CASE #1: People vs. Retubado G.R.

124058 Sept 10, 2003

CASE #2: People vs. Ulep G.R. 132547 Sep 20, 2000 People vs. Ernesto UlepG.R. no. 132547September 20, 2000

FACTS: SPO1 Ernesto Ulep is found guilty for the murder of Buenaventura Wapili. The case is inevitably subjected for review to the Supreme Court due to the imposed penalty of death. The deceased was not feeling well and talking insensibly to himself inside the room. After a little while he was smashing the furniture and acting like crazy. His brother in-law named Dario tried to pacify him but he failed that is why he asked for some help from their neighbor a policewoman. This policewoman radioed SPO1 Ernesto Ulep, SPO1 Edilberto Espadera and SPO2 Crispin Pillo. The three responding policemen were armed with M-16 rifles. SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot and told the victim to put down his weapon otherwise he will be shot. However, the victim refused and instead advanced towards the police officers. SPO1 Ulep shot the victim. As the victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and fired another bullet into his head. The case was filed against SPO1 Ulep through the office of the Ombudsman for the Military. The accused argued that he was not guilty since he acted in self-defense.

Issues: Whether or not the circumstance of fulfillment of duty should be appreciated in the case.

Ruling: No. since the second requisite is absent which states that the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, when SPO1 shot the victim in the head even the latter slumped to the ground is unreasonable act. However, when the accused fired a warning shot, it shows that he has no motive and intention to kill the victim. The court reiterated that the appellants decision to kill was made in an instant and the victims helpless position was merely incidental to his having been previously shot. In this respect, there is an incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty which is deemed as

special or privileged mitigating circumstance. Such circumstance reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law in accordance to Article 69 of the RPC. In addition, the court acknowledged the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The Supreme Court held that SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of HOMICIDE, instead of Murder, and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional medium as minimum, to six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum. He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Buenaventura Wapili in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

CASE #3: People vs. Beronilla G.R. L-4445 Feb 28, 1955

PP VS BERONILLA GR NO. L-4445 FACTS This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the Court of First Instance convicting them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz , Province of Abra.Borjal, the elected mayor of La Paz at the outbreak of war, was accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy. The accused Beronilla, the appointed Military Mayor, received a memorandum issued by Arnold authorizing them to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage or aiding the enemy. One of the puppet government officials is Borjal. Pursuant to the memorandum, he placed Borjal under custody and asked residents of La Paz to file case against him. He also appointed a 12-man jury including Adriatico, Velasco, and Paculdo who served as the clerk of jury. Borjal was found guilty and was imposed with the death penalty. After compliance of execution, Beronilla reported to Arnold. Two years later, Beronillo and others involved in the Borjal case were indicted by CFI of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Borjal. Pres. Roxas issued E.P. no. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized, under

RPC in furtherance of resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. All the accused (except Labuguen who filed and granted amnesty by the AFP), filed their application to Second Guerilla Amnesty Commission, which denied their application on the ground that they were inspired by purely personal motives, thus remanding case to CFI for trial on merits and they were convicted for murder. ISSUE Whether or not the accused are guilty for murder Whether or not they are entitled of amnesty

HELD Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that cannot now be ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death. The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it has been already decided that the concurrence of personal hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does not operate to exclude the case from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed by appellants, since then "it may not be held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal motives" It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we cannot say that criminal intent has been established. But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy control and occupation.

CASE #4: People vs. Bonoan G.R. 45130 Feb 17, 1937 GR No. L-45130 Feb 17, 1937 PEOPLE vs. CELESTINO BONOAN FACTS: Accused threatened to kill then stabbed the deceased, Carlos Guison, three times with a knife which caused the latters death in three days. Accused stated that his reason for stabbing was that the deceased owed him P55. It was further established that for two days the accused had been watching for the deceased in order to kill him. According to the report, accused was found to be suffering from Manic Depressive Psychosis. ISSUE: WON accused should be exempted from criminal liability under paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the RPC. RULING: Yes. In the type of dementia prcox, the crime is usually preceded by much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attacks are common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken.

CASE #5: Clave vs. People G.R. 166040 April 26, 2006

CASE #6: US vs. Caballeros G.R. 1352 Mar 29, 1905

March 29, 1905 G.R. No. 1352 THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle, vs. APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
I. PRINCIPAL PARTIES A. United States complainant - Representing the four American school teachers who were murdered/ assassinated in Cebu B. Apolonio Caballeros and Roberto Baculi - defendants - Convicted by CFI-Cebu as accessories to the crime of assassination, by taking part in the burial of the corpses in order to conceal the crime II. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS A. Court of First Instance of Cebu - Convicted the defendants to the penalty of seven years of imprisonment (presidio mayor) as accessories to the crime of assassination or murder B. Supreme Court - Petition for review and reconsideration of the decision of CFI III. FACTS

Four American teachers were murdered by a band of persons (not named). Baculi and Caballeros(defendant) were charged as accessories to the crime including failure to report to the authorities the perpetration of the crime. The defendants alleged that they were forced. Baculi confessed and was affirmed by the eyewitness that he buried the corpses because he was forced by the band by striking him with the butts of their guns, but he was not present when the Americans were killed. Caballeros also confessed to the crime due to a promise that nothing shall be done to them. IV. ISSUE

1. Whether or not the accused are liable as accessories to the crime

V. RULING No. The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par 9,Art.8); in this case Baculi acted under such circumstances.

Testimonies from witnesses that Caballeros was not present in the crime and that his confession was due to a promise that nothing shall be done to them proved that he did not take part in any way in the execution of the crime. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily , without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as a proof on trial (Sec. 4, Art No. 619 of the Phil. Commission)

Failure to report to the authorities the perpetration of the crime is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore cannot render the defendants criminally liable.

FALLO: Judgment appealed from is reversed , defendants are acquitted.

