~ . ' "the '\

~-.\

1"1

'"

'

:,

.,'.::'

',-~

~.\."

'

four ' Military'

,.

Regions'~
'j

Province extent
;-

reports possible

and the to

evaluation the

was retained of the to each

tq the
remarks. of the 44
.:-:~:.
:,: "t

preserve

accuracy

_.'

2.

(C)

The common criteria were as follows:

applicable

provinces

commanders

in,

and support to carry

for, out

the specific ability

PHUNG HOANG Program. targeting to neutralize techniques: 'selected

' ....'.;!

c.

Ability

An evaluation

of demonstrated Vel using

<,

members of the

approved

operation~l

techniques

and

:, DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADE T/O~ S E 0. .._"...r,~: _.:::.:N~A~--,-;;.;..-"-.:::1 " F, / ,.'i? CONr:UE~:Ti;:.,. cr. __ N A '>

<)

DECLASSiFY ell ~l6 c: <:, 'r! r f) }\ y

3]

DEe

978

..MAC.CDRDSS PS

.
I.

,..'.

,~--

,-

"

proper coordination d. 3. (C) Problem

between

appropriate

POPAT

areas or comments:
.A

Self explanatory . of the PHUNG HOANG

;

A country-wide
~ ..'
.

evaluation

.. ,

;-~

'~is as follows:
"'~-~'-.'"

"i":"'~ntegration:
:"

All IOCC' s
/'"

District

and"J>I"ovince POC's, 'except ,.,a'n a

-"~

the int~gration~~:~n space, .or occ~pa tion

f '

7!!:~- tse~
f,~rces. Poli~ar~UllY the Lnt egr-a.t t ori=and
"",-

h7"((

due to .~.lack of ~r-t~s~.

.. '

"",ili_

'~~',' space the -

--ex~ep~~s.)

In those few locatl0ns where avallable

"
"

"

.' is a prob/~ational necessity

COgni~~nt~f

to accomplish

have requested "-.

add.rfional funds or facilities

/.....
./'"

to do so.
0" -.

,-,.

----.......

~_.",_--.-........,...

__

"

.:0<_,.",.

- .. "'

,-

~.s>-' .... -

lJVI""vcA

/")...

-j-'

7- J1..(jrL~~-1' _.(.
jl _~ ~ "

b.
" I ,

Degree

of GVN emphasis:

The PHUNG-HOANG

Program of command
,I:,

in Military
i ,.,:1. "

Region

IV has long had the advantage

emphasis

on the part of the Corps Commander. down to District

This attitude

has permeated

level, and is a major factor

Similar command other Military and actions

emphasis Regions,

has been slowly developing and is evident

in the
,

now in the st~tements As happened during necessity

....

:......::...;.-~ ..~~ .
":1 -

of respective

Corps Commanders. cease-fire

during the April invasion, the period appears of dealing

speculation the critical Conversely,

to have emphasized with the VCI.

decisively

there are

,,,.,

,'.',

__ ,,~.~~"

.,

'.~."~~~",

"

,.'

<-

."~,._"

."~_"",,~,,~,_

'i

..

..

