Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 122269 September 30, 1999
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO A. BANTUGAN, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan, and HEIRS OF ZENAIDA BUSTRIA-
TIGNO, represented by CAMILO TIGNO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:
For review is the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals, dated October 4, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34013,
dismissing a petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines for the annulment of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, which declared private respondents to be the absolute
owners of a piece of land in Barangay Malacapas, Dasol, Pangasinan. The government, as petitioner,
prays that the aforesaid decision of the trial court, rendered in Civil Case No. A-1759, be annulled.1wphi 1.nt
The facts are stated in the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals:
Sometime in 1957, one Matias Bustamante filed with the then CFI of Pangasinan an
application for registration under Act No. 496, as amended, of a tract of land
containing an area of 880,000 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay
Malacapas, Dasol, Pangasinan.
Both the Director of Forestry and the Director of Fisheries filed oppositions to the
aforecited application, alleging among others, that "said parcel of land, with the
exception of 97,525 square meters, is a part of the Timber Land Block "A" Land
Classification Project 44, which is converted into fish ponds." Isidro Bustria [private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest] and Julian Bustria, also opposed the said
application for land registration, alleging that they "have in the year 1943 occupied in
good faith their respective portions having a total area of fifty (50) hectares, more or
less . . . converted their respective portions into fish ponds . . . and actually
possessed and occupied their respective portions . . . exclusively against all persons,
except the Director of Forestry & Director of Fishery." After trial, the lower court
rendered a Decision in favor of applicant Bustamante.
On appeal to this Honorable Court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30058-R, it was found
that 783,275 square meters of the land applied for were accretions added to
applicant Bustamante's riceland of 9.7525 hectares, and that said accretion was
caused by the sea on the southward portion of said riceland. This Honorable Court
then ruled:
This being so, the said accretion belongs not to the riparian owner
but the State. All lands thrown up by the sea and formed upon the
shores, belong to the national domain and are for public use, in
accordance with the provisions of the Law on Waters of August 3,
1866 (Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505) (p. 20, Decision,
November 16, 1967).
Thus, modifying the judgment of the lower court, this Honorable Court rendered a
Decision on November 16, 1967, disposing:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby
modified so that only 9.7525 of the land applied for is hereby
adjudicated and ordered to be registered in the name of the applicant,
the remaining area being hereby declared land of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, without prejudice to
whatever rights oppositors Isidro Bustria and Julian Bustria may have
acquired over portions of the area thus declared as land of the public
domain, with costs against applicant.
SO ORDERED.
When brought up on certiorari to the Supreme Court, the foregoing Judgment was
affirmed in toto in the Resolution in G.R. No. L-18605 dated February 29, 1968.
It is relevant to state at this point that the parcel of land that is presently the subject
of the dispute in the instant case, Lot No. 7764, CAD 624-D (Portion) [Psu-155696,
Lot 3 (Portion)], forms part of the above-mentioned parcel of land declared by this
Honorable Court as belonging to the public domain, classified/zonified land available
for fishpond development, per L.C. Map No. 3175, approved on June 24, 1984,
under administrative Order No. 4-1829 (Annex "D", Petition). The subject lot contains
an area of 49,999 square meters, more or less. This lot has been leased to Mr.
Porfirio Morado by the [Republic of the Philippines], represented by the Secretary of
Agriculture, for a period of twenty-five (25) years, or up to December 31, 2013, under
Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 5132, dated August 17, 1989 (Annex "E", Petition).
On July 6, 1988, however, the late Zenaida Bustria [daughter of Isidro Bustria] filed a
complaint against Porfirio Morado in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, Branch 55, for ownership and possession over the lot in question
[docketed as Civil Case No. A-1759]. Herein petitioner, the Republic of the
Philippines, was not made a party to that suit.
In her complaint, Zenaida Bustria claimed absolute ownership and quiet and peaceful
possession of several lots under PSU-155696 surveyed in the name of her father,
Isidro Bustria. She further asserted that said Porfirio Morado maliciously applied for a
fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources over Lot 3
thereof (the subject lot), well-knowing that said lot had always been occupied,
possessed and worked by her and her predecessors-in-interest.
Porfirio Morado denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that the lot in
question is part of the public domain which he developed and converted into a
fishpond. Due, however, to Porfirio Morado's and his counsel's failure to appear at
the pre-trial and subsequent court hearings, the trial court subsequently declared
Porfirio Morado "as in default."
On December 17, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive and
absolute owner of the land in question stated in
paragraph 4 of the Complaint and entitled to the
exclusive and quiet possession of the said land; and
(b) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
amount of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and the sum
of P500.00 per day of hearing of the counsel; plus
costs.
(Annex "A", Petition)
On January 23, 1992, Porfirio Morado filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment which
was denied on July 21, 1992 for lack of merit.
On July 8, 1992, a writ of execution was issued, and it was implemented by Sheriffs
Manuel O. de Asis and Sheriff Cesar A. Gines. Spouses Porfirio Morado and Juliana
Morado thereafter filed with this Honorable Court a Petition for Certiorari with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 28932. In a Resolution dated
December 11, 1992, the Petition was denied for lack of merit. The related Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated February 18, 1993. (Rollo, pp.
107-112) (emphasis omitted)
2