CASE #7: People vs. Fernando G.R. L-24781 May 29, 1970

CASE #8: People vs. Escote G.R. 140756 April 4, 2003

CASE #9: People vs. Pacis G.R. 146309 July 18, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS G.R. No. 146309. July 18, 2002 FACTS: On April 6, 1998, Atty. Jose Justo S. Yap, supervising agent of the Dangerous Drugs Division-National Bureau of Investigation, received information that a certain Roberto Mendoza Pacis was offering to sell one-half (1/2) kilogram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu for the amount of nine hundred fifty pesos (P950.00) per gram or a total of four hundred seventy five thousand pesos (P475,000.00). The NBI Chief of the Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and Senior Agent Midgonio S. Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case. In the afternoon of the same day, Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon and the informant went to the house of appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. The informant introduced Atty. Yap to appellant as interested buyer. They negotiated the sale of one-half (1/2) kilogram of shabu. The total price was reduced to four hundred fifty thousand pesos (P450,000.00). It was agreed that payment and delivery of shabu would be made on the following day, at the same place. On April 17, 1998, around 6:30 in the evening, the NBI agents and the informant went to appellants house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag with markings yellow cab. When he opened the bag, Atty. Yap found a transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance inside. While examining it, appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap instructed Senior Agent Congzon to get the money from the car. When Senior Agent Congzon returned, he gave the boodle money to Atty. Yap who then handed the money to the appellant. Upon appellants receipt of the payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him. Per instruction of Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon transmitted the shabu to the Forensic Chemistry Laboratory for examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosales testified that on April 8, 1998, she received the specimen from Senior Agent Congzon together with the letter request. The specimen weighed 497.292940 grams. After examination, the specimen was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (Citations omitted) ISSUES: 1. Whether the buy-bust operation that led to appellants arrest was valid 2. Whether the presentation of the informant was necessary to prove appellants guilt 3. Whether the trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to appellants alibi.

RULING: Claiming that he was framed by the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), appellant assails the validity of the buy-bust operation that led to his arrest. A careful examination of the records shows that the operation that led to the arrest of appellant was indeed an entrapment, not an instigation. The trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded the highest respect, because it had the advantage of observing their demeanor and was thus in a better position to discern if they were telling the truth or not. In the present case, the RTC noted that the prosecution witnesses testified in a clear and straightforward manner in narrating the events that had transpired before and during the buy-bust operation. With respect to the informants identity, we hold that it may remain confidential. There are strong practical reasons for keeping its secrecy, including the continued health and safety of the informant and the encouragement of others to report any wrongdoing to police authorities. This is settled jurisprudence and we will not belabor it here. On April 6, 1998, NBI agents, acting as poseur-buyers of illegal drugs, allegedly went to the house of appellant to discuss with him preliminary arrangements for the sale. However, Pacis disputed this allegation. To bolster his claim, he presented his sister-in-laws driver, Ramon V. Ty, who testified that he was with the former in Urdaneta, Pangasinan on that same day; hence, appellant could not have been with the poseur-buyers in Manila to discuss the quantity and the price of the shabu to be delivered the next day. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The excuse must be so airtight that it admits of no exception. In the present case, however, we agree with the RTC that the claim of Ty was not substantiated by the testimonies of the persons he and appellant were supposed to have met in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Hence, appellant was unable to disprove the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that on April 6, 1998, he was discussing the terms of the sale with the poseur-buyers. Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that the positive identification of the accused -- when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses -prevails over alibi and denial which are negative and self-serving, undeserving of weight in law. Compared with the detailed, convincing and well-documented Decision of the trial court, appellants denial and alibi pale into insignificance. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

CASE #10: People vs. Ubaldo G.R. 129389 Oct 17, 2001 GR NO. 129389 October 17, 2001 People of the Philippines vs. Teodorico Ubaldo

FACTS: August 27, 1988, in the household of Reyanaldo Ventura was occupied with the preparations for the wedding of his son. On that same day, an intoxicated Norberto Cabot, uncle of the bride, started berating the cooks for not bringing out the foods.The cooks manage to pacify Noeberto and he weny home to his residence, one house away from the Venturas. After an hour, he returned and stared shouting. Reynaldo manage to convince him to go home and he complied with his request. On the third time, he returned and became violent, disrupting the wedding festivities. Reynaldo upon the advise, he proceeded to the house of Teodorico Ubaldo (barangay captain), second cousin of Norberto, he persuaded him to come along and pacify Norberto. When they reached the Ventura residence, Reynaldo was informed that his wife collapsed due to fear and heart ailment and he rushed to attend his wife. The appellant went alone to the kitchen and approached Norberto from behind. He pulled out his gun and fired at Norberto, hitting him in the nape. Two shots followed and Norberto fell face downward. Upon hearing the shots two sisters of the victim (Pacita and Basilia) rushed to the scene, upon seeing Norberto fallen, they shouted for help. The appellant fled. ISSUES 1. Whether the appellant act in self-defense 2. Whether the appellant inclined to mitigating circumstance 3. Whether the appellant guilty of the crime homicide RULING 1. NO. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Self-defense as justifying circumstance, however, the appellant deemed to admit that he killed the victim, the burden of proof shifted to him to establish and proved his claim. The appellant must show the presence of all the elements of self-defense (Art. 11 [1]). On the testimony of presented there was lack of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which corroborated with the medico-legal expert testified that the victim was shot at the lateral side of the neck about two feet from his assailant. The wound of the deceased shows that the means employed were hardly reasonable at all. Assuming that the deceased fired first at the appellant, a single shot could have already disabled the appellant, who was intoxicated. The

numbers of inflicting wounds of the deceased are important indicia which disprove the plea of self-defense. 2. YES. The appellant inclined to the mitigating circumstances that the sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. The court given credence to the testimony of Reynaldo Ventura, the incident happened at the wedding party was precipitated unruly, wild behavior of the victim who was drunk, shouting and armed with bolo. This prompted to call the appellant Barangay Chairman who responded. Although the offender cannot successfully claim self-defense when the aggression is in for injury or threat, he can be given benefit of mitigating circumstance (Art.13[4]). This is especially applicable because the appellant was then discharging his duty as a person in authority. 3. YES. The appellant is guilty of the crime homicide. After the incident happened, the appellant went hiding. If it were true that he never intended to kill the victim, considering that he was a barangay chairman 9a person in authority) and a second cousin of the victim, it was highly improper for him to flee from the scene and not attend or explain his side to the police. That flight negates self-defense and indicates guilt. Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49, in Crim. Case No. U-5003, the appellant Teodorico Ubaldo is guilty of the crime Homicide, but reducing the sentence imposed on him to only an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum is AFFIRMED. He also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P 10,000 as exemplary damages.