_~

,_

~,

__

~~~~.~M~.~~

"-,

"

.. ,.J~;'" ,".
r _.
" .

~.

,.
"

instances

of Chiefs

districts

and

their 'respective National Police Commanders,' , .~.b '::l::-iJvuYU~ to understand the ~~Program, or "',' for their own reasons, failing to give it
.

~ppo,:~~~ c .,~f .flected . in'pr . ) B. ic Targeting:

_ __

:/ as (See' ',' ,

Gross neutrali~t--Hms

iminar! GVN ~~gures,' ar~bi~g. e, bu.:t; b~,~valid, targeting

~:,--h:
, .

Harder to isol

is an apparent"
-.

increase
"

in the use o~ie

techniques.

The

'.: ..

advantages Of~ the ~rObablY

~er,

comm~iici

ty -inh"re~t -

in-

---

account for this develoRme-llt

that in those provinces the National

Jt is Mcsa apparent situation

where

the military operating relatively

precludes

Police from are combat

freely,

specific

targeting

techniques

ineffective

due to a lack of available

military/police
-.'-!

operations

will be necessary designating

to achieve confirmed
"

VCI'

neutralizations targets

by specifically objectives

VCI
.

as secondary

of conventional

local

operations. d. Problem Areas: The problems at province areas: and command effort control. The that are common to
(}/IL"h' '-l~/u:YI.!/;'.... f .'-PIHJN6-HOANG operations

level and below fall

into the following (1) effectiveness

general

Command emphasis

~1j-

-tP/'/r..d~-1.1

of -the PHUNG-HOANG

at all levels

directly

with the attitude

of the key

and police commanders. of the provinces and the absence

:,.:(.:

The problems

are the of firm coordination. "The

(2) "Intelligence

the Sector or Sub-Sector Service-(MSS) '"It is hoped that the Permanent representation security

S2 and

go their separate Offices, which Lnc l.udo and

from al~ost all the intelligence

agencies,

can become a means of increasing but this will require,at interest the on

interagency very

cooperation,

least, continual

command

and attention

part of District (3) 'the personnel

, .

and Province operations.

Ch~i~e~f~s~. Although

------~========~;
specialized
/U"/itL

pac

a great n~~

manning

the POC' s have received

d {;/..(
of to

training

at Regi...,0I?-a~ National and

Y2V'vf~Y'v1'V~ "a-fi..4i---')tI}:l Jl'1"Vf I ' ..' '. . i, h..""~ll:er;Rt:,~=if""ie;:;:c:l:erk'J.,-111enta11:."..Some . ~~>t:.:=!~..g"'t:'5.

<_l/tte'.A

schools.J~he !1pertty

tJ.-:;h A.;;' t~~s.=pe~~~~-::-in=:-;:f

,..,.'""

the

roc

personnel to

visualize apprehend

and plan the types of operations VCl living in contested areas.

necessary

Not knowing what they merely file it.

to do with the information

they receive

4.

(U)

comments in Incl

'.',

,~

",

.,';"

UPDATED HAVE NOT BEEN

I

.'

"

'.

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

,-,'

.~. '
. '.'~") "..,. I

Hiep Due, Carn Lo, Dong Ha, Gio

... ,.:

i ;

Mai Linh, and Trieu

" 'BINH DINH PROVINCE

'

..

Hoai An, Hoai Nhon, Tam.Quan KONTUM PROVINCE

"

.~'

Dakto,' Kontum DIOCC MR III BINH LONG PROVINCE Binh Long PIOCC An Loe, Chon Thanh and Loe Ninh DIOCC PHUOC TUY PROVINCE DIOCC PHUOC LONG PROVINCE
",":, ':.' ...
",~ '"

~,,~;:,,'.' .- .

Bo Due DIOCC MR IV KIEN TUONG PROVINCE Tuyen Binh DIOCe

... I -.-

'

.~_

.~.. ,r _

'.

~""

.I:

-Q.lJ

m,llt.L\.

A PR
-~'

":',!i;':

T,;

'::;.

,U . -.it;

" t,.. _

.:~ .,~f :

.~.~

REGIONI QUANG NAM PROVINCE: ,All IOCC's are

";.'~. '.

:,'~~',:~,~: -'-,

~:,~
,.'

',-

::.-:-..
~,

completely
\~, ~,';" .;

integrated
.."... -, .

the
r ": ,~,

POC's.
.~~~~.!..~~ , .,_ -

-:.,

~:--. :

. Although
'0"-,
!' '.\. .

98 of 103 Village
I: -" ::;~:.,-..

National
~ ."~, ':~~~ ..

Police

attended".}HUNG HOANG trainin~.

", V;:~:.

ofs~me
:~:. ':

have . ',7i.o::tf.:-;':.; . -" ,';/-:"r~~,~<~/::.~.;_;, .. ,:-.~~~-~ ,:~!. .sort ,>theireounter7:;c:t>X'i::'~/"

.. ',-' " .. "':. , __ ; -.

Chiefs

. Permanent
. .r '

Office
',:c': .

Chief

and Province
, . ',' .
: I ..

POC Chief .
,> . '..~ , c.,',

'~.

. t-'.:

. , '." \

-.... -';

A/B level

VCI were given

t : ;

"An Tri"
.' -#~;_.. ,' 7.... .
:. .

detentions
'-:.'

and 107 AlE. in ,. 2 .

September. -'. '. , . .

<.

. : ~~:}~ ..

:~=:;:~

.1~_

QUANG I PROVINCE: NGA integration

.,'

evr.X('

.. :'

,' ..'. . '.

~T".eAJl,;;~t-'

-;

-.

of -PHfJNtr--HeAN6 activities has been a slight Province leader, POC Chief

into

the

National

Police Although

there the

deer ease
is a well-

in activities.

a,./.. A .~Z .

trained,
p;"1/tl.'"...

capable,

enthusiastic his boss, the

experienced
\.

i~~.f.Province National Police

~HOANG activities,

Chief, takin~..Il:ios.!'ll" .... !!,oman apathetic Province Chief, ..

f.?~'("f>.;;~+'?t~;~;;;j~:'.n n'o{Share
'.

~i;;"
'.
1 . _ .~

his

enthusiasm.

The Province having of

Security met three Total

Council":: times
"':',.

~ .
.:

. appears
,

to be relatively
.-~

energetic, a total

"

in

September

to consider for

107 cases.

neutralizations to 32. 3.

September,

including

4 ralliers;

amounty

..

QUANG TIN PROVINCE:., '

QN,;t,iiuJci':"floI~t-;:;--'~iin " is a comPletelYJ

Vietnamese The Province show," and one that and the as are evidently POC Chief their works quite are both well well) ~

~;

~tJ

NP Chief

7 tr~

subordinates.

The POC and the Permanent

/,,';.

Office work well together,

and
,

.'
"~:

...

can generate

quick reactions reaction

to intelligence .. The POC is effectively

.

had a dedicated .. employed targets.

force which
I

a-a: -T~~4.f .
.

,,'

throughout

the Province

