Vivarium

25

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1987

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12:42:53 PM

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXV (1987)

L.M. De Rijk

In MemoriamCorneliaJohanna
De Vogel

MartinM. Tweedale

ReplytoProf.de Rijk

L.M. De Rijk

Postscript

23

Paul VincentSpade

Five EarlyTheoriesin theMediaeval

24
Insolubilia
-Literature

JohnP. Doyle

SuarezonBeingsofReasonand
Truth(1)

47
76

Reviews

81

Neil T. Lewis

Determinate
TruthinAbelard1

HesterGoodenough
Gelber

TheFallacyofAccidentand the
Dictumde omni:Late Medieval
overa ReciprocalPair .... 110
Controversy

C.H. Kneepkens

Ab omnihominehabeturaliquod
capud: A Noteon theConceptof
in 12th-Century
Word-Order
Grammatical
Thought1

146

To
BooksReferred

153

Reviews

154

BooksReceived

160

12:42:53 PM

Vivarium
XXV, 1 (1987)
IN MEMORIAM

CORNELIA

JOHANNA DE VOGEL

C.J. de Vogel, Emeritus professorof Ancient and PatristicPhilosophy at the State Universityof Utrecht, died on 7 May, 1986 in the
82nd year of her life. For her to study and teach the historyof philosophy eo ipso meant to express her own philosophical ideas.
Afterhaving taken her doctoral degree at Utrecht with a dissertation on 'a turningpoint in Plato's thought', she mainly focussed on
problems of a theological nature, and this field of problems received
most of her attentionafter she retired. Even during the years inbetween, however, she was almost exclusivelyinterestedand engaged in
problemsof a theologicalor metaphysicalnature (she did not consider
the two disciplinesas essentiallydifferentfromeach other), problems
which received her fullestattention.
which
When it became obvious that the scholarlyjournal Phronesis
she had helped to set up was hardly suitable forstudies on Mediaeval
thought,her pupil L. M. de Rijk found her willingto supporthis iniwas
tiativeto set up the presentJournal. The orientationof Vivarium
not the same as her own: she always maintained thatGreek philosophy
and especiallyPlatonism had prepared the way to Christian mediaeval
thoughtand that is why she hardly noticed the unique development
within Mediaeval culture. People like Abelard and Ockham she
viewed with suspicion, and even a figuresuch as Duns Scotus did not
seem to fitin with her ideas.
In Utrechtshe taught her pupils to studytextsin a strictlyphilological manner. She displayed an exemplary work ethic; she devoted
herselfto her pupils even if theychose to go theirown way. Her conversionto Catholicism (in 1945) and her sex oftenmade it difficultfor
her to feelat home withher fellowworkers,especially because she was
oftenunfathomableand difficultto get along with. She would have
nothingto do with feminismand yet she would, often passionately,
defendequal rightsforwomen. The last years of her life she chose to
spend in isolation in the Zealand coastal village of Renesse, where the
1

12:44:34 PM

locals only knew her as the organist of the littlechurch on the beach.
The parish priestwas the only person who frequentlyspoke to her and
few people she had known at the universityever came to visit her.
C.J. de Vogel deserves to live on as an influentialscholar, famous
even far beyond her own country. It is a great honour forher pupils
to have had such an inspiring instructor.
L. M. DE Rijk

12:44:34 PM

Vivarium
XXV, 1 (1987)
Reply to Prof. de Rijk
MARTIN M. TWEEDALE

It is always a bit disconcertingto have one's work severelycriticized

by a scholar in one's own field, and even more so when by a figure
so distinguished as Prof. de Rijk, whose work in editing texts of
medieval logic I have long admired and relied upon. Much of the
criticismwhichhe expressed in an articlein thisjournal last year1that
I agree with, but there are
discusses my book Abailardon Universals2
some matterswhere I would like to dissent. It may be useful to sort
out here just exactly which of Prof, de Rijk' s comments and suggestions I accept and which seem to me either dubious or wrong.
I
First of all, Prof. de Rijk has done me and whatever readers my
book may have the service of pointing out some errorsI made in the
translationof Abailard's writings. He finds these errors annoying; I
do too, and I wish to apologize rightnow to him and other readers
whom theyhave eitherannoyed or misled. Some of these errorsconstitutea serious faultin a book one of whose main aims was to make
certain textsavailable in English forphilosophers and others who do
not read Latin. Let me here list the passages in question, giving the
translationI would now prefer. At the same time I shall add a few
remarkson the way Prof. de Rijk would read those passages.
(1) Logica Ingredientibus
(henceforthLI) p. 13 (11-1 2)3, (my book p.
108):
eorum
nonestsicutneehomo
entiarum.
Quare
fundamentum
differ
fortheseaccidents
heis nottheunderlying
Consequently
support
justas neither
is mantheunderlying
fordifferences.
support
1 Martin
M. Tweedale
onAbailard.
SomeCriticisms
Venture
, in: Vivarium,
ofa Fascinating
XXIII (1985),81-97.
2 NorthHolland,Amsterdam
1976.
3 B. Geyer,
Peter
Abaelards
derPhilosophie
zurGeschichte
, in:Beitrge
Schriften
Philosophische
desMittelalters,
Band21, Heft1-4,Mnster/W.
1919.
3

12:44:40 PM

Reading this as 'Consequently there is no base for these

accidents...' was a very careless erroron my part. By the way, in the
'
'
preceding sentence I did not translate praeteras 'over and about', as
Prof. de Rijk claims (p. 84), but as the perfectlycolloquial 'over and
above'.
"
PetitioniSociorum
(2) Logica "nostrorum
(henceforthLNPS) p. 522
4
book
(13-17), (my
p. 142-3):
Aristoteles
universalis
, princeps
Quodetiam
peripateticorum,
perdiffinitionem
quam
ponit,
" idest
insinut
depluribus,
, cumait: "Universale
a
aperte
est,quodestnatum
praedicari
nativitate
suahoccontrahit,
exinstitutione
scilicet.
thePrinceofthePeripatetics,
indicates
thisinhisdefinition
Aristotle,
of
clearly
'universal'
whenhe says,"A universal
is whatis formed
so as tobe predicated
ofmany,"i.e. itdrawsthisfromitsformation,
i.e. fromitsestablishment.
(3) LNPS p. 524 (13-16), (my book p. 146):
Conversae
scilicet
: voxestgenus
velvoxestspecies,
nonsuntconcedendae,
cum
harum,
per
illascommunitas
essentiae
inomnibus
ostendatur,
quaesimiliter
reperitur.
Buttheirconverses,
viz.:
An utterance
is a genus
or
An utterance
is a species
arenottobe conceded
as though
ofan essence,
which
theyasserta commonness
is foundsimilarly
in everything.
4
Originally I translated cum' as 'since' and intended the passage to
be read the way Prof. de Rijk suggests(p. 87) at the end of his remark,
i.e. as meaning that to grant the truthof the converses because they
assert a commonness of essence is not allowed. But clearlymy original
translationwas open to the incorrectreading thatit is because the converses express a commonness of essence that their truth should be
'
'
rejected. Prof. de Rijk would translate cum as 'although' so that we
get 'are not to be conceded although they assert...'. However, this
implies that Abailard thought those sentences did assert a commonness of an essence, when it is clear fromhis earlier remarksthat
he did not thinkthey asserted this but rathersaid that a certain propertybelonged to an utterance, a propertywhich in factan utterance
could not have. Hence I now choose to render ' cum' by 'as though',
although this is admittedlyan unusual translation.
4 B. Geyer,op.cit.
4

12:44:40 PM

MontaneMinores(Logica Modernorum
, vol. II, pt. 2,
(4) Introductiones
5
book
23
p.
p. 164):
(17-20), (my
essepredicatum
etsubiectum
: nonquodineis
inhuiusmodi
Dicittarnen
propositionibus
subitelo
, sedquiasubiecto
apponitur,
facitenuntiationem.
predicatum
predicatur
ofthissorta subjectand a predicate;
Yethe saysthatthereis in propositions
is predicated
ofthesubjectbutrather
it is notthatin themthepredicate
that
a declarative
it is attached
to thesubject,thatproduces
sentence.
I embellished this passage a littletoo much to bring out the rather
paradoxical thesisit attributesto Alberic, namely that in logicallyparticular propositions the predicate is not predicated of anything
including the subject term. In fact in the sentence preceding the one
above Alberic is said to hold the view that there is no predication in
such cases. In a ' bowler' ' of his own Prof. de Rijk chastises me for
constructinga translationwhich attributesthis "unexpected" view to
Alberic. "How on earth can Alberic of Paris (who is quoted here)
claim that in a propositionthe predicate is not predicated of the subject?" he asks rhetorically.Evidently Prof. de Rijk did not study the
preceding sentence very carefully.It reads:
determino
rem
dereterminm
nihil
dealiquo,
Albericus.
..dicit
,
praedicari
Magister
nonestpraedicari.
praedicari
quiaparticulariter
In otherwords, what authoritiescall a predicate in a propositionof
particularquantity is not in factpredicated at all, on Alberic's view.
I do not know how Alberic defendedthe view thistextand my translation attributeto him, but that the text says he held it seems to me
indisputable.
(By the way, Prof, de Rijk on p. 89 incorrectlycites my previous
'
translationby substituting'that' for 'because with the result that it
appears ungrammatical.)
(5) LNPS p. 527 (23-28), (my book, p. 165):
habent
hocestsensibilta
sunt
nonomnia
insensibilibus
Genera
etspecies
posita,
quaedam,
etnoncumaliqua
extra
idestreshabent
nominare
sensibilia,
forma
, etponuntur
significare
nonideo
amitterent,
subiacent,
subiaceat,
quaesensui
quiasi resomnes
formas
quaesensui
nominari
minus
a genere
etspecie
possent.
i.e. they
Certaingeneraandspecies,butnotall,havebeengivenin sensibles,
butnot
i.e. theysignify
andaregivenoutsidesensibles,
namesensibles,
things
lostall theforms
via someformthatfallsunderthesenses,becauseifthings
whicharesubjecttothesenses,theycouldjustas wellbe namedbygeneraand
species.
5 L. M. de Rijk,Assen1967.
5

12:44:40 PM

as "sent out" was a careless error

The mistranslationof 4amitteren
on my part. My commentary shows, though, that I was not misled
about the sense of the passage. Prof. de Rijk's proposed translation(p.
89) is 'would loose', which is just as bad as mine was (or is 'loose' a
misprintfor 'lose'?).
(6) LI p. 317 (12-15), (my book p. 169):
Ubivero
attendit
nturm
reivelineoquodresestvelensvelsubstantia
velcorpus
aliquam
velalbavelSocrates,
intellectus
cumquidem
deconfusione
erat
dicitur,
,
quaeimaginations
ad intellectum
ducitur.
perrationem
in as muchas thethingis either
Butwhenthemindnotesa natureofa thing,
or a bodyor whiteor Socrates,
itis calledan idea,i.e.
a beingora substance
whenitisledbyreasonfrom
thevagueness
whichisassociated
withtheimaginationto an idea.
Here I did not commitwhat Prof. de Rijk calls the ' 'howler' ' of con'
9
'
fusing quidemwith quod (p. 90) but the equally careless errorof con' I did
'
era as the subject of 'ducitur. ' Quidem
struing quae imaginationis
not translateat all. Prof. de Rijk is annoyed by my occasionally failing
9 and
to take note of words like ' quidem
, but present-day
'projecto9
does
not
their
use
English prose
English equivalents nearlyas oftenas
Abailard uses those latin words, and in facttranslatingthemis at times
quite superfluous. Here, though, I thinkthe translationdoes need to
9 in some
note the ' quidem
way.
9
As fortranslating' intellectus
by 'idea', I admit this practice has its
I
drawbacks, and am not at all sure that I would retain it if I were to
reworkillmy translations.But the alternativesare prettybad as well.
'Intellection' is grotesque and meaningless in today's English.
'Understanding' is misleading. 'Act of thinking' suggests pondering
9
or deliberating, which is not what ' intellectus
designates. I certainly
made it clear in my commentarythat an idea forAbailard was an act
and not the product or object of an act. The word 'idea' can have both
senses in current English usage.
Prof. de Rijk says (p. 90) that my equation of intellectus
with ideas
may be what led me to feel the need on p. 170 of my book "to
exculpate Abailard from any suggestion of some intermediatesense
datum". To referto my short remarkas an exculpation is to elevate
a brief aside into a peroration. Certainly Prof. de Rijk's suggestion
about my motivationsis preposteroussince the topic of the discussion
Nor does anythingI say, so faras I can see, force
is sensusnot intellectus.
Abailard to the view that "ideas conceive of ideas". I franklyfind
Prof. de Rijk's remarks at thisjuncture very puzzling.
6

12:44:40 PM

(7) LI p. 314 (32-35), (my book p. 172):

Sunttarnen
illudesse
animam
, quaeitaseformare
, utsingularum
quivelini
ipsam
potest
rerum
similitudines
etinseipsapossit
, insimilitudinem
exprimat
quorum
singula
speculari
setransformat
.
quoque
Nevertheless
arethosewhoholdthattheminditself
there
is thatimage,andthat
itis abletoformitself
so as toexpress
likenesses
ofparticular
andtobe
things
able in itselfto thinkabout particular
items,intowhoselikenessit also
transforms
itself.
' as
I preferto retainthe translationof ' instar
'image' since it makes
clear that Abailard is talking about what he elsewhere refersto by
'
'imago'. Also contraryto Prof,de Rijk (p. 91) I did not render animam
9
illudesse,quae as 'the mind that is that which', but as 'the mind itself
is that which'.
(8) LI p. 25 (28-29), (my book p. 176):
uthochabens.
Nonenim
reshoctantum
habet
attenditur
, sedtantum
toas
Forhe- thethinghere- doesnothaveonlythis,buthe is onlyattended
havingthis.
'
'
In the whole passage ofwhich thisis a part I translated'ea9 and earn
as 'him' while recognizing that 'res9is their real antecedent. But the
thing in question here is a man and one cannot properlyin English
referto a man as a thingor by 'it'. So I thinkwhat Prof. de Rijk takes
as a mistakehere (p. 91) is reallyjust a way of puttingwhat Abailard
says into reasonable English. But he is rightthatI carelesslyassociated
' hoc' with 'res' in this sentence.
(9) LI p. 328 (22-24), (my book p. 177):
sicesseattendant,
utpraesentialiter
adhocimagines
inanimo
Nonenim
praesentialiter
colligo
esse.
sedsicanteacontigisse
velcontingendum
ForI do notnowgather
imagesinmymind/just/so thatI mayattendtowhat
orwhat
before
towhathappened
isnowthecase,butalsothatI maynowattend
is goingto happen.
In thelast sentenceof the passage I give on p. 177 Prof,de Rijk says
' sanae
essenshould be rendered: 'be the product of soundly
conceptionis
This
is not very meaningfulEnglish, but he may be right
conceiving'.
that the genitive there indicates a source.
7

12:44:40 PM

(10) LI p. 24 (28-30), (my book p. 179):

iampraeter
rem
etintellectum
diversas
tertia
cumeasab intellectibus
Sedprojecto
facimus,
exiitnominum
significatio.
fromideas,there
oncewe treatthem/i.e.theforms/
as different
Butcertainly
fornounsbesidesthething
andtheidea.
hasnowcometobe a third
signification
The translationin my book is genuinely horrible. But I find Prof,
de Rijk's translationof this sentence unacceptable as well. He would
read it as follows:
in thatwe aremakingthem/i.e.theforms/
as /sic!/
Butcertainly
diversefrom
theintellections,
theninavoidably
/sic!/
besidesthethingand theintellection,
hascomeoutas a thirdthing.
signification
4
4 9
! Prof. de
My careless errorwas to treat eas as referringto nomina*
Rijk makes no slips of that magnitude, although he does forgetto
translate 'nominum9.(pp. 92-3) What I mainly disagree with is his
claim thatwhat Abailard is saying is thaton the view under discussion
we shall have to treatnominal significationas a thirdthingin addition
to ideas and things. It seems clear to me that Abailard' s proposal is
ratherthat ifwe allow both that common formsare signifiedby nouns
and that common formsare neitherthingsnor ideas, then in addition
to significationof things and significationof ideas, whose distinction
is attested to by the authorities,we will have significationof forms,
which no authoritytreats as a distinctthird sort of significationthat
nouns have. Prof. de Rijk's translationfailsto make it clear that what
we are dealing with is three distincttypesof significationsthat nouns
'
9
or object signified
have, where by significatiois meant the significatum
rather than the propertyof signifying.In other words we now have
threeratherthanjust two sortsof object of nominal signification.My
latinist friendhere tells me the Latin will bear this interpretation.
(11) LI p. 20 (12-14), (my book p. 206):
Statum
hominis
resipsasin natura
hominis
statutas
quoque
possumus
appellare,
quarum
communem
similitudinem
illeconcepii,
quivocabulum
imposuit.
Alsowecancallthestatus
mantheverythings
nowestablished
bythenatureof
whosecommon
likeness
heconceived
whoappliedtheword
man,i.e. thethings
/tothem/.
Here I gratefullyaccept Prof. de Rijk' s suggestion that the 'non'
9 should be 'nunc9
which the ms. has before ' natura
. The sentence then
turns out to be a sort of aside in which Abailard acknowledges a use
of ' status9 which, to my knowledge, he never alludes to again. (By the
8

