DAPITON vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 107259; JUNE 9, 1997

FACTS:
That sometime before May 5, 1967,
Raymundo Dapiton who was then
needing money, approached the
private respondent Meljohn dela
Pena and requested for a loan
of P400.00 offering to place as
security of said loan his residential
house and lot located at Almeria,
Leyte.
That the fair market value of the
same is not less than P3,000.00
more or less; it is the house where
Dapiton has been living for thirty
(30) years up to the present.
That the private respondent agreed
to the request of Dapiton and
thereafter said private
respondent prepared the
corresponding document and
Dapiton was made to sign the same
on the 5th day of May, 1967, before
Notary Public, Dionisio R. dela Pea,
father of herein defendant.
Thus, the petitioners contend that
the transaction between Raymundo
Dapiton and the private respondent
was one of loan of P400.00 to be
paid within one year time with the
property subject of the question
deed as security for the payment of
the said loan.
Private respondent, however,
maintains that the transaction
between him and the deceased
Dapiton was one of absolute sale.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the true nature of
the contract between Dapiton and
dela Pena was one of an equitable
mortgage or absolute sale.

HELD:
Closely examining the facts of this
case, we find that, contrary to the
findings of the Court of Appeals,
there are numerous indications that
the contract effected between the
parties is actually an equitable
mortgage and not an absolute deed
of sale.
Firstly, it is without dispute that
private respondent Dela Pea made
two (2) annotations on the deed of
sale, one at the left hand margin
and another at the back of the
page. These annotations grant
Raymundo Dapiton the right to
repurchase his property within one
year. This right of repurchase is a
clear contravention of private
respondents claim that the deed of
sale was meant to be absolute.
Secondly, it has been
established that the deceased
Dapiton habitually borrowed money
from numerous acquaintances,
using the said property as security
for the loan. The amount borrowed,
amounting to Four Hundred Pesos
(P400.00), invariably remained the
same. Although these loans were
constantly denoted as sale with
right of repurchase, the deceased
Dapiton continously remained in
possession of the property despite a
succession of such loan
transactions. Evidently, all these
transactions were equitable
mortgages.
Thirdly, we find it difficult to
believe that the private respondent
would tolerate the uninterrupted
occupation of the property by the
Dapitons simply because he has no
need for it just yet. In the light of
the fact that the private respondent
has been in dispute with the
Dapitons since 1968, and
considering his claim of absolute
ownership, it is unthinkable for
private respondent to let Dapiton
and his heirs remain and make use
of the property for almost thirty (30)
years.
Fourthly, the private respondent is a
member of the bar, well-versed in
the intricacies of the law. We thus
find it improbable that he would
agree to add the annotations
pertaining to the deceased Dapitons
right of repurchase only to appease
Dapitons children. If , as he claims,
the sale was indeed absolute, the
fact that he would place such
annotations as would put in
question the absoluteness of the
sale raises some doubt as to the
true nature of the transaction
involved. After all, if the property is
truly his by right, no amount of
objections raised by the children of
the elder Dapiton would change the
fact that the sale is already a fait
accompli. No vendee in his right
mind would agree to any act which
would weaken his absolute claim to
a property sold to him wthout any
restraint or condition. If the sale
was indeed absolute, why grant
Dapiton a right to repurchase at all?
Lastly, Article 1603 of the New
Civil Code provides:
Article 1603. In case of doubt , a
contract purporting to be a sale with
right to repurchase shall be
construed as an equitable
mortgage.
In the case at bar, the true nature of
the contract between Dapiton and
dela Pea is the crux of the issues
raised in this petition. Considering
the circumstances of this case, we
resolved the doubt in favor of the
petitioner. The actuations of the
private respondent are highly
suspect, if not downright
dishonorable. AS A JUDGE and
member of the bar, he is charged
with the duty to act fairly and
equitably. He has not been fair, nor
has been forthright in his dealings
with Raymundo Dapiton.

LEGASPI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-45510; MAY 27, 1986

FACTS:
On February 8, 1971, the plaintiff
now petitioner filed a complaint with
the CFI of Cavite for reconveyance to
enforce his right to repurchase two
parcels of land, Lots Nos. 3962 and
3963 of the Imus Estate covered by
TCT Nos. T-4388 and T-4389,
respectively, which he sold to the
defendant, now private respondent,
pursuant to a sale with pacto de
retro
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with
the Right to Repurchase dated
October 15, 1965 and marked as
Exhibit A.