CASE #11: People vs. Juan G.R. 152289 Jan 14, 2004 Facts: On April 23, 2001, around 10:00 p.m., Yolanda Juan opened the door of their house to let her son, herein appellant Marlon Juan, in. Deogracias Juan, Yolandas husband and appellants father, who was resting inside their bedroom could hear his wife and sons voice. Marlon who was high on drugs demanded delicious food for dinner. Moments after, Deogracias heard the throwing and breaking of plates. Then he heard Marvin, appellants brother, yelling Mother is dead already. Deogracias immediately proceeded to the porch where Marvins voice came from and saw Marlon in the act of stabbing Marvin. Deogracias grabbed the asador (pointed iron bar) from Marlon and they wrestled for its possession. Eventually, Deogracias got control of the asador. Marlon then drew a knife from his waist and tried to stab Deogracias but the latter was able to wrest the knife away from the appellant. Appellant ran away. When Deogracias finally turned his attention to his wife, only then did he realize that indeed she was already dead. Yolanda was lying face down on the floor, no longer breathing. Deogracias nevertheless still brought her to the hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. Upon arraignment on September 17, 2001, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to the crime charged. On January 9, 2002, the trial court promulgated its decision finding the accused Marlon Juan, guilty of parricide for killing his mother and is sentenced to suffer supreme penalty of death. Issue: Whether or not death is the proper penalty to be imposed to the accused Held: No. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Since the penalty for the crime of parricide is composed of two indivisible penalties, the imposition of the proper indivisible penalty on appellant is governed by Article 63 of the Code which provides: In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: (1)When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. (2) When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. (3) When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. (4) When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation. In this case, no aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information. With regard to the presence of any mitigating circumstances, we find that appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt. In this case, appellant made his confession of guilt before the presentation of evidence by the prosecution since he pleaded guilty during the arraignment. Clearly therefore, all the requisites of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession were present. Thus, since the crime of parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed by the trial court on appellant, not the penalty of death.

CASE #12: People vs. Apduhan Jr. G.R. L-19491 August 30, 1968 Facts: At about 7:00 o`clock in the evening accused Apduhan and five other persons all armed with different unlicensed firearms,daggers and other deadly weapons entered into the dwelling house of the spouses Miano once inside,inflicted upon two persons physical injuries which caused death and thereafter the accused and five other companions take away money amounting to P322.00 belonging to the spouse's.Case was called for trial.Apduhan desisted from pleading guilty and let his previous plea stand on record after further warning that he faced the grave danger of being sentenced to life imprisonment.

Issue: Whether or not Plea of guilty circumstances? affect the imposition of penalty in account of Aggravating

Ruling: The prosecution does not need to prove the said circumstances (Dwelling,Nighttime,and Band) since the accused by his plea of guilty has supplied the requisite proof. The settled rule is that Dwelling is Aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons,like the offense at bar. Rationale behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. Morada is inherent only in crimes which could be committed in no other place than in the house of another, such as trespass and robbery in an inhabited house. In the case at bar,accused Apduhan shows that he and his co-malefactors took advantage of nighttime of the offense as they waited until it was dark before they came out of their hiding place to consummate criminal designs.Nocturnity is aggravating when it is purposely and deliberately sought by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime or to prevent their being recognized or to insure unmolested escape. The element of band is appreciated when the offense is committed by more than three armed malefactors regardless of the comparative strength of the victims,the indispensable components of cuadrilla are (1) at least four malefactors and (2) all of the four malefactors are armed. For failure to secure the required number of votes,the penalty of death cannot be legally imposed. Penalty next lower in degree-Reclusion perpetua should consequently be imposed on the accused.

CASE #13: People vs. Marasigan G.R. L-46786 November 25, 1940

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. OCTAVIO MARASIGAN GR No. L-46786, November 25, 1940

FACTS: The appellant, Octavio Marasigan, was a business student at the Ateneo de Manila and the deceased, Elisa Jereos, was studying a pre-med course at the University of Santo Tomas. In June 1938 the appellant and the deceased agreed to have amorous relationship, but before the agreement the deceased already had an affair with a cadet named Ramon Gelvezon and was regarded as one of her suitors. On the morning of October 20, 1938, the appellant, the deceased and her friend Monserrat Montelibano went to Baguio City. Upon arrival, the appellant stayed at room no. 21 of the Zigzag Hotel and the deceased and her friend at room no. 19. At about 5 PM on the same day, the three went to Teachers' Camp and Gelvezon was presented by the deceased to Monserrat and the appellant. On the afternoon of 22 of the same month the three were again at the Teachers' Camp and Gelvezon and the appellant played basketball. In the evening of the same day the deceased telephoned Gelvezon and after having talked, she gave the device to the appellant. In this conversation with rival Gelvezon both were mutually gallant and offered to continue courting the deceased. Shortly after the conversation on the phone, the deceased went to Teachers' Camp and was accompanied by Gelvezon where they remained until about 9 PM. The appellant and Monserrat were in search of the deceased and they found out that she went to a show house and was taken by Gelvezon to the hotel. On the morning of October 23 of the same year, the appellant and the deceased went together to church and heard mass. On leaving the church at about 6 AM, both boarded a taxicab and the appellant instructed the driver to lead them to the Mines View Park. When the car was heading to go to that site, the appellant ordered the driver to turn around and go to the hotel, but again the appellant instructed the driver to go ahead in the direction of the Mines View Park. When in front of the Post Office, the driver stopped the car because he heard that they had opened the door and saw that the deceased was the one who opened it. He asked the two passengers who he would obey. On that occasion he observed that the deceased was pale and tried to jump out of the door and the driver went through the Zigzag Hotel. Before arriving at the hotel, the deceased accepted the appellant's invitation to go to walk at 5 PM. At about 1:30 PM, the deceased felt a heart attack and was administered by an injection and prescribed to rest and not go outside by the doctor. During this time the deceased was lying in her bed and the appellant entered five times within the room while Gelvezon was inside. As soon as Monserrat and Gelvezon left the hotel, the appellant called a taxicab handled by the driver Abonejar Nicomedes.