12:44:40 PM

'
way, I did not omit to translate quoque as Prof. de Rijk asserts on p.
94) As my commentaryon p. 207 states, I was unsure what to make
of this sentence and simply tried lamely to make the ' non9 of the ms.
play a role.
I have long been dissatisfiedwith 'type' as a translationof 'status'>
so I am favourablydisposed to Prof, de Rijk' s commentson thispoint
(p. 93), while remaining uncertain how best to translate it. Perhaps
it should just be leftin the Latin.
The reason I used 'the typeof a man' ratherthan 'the type of man'
is that only the formercan be at all read as meaning the character of
being a man. The latterwould referto some character whose extension is included in the extension of being a man. Certainly I was well
' means
aware that ' statushominis
'being a man', as anyone who reads
on
this
and
other
my commentary
passages could not help but
observe.
Also I would like to add to the list of my mistakes one which Prof,
de Rijk did not mention but which was pointed out to me by Prof.
Norman Kretzmann some years ago.
6
(12) Dialcticap. 140 (23-29), (my book p. 302):
vel
verba
contrarii
videmur,
Quodautem
quodmulta
componimus
grammaticorum
regulis
ut
velabaliisquamabactionibus
velpassionibus
ut'essehominem
substantiva,
sumpta,
*essealbum
Illienim
sententiam
rectam
enuntiationum
, nonabhorreas.
aperiendam
propter
multa
tenerorum
aut
tenent,
provectis
inquirere
procapacitate
quiprimm
disciplinae
gradm
subtilitatem
laborare.
inquibus
dialecticae
reliquerunt
oportet
corrigenda
of
Do notrecoilin horrorwhenin orderto openup thecorrectmeanings
we puttogether
suchas 'to be a man',
sentences
manyverbsor substantives,
other
suchas 'tobewhite',
from
thanactions
orpassions,
orverbsderived
things
Forthosewhoarein the
andthusseemtogo againsttherulesofgrammarians.
forthecapacities
ofbeginners,
first
rankofthediscipline,
outofa consideration
in
ofmanymatters
haveleftto theadvancedtheinquiryintoand correction
ofdialectic
whichthesubtlety
mustbe employed.
In only fourof the above cases, (1), (5), (10) and (11), does it seem
to me my readers could have been significantlymisled by my original
translations,and in the case of (1 1) theywere warned in the commentarythatI was unsure of the meaning of the sentence in question. Any
errorsof the magnitude of these fourare serious, but I am relieved to
findthat in no case were theyor any of the other errorsin translation
the cause of any misinterpretationin my commentaryof Abailard's
philosophical positions.
6 ed. byL. M. de Rijk,Assen1956,secondedition1970.
9

12:44:40 PM

In factin no case, save (11), does my substitutingthe new translain my commentary.

tion make me want to say anythingat all different
I
some
made
remarks
on
207
p.
defendingthe retentionof
(In (11)
' non' in the
I
would
retract.
But this does not conremarks
now
text,
cern the basic view that Abailard held concerningstatus.) I thinkthat
Prof. de Rijk' s article conveys the impression that I have
misunderstood Abailard's thought on "many decisive points", and
that I have even failed to translatecertainwords when thatwas convenient for my interpretation.This is what I would want to reject
entirely.
In the remainder of this piece I shall firstdiscuss some points of
translationwhere I am inclined to reject Prof. de Rijk's suggestions
and then move on to substantive matters of interpretationof what
Abailard is saying.
II
(1) LI p. 117 (2-7), (my book, pp. 93-94):
Prof. de Rijk (p. 83) calls my translating' quasi' by 4as though' in
the clause, 4ideoqueea superposuit
ceterisquasi primanatur
aliteret digniora
"a
howler
of
on
the grounds
rerumcontinentia'
,
major importance",
that it "implies that Abailard does not share the Aristotelian view
involved here." My intuitionssay that 'as though' does not have that
implication but rather leaves it an open question whetherAbailard
held that view or not. Prof, de Rijk prefers'since', but this I think
definitelyimplies thatAbailard did share thisview, whereas 'quasi' , as
Prof, de Rijk himselfremarks, really means 'since, in the speaker's
mind', where the speaker here is Aristotle,not Abailard, and absolves
the author of the whole passage fromany commitmentto the view he
is attributingto someone.
'
'
Further,Prof,de Rijk says I failedto translatethe ideo in the above
clause. That is incorrect(my translationstarts: 'and therefore'),and
his error at that point should cast some doubt on the claim he
immediately inserts that I often leave out single words, especially
where they are unfavourable to my interpretation.That charge is
nowhere substantiated in his article.
Prof, de Rijk then goes on to what follows 'quasi' , namely 1prima
naturaliter
et digniorarerumcontinentia'
, and says that I incorrectly
.
associate 'primawith 'genera'and then misunderstand' digniorarerum'
But I could not have associated 'prima' with 'genera'for the simple
10

12:44:40 PM

reason that 'genera'does not occur in this passage; ratherI associated

it with the W that precedes it in the clause quoted earlier. This W
itselfrefersto the nominain which Aristotleis said to have thoughtthe
significationof of all othernouns began. The real issue between Prof,
'
de Rijk and myselfhere is whether 'primanatur
aliteret digniorarerum
'
is to be taken as a single phrase servingas the object of continenti^or
' is the
'
I read it in the
whetheronly 1digniorarerum
object of continentia.
latter way, but I admit that it is equally possible to read it in the
formerway, and in that case I would translate the clause by:
thethings
as though
andtherefore
heplacedthemovertheothers
theycontained
and higher
thatarenaturally
primary
ranking.
My latinistfriendhere at Auckland finds it hard to choose between
these alternatives.
' Prof. de
As for' digniorarerum
Rijk thinksmy translationas 'nobler
evidences
some
mental
block
on my part. I see nothingwrong
things'
here (except I do like Prof, de Rijk' s suggestion that we translate
'
4
4
digniorby of higher rank'); what we have here, in my opinion and
in that of my latinistfriend,is a partitivegenitiveof a familiarsort,7
and the phrase literallymeans 'the higher ranking among things'.
Prof. de Rijk wants to treat it as a differentsort of partitivegenitive,
where it would mean the higher ranking elements in things. His
translation of the whole clause reads: 44since they contain those
elementsin things(viz. theiruniversal characters)which are naturally
firstand of a higher rank". This is, I suppose, a grammatically
possible reading,but a highlyunlikelyone, it seems to me, since it has
Abailard attributingto Aristotlea view whichhe certainlydid not hold
and whichAbailard himselfopposed, viz. thatthereare common constituentsof things.Also if Abailard had wanted to talk about charactersofthingsin contrastto thingshere, he would almost certainlyhave
made that clear, for there is nothing in the immediate environs that
would lead us to expect such a distinctionat thispoint. By farthe most
direct interpretationof these words (accepting for the moment that
'
'
'
4
prima and digniora go together) is that Abailard attributes to
Aristotlethe view that substance, quality, quantity etc. are primary
7 Foran exampleofthissortofpartitive
De Rerum
Natura
see Lucretius,
I,
genitive
'thepavedroads'and not'thepavedparts
315andIV, 415: 'strata
viarum
meaning
thanthe
is morefrequent
andmoreidiomatic
ofroads'.Thissortofpartitive
genitive
to C. Bailey
topartsofthings,
othersortwhichactually
makesreference
according
in TitiLucreti
CariDe Rerum
Natura
, vol. I, pp. 91-92,Oxford1947.
11

12:44:40 PM

and higher ranking things. It is entirelyunlikelythat he attributesto

him te view that substance, quality, quantity, etc. are "elements" of
things, since that is a very un-Aristotelian view, and not one any
unprejudiced reader of Abailard would expect to crop up.
(2) DialcticaGarlandi Compotistae, ed. by L. M. de Rijk, p. 20
- p. 21
(22)
(8). (my book pp. 137-8).
Prof. de Rijk criticizes (p. 84) my use of inverted commas in
translatinga passage fromhis edition of Garlandus' Dialctica. He says
that I do not make a proper distinctionbetween words being used
autonymously,where invertedcommas are needed, and words being
used to stand for genera and species, where he uses italics. But what
is remarkable about Garlandus' treatmentof genera and species, and
individuals as well, is that theyare all utteranceson his view. In other
words, Garlandus systematicallydenies the verydistinctionthat Prof,
de Rijk would have us foistupon him. For example, ifwe followProf,
de Rijk' s advice, one portion of the passage comes out as follows:
bothitself
anditsgenus.Thisis provedas follows:
Bodyis a speciesthatsignifies
Airis a speciesofbody
and 'air' signifies
thisutterance
'body'as wellas this
utterance
itselfand
'substance';therefore,
, the genusof air, signifies
body
substance
a speciessignifies
inas much
, themostgeneral
genus,becausewhatever
as it is a species,itsgenusalso signifies.
This renderingleaves the argumentin an unsatisfactorystate, since
nowhere in it is it established that the species air signifiesbodyand
substance
; all we have is that air' signifies'body' and 'substance'. But
once we apply Garlandus' nominalisticthesisand change all the italics
to invertedcommas, we have my translationand an argumentwhich
is formallyvalid. (It should be noted in thisconnectionthatGarlandus
is particularlycareful to make his arguments completelyexplicit and
valid on formal grounds.)
(3) LNPS p. 522 (33-35), (my book p. 144)
On p. 84 of his article Prof, de Rijk charges me with another
howler; I have, he says, taken the verb 'astruen, treatedit as a passive
and mistranslated it to boot as 'construe' rather than 'claim'. But
what Prof, de Rijk seems not to have noticed is thatthe view Abailard
is raising an objection to here is his own, and to translate ' astruanas
'they claim', as Prof, de Rijk wishes, is to indicate misleadinglythat
Abailard is talking about a group which does not include himself.
(Note in the preceding paragraph, found in my book p. 143, he has
12

12:44:40 PM

used the firstperson plural.) I decided to avoid that problem by using

a passive constructionwhere no personal pronoun occurs. As for the
differencebetween 'are claimed to be universais' and 'are construed
as universais', I franklydo not see any, except the hint in the latter
that some subtle theorizinghas made the position possible, and certainlythat is true in this case. If this is a "howler", then "howlers"
must occur in every translationthat varies at all from the literal.
(4) LNPS p. 523 (11-15), (my book p. 145)
depluribusetc.' means
I doubt that the 'illu in ' illudiquodpraedicatur
'the phrase', as Prof, de Rijk suggests(p. 85), although that proposal
is possible. My doubt is based on the use of 4llu in lillud quod
'
praedicaturtwo sentences before the passage under discussion. There
it clearly cannot mean 'the phrase' because Abailard is not referring
to the phrase ' quod praedicatur rather it means 'that'. Now in the
passage beforeus Abailard clearly is talking about a phrase; the only
issue, and it is a very small one, between Prof, de Rijk and myselfis
' or
'
de pluribus
whetherthe phrase in question is illud quodpraedicatur
'
depluribus'.Again Prof, de Rijk misquotes my translaquodpraedicatur
tion so that it appears that I did not notice an autonymous use of the
phrase. He says that I translated it as 'that which is predicated'
whereas in fact I used inverted commas and translated it by "that
which is predicated...". Since then my translationand Prof. de Rijk's
are virtuallythe same, I am at a loss to know what he is complaining
about and what "erroneous judgment" I have been led to, unless, of
course, he really did not notice my invertedcommas.
In the second sentenceof the passage Prof, de Rijk says my translation gives "the exact opposite of what Abailard is saying", because I
'
have misread ' aliter as meaning 'otherwise' rather than 'in another
way'. The point of Abailard's remark is, in my opinion, that if we
insist that the definitionof 'genus' be 'that which is predicable of
many etc.', then the definitioncan only be predicated of somethingin
an assertionof an identityof some thingwith itself,which he expects
us to findparadoxical compared withhis own view that the definition
is simplya phrase indicatingthe propertyof being predicated of many
and thus does not predicate any subject of that property.Abailard is
very conscious of this difference.It is noted in his TheologiaChristiana
(henceforthTC ), bk. Ill, parag. 140 (p. 248 (1720-1))8 thatthe matter
8 ed. E. M. Buytaert
1969.
vol. II, Turnholt
in Petri
Abaelardi
OperaTheologica,
13

12:44:40 PM

of a waxen image is not enmattered although it is the thing that is

enmattered. In the next paragraph Abailard goes on to remark(lines
1729-1736):9
topredicate
a form,
another
theinformed
itis onethingtopredicate
Certainly
ForifI say,'thewaxenimage
i.e. theverythingsubjecttotheform.
itemitself,
ofthewax,thenI linkand
in respect
is priorto thewax', i.e. has priority
andwhatis saidis false.ButifI say4hewaxenimage
theform
itself,
predicate
is an itempriorto thewax,i.e. somethingpriorto thewax,thenI linkand
is true,sincethatimageis a
itemand theproposition
theinformed
predicate
bodywhichis priorto thewax.
It is this sort of distinction between predicating the form and
predicatingthe informeditem that is, I believe, at stake in the LNPS
"
passage. If Prof. de Rijk agrees with that he should not say I arrive
at the exact opposite of what Abailard is reallysaying". If he does not
agree, then I would be interestedin knowing what his interpretation
is.
MontaneMinores(as quoted by Prof, de Rijk on pp.
(5) Introductiones
15-16 of his "Some new Evidence on TwelfthCentury Logic. Alberic
and the School of Mont Ste Genevieve (Montani)", VivariumIV, 1
(1966)), (my book p. 148).
Prof, de Rijk says (p. 88) that the sentence dicimusei esse
9
4
oppositumshould be translated: we rathersay that it is its opposite'.
But this would be quite misleading, since examination of the whole
text reveals that what the author goes on to say, is a propositionthat
is the logical opposite of one he has just mentioned and to which lei9
refers.So the author is not saying thatsomethingis its opposite, which
would be rather silly in any event, but that he is going to assert the
opposite of the proposition just mentioned. Ergo, my translation:
' Rather we
say the opposite of this'.
(6) L/, p. 21 (9-11), (my book p. 171)
etilla altitudo
Prof,de Rijk seems to thinkthat 4vera9in ' ilia quadratura
9
'
sit
with
et
altitudo9
rather
than with
intellectus
veraforma
quadratura
goes
. I really cannot see any reason for that and my translation
'forma9
follows that of McKeon's here. Also Prof, de Rijk says I have
9 Aliudquippe
hocestrem
estpraedicare
subiectam.
, aliud
formam
formae
formtm
ipsum,
ipsam
habet
tunc
estprior
cerea
cera hocestpriorittm
Si enimdicam'imago
cerae,
respectu
ipsam
praedico
estquoddicitur.
dicam'imago
estprius
Si vero
cerea
cera
, etfalsum
copulo
formam
praedico
vera
estpropositio,
hocestresaliquaprior
cum
cera,tunc
ipsum
copulo
formtm,
sitcorpus
.
quodestpriuscera
ipsaimago
14

12:44:40 PM

misunderstood the passage when I say that "Abailard resists any

attemptto view a likenessas some real psychologicalentity." I suggest
in returnthatifProf. de Rijk thinksI am wrong on that point, he has
badly misunderstoodthe passage.
(7) LNPS p. 531 (5-8), (my book, p. 180)
My translationhere takes some libertieswith the Latin in order to
give a more readable English translation. So far as I can see I have
accurately rendered Abailard's intent.
(8) LNPS, p. 532 (30-32), (my book p. 181)
In my opinion Prof, de Rijk' s suggestion (p. 93) that we translate
' hac voce
'
prolata as 'this expression having been pronounced' instead
of 'by this spoken expression' obscures the meaning and is awkward
4
English as well. His other suggestionthat we render Auditornonhabet
quodrationabiliter
intelligaas 'The hearer does not have somethingto
rationally think of is acceptable (given no scruples about split
infinitives)and perhaps even stylisticallymore colloquial than mine,
but there is no differencein meaning.
Ill
In thisfinalsectionI want to take up a couple matterswhere I differ
fromProf. de Rijk not only on matters of translation but on fairly
significant points of interpretation of Abailard's philosophical
positions.
(1) On p. 83 of his article and elsewhere Prof. de Rijk takes me to
' as 'essence' rather
task for translating ' essentia
than as 'thing',
' refersto a concrete
' essentia
he
I
admits
am
aware
that
although
fully
thing. The reason I kept to 'essence' rather than 'thing' is that in
English you cannot say 'the thingof something', whereas you can say
'the essence of something', and it seemed to me we needed phrases of
the latter sort, notably in the passage fromLNPS where we find the
'
10
phrase Haec essentiavocis'. But now Prof. de Rijk holds the view that
'
' are in the
thisand also the phrases statusanimalis' and ' materiaSocratis
"
,
present contextexamples of what he calls the genitivusexplicativus"
10Another
reasonis Abailard'suse of'essentialiter
(mybookp. 146).In Englishwe
have'essentially'
butno 'thingly'.
15

12:44:40 PM

a constructionillustratedby the phrase ' nomenhominis1

, which should
be rendered as 'the noun, 'man". Consequently he would render (p.
'

88) haec essentiavocis as 'this thing, viz. the utterance' or 'this

' as 'this material
utterancequa thing', and (p. 87) ' haecmateriaSocratis
thing, Socrates'. (Twice on p. 85 Prof. de Rijk incorrectlysays I
'
translatedthe phrase ' haecessentiavocis as 'this essence of utterance',
which sounds like a strangeperfume. In factmy translationwas 'this
essence of an utterance'. He gets it righton p. 88.)
I am gratefulto Prof, de Rijk for informingme that the genitivus
is a recognized constructionin Latin, but I have doubts
explicativus
about some of his applications of the notion. Firstof all, he says there
is a "golden rule" in Latin which proscribesconstructionsof the form
'
' nomenrex'
'
meaning the noun 'king', or statusanimal meaning the
statusanimal, where the nouns involved are in the same case. The only
exceptions, he says, are "combinations in which the other part is a
'
proper noun" as in urbsRoma1. In order to avoid such constructions
as in ' nomenregisand
authors resort either to the genitivusexplicativus
' statusanimalis' or an
apposition with invertedword order such as rex
. "Phrases," he says, "such as ' nomen,rex' are simplyimposhocnomen'
sible in Latin" (p. 86).
However, a quick sweep through Abailard's TheologiaChristiana
shows, if Buytaert's edition is to be trustedhere, that Abailard was
eitherblissfullyunaware of this rule or feltit could be violated when
the firstnoun is accompanied by a demonstrative.I found these five
places where the rule is clearly violated:
'
'
(1) p. 84 ( 394): hoc nomen omnipotens
'
'
(2) p. 254 (1952): hoc nomen opifex
'
(3) p. 272 ( 222): neque hoc nomen multa', eque hoc nomen
'
' multitudo
'
'
'
'
(4) p. 287 ( 727): haec nomina Pater et potens', vel Filius et
' vel '
'
'
'
'
sapiens
SpiritusSanctus et benignus
'
'
'
'
'
'
(5) p. 301 (1118): hoc nomenaeternussive etiam Deus vel creator
and several others where it is violated if the rule excludes such constructionswhen the word named is a proper noun:
'
'
(6) p. 280 ( 486): hoc nomenDeus
'
(7) p. 280 ( 492): hoc nomen Socrates'
'
'
'
(8) p. 287 ( 738): haecnomina'Pater', Filius', SpiritusSanctus
'
'
(9) p. 316 (1647): hoc nomenDeus
16