On April 19, 1994, petitioner, invoking 9 of B.P. Blg. 129,
3
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for the annulment of the trial court's decision, dated December 17, 1991. Petitioner alleged that the land
in question is within the classified/zonified alienable and disposable lend for fishpond development, per
L.C. Map No. 3175 approved on June 24, 1984, under Administrative Order No. 4-1829 and that since the
land formed part of the public domain, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) has
jurisdiction over its disposition in accordance with P.D. No 704, 4.
On October 4, 1995 the, Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition.
4

Hence, this petition for review.
The judgment rendered in a case may be annulled on any of the following grounds: (a) the judgment
is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law; or (b) it was obtained through
extrinsic fraud.
5
The question in this case is whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court is void on
any of these grounds. The preliminary question, however, is whether the government can bring such
action even though it was not a party to the action in which the decision sought to be annulled was
rendered.
We shall deal with these questions in inverse order.
First, is the question whether petitioner has personality to bring the action below. To begin with, an
action to recover a parcel of land is in personam. As such, it is binding only between the parties
thereto, as this Court explained in Ching v. Court of Appeals,
6
viz:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an
action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding
or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment
therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given
an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the
former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the
latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a
parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.
The appellate court, holding that the proceedings before the trial court were in personam, ruled that
since petitioner was not a party to Civil Case No. A-1759, it is not a real party-in-interest and,
therefore, has no personality to bring the action for annulment of the judgment rendered in that case.
The appellate court said:
Private respondents are correct. Civil Case No. A-1759 was purely for "Ownership
and Possession". The decision sought to be annulled is solely "between the private
respondents [the Bustrias] and Porfirio Morado" (Rollo, p. 142). Petitioner Republic
was not a party in the case and is not bound by the judgment rendered therein.
It is settled, a real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 128; University
of the Philippines Board of Regents vs. Ligot-Telan, 227 SCRA 342; Tampingco vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 652; Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 203
SCRA 310; Travelwide Associated Sales, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 205).
Petitioner Republic not being a party, and the judgment not being in rem, it does not
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment sought. Petitioner Republic can on
its own, and even without resorting to this petition for annulment of judgment,
institute the proper action to assert its claim that the "subject lot is a land forming part
of the public domain'' (Rollo, p. 145). It need not seek the annulment of the subject
judgment, in Civil Case No. A-1759 in which it was not a party and involves merely a
question of ownership; and possession between plaintiffs Zenaida B. Bustria and
defendant Porfirio Morado and which decision is not binding on it, to be able to assert
its claim or interest in the property. It is clear for this reason that petitioner is not a
real party-in-interest (Section 2, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court).
7

The appellate court is in error. In Islamic Da'wah Council of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,
8
this Court
held that a party claiming ownership of a parcel of land which is the subject of foreclosure proceedings
has a sufficient interest to bring an action for annulment of the judgment rendered in the foreclosure
proceedings even though it was not in the party in such proceedings. It was held:
[A] person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is
essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the
use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.
In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to the
foreclosure case. Neither are they principally nor secondarily bound by the judgment
rendered therein. However, in their petition filed with the Court of Appeals they
alleged fraud and connivance perpetuated by and between the Da Silvas and the
Council as would adversely affect them. This allegation, if fully substantiated by
preponderance of evidence, could be the basis for the annulment of Civil Case No. 4-
43476.
9