against ... PIlliNG-HOANGPolice and.

In August there were five National

:.:

seven comb Lned National operations. operations, the.Septemb~r intelligence. of all members

Police/mi Iitary Ipara-mi Iitary there were 47 National Police

In September

-.

and 31 c omb Lned operations.

;,"

.Twenty-four of;'

O./;1...U'

-1:.w{.<.~J,~

operations In August

were in response the Province

to ~OANUr

Chief held a meeting and Village the to target PHUNG

of the Province, for the purpose efforts

District

HOANG committees intelligence

of coordinating

gathering

of all agencies

VCI and to launch a campaign more A and B category up by the willingness of the National generated VCI.

to identify This command

and neutralize emphasis, backed

to commit military force in support O./',~.l.A.'-"'l:;c./i:Jl~f>!t-i~7! Police and to react on 'PHUNfr--HOA-N6 - POC appears to be

intelligence, QUANG TRI: The scheduled

4.

integration

of IOCe's of the

POC's was not met because Province.

of the NVA invasion

To date the Province

PHUNG HOANG Permanent

Office and the POC's for Hai Lang, Mai Linh, and Trieu Phong Districts have been organized and are operational

~etr~ '---2

II

..

~, '",

' ,

.. ~ -

"

'.

within

the Danang area refugee

camps.

Plans for the coming four districts

'month are to organize and to integrate . security ruption,

.(~

the POC' s for the remaining

..;

the POC activities

into the overall the dis-

plan for the refugee

camps. ' Despite

pOCare continuing
C- ()(fl.l \~, r~Jltl't~.t,f'.

--

,.,
Police level

.-'

Quang Tri ~PH~~H~~ational to attend regional

and national

-,-PHUN.G-HOANGchools, s
. <'.'.~ "

and have been given additional

'",'
'"'

allocations few months. 5.

to continue

th~-training

pace over

THUA THIEN Police

(AND HUE MUNICIPALITY): Centers are Orga~ize:~~ POC, thahks National the best in

. .. \

Operations

active

throughout

the Province. and ability

The Province

to the leadership Police

of the Province is considered

\\

Chief and the POC Chief, and compares

\ -\
\

the Region, country. 'usinghoth

very favorably

with any in the successes

There have been significant specific targeting

operational

by Special

Branch and general

,area;ltargeting, by combined

National

Police/Territorial Province The

~l
'.<s..

forces . -1- " "Unfortunately ,there is a wide gap between " ."" and District District POC's in general ability

and initiative.

POC's still suffer from the "file clerk - petty mentality, than being more concerned with office

\\
-,

bureaucrat" procedu~es

neutra liza t ions.

The Provi nee POC Chi.e f is

;.ware __ f -thIs-shor-tc'omiilgand'a-' .orrective-.trai~i~g a 2 G was conducted in September for District personnel.

~;~r;~- / .. _~ ~

has declined 387

F~~

0.. ""T..M/;'q"v.A,~ 4':0'

for two straight

months.
<.,

operations,

88 of

97 A/B neutralizations. operations, resulting

<

77 of which wer~ against

in 34 A/B neutralizations. of the intelligence requirements. over District effort, and The Province

be little coordination poor response

to intelligence control

POC is not exercising

the plus side, the CHlEU HOl Service cooperating significant 2. well with the National neutralizations.

POC's. On S~G-and the ~ are

Police,

BINH THUAN:

------........
POC's are undermanned, appears to be good communications POC's. The Province although there between is .; and coordination Security Council

the various functioning average

well, and is handing

out sentences sentences.

which This rather

twice the length of previous to be due to national

L ~/J (~
I ~I

is thought

policy directives

than local initiative.

3. DARLAC:
a/'I'\)~~ '(.. '.. f;,.""v~l/l<o{t

.~/
..
..{

~~-HBANG
District,

activities

are rated as good in on~

/
fair to poor in two Districts, A major and non-existent appears to be /

\
in the fourth District. hindrance \

C2
.-

j/
<

. WI'\1iI8I ~. a '1j fC7'Cr'fIIAL

->c_ '",,-,

.J

~~:{( '-7enn.tJ!t-<'1.t @t,.(>1~~'''~A ~ ; ~~PHUNG-H0AN~ an attitude which has transmitted

to the District collection Chiefs. Ninety

police work.

The Province

Chief appears

to be apathetic

is lacking.

initiated

by the National The

been received.

to captured Chanhs.

, ";

-' .:

'

. ,"i',:'.:

I.

:'.' " . ~i
, <

Province report
.-:'r:~..fIJW,I0.r't.(I~

indicates

that the Province

t. R (Jr
~
..

forces Platoon

including

N'I'F'l1 and the Sector areas

Intelligence to remain

into operational
'.,
..
'

-.'"t

, .....

in the field until they had valid results~ .

6 ...LAM DONG: Province indicate marked Documents discovery arrested Reports for August and September of led to the

progress

in the number
...

captured

by t erdt or-La I forces

of 24 suspected included members

VCI in September .. Those

'-'

-'... --,.~

of youth groups and RF units. had been working for the gives

As some of these individuals VC for several promise

years, their continued

exploitation However,

of further neutralizations.

the MR II the province resulting

Senior PHUNG HOANG Advisor

still characterizes performance

as having a poor operational from a lack of intelligence into VCI areas. attitude
7.

directly

and of aggressive

operations to be the
,. ,)

He cites the basic problem Chief.

of the Province
NINH THUAN:

Lack of specific operations

intelligence

on which

to base

~\_"P
has been a major problem. Of 920 alleged -PHUNG. HeANG""operations contact. in the last three months only 57 involved and