The appellant embarked on the car followed by the deceased and instructed the driver to take them to the Teachers' Camp. When they were along the Leonard Wood Road near the Teachers' Camp, Abonejar heard that the deceased exclaimed and he was suddenly filled with fear and terror. He looked at the mirror he had in front of him and saw that appellant stabbed the deceased with a double-edged knife. Abonejar was propping the car and saw that appellant was also wounded. Abonejar asked another taxicab driver to track the event to the police. The police found the deceased dead and lying face up on the floor of the car, head to the left door, and the appellant sitting in the back seat, crouched over the body of the deceased. Wounds that had the appellant and the deceased were bleeding profusely and in the car they found the bloodied double-edged knife as well as the bag of the deceased. The appellant and the corpse of the deceased were taken to hospital in Baguio. The corpse of the deceased had two serious and fatal injuries to the chest, one in the right shoulder, three in the back, one on his right forearm, several in the fingers of both hands, plus a contusion on the left named scratches in the right arm and forearm. The appellant had two wounds himself was inferred, which forced him to be hospitalized for long. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of murder committed by the appellant is attendant to an aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation? (Article 14, p. 16) RULING: YES. The three (3) requisites for evident premeditation are present in the case at bar as follows: 1. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime; 2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and 3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.

CASE #14: People vs. Ortiz G.R. L-12287 May 29, 1958 The People of the Philippines vs Fortunato Ortiz and Cipriano Lopez Facts: On April 1950, two men broke into the home where spouses Victor and Mateo Santiago were sleeping with their children. They took Victor out of the house and tied him to a post where other malefactors, about 8 of them, guarded him. Then one of them went back inside and demanded money from Matea, who told him that they had none. He then raped her. Another man went inside and stole clothes and a woolen blanket, and afterwards raped Matea. Thereafter, one the malefactors, "Sergeant", also told Matea that he wanted to have sex with her. Upon her refusal, she lifted her skirt and trained his flashlight on her genitals, after which he succeeded in raping her. However, in focusing his flashlight on her, Matea could, by its light, recognize him as Fortunato Ortiz, a man the spouses knew well. Another man also went inside, ransacked the house and intimated his lustful desire, but because of her pleas he desisted. The malefactors next entered the neighbouring house of Ricardo and Gregoria Salvador, where at gun point they ordered Ricardo out of the house and tied him to a post. They then proceeded to do the same as in the previous house, looting jewelry and raping Gregoria one after the other, threatening her that if she resisted, they would punch her womb which was then 8 months pregnant. Later, the victims learned that Ortiz and Lopez were being held in the custody of the Philippine Army. They confessed to have participated in the rape and robbery. Respondents were charged which the crime of robbery with rape in the Court of First Instance - Isabela. The case was dismissed for alleged lack of evidence but they were later found guilty and sentenced to an indeterminate period of not less than 10 years, 2 months and 21 days of prison mayor but not more than 18 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, and to indemnify the victims for the rape and robbery done to them. The respondents appealed the decision to CA but during the course of the trial, Ortiz moved for the withdrawal of his appeal, leaving Lopez as the sole appellant. CA then found that the two indeed committed the crime with the attendance of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling and with the aid of armed men, and as against Lopez the additional aggravating circumstance of recidivism. The Court concluded that the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, which certified the appeal to the SC. Issue: Whether or not the erroneous application of penalty by the trial court which, by withdrawal of appeal in the CA, can be corrected by the SC

Held: SC increased the indemnification to be made to the victims, and the penalty to reclusion perpetua. This modification, however, applies only to Cipriano Lopez. The Court is in no position to correct the error because of the withdrawal of appeal by a more shrewd Ortiz. But the miscarriage of justice may be minimized if the DOJ and the prison authorities refuse to release him upon his service of the minimum and have him serve the maximum prison sentence.

CASE #15: People vs. Lacao G.R. 95320 September 4, 1991 Facts:

The accused-appellants Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", Patria Lacao, Trinidad Mansilla, Baltazar Lacao II, alias "Boticol," and Baltazar Lacao III, alias "Toto," were charged with the complex crime of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority, the deceased Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr, on or about the 28th day of September, 1985, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in Brgy. Manibad, Municipality of Mambusao, Province of Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused armed with knives and wooden stools, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of nighttime and superior strength to better facilitate the commission of the offense, assault, attack and hit one Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr., an agent of person in authority while in the actual performance of his official duties, thereby inflicting upon the latter several injuries on the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death; that due to the death of said Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. and the consequent loss of his earning capacity, his heirs have suffered and are entitled to an indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 plus moral and exemplary damages. Further more, the accused Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan" has been previously convicted by final judgment of the crime of homicide. Issue: Whether or not the trial Court erred in finding the accused-appellants Baltazar Lacao, Sr., Patricia Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla guilty of the crime of murder with direct assault upon an agent of person in authority in accordance with Articles 248 and 148 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines and Whether or not the Court erred in sentencing them of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr the sum of P30, 000 for his death, P9, 250 as actual damages plus P100,000 as moral damages and the cost of the suit. Held: No. The Court did not erred in finding the accused-appellants Baltazar Lacao, Sr., Patricia Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla guilty of the crime of murder with direct assault upon an agent of person in authority. According to the finding of the Court accused-appellants Baltazar Lacao admitted that he killed the said victim and to other accused-appellants Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla were their disavowal of participation in the gory killing of Cpl.

Inocencio furthermore, their cooperation in the execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which, although not indispensable to the commission of the offense, bore a relation to the acts done by the principal and supplied material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. Since they were aware of the criminal intent of the principals and having participated in such murderous criminal design sans a conspiracy, the Court held them guilty of the milder form of responsibility as accomplices thus the two will serve the sentence of reclusion temporal. As to the Court erred in sentencing them of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr the sum of P30, 000 for his death, P9, 250 as actual damages plus P100,000 as moral damages and the cost of the suit. The court modify their ruling The penalty for the complex crime at bar is that for the graver offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. No modifying circumstance can be considered for or against herein appellants. With the proscription against the imposition of the death sentence, the trial court correctly sentenced appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. to suffer reclusion perpetua. Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla are hereby sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the present policy on the matter, with appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. primarily liable for P40,000.00 and appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla for P10,000.00, subject to the provisions of Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code.