12:44:40 PM

Given my limited knowledge of Latin, a weakness Prof. de Rijk is

keen to note, I shall refrainfromany opinion on this matter. Perhaps
examination of the mss. from which Buytaert worked would reveal
some error on his part here. But it seems more likely that Prof. de
4
Rijk' s 'golden rule" does not apply when we have a demonstrative,
and in that case it is of no significanceforinterpretingthe phrases we
'
are interestedin, viz. ' hie statusanim , haecessentiavocis', and 'haec
materiaSocratis'. But I would be interestedin what Prof, de Rijk has
to say about the apparent exceptions to his rule that I have found.
In any event until that matter is resolved, I remain in some doubt
about his recommendationthat we change lhicstatusanimal', which is
what the ms. has, to 6hiestatusanimalis'on p. 524 of LNPS. I confess,
'
though,that I also have doubts about the proposal I put forththat hic
'
statusanimal means 'this type animal', i.e. 'this sub-typeof animal'.
It seems the definitiveinterpretationof this phrase remains to be
given.
What I feel more certain about is that Prof, de Rijk goes too far
'
'
when he claims that the phrases Haec essentiavocis and lHaec materia
Socratis
', foundon pp. 523 and 524 of LNPS , are also genitiviexplicativi.
'
'
'
Let us consider firstthe phrase haecessentiavocis'. The word essentia
figuresvery prominentlyin TC , and there we find it is used almost
'
interchangeablywith Substantia (see for example, in Buytaert's edition, p. 89 (546), p. 220 (798), p. 229 (1126-8)), but substances are
contrasted with accidents by Abailard so that we can speak of the
substance of something,i.e. that which underlies the accidents of the
thing.(See, forexample, the discussion in TC p. 229 ff.and the many
places where he speaks of the single substance of the three divine
Persons.) Likewise it seems to me that thereare many passages in TC
where we want to speak of the essence ofsomething,meaning by that
the thingthat is the subject of various formsand properties.Abailard
can even speak of the quantityof the essence of something(TC p. 251
(1827)). I thinkit is quite clear fromthis and a host'of passages in TC
that an ordinarypartitivegenitivecan be used with essentia',and thus
its translationas 'thing' is not always possible. For example, consider
the followingpassage (TC p. 234 (1266-1273):
esse
sedentem
hunc
etiam
sitalbus
etSocrates
sitSocrates
Atvero
cumhiesedens
, constat
numero
dicantur
multa

et
huius
sedentis
sit
huius
essentia
eadem
cum
album
albi;
,
prorsus
licetoccupata
huiusetillius,quaediversis
sitessentia
ethicalbus
hicsedens
, cumeadem
essedicitur.
Socrates
numero
autmulta
nontarnen
autmultae
sitformis,
Alioquin
personae
numero
esset
universale
'Socrates'
hocnomen
, cumdedijferentibus
quamsingulare
potius
diceretur.
17

12:44:40 PM

The point I want to make here is thatin the clause ' cumeademprorsus
ethuiusalbi' we must take the genitivesas paressentiasit huiussedentis
titive and not explicative, and consequently also in the clause ' cum
eademsit essentiahuius et illius'. This passage can hardly make sense
unless we creditAbailard with distinghuishingitems that nevertheless
havethe same essence so that it would be translated as follows:
Andsincethissitting
itemis SocratesandSocrates
is white,itfollows
thatthis
itemis white,sincethissitting
itemandthiswhiteitemhaveexactly
the
sitting
sameessence.Neither
wouldthissitting
itemandthiswhiteitembe saidto be
sincethisand thathavethesameessence,and thoughthe
manyin number,
essenceis occupiedbydifferent
nevertheless
Socratesis notsaid to be
forms,
thisnoun'Socrates'wouldbe
manypersonsor manyin number.Otherwise,
universal
ratherthansingularsinceit wouldbe said of itemsthatdiffer
in
number.
To returnto the phrase ' haecessentiavocis*
, which Prof. de Rijk says
means just "this individual word", I rather suspect that we are
dealing with an ordinary partitivegenitive here too. What Abailard
refersto by this phrase is the concrete thing, a sound of some sort,
which possesses two properties:(1) that of being an articulateproduct
of the speech organs, and (2) that of having a meaning established by
' '
linguistic convention. The formeris indicated by the term vox and
4
'
'
the latter by a term like sermo or nomen'
, for it is one of Abailard's
basic points that the very same thingcan be subject to both of these.
Abailard is playing here with a notion very akin to that of a
substratum,although he never, so far as I know, is led to espouse a
mysterioussubstratumof itselfdivorced fromall formsand properties,
such as Aristotleproposes in Metaphysics
VII, 3.
As forthe phrase haecmateriaSocratis9
, Prof, de Rijk complains (p.
87) that my translation of this as 'this matter of Socrates' gives the
erroneous impressionthatAbailard is talkingabout Socrates' material
component, and should instead be translatedas a genitivus
explicativus
construction,viz. as 'This material thing,viz. Socrates'. But it seems
to me that in fact it is "Socrates' material component" that Abailard
is talkingabout here, and the genitiveis partitive,not explicative. The
passage in question fromLNPS , p. 524 should be compared with ones
in TC where Abailard talks about a wax image and the wax that is its
matter. (See TC III, par. 140, and IV, par. 86.) The point of these
passages is to note that although the wax and the waxen image are the
same essence, it is not true that all the predicatesapplicable to one are
applicable to the other. For example, the wax is not made fromwax
even though the waxen image is; and the waxen image is not the
18

12:44:40 PM

matterof the waxen image even though the wax is. Much the same
point is made with respect to Socrates and the material making him
up in a passage at TC IV, par. 40. I shall translatethis passage since
it amounts to a gloss by Abailard himselfon the passage in LNPS we
are discussing:11
as we notedearlier,thereare manyitemsthatare thesamein
Furthermore,
thisespecially
number
whosenamesarenevertheless
bypredication;
disjoined
occurswherethenounscontaina certain
relational
force,sinceeveryrelation
is thematter
exists
between
thesameinnumber
ofSocrates
Certainly
opposites.
ofSocrates
andtheperpetual
alsothepriorelement
andSocrates,
andSocrates,
ofSocratesandSocrates,
element
sincethisbodyor thisanimalarein factthe
of
sameas Socrates.Andyetit is notrightto saythatSocratesis thematter
he is thesameitemwhichis thematter
ofSocrates,
or
eventhough
Socrates,
he
thathe is priortoSocrates,
i.e. tohimself,
or thathe is perpetual,
although
is thatwhichis perpetual,
namelythisbody.
The point, then, that Abailard is tryingto make by contrasting
Haec materiaSocratisestSocrates
with
Socratesest materiaSocratis
is that a shiftof a phrase fromsubject position to predicate position
can shiftthe sense of the predication fromone which asserts an identityof essence to one which asserts that a relation belongs to something. (We should recall that earlier in the passage from LNPS
Abailard has made this distinctionbetween predicating a propertyof
somethingand predicatingthe thingthat has that property.See supra
9
pp. 13-14.) In view of this it is clear that materiaSocratis indeed
does referto Socrates' materialcomponent,contraryto Prof. de Rijk's
conjecture. Also I doubt that we should followProf. de Rijk by inser'
'
'
'
ting haec before materiain the second sentence, even though this is
'
'
requiredto make the second the formalconverse of the first.The haec
is there in the firstsentence to make sure we read the proposition as
assertingthat one thingis the same in essence as the other. Its insertion in the second would encourage a like reading of it and thus
produce a sentence which would notstrikethe reader as absurd, and
thus the contrastwould be lost.
11p. 282(580)- p. 283(590):Praetera,
numero
eadem
multa
utsuprameminimus,
,
sunt,
visquaedam
nomina
sunt
relationis
tamen
disiuncta
, quodmaxime
facit
quorum
perpraedicationem
consistt.
inter
Idem
omnis
relatio
cumvidelicet
continetur,
quippe
quaeinillisnominibus
opposita
etperpetuum
Socratis
et
estnumero
etSocrates,
etpriusSocratis
etSocrates,
materia
Socratis
cumvidelicet
sitquodSocrates
diciconvenit
sivehocanimal
idem
hoccorpus
Socrates,
; tamen
aututsitprior
utSocrates
sitmateria
sitidem
Socratis,
Socrate,
Socratis,
quodestmateria
quamvis
sithocquodestperpetuum,
licet
hoccorpus.
hocestseipso,aututsitperpetuus,
utpote
19

12:44:40 PM

(2) Prof. de Rijk's comments (pp. 89-90) on my tentativenessof

expression on p. 168 of my book give me the impressionthat he does
not quite understand what I was doing there. The point was to
explicate Abailard's concept of using a noun "denotatively"
) by comparing it with the modern notions of quantification
( appellative
and noting that these notions do not in fact quite catch Abailard's
intent. I do not think Abailard is "most explicit" on how he would
interpret'Some hood is wanted by me' because what he explicitly
discusses (see pp. 180-2 of my book) are sentences in which 'hood'
occurs in a referentiallyopaque context, whereas here it occurs
transparently.Tentativeness is called forhere because we are trying
to explicate basic notions in the theory of referenceand Abailard
himselfhas not, so far as I know, laid out an explicit theoryon this.
One has to tryto judge fromexamples how he would have developed
the theoryhad he wanted to.
Prof. de Rijk says I have not understood what Abailard was trying
to explain here. (By 'here' I guess he means in the passages in my
book, pp. 180-2, i.e. those at the end ofLNPS startingon p. 530 (20).)
I am not sure what he thinksI have missed, and when I read his own
4
analysis (in 'The semantical Impact of Abailard's Solution of the
Problem of Universais")12 I find there is a wide area of agreement
between our interpretations.I do have two reservations, however,
about Prof. de Rijk's commentsin thatarticle. One is relativelyminor
and concerns his comparing sentences like
(1) I want a golden castle
with ones like
(2) I dreamt a dream
(3) I foughta fight.
The point about (1) is that 'a golden castle' is not being used there
to referto anythingbut simplyindicates the characterof the want. As
Prof, de Rijk nicely puts it, (1) says I am a golden-castle-wanter. But
'a dream' in (2) and 'a fight' in (3) can be thoughtof as referential,
i.e. as referringto some dream or some fight.What is peculiar in (2)
and (3) is thatthe item referredto is somethingwhich is identicalwith
a particularcase of the activityindicated by the verb and not at illan
object of that activityin the way one's opponent is an object of one's
fighting.That seems to me to be a differentmatterentirelyfromthe
of 'golden castle' in (1).
non-referentiality
12pp. 139-151
inPetrus
Abaelardus
ed R. Thomas,
Werk,
(1079-1
142):Person,
Wirkung,
Trier1980.
20

12:44:40 PM

It is perhaps this, in my opinion mistaken,analogy that leads Prof,

de Rijk on to what strikesme as an importanterrorof interpretation.
In summing up Abailard' s solution to the problem of universais he
says:13
a golden-castle'
thegoldenAs a matter
offact,justas in thecaseof'wanting
castleis only(mentally)
existent
theuniversal
as a productof mywanting,
rather
its
ofa vox
(meaning
) doesnotexistin theoutsideworld.Itsexistence,
and,accordingly,
beinggiven,isjustdue tosomeproductive
wayofthinking,
neverexceedstherealmofthinking.
Prof,de Rijk then goes on to say thatthissolution "much resembles"
Ockham' s in its firststage, by which I suppose he means Ockham' s
proposal that universais are ficta in the mind.
But Abailard' s point is not to find something which is what a
oroutsideit. The point
universalword means either
in therealmofthinking
is to show thatwe need not thinkthatthereis somethingwhich is what
a word means. Abailard clearlydisassociates himselffromviews which
say that what I think of through a word is either some real mental
entityor somefictumof the mind. Such a view would preventour talk
frombeing about the real public world about us.
Prof. de Rijk seems to think that in this last extant part of LNPS
Abailard has revealed to us the whole basic character of his solution
to the problem of universais. As I see it, Abailard has here merelycut
the logical ground fromunder one ratherdirect route to realism, i.e.
the route which insiststhat there has to be some thing which a word
signifiesand which the mind grasps when it uses or hears that word.
In fact in this very passage Abailard himself talks in a way that
mightseem to grantall the realistwants. He says thatthroughthe concept associated with the word 'man' I consider "human nature" (p.
531 (16)). Furtherhe claims that in asserting'A man is running' one
points out human nature, (p. 532 (27)) Again, when one says 'Plato
is a man' by the idea associated with 'man' one "declares and
discloses a being of Plato's" (p. 531 (24)). Again, the predicate noun
is declarative "because through its idea what each being is is
declared" (p. 531 (26)). Finally, Plato and Socrates agree "in virtue
of the fact that they are men" (p. 531 (38)), although this does not
mean there is somethingin virtue of which they agree.
Here we have the kind of talk which I had in mind as verging on
the self-contradictory,
when I said Abailard uses talk he himselfknew
13Ibid.p. 149.
21

12:44:40 PM

to be misleading. This was not meant as a reproach of Abailard, as

Prof. de Rijk thinks(p. 96); ratherone of the main aims of my book
was to show that what Abailard was tryingto say virtuallyforcesone
to talk in self-contradictory
fashion,and yetwhat he was tryingto say
is a defensible position and even quite profound. I do not think
anybody could read my book at all carefullyand not come away
believing I held Abailard in the highestrespectas a logician. Whatever
errorsI attributeto him are ones of detail and not ones which it would
be ' 'ridiculous' ' to impute to a ' 'champion of logical and verbal
acumen".
At any rate, it seems to me quite preposterous to suppose that
Abailard thoughtthat human nature or being a man are itemsdependent for their existence on thinking.But clearly these are the sort of
items he thinksconcepts associated with universal words are concepts
of. The heart of Abailard' s solution to the problem of universais lies
in his defense of the view that items like these are not things, even
though they in a way have objective existence. The LNPS passage
serves the merely negative aim of showing that we cannot conclude
they are thingsmerelyby noting that theyare the apparent objects of
verbs like 'mean' and 'think of.
In conclusion I would just like to make one remark on Prof. de
Rijk's judgment that "to all those who are unable to meticulously
check his translations" I am an "unreliable guide" to Abailard' s
thought.A guide must be judged on two scores: firstwhetherhe leads
his followersto the rightplace, in this case the correctassessment of
Abailard' s views on universais, and secondly whether he gets them
there without too many mishaps on the way. While admittingthere
were mishaps that I should have avoided, I remain convinced that I
did lead my readers to basically the right interpretation,both in
general and of the specificpassages I discussed. Whether the mishaps
were so frequent and so serious as to make the journey on balance
unprofitableI leave to my readers to decide forthemselvesnow that
they have the benefitof Prof. de Rijk's critique.
Auckland, New Zealand
University
ofAuckland

22

12:44:40 PM

Postscript
L. M. DE RIJ
I might
havegiventhatI didnot
I wouldverymuchliketoeliminate
anyimpression
valueProfessor
hisresponse
as a conTweedale'swork.I greatly
highly
appreciate
tothediscussion
venture'
tribution
twelfth
century
concerning
logic,the'fascinating
in whichAbelardwasso deeplyinvolved.
Thereare a fewsourcesofmisunderstanding
whichI wouldliketo remove.
thatthe
a. ad L.I. 117,2-7. I admitthatI started
fromthe(wrong?)assumption
thattheuser(Abelard!)doesnotsharetheviewmenEnglish
phraseasthough
implies
to
tioned.I did notsay thatour rendering
of quasishouldimplyhis adherence
viewinthis
hisadherence
view.(Incidentally,
inmyopinion
toAristotle's
Aristotle's
I do notwishto treatrerum
in thephrase
connection
is a surething.)Moreover,
4as a different
as Tweedale
sortofpartitive
rerum
digniora
(r! De Rijk) genitive',
Socratis
assumes;it is a commonuse of thepossessive
genitive
just as in manus
a handis a man'spart
, tobe sure).EveryLatinist
maytellyouthata Latin
(although
orpoculum
is a different
vint).
thingaltogether
partitive
genitive
(e.g. in ubiterrarum
thestringency
ofwhatI have
b. Professor
Tweedaleis certainly
rightin rejecting
thegenitivus
calledthe'goldenrule'(concerning
Indeed,MedievalLatin
explicativus).
s own
Abelard'
rex'
. The evidence
he adducesfrom
ofphrases
suchas lnomen,
admits
fromother
withexamples
textsis quiteconvincing
and couldeasilybe augmented
between
authors.
However,
'type'and 'submythesisaboutTweedale'sdistinction
aboutthiscontroversy
type'isnotaffected
bythat.I wouldliketoleavethejudgement
c. ad LNPS, 532,30-42.Again,
toothers,
between
Tweedaleandmyself
(andothers)
construcareparticipai
as hocvoce
locatedattheheadofa sentence
suchphrases
prolata
It is strictly
tions(incasu,an ablativus
againstLatinidiomtotaketheparabsolutus).
in suchcases.
ticipleas usedadjectivally,
(and render:'by thisspokenexpression')
If 'thisexpression
is awkward
English(as, no doubt,its
havingbeenpronounced'
thephrasesomething
areas well)onemustrender
inDutchandGerman
counterparts
our Latin
WhenI was a schoolboy
like:'whenthiswordhas beenpronounced'.
thisidiomintous. As oftenas we triedtoexplain
wouldnottireofdinning
teacher
he
as youwillunderstand)
awayouroffences
againstthatidiom(quiteinventively,
on thedesksayingthefinalwords:'a language'sidiomis notto
wouldbanghisfists
readyour
be understood,
but onlyto be seen and be accepted.And therefore,
Caesar!'
a review
I havea confession
tomake.The onlyreasonformetoattempt
Finally,
ofTweedale'sfinebookwashisremark
, mindyou!)that"he [Abelard]
(inhisPreface
''
knew
tobemisleading
inwayshehimself
andtalks
contradicts
himself
so frequently
(my
a
shred
not
book
does
I
been
to
see
that
Tweedale's
have
give
always
happy
italics).
of evidenceforthisodd thesisof his. However,someof mystudents
appealto
contraditions
somesupposed
oftheir
viewsconcerning
indefence
Tweedale'sauthority
manoeuvres
on thepartofAbelard.So I decidedtocometo
andsupposed
misleading
loveamongtheMedievais!)againsthisattackers.
thedefence
ofAbelard(myfirst
Whatan improper
motivation
fora review,
say,Andhowrightyouare!
youmight

