G.R. No.

L-8936

October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city
of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is
located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906,
decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided
for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration
of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot
given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had
been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the
defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and
correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower
court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency
of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of
said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots.
The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the
defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not
appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration
of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore
registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land
occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be
applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein,
by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus
lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs
having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert
and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of

the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose
of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to
put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it
would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it
can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial
(Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is
final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey
Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51
American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the
world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no
fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed
by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To
permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the
same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very
purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better
title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only
may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct
statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the
evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few
exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in
some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered
title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateralproceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under the
torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions
like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been
registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar
to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it
must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to
the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise
subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once
registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under
the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is
notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to
the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the
difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in
his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the
case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the
land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
(Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48;
Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds
however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written
documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be
rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian
torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens
System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include
the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is

issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder
of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two
certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier
one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such
decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right
of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to
file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of
registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any
court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can
not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be
opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or
decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when
the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code
provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it
shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes
that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case
depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code
are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the
absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing
the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance
with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case
land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in
date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says,
among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of
the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right,
and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest
his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound
by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own
omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of
a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing
with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the
expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method
adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff
had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the
mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done
thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so
as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective

parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real
owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of
the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of
the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent
entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to
the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground
for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was
the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the
name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that
judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the
appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest
certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to
successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the
error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the
vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor
had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the
owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee
acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may
acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available
rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That
is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be
unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In
the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same
to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those
who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be
deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had
sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase
"innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two
innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent
purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions
of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to
the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs,
assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is
recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All
persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it
contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite
authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate,
sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289;
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351;
McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting
the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is
presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption
cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law

requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of
what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions
of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of
law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property
be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The
record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts
allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory
provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage,
plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he
was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he
had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of
what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the
law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is
mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the
existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second
original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered
in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be
applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a
purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of
the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of
which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent
purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what
the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an
innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or
his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the
phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land
has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the
torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the
world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included
in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot
registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed
of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of
said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record
of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these
rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We
believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to
resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the
first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his
successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict
therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the
second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which
he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase,
rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration
under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the
effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are
inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries.

If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is
registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing,
to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be
protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The
record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the
land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore
made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee,
as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TRENT, J., dissenting:

I dissent.
In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the reasoning and authority on which
it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against the original holder of the later certificate, where there has been no transfer of title by either party to an
innocent purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in permitting the double registration
to take place; (second) that an innocent purchaser claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against the original holder of the later certificate, and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of
the later certificate; the innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the issuance of the later
certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority opinion sustains the
proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against an innocent
purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.
As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid down by both
Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject to exception, and of course of no binding force or
authority where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is applicable to the facts developed in a
particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the proposition set forth in the
last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons
have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied
with all the requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to the matter in hand, may be
stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and

independent registered titles to the same land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who first
acquired registered title and who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard should be
protected, in the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be applied in cases of
double or overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act; for it is true as stated in the majority opinion
that in the adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land Registration "mistakes are bound to
occur, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;" and that in the absence of statutory provisions
covering such cases, "it is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances,
so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration all of the conditions, and the diligence of the
respective parties to avoid them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a case wherein the reasons
on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful reasons demand the application of a
contrary rule.
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well settled equity rule that:
"Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first occurred will be given the preference."
But it is universally laid down by all the courts which have had occasion to apply this equity rule that "it should
be the last test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other equitable ground for preference exists."
(See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the
general rules, that in cases of double or overlapping registration the earlier certificate should be protected,
ought not to prevail so as to deprive an innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of the earlier
certificate contributed to the issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title
should not be heard to invoke the"just and equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have
his own title protected and the title of an innocent purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any
case wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly without fault, while the holder of the
issuance of the later certificate, in that he might have prevented its issuance by merely entering his
appearance in court in response to lawful summons personally served upon him in the course of the
proceedings for the issuance of the second certificate, and pleading his superior rights under the earlier
certificate, instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment to be entered against him
adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am contending for by reasoning (with
which I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that as between the original holders of the
double or overlapping registration the general rule should prevail, because both such original parties must held
to have been fault and, their equities being equal, preference should be given to the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the reasoning whereby it
undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in favor of the original holder of the earlier certificate
against purchasers from the original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to demonstrate that such
purchasers can in no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it is said, negligence may and
should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no event can he claim to be without fault when it
appears that the lands purchased by him from the holder of a duly registered certificate of title are included
within the bounds of the lands described in a certificate of title of an earlier date.
At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down under the various
systems of land registration, other than those based on the torrens system) insists that a purchaser of land
land duly registered in the Land Registration Court, is charged with notice of the contents of each and every
one of the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on file in the land registry office, so
that negligencemay be imputed to him if he does not ascertain that all or any part of the land purchased by him
is included within the boundary lines of any one of the thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose
original registry bears an earlier date than the date of the original registry of the land purchased by him. It is
contended that he cannot claim to be without fault should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was
possible for him to discover that the land purchased by him had been made the subject of double or