CASE #16: People vs. Maloloy-on G.R. 85246 August 30, 1990

G.R. No. 85246 August 30, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE MALOLOY-ON, accused-appellant. FACTS Accused-appellant Felipe Maloloy-on and his son, TitingMaloloy-on, were charged with murder in the Regional Trial Court of Masbate in an information dated August 23, 1985 which alleges that on or about July 1, 1985, at SitioBasyao, Barangay Jose Abenir, Sr., Palanas, Masbate, the said accused, with intent to kill evident premeditation, treachery and superiority of strength, feloniously attacked and hacked with bolos one BiotesmaTambago, thereby inflicting wounds on the victim which directly caused her instantaneous death. Only appellant Felipe Maloloy-on was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, with the assistance of his counsel de parte. Accused TitingMaloloy-on was not apprehended and was later reported to be dead, after having purportedly figured in a stabbing incident, hence the case against him was ordered by the trial court to be placed in the archives in the absence of proof of his death. Having been established beyond reasonable doubt that accused Felipe Maloloy-on committed the offense charged with the aid of his son TitingMaloloy-on (who is now allegedly dead) employing superior strength qualified by treachery in the process which aggravating circumstance is not off-set by any mitigating circumstance, said Felipe Maloloy-on is penalized under Par. 1 of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the extreme penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to proportionately pay the costs. The appellant assigns the reversible errors, then the court affirm with modification, the decision appealed. ISSUE WON the lower court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and in not acquitting accused-appellant. RULING The lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder. There was no testimony on the actual nature and mode of the attack on the hapless victim, much less to show that treachery was deliberately adopted to ensure the infliction of the fatal wounds. For the same reason, there is likewise no evidence of the respective or joint participation of the two accused in assaulting the victim, much less that they took advantage of their superior strength. Mere superiority in the number of assailants and nothing more, does not constitute the circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Furthermore, superior strength is inherent and absorbed in treachery which, latter circumstance,

however, was not proved in this case. Appellant Felipe Maloloy-on can, therefore, be convicted only of homicide. While there is testimony that appellant supposedly asked the barangay captain to accompany him to the municipal building to surrender, this mitigating circumstance was not appreciated by the trial court obviously because of the conflicting versions thereon. More to the point, appellant stoutly maintains in his brief that he did not surrender to the police authorities on July 4, 1985, but that he merely went to the municipal building to retrieve his impounded carabao. Consequently, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be credited in favor of appellant, with the result that sansany modifying circumstance, the medium period of reclusion temporal, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, should be imposed on appellant, with the corresponding application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

CASE #17: People vs. Guevarra G.R. L-24371 April 16, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CONSTANCIO GUEVARRA, ET AL., defendants, CONSTANCIO GUEVARRA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Guevarra and Felipe Cornelio, who are both policemen were charged with murder. It was alleged that about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused, aided one another in the commission of the crime of murder with treachery and evident premeditation, and taking advantage of their superior strength and official positions, and in the darkness of the night, wilfully and feloniously shot Agapito Salazar, who was mistaken by the said accused to be Andres Papasin. As a consequence of the gunshot wound inflicted upon the said Agapito Salazar, he died instantaneously.

The trial court found Guevarra guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery without any modifying circumstance, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua. Felipe Cornelio was acquitted on reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not murder was qualified with treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation, nighttime, abuse of superior strength and official position

RULING: Yes, the murder is qualified with treachery but there were no aggravating circumstances appreciated in the case.
The crime committed by the appellant is murder qualified by treachery. When he shot the victim, appellant was then well hidden behind a tree that the victim, who was unarmed and unaware, had no way of defending himself. Thus, appellant employed means, methods or forms to insure the execution of the crime, without risk to himself. As the appellant committed the act with intent to kill and with treachery, the purely accidental circumstance that as a result of the shots a person other than the one intended was killed, does

not modify the nature of the crime nor lessen his criminal responsibility, and he is responsible for the consequences of his acts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of it. (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 907; People vs. Tolentino, et al., 82 Phil. 808; People vs. Mamasalayan, 92 Phil. 639; People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950.) The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be appreciated because the deceased was not the intended victim (People vs. Guillen, supra); neither the aggravating circumstance of night time may be appreciated for the reason that the same is already absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery; nor the aggravating circumstance of superior strength for the reason that only appellant Guevarra was responsible of the crime, or that of official position for the reason that there is no proof that the appellant has used the influence, prestige, or ascendency which his office gives him as the means by which he realized his purpose. (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 156.) WHEREFORE, the decision is affirmed in all respect, with costs against the appellant.

CASE #18: People vs. Asis G.R. 118936 Feb 9, 1998

PEOPLE vs. LORENZO ASIS & ROMEO MENDOZA. February 9, 1998

FACTS: On June 19, 1991, accused-appellants Asis, Romeo Mendoza, Carino and Emelita Mendoza were charged with murder before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. On June 4, 1991, Ernesto Maningas went to ply his usual trade as a tricycle driver. Witnesses stated that they saw Asis and Romeo Mendoza on board Maningas tricycle headed to Bgy. Pinakpinakan. The next morning, Maningas dead body with 23 stabbed wounds was found in Bgy. Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan, near an irrigation dike. The above accused, armed with fan knives, willfully and unlawfully stabbed Ernesto Maningas, hitting the victim on the different parts of the body by conspiring and mutually helping one another with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength. Aside from the fact that they were the last two persons seen in the company of the victim before he was killed, soon after said killing they were also seen with their clothings smeared with blood and they themselves had some injuries on their person. The deceased was able to fight back and bite Asis on his left shoulder. Emelita Mendoza was later excluded from the charge when no probable cause was found to exist against her. Carino was also acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence. Trial court convicted accused Asis and Mendoza of murder. Asis filed for an appeal.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Asis despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt 2. Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua despite the failure of the prosecution to show the existence of any circumstance that may qualify the killing to murder HELD: 1. No. Conviction is sustained. In a criminal prosecution, a conviction may be sustained on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites are met: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All these requisites have been successfully met by the prosecution. The evidence showed that appellant was one of two persons last seen in the company of the victim before he was killed. On the morning that the victim's body was found, the appellant was observed with his clothes smeared with blood. Witness dela Cruz saw his left shoulder with bite marks and his right hand swollen. When asked about the injuries, he admitted engaging in a fight in Bgy. Pinakpinakan. On the same morning, some CAFGU soldiers spotted the appellant with co-accused Mendoza while walking by the road in Bgy. Caingin. They had blood-stained clothes. The two ran away, when pursued. Their flight evinces guilt. These circumstances taken together lead to no other conclusion but that the appellant is guilty as charged.