23

12:44:46 PM

Vivarium
XXV, 1 (1987)
Five Early Theoriesin theMediaeval 'nso'uhi''3.~ Literature
PAUL VINCENT SPADE

Mediaeval logicians, fromat least the second halfof the twelfthcentury,devoted much time and effortto semantic paradoxes of the Liar
9
type ("This sentence is false' or "This sentence is not true"). Such
'
paradoxes were called insolubilia"- "insolubles".1 Despite the term
most authors were convinced that it was in fact possible to "solve"
such paradoxes; the solution was just very difficultto find.2It is not
surprising,therefore,that we see a wide varietyof suggestedsolutions
in the mediaeval literatureon thisproblem.3It is purpose of thispaper
to examine and survey such solutions during the early historyof that
mediaeval literature.
I
The earliestknown mediaeval discussions ofparadoxes like the Liar
took place in the middle or late twelfthcentury.In his Arsdisserendi
, for
1 Thisclaimneedssome
In factfewauthors
togivea rigorous
qualification.
attempted
ofan insoluble,
definition
andthosewhodidtrygavedefinitions
thatwereeither
too
broador toonarrow
tofittheirintentions
oreventheirpractice.
Someauthors
considered
undertheheadingof1'insolubilia"
variousparadoxes
orpuzzlesthatbearlittle
relation
totheLiar.See,forexample,
Ca. 8, sophisms
1-6,
JohnBuridan's
Sophismata,
'
inJohn
Buridan
OnSelfa Translation
, with
,
Reference:
Sophismata'
Chapter
Eight
ofBuridan's
anIntroduction
, anda philosophical
, G. E. Hughes,ed. & tr.,(Cambridge:
Commentary
onpp. 141-161.
In
Press,1982),pp.38-61,witha commentary
University
Cambridge
thepaperback
whichincludes
thetranslation
andcommentary
butomitsthe
edition,
Latintext,thecorresponding
ofthe
pagesarepp.34-45andpp.80-100.Foranedition
entireSophismata
Buridanus
T. K. Scott,ed., (Grammatica
, seeJohannes
, Sophismata,
vol. 1, Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt
Speculativa,
1977),translated
by. . ScottinJohn
Buridan
: Sophisms
onMeaning
andTruth
NewYork
, (Century
Sourcebooks,
Philosophy
theseotherkindsofparadoxes,
itwasvariations
on the
1966).Butnotwithstanding
Liarparadoxthatappeartohavebeenthecentral
concern
oftheinsolubilia-iiterature.
2 See thediscussion
ofthisattitude
in myintroduction
to WilliamHeytesbury,
On
11
: Chapter
Insoluble"
Sentences
OneofHisRules
, PaulVincent
forSolving
Sophisms
Spade,
vol.21,Toronto1979),pp. 7-11.Heytesbury
tr.,(MediaevalSourcesinTranslation,
is theonlymediaeval
himself
authorI knowwhodidnotsharethisoptimistic
view,
andevenhe wasnotaltogether
consistent
aboutthematter.
See ibid.
3 Fora survey
ofthismediaeval
seeFrancesco
Leantinomie
semantiche
literature,
Bottin,
nellalogicamedievale
Liar.A
, (Padua 1976);and Paul VincentSpade, TheMediaeval
vol.5, Toronto1975).
Literature,
oftheInsolubiliaCatalogue
(SubsidiaMediaevalia,
24

12:44:58 PM


4
instance, writtenin 1132, Adam of Balsham asks "Whether he lies
who says nothingbut that he lies,"5 and also "Whether he says the
'
truthwho says nothingbut thathe lies' .6 These are the earliestknown
mediaeval formulationsofthe Liar-sentence. But Adam presentsthem
as examples of an altogetherdifferent
point. He says nothingwhatever
to indicate that he was aware of the very specialiproblems theypose,
that theywere currenttopics of philosophical discussion in his day, or
how one mightgo about tryingto answer those questions.7
Nevertheless, there is other evidence to indicate that the special
problems associated with such sentences were realized and discussed
by the second half of the twelfth century if not before.8 The
, for instance, includes the following
anonymous DialcticaMonacensis
remark in its account of the Aristotelian fallacy secundumquid et
: "But how this fallacy arises in utteringthe insoluble 4 am
simplicter
saying a falsehood', that is a matterdiscussed in the treatise on insolubles."9 This passage, from some time in the second half of the
twelfthcentury,10contains the firstknown occurrence of the word 4n4 On thedate,seeAdamBalsamiensis
ArsDisserendi
,
Alexandi)
(.Dialctica
Parvipontani
LorenzoMinio-Paluello,
ed., (Twelfth
Century
Logic:Textsand Studies,vol. 1,
had
Roma1956),p. xxi.Thisdatemustbe usedwithsomecaution.TheArsdisserendi
in1132,is
Thefirst,
which
atleasttworecensions.
appearstogobacktoAdamhimself
is quitedifferent
and
foronlypartof thetext.The secondrecension
preserved
thissecond
later.The passagesfrom"Adam" quotedbelowcomefrom
presumably
thattheywerepresentin theoriginal.Thereis
thereis no guarantee
recension;
' who
"Alexander'
toa certain
thetextoftheArsdisserendi
evidence
,
linking
manuscript
a
Adam's
school
later
member
of
withAlexander
isperhaps
tobeidentified
Neckham,
inanycasehas
Neckham
seeibid.
atthePetitPont.On allthesematter,
, pp.xiii-xxii.
a rolein ourstory.
See below.
5 Ibid.,p. 86.21-22:"An mentiatur
dicit."(Alltranslations
qui nichilnisise mentiri
in thispaperaremyown.)
6 Ibid., p. 107.26-27:
dicit."See alsoibid.
"An veredicatqui nichil
nisise mentiri
, p.
dicit."
107.25-26:
"An vereenuntiet
qui se mentiri
7 See thediscussion
of thesepassagesin Paul VincentSpade, TheOrigins
ofthe
in: Franciscain
Mediaeval
Studies,33 (1973),pp. 292-309at pp.
Insolubilia-Li/^ra/wr^,
294-295.
8 I didnottakesufficient
accountofthisevidencin myTheOrigins
oftheMediaeval
ofindiscussions
thattheearliestexplicit
whereI maintained
Insolubilia
-Literature,
cenofthethirteenth
before
thebeginning
solubilia
couldnotbe datedwithcertainty
tury.
9 See L. M. De Rijk,Logica
totheHistory
A Contribution
Modernorum:
ofEarlyTerminist
andEarly
, (Assen1967),
, vol.II: TheOrigin
oftheTheory
ofSupposition
Logic
Development
indictione
illiusinsolubilis:
Part2, p. 594.30-31:
lego
"Qualiterautemfiathecfallacia
" The "treatise
oninsolubles"
is
dico
intractatu
de insolubilibus.
, hochabetur
falsum*
as wehaveittoday.See ibid.,n, 1.
notcontained
in theDialctica
Monacensis
10On thedate,seeibid.,Part1, pp. 410-414.
25

12:44:58 PM

' as a technicaltermforthiskind of
solubile
paradoxical sentence,11and
shows that already separate treatiseswere devoted to the topic. By
itself,however, the passage provides no evidence that the special, antinomial nature of such sentences was understood.
Such evidence is unequivocally to be found, however, in another
late twelfthcenturytext. Alexander Neckham, in his De naturisrerum
,
writes:12
else,he sayssomeproposition.
sayshelies,andsaysnothing
Again,ifSocrates
ifSocrates
a trueoneora falseone.Therefore,
either
Therefore,
saysonlythathe
lies,hesayswhatis trueorwhatisfalse.ButifSocrates
saysonlytheproposition
lies.Andif
thatSocrates
lies,andhesayswhatistrue,thenitistruethatSocrates
ifSocrates
itistruethatSocrates
lies,Socrates
says
sayswhatisfalse.Therefore,
thatSocrates
lies,andhesayswhatis true,hesayswhatis
onlytheproposition
thatSocrates
false.ButifSocrates
lies,andhesayswhat
saysonlytheproposition
is false,thenit is falsethatSocratessayswhatit false.Andifit is falsethat
doesnotsaywhatisfalse.ButifSocrates
Socrates
says
sayswhatis false,Socrates
ifSocrates
whatistrueorwhatis false.Therefore,
onlythathelies,hesayseither
ifSocrates
saysonlythathelies,and
sayshelies,hesayswhatistrue.Therefore,
he sayswhatis false,thenhe sayswhatis true.ButifSocrates
saysonlythathe
ifSocrates
lies,he sayswhatis trueorfalse.Therefore,
saysonlythathelies,he
sayswhatis trueandsayswhatis false.
This text shows a clear understandingof the problem sometime in
the late twelfthcentury.13On the other hand, Neckham gives these
11On theclaimthatsucha useofthetermmaybe found
as earlyas 1159inJohnof
Metalo
Mediaeval
Insolubilia
, seeSpade,TheOrigins
-Literature,
Salisbury's
gicon
ofthe
pp.
295-296.
12Alexander
De naturis
libriduo, withthePoemoftheSameAuthor
rerum
Neckham,
, De
laudibus
MediiAevi
divinae
, ThomasWright,
ed., (RerumBritannicarum
sapientiae
andMemorials
orChronicles
ofGreatBritain
andIrelandduring
theMidScriptores,
KrausReprint,
dleAges(RollsSeries),no.34; London1863;reprinted
1967),p. 289:
et nihilaliuddicit,dicitaliquodenuntiabile,
"Item,si Sortesdicitse mentiri,
ergo
dicitverum
verum
velfalsum;
se mentiri,
velfalsum,
sedsi
ergosi Sortesdicittantum
etdicitverum,
menSortesdicittantum
idquodestSortem
verum
estSortem
mentiri,
Sortesdicitfalsum;
id
mentiri,
tiri,et siverumestSortem
ergosi Sortesdicittantum
et dicitverum,dicitfalsum;
sed si Sortesdicittantum
id
quod estSortemmentiri,
etdicitfalsum,
falsum
estSortem
dicerefalsum,
etsifalsum
mentiri,
quodestSortem
sementiri,
estSortem
dicerefalsum,
Sortesnondicitfalsum;
sedsiSortes
dicittantum
dicitverum;ergosi Sortesdicit
dicitverumvelfalsum;
ergosi Sortesdicitse mentiri,
se mentiri,
se mentiri,
etdicitfalsum,
dicitverum;sedsi Sortesdicittantum
tantum
se mentiri,
dicitverumet dicit
dietverumvel falsum;ergosi Sortesdicittantum
oftheparadox,ibid.,pp. 289-290,
falsum."Alexander
goeson togiveotherversions
inDe Rijk,op.
arereproduced
formypresent
butthissuffices
point.Allthesepassages
cit., Part1, pp. 290-291.
13ThedateoftheDe naturis
inuncertain,
itwasapparenty
wellknown
rerum
although
toNeckham,
See Wright's
introduction
at theendofthecentury.
op.cit, pp. xiii-xiv.
ofAdamof
Neckham
wasbornin 1157.(Ibid., p. ix.) In viewoftheabovediscussion
hadstudied
at thePetitPont,at the
thatNeckham
Balsham,itis perhaps
significant
26

12:44:58 PM

versions of the paradox only as examples of the kinds of ' 'vanities' '
one deals with in dialectic. He offersno indication of how one
'
"
might- or did- tryto solve' them.
It is not until the turnof the centurythatwe findstillextantdiscussions that not only show an explicit awareness of the antinomial
featuresof insolubilia
, but also offeror referto more or less identifiable
to
resolve
them.14From that time on, we can distinguish
attempts
threemain stages in the mediaeval development of this literature:15
about1200toroughly
1320.
(1) An earlyorseminalstage,from
andsophisticated
centered
atMerton
stageofintense
(2) A short
activity,
mainly
from
about1320untilabout1350.
College,Oxford,
around1350totheendoftheMiddleAges,16
a periodthat,
(3) A latestage,from
schoolfounded
thatbothAdam
byAdam.{Ibid.,p. x.) It is perhapsalsosignificant
andNeckham
wereEnglishmen.
De Rijk(op.cit., Part1, p. 290)remarks
that"all the
thesesdiscussed
in thetextcontaining
thepassagecitedabove"are
byAlexander"
foundin theArsMeliduna,"whichhe datesbetween1154and 1180(ibid.,pp.
andattributes
toa Frenchman
, pp.279-280).ButI havebeenunableto
280-281)
(ibid.
locateanyunequivocal
references
toinsolubilia
inthedescription
andquotations
from
thisworkpublished
byDe Riik,ibid..Chs. 6-10,dd. 264-390.
14Theearliest
extant
treatise
ofthiskindis discussed
andeditedin L. M. De Rijk,
Some
Notes
onthe
Mediaeval
Tract
De insolubilibus,
with
Edition
the
the
ofa Tract
Dating
from
EndoftheTwelfth
4 (1966),pp. 83-115.
, in: Vivarium
Century
15See alsothediscussion
ofthesethreestagesin PaulVincent
, in:
Spade,Insolubilia
TheCambridge
et.al., eds.,
, NormanKretzmann,
History
ofLaterMedieval
Philosophy
accountofsomeofthedif(Cambridge
1982),Ch. 12, pp. 246-253.For another
' Metalferences
between
thefirst
twostages,see Francesco
Bottin,TheMertonians
Sciences
andtheInsolubilia,
in:P. OsmundLewry,
:
inguistic
ed., TheRiseofBritish
Logic
ActsoftheSixth
onMedieval
BalliolCollege,
European
Symposium
LogicandSemantics,
Oxford,
19-24
Vol. 7. Toronto
June1983,(PapersinMediaevalStudies,
19851),
pp. 235-248.
16Forthepost-mediaeval
ofinsolubilia,
seeE. J. Ashworth,
andLogic
history
Language
inthePost-Medieval
Historical
vol. 12,Dordrecht
Period,
(Synthese
Library,
1974),pp.
andE. J. Ashworth,
TheTreatment
Paradoxes
1400to1700,in:
101-117;
ofSemantic
from
NotreDameJournal
ofFormalLogic,13(1972),pp. 34-52.
17Thereweresome
forinstance,
theviewsofJohnWyclif
and
noteworthy
exceptions:
PeterofAilly.On Wyclif
s viewas contained
inhisLogicae
seeSpade,The
continuado,
Mediaeval
also wrotean independent
Summa
inLiar,itemxliii,pp. 74-76.Wyclif
in somemanuscripts
attributed
toJohnTarteys.
to
solubilium,
(TheworkI attributed
ibid.
s Summa
SeeJohnWyclif,
, itemxl,p. 70,is in factWyclif
Tarteys
insolubilium.)
Summa
PaulVincent
insolubilium,
SpadeandGordonA. Wilson,eds.,(Binghamton,
NY: Medieval& Renaissance
Texts& Studies,forthcoming).
The treatise
described
as itemxliv,andtentatively
attributed
toWyclif,
in TheMediaeval
Liar,pp. 76-77,isin
factnotbyWyclif
at all (although
it is influenced
by him),butrather
by Robert
See L. M. De Rijk,Logica
AnAttempt
Oxoniensis:
toReconstruct
a Fifteenth
CenAlyngton.
ManualofLogic
, in; Medioevo,3 (1977),pp. 121-164at pp. 139-140.On
tury
Oxford
PeterofAilly
's view,seePaulVincent
andInsolubles
, An
Spade,Peter
ofAilly:Concepts
Annotated
Historical
vol. 19,Dordrecht
Translation,
(Synthese
Library,
1980).Peter's
viewsappeartobe derived
inpartfrom
thoseofGregory
ofRiminiandMarsilius
of
morefully.See ibid.
Inghenin waysthatneedto be investigated
, introduction,
pp.
6-7.
27