This ruling was reiterated in Top Management Programs Corp. v. Court of Appeals.
10

The next question is whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to declare the land in question
to belong to private respondent. The government asserts that the lot is within the "classified/zonified
alienable and disposable land for fishpond development," hence, it is part of the public
domain;
11
that under P.D. No. 704, 4, jurisdiction over its disposition is vested in the BFAR; that unlike
agricultural land, public lands which are declared suitable for fishpond purposes may only be disposed of
by way of license, concession, or lease; and that possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into private ownership.
12

On the other hand, private respondents do not deny that Isidro Bustria, to whom they trace their
ownership, previously filed a fishpond application with the BFAR over the disputed land.
13
Neither do
they deny that the disputed land formed part of the public domain. They insist, however, that P.D. No. 704
applies only to "lands suitable for fishpond purposes" while the land in dispute is already a "fully
developed fishpond." They assert ownership of the subject lot through open and continuous possession
of their predecessor-in-interest since the Second World War.
14

We agree with petitioner. The State clearly stands to be adversely affected by the trial court's
disposition of in alienable public land.
The land involved in this case was classified as public land suitable for fishpond development.
15
In
controversies involving the disposition of public land, the burden of overcoming, the presumption of state
ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant.
16
Private respondents have not
discharged this burden.
The fact that the land in dispute was transformed into a "fully developed fishpond" does not mean
that it has lost its character as one declared "suitable for fishpond purposes" under the decree. By
applying for a fishpond permit with the BFAR, Isidro Bautista admitted the character of the land as
one suitable for fishpond development since the disposition of such lands is vested in the BFAR.
Consequently, private respondents, as his successors-in-interest, are estopped from claiming
otherwise.
It is settled under the Public Land Law
17
that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30 years is ipso
jure converted to private property by the mere lapse of time.
18
However, only public lands classified as
agricultural
19
are alienable. Lands declared for fishery purposes are not alienable
20
and their possession,
no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into ownership.
Since the disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall within the jurisdiction of the
BFAR, in accordance with P.D. No 704, 4,
21
the trial court's decision, dated December 17, 1991, is
null and void. The trial court has no jurisdiction to make a disposition of inalienable public land. If, as
claimed, Porfirio Morado secured a fishpond permit through fraud and misrepresentation, private
respondents' sole recourse, if any, is to secure the annulment of the same before the BFAR and apply for
a new one in their favor, provided that they are qualified therefor. What they did, however, was not only to
bring their action in the wrong forum but to ask to be declared owners of the land in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, Ninth Division, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 34013, dated October 4, 1995, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The decision of
Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1759 is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID.1wphi 1. nt
SO ORDERED.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J .:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares,
as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under
the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz.
1
The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
2
The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the
land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is
the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore
not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before
us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the
earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest
lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in
1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the
classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and
grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories.
3
This provision has
been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution.
4

Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated.
5
Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141.
Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified
as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government,
6
promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps
or manglares were defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also,
to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon.
Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot
be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains.
x x x
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom
had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a
common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of
sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative
Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the
Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry:
7

...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act
(Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation
and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English
means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree
in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants
growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not
change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that
the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law,
the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine
Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of
1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of
appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias,
8
promulgated on
March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice
Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think
this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been
definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this
phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and
Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry,
9
with
Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even
quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees
are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of
commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are
not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan,
10
the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,
11
reiterated
the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the
contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
12
promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled
"that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming
part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,
13
the Court was more positive when
it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although
conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second
and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that
Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons
for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted
and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have
to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
14
where this Court agreed with
the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or
forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve
days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical
pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are
agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the
authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is
now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made
such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer
our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed'
and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the
rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they
are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with
each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization
of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of
making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes
to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this
section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class
to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon
there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department
Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public
lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and
the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered,
sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify
the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such
proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become
part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry
that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be
declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect
veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and,
no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said
provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the
requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid
and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as
forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals,
15
where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much
later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove
swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of
Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of
the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of
his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827
of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director
of Lands,
16
to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of
such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural
land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not
authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the
authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a
basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the
Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or
otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing
or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp
lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can
be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the
fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown
that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that
the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty
years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law.
17
These matters are not presumed but must be
established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis
used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor
of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases.
18

We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the
subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not
alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.
Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia Bisnar.