The Province

Chief is aware of this deficiency

-.".'

;.'
is extremely efforts. progress interested in bettering intelligence

...,...

collection

The National

Police are, on a whole, at District

~
. "

making~od Coordination a
.j

in their efforts between

level.

and cooperation problem 8.

concerned ,agencies remains

"

at Province PRU BON:

level.

---~-.;;.---~~
.

...--,;'

;'

- .... ,-.

The Province cooperation between

POC is functioning agencies.

well, with good However, in only

the various

neutralization three category

9.

efforts

in September

resulted

B VCI being

apprehended.

PHU YEN: Neither the August nor the September Province

Reports make substantive POC's.

mention

of PHUNG HOANG or the notes the

The MR II Senior PHUNG HOANG Advisor

following: a. is still

A coordinated

intelligence

collection

effort

lacking. b. Of 1,044

~(}.;!.iti ~ 1:4A.Jtbtul~~~I

operat:ims, only 162

had contact.

o.,..Y\M. ,.TP..!"r,,(jl.~
the ~~HOA~G will change

c.

The Province

Police Chief is convinced or assignment

that

organization, again in January

of responsibilities, to

1973, and is not anxious

push too hard. d. Only 6% of VCIneutralizations in the last

"

two mon~hS were

10.

of confirmed

veLlA
"
'

"

PLElKU: The military situation

'"

in this Province

has'

taken precedence
'

OM-tf

-t::vi~L.i-t~

over almost anything operations

else , 'however,' '"'~,

:," ...

.,

,.,.

'.ffective ~&-1IO:A:Nt} e
'~ .:

are still continuing ... :, Police/Sub-sector

Between effort

18 and 25 September

a combined

rolled up a total of 18 VCl in An My Village,

I

-! .

'

' .

1"'

.'

Trung District. sympathizer's capture

This rqll up was initiated

by a GVN

tip which resulted documents,

in two VCI KIA and the

. ,",

of numerous

the further

exploitation

of which produced 11.

('tr" ..~-, (1 ~):.A' ..\--r::; Q /. \, t.A..<, '.cZ)Ij'!,I.."

the rem~ining

16 neutralizations.

QUANG DUC: The MR II Dong Khoi campaign, in tactical operations, started on

Vy

~ANG

intelligence

24 August
.:.
"

in Duc Lap District,

and led to the apprehension of the Due Minh Committee. No

.,f 11 !_n_i:li.Y.l._cillihs o believed Village further Committee

to be members

and the Duc Lap District information

substantive TUYEN DUC:

is available.

12.

The PHUNG HOANG program a good intelligence neutralizations Bong Lai Hamlet Duong District collection

is well underway Significant

here, with

..,L'

effort.

iff

in September Security

included

the Chief of the

Section,

the Chief of the Don Section and theJ

PRP Committee

Rear Service

and Deputy

ordination 13.

and con.t~'~~~-~~7 CAM RANH CITY:

__

--":"~~---:"'~~-!

__ ""';

August and September, Unfortunately

evidently

helped by

disagrees, without

r~al progress

will be difficult

the support

of the Mayor.

III.

MILITARY 1.

REGION

III

BIEN HOA: Despite instructions

.--to establish reorganization Essentially were conducted, specific

-plans are just was the Although would be lack

POC's on

12 June 1972, serious in Bien Hoa Province. somePOC related

is j~st beginning this means that, although

matters

to comply with the true meaning currently being implemented.,

of the directive

One accomplishment

establishment

of a model

POC in Di An District. layout, its duplication

this is a very effective near impossible of adequate

in most provinces Currently

due to a current

space.

there is a fair exchange

~ ~-~~-~~ -~~~C-~~~----_:---J

\
I

of information

with member

agencies,

but very

little

'~~2"":":~~ ..~,_~

from military area. There is good information

'S!(G

on the physical
.

location Although

.of member dossiers clearly

agency sources

and on ~

operations.

are being maintained, understood. Further,

specific

targeting

dossiers

at province at of 17
13

do not reflect

the same illbrmation as dossiers

level on the same individual.

There is a Shortage

'.
National Policemen.

.pOC. ~' ,
There is poor

7.:t.Nl6~d.a/1.~)
inc luding follow-up in some districts; have

persons wi thin province ~6--o:fftees,....,.

for example,

in Duc Tu District,

114 VCI members

been identified

and only 12 confirmed,

and in Tan Uyen District There

162 have been identified,

are poor plans throughout of targeted 2. VCI.

but only 42 confirmed. the province

for the apprehension

... ;e, .. ;".,.. .

BINH DUONG: ..-' ee.OC/ a/vl~t~4ltAJtf!/tJ.,1-t/~"-~---'--~~-~-~.. "~'~ The ~NQ effort in this province is strong areas. The National Police Chief is highly He runs a "tight is conducted are

\).

in several motivated,

./,
t

intelligent,

and forceful.

I'

shop", due to his efforts excellent down to and including maintained dividuals village

targeting

level, and dossiers manner.

in an efficient are assigned

and current

Two indaily on

( ,
\

'>-~\-.
\

a/lt;1

., :'~.... . .

'1)

to each case, and report

\,
the development of the case. In fact, one Chieu Hoi

//

10

service
\,) Q C.

member works with each National program. .A good people's

Policeman net is

fu\;t,{'

TrtA.M'tUJiintelligence and member agency cooperation attitude and co-

also established, ordination Chief. dividual

reflects

the positive

of the Police

His is one of the few systems

in which an in-

from the PF platoon

pC9C-.,

in each village

works

in

concert with -PfHlNG-.UGA-NG

pe~sonne 1, ,A"l ... th~U~h ,the Province the ~tr