12:44:58 PM

areconcerned,
wasdevoted
tothecareful
elaboration
as faras insolubilia
mainly
ofviewsoriginally
thesecondstage.17
andrefinement
developed
during
The turningpoint between the firstand the second of these stages
was the Insolubiliaof Thomas Bradwardine, writtenprobably between
1320 and 1324. 18The topic of this paper, therefore,is the insolubilialiteraturefromthe turn of the twelfth/thirteenth
centuryto the time of
Bradwardine.
In my earlier paper "The Origins of the Mediaeval InsolubiliaLiterature,"19I investigatedpossible sources forthe mediaeval discussion of these paradoxes. The resultsof thatpaper need not be rehearsed here, except to note that the mediaeval literatureseems to have
taken its inspirationfroma passage in Aristotle'sSophisticielenchithat
perhaps suggestsbut by no means explicitlyformulatesthe antinomy.
In that passage, part of the treatmentof the fallacy secundum
quid et
a
that
he
will
case
of
man
who
swears
mentions
the
Aristode
,
simpliciter
commit perjuryand then does so. Is that man a perjureror not? AbAristotlesays, he is; it is only in a certain respect
solutely(simpliciter),
( secundumquid), namely with respect to the particular oath that he
would commitperjury,thathe keeps his oath.20Aristotlethen goes on
18On thedate,seeJamesA. Weisheipl,
andSome
in: Mediaeval
Ockham
Mertonians,
in MarieLouise
Studies,30 (1968),pp. 163-213,at p. 190.The textis published
duXIVe
de
etaudbut
insolubles
auXIIIesicle
despropositions
, suivie
Roure,La problmatique
et Th. Bradwardine
de W. Shyreswood
l'dition
destraits
, in: Archives
, W. Burleigh
du moyen
etlittraire
d'histoire
doctrinale
ge,37(1970),pp.205-326atpp.285-326.
seePaulVincent
Thiseditionmustbe usedwithcaution.On Bradwardine's
theory,
in:Medioevo,7 (1981),pp.
andBradwardine's
ofSignification,
Theory
Spade,Insolubilia
were
115-134.The othermajortheories
duringthissecondstageoftheliterature
On Swyneshed's
andWilliamHeytesbury's.
view,seePaulVinRogerSwyneshed's
d'histoire
andComments
Edition
Insolubilia:
centSpade,Roger
, in:Archives
Swyneshed's
andPaulVicentSpade,
etlittraire
du moyen
doctrinale
ge,46(1979),pp. 177-220;
Semantic
Notions
A Study
,
ofSome
ofHisPreliminary
Theory
ofInsolubilia:
Roger
Swyneshed's
of
in: AchimEschbachandJrgen
, (Foundations
Trabant,eds.,History
ofSemiotics
see
vol. 7, Amsterdam
theory,
Semiotics,
1983),pp. 105-113.On Heytesbury's
Heytesbury,
op.cit.
19See n. 7 above.
20Aristotle,
xa
x8efxfjSe,
, 24, 180a38-bl:out'eteopxe
vyxrj
Refutations
Sophistic
if
8ou.("Neither,
toutofivov,
8' fiaa
eopxel
euopxeT
Triopxcv
mopxriaetv
euopxttv,
that
orkeepshisoathinthis
hekeepsthisoath[tocommit
way,isitnecessary
perjury],
hewhoswearshewillcommit
Rather
healsokeephisoath[without
perqualification].
toa secondoath]only;he
thisperjury
[withrespect
jurykeepshisoathincommitting
The textis veryobscure;in pardoesnotkeephis oath[without
qualification].")
two
doesnotunambiguously
Aristotle
ticular,
saythatthecasehehasinmindinvolves
I
thefirst.
oathfulfilling
anda second(perjured)
oaths,theoneoathtocommit
perjury
andthirteenth
havereconstructed
thecaseas itwas generally
bytwelfth
interpreted
InsolubilaSee Spade, TheOrigins
Latincommentators.
oftheMediaeval
century
Literature
, pp. 302-306.
28

12:44:58 PM

to say, "The argumentis similar too concerningthe same man's lying

and speaking the truthat the same time."21 Mediaeval authors saw
here a referenceto the Liar paradox. Hence it is not surprisingto find
thatone ofthe earliestmediaeval approaches to insolubiliaviewed them
as fallacies secundum
quid et simpliciter.
II
Here is a list of fifteendiscussions of insolubiliafrom the period
before Bradwardine. They are arranged in approximately
chronological order, although it is impossible to be very confident
about this, since the dating of some of the works is very uncertain. I
have excluded fromthe list all discussions fromthis early period that
are based on the passage in Aristotle'sSophistici
elenchibut nevertheless
fail to formulatea fullyantinomial paradox like the Liar.22
Insolubilia
or earlythirteenth
Munich,
(1) Anonymous,
(latetwelfth
century),
MS CLM 14458,fols.39rb-40ra.23
Staatsbibliothek,
Bayerische
inSophisticos
Commentarium
elenchos
Aristotelis
(2) RobertGrosseteste,
(1215-1229),
MertonCollege,MS 280,fols.lra-38va.24
Oxford,
Insolubilia
nationale,MS lat.
(3) Anonymous,
(c. 1225),Paris,Bibliothque
11412,fols.88ra-91va.25
Insolubilia
naParis,Bibliothque
(4) Anonymous,
(mid-thirteenth
century),
tionale,MS lat. 16617,fols.50v-54v.26
Insolubilia
naParis,Bibliothque
(5) Anonymous,
(mid-thirteenth
century),
MS lat.16617,fols.46v-50v.27
Thetexthasbeenattributed
toWilliam
of
tionale,
buttheattribution
is notwellfounded.28
Sherwood,
21Aristotle,
<1>eu8ea0ai
8* Xyo
xatep
tv
, 24, 180b2-3:
Sophistic
Refutations
fxoio
auTv
Thereareotherparadoxes
discussed
inthispassagetoo.But
oc{iaxaaXrjsuetv.
noneofthemis as developed
as theexampleoftheperjurer.
22Therearemanysuchdiscussions,
downto theendofthethirteenth
and
century
evenbeyond.
See Spade,TheOrigins
Mediaeval
Insoluhilia.Literature,
ofthe
pp.302-307.
23EditedinDe Rijk,Some
Notes
onthe
Mediaeval
Tract
De insolubilibus.
See Spade,The
Mediaeval
Liar, itemix,p. 32.
24See S. HarrisonThomson,The Writings
Grosseteste
, BishopofLincoln
ofRobert
1235-1253
Liar, itemlix pp.
, (Cambridge
1940),pp. 81-82;Spade, TheMediaeval
97-98.Unedited.
25Unedited,but discussedin De Rijk,SomeNoteson theMediaeval
TractDe inLiar, itemxxi,pp. 43-44.
solubilibus,
pp. 93-98.See alsoSpade,TheMediaeval
26EditedinH. A. G. Braakhuis,
TheSecond
Tract
onInsolubilia
Found
inParis
, B. N.
Lat.16.617:AnEdition
with
anAnalysis
5 (1967),
, in:Vivarium,
oftheText
ofItsContents
See Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar,itemxx,pp. 42-43.
pp. 111-145.
27Editedin Roure,op.cit.,pp. 248-261.See Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar,itemvi,pp.
26-28.
28See thediscussion
inDe Rijk,Some
ontheMediaeval
Notes
Tract
De insolubilibus,
p.
93.
29

12:44:58 PM

tractvii ("De fallaciis"),in the

Logica(1253-1257),
(6) LambertofAuxerre,
29
secundum
discussion
ofthefallacy
quid simplicter.
Insolubilia
St.John's
of
Richard
Sherwood,
Cambridge,
century),
(thirteenth
(7)
College,MS 100,fols.135ra-138va.30
elenchos
qq. 94-95.31
Quaestiones
super
Sophisticos
(1270-1280),
(8) Anonymous,
libro
Elenchorum
novae
Quaestiones
super
(c. 1280),q. 25.32
(9) SimonofFaversham,
libros
Elenchorum
super
(latethirteenth
century),
(10)JohnDunsScotus,Quaestiones
33
qq. 52-53.
otherwise
referred
to in
unknown,
(Magisterinsolubilium),
(11) Anonymous
inopusPrisciani,
Gonville&
ThomasChirmister's
Quaestiones
q. 7, Cambridge,
fol.2Ir. The manuscript
is to be datedprobably
Caius College,MS 688/645,
before1307.34
Gonville& Caius ColNotandum
(before1307),Cambridge,
(12) Anonymous,
fol.76.35
lege,MS 688/645,
Tractatus
desophismatibus
earlyfourteenth
century,
(probably
(13) Anonymous,
butpossibly
afterBradwardine),
Bruges,Bibliothque
publiquede la ville,MS
500,fols.173ra-180va.36
Insolubilia
(1302).37
(14) WalterBurley,
Richard
of
Priorm
superlibrum
Campsall,Quaestiones
analyticorum
(before
(15)
1307),q. IO.38
There is nothingin any way definitiveabout this list; it represents
only those items that have come to my attentionand that I am in a
position to say somethingabout. The list surelydoes not exhaust the
beforeBradwardine.39But it does allow one to get
mw/ufo/wz-literature
an idea of the diversityof contextsin which one findsthis topic being
discussed:
29See LambertofAuxerre,
Lamberti
Logica(Summa
), FrancoAlessio,ed., (Firenze
Liar,itemxlv,pp. 77-78.
1971),pp. 186-187.See Spade,TheMediaeval
30Unedited.
ofSherwood.
isknown
ofRichard
Seeibid.
, itemlvii,pp.94-95.Nothing
withWilliamofSherwood.
He is nottobe confused
31See Incertorum
elenchos
auctorum
, StenEbbesen,ed., (Corsuper
Sophisticos
quaestiones
Danicorum
mediiaevi,vol. 7, Copenhagen
1977),pp. 221-226.
pusphilosophorum
in Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar.
Thistextis notdiscussed
32See SimonofFaversham,
elenchorum
etal., eds.,
libro
, StenEbbesen,
Questiones
super
in
Thistextis notdiscussed
(StudiesandTexts,vol.60,Toronto1984),pp. 165-167.
Liar.
Spade,TheMediaeval
33InJohnDunsScotus,Opera
omnia
, LukeWadding,
Durand,
ed.,(Lyon:Laurentius
Liar,
Hildesheim
1639;reprint
1968),vol. 1, pp. 268-269.See Spade,TheMediaeval
itemxxxvii,
pp. 65-66.
34See Ibid,yitemi, p. 19.
35Thisverybriefnoteis editedibid.
, itemxiv,pp. 37-38.
36See ibid.
, itemxix,pp. 41-42.Unedited.
37EditedinRoure,op.cit., pp.262-284.SeeSpade,TheMediaeval
Liar, itemlxvii,pp.
111-113.
38See TheWorks
EdwardA. Synan,ed.,vol.1: Quaestiones
super
ofCampsally
ofRichard
Priorm
librum
, (StudiesandTexts,vol.17.1,Toronto1968),pp. 162-177.
analyticorum
Liar, itemliv,p. 91.
See Spade,TheMediaeval
39See section
VIII ofthispaper,below.
30

12:44:58 PM

(a) In literal commentaries on the SophisticiElenchi for example,

Grosseteste's (item 2 above). This is not surprisingin view of the role
It is curious, however,
the Elenchiplayed in the insolubiliaAiterdXwrt.
that Grossetestehas little to say about Aristotle's man who lies and
speaks thetruthat the same time. Instead of tryingto forcethatexam'
ple into the pattern of Aristotle's 'perjurer" - example, as many
authors tried ratherunsuccessfullyto do,40 Grosseteste does the opposite, casting the "perjurer" - example in the mold characteristicof
the Liar. Whereas Aristotleseems to have the perjurertake two oaths,
one of them ("I swear I will commit perjury") in the futuretense,
Grossetestehas him take only one oath, and that in the presenttense:
"By God, I am committingperjury". And that is the only oath he
takes.
(b) In collectionsof questions on the Elenchi.For instance, Scotus'
(item 10 above), Simon of Faversham's (item 9), and the anonymous
collectionlisted as item 8.
(c) In a logical Summa(Lambert ofAuxerre's, item 6), in the section
Curiously, thereis no
discussingthe fallacysecundum
quid etsimpliciter.
discussion
in
two
those
other
thirteenth
analogous
great
centurySummulaeof logic, William of Sherwood's41and Peter of Spain's.42
(d) In a Sophismatanot directlyrelated to Aristotle'sSophisticielenchi
(item 13 above).
(e) In a littlenote jotted in a manuscript(item 12).
(f) In several independent treatisesdevoted exclusivelyto the topic
(items 1, 3-5, 7, 14 above).
(g) And in various other contextsas well (items 11, 15).
Ill
In all this variety of material, we can distinguish five main approaches duringthispre-Bradwardinianperiod. Sometimes theywere
40See Spade,TheOrigins
InsolubiliaLiterature,
oftheMediaeval
pp. 302-306.
41See MartinGrabmann,
DieIntroductions
inlogicam
desWilhelm
vonShyreswood
, (Sitder Bayerischen
-hist.Abt.,
Akademieder Wissenschaften,
Philos.
zungsberichte
in NormanKretzmann,
William
1937,Heft10,Mnchen1937),translated
ofSherwood's
Introduction
toLogic
mention
in, (Minneapolis
does,however,
1966).Sherwood
in hisSyncategoremata.
solubilia
See J. ReginaldO'Donnell,ed, TheSyncategoremata
of
William
in: MediaevalStudies,3 (1941),pp. 49-93at p. 58; translated
in
ofSherwood,
NormanKretzmann,
William
onSyncategorematic
Words
Treatise
, (MinofSherwood's
55.
neapolis
p.
1968),
42PeterofSpain,Tractatus
Summule
loeicales
, CalledAfterwards
, L. M. De Rijk,ed.,
(Assen1972).
31

12:44:58 PM

combined in more or less ingenious ways, and sometimesit would be

perhaps appropriate to subdivide them. But basically, there are five
main views.
First,as mightbe expected, thereis the "Aristotelian" solutionthat
views the paradoxes as instances of the fallacy secundumquid et
simpliciter.
Significantly,this approach is nottaken by item 1 in the
above list, the earliest known mediaeval treatmentthat actually proposes a solution,43although the author of that work does know about
the fallacy and appeals to it in his discussion.44Neither is it the approach taken by items 4 or 14 in the list. On the other hand, it is
adopted by items 2-3, 5-10, perhaps II,45 by 12-13 and by 15.
continued to be apMoreover, the fallacy secundumquid et simpliciter
- although not with such
context
insolubilia
in
the
of
to
pealed
regularity- even well afterthe early or "seminal" period that is the
topic of this paper.46
On the other hand, many of our authors use this fallacy in ways
quite unlike what Aristotlehad in mind. Aristotleat least suggested
but truesecunthatthe Liar sophism is to be regarded as falsesimpliciter
dumquid.*7On the otherhand, some authors, such as the author of the
littlenote that is item 12 on the above list,48appear to have held that
the Liar sentence was neithertrue nor false simpliciter
, but ratherboth
what Aristotle
This
seems
different
from
true and false secundum
quid.
had mind.49
43Thissuggests
thatthehistorical
linkbetween
theElenchi
andtheinsolubilia-Mteraturt
is morecomplicated
thanit firstappears.See Spade, TheOrigins
oftheMediaeval
Insolublia
-Literature,
p. 307.
44See section
VII ofthispaper,below.
45The briefreference
butis
tothe"Magisterinsolubilium"
thisapproach,
suggests
toomeagertoallowanydefinitive
abouthisview.
judgment
46Forexample,byBradwardine
(see Roure,op.cit.,pp. 305-307,para.7.11-7.14),
and byPeterofAilly(see Spade,Peter
, pp. 93-94,para.378-383).In these
ofAilly
as merely
The
theroleofthefallacy
authors,
however,
maybedescribed
"honorary".
is preserved,
is elsewhere.
ofAristotle
buttherealemphasis
ofthetheory
authority
47Aristotle,
8*auTOV
ou8v
, 25, 180b5-7:xoAuei
a7tX<
jxveivai
Refutations
Sophistical
8' aXrjGfj
xaeivaiaXrjfj
8ejxrj.
itsbeing
xtvdc,
fjtiv,
7cf
XTjGfj
8),
prevents
("Nothing
or beingtruewithrespect
to
falseabsolutely
buttruesomehow
, or [true]ofsomething,
butnottrue[without
something
qualification!.")
48See Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar, itemxiv,p. 38: "Et dicendum
'aut
quandoquaeritur
dicitverumautnonverum,'dicendum
quodequesicequesic,seddicithocnon
verum."("And itistobesaidthatwhenoneasks'Does hespeaktruth
oruntruth?',
it
is tobe saidthatitis neither
theonenortheother.Ratherhe speaksthisuntruth.")
49Shortly
helda viewlikethis.See his
afterBradwardine,
RichardKilvington
arepreparKretzmann
andBarbaraEnsignKretzmann
, soph.48.Norman
Sophismata
32

12:44:58 PM

Again, some authors forinstance, Lambert of Auxerre (item 6 on

the list) and the author of the text ascribed, without convincing
evidence, to William of Sherwood (item 5) - appealed to the
Aristotelianfallacy by saying that the Liar sentence can contain no
term that referssimpliciter
for, the whole
to, or supposits simpliciter
not
truth
or
secunHere
it
is
falsehood
secundum
but
sentence,
quid.
only
is inthat
dumquid but rathersupposition or referencesecundum
quid
volved. This is clearly an attempt to combine the Aristotelianview,
that the way to solve these paradoxes is by pointingout a fallecysecundumquid etsimpliciter
, with some kind of restrictionon or rejection of
self-reference.50
The fallacy secundumquid et simpliciterthus became a kind of
authoritativeframeworkthat was imposed somewhat artificiallyon
quite diverse attemptsto solve the paradox. To the end of the Middle
Ages, authors proved to be very adept at showing that the most
marvelous theorieswere really what Aristotlehad meant all along in
that passage in the Elenchi.
IV
A second main approach to insolubiliaduring thisearly period is the
view Walter Burley (in item 14 in the above list) calls "transcasus".
The term is obscure in this context. It appears to be a literal translation of theGreek (
("change").51 In Stoic logic, propositions
that could change their truth value over time were called
in exactly
And indeed, Burley uses the termtranscasus1
(jLTOC7U7CTOVTa.52
54
thisway in his Obligationes
,53and definesit this way in his Insolubilia.
witha commentary.
ofKilvington's
andtranslation
together
Sophismata,
inganedition
on
SimonofFaversham
explicitly
arguesagainstsucha theory
(op.cit.p. 166.55-59),
butfalsein another
is a 1'multiplex"
thata sentence
truein onerespect
thegrounds
whereastheLiarsentence
is notlikethat.The Liar
sentence,
(thatis, ambiguous)
an equivocation.
cannotbe solvedsimply
bysayingitinvolves
paradox
50SimonofFaversham,
andJohnDunsScotus,op.cit., q. 52,p.
op.cit., p. 167.88-95,
interms
ofthe
itis notexpressed
havea similar
view,
269,perhaps
explicitly
although
" and " secundum .
"
notions
quid"
simpliciter
51StenEbbesenfirst
tothisfact.
calledmyattention
52See Michael Frede, Die stoische
der Akademieder
, (Abhandlungen
Logik
in Gttingen,
Wissenschaften
Klasse,dritte
Folge,Nr. 88;
Philologisch-Historische
Gttingen
1974),pp. 44-48.
11
53See RomualdGreen,TheLogicalTreatise
: AnIntroduction
with
De obligationibus"
NY forthcomSherwood
and
Walter
Critical
Texts
William
, (St. Bonaventure,
Burley
of
of
tunc
dicitur,
negandoistam'A est'etquandonegatur,
ing),para.3.80:"Ad tertium
fuitfalsum,et ideo accidit
positumest verum.Sed quando proponebatur,
33