GRIO-AQUINO, J .:
Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May
27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director
of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private
respondents' application for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in
LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.
In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July 20,1976, the
applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of
the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq.
m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas,
Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p.
41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).
On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development,
opposed the application on the grounds that:
1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to
acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having
been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish Government,
such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or special grant,
(3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de
compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory
information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized
mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable laws.
2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application.
3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record
on Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on March
14, 1977, and included the following allegation:
Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby
apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land as owners for
more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the
applicants, herein private respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest
have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of
land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the
filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts,
bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the
lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots
are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case
of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government
alleges that:
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable
agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48
(b) of CA 141, as amended.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act
2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for
doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branchof the
government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or
abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1)
the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then
Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply
(Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs.
Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of
forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling
in Amunategui that:
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving
that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he
is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein
sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as
those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding
the filing of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA
69.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration in
LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, represented
by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA
CITY, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.

BIDIN, J .:
This is an appeal from the 1) decision * of the FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated
May 13, 1986, in AC G.R. No. 01410 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez,
applicant-appellee vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al., Oppositors-appellants, affirming the decision ** of the then Court of FIRST
INSTANCE of Quezon, 9th Judicial District, Branch 1, dated November 4, 1980 in Land Registration Case No. N-1106 entitled the ROMAN
CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director, Bureau of
Forest Development, oppositors, ordering the registration of title to the parcel of land designated, as lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 and
its technical descriptions, and the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592 and its technical description, together with whatever
improvements existing thereon, in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena and 2) its resolution Dated June 19,1986,
denying appellant's "Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."
The factual background of the case as found by the Intermediate Appellate Court are as follows:
On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by
Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels
of land. Three of said parcels, denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan
PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon
Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592 is located in Barrio Bucal
(Taguan), same municipality and province. As basis for the application, the applicant
claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or donation dating as
far back as 1928.
The legal requirements of publication and posting were duly complied with, as was
the service of copies of notice of initial hearing on the proper government officials.
In behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development, the Solicitor General filed an Opposition on April 20, 1979, alleging
therein among others, that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee
simple to the parcel of land being applied for.
At the initial hearing held on November 13, 1979, only the Provincial Fiscal in
representation of the Solicitor General appeared to interpose personal objection to
the application. Hence, an Order of General Default against the whole world was
issued by the Court a quo except for the Director of Lands and the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development.
The preliminaries dispensed with, the applicant then introduced its proofs in support
of the petition, summed up by the lower court as follows:
With respect to Lots 1, 2, and 3, plan PSU-65686.
Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSU-65686 respectively containing an area of
18,977, 6,910 and 16,221 square meters, are adjoining lots & are
situated in the Barrio of Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Province of
Quezon (formerly Tayabas) (Exhibits F, F-1, F-2 and F-3). Said lots
were surveyed for the Roman Catholic Church on November 3, 1928
(Exhibit P-5) and the survey plan approved on October 20, 1929
(Exhibit F-6).
Lot 1 was acquired by the Roman Catholic Church thru Rev. Father
Raymundo Esquenet by purchase from the spouses Atanacio Yranso
and Maria Coronado on October 20, 1928 (Exhibits G, G-1), portion
of Lot 2 also by purchase thru Rev. Father Raymundo Esquenet from
the spouses Benito Maramot and Venancia Descaller on May 22,