overlapping registration by a comparison of the description and boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and
parcels of land to be found in the land registry office.
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the introduction and
adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration of land. The avowed intent of that system of land
registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the
certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands
conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that he is charged with notice of the contents of every
other certificate of title in the office of the registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may
be imputed to him as negligence.
If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land registration, instead of
making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and instead of avoiding the necessity for
expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of the land record and registries, in order to ascertain the true
condition of the title before purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and uncertainty of any
attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the title to lands purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens system of land
registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real
estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and all others dealing in
registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands furnished by the
Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling which charges a purchaser or
mortgage of registered lands with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the land registry, so
that negligence and fault may be imputed to him should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the
lack of such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act desires to avoid the
imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such lands have been made the subject of double
or overlapping registration, what course should he pursue? What measures should he adopt in order to search
out the information with notice of which he is charged? There are no indexes to guide him nor is there anything
in the record or the certificate of title of the land he proposes to buy which necessarily or even with reasonable
probability will furnish him a clue as to the fact of the existence of such double or overlapping registration.
Indeed the only course open to him, if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double or
overlapping registration, would even seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive comparison of the
registered boundary lines contained in the certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy with those
contained in all the earlier certificates of title to be found in the land registry. Assuredly it was never the
intention of the author of the new Land Registration Act to impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly
registered real estate, under penalty that a lack of the knowledge which might thus be acquired may be
imputed to him by this court as negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of lands which
have been the subject of double or overlapping registration.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered certificate
of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered against him, adjudicating all or any part of
his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he was served with notice or had actual notice of the
pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default judgment was entered.
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of Land Registration may
reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he has actual notice that proceedings are pending
in that court wherein another applicant, claiming the land as his own, is seeking to secure its registry in his
name. All that is necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance in those proceedings, invite the court's
attention to the certificate of title registered in his name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the
damage and inconvenience flowing from the double or overlapping registration of the land in question. There is
nothing in the new system of land registration which seems to render it either expedient or necessary to relieve
a holder of a registered title of the duty of appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it
is being attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or failure so to do, his
lands become subject to double or overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to subject an innocent

purchaser, holding under the later certificate, to all the loss and damage resulting from the double or
overlapping registration, while he goes scot free and holds the land under a manifest misapplication of the
equitable rule that "where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given
the preference." It is only where both or neither of the parties are at fault that the rule is properly applicable as
between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later certificate of registry to the same land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right of the holder of a
certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those dealing with registered lands can confidently rely
upon registry certificates thereto is equally forceful by way of argument in favor of the holder of one or the other
certificate in case of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to determine which of the certificate
holders is entitled to the land. The decision of that question in favor of either one must necessarily have the
effect of destroying the value of the registered title of the other and to that extent shaking the public confidence
in the value of the whole system for the registration of lands. But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that
mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the
duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize the damages,
taking into consideration all the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."lawphil.net
It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority opinion, to
case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in
the course of which the latter certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which he has received personal
notice of the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the pendency of such proceedings
I readily agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far as it holds that negligence, culpable negligence,
should not be imputed to him for failure to appear and defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit of
the equitable rule. It is true that the order of publication in such cases having been duly complied with, all the
world is charged with notice thereof, but it does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice,
culpable negligence in permitting a default judgment to be entered against him may be imputed to the holder of
the earlier certificate so as to defeat his right to the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate.
Such a holding would have the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the holder of a
certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador de su casa" in order to
avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I agree with the writer of the majority opinion that to do so would
place an unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate, which was not contemplated by the authors of
the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable burden is placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule
which imputes culpable negligence to him when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered
against him adjudicating title to his lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he has actual
knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in which such judgment is entered and despite the fact that he
has been personally served with summons to appear and default his title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties," it seems to me that
there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting equities set up by an innocent purchaser who acquires
title to the land under a registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier certificate who permitted a default
judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of
which the later certificate was issued.
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent purchaser in cases such as
that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of convenience and public policy which militate in favor of
the recognition of his title rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown, unspecified and
uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance and labor
on every occasion when any transaction is had with regard to such lands; while the other ruling tends to
eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the land registration law was
enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a certificate of registered lands other than that of
defending his title on those rare, definite and specific occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is
being challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to the
minimum by the conclusive character of his certificate of title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore,
judgment against the innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as

that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or overlapping registrations by
encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and conclusively, to permit default
judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title to all or a part of their registered lands in favor of other
applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without
adding in any appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to save them the very slight trouble or
inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the court in which their own titles were secured, and
inviting attention to the fact that their right, title and ownership in the lands in questions has already been
conclusively adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration without actual notice to
the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of things to be so rare as to be practically negligible.
Double or overlapping registration almost invariably occurs in relation to lands held by adjoining occupants or
claimants. It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein double registration can take place, in the absence of
fraud, without personal service of notice of the pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of the earlier
certificate, the statute requiring such notice to be served upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining
those for which application for registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can, even
by the use of fraud, conduct proceedings for the registration of his land to a successful conclusion without
actual notice to the adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of a certificate of title
issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the records of the Court of Land Registration with
reference thereto and with no knowledge that any part of the land thus purchased was included in an earlier
certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier certificate of title, negligently
permitted a default judgment to be entered against him in the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of
the lands included in his own certificate of title in favor of another applicant, from whom the defendant in this
action acquired title, and this despite the fact that he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the
pendency of the proceedings and was personally served with summons to appear and defends his rights in the
premises. It seems to me that there can be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of
the parties, and further that the judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase
the number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will fail to appear and defend their titles when
challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously increasing the
possibility and probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands
generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of Land
Registration.
Carson, J., concurs

G.R. No. L-16257

January 31, 1963

CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for plaintiff-appellant.
Eduardo P. Arboleda and Jesus S. Rodriguez for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Plaintiff, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant, the Province of Negros Occidental, the
possession of Lot 378 of the cadastral survey of Bacolod, Negros Occidental, and a reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of said lot by the defendant from November 8, 1935, in addition to attorney's fees