12:44:58 PM

Nevertheless,the actual theoryhe presentsin the Insolubiliaunder this

name appears, at least at first,to be somewhat different.Although
thereis stillan appeal to differenttimes, the notion of a changeof truth
value over time seems to play no role. The theorygoes like this:
If I utter the sentence T am saying a falsehood', the verb in that
sentence, even though it is grammaticallyin the presenttense, nevertheless refersto a time before the utterance of that sentence, so that
despite the grammar,the sentence really means somethinglike 'I was
saying a falsehood a moment ago'. My sentence is thus either
straightforwardlytrue or straightforwardlyfalse, depending on
whetherI did or did not utter a falsehood at the earlier time referred
to.55
Burley thinksthis view is importantenough to reject it explicitly,56
and so does Bradwardine.57Neverthelesswe know of only two texts
that actually maintain this theoryduring the period we are consider"
'It isA'. Andwhenitisdenied,thenthe
tothethird
transcasus.
bydenying
("I reply
a transcasus
ocitwasfalse,andtherefore
is true.Butwhenitwasproposed
positum
curs.")
54Roure,op. cit., p. 270,para. 2.07: "Et esttranscasus
quandoaliquapropositio
whensome
isa transcasus
vele converso."
infalsitatem
a veritate
mutatur
("Andthere
orconversely.")
from
truth
tofalsehood
is changed
sentence
55Ibid.:"Unde dicuntquodmedicentemedicerefalsum,
aut
si posteaquaeratur:
inquodicoaliquid
dicuntquodfalsum,
dicoverumautfalsum,
quiaaliudesttempus
et pro quo dico aliquid.Ideo si dico me dicerefalsum,dico hoc pro tempore
nihildixi,ideoindicendo
medicerefalsum,
etquiaintempore
precedente
precedente;
dicofalsum,
quiadicoaliterquamestinre." ("HencetheysaythatwhenI sayI am
ora falsehood,
I saya truth
itis askedwhether
ifafterwards
they
sayinga falsehood,
is otherthanthe
ForthetimeinwhichI saysomething
saythat[I say]a falsehood.
I sayit
a falsehood,
ifI sayI amsaying
whichI saysomething.
timeabout
Therefore,
in
timeI saidnothing,
therefore
time.Andbecauseinthepreceding
abouta preceding
I saya falsehood,
thanisreally
becauseI sayotherwise
a falsehood
I amsaying
saying
thecase.")
56Ibid.,p. 271,para.2.08. Nevertheless,
is moreplausible
thetheory
Burleythinks
interalias." On the
See ibid.,para.2.07: "et istaopinioestprobabilior
thanothers.
reasonforthis,see n. 76 below.
57Ibid., p. 294, para. 5.04: "Quarta oppinioest restringentium
tempus,ut
Sortes
turprotantoquiadicebant
est.Qui sicnominan
quodSortedicente:
premissum
tamendebetintelligi
dicit
licetsitpresentis
dicit
protem, hocverbum
temporis,
falsum
is
immediate
tempus
prolationis."
("The fourth
opinion
precedente
poresiveinstanti
as
thetime,as wasstatedbefore.
thatofthosewhorestrict
Theyareso calledinsofar
is sayinga falsehood',
theverb4s
says'Socrates
theyusedtosaythatwhenSocrates
forthe
shouldbe understood
itis in thepresent
tense,nevertheless
saying',although
NotethatBradwardine
thetimeofutterance.")
timeorinstant
immediately
preceding
describes
itas thethetheory
forthisview,butrather
doesnotusetheterm4transcasus1
"
discusses
this
thetime").Bradwardine
oftheilrestringentes
tempus("thosewhorestrict
that
his
used
to
tense
in
the
by
suggesting
perhaps
they
say),
imperfect {dicebant,
theory
timetheviewwasno longercurrent.
34

12:44:58 PM

ing.58 One is Simon of Faversham's discussion (item 9 above),

although Simon devotes only a few lines to affirmingthis view. He
provides no elaboration and absolutely no argument in favor of this
approach. The other text offersa fullerpicture. It is item 4 in the
above list, fromthe mid- thirteenthcentury.The anonymous author
of that text argues for the theory of transcasuson the grounds that
" discourse can take
place about anythingthat is prior according to
nature to the discourse thattakes place about it, and about only such a
"
thing,"59and everythingthat is prior in time is prior by nature.,,6
Bradwardine offersa differentargument for this theory,although
his wording("can give") suggeststhat perhaps this argumentwas not
actually used by the theory's proponents:61
Andtheycangivethefollowing
reasonforthis.Forlanguageexistsin manin
ordertoexpress
whatthemindconceives.
manexpresses
Therefore,
forthetime
in whichhe conceives.
or instant
Buthe naturally
conceives
before
he speaks.
heexpresses
forthetimeorinstant
before
thetimeofutterance.
Therefore,
Neither of these reasons is especially persuasive. Perhaps some additional motivationforthe theorymay have resulted fromtampering
with tenses in an attemptto make the Liar fitwhat Aristotlehad said
about his "perjurer" - example.62But I am not at all confidentofthis.
First,Aristotlehad the perjurerspeak in the futuretense, and I do not
see how we can get fromthatto the past time involved in the theoryof
transcasus
. Furthermore,the anonymous item 4 in our list, in which
transcasus
is maintained, is one of the few early textsthat does notap, in the discussion of which
peal to the fallacysecundum
quidetsimpliciter
Aristotleintroduceshis perjurerwho speaks in the futuretense.
A more likelyrationale forthe theorymighthave arisen fromviewing insolubles as emerging in the context of a disputatiode
58It is possible,
andperhaps
evenplausible,
to readpartsofScotus'discussion
this
wayas well.Butit is notunequivocally
required
byhisactualtext.See sectionV
below.
59Braakhuis,
op.cit.,p. 137.29-30:"sermopotestfieride quolibetquod estprius
secundum
sermone
naturam
factode ipso,etde solotali."
60Ibid. , p. 138.5-6:ipso
"omnequodestpriustempore
estpriusnatura."Bythemselves,
theseconsiderations
do notimply
theviewBurley
describes.
or
Nevertheless,
rightly
theanonymous
authordoesseemtoholdthatviewforthesereasons.
wrongly,
61Roure,op.cit., p. 294,para.5.04: "et possunt
ad hochaberetalemrationem,
quia
ad exprimendum
mentis
loquellaestinhomine
conceptum,
ergohomoexprimit
pro
siveinstanti
in quo concipit,
sed naturaliter
tempore
priusconcipit
quamloquitur.
siveinstanti
Ergoexprimit
protempore
prioritempore
prolationis."
62See Spade,TheOrigins
Insolubilia
-Literature,
oftheMediaeval
pp. 303-306andp. 307
n. 64.
35

12:44:58 PM

.63 There, 4'the timefor which somethingis conceded is

obligationibus
earlier than the time in which somethingis conceded."64
V
A thirdapproach to the Liar is taken byJohn Duns Scotus (item 10
on our list). Scotus adopts the Aristotelianframeworkof the fallacy
secundum
, but combines thiswitha distinctionbetween
quidetsimpliciter
what he calls the 4'exercised act" {actusexercitus)
and the " signified
act" (actussignificatus)
, In the standard case of the sentence 'Socrates is
a
saying falsehood', the signified act is the act Socrates is talking
about, that is, what Socrates says he is doing- namely, saying a
falsehood. The exercised act is what Socrates actually does in his utterance. Scotus thinksthatwhat Socrates actuallydoes in thiscase is to
,
say a truth.Therefore,the act he is talkingabout, the actussignificatus
must be an act of speaking falsely.As he puts it, "there is falsehoodin
the signifiedact and truthin the exercised act."65
In order to avoid attributingboth truthand falsehood to the same
act of speaking, this theorymust hold that the exercised act and the
signifiedact are twoacts, not one. And indeed, Scotus does hold this,
as we shall see.
The application of the notions actusexercitus!
actussignificatus
to the
context of the paradoxes seems to have been an approach that had
some circulation. Bradwardine mentionsa view perhaps like Scotus',
but rejects it:66
63On suchdisputationes
deobligationibus
From
thebegin, seeEleonore
Stump,Obligations:
totheearly
Medieval
, in: TheCambridge
, Ch.
ning
fourteenth
century
History
ofLater
Philosophy
: Developments
inthe
16,PartA, pp. 315-334;andPaulVincent
Spade,Obligations
fourteenth
Medieval
, in: TheCambridge
, Ch. 16,PartB, pp.
century
History
ofLater
Philosophy
335-341.
64See WalterBurley,
deobligationibus,
Tractatus
inGreen,op.cit.,para.3.153:"...sed
aliquid,estpriusquamin quo conceditur
tempus
proquo conceditur
aliquid."See
alson. 55above,wherethere
is a claimofdistinction,
noclaimaboutpriorialthough
ty65Scotus,op. cit.,q. 53, ad 1, p. 270: "...sed in proposito
falsitasest in actu
in actuexercito."The distinction
exercised
between
and
, et Veritas
sign<ific)ato
ofthemodern
actsis reminiscent
distinction
between
useandmention.
But
signified
theyarenotthesamedistinction.
66See Roure,op.cit.,p. 296,para.5.08: "Octavaoppinioestdistinguentium.
Qui ob
hoctalenomenacceperunt
dicere
Sortem
dedicere
quiaSortedicente
falsum
distinguebant
Potest
dicereexercitum
enimsignificare
velconceptum.
Etvopenesequivocationem.
cant'dicereexercitum'
dicerequodestinexercitio,
etestilliusquodestindici(indici]
indicied.)et nonestdictumcomplete;
'dicereveroconceptum',
dicunt,cumhomo
priusdixerit
aliquidvelaliqualeet instanti
postdicatse dicereilludveltale...."
36

12:44:58 PM

whotakesucha namebecause
Theeighth
is thatofthe"distinguishes",
opinion
ofthefactthat,whenSocratessaysthatSocratesis sayinga falsehood,
they
anexercised
theequivocation
in'say'.Foritcansignify
ora consaying
distinguish
ceived
Thesaying
thatisintheprocess
ofbeingsaidandis notcompletely
saying.
orin
saidtheycalltheexercised
saying.Butwhena manearliersayssomething,
someway,andata laterinstant
saysthathesaysthat,orinthatway,theycallit
theconceived
saying.
Note that Bradwardine contraststhe exercised act with the conceived
'
4
act; he does not use the term actussignificatusas Scotus did.67 Note
also that Bradwardine interpretsthe theoryhe describes in such a way
that it is committedto a formof transcasus.Scotus' theoryis perhaps
not committedto this. He does say:68
Nowthatinthiscasethere
thisis clearfrom
thefactthat
is falsehood
absolutely,
an expression
is saidtobe absolutely
falsebecauseitis a signofthefalse.Forone
whobeginsto speaklikethis[namely,
T am sayinga falsehood']
saysnothing
thatmight
be false.Ifheweretosaythata manisan ass,orsomething
likethat,
wouldbe true.
[then]this['I am sayinga falsehood']
But, although it is a plausible interpretation,there is nothing explicitlyin this passage (or anywhereelse in Scotus' discussion) to indicate that the ' 'other" falsehood that would make I am saying a
falsehood' true would have to be a priorfalsehood; it mightverywell,
forinstance, be a falsehood the speaker is just about to say.69
Later in the fourteenthcentury,the distinctionbetween exercised
and signifiedacts is mentioned by Marsilius of Inghen- and through
him by Peter of Ailly- in the contextof the paradoxes, although it is
not clear that theyhad Scotus' doctrineparticularlyin mind.70Indeed
Scotus himselfmakes it clear thathe is not the firstto apply the distinction between exercised and signifiedacts to the paradoxes:71
67Giventhe close linkagebetweenthenotionsof
in
and thought
signification
mediaeval
thisterminological
notespecialy
is perhaps
semantics,
disparity
significant.
See Paul VincentSpade, TheSemantics
, in: TheCambridge
ofTerms
History
ofLater
Medieval
, Ch. 9, pp. 188-196.
Philosophy
68Scotus,op.cit.,q. 53,p. 269:"Quod autemcircaipsumsitfalsitas
hoc
simplicter,
falsa,quia estsignum
falsi,quoniamsic
patetperhoc,quodoratiodicitur
simpliciter
esseasinum,
vel
Si enimdiceret
hominem
incipiens
loqui,nihildicit,quodsitfalsum.
haecessetvera."
aliquidhuiusmodi,
69In hisonlyargument
adoppositum
inq. 53,Scotussays"...sed haecoratioestfalsa
sicloqui,cumnihilpriusdixit,etcetera."(...
'Egodicofalsum'
quamdicitincipiens
buttheexpression
'I am sayinga falsehood',
whichhe sayswhobeginsto talkthis
hesaidnothing
earlier
, andso on.") Scotusagreeswiththissideofthe
way,is falsesince
buthedoesnotexplicitly
onewayortheother
aboutthisarguquestion,
sayanything
mentforit.
70See Spade,Peter
, p. 69, par.262,andp. 143nn. 692-693.
ofAilly
71Ibid. : "Quod autem
sic incipiens
loqui sit verussecundumquid diversimode
a diversis.
ponitur
Quidamenimponunt
quodestverussecundum
quidquiacircaali37

12:44:58 PM

ina certain
is maintainButthathewhobeginstospeaklikethisis true72
respect
thatheis truein a
ed in different
waysbydifferent
people.Forsomemaintain
aboutsomefalseexis exercised
becausean actofspeaking
certain
truly
respect
In another
respect
way,itissaidthathewhosaysthisistrueina certain
pression.
tobe
theproposition
actthecaseis understood
becauseintheexercised
through
actthatanexpression
theexercised
thecase.Butbecauseitisnotfrom
as isreally
suchanexpression
issaidtobetrue
is saidtobeabsolutely
trueorfalse,therefore
an act
actitis understood
thatheexercises
Forintheexercised
ina certain
respect.
andthatis truein reality.
of"saying"abouta falsehood,
Scotus' theoryis an amalgam of several lines of thought.There is,
firstof all, the distinctionbetween exercised and signifiedacts, which
is what I am emphasizing here. In addition, theremay or may not also
But in any case, insofaras the theoryis combe a version of transcasus.
mittedto saying that the exercised act and the signifiedact are two,
not one, Scotus is also committedto some kind of restrictionon the
possibilityof self-reference.This brings us to the next main theoryI
want to discuss.
VI
There remain two other importantviews during thisearly period of
The firstis called " restriction
the insolubilia-litcrditurc.
("restriction"),
. This view rejectsthe possibilityof selfthe view of the "restringentes"
referencein some or all cases. The kind of "reference" at stake here is
"supposition" a property of categorematic terms that occur in a
sentence.73Thus the characteristicquestion with which this view was
concerned, and which it answered in the negative, was whether "a
part can supposit forthe whole of which it is a part".
Some authors also considered more complicated kinds of
pathological reference,and denied not only thata termin a sentenceP
can supposit forP itself,but also that it can supposit forthe contradictoryof P , or foranother sentence Q,thatis logically equivalent to P, or
aliterquodsicdicensest
exercetur
vereactusdicendi.Dicitur
falsam
quamorationem
sicutestinre.
verussecundum
intelligitur
perpropositionem
quid,quia actuexercito
veravelfalsa,ideotalisoratio
nondicitur
oratiosimpliciter
Sedquia ab actuexercito
actum
secundum
dicitur
quodipseexercet
intelligitur,
quidvera.Actuenimexercito
et illudin reestverum."
dicendicircafalsum,
72Scotusspeaks,bothhereandthroughout
ofthespeaker
thequestion,
, andnotjust
as beingtrueor false.Indeedthetitleofhis q. 53 is:
thespeaker'sproposition,
verusin dicendo?"
sic loqui 'Ego dico falsum'sit simpliciter
"Utrumincipiens
true
isabsolutely
a falsehood'
hewhobeginstospeaklikethis'I amsaying
("Whether
Dicens
: "Ad oppositum.
forthisusageis givenibid.
Thejustification
in[so]saying?")
a qualitatesui dieti...." ("On the oppositeside: A speakeris
denominatur
valueofwhatis said- ")
denominated
bythetruth
73On supposition,
see Spade,TheSemantics
ofTerms.
38