2. Yes, the trial court has erred in imposing reclusion perpetua. The trial court did not state in its Decision the circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder. The trial court has erred in considering abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. It must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that this qualifying circumstance was consciously sought by the assailants. In the case at bar, the fact that there were two assailants and one of them was armed with a knife does not by itself show that abuse of superior strength was present. Mere superiority in number does not indicate the presence of this circumstance. Nor was it shown that the victim was weaker in constitution and that he could not have possibly defended himself from his stronger assailant. On the contrary, it appears that the victim was able to put up a fight and even inflicted several wounds on appellant Asis and his co-accused Mendoza. As there was no qualifying circumstance, the trial court should have convicted appellant Asis of homicide and not murder.

CASE #19: People vs. Cortes G.R. 105010 Sept 3, 1993

People vs Cortes GR No. 105010 September 03, 1993

FACTS Dignos, a farmer, testified that he saw Cortez and a Domingo Lajos who forcely raped and killed after a woman in the name of Lepitin. He reported the incident to the father of the victim 3 days after the latters return from a neighboring barangay. Accused appellants denied accusations that Dignos contentions were questionable because of the late filing of complaint and that his testimony was insufficient. ISSUES (1) Whether or not, Dignos testimony was questionable and invalid. (2) Whether or not, the accused appellants were guilty of the crime, rape with homicide.

RULING (1) No, the contentions of Dignos are not invalid and questionable. The fact that he is the sole witness of the case, and his appearance to testify is enough to convict the accused appellants, even in the absence of corroboration or other evidences. As to his delay of reporting the incident, the court defend that it doesnt change the veracity of his testimony, for it was satisfactorily explained. And at any rate, it was uncommon for any witnesses to be involved in such crime and show reluctance in it; the reporting of Dignos to the victims father even if it was 3-days late was accepted and validated. Yes, the accused-appellants were guilty of rape with homicide. Though, Lajos contends that he did not raped Lepitin, the court ruled that if there is conspiracy or unity of intention to commit the crime, the person/s are liable and is charged for the offense done. In respect to the death of the victim, both are liable for they concerted in the accomplishment of the felonious purpose, and that is to kill the girl.

(2)

CASE #20: Araneta vs. CA G.R. 43527 July 3, 1990 ARANETA vs. CA 142 SCRA 532 (1986) FACTS: Complainant Gertrudes Yoyongco approached the appellant, Atty. Aquilina Araneta, a hearing officer of the Workmens Compensation Unit, to inquire about the procedure for filing a claim for death compensation. Learning the reqirements, Yoyongco prepared the forms and filed them at the Unit. When she went again to follow up on the status of the application, she was told by the appellant that she had to pay PhP100 so that her claim would be acted upon. Unable to pay, Yoyongco then went to her bro-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, the Chief of Criminal Investigation Service, Phil. Constabulary, and informed him the demand of the appellant. The Col then gave her two PhP50 bills marked with notations CC-NE-1 and CC-NE-2, photographed and dusted w/ ultra-violet powder. The complainant then went to the officer along with CIC Balcos who pretended to be her nephew. She again requested the attorneyto process her claim but was again asked if she already had P100. In answer, Yoyongco brought out the two P50 bills & handed them to the appellant. As she took hold of the money, CIC Balcos arrested her. In the PC headquarters, Atty. Aranetas hands were examined for the presence of UV powder & result was positive. ISSUE: Whether or not there is instigation in this case. HELD: No, there is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the intent originates from the mind of the criminal; the idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests the same to the accused, who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. In this case, appellant is found guilty of the crime of bribery, a violation of RA No 3019 (Anti -Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), since the idea for the crime is her very own.

CASE #21: People vs. Lao G.R. L-10473 Jan 28, 1968 People vs. Lao GR No. L-10473 January 28, 1961 FACTS: Rosario Lao and Vicente law were common-law spouses. They were engaged in poultry raising, maintaining a poultry farm at Mango Road, San Francisco del Monte. Osias Feliciano was a helper at the store. Vicente Lao had another common-law wife in the person of one Rosa Baltazar. In November, 1953, she was brought by Vicente Lao to the poultry farm at San Francisco del Monte to reside there and to supervise the work in the poultry farm. Rosario told Osias that she wanted to get rid of Rosa since her presence will bring bad luck to the business. A certain Ben came to Rosario who agreed with her in dispatching Rosa. Osias was asked by Ben that should they get to Rosa, he should not cry for help nor tell their identity if he will be asked. Ben and Albertos first attempt in getting rid of Rosa was not successful. In their second attempt they were able to execute the plan. Osias, although loyal to Rosario Lao, testified the killing for he was heed by his conscience. Ben was acquitted since he just followed the orders of Rosario as agreed between them. Moreover, he did not take part in the killing.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not conspiracy is attended in the case at bar. 2.) Whether or not there is an aggravating circumstance in the case at bar. 3.) Whether or not the crime committed by Alberto is kidnapping with murder. RULING: 1. Yes, conspiracy was attended in the case at bar since there was an agreement between Alberto and Rosario to dispatch Rosa as ordered by Rosario Lao. Appellants Alberto Padiamat and Rosario Lao participated in the commission of the crime, the former as principal by direct participation and the latter as principal by induction. 2. Yes, the crime is attended by the following qualifying and aggravating circumstances: On the part of Alberto Padiamat by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, and the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and consideration of a price or reward In the case of Rosario Lao, by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. Appellant Padiamat should be sentenced to the supreme penalty of death but considering that he played merely a secondary role in the commission of the crime, there is lack of sufficient vote to impose said penalty; his sentence is, therefore, reduced to that of reclusion perpetua. Rosario Lao is sentenced also to reclusion perpetua. 3. No, the crime committed by Alberto is not kidnapping with murder as stated in the title of the information, but murder, for the reason that the conspirators had planned to commit the latter crime, not that of kidnapping her first, and killing her later.