and costs. On June 28, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment for the
plaintiff. On appeal taken by the defendant, this judgment was, however, set aside by the Supreme Court (see
G.R. No. L-6204, decided on July 31, 1956), which, likewise, ordered the case remanded to the lower court "for
further trial", after which another decision was rendered by said court of first instance dismissing plaintiff's
complaint and ordering plaintiff to execute a deed conveying Lot 378 to the defendant. The case is, once
again, before us, this time on appeal by the plaintiff, the subject matter of litigation being worth more than
P200,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
The main facts are not in dispute. Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan, consisting of Lots 378, 405,
407, 410, 1205, 1452 and 1641 of the aforementioned cadastral survey, with an aggregate area of over 502
hectares, originally registered in the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. Lot 378 has an area of
22,783 sq. meters, more or less, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 (Exhibit 4), issued
on August 25, 1916, in the name of the Amenabars. On November 30, 1920, the latter sold the aforementioned
hacienda to Jose Benares (also referred to in some documents as Jose Benares Montelibano) for the sum of
P300,000, payable installments, as set forth in the deed of sale, Exhibit 21. On February 8, 1924, said Original
Certificate of Title No. 1776 was cancelled and Jose Benares obtained, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 6295 in his name. Meanwhile, or on March 12, 1921, the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had been
mortgaged by Jose Benares to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. for the sum of P27,991.74 (Exhibit Y-2). On
December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine
National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. (Exhibit Y-1). These
transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and annotated on
the corresponding certificate of title, including said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295, covering Lot 378.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, in pursuance of a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental dated September 29, 1931 (Exhibit U-1), and the Bank acquired the
Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, said Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 6295 was cancelled and, in its stead, transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 0151 which, owing to its
subsequent loss, had to be reconstituted as Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1371 in the name of the
Bank, was issued on March 14, 1934 (Exhibit P). Soon, later, or on November 8, 1935, the Bank agreed to sell
the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Banares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual
installments, subject to the condition that, until full payment thereof, title would remain in the Bank (Exhibit R).
Thereafter, Carlos P. Benares transferred his rights, under this contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which
completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949. Hence, on September 29, 1949, the Bank
executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff (Exhibit Q) and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1798, covering 378 was issued, in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 (or reconstituted Transfer
Certificate of Title RT-1371), in plaintiff's name (Exhibit O).
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
At this juncture, it should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter
did not take possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged
right of lease. For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favor of Carlos P. Benares,
contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit Q) by
the Bank, on September 29, 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda, it was discovered that
Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately, thereafter, or on
October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation
and, not being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10,
1950.
In its answer dated June 24, 1950, defendant maintained that it had acquired Lot 378 in the year; 1924-1925,
through expropriation proceedings; that immediately after the commencement of said proceedings in 1924, it
took possession of said lot and began the construction thereon of the provincial hospital, which was completed
in 1926; that since then it had occupied said lot publicly, adversely, notoriously and continuously as owner
thereof; that, "for some reason or other and for cause beyond comprehension of the defendant title thereto was

never transferred in the name of said defendant"; that said lot had been placed in defendant's name for
assessment purposes under Tax Declaration No. 16269 (dated December 31, 1937); and that plaintiff had
acted in bad faith in purchasing said lot from the Bank in 1935, for plaintiff knew then that the provincial
hospital was where it is up to the present, and did not declare said lot in its name for assessment purposes
until 1950, aside from the fact that Alfredo Montelibano, the controlling stockholder, president and general
manager of plaintiff corporation, was the first City Mayor of Bacolod which contributed to the support, operation
and maintenance of said hospital. In an amended answer, dated November 8, 1950, defendant alleged, also,
that the aforementioned expropriation case was "amicably settled as between the parties herein, in the sense
that the ... Province of Negros Occidental would pay ... and did in fact pay to Jose Benares the assessed value
of Lot 378 ... and whatever consideration pertaining to said lot in excess of its assessed value which was paid
by the Province would be donated and was in fact donated by said ... Jose Benares in favor of the Province
purposely for hospital site".
The main question for determination in this case is whether or not defendant herein had acquired Lot 378 in
the aforementioned expropriation proceedings. This decision appealed from in effect decided this question in
the affirmative and declared that plaintiff merely holds it in trust for the defendant, in view of which it ordered
the former to convey said lot to the latter. This conclusion is predicated, substantially, upon the following
premises, namely that case No. 3041 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for the expropriation
of the hospital site of said province, was actually commenced on January 26, 1924; that, among the lands
sought to be expropriated in said case was Lot 377 of the aforementioned cadastral survey, belonging to one
Anacleta Agsam, who sold it, on July 10, 1926, to the defendant (Exhibit BB), in whose favor the corresponding
transfer certificate of title (Exhibit BB-2) was issued on July 12, 1926; that, according the testimony of Jose
Benares, the expropriation of Lot 378 was settled amicably upon payment to him of the sum of P12,000; and
that defendant's failure to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title to Lot 378 was due to "the
mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms part of Lot No. 405-B" in the plan (Exhibit X.).
The testimony of Jose Benares does not deserve, however, full faith and credence, because:
1. Jose Benares appears to be strongly biased and prejudiced against the plaintiff and its president, for
the former believes that the latter had "manipulated" to exclude him from plaintiff corporation, and there
have been four (4) litigations between Jose Benares and plaintiff, all of which have been finally decided
against the former;
2. The testimony of Jose Benares is extremely contradictory. Thus: (a) he testified to having been paid
P12,000 by the Government, although, at the rate of P1,000 a hectare at which, he would have us
believe, he agreed to sell Lot 378; he should have received less than P3,000 for its 22,783 sq. meters;
(b) he claimed to have received said sum of P12,000.00 "in the year 1924 or 1925", about "2 or 3 days"
after the Government had taken possession of the land, and to have sent the money next day to Pilar
Amenabar, but the latter acknowledged to have received the said sum of P12,000 on November 7,
1928;
3. Said testimony was contradicted by that of defendant's witness Jose Marco, former deputy clerk of
court of Negros Occidental, for: (a) Jose Benares asserted that there was a written compromise
agreement between him and the Government, whereas Marco averred that agreement was merely oral;
and (b) Marco stated that Benares had agreed to accept, as compensation for Lot 378, the assessed
value thereof, which was P430, and to donate to the Government the difference between this sum and
the true value of the property, but Benares affirmed that he was first offered P300 per hectare, which he
rejected, and that he later demanded P1,000 a hectare, which the Government agreed to pay,
although, subsequently, he said that Rafael Alunan and Mariano Yulo had prevailed upon him to accept
P1,000 per hectare;
4. Jose Benares was, also, contradicted by defendant's witness Ildefonso Coscolluela, the provincial
treasurer of Negros Occidental at the time of the expropriation, who positively assured the Court that
the expropriation case "was not yet terminated" and that "negotiations were still pending" for the
acquisition of Lot 378 by the Government when he retired from the service in 1934.