12:44:58 PM

that in turn contains a term that supposits for P , and so on.74 They
were worried not just about the case in which Socrates says only
'Socrates is saying a falsehood', but also about cases where, for instance:
(a) Socrates says only 'What Plato is saying is true', and Plato says
only 'What Plato is saying is false'. Here Plato's sentence is an immediate and directinsoluble. But no matterhow one chooses to handle
Plato's sentence, there is still a problem with Socrates' sentence.
Socrates' sentence is simply the contradictorynegation of Plato's
sentence,so thatthe two must presumbalyhave opposite truthvalues.
Hence, by saying that its contradictoryis true, Socrates' sentence
seems in effectto be saying that it itselfis false, and so in this indirect
way to be an insoluble too.
(b) Socrates says only 'What Plato is saying is false' and Plato also
says 'What Plato is saying is false'. Again, Plato's sentence is a direct
insoluble. But Socrates' sentence is not; it does not referto itself
' it
refersto Plato's sentence, a different"token" of the same "type".75
But however one handles Plato's sentence, the two sentences are
duplicates of one another, both syntacticallyand semantically(they
referto exactlythe same thingand make exactlythe same claim about
it, thatit is false), so thattheyare presumablylogicallyequivalent and
have the same truthvalue. Hence, by apparentlysaying thatitslogical
equivalent is false, Socrates' sentence seems in effectto be saying that
it itselfis false too.
(c) Socrates says 'What Plato is saying is false' and Plato says 'What
Socrates is sayingis true'. Here, apparently,what Socrates says is true
if and only if what Plato says is false- that is, if and only if what
Socrates says is nottrue. Hence, what Socrates says is true if and only
if it is not true, which is paradoxical.
In such cases the restringentes
said that this kind of referenceor supcannot
occur.
When Plato, for instance, says only
position simply
'What Plato says is false', the term'false' therecannot referto or sup74See Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar, itemxxx,pp. 55-56(HenryofEngland),anditem
101-102(RogerRoseth).Virtually
is knownaboutthemysterious
lxii,
pp.
nothing
'
'Henryof England";eventhenameis uncertain.
RogerRosethwroteprobably
after
Bradwardine.
I havebeenunabletofindanyauthorwhowrote
slightly
definitely
beforeBradwardine
and whorejected
of referential
thesemorecomplicated
forms
Theremusthavebeensome,however,
sinceBradwardine
takesgreatpains
pathology.
toarerue
againstsucha view.See Roure,oto.cit.,pp. 287-293,para.2.00-4.11.
75Manymediaeval
authors
heldthatitis thesentence-token,
notthetypeand not
some"proposition"
thatis thebeareroftruth
value.
expressed
bythesentence,
39

12:44:58 PM

posit for Plato's sentence itself,but must instead referonly to other

falsehoods. Hence Plato's sentence in effectmeans that Plato says
somethingfalse otherthan thatverysentence. But by hypothesisPlato
- true or false- other than that
doesn't say anything
very sentence.
the
sentence
he
does
is
false. Similar
Hence,
say just straightforwardly
treatmentscan be applied to (a)-(c) above.
It is easy to see how this approach mightreadily be combined with
the theoryof transcasus
, as in fact it was combined in the anonymous
item 4 on our list, and perhaps in Scotus' theoryas well. Indeed,
transcasusentails restrictio.
Restrictiosays that the spaeker is talking
about some othersentencethan the one he is in the process ofuttering.
Transcasus
just narrowsdown the possibilities:he is talkingabout what
he said just a moment ago.76
Restrictiowas a popular approach in the mediaeval insolubilia
literature,even well afterthe end of the earlyperiod thatis the topic of
this paper. Whereas transcasus
, for instance, died out fairly early,
restrictio
was one of the enduring views.77
It is worthpointingout the obvious similaritybetween the theoryof
restrictio
and modern theoriesthat avoid the paradoxes by denyingselfreference- often with an appeal to a hierarchyof types or levels of
language. And the same criticismthat is oftenlevelled against these
modern theoriescan be levelled also against at least a broad application of the theoryof restrictio
: all these theoriesare too sweeping. They
rule out not only the vicious cases of self-reference
that we want to do
but
also
cases
of
innocuous
self-reference
that
somethingabout,
quite
we have no antecedent reason to want to rule out. For instance, I can
quite intelligiblyand even truthfully
say 'What I am now saying is in
English', or 'This sentence has fivewords'. Yet these theorieswould
rule out such sentences.
Some mediaeval authorswere aware of thiscriticismand raised it.78
76This seemsto be thereasonBurleysaysthattranscasus
is a plausibleview,even
intheendherejects
it.(See n. 56above.)ForBurley'
s owntheory
is a form
of
though
See below.
restrictio.
77See Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar, indexunder' restringentes1
.
78See,forinstance,
inRoure,op.cit., p. 270,para.2.05:"... siSortesincipiat
Burley
sicloqui:aliquid
dicitur
a Sorte
vera:aliquid
dicitur
a Sorte
, tuncesthecpropositio
; ergoest
veraproaliquosupposito
sedpronullosupposito
esseveranisi
subjecti,
subjecti
potest
a Sorte
, quia Sortesnihilaliuddicit.Ergosubjectum
prohac oratione
aliquiddicitur
huius:aliquid
dicitur
a Sorte
potest
prohactota."("... IfSocrates
supponere
beginsto
is saidbySocrates',thenthisproposition
is
speakas follows
'Something
'Something
saidbySocrates'is true.Therefore,
itis trueforsomething
forwhichthesubject
supforwhichthesubject
unlessitisforthis
posits.Butitcanbe truefornothing
supposits
40

12:44:58 PM

in two
It is perhaps because of this that we find the theoryof restrictio
a strong form and a weak form.
forms in the insolubilia-literature,
rules out all self-referencewhatever,79and leaves itself
Strongrestrictio
rules out selfopen to the criticismjust mentioned. Weak restrictio
referenceonly in the case of insolubilia.It is sometimesdifficultor even
in its
impossible to tell whether an author is maintaining restrictio
strongor its weak form.Nevertheless,at least this much can be said.
was maintained by
Before Bradwardine, the strong form of restrictio
item 4 in the above list, the anonymous mid-thirteenthcenturytext
that adopts the theoryof transcasus
; by item 5, the anonymous text
sometimes ascribed to William of Sherwood; by item 9, Simon of
Faversham, with a qualification;80and by Scotus, item 10, with the
same qualification.81Curiously, although the author of item 5 accepts
'
the restringentes
rejectionof self-reference,he does not thinkthis alone
will adequately solve the paradoxes.82His own theoryin effectaccepts
and supposition
theirview, but is cast in termsof suppositionsimpliciter
item
13 on the above
is
also
restrictio
secundum
accepted by
quid. Strong
is said by Socrates',becauseSocratessaysnothingelse.
expression
'Something
forthiswhole
is saidbySocrates'can supposit
thesubjectof'Something
Therefore,
[sentence].")
79Andperhaps
in (a)-(c) above.
discussed
alsotheotherkindsofreference
80SimonofFaversham,
Simon,doesnotruleoutsuchsupposiop.cit.,p. 167.88-95.
in a
butsaysthatit is "improper".A termcontained
tionor reference
altogether,
forthatwholesentence.
asa part
cannot
sentence
Yet,asa universal
, supposit
properly,
- itmayindeed
- thatis,as a general
toa wholerangeofthings
termreferring
whole
in
the
included
sentence
is
if
that
that
whole
sentence
for
range.Thisis a
supposit
itcomes
reference.
Nevertheless
restriction
onselfmodest
since,whatever
remarkably
and notjustto insolubilia
to applytoall sentences
, I haveincluded
to,itis intended
restrictio.
ofstrong
Simonamongthosewhoholda version
81Scotus,op.cit.,q. 52,p. 269.Forthequalification,
note.
seethepreceding
82See Roure,op.cit., p. 253,para.4.10: "Licetautemrestringentes
benedicantquo
prototo,maletamensol(quo]quoqueed.)ad hocquodparsnonpotestsupponere
concetotum
vunt,quia,cumconcedunt
processum
argumentum,
usquead ultimum
sic
medicerefalsum,
etcumproceditur
concedunt
duntopposita,
quia respondendo
estmedicerefalsum,
ergonondicofalsum',malenegantilludidem.
'ergofalsum
concedendum
estquod
Item,hecsolutiononestsecundum
Aristotelem;
propterea
etnonverasolutio."("Butalthough
restrictio
sitviainsolutionem
veram,utpatebit,
for
tothefactthata partcannotsupposit
arewell-spoken
withrespect
therestringentes
thewhole,nevertheless
theygivea bad solution.For,whentheygrantthewhole
Forin theirreply
process
up tothelastargument,
theygrantopposites.
[reasoning-]
Andwhen
a falsehood'].
thatI saya falsehood
they
grant
[whenI sayonly'I amsaying
it is falsethatI say a falsehood;
goeson as follows:'therefore
[their]argument
thesamething.
I donotsaya falsehood',
therefore,
Again,thissolutheywrongly
deny
thatrestrictio
isthe
itistobegranted
tionisnotinaccordance
withAristotle.
Therefore,
as willbe clear,andnotthetruesolution
[itself].")
waytothetruesolution,
41

12:44:58 PM

list, the anonymous early fourteenth century Tractatus de

83
sophismatibus.
On the other hand, the followingitems on our list of early discus: item 6, Lambert of
sions maintain at leastthe weak version of restrictio
Auxerre who, like the author of item 5, puts his theoryin termsof supposition simpliciterand supposition secundumquid; item 12, the
anonymous early fourteenthcentury note; item 14, Walter Burley
from the early fourteenthcentury, who clearly does not hold the
4
strongerformof restrictionand item 15, Richard of Campsall, who
lisoclearly does not hold the strongerversion.
one or the other formof
The followingauthors on our list rejected
: item 3, the anonymous textfromc. 1225, which rejectseven
restrictio
weak restrictio
; item 8, the anonymous questions on the Elenchifrom
around 1270-1280, where in q. 95 the author rejectseven weak restrictio; and item 14, Burley, who rejectsonly the strongformof restriction
The strongformof the theoryis indeed too strong;it is open to the
objections mentionedabove. On the otherhand, the weak formof the
is possible except
theoryin practice tended to be ad hoc. Self-reference
and
of
in
the absence
in insolubilia.But
independent
any precise
characterization of insolubility, this in practice meant that selfreferenceis possible except when it leads to contradiction.In short,
self-referenceis possible except when it is is not. That is certainlytrue,
but it is not a theory- it is a tautology.86
83Therearesomepalaeographical
so
withreading
thistextin microfilm,
problems
as I readthetext,itmainsureofthisclaim.Nevertheless,
thatI cannotbe altogether
whosedatesareunknown
restrictio.
tainsstrong
(seen. 74 above),
HenryofEngland,
inthelaterfourteenth
restrictio
alsomaintained
, as didRichard
century
Brinkley
strong
in Spade,The
textis listedas anonymous
bad reasons).Brinkley's
(forastonishingly
Liar, itemx, pp. 33-34,andis editedin PaulVincent
Mediaeval
Spade,AnAnonymous
M. S. L. Dissertation,
Text
andStudy,
Treatise
on'Insolubles
Toronto,
Fourteenth-Century
see GedeonGi and
ofMediaevalStudies,1969.On Brinkley,
Institute
Pontifical
andHis Summalogicae,in: Franciscan
Studies,40
Brinkley
Rega Wood,Richard
my"anonymous"
(1980),pp. 59-101.It was Gi and Woodwhofirstidentified
Summa
treatise
as partofBrinkley's
logicae.
84Burley'
was takenoveralmostexactly
ofinsolubilia
s theory
byOckham.See Paul
ofFormalLogic,15
in: NotreDameJournal
onSelfVincentSpade,Ockham
Reference,
298-300.
pp.
(1974),
85On SimonofFaversham
in
beincluded
andScotus,bothofwhommight
justifiably
thislist,seenn.80-81above.
86See Spade,Ockham
onSelfReference.

42

12:44:58 PM

VII
The fifthand last of the major early theories of insolubiliais the
'
"
theoryof "cassatio", the view of the "cassantes", those who nullify'
or "cancel" . On this theory,when one uttersan insoluble sentence,
he is not reallysayinganything.'Nil dicis' ("You are sayingnothing")
is the phrase characteristicof this view. This seems perhaps to mean
that what is said "lacks sense" or "fails to make a statement".
This view is a popular modern theoryalthough once again, in the
absence of any exact and independent characterization of the
paradoxes, the theorytends to be trivial:sentencesmake statementsor
have sense except when they cannot.
Cassatio was maintained by two of our early texts: item 1, the
anonymous textfromthe late twelfthor early thirteenthcentury;and
item 3, the anonymous text fromc. 1225.87 It is significant,I think,
that two of the earliest known treatmentsof insolubiliatake this quite
non-Aristotelianapproach to the paradoxes. Item 3, around 1225,
says that this view- which the author does not call cassatiobut rather
"
actus" ("abolishing the act") is "according to the common
interemptio
judgment" {secundumcommune
judicium).88 Formerly I took this as
evidence forthe widespread acceptance of this view in the early thirteenthcentury.But now I thinkthe authormeant only thatthe view of
the cassantesagrees with what the "common man" would say. The
author makes a rathercurious appeal to the "man-on-the-street": If
"
"
you were to approach a rusticus and say 'What I am saying is false',
he would reply that you are not saying anything: "M/ dicis. "89
Item 1 on our list, the earliest extant complete treatmentof insolubilia,already recognizesthatsome distinctionsand refinementsare
necessaryin order to make the view plausible. The author says that in
the case of an insoluble we have to deny that there is an act of saying
anything,since in general, with respect to any judgment or proposition ( enuntiabile
), we have to deny everythingthat would make it insoluble.90He then raises an objection:91
87In Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar, p. 43, I wrongly
saidthatthistextrejects
cassatio
.
88See ibid.
89Ibid.,p. 44.
90See De Rijk,Some
Notes
ontheMediaeval
Tract
De insolubilibus,
pp. 105.32-106.2.
91Ibid.,p. 106.3-16:"Sed contra.Dicere
nilaliudestquampriusasserere
et postea
Sedassertio
nonestcassanda,cumexipsanonsequatur
inconveniens.
Dato
proferre.
enimquod asseratur
et non proferatur,
inpunepotestsustineri
quod sit falsum.
Similiter
nonestcassandanecsoletcassari.Etitacumassertio
nonsitcassanprolatio
43

12:44:58 PM

andafter"To say" is nothing

elsebutfirst
to assert92
Buton thecontrary:
is notto be cancelled,
sincean inconsistency
wardsto utter.Buttheassertion
a falsehood']
is asserted
and
it.Forgiventhat['I amsaying
from
doesnotfollow
thatitis false.Likewise,
theutwithimpunity
itcanbe maintained
notuttered,
- norisitusually
cancelled.
Andso,sincetheasserisnottobe cancelled
terance
and thesetwoare [whatitis] "to
or theutterance,
tionis notto be cancelled,
is tobe
Andso,ifsomething
thesayingis nottobe cancelled.
say", [therefore],
sinceitis priorandan inconis nottobe cancelled
andtheassertion
cancelled,
istobe
as itseems,thattheutterance
from
doesnotfollow
it,itremains,
sistency
cancelled.
Andthatis notusuallydone.
animal'is deniedofeverything
other
'rational
Solution:
Justas thedefinition
is
likewise
'assertion
withutterance'
thanman,yetitspartsare notdenied,93
deniedofthisproposition
(enuntiabile)
[and]yetitspartsarenotdenied.Hencethe
butin a respect
thatithastotheutis nottobe cancelled
assertion
absolutely,
to
is tobe cancelled
buttheonewithrespect
terance.Henceneither
absolutely,
theother.
Parts of this passage are obscure. But it is clear at any rate that the
charge, which the anonymous item 5, attributedto William of Sherwood, levels against cassatio, thatit simplygoes contraryto sensation,94
is altogethertoo facile. The above passage explicitlysays that it is not
the sensible utterancethat is cancelled or abolished. Nevertheless,this
unfairobjection was picked up by Burley95and by Thomas Bradwar'4
dine, who adds the claim that the view also contradicts the
understanding/'96 which likewise seems unfair. Through Bradwardine, whose surveyof previous opinions was quoted more or less veret istaduo sintdicere,dictiononestcassanda.Et ita si aliquidest
da prolatio
inconvenonsitcassanda,cumpriorsitetexipsanonsequitur
etassertio
cassandum,
Solutio.
nonsitcassanda.Ethocnonsoletfieri.
utvidetur,
niens,restt,
quod
prolatio
4animal
tarnen
a quolibet
alioab homine,
rationale1
removetur
Sicuthecdiffinitio
partes
ab hocenunassertio
similiter
cumprolatione
eiusnon removentur,
[non]removetur
nonestcassandasimpliciter,
Undeassertio
eiusnonremoventur.
tarnen
tiabili,
partes
seduna
ad prolationem.
Undeneutraestcassandasimpliciter,
sedhabitorespectu
theauthor
is De Rijk's.Notethatalthough
alterius."Thedeletion
implicitly
respectu
secundum
between
distinction
quidattheendofthis
simpliciter!
appealstotheAristotelian
basisforhissolution.
passage,itis nottheprimary
92Apparently
hereas a kindofmentalact.
regarded
93Sincethereareanimalsand rational
things
(angels)otherthanmen.
94See Roure,op.cit.,p. 250,par.2.01: "Itemhecoppiniomanifeste
contradicit
senthatis not
sensation
sui non decepto."("Again,thisopinionclearlycontradicts
deceived.")
95Ibid.,p. 269,para.2.03: "Praeterea
audire
ipsinegantsensum:quia ipsipossunt
Sortemdicerese dicerefalsum,ergoSortemdicerefalsumpotestdicia Sorte."
Fortheyare ableto hearSocratessaythathe is
("Moreover,theydenysensation.
a falsehood
canbe saidby
is speaking
Socrates
that
a
therefore,
falsehood;
speaking
Socrates.")
96Ibid. , p. 295,para.5.05: "Sed isticontradicunt
sensuietintellectui."
("But they
andunderstanding.")
contradict
sensation
44