1JA.'l,-r:;/i.,t~r\~~f~

and District

Chiefs support

effat, they plan for the

have not yet established of the targeted 3.

a cohesive

VCI using the resources

BINH LONG: Due to the NVA attack in April all PHUNG HOANG were either lost or areas in

physical

assets,

including

vehicles,

destroyed. overrun

Illegal VCl are currently

administering

by the NVA.

The legal VCl are not operating of remaining

the province

due to the paucity

personnel.

They did, however,

follow the refugees refugee camp.

into Phu Van Camp, An eight-man team

the Binh Duong Province is conducting Th~ anti-VCI

operations

in the refugee

camp.

operation,

thus far, has resulted detained

in the apprehension Interand are

of 7 VCl who are presently rogation currently Center.

in the Province

Forty others

have been identified

under PSB surveillance.

Some of the refugees

..
from Binh Long Province the Bien Hoa refugee where anti-VCl of that 4. The Binh Tuy Province have been involved have an BlNH TUY: are also housed in An Loi Camp, of Long Thanh, "

camp in the vicinity

activity

is also being implemented.

in the furtherance of the anti-VCl PO"" . . - :',;' for several,months. This notwithstanding, the -PIH:JNU:G~I~IO~A~rl'\f~G~'
.

~.

program

in the province

is not strong.

Many of the problems Chief

,

are caused by a lack of direction

by the Province

(9<7-

over ..pHBN6-HOANG the Permanent guidance personnel

matters.

For this reason,

personnel

in

POC. ad.;l 7:~4<-~~-

Office do not function operations.

properly

in providing

for ~+HN~

Also, the proper to the POC, and such assignment. problem, but this There is

have not been transferred

there is doubt as to who should direct province had a serious by action

office supply

has been resolved

of this headquarters. from the village

a slow flow of information

to the province, it
I

and when a lead is given to a village is developed conduct too slowly.

by the district

There is much turmoil the province,

concerning but five The

the

of inspections

throughout

hopefully

this will shortly

be resolved. section

However,

individuals

in the inspection

are untrained.

.'
The current Permanent Office Chief, an ARVN Captain,
.;' , "
-\

....

. -:;."~ - -v-.

,'.'

dis-

likes working

with the National

Police.

He is a deterrent

:'.:~ '''_
.0 "

.<

.....,,~.;'. :
'~'.'

o- .'~'

to progress and should be replaced. ,Further ~'the entire . , ") A"\ /';' '. J..'.:, . r ~ C... vt. -I, I_ 7"" .,' "".Jlu.",Yl'" ~hOt Jl/vvr,<", support and ~G-HQANG effort in Binh Tuy needs ., direction from the Province Chief.
,

5.

GIA DINH:
i! ,

-"

..

:'

. POC's exist\ at all l~vels.

j. ,:,'.

Adequate

coordination

between

various

friendly

agenci~s
:;.

has been established, The POC communication

in the exchange system

, ;.;. ..

of inf'ormation.

J'>'..~ .... /

is adequate

in Gia Dinh, but addi t Lona'l. t eIe phone s As of August the Gia Dinh POC brought is the

are needed virtually

for the POCo

ceased to operate due to two problems The first problem Of the original

about by the reorganization. malassignment of personnel.

five PSB

personnel ,ti?i~'~e .. ~en.im:properlY~.:.ass.i,gJ}ed .. haYe ~ ..o ~the .. t ,.:_I Permanent

_ .":~"::., "';';' ~.

Office rather than the POC' while the two who are in the POC are ineffective. The Situation Section

:.if~:."',

actually

of the POC is run by a MSS NeO, who is only a paper handler. The second problem responsibility involves an unwillingness to accept until

or to carry out certain

functions

SOP 4 is receiv~~ 6. HAU NGHIA: The main thrust

-----------------------

in this p~ovince
officers

has

been

to

train at least five targeting of this procedure,

in all facets targeting

with the hope that specific

-,
... ',

;'!': ,

~\'

, .:1:
f ",,"(

....

.... -

. will then be implemented.

:':
\

Hence, an overall

improvement
" :. 'J' .',-'

in the program would result. been successfully implemented.

To date this effort

i .. :,..-

has not
i-',
"

Therefore, 'the program Office and POC

-,

.J....

has 'several deficiencies. personnel do not clearly

" '\"

Permanent understand
J',' ,,:

their mission show a

<;'~}'::~\~::'.

and are

not functioning in specific

properly.

Dossiers

targeting

procedures

and would be useless,-a~

t-:.

this' ~~int in time, t~ get\~o'nV~?ti(mS, if Ln vf a.c ,';'th~ t ...... -' ,,VCI members were apprehended. Police officials, to include
':
, ~_'J -: '~) .'

the Province motivated, critical

and District

Police Chiefs are weak, corrupt.

poorly

and some are possibly

There is a

need for restructuring

of the PHUNG HOANG program underway.

: ....

in Hau Nghia, 7.

and this is currently

LONG AN: This province is characterized by widely dislittle

persed

hamlets which allows the VCl to operate with Further,

"fear of apprehension.

report ing of VCI act ivi ty system.

'is limited due to the lack of a good communications The people, however, are working with the police arrive too late

in reporting

VCI activities. police reaction.

But the reports

As in most of the provinces, The Province

the police Chief seems to

in Long An are poorly educated. be beset with a multitude

of problems,

and does not seem

able to absorb the VCl threat or the PHUNG HOANG concept.

The PHUNG HOANG Committee accomplished.

meets weekly,

but little- is
-; "

0<

The reason for the lack of accomplishment that most of the VCI have left the