1969 (Exhibits M, N-1), while the remaining portion of Lot 2 and Lot 3
were already owned and possessed by the Roman Catholic Church
even prior to the survey of the said three lots in 1928.
Records of burial of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria,
Quezon showed that even as early as November 1918, Lot 3 has
already been utilized by the Roman Catholic Church as its cemetery
in Candelaria, Quezon (Exhibit N, N-1 to N-5).<re||an 1w>
These three lots presently constituted the Roman Catholic Church
cemetery in Candelaria, Quezon.
Lots 1, 2 and 3 are declared for taxation purposes in the name of the
Roman Catholic Church under Tax Declaration Nos. 22-19-02-079,
22-19-02-077 and 22-19-02-082 as 'cemetery site' (Exhibit S, V and
T).
With respect to the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592:
This parcel of land situated in the barrio of Bucal (Taguan),
Municipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon (formerly Tayabas)
and more particularly described in plan PSU-1 12592 and its
technical description with an area of 3,221 square meters (Exhibit 1)
was formerly owned and possessed by the spouses Paulo G.
Macasaet, and Gabriela V. de Macasaet. Said spouses, on February
26, 1941, donated this lot to the Roman Catholic Church represented
by Reverend Father Raymundo Esquenet (Exhibit J, J-1 to J-4). It
was surveyed for the Roman Catholic Church on Aug. 16, 1940 as
church site and the corresponding survey plan approved on Jan. 15,
1941 (Exhibits I-1, I-2, 1-3).
Previously erected on this Lot was an old chapel which was
demolished and new chapel now stands in its place on the same site.
For his part, the Fiscal in a Manifestation dated July 22, 1980, said 'the State will not
adduce evidence in support of its opposition and will submit the instant case for
decision.'
Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo concluded, on the basis
of acquisitive prescription at the very least, that the former had adequately shown
title to the parcels of land being claimed.
Since the acquisition of these four (4) lots by the applicant, it has
been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, and such
possession, together with its predecessors-in interest, covering a
period of more than 52 years (at least from the date of the survey in
1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to lot
3, all of plan PSU- 65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the
fourth parcel described in plan PSU-112592 (at least from the date of
the survey in 1940) have been open, public, continuous, peaceful,
adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of owner.
Accordingly, the court ordered the registration of the four parcels together with the
improvements thereon "in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
LUCENA, INC., a religious corporation sole duly registered and existing under the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines."
Against this decision, the Solicitor General filed a Motion for reconsideration on the
following grounds:
1. Article XIV, Section 11 of the New Constitution(1973) disqualifies a private
corporation from acquiring alienable lands for the public domain.
2. In the case at bar the application was filed after the effectivity on the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973.
which was denied by the lower court for lack of merit.
Still insisting of the alleged unconstitutionality of the registration (a point which,
incidentally, the appellant never raised in the lower court prior to its Motion for
Reconsideration), the Republic elevated this appeal. (Rollo, pp. 25-28)
On May 13, 1986, the first Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered its
Decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the judgment a quo to be supported by law and the evidence
on record, the same is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo p. 30)
A reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision was sought by Appellant Republic of the Philippines,
but for lack of merit, its motion for reconsideration was denied on June 19, 1986, by Resolution of
the First Civil Case Division, Intermediate Appellate Court which resolution reads in full:
Considering appellant Republic of the Philippines "Motion for reconsideration" filed
on June 4, 1986; the Court RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit, grounds raised therein having all been considered in the decision.
(Rollo, p. 31)
Hence, this petition.
The following are the assigned errors raised by the petitioner in its petition:
1. The decision and the resolution in question are contrary to law and decisions of
this honorable Court in Meralco vs. Castro-Bartolome and Republic, 114 SCRA 799
(prom. June 29,1982); Republic vs. Judge Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114
SCRA 875, June 29, 1982); and Republic vs. Judge Gonong and Iglesia ni Cristo,
118 SCRA 729-733 (November 25,1982); Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y
Hermanas, Inc. 141 SCRA 21-25 (Jan. 7,1986).
2. The lands applied for registration were the subject of a previous registration case
where a decree of registration was already issued.
3. Respondent corporation failed to establish the indentity of the lands applied for.
(Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The issue raised in this case involves the question of whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena,
as a corporation sole is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land
subject of this case.
Corollary thereto is the question of whether or not a corporation sole should be treated as an
ordinary private corporation, for purpose of the application of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973
Constitution.
Article XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution, in part provides:
Sec. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may
any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares....
Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a Certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner contends that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena
(private respondent herein) which is admittedly a corporation sole is disqualified to own and register
its title over the parcels of land involved herein. (Rollo, p. 41)
In its petition it likewise argued that being a juridical entity, private respondent cannot avail of the
benefits of Sec. 48(b) of the public land law which applies to FILIPINO citizens or NATURAL
persons. On the other hand, private respondent in its MEMORANDUM espoused the contrary view.
There is no merit in this petition.
The parties herein do not dispute that since the acquisition of the four (4) lots by the applicant, it has
been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with its
predecessors-in-interest, covering a period of more than 52 years (at least from the date of survey in
1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU-65686; and
more than 39 years with respect to the fourth parcel described in plan PSU-11 2592 (at least from