Bernardo B. Legaspi is the
registered owner of two parcels of
land which he sold to his son-in-
law, Leonardo B. Salcedo on October
15, 1965 for the sum of Php25,000
with the right to repurchase the
same within 5 years from the
execution of the deed of sale. Before
the expiry date of the repurchase
period Legaspi offered and tendered
to Salcedo the amount of Php25,000
for the repurchase of the two parcels
of land; that the tender of payment
was refused by Salcedo on the
ground that the repurchase price
should have been Php42,250 due to
extraordinary inflation. Salcedo,
furthermore; refused to convey the
property to Legaspi. As a result of
his refusal, Legaspi consigned with
the CFI of Cavite the amount of
Php25,000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner validly
exercised his right to repurchase the
properties within the five-year
period as stipulated in the sale with
pacto de retro entered into between
the petitioner as vendor a retro and
private respondent as vendee a
retro.

HELD:
Since the case at bar involves the
exercise of the right to repurchase, a
showing that petitioner made a valid
tender of payment is sufficient. It is
enough that a sincere or genuine
tender of payment and not a mock
or deceptive one was made. The fact
that he deposited the amount of the
repurchase money with the Clerk of
Court was simply an additional
security for the petitioner. It was not
an essential act that had to be
performed after tender of payment
was refused by the private
respondent although it may serve to
indicate the veracity of the desire to
comply with the obligation.
On the issue of whether or not the
tender of payment in the manner
described by the petitioner resulted
in the exercise of the right to
repurchase, we rule that it was
erroneous on the part of the
respondent court to reverse the
factual finding of the trial court that
a valid tender of payment was made
seasonably. The records do not
show that this finding is grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures.
ALONZO vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. L-72873; MAY 28, 1987

FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited
in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel
of land registered in the name of
their deceased parents. One of them
transferred his undivided share by
way of absolute sale. A year later,
his sister sold her share in a Con
Pacto de Retro Sale. By virtue of
such agreements, the petitioners
occupied, after the said sales, an
area corresponding to two-fifths of
the said lot, representing the
portions sold to them. The vendees
subsequently enclosed the same
with a fence. with their consent,
their son Eduardo Alonzo and his
wife built a semi-concrete house on
a part of the enclosed area.

One of the five coheirs sought to
redeem the area sold to petitioners
but was dismissed when it appeared
that he was an American citizen.
Another coheir filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of
redemption of her brother. Trial
court dismissed the complaint, on
the ground that the right had
lapsed, not having been exercised
within thirty days from notice of the
sales. Although there was no written
notice, it was held that actual
knowledge of the sales by the co-
heirs satisfied the requirement of
the law. Respondent court reversed
the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge of
the sales by the co-heirs satisfied
the requirement of the law.

HELD:
Where co-heirs filed an action for
redemption of co-heirs sold share
only after thirteen years had elapsed
from the sale, they are deemed to
have been actually informed thereof
sometime during those years
although no written notice of sale
was given to them.

While we do not here declare that
this period started from the dates of
such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do
say that sometime between those
years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed,
the other co-heirs were actually
informed of the sale and that
thereafter the 30-day period started
running and ultimately expired. This
could have happened any time
during the interval of thirteen years,
when none of the co-heirs made a
move to redeem the properties sold.
By 1977, in other words, when Tecla
Padua filed her complaint, the right
of redemption had already been
extinguished because the period for
its exercise had already expired.

REYES vs. CONCEPCION
G.R. NO. 56550; OCTOBER 1,
1990

FACTS:
The plaintiffs, the defendants and the
intervenor are the pro-indiviso co-
owners of the properties cited and
described in the complaint.
That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs
received a written notice from the
defendants and the intervenor that the
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION had
offered to buy the latter's share in the
properties listed in the complaint.
The VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS
AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION
is ready, willing and able to purchase
not only the aliquot shares of the
defendants and the intervenor, but also
that of the plaintiffs, in and to all the
properties subject of this case, for and
in consideration of the net amount of
TWELVE and 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS
per square meter and under the afore-
quoted terms.
The plaintiffs were requested:
a) To exercise their pre-emptive
right to purchase defendants'
and intervenor's shares under
the above-quoted terms.
Petitioners filed with the CFI a
complaint for injunction and
damages, seeking to enjoin private
respondents Socorro Marquez Vda.
De Zaballero, Eugenia Z. Luna and
Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling
to a third party their pro-
indiviso shares as co-owners in eight
parcels of registered land located in
the province of Cavite, with an
aggregate area of about 96 hectares.
Petitioner claimed that under Article
1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as
co-owners, had a preferential right
to purchase these shares from
private respondents for a reasonable
price.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner has a pre-
emptive right to purchase the pro-
indiviso shares of his co-owners.