.,
_', "

is the assumption
. :
'. I ';

-"

i-

province
,,,,'

and are concentrating

.'i~: .. \'1'
I

their efforts
';: (~

towards

<

the GVN structure

,: '.. .

in the Saigo~<a~~~
....

,~-gpeof,the di~tricts,
.pOC
O!41./A ~~ . . . . ..'.", -",

Binh Phuoc, is particularly

weak

..... .. ... . ....rft. .

in ~ activities. ~:.' ':;i-[_~~'r' and stronger The situation was
~.:

will require
-'

considerable

tr~ining

:,;~~%1~;
."

..

.. in order to -'establish a viable also further complicated personnel

program.

by the fact that intelligence to the POC as directed, data to it. This district

were not transferred

nor do they provide

intelligence

has been given a high priority 8. LONG KHANH:

for command

assistance.

\~o 0

,-~..L (l/l't,.?24 ---1..-tM(fr~.A _

The 'PHUNG--iff)A-Ntt effort

K;2~~c~:.~-,:,t,__ .

in Long Khanh Province direction,

is just the for ~

getting started

in a positive

Initially,

P" C~(){/t;(Ji'

Province

Chief showed

little interest

or enthusiasm

r.~~rV!>A~(,rwr pwr--n('4t ' .. , ""PH'{ffl-G-H~ His 'attitude has changed,

.
but he is not to

be classified are working personnel

as a "hard charger". However,

US and VN personnel many of the Vietnamese

'v.,

in concert.

are inexperienced is acute.

and low quality. One method

At the village

level this problem

being used to

plan for VCI Chief approved enthusiasm for it. However, recently
~~.I

the his

has waned. it to him. the people's

Hence the PSA Ls current ly trying

.a. ,: ..,'
c.,!";""

With the exception .".-'

of Kiem'Tam

District,

intelligence

net throughout

poor. This was caused by the reluctance, Province Chief to get out and meet and instill confidence A major threat in

in the people in the local government. Long Khanh is posed by members out of the province effective personnel.

of the VCI who move in and Currently, no of

from sub-regions.

plan exists for the control This threat is further

of this category

compounded

by the fact

hat cinii~approximately 40 percent

of the people understand to play in the

PHUNG HOANG and the role it is designed neutralization 9. of the

y~~, __ ~
location

~----------------~~
roc.. a".,.J.,\' T.. J~4 O
of this province is in

PHUOC LONG: The geographic

itself, a deterrent It is extremely

to a successful-pffljNG~G

program. to get

isolated.

Hence, it is difficult

.~ .
'

..
, ,
"'.,

.\.

.- ..;.,
..

..

" '.'

.,

....
,

.... '

'\"'\"-'~~
~ ~d~'-'''-''

.'

..

quality

personnel

"

assigned

there.

It is,possible
,
/,

those who are assigned ',that they merited

.

are either
, -,

so poorly qualified or are being disciplined ",' province is, or

;'. , r

such assignment

~, ,

Personnel

shortages

are critical.,The
' .. )', I

"

bel'ieve~ it~el~ ,ta.b~" short.:2~7i'"p~~icem~.&~ naturally, province has had the greatest

Jll~'s.p~~~o
"The
j
I

',.::',
'," ~,

impact on ~"'(;::f

~
.

pee

~4<

7..4NUi~

~<4.

Police Chief is not attuned

to -PIffiNG
:'-.;:,'
','

HOAifG and

-,

''

'has made no tflones-t-effortto keep a ~ Most personnel three separate District where are untrained-and functions.

program going.' :.. some pers?nnel perform

A case in point is Duc Phong Office Chief duties NCO. There is also a Most of the controlled

the poe/Permanent by one untrained

are performed critical

space problem are mountain

in this district.

population

people who are so carefully

by the VCI in isolated bases that a people's net is near impossible to establish.

intelligence member

The available

of intelligence Personnel operandi

by which

the VCI could be apprehended. of the modus

a ---,also ha,ve, poor unde rs t and Lng o-a: -r:~A"n.~-(U;tiAJ..t:t~....!..../ of

~~\~s

' team

province and restructuring.

has top pnority A training

for command

emphasis

also be sent th~~. 10. PHUOC T UY,

------~--------------------------------.1/7

=r:

'-.1..

rOC, 0V'/tAA I~!wru--r"f The ..-PffUNG---mJA"NG' effort

is starting

to fall into Police

place

in Phuoc Tuy Province.

The Province

National

is new, his attitude the "'PHl:JNG--HBAN6

a"f~1:r":t,.:tJ),.(~I'L.t,~~-

is positive

and he shows concern

for

program.

The prov ince has a good mixture Police cadre. There

of young intelligent is a critical National

ARVN and National

,;.'}:~'::>Zy;:.:..~.,-'.

space problem

in Dat Do ~istrict
c.:

+~

in that the

Police Headquarters however,

was 100 percent no record~ were

~~'V~.

destroyed lost.

the April offensive; in this district are excellent; weak.

O'iA-,\.tr-7:iA1W"l.l,A-:f'
understand~N& however,

and their dossiers plans are ,

their VCI apprehension the dossiers

,

In Long Dien district situa~ion

are incomplete,
~ '-o-._,,~\.'.:o

do no contain use in getting

overlays,

and would be of little Further, there are poor is about the

VCl convictions.

plans for VCI apprehension. same as Long Dien District. standing for VCI organization

Long Le District Although

there is a good underinformation is

and apprehension,

poorly recorded

in the dossier;

and there is no concerted

effort

the VCI.

11.

TAY NINH: The PHUNG HOANG program

/.--'--~-~;

--'

in Tay Ninh can be classified The Province

as weak and bordering

on being unsatisfactory.

Chief and Province National Police Chief are poorly motivated POc. (1.v'':{,1' ,o7Jz,"'f/l,6J'~I;_.:",1! ?~;1.~ towards -PHttN6-HOANtr, and this ref lects down to the district ( level. In Khiem Hanh District