CASE #22: US vs. Abiog G.R. L-12747

Nov 13, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE ABIOG and LUIS ABIOG, defendants-appellants. FACTS: This is a case of an appeal from the judgment and sentence of the Court of First Instance finding the defendants (abiog) guilty of homicide. The deceased Anacleto Cudiamat (hereafter denominated C), coming upon the defendants cleaning a caua said to them, "What of it if you throw away the water as I also can get water as easily as you can?" Vicente Abiog (hereafter denominated V), indignant at this allusion replied. "Do you want a fight? Wait there." Immediately proceeding to the house, V procured a revolver and returned to the field. A brother of V. Marcelino Abiog, attempted to gain possession of the revolver and was killed (probably accidentally) for his pains. Loading the revolver anew, V pointed it at C wounding him in the stomach. The wife of C tried to succor her husband, but the other brother Luis Abiog (hereafter denominated L) stopped her and attacked C with a bolo. C's nephew, Urbano Banastas, was also wounded. While the points indicated stand out sharply in the record, they fail adequately to portray the passing of events or the words spoken during this affray. V contended that the act is just a self-defense and L cannot be criminally responsible because it was not a conspiracy where they did not plan the act of killing the plaintiff. However, the doctor stated that the wounds inflicted to the defendant can caused the death which afterwards resulted to it. ISSUE: Whether or not the inflicted wound to the victim can cause death. RULING: YES, the wound inflicted caused the death of the victim. Applied to the present facts, for V escape culpability, it was incumbent upon him to prove that the death resulted from a cause other than the wound inflicted by him. For L to escape culpability, a similar burden of proof was on him. The two defendants cannot jointly escape by merely standing still and doing nothing. In reality under the proven facts, C was living when wounded by V, and C was living when wounded by L. Both wounds operated to cause death. Death, therefore, can traced to the independent act of each defendant. Death is imputable to each defendant. To summarize, common sense rules, and ones founded on authority, are believed to be these: V and L, acting independently are responsible for their individual acts only. The burden rests upon each defendant, charge with an act which might cause death, to show that death resulted from a cause different from the act imputed to him. Neither V nor L has met this burden of proof. As the spark of life went out, each wound was a contributing cause. Death was the joint result of their acts. The defendants and appellants are each sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-half of both instances, and are jointly and severally made liable to the heirs of the deceased Anacleto Cudiamat in the amount of P1,000. So ordered

CASE #23: People vs. Azcona G.R. L-40098 Feb 28, 1934

FACTS:
Arsenio Cabilis, originally from Cebu, had been merchandising in Misamis and a number of the inhabitants in Misamis and adjacent territory had become indebted to him. To collect debts owing to him from some of these debtors, Cabilis in January, 1933, went out to Bolinsong, accompanied by Luis Amado, to whom Cabilis expected to turn over the duty of collecting the moneys owing to him in that neighborhood. It appears that in the past bad blood had developed between Cabilis and Felix Azcona, and on a certain occasion Azcona had been shot in the arm by Cabilis, with the result that one of Azcona's arms had been amputated. This incident rankled in the soul of Azcona and he seems to have cherished an intense animosity against Cabilis. Azcona was a landowner and his co-accused in this case consists of individuals employed by him or cultivating his land. These individuals were accordingly drawn by Azcona into a plot for the purpose of destroying Cabilis. The Police in Misamis received information of the danger, and a detachment was sent out to Bolinsong with directions by all means to prevent Azcona and Cabilis from coming together. He was told that Cabilis was due to arrive that evening on the launch. The sergeant therefore, with two privates, proceeded down to the landing place, where, among others, they found Felix Azcona, who gave them the same information, namely, that Cabilis was soon to arrive. In the course of the conversation that resulted Azcona revealed his deep resentment towards Cabilis, and when the sergeant told him that the Constabulary were there to prevent any trouble between him and Cabilis, Azcona wept. The information received as to the movements of Cabilis was not misleading, and presently the boat came with Cabilis aboard. The sergeant went down to meet the boat and conversed a few moments with Cabilis, telling him that he should not go out in that neighborhood without a Constabulary escort. Early in the morning of January 14, 1933, Cabilis took his man Amado, and, without informing the Constabulary at the barracks, proceeded on his way to Tiaman.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the case there being no other evidence to implicate the appellants. HELD/RULING: No. All of the accused relied upon an alibi at the trial, pretending that at the time the
murder was committed they were peacefully engaged in farming operations some distance away. After being arrested, Lumantas made statements in which he admitted his guilt, and indicated Azcona as the individual who had prompted or coerced him into assuming the role of principal assassin. Of course this confession was not admissible against his co-accused, and Lumantas tried to make it appear at the trial that it had been obtained under conditions that made it inadmissible against himself. With this contention we are unable to agree. But for the rest the case is made out against Azcona, Lara, and Cebedo by the testimony of Luis Amado, who, in our opinion, is a trustworthy witness; and his account of the tragedy is intelligent and convincing. In the case of People vs. Tamayo (44 Phil., 38, 54). We cannot safely say that the wounds inflicted by these two, or either of them, really contributed materially to the death of Cabilis, because he was already in the throes of dissolution when Cebedo struck his neck. But the fact that they were with Azcona when the crime was consummated, and followed him to the spot where Cabilis was lying, where they obeyed the directions of Azcona to the complete consummation of the murder, shows, in our opinion, that they are at least guilty as accomplices.

CASE #24: People vs. Pilola G.R. 121828 June 27, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, RENE GAYOT PILOLA [G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003]

Facts: One night, Elisa Rolan was inside their store waiting for her husband to arrive. Outside, were Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. having a good time while drinking beer. At that very juncture, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store and joined the two. In the course of their drinking splurge, the conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar affronted Julian, and the latter got irritated. A clash then between the two ensued. Elisa tried to pacify the event and advised them to go home instead. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to conciliate the two to no avail. Joselito's intrusion apparently did not prosper. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito's neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the appellant, who were then across the street, saw their comrade Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fight. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell how many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for his life. When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselito's head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselito's house and informed his wife and brother of the incident. Issue: Whether or not appellant is merely an accomplice. Held: There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.

There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One needs only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as coprincipals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to make him a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same end. In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victims death. Both the offenders are criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts. Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death of the victim, one as a principal by direct participation, and the other as an accomplice. To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community of criminal design; that, knows the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice. In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and Ronnie were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim.

CASE #25: People vs. Antonio G.R. 128900 July 21, 2000

Facts: Antonio has been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC for the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. Antonio and Tuadles, the victim, met at the International Business Club to play poker and pusoy dos. They played until morning. During the time when they had to tally their scores and collect winnings, an argument arose between the two. The prosecution presented that Antonio, without warning pulled a gun from his behind and shot Tuadles at a very close range. On the other hand, the defense said that the argument arose from Tuadles refusal to pay. During the heated argument, Tuadles suddenly grabbed the gun from the table and the two grappled for the possession of trigger. Tuadles was shot and was lying on the floor

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that treachery attended the commission of the offense charged Ruling: Yes, the trial court erred in holding that treachery attended the commission of the offense charged. The trial court did not explain the basis for the treachery except for a terse citation that there was a sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment crime. Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where accused made no preparation or employed no means, method and form of execution tending directly and specially to insure the commission of a crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense which the victim may take. It is not enough that the means, methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the offender arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. The charge of murder was changed to homicide since the presence of a qualifying circumstance was not proven.