Upon the other hand, several circumstances strongly indicate that no compromise agreement for the
acquisition of the land by the Government had been reached and that the expropriation had not been
consummated. For instance:
1. The only entries in the docket relative to the expropriation case refer to its filing and the publication in
the newspaper of the corresponding notices (Exhibit 1);.
2. The registration of the deed of sale of Lot 377 by Anacleta Agsam to the Government, followed by
the cancellation of the certificate of title in her name and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another title in
the name of the Province, when contrasted with the absence of a similar deed of assignment and of a
transfer certificate title in favor of the Province as regards Lot 378, strongly suggest that no such
assignment or agreement with respect to Lot 378 had been made or reached;.
3. The property was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. since March 12, 1921, and this
mortgage, duly registered and annotated, inter alia, on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1776, in the
name of Jose Benares, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Moreover, Lot 378 could not have
been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. Yet, the latter was not made a party in the
expropriation proceedings;
4. On December 26, 1926, Jose Benares constituted second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which
would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged then to the mortgagor. Neither could
said lot have been expropriated subsequently thereto without the Bank's knowledge and participation.
What is more, in the deed executed by the Bank, on November 8, 1935 (Exhibit R), promising to sell
the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that portions of Lots 405, 407 and
410, forming part of said Hacienda and designated as Lots 405-A, 407-A; 407-B and 410-A, had been
expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary
implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.
The decision appealed from says:
... It is evident that there were no further proceedings in connection with the expropriation case and the
chances are that the case was dismissed. The Court had to examine carefully and minutely every
single piece of evidence adduced by both parties in order to arrive at the correct solution of the
mystery. The Court believes that the failure of the government to secure the corresponding transfer of
title to Lot 378 lies in the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms a part of Lot 405-B. This
conclusion was arrived at after examining closely the plan, Exhibit X. The plan shows that while all the
subdivided lots were properly identified by lot numbers, that particular portion at the lower corner of the
plan encircled with red pencil, marked Exhibit X-1, is not labelled with the corresponding lot number and
that portion is precisely lot No. 378, now in question, where the hospital building was constructed. This
plan was prepared for the government on May 12, 1927 by public land surveyor, Mr. Formento,
embracing lots covering over 22 hectares for the Capitol and hospital sites. The fact that this particular
portion was not labelled with the corresponding lot number might have misled the authorities to believe
that it formed a part of lot 405-B, which adjoins it, although separated by the creek. This lack of
reasonable explanation why the government failed to secure the corresponding certificate of title to lot
378, when there is sufficient proof that Jose Benares was paid and he executed the deed of sale in
favor of the government.
Although said decision appears to have been prepared with the conscientiousness and moral courage that
account for the well earned reputation and prestige of the Philippine judiciary, we find ourselves unable to
concur in the foregoing view. To begin with, there is no evidence, and defendant has not even tried to prove,
that the expropriation case had ever been dismissed insofar as Lot 378 is concerned. Hence, the lower court
merely speculated about the "chances that the (expropriation) case was dismissed." By the way, the contrary
was intimated by defendant's witness, Ildefonso Coscolluela, for he testified that the expropriation case was
still pending in 1934, when he ceased to be the provincial treasurer, and the record before us suggests that
since the Province took possession of the land in 1924 or 1925 and completed the construction of the hospital
in 1926, there were no further proceedings in said case..

With respect to the plan, Exhibit X, there is, likewise, no evidence whatsoever that the authorities had been
"misled ... to believe" that the portion at the lower corner of said plan which was enclosed, during the trial,
within a circle in red pencil, and marked as Exhibit X-1 formed part of Lot 405-B, which had been
expropriated by the Province of Negros Occidental. In fact, said portion, Exhibit X-1, is not part of the land
covered by the plan Exhibit X. A close examination of the latter shows that the boundaries of said portion are
not delimited on the plan. More important still, on the right hand side of Exhibit X, the following appears in bold
letters: "Subdivision & Consolidation PLAN of Lots Nos. 400, 401, 403,405, 406, 407 and 410 Bacolod
Cadastre as surveyed for the Provincial Government of Bacolod, Negros Occidental (Capitol site)". The
absence of Lot 378 from said enumeration and the explicit statement in Exhibit X to the effect that it refers to
the "Capitol Site", negates the possibility of its being mistaken by any body, much less by government
engineers, as including the hospital site, and, hence, said Lot 378. Lastly, the very evidence for the defendant
herein, specially the assessor's field sheets and declarations of real property for tax purposes (Exhibits 9, 10,
11, 12 and 13) show that the Government had always regarded Lot 378, not Lot 405, as part of the Provincial
Hospital Site. In any event, said possibility of mistake, if any, which would be remote, cannot suffice to warrant
in the face of documentary evidence to the contrary the conclusion that Lot 378 has already been
acquired by the Government.
How about the P12,000 received by Jose Benares from the Government and applied by him to the payment of
his debt to Pilar Amenabar? Said amount could not possibly be the price of Lot 378, for, at the rate of P1,000 a
hectare allegedly agreed therefor, its price could not have exceeded P3,000.00. In this connection, it should be
noted that, aside from the expropriation proceedings for the hospital site, another expropriation case for the
Capitol site, affecting another property of Jose Benares, appears to have been instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. Jose Benares may have mistaken the payment for his land included in the
Capitol site, as one intended for Lot 378, which was affected by the hospital site. And this possibility may
amount to a probability when we consider that he erroneously believed that there had been
only one expropriation case, instead of two cases, against him, and that Lot 378, was not included in the
mortgage constituted by him in favor of the Philippine National Bank. Evidently, he did not have, at least, an
accurate recollection of the events or transactions affecting his properties, and, hence, his testimony may not
be relied upon.
Thus, the evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged acquisition by the defendant of Lot
378, which must be held, therefore, to be the exclusive property of plaintiff herein.
The lower court entertained no doubts about the veracity of the testimony of plaintiff's president to the effect
that he did not know until 1949 that the land on which the Provincial Hospital Building stands is Lot 378. Yet, it
held that plaintiff was "not a purchaser in good faith for having constructive knowledge of defendant's
possession of the property at the time it was bought by the plaintiff", because Carlos P. Benares whose right
to buy the Hacienda Mandalagan from the Bank was acquired by plaintiff "is a part owner of the Capitol
Subdivision and holds a responsible position therein"; because the hospital was already constructed in Lot 378
since 1926 and the lot was declared in the name of the Government" and "when plaintiff bought the lot in 1935
the purchaser should have inquired as to its location and improvement"; because "it took the plaintiff 14 years
to sleep over the supposed rights to take possession of lot No. 378"; and because "of the overwhelming fact
that lot No. 378 was erroneously or inadvertently included by the deeds of sale (Exhibits Q & R) executed by
the Philippine National Bank in favor of the plaintiff subdivision and that same lot was occupied by the
defendant government for the provincial hospital for the last 34 years, as owner thereof".
As above stated, however, and the lower court conceded, plaintiff's president did not know until 1949 that lot
378 was the very land occupied by the provincial hospital. Moreover, there is a total absence of evidence that
this fact was known to Carlos P. Benares before 1949. Neither may such knowledge be deduced from the
circumstances that he is a son of its former owner, Jose Benares, for even the latter appears not to be wellposted on the status of his properties. Indeed, Jose Benares did not apparently know that there were two (2)
expropriation proceedings effecting said properties: that the P12,000 received by him from the Government
was not meant for Lot 378; and that this lot was one of the properties mortgaged by him to the Bank.
"Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in and to
real estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto giving the public the right to rely upon the face of

Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
further inquiry (Tiburcio vs. PHHC, L-13479, October 31, 1959; Revilla vs. Galindez, G.R. No. L-19940, March
30, 1960; Manacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No. L-13791, February 27, 1961). In the case at bar plaintiff had no
such actual knowledge, it being an established fact that he was not aware until 1949 that the land on which the
provincial hospital stood was Lot 378. Furthermore, since the year 1921, or before the expropriation case for
the hospital site had begun, said lot was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the mortgage, duly
registered, as well as annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, was not cancelled until September 28,
1935. Prior to this date, or on December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was subjected to a second mortgage in favor of the
Bank, which acquired title thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings, in 1934. When the Bank agreed on November
8, 1935, to sell the property to Carlos P. Benares and the latter, subsequently conveyed his rights to plaintiff
herein, as well as when the bank executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff's favor on September 20, 1949,
the title to the property was in the name of the Bank. Considering that sugar centrals as well as banks are
known to have an array of experienced and competent lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was not justified
in assuming that said institutions had scrutinized the background of Lot 378 and were satisfied that the same
belonged to the mortgagor when said mortgages were constituted, and to the Bank when said deed of sale
was executed. In short, we find that plaintiff herein is a purchaser in good faith and for value..
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant, we are of the opinion, and so
hold, that, since the latter's right to expropriate Lot 378 is not contested, and is seemingly conceded, the
plaintiff may demand what is due by reason of the expropriation of said lot. In short, plaintiff is entitled to
recover from the defendant the fair and full equivalent to Lot 378, as of the time when possession thereof was
actually taken by the defendant, plus consequential damages including attorney's fees from which
consequential damages the consequential benefits, if any, should be deducted, with interests, at the legal rate,
on the aggregate sum due to the plaintiff, from and after the date of said actual taking. The case should be
remanded, therefore, to the lower court for the reception of evidence on the date of said actual taking and the
amount of compensation collectible from the defendant, and the rendition, thereafter, of the corresponding
decision thereon..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings, as above stated, with costs against the defendant. It is so ordered..
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-67583

July 31, 1987

BASILISA S. ESCONDE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SAMILO N. BARLONGAY and RAMON V. DELFIN, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 16, 1984 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, Branch CLXXII, dismissing petitioner's complaint.
The facts admitted by the parties are the following:

Private respondent Ramon V. Delfin is the applicant in the "Application for Registration of Title" dated April 14,
1969, docketed as LRC Case No. 710-V at the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila (now RTC, NCJR, Branch 171, Valenzuela). The land subject of the Application, Reconveyance
and the present petition is one and the same parcel of land containing an area of 2,273 sq. m. The application
was granted in a "Decision" dated December 8, 1969, and private respondent received copy thereof on the
same date. Said parcel of land is now covered by OCT No.-05002 issued on January 23, 1971 by the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan. On February 13, 1978 said private respondent Ramon V. Delfin as applicant in the LRC
Case filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession" against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde (Brief for
Petitioner, pp. 6-7, Rollo, p. 120).
On March 6, 1978, Judge Crispin V. Bautista issued an Order denying for lack of merit the opposition filed by
the Esconde spouses to the petition for Writ of Possession.
On September 26, 1978, Judge Avelino M. Constantino, who took over the same branch presided over by
Judge Bautista, issued an Order for a writ of possession against the said spouses.
Petitioner filed with the same court a Petition to quash the Writ of Possession to which an Opposition was filed
by the private respondent (Comment, Rollo, pp. 88-90).
On October 6, 1978, herein petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 5th Judicial District,
Branch VIII (now RTC, NCJR, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Bulacan) a complaint for reconveyance, against the
herein private respondent, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 721-V-78 (Record, pp. 24-28).
On October 14, 1978, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint with prayer for stay of execution of judgment in
LRC Case No. V-710 (Ibid., p. 29-33).
Private respondent, in a Motion to Dismiss dated December 26, 1978, moved for the dismissal of the case on
the grounds, among others, that (1) the cause of action, if any, is barred by res judicata; (2) the complaint fails
to state sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance; and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or
laches from filing the case (Ibid, pp. 34-39).
On January 15, 1979, petitioner filed a Rejoinder to Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Leave of Court to Amend
Complaint to Include Plaintiff's Husband as Party-Plaintiff (Ibid, pp, 40-44). On the same date, the Amended
Complaint was filed (Ibid, pp. 45-50).
Private respondent filed a Reply to Rejoinder (Opposition) to Motion to dismiss with Opposition to the Motion
For Leave of Court to Amend Complaint, dated January 18, 1979 (Ibid, pp. 51-54).
On June 5, 1979, Judge Constantino denied Petition to Quash Writ of Possession (Rollo, p. 108). The Sheriff
then delivered possession to the private respondent, but then petitioner re-entered the premises and took
possession thereof, hence private respondent filed a Motion for an Alias Writ of Possession on March 2, 1983.
On March 4, 1983, an order directed the issuance of an alias writ of possession.
On March 29, 1983, the Sheriff turned over possession of the premises to the representative of the private
respondent. This notwithstanding, when private respondent went to the premises, he was barred by the
petitioner from entering the property. Consequently, private respondent asked for a writ of demolition for the
removal of any construction of the Esconde family on the premises and to cite petitioner Basilisa Esconde for
contempt of court.
On November 17, 1983, private respondent moved for a second alias writ of possession in view of the failure of
the petitioner to turn over possession of the premises to private respondent and the same was granted in the
Order of November 21, 1983.