-

iff

most ~~~onn~l,

a',re new and Further, \

are just learning several

how to implement formal ~

{).--tA"Jj - (..t.--'t)c~f~-*(,. -PH-BN"G H9:A~.

("

,,-ct &C_

have not received

training. e<J) C-

-.-/

"

'-.
'

..
on 2 October. He has a to take and seems anxious
.

The District

Chief was assigned

good record as a combat commander hold. . member During preparation

. .

for reorganization ~heir personnel. tifwork

of the POC Consequently,

ai~ncies

withdre~

few trained targeting.

people are available The dossiers

on specific

also reflect

this, for they do of information, for they -

not contain:

a file on the extract

. .

have nO~~lan ot' a'b'tion,and n6'~~quests District district is worse; very

~1.. -

Hieu Thien there and Further, In Phuoc

little motivation

exists

and NP Chiefs are not with the program. persons are available for PHUNG IIOANfry

>..f),'OA;d; -ri:NltiA.#f BMA-~"

few trained Ninh District July despite the RD cadre were withdrawn directives that required from the program in

-d::p Po c.-"

them to support-PHBN~ and represent situation overlays in this

vHeA~

Dossiers

are very poorly maintained, They do not contain

poor targeting

efforts.

and work sheets are incomplete .. There province require for VCI apprehension a concerted

is poor planning

or neutralization

qJ>o,,;(

and it will going.

effort to get a~~

program

IV MILITARY 1.

REGION

IV

AN GIANG:

-----------.-.~
provinces \ One reason for the low ~ ~(

An Giang is one of two most pacified

in MR IV (the other is Go Cong). There was one neutralizatio~a_ /;,(

in August number outside and two in September.

of neutralizations the province

is that most VCI must reside it ~

and can only op~rate within

--------


, ''I>-

.',

~..
,
'

''!'' "

';,

",'

.l,

'

sporadically.
I J

This is substantiated are totally cleared

by the fact that of VqI. There is

~ .-.,

34 of 38 villages

"

1'1P a......:tl r:vvu>'t.tttf

capable
. r.'

a degree

of complacency

among ~HUNG

HOANG personnel in
of reacting
'. ,'- . .' ::'.

province,but intelligence 2.

they are believed

to
"

of, VCI activ: ty, if any sho,u1d occur.

'------AN XUYEN: "As

;:"
'''''-';

of 30 September
'.~

it was estimated
i',

that .ehemy~_tI"_~_~~~1~
/~
11'.;(','\ , ,,;-

' .:;~i:)\

11,..

,':),1:~~~:!:1\i:::I~'5~~>4

in An Xuyen amounted

to NVA: 1,090", Main Force: 433, Local' l~'t~tiU'':):;:<:'

. . .-,_::'~',::\~/'~;~'1" ::~f/ ,~;:

Force: 390, _Guerrillas:

3',-679,~~<:l_._YCf:,~r,~_~~_~,_ ..
.

T~e ,re~~i~Ec;;~{~-'"
:'''~:''':~\:j:'.~'::''A'

of the VC in their traditional U Minh stronghold has caused /'If Cl.4.:l:i.' ~., difficulties for the -PHUN&-HBANG program. This occurred when" the ARVN 21st Division division returned moved to An Loc in April. Since the

in July the National

Police have not regained the division left.

the operational Neutralizations

capability decreased

they had before

from 36 in July to 23 in August there were 10 VCI captured In addition,

and 22 in September. in Septemher

However,

as the result

of specific

targeting.

'the VC Party Chairman on a recent 3.

of Song Ong Doc District

was killed

operation~.~

--~.

----------------~-------------------

BAC LIEU: Integration of the Anti-Terrorism elements of the in

former PIOCC/DIOCC's all districts

into the POC's has been completed

..'
and at province level.

Iff ~',

However, the ,~nU1m JIO;ANU

'r~$

have declined reorganiza tion. and emphasis formerly

in Bac Lieu since to ,a_;!ack of In Gai Rai,

This is due mainly

by the Province

Police Chief. district,

NP
Bac Lieu's mat productive the~

~'\~{-1:'I%'~~G program

has come to a standstill.

BA XUYEN: As of August VCI and 804 unidentified

,~

-----had 432
. .',
,>y;

1972, Ba Xuyen

A and,B category for the

Q..y:;{;{ T..eItir./v'4.-;f

total of 1,

6.

..pH~ANtloperations 218, with

of August totaled

18 KIA, 14 CIA, and 2 rallied. During this operations

Total neutralizations month the Province would people creased

for the month were 23.

Chief directed

that all tactical

include police units which will be used to screen in areas covered by the operations. This has inT~(f/l.!(~/tt4,f

{)""''-Z?
the number of '\CIcaptures; totaled for the month of September

"PHYN~

operations 11 KIA, 7 CIA

133, with

Total neutralizations

for the month amounted characterizes although some

~/I!ct:r- "r' . ~. /"t~A$>rv.41"

improvement 5.

to 23.

The

IV Senior

PHUNG HOANG Advisor

~PHlJNG''If01tNG program

in Ba Xuyen as stagnant,

has been noted since the reorganization.

CHAU DOC: Results in terms of both detained and sentenced of A and

were high during the F-6 program. and B VCI increased

Neutralizations

from 37 in July to 62 in August,

e"~~
"'<\

'.....
.':,

....

decreased

to 37 in September. in September program

However,
; ,

30 of of s~ntenci~g.
,
.; ...,.

neutralizations

were as a result

lQ;1\..::t{~"Ll4,1-Y\
The ~HQANG

in Chau Doc has been one of the best

. "\'
-.': ;,:;.~'.

~ in MR IV in terms of organization recent

,

and results.

With the

appoin1tment of a new Province Police Chief, Chau Doc '.' . .. :-~. Province is expected to continue to equal, if not surpass,
-'.\
l.-"

I;

agencies

within

this province. Office Chiefs

The Province

has had two POC

and two Permanent Neutralizations in August

in the last two months. from 39 in July to 40

increased

slightly