HELD:
This claim is patently without basis. In
this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on
co-ownership do not grant to any of the
owners of a property held in common a
pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-
indiviso shares of his co-owners.
Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of
the New Civil Code is misplaced

Article 1620 contemplates of a situation
where a co-owner has alienated his pro-
indiviso shares to a stranger. By the
very nature of the right of "legal
redemption", a co-owner's light to
redeem is invoked only after the shares
of the other co-owners are sold to a
third party or stranger to the co-
ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33
Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar,
at the time petitioners filed their
complaint for injunction and damages
against private respondents, no sale of
the latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third
party had yet been made. Thus, Article
1620 of the New Civil Code finds no
application to the case at bar.

UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 107439; JULY 20, 1995

FACTS:
The Catador spouses offered to sell to
private respondent Rosa Sauler the
whole parcel of land for P80.00 per
square meter. The latter agreed and, on
07 July 1977, she paid the spouses an
initial amount of P45,000.00.
On 18 October 1978, the Catador
spouses hypothecated the property to
the State Investment House, Inc.
("SIHI"), to "accommodate" their niece,
Angelina Cadieva-Lacson, who had
secured a loan of P250,000.00 from
SIHI. The mortgage was registered with
the Registry of Deeds in Bulacan and
annotated on the transfer certificate of
title of the property. Upon learning of
the mortgage, private respondent met
with the Catador spouses in order to
"renegotiate" their standing agreement.
It would appear that private respondent
gave up a claim to get the entire
property and agreed to instead retain,
with the conformity of the Catador
spouses, an area within the lot as the
"katumbas" or as equivalent of the
downpayment of P45,000.00.
2
Private
respondent opted for the 555-square-
meter area which she was then
occupying and on which she had
theretofore made improvements. Her
request for a survey and subdivision of
the property, as well as a separate title,
could not, however, be granted by the
Catador spouses since the certificate of
title over the whole lot was by then
already handed over to SIHI.
Angelina Cadieva-Lacson, the niece of
the Catador spouses, defaulted on her
loan; whereupon, SIHI foreclosed on the
security. One year thereafter, or on 17
March 1981 (the expiry date of the one-
year redemption period under Act No.
3135), SIHI received a letter from
private respondent asserting her
ownership over the 555 square meters
of the foreclosed land. The letter was
followed, on 13 August 1981, by
another communication sent this time
by private respondent's son, William
Ang, who offered to buy from SIHI one-
half of the property for P225,000.00.
SIHI did not respond to both letters.
Two years later, petitioner Michael T.
Uy bought the property from SIHI. The
deed of sale presented for registration
before the land registration
authority
4
showed that petitioner
obtained the property for P60,000.00
on 13 December 1983 (although
another deed of sale, also dated 13
December 1983, indicated an additional
purchase price of P300,000.00
5
). TCT
No. 48467 in SIHI's name was cancelled
and TCT No. 108486 was issued to
petitioner on 29 March 1984.
6

Alleging title over the portion of the
property sold to her, private respondent
filed, on 11 July 1985, with the
Regional Trial Court in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, a complaint for legal
redemption with damages against
Michael T. Uy and SIHI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent
has a right of legal redemption under
Article 1620 of the Civil Code.

HELD:
The exercise of a right of legal
redemption under Article 1620 of
the Civil Code presupposes the
existence of a co-ownership at the
time the conveyance is made by a
co-owner and when it is demanded
by the other co-owner or co-owners.

The facts that would indicate private
respondent's rightful title to a specific
portion of the foreclosed asset, i.e., her
being in possession of the 555-square-
meter area, her repairing and improving
the house standing thereon, her
enclosing the premises with concrete
fence and a steel gate, installing
drainage (pipes), as well as filling up
the site with earth ("tambak") and her
constructing a bodega for the raw
materials and supplies of her "Kastiron
Foundry & Machine Shop"
business, verily, are the circumstances
that negate, rather than bolster, her
claim for legal redemption over the
entire property on the basis of Article
1620, in relation to Article 1623, of the
Civil Code. The exercise of a right of
legal redemption thereunder
presupposes the existence of a co-
ownership at the time the conveyance is
made by a co-owner and when it is
demanded by the other co-owner or co-
owners. There is co-ownership when
"the ownership of anundivided thing or
right belongs to different persons."