Petitioner then filed with Judge Avelino M. Constantino of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Motion to
Quash and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ of Possession on the ground that they have
filed a civil action for reconveyance.
On February 1, 1984, petitioner filed a Motion to Expedite Resolution of Pending Incidents and Motion For
Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (Ibid, pp. 5759).
On February 13, 1984, private respondent filed a Manifestation With Opposition to Motion for Issuance of
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (Ibid, pp. 60-62).
Respondent Judge, in an Order dated April 16, 1984 (Ibid, pp. 63-64), dismissed the complaint for
reconveyance on the grounds: (1) that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by res judicata and (2) that the
Motion to Admit Amended Complaint and for Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction is not
proper as it seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another branch of this Court
which is not allowed. Hence, the instant petition (Ibid, pp. 10-23).
The Second Division, in a Resolution dated August 29, 1984, resolved to require the respondents to comment
(Ibid, p. 75).
On October 20, 1984, respondents, in compliance with the above-mentioned Resolution, filed their Comment
(Ibid, pp. 87-101).
In a Resolution dated December 3, 1984, the Second Division resolved to give due course to the petition; and
to consider respondents' comment to the petition as an answer (Ibid, p. 110).
In a letter dated January 21, 1985, counsel for the petitioner was required to file petitioner's brief (Ibid, p. 112).
In compliance therewith, said brief was filed on March 23, 1985 (Ibid., p. 120).
On April 1, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion to Include Additional Party-Respondent and Motion for the Issuance
of Preliminary Injunction, praying, among others, that the Sheriff be included as additional party-respondent
(Ibid, pp. 122-126).
The Second Division, in a Resolution dated April 17, 1985, resolved to require the respondents to comment on
the motion by counsel for the petitioner to include an additional party-respondent and the motion for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction (Ibid., p. 141).
On May 7, 1985, respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Include Additional Party-Respondent and
Motion for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction (Ibid., pp. 142-146).
On June 21, 1985, Brief for the Respondents was filed (Ibid, p. 148).
The Second Division, in a Resolution dated November 11, 1985, resolved to consider the case submitted for
deliberation (Ibid., p. 158).
On November 26, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Resolution of her motion of April 1, 1985motion to include the Sheriff as party-respondent and for the issuance of a preliminary injunction (Ibid., pp.
159-162). This motion of petitioner, in a Resolution dated December 11, 1985, was noted by said Division
(Ibid., p. 165).
On February 1, 1986, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion, praying, among others, for the inclusion of the Sheriff
as party-respondent, and thereafter, for an injunction directing the Sheriff to restore the peaceful possession of
the land to petitioner (Ibid., pp. 166-171).

The Second Division, in a Resolution dated February 17, 1986, resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
directing the Sheriff and private respondent to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out the Third Alias Writ of
Possession (Ibid, p. 176).
On March 4, 1986, petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Resolution and Temporary Restraining. Order both dated
February 17, 1986, either nullifying the Third Alias Writ of Possession served or in the alternative to issue a
mandatory injunction (Ibid, pp. 179-183). This motion was denied by the Division in a Resolution dated May 21,
1986 (Ibid, p. 185).
The issues in this case are
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ADMIT AMENDED COMPLAINT AND FOR
ISSUANCE OF RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS PROPER.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Land registration proceedings in this case commenced on April 14, 1969 and decision thereon was rendered
on December 8, 1969. Hence, the law in force at the time was Act 496, P.D. 1529 (otherwise known as
Property Registration Decree) having taken effect only on Jan. 23, 1979.1 The pertinent provisions of said Act
496 read:
SEC. 34. Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an
answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The
answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the
party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by
some person in his behalf. (As amended by Sec. 1, Act No. 3621).
SEC. 35. If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion
of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the
application to be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice, "To all whom it may concern," an
the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. After such
default and order, the court may enter a decree confirming the title of the applicant and ordering
registration of the same. (As amended by Sec. 8, Act No. 1699).
On the other hand, under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the effect of such order is as follows:
SEC. 2. Effect of order of default. Except as provided in section 9 of Rule 13, a party declared in
default shall not be entitled to notice or subsequent proceedings, nor to take part in the trial.
Petitioner's claim that she came to know of the land registration case only upon receipt of a Petition for Writ of
Possession is completely rebutted by private respondent's evidence. In the notice of Initial Hearing (Rollo, p.
148-a) she is one of those cited to appear; in the Survey Notification Letter (Rollo, p. 148-c) her husband was
notified of the scheduled survey of the land as indicated by his signature opposite his name and in the
Surveyor's Certificate (Rollo, p. 148-b) her husband was reported one of the adjoining owners present. There
is no question that notice to her husband is notice to her under the law, her husband being the administrator of
the conjugal partnership (Art. 165, Civil Code). Otherwise stated, there was no concealment on the part of
private respondent. In fact, the records show that private respondent stated in his application for registration of
title that a portion of the land was being occupied by petitioner sometime in September 1967, by breaking the
stone wall fence without his knowledge and consent (Application for Registration of Title; Rollo, p. 102).
However, petitioner and her husband, despite the chance given them to be heard in the land registration
proceedings, opted not to appear.