to 45 in September. in this province continue

Thus a level seems to have over the last three months the large VCI population. in Chuong Thien makes a situation which is
-I-

been reached
./;:.".,- -; U

that will probably The military National expected National

despite

situation

which exists

Police operations

difficult,

to continue -. Maldistribution Policemen is evident,

of the 1,426 police stations

with all village

operating below strength. The National Police are characterized ~ as faction-ridden and ineffective. The F-6 program in this ~

::::::c:u:::s::::::e~a::::~ve'" with only 56 a::?

22

,
~.'
"",

:".'
"

.....

'",',

~~-',

.' ~
,

-'1

~, .f .

" '.
.........

7.

DINH TUONG: The National program Police in Dinh Tuong in Delta in terms of in spite Neutraland

D-1'{;t~ ''''I:e.!11I..O'l,t4-r'
the PHUN~AN(J 'operational

one of the best

..

results.

This has been accomplished into the western districts.

of an NVA incursion

izations rose sharply 101 in September. number of monthly in MR IV in 1972. appears maximize 8. bright,

from 52 in July to 75 in August total is the highest bya

The September neutralizations The future

achieved
, OJv.:O'

province

(~IV\.e'ltA;(

of the PHUNtr-HO~Nfr program Police have begun

and the National

their use of intelligence. GO CONG: VCI increased their taxation and propaganda

-during from .... ~,.,' the .) \\

activities reported

significantly

in August and September.

VCI were

in most of the 205 enemy sightings There are presently in the Province.

recorded

the month.

77 identified

and 13 estimated increased

vcr carried

Neutralizations Despite

7 in July to 16 in August.
T ' ,

some complacency, of dealing elements.

National problem, 9.

Police barring

are considered

capable

with the ~

>
"

a flow of major VC!NVA

KIEN GIANG: The integration

.-------element

of the Anti-Terrorism level has enhanced in Kien Giang.

into the POC at province

("f ~"" ~;~!!{-:;,r h-';.,c..r \.<"",.rl" -FJ,!' ""\ ! >, \.....- ir'
,

the effectiveness Prior to integration, targeting

of the ~PHUNG'':1fQANG: program the greatest

problem was to implement

specific

2~

:'

r:

-,

'

/'

needed in levying

specific jntelligence

requirements.

to specific
..

intelligence
..

requirements

that are program appears

02A'Ctt{~/(ll.~ll..~t

general, bright,

the future

of the~ANG Police

and the National

have begun to

of the intelligence KEEN HOA: National

and forces available.

Police effectiveness

has

August,

Kien Hoa neutralized

total of A & B VCI in MR IV for CY .. eutralizations N 51. This decrease is attributed decreased in

to the fact that the PSC There Element at province is a

only one meeting major problem within

during the month of September. the Anti-Terrorism Police Compound

of collocating

the POC on the National

textbook -

perfect:i,.onucceeded s

in neutralizing .
~.

KIEN

;;n~~~
program
, 'f', '

cpmp~~;;j;J~:~~~"'_"-'t_':__ ".......,
is remain very low, in the
. \': 1/

The ~G National Police control.

'Neutralizations

with only 5 VCI beingneutr~lized and August, and 6 in September.

"

Part of

situation ,in the province"but

",\~\;;,:':~;ii.;{"f/:":;,::\,,,:

,(iActt~r.M~*.

there

emphasis

placed on the .p.IRJN<1-HeA-N&

drqpe~
from 13 in July sentencing), (primarily because of low percentage of

to 2 in August.

Near the end of the month began' to ac~entuate inspections

PH-BN6-a1'{.lt-'~/..4~~

the ProvinceChi~f initiated regular

of the districts Police Chief.

with a team headed by the Province

Deputy

::-: :

'.. '

,,'" .;1,'

There were
'.. .

"August, a rise' 67 neutralizations, sentencing.

C!.."n(..{ ' (.. c/v"l(5.r't,i4/f

of. 9 from July.',

'. \:. :~.:';,~ .:.:~ ..~~'.. ... / In September ,-:,oi~'a"":t~-fa:l

'

.'

'..

,.~

.:, ..

,;i,L'

48 A and B VCI were neutralized

, ~.. . ~ '/

. by .
; -'T,
'j.

This

is

attributed

to the

fact

th~t'

treProvince the

Security ,.,;.----r.

..J,.

Committee is
'

now meeting
. ". . .

regularly. fairly

,Although effective,

.p.g.t,JNG-HGANu'

program in results . ..
.
,;"~

Phong Dinh is
-",'

. , operational

should

be achieved

by collocating National districts

. !:; .::-

the Police this

;Anti-Terrorism Compound at
'-','-

Element with
r"

the "POC on the of the seven

province.

In five

_~' .!

)';if;;;.!i".

:""J~',..i:'

'1.~.

;::/:;~S:~~~~,;..;~~:

been accomplished. '.15 October.

Two of tne.five Chief

expect

co location

by

The Province result

has begun visi t"ing District

POC's, which should 14.

~.
1~.

in s orne improve~~,

SADEC: Operational effectiveness

.,
e.:

of the

National

Police

:.~,

- :,:

. progressed emphasized

during the

August and Sept ember , as the

. .. "

Province from 3 in
"~'I

program.

VCI neutralizations

rose

;;.,
~

., .,'" . j

.--:-e

-)

, .. ,1:'

"

~" .

..J

, .''".~.{.. ~::..

. ,,",July '15 in August ~ Six A and B VCl were killed to

!.~:

in September,
< :.-

.!~ \ .~'.

.-'

~ ".

before

the PSC in August were sentenced.

During

September in-

83% of VCl appearing

before the PSC were sentenced,

of Vinh Binh, although

the district ratio

of Long Toan is much of VCl than "the other are second

;.t

----:' .. ~:less s~'6ure and has a higher

districts. Too many district
r

NP commanders

lieutenants. 16.

VlNH LONG: Neutralizations increased from 27 A and

BV~@lf
inCreaSe)

in JU1Y"to 31 in August.

However', neutralizations

27