the date of the survey in 1940) have been open, public, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the
whole world, and in the concept of owner.
Being disputed before this Court is the matter of the applicability of Art. XIV Sec. 11 of the 1973
Constitution to the case at bar.
Petitioner argues that considering such constitutional prohibition, private respondent is disqualified to
own and register its title to the lots in question. Further, it argues that since the application for
registration was filed only on February 2, 1979, long after the 1973 Constitution took effect on
January 17, 1973, the application for registration and confirmation of title is ineffectual because at
the time it was filed, private corporation had been declared ineligible to acquire alienable lands of the
public domain pursuant to Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the said constitution. (Rollo, p. 41)
The questioned posed before this Court has been settled in the case of DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509 [1986]) which reversed the ruling first enunciated in
the 1982 case of Manila Electric Co. vs. CASTRO BARTOLOME, (114 SCRA 789 [1982]) imposing
the constitutional ban on public land acquisition by private corporations which ruling was declared
emphatically as res judicata on January 7, 1986 inDirector of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas de
Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., (141 SCRA 21 [1986]).<re|| an1w> In said case, (Director of Lands v. IAC, supra), this
Court stated that a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings must be made. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be
answered in the negative.
If, on the other hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporation or association obviously does not apply. In affirming the Decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court in said case, this Court adopted the vigorous dissent of the then
Justice, later Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, tracing the line of cases beginning with CARINO,
1
in
1909, thru SUSI,
2
in 1925, down to HERICO,
3
in 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed
by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite periodipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes' private property.
(DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 518).
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the state than the dictim of the statute itself;
4
that the possessor "... shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title ..." No proof being admissable to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of time, and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not ORIGINALLY convert
the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino,
"... There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. (DIRECTOR OF
LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 520).
The open, continuous and exclusive possession of the four lots by private respondent can clearly be
gleaned from the following facts on record: Lot 1 and portion of Lot 2 was acquired by purchase in
1928 and 1929, respectively. The remaining portion of lots 2 and 3 was already owned and
possessed by private respondent even prior to the survey of said lots in 1928. In fact, records of
burial of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed that as early as 1919, Lot 3 has
already been utilized by the Roman Catholic Church as its cemetery. That at present, said three lots
are utilized as the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon. That said lots are declared for
taxation purposes in the name of the Roman Catholic Church. The fourth parcel of land was
acquired by donation in 1941 and same lot is utilized as church site.
It must be emphasized that the Court is not here saying that a corporation sole should be treated like
an ordinary private corporation.
In Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, et al.
(L-8451, December 20,1957,102 Phil. 596). We articulated:
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following:
A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy.
Conceived and introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this legal
creation which was referred to as "that unhappy freak of English Law" was designed
to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and
on behalf of the church which was regarded as the property owner (See 1 Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always
be one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to
give them some legal capacities and advantages, particulary that of perpetuity, which
in their natural persons they could not have had. In this sense, the King is a sole
corporation; so is a bishop, or deans distinct from their several chapters (Reid vs.
Barry, 93 fla. 849, 112 So. 846).
Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 which reads as follows:
Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property. Any corporation sole may
purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church, charitable,
benevolent or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts for such
purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon
obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province
where the property is situated; but before the order is issued, proof must be made to
the satisfaction of the Court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell
has been given by publication or otherwise in such manner and for such time as said
court may have directed, and that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to
mortgage or sell should be granted. The application for leave to mortgage or sell
must be made by petition, duly verified by the chief archbishop, bishop, priest,
minister, rabbi or presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by
any member of the religious denomination, sect or church represented by the
corporation sole: Provided, That in cases where the rules, regulations and discipline
of the religious denomination, sect or church religious society or order concerned
represented by such corporation sole regulate the method of acquiring, holding,
selling and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations and
discipline shall control and the intervention of the courts shall not be necessary.
There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is vested with the right to
purchase and hold real estate and personal property. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary
private corporation because whether or not it be so treated as such, the Constitutional provision
involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.
In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of Lands vs. IAC,
(supra, 513), the lands subject of this petition were already private property at the time the
application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. There is therefore no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision and Resolution
of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.