Thus, as aptly stated by respondent Judge, "A land registration proceedings which is in rem, is valid and
conclusive against the whole world. The failure of the plaintiff and her husband, despite the notice of the
publication and posting by the sheriff of the notice of hearing, to oppose the defendant's application for
registration will bar her from filing this action." (Order, dated April 16, 1984; Civil Case No. 721-V-78; Rollo, p.
64).
Under Section 38 of Act 496 ... Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto ... . It
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation or included in the general description
"To all whom it may concern." That under said section, this decree became conclusive after one year from the
date of the entry, is not disputed (Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 354 [1923]). On the contrary, this Court has
invariably ruled that "Land Registration is a proceeding in rem, and binds all persons known and unknown."
(Moscoso v. C.A., 128 SCRA 70 [1984]). It is a settled doctrine that when a decree of registration has been
obtained by fraud, the party defrauded has only one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review
before a competent court, provided that the land has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
Said Section 38 categorically declares that "upon the expiration of the said term of one (1) year, every decree
or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible (Albienda v. C.A., 135
SCRA 406-407 [1985]).
Hence, it was established that when no answer in writing nor any opposition is made to an application for
registration of property in Court, all the allegations contained in the application shall be held as confessed by
reason of the absence of denial on the part of the opponent. A person who has not challenged an application
for registration of land even if the appeal afterwards interposed is based on the right of dominion over the same
land, cannot allege damage or error against the judgment ordering the registration inasmuch as he did not
allege or pretend to have any right to such land (Cabanas v. Director of Lands, 10 Phil. 393).
In the same manner, it has been held that a claimant having failed to present his answer or objection to the
registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens System or to question the validity of such registration within a
period of one year after the certificate of title had been issued, had forever lost his right in said land even
granting that he had any right therein (De los Reyes v. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420).
However, an action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the
latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him (Bilog, "Remedies Available to Aggrieved Parties As a
Consequence of Registration Under the Torrens System"; Property Registration 1979; pp. 122-123). The
prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously
registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree,
for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured
the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof (Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 357
[1977]). An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the
decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the
registered owner to the rightful owner (Director of Lands, et al. v. Register of Deeds, et al., 92 Phil. 827
[1953]).lawph!l
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper remedy. As
earlier stated, there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto,
nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of one year
within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions, the Court ruled that the
land should be adjudicated to the registered owner (Paterno, et al. v. Salud, 118 Phil. 933-934 [1963]). Even
more implicitly this Court held in Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. v. Remolado (135 SCRA 412 [1985]) that:
"Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a moral obligation, often
regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the
action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy."

Moreover, petitioner's action for reconveyance had already prescribed. An action for reconveyance of real
property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title (Balbin v. Medalla,
108 SCRA 666; and Alarcon v. Bidin, 120 SCRA 390).
The first issue being without merit and the second issue being a mere incident thereto, there appears to be no
necessity to discuss the latter.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*

Published in the Official Gazette, January 8, 1979, 75 O. G. No. 2, 185 (Taada v. Tuvera)

G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988

EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and the private respondents in
G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases and the instant case is the same a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing of the earlier petitions.
These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually,
Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098

was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court issued a writ of
possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the
ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after
considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently
acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration having
been denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the Court of
Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on certiorari
denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was
denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied in
another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This decision
in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983.
The petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--contend that the writs of possession and
demolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil Case No.
00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the implementation of the
writ; that counsel for the respondent should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a
concerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and demolition and
that petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the filing of this petition
before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate
Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant
petition for indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827
before the respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not
to render the petition moot and academic pending the Court's consideration of the issues, the
Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take
cognizance of issues already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in
Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition is
likewise ordered. (pp. 107-108, Rollo G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration of the
December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this same date, another resolution was issued, this time
in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents
(Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9,
1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984,
dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited
pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No.
64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo
issued the following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia
through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and
March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29, 1983 Promulgated by
Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496, therefore she must
register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, the same is hereby
GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared null and void and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared valid and subsisting title
concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara
Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the Subdivision Agreement of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration and manifestation filed
by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground that there was a pending case
before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo
Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte motions for
issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement
the judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon. Judge Tito G.
Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to register the Order dated
September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new
certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners,
we issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator for
implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G.
Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants through counsel on
October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of
Iloilo, and formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and
the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated
November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia dated
August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the writ of possession was granted by the
Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution dated September 17,1986, the
present motion is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to register the
Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER

This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on
December 2, 1986, in compliance with the order of this Court dated November 25, 1 986, a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel
on December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to its order dated December 15,
1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period granted by the
Court finding the petition tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the date of this order, after which period,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners
Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a memorandum of
the annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private respondent in G.R. No.
64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated
September 17, 1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-25772, should the
same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in the Resolution of November 27,
1985) or is it already deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated
September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the implementation of the
writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p.
536, Rollo 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987
noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and in G.R. No.
64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the implementation of our resolutions, this
COURT RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary sanctions upon
whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of the resolutions of this Court. No further
motions in these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated November 6, 1986 and January 6,
1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T-111561
and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate
of TItle No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still
pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the
petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987
ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial
court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice
of lis pendens in the new certificates of titles.

In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 denied the petitioners'
motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners
filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the respondent
judge to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice
of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of is pendens on the new
certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an
urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion and directed the Acting
Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 12,
1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based on the second
paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other disposition of
the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land
and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis
Pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice
of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of
the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-111560, T-111561
and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with the
Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido
and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of subject Notice of Lis
Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon the registration of the certificate of the
Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal
thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens was based is still
pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not
this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of
Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were
not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his
February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of
Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A
corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title.

Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the
same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by
Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was
annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated October 24, 1984
dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why respondent Judge Gustilo
recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido,
Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is
very clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her coowners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in
her name and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042,
p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R.
No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil
had the authority to declare as null and void the transfer certificate of title in the name of
petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No. 62042 contrary to the trial
court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the reconstitution proceedings
declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for
being fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long before Civil Case No.
15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents herein, in filing Civil Case
No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R.
No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in
the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration
thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the
property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective
purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep
his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation.
(Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of
Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)

The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this case necessitate the
application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of
Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the
effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper
case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has
the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the
evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his
complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are
unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant.
(Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the Supreme Court illustrate how the
private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting
Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No.
4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the
Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled
upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled by the respondent Acting
Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil
Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court
of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court below but based on the order, it can be safely
assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the
petitioners (the defendants therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the
Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate and/or
cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore,
and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for
registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by
the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of
Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.
According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language the word shall means "ought
to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to
express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of
deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of
Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order
directing him to cancel the notice oflis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the
subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now,
the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section
117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this Court's
already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendensannotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara
Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory
tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents
involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February
12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-18725

March 31, 1965

JOSE MA. LEDESMA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
FELIX VILLASEOR, movant-appellant.
Sicangco, Estino, Sison and Associates for petitioner-appellee.
Gabriel Benedicto for movant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Felix Villaseor, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of his deceased father, Eusebio
Villaseor, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. 5662) to enjoin the
Register of Deeds of the same province from registering a deed of sale by which the deceased conveyed to
Jose Ma. Ledesma two lots registered in his name, to wit, Lots Nos. 2532-C and 2533-B of the Cadastral
Survey of Bago, Negros Occidental. The reason given for seeking injunctive relief was that the deed of sale
was fictitious and that the signature of the vendor was forged. The court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
to maintain the status quo. The vendee, Ledesma, who had not been impleaded as a party-defendant,
intervened in the case. On October 3, 1960 the court lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the
petition.

Two days later, on October 5, Ledesma filed his own petition in the cadastral record of said lots, asking that the
Register of Deeds be ordered to register the aforementioned deed of sale. The ground alleged in the petition
was that Civil Case No. 5662 had been dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued therein had been
dissolved. On the same day the court, without notice either to the Register of Deeds or to appellant, and solely
on the basis of the allegations in the petition, issued the corresponding order for registration. In compliance
therewith the Register of Deeds cancelled the two certificates of title in the name of the deceased Eusebio
Villaseor and issued new ones in Ledesma's name. On October 8, 1960, again upon Ledema's petition, the
court ordered the cancellation of the certificates thus issued and the issuance of still new ones, also in his
name.
Villaseor moved for reconsideration of the two orders and then perfected this appeal upon their denial.
Appellant claims that the lower court erred in issuing the orders appealed from because: (1) appellee failed to
give notice to appellant or to furnish him copy of the petition; (2) appellee should have filed the same in Civil
Case No. 5662 and not in the cadastral proceeding; (3) the court had no power to order the Register of Deeds
to register the deed of sale in question when the same was being contested as fictitious nor to order the
issuance of titles in the name of the supposed buyer; and (4) if, as appellee points out, the Register of Deeds
had improperly refused to register the deed of sale, the proper remedy should have been a suit
for mandamus.1wph1.t
We are of the opinion that the lower court did commit the error attributed to it. To be sure, when the writ of
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 5662 was dissolved in the same order which dismissed appellant's
petition the obstacle to the registration of the deed of sale was removed. The effect of the dissolution was
immediate and would not be stayed even if an appeal had been perfected from the order of dismissal (Watson
v. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 480; Sitia Taco v. Ventura, 1 Phil. 497). But that is only as far as the Register of Deeds was
concerned, his duty under the circumstances if the document was on its face registrable being
administrative and ministerial. The lifting of the injunction, however, or even the dismissal of the petition, was
no authority for the court in the cadastral proceeding to issue the orders complained of without notice to the
Register of Deeds or to appellant, considering that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3662 was not yet final. The
court knew of the pendency of that case and of the fact that the relief sought therein by appellant was precisely
to prevent registration. Irrespective of the propriety or impropriety of the remedy pursued, that is, whether or
not mandamus should have been resorted to, the least that the court a quo should have done was to afford
appellant proper notice and hearing, so that he could reiterate his objections to the registration and present
evidence to substantiate them and/or call the court's attention to the fact that the question had not yet been
definitely settled in the civil action since the order dismissing it was not yet final.
It is one thing for the Register of Deeds, in the exercise of his ministerial duties under the law, to register an
instrument which in his opinion is registrable, and quite another thing for the court itself to order the
registration. The former does not contemplate notice to and hearing of interested parties such as are required
in a judicial proceeding nor carry with it the solemnity and legal consequences of a court judgment. The court a
quo, in anticipating the action of the Register of Deeds, unnecessarily took the matter out of his hands and at
the same time preempted the question of registration still pending in the civil action filed by appellant.
The orders appealed from are hereby set aside, with costs against appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P.,
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-20611

May 8, 1969

AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,

vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Vicente Llanes for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC Consulta No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the
registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos,"
with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be
annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to
have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (/) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of
the land is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in
law." It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three
separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different
buyers. The pertinent entries read:
Entry No. 5658.

Sales.

Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of
3,710 square meters only in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby
cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of the vendee ... is
hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ...
Date of Instrument:
xxx

xxx

Entry No. 5659.

January 25, 1955, ...

xxx
Sale of portion.

Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of
16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled
with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to
succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument:
Entry No. 5660.

June 9, 1953. ...

Sale of portion.

Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided
portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate of
Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu
thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights,
participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument:

February 12, 1952. ...

The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an additional memorandum
stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds
of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of
Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th day of
January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title
No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested
annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who subsequently
upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal
point in controversy, the Commissioner observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described in the Original
Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided portions thereof on three different
occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate
issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's duplicates which are presumably in
the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of Original
Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The
claim of counsel for the donees that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was
unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to the
contrary, these titles are presumed to have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.et
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want to compel annotation of
the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the
production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for
registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument." Under this provision, according to
petitioners, the presentation of the other copies of the title is not required, first, because it speaks of "registered
owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three
vendees-co-owners in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was
illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that there is only one
duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production
whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds
to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title
were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land
Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is
beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction.
There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely
affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The
law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both
must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the
title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of
Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding the action taken by the
Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is,
property of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should
first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal
conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its implications, for without a previous settlement of the
partnership a surviving spouse may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the
result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of the property is
assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which
justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property which he

donated was more than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had
sold portions of the same land to three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the
civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the
validity of the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation may
well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected
by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur and that of the
Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Capistrano, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.
Footnotes
*

Section 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or more persons. Where two or
more persons are registered owners as tenants in common, or otherwise, one owner's duplicate
certificate may be issued for the whole land, or a separate duplicate may be issued to each for
his undivided share.