CASE #26: People vs. Geronimo G.R. L-8936 Oct 23, 1956

Facts: The defendants Federico Cmdr. OSCAR, Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony, alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang Pacio, alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa alias David, Jesus Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle, Rosendo Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago Rotas alias Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres Diapera alias Maclang, alias Berto, alias Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo, alias Albert, Teodoro Primavera alias Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez, Pedro Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. These are the ranking officers or members of Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) and Hukbalahaps Huks. In the information it alleged 5 instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezons convoy on April 28, 1949 and ending on February 1954 where Geronimo killed Policarpio Tipay a Barrio Lieutenant. He pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court found him guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. He appealed raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is not the complex crime of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision mayor. Issue: Whether or not rebellion be complexed with murder, robbery or kidnapping? Held: No. The crime is not committed in furtherance of rebellion, without political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed in rebellion. Furthermore, it cannot be taken with rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. He would be held liable for separate crimes, and these cannot be merged into a juridical whole. [T]he decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (noncomplex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000

CASE #27: People vs. Guillen G.R. L-1477 Jan 18, 1950 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder and sentenced to the penalty of death. In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The findings showed that he was not insane and could be tried before the court. Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades in a plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, hurled the grenade at the President Manuel Roxas when the latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform at the Plaza Miranda. General Castaeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) who died on the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.

ISSUES: First, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the commission of crime."

RULING: Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable: Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties. The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim. There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder. In this connection, it should be stated that in violation of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense. The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporalin its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)

CASE #28: People vs. Jaranilla G.R. L-28547 Feb 22, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, FRANCO BRILLANTES and HEMAN GORRICETA, accused. ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, and FRANCO BRILLANTES, defendants-appellants. Facts: While Gorriceta was driving a Ford pickup truck, he saw Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck. Jaranilla requested to bring them to Mandurriao, Gorriceta take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's place. So, Jaranilla, Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup truck which Gorriceta drove to Mandurriao. Upon reaching Mandurriao, Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. After an interval of about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared. Each of them was carrying two fighting cocks. They ran to the truck. Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove the truck to Jaro. While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman Jabatan had fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go down. They did not heed the injunction of the policeman. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened Gorriceta. He immediately started the motor of the truck and drove straight home. His uncle had counselled him to surrender to the police. The policemen took Gorriceta to their headquarters and became a State Witness. Issues: Whether or not Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes can be held liable for robbery with homicide Ruling: Suyo and Brillantes is not liable for robbery with homicide for It is not reasonable to assume that the killing of any peace officer, who would forestall the theft or frustrate appellants' desire to enjoy the fruits of the crime, was part of their plan. There is no evidence to link appellants Suyo and Brillantes to the killing of Jabatan, except the circumstance that they were with Jaranilla in the truck when the latter shot the policeman. Gorriceta testified that Suyo did not do anything when Jabatan approached the right side of the truck and came in close proximity to Jaranilla who was on the extreme right. Brillantes pulled his revolver which he did not fire. Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make a person a coprincipal thereof. Jaranilla is liable for theft and homicide, due to the direct assault upon an agent of authority.

CASE #29: Salgado vs. CA G.R. 89606 Aug 30 1990 AGUSTIN SALGADO vs. CA and HON. ANTONIO SOLANO (Presiding Judge of the RTCQuezon City) and FRANCISCO LUKBAN FACTS: The petitioner Salgado was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of 4 months and 20 days and to indemnify the private respondent in the sum of P126,633.50 as actual damages, and the sum of P50,000.00 as damages for the incapacity of the latter to pursue his poultry business. Salgado then filed an application for probation with the trial court containing, among others a condition that the condition that the petitioner has to pay private respondent P2,000.00 a month for his civil liability. The trial court granted this and the petitioner complied with this from May to October 1987 which was voluntarily accepted by Lukban. But on November 1987, the trial court issued an order granting Lukbans motion for issuance of a writ of execution compelling the petitioner to pay the remaining balance of his civil liability. The motion for reconsideration and petition by Salgado opposing the order was dismissed by the Trial Court and CA, respectively. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there was an alteration or modification made on the final and executory decision when the petitioner was granted his probationary condition to only pay P2,000.00 a month; and 2. Whether or not probation may only affect criminal liability and not the civil liability of the petitioner. RULING: There is no question that the decision finding petitioner guilty had become final and executory because the filing by respondent of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. The Court, however, finds that the grant of application for probation did not alter or modify the above decision as the condition of the payment of P2,000.00 monthly during the period of probation did not increase or decrease the civil liability adjudged against petitioner but merely provided for the manner of payment. As for the contention that probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case should not be given a literal meaning. Here it only means that although the execution of sentence is suspended by the grant of probation, it does not follow that the civil liability is extinguished. The only issue would then be if the trial court may impose a term which a probationer may settle his civil liability against the offended party during the period of probation. This is allowed with the only limitation that it does not jeopardize the constitutional rights of the accused. The petition is GRANTED.

CASE #30: Petralba vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. 81337 Aug 16, 1991 FACTS:
Richard V. Petralba, was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Treasury of Alcoy Cebu on October 23, 1 979. Fourteen (14) months after designation, petitioner's cashbook balance was audited and was found short On July 30, 1984 Petralba, was charged with Malversation of Public Funds, in violation of Article 217, Revised Penal Code. Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner dated December 15, 1987. Hence, this petition. On August 10, 1989, while this case was pending, petitioner's counsel filed a manifestation that his client, Richard V. Petralba, had died, evidenced by a death certificate dated July 10, 1989.

HELD:
In the case at bar, petitioner Richard V. Petralba died pending appeal and before any final judgment therein. Hence, the death of Richard V. Petralba extinguished his personal and pecuniary (such as the fine) liabilities.

Though the death of an accused during the pendency of an appeal extinguished his criminal liability, his civil liability survives.

The estate of the deceased petitioner was sentenced to indemnify the government.