12:44:58 PM

batim by Ralph Strode in the late fourteenthcentury97and by Paul of

Venice's Logica magna in the early fifteenth century,98 this
"refutation" came to be a standard one. It should be added that
Richard of Sherwood (item 7 on our list) also rejectscassatio, although
I have not yet been able to study his text enough to be able to say
whetherhe uses the same arguments.
Nevertheless, although people continued to argue against cassatio
well into the fifteenth
century,theywere arguing against straw men.
The view died out, as far as I am able to tell, after about
1225- although,curiously,it seems to have been revived in the "postmediaeval" period by a certain David Derodon and perhaps by
others.99
VIII
These are the main theoriesof insolubiliaduring the early period of
the literature. In section VII above, I mentioned Bradwardine' s
survey of previous opinions at the beginning of his own treatise.100
That survey provides an interestingsummary of the early literature.
Bradwardine distinguishes eight views in addition to the
"Aristotelian" one that he accepts, involvinga ratherstrained appeal
to the fallacysecundum
The eightare: (i) strongrestricquidetsimpliciter.
be
weak
what
to
restriction
ts, (ii)
appears
althoughBradwardine casts it
in the formof the Aristotelianfallacyof "figure of speech";101 (iii) an
appeal to the Aristotelianfallacy of "false cause" - I know of no one
who took that approach; (iv) transcasus
, which we have seen; (v) and
two
of
cassatio.
versions
Opinion (v) says that no one can say that
(vi),
he speaks falselyor understandthathe understandsfalsely,and so on.
This, Bradwardine says, "denies the senses and understanding."102
Opinion (vi) says that one who neverthelessdoes say such a thing
"says nothing". Bradwardine replies that such a speaker says at least
97See Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar, itemliii,p. 87.
98Ibid., item1. p. 82.
99See Ashworth,
andLogicinthePost-Medieval
Period
, p. 115;andPaulVinLanguage
centSpade,reviewofAshworth,
andLogicin thePost-Medieval
Period
, in:
Language
15(1976),pp. 333-340at p. 338.
Dialogue.
100Roure,op.cit.,pp. 286-296,para.2.00-5.08.
101Thefallacy
ofspeechwasregularly
offigure
fallacies
appealedtotoexplaincertain
inconnection
withthetheory
ofsupposition.
See De Rijk,Logica
Modernorum
,
arising
vol.II, Part1,pp.499-512,
especially
pp.511-512.NodoubtthisisthebasisforBradinfactI knowofnoauthor
wardine'
s classification,
whoexplicitly
although
appealsto
thefallacy
offigure
ofspeechinconnection
withinsolubilia.
102See n. 96 above.
45

12:44:58 PM

words, and so not nothing. In view of the distinctionsdrawn in the

passage quoted above fromitem 1 in our list, thisrefutationtoo seems
to miss the mark. It is not clear why Bradwardine treatscassatioas two
separate views. Burley uses the same characterizationsas Bradwardine does, but he treatsthem as characterizinga single view.103
Opinion (vii) in Bradwardine's surveydenies bivalence; insolubles
are neithertrue nor false,but have some intermediatevalue. I know of
no one who actually maintained this view in general, although Roger
Swyneshed afterBradwardine allowed it to happen in certain special
cases.104Other authors discuss such views too, even though they do
not accept them. William Heytesbury, for instance, writing after
Bradwardine, describes and rejects such a theorybased on the view
that insolubiliafail to be "propositions". 105There may be some connection between the view Heytesbury describes and the theory of
cassatio, but that is uncertain. In view of the factthat opinions (v) and
(vi) in Bradwardine's list are formsofcassatio, it is perhaps too much to
suppose that opinion (vii) is meant to be yetanotherformof it. Again,
Richard Brinkley in the late fourteenthcentury describes in some
detail and rejects a view that denies bivalence on the basis of a
I know of no one who held such a view.
"causar' theoryof truth.106
in
Bradwardine's
surveyof previous views is
Finally, opinion (viii)
the theoryof exercised and signifiedacts, a theoryheld by Scotus but
apparently by others as well.
Bradwardine's list, with its occasionally obscure features and
unidentifiedviews, indicates that we have by no means yet exhausted
literature.
the early period in the mediaeval insolubiliaBloomington, Indiana
Indiana University
103Roue,op.cit.,p. 269,para.2.02-2.03.
104See Spade,Roger
in inters Insolubilia,
p. 180,para.2. Fordifficulties
Swyneshed'
s Theory
on thispoint,see Spade,Roger
ofInSwyneshed'
theory
Swyneshed's
preting
solubilia.
105See Heytesbury,
wasdefined
byBoethuis
op.cit.,p. 19,para.6. A "proposition"
Detopicis
SeeBoethius,
a truth
ora falsehood".
as 4'an expression
,
dierentiis
signifying
estoratioverumfalsumve
PL 64, col. 1174B:"Propositio
significans."
106See Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar, itemx, p. 33, fourth
opinion.
previous

46

12:44:58 PM

Vivarium
XXV, 1 (1987)
Suarezon BeingsofReasonand Truth(1)
JOHN P. DOYLE

SectionI -

The tradition
: Plato,Aristotle
and thescholastics

From Parmenides on, it has been a commonplace in the Western

philosophicaltraditionthattruthis a functionof being. One need only
rememberthe general Platonic doctrineof Forms, which are at once
and truth.More
"really real" (Vuco
'v)and the locus of intelligibility
and again in the Sophisthas raised
specifically,Plato in the Theatetus
the problem of truthand falsitywithrespectto non-existingthings.In
the Theatetus
, Socrates, considering the differencebetween true and
false belief, rejects the view that false belief is directed toward that
which is not, on the ground that to think what is not is to think
,
nothing,which is not to thinkat all.1 The issue recurs in the Sophist
where it is stated that it is false to attributebeing to thatwhich is not.2
Later in this same dialogue the problem is solved to Plato's satisfaction by the theoryof the Form of the Other.3
While Aristotlehas rejectedPlato's Forms, in various places he too
has said or implied that each thingis true to the degree that it has being.4 But, rightalong with this, he has shiftedemphasis fromthings
themselvesto the mind. To be more exact, forAristotletruthis found
primarily, if not exclusively, in the second operation of the
mind- that is, in the judgment by which we combine or separate
1 Cf. Theatetus
189A, B.
2 Cf.Sophist
238C; alsocf.:- Anystatement
mustbe aboutsomething
rather
than
262 E;- and a falsestatement
nothing,
Sophist
speaksaboutnonbeingsas though
theywerebeings,ibid.263 .
3 Cf. Sophist
257B-263B.On all of this,see F.M. Cornford,
Plato'sTheory
of
, reprintof original[1934] edition,Indianapolis1957, pp. 114-120,
Knowledge
andMediaeval
Semantics
and
212-214,289-320.Also cf. L.M. de Rijk, On Ancient
XIX (1981),pp. 1-46and 81-125,XX
(4, 5, and 6), in: Vivarium,
Metaphysics
toseeing,
(1982),97-127.So farI havenotbeenableto obtain,butI lookforward
Prof,de Rijk's recently
A Philosophical
published
,
study:Plato'sSophist:
Commentary
Amsterdam
1986.
4 Cf.e.g. Metaphysics
II, . 1; 993b30-31.
47

12:45:07 PM

items which we have firstsimply apprehended.5Thus truthoccurs in

our judgment that somethingis which in fact is, or that somethingis
not which in fact is not.6 Accordingly,truthseems to require at least
two things: (1) some mental composition or separation, and (2) a
conformitybetween this and thingsas theyare in themselves.
Aristotlehimself,while not explicitlyraisinga furtherproblem, has
'
occasioned one here in connection with "the goat-stag' (
Mentioned by Plato in the Republic(488 A), the goatTpayXoccpo).7
a
is
creature
of artfulimagination, which involves an (impossistag
or
ble?) synthesis composition of two essences. Aristotleaccepts this,
but connected questions occur about the being, intelligibility,and
truthof such a creature. A goat-staghas no being or intelligibilityin
itself apart from thought.8 Furthermore, the mental composition
which it involves does not sufficefortruth.9It seems, indeed, just the
composition of the goat-stagmakes it
opposite: the self-contradictory
a perfectexample of what Aristotlehas called a "false thing" (7cpay(xa
^).10But at the same time, somewhatparadoxically,Aristotlehas
The obdeclared that the (term) goat-stag does have signification.11
if
no
this
has
And
vious question is what does it signify?
then,
being or
truthas such, what truthcan there be in any statementsabout it?12
Following Boethius,13throughcenturiesof medieval Scholasticism,
the problem remained,14and, if anything,grew more difficult.From
Sacred Scripture,where God has named Himself as "Being",15 and
5 Ibid.VI, c. 4; 1027b18ff.
6 Cf. ibid.IV, c. 7; 1011b27. In linewiththis,Aristotle
locatestruth
(or "beingas
consideration
bythe(real)scienceof
true")inthemindandexcludesitas suchfrom
cf.Metaphysics
XI, c. 8; 1065.
metaphysics,
7 Cf. Perihermeneias
c. 1; 16a 16,textin note11,below.
8 Cf. Posterior
II, c. 7; 92b6.
Analytics
9 Cf. Perihermeneias
. 1; 16a 16,textin note11.
10Cf.Metaphysics
V, c. 29; 1029b17-19.
11Perhermeneias
SeaArje
. 1; 16a 16: "... xalyap ^
ti,omcc
rj
<rrfi.atvet
|xv
..."
vjatjto etvat
rj)eivai),
4>eu8o,
12The problem
from
maybe easilyinferred
Metaphysics
V, c. 7; 1011b26.
13Cf. Boethius,
ed. . Meisner,
2 vol.,
inlibrum
Aristotelis
Commentarii
Oeptp(xtvea,
cf.J. Isaac,
after
PL 64, col.293-392.On thetradition
Boethius,
Lipsiae1877-1880;
deBoke SaintThomas
, Paris1953;alsocf.
O.P., Le PERI HERMENEIASenoccident
1984.
Tradition
andtheMedieval
H. Arens,Aristotle's
, Amsterdam
Theory
Linguistic
14E.g., seeSt. Thomas,InAristotelis
libros
PeriHermeneias
I, . 1,1.3, ed. R.
exposition
in librum
Spiazzi, Taurini 1964, . 35, p. 17; Williamof Ockham,Expositio
andS. Brown,St. BonavenPerihermeneias
Aristotelis,
I, . 1, p. 9, ed. A. Gambatese
in universam
Aristotelis
ture,N.Y. 1978,pp. 364-367;F. Toletus,S.J., Commentaria
De Interpretatione
I, c. 1 Venetiis1597,p. 106v.
Logicam:
15Cf.Exodus
onExodus
here,cf.F. Suarez,De DivinaSubstan3, 14.Forcommentary
48

12:45:07 PM

then again, in the Person of Christ, as " Truth", 16 emphasis was

shiftedback toward truthas a propertyof being "outside the mind".
This emphasis can be seen in the writingsof St. Augustine,17as well
as in the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas: Verumsequituressererum
. 18
But even with this, thereis continued recognitionthat truthdoes centrally involve the mind, especially in its second operation of judgment.19All of which is consistentwith the standard medieval definition attributedto Isaac Israeli: "Truth is the adequation of the mind
and reality".20The question, however, persists: what of truthwhere
there is no reality?What of truthwith regard to the goat-stag?
SectionII - FrancisSuarez: hisgeneraldoctrine
oftruth
Francis Suarez, S.J. (1548-1617), the Spanish philosophertheologian rightly regarded as "the main channel by which
scholasticismcame to be known by modern classical philosophers",21
has passed on the common teaching of the Schoolmen that truthis
threefold.(1) There is a truthin words, in writing,and in what he
calls "non-ultimate concepts" (i.e. concepts of such words and
(2)
writing),22which is termed truth"in signifying"(in significando).
tiaI, . 1, nn. 5-6,11 (I, p. 23); ibid.II, c. 32, n. 22 (p. 193).(Unlessotherwise
references
to SuarezarefromtheVivesedition
ofhis
noted,thisandall subsequent
omnia
whichwillbe citedwithvolumeand pagenumbers
Opera
[Paris,1856-1866]),
withinparentheses.
For a chronology
of Suarez' works,cf. J. Iturrioz,S.J.,
Suareciana
, in: Pensamiento,
IV, nmeroextraordinario
Bibliografia
[1948],esp.
pp. 606-608).
16John
St.ThomasonJohn14,6, cf.DeDiv.Subst.
14,6. ForSuarezfollowing
I, . 7,
. 10(1, p. 22).
17ForAugustine's
oftruth,
cf.. Boyer,L'idedevrit
de
doctrine
danslaphilosophie
saint
2nded., Paris1939.
Augustin,
18On St. Thomashere,see G. Phelan,Verum
essererum
, in: Mediaeval
sequitur
andTruth
inAquinas
Studies,I (1939),pp. 11-22;also cf.J. Owens,Judgment
, in:
MediaevalStudies,32 (1970),pp. 138-158.
19Cf. St. Thomas,De Ventate
Theol.I, q. 16,art2.
q. 1, art.3; Summa
20On thedubiousascription
ofthisdefinition
to Isaac Israeliand (following
D.H.
trait
desproprits
transcendentales
de
Pouillon,Le premier
, in: Revueno-scolastique
to Avicenna,
42 (1939),pp. 58-61)itsmoreprobableascription
cf.E.
philosophie,
intheMiddle
Gilson,History
ofChristian
Philosophy
Ages,NewYork1955,p. 647,n. 26.
On theThomistic
ofbeingandtruth
inGod,againstthebackground
ofthe
identity
cf.E. Gilson,Le Thomisme
Paris1948,esp.pp. 326-328.
definition,
, 5thedition,
21A. A. Maurer,Medieval
of
, NewYork1962,p. 356. On theinfluence
Philosophy
in metaphysics,
cf.J. Iriarte,
La proyeccin
deunagran
sobre
Suarez,especially
Europa
de losdiasdelbarocco
, o Suarezenlafilosofia
, in: Razn y Fe, 133 (1948),
metafisica
pp. 229-265.
22ForSuarezon "non-ultimate
cf. "... estverbumintellectus,
in quo
concepts",
etiampotestverbum
vocisa verborei.Illudest,quod a dialecticis
vocari
distingui
49

12:45:07 PM

There is a truthin the intellectknowing things,which is called truth

"in knowing'' (in cognoscendo)
. And (3) thereis a truthin things,which
is truth "in being' ' (in essendo).23Among themselves, these three
truthsall have some similarityor proportion. This is especially inasmuch as in some way (aliquo modo)the othertruths,to the extentthat
they are "real", are contained under, or are analogous to, the last
et secundum
nonultimus:
soletconceptus
estqueetiamverbum
quid,
imperfectum
habeteamdemrationem
reisignificatae
quam
respectu
pervocem,namformaliter
..." De Trinitate
oreprolatum,
verbum
IX, c. 2, n. 12 (I, p. 725).Letus notesome
- withrespect
notjusttothebarewordbutalsosecundum
semantic
quidto
aspecthere
- cf.note130below.Alsoletus remark
havethe
that"to formally
thethingbeyond
theultimate
as thespokenword"meanslikeittosignify
adplacitum
samecharacter
Forthe"non-ultimate
whichthisnaturally
signifies.
conceptand alsothethingitself
cf.: "... cum audimusvoces,aut legimus
concept"among"the dialecticians",
ex instituto,
duo semperin nobisconceptus
alteripgignantur,
scriptasignificativa
etiamignaroidiomatis
alterrei
siusvocis,autscripturae,
qui inhomine
gignipotest,
nisiin eo, qui tenetsignificationem
vocabuli.... Ac
qui nongignitur,
significatae,
ille
dicisoletnonultimtus,
ultimtus.
posterior
Aptiustarnen
priorilleconceptus
diceretur
diabeticorum,
Medius,hie Ultimus."PetrusFonseca,S.J., Institutionum
Gomes[Coimbra
LibriOcto,Conimbricae
1575,I, c. 11 (ed. JoaquimFerreira
id
duplexaltermedius,alterultimus,
1964],I, p. 40); alsocf."Est enimconceptus
aliusreiperearnsignificatae.
..." Commentarii
estunusvocis,quae profertur,
Collegii
Dialecticam
DeInterpretationen
Conimbricensis
Aristotelis,
cap. 1,q. 3, a. 3,
S.J.inuniversam
Summularum
ed. Lugduni1607,p. 37. Alsocf.D. Soto,O.P., Summulae
, L. 1, c. 3,
Summa
2nded.: Salamanca1554,pp. 5r.and6v.; andGasparCardilloVillalpando,
inProtestant
Summularum
1590,pp. 9-10.Forthedoctrine
, L. 1, p. 2, c. 2, Compiuti
Scholasticism
after
Lexicon
, Francofurti
1613,
Suarez,cf.:R. Goclenius,
philosophicum
L. II, c. 24,p. 5, n. 1,GiessaeHessorum
p. 429;andC. Scheibler,
Opusmetaphysicum
1617,t. 1, p. 813.
23Cf. "In quo estrursus
soleredistingui
scilicet,
observandum,
veritatem,
triplicem
in
et in essendo.PrimaVeritas
in significando,
et cognoscendo,
propriereperitur
vocant.Secunda
autetiamin conceptibus,
vocibusvelscripturis,
quosnonultimatos
et conceptione
estin intellectu
res,seu in cognitione
ipsarumrerum.
cognoscente
conturverae.Primaigitur
veritatis
Tertiaestin rebusipsis,quae ab illadenominan
secundaad physicum,
sideradoad dialecticum
quatenusde animaejusque
pertinet;
deentein
functionibus
tertia
veroestpropria
considrt;
quaetractat
hujusscientiae,
entium."Disputationes
ens,etde passionibus
DA),8,
metaphysicae
(hereafter
quantum
an illustration
withfar
ofthesethreetruths,
prol.(XXV, p. 275).Foran illustration
as well as fortheology,
forfaithand credalstatements,
rangingimplications
cf. "... nonsolumenimdicimusesseverum
and languagegenerally,
knowledge,
veramesseproposiDeumessetrinum
etunum,etsimiliter
quo credimus
judicium,
etunum,verum
sedetiamhocipsum,Deumessetrinum
tionem,
qua id affirmamus,
id est
in intellectu,
solumhabetilla resproutestobjective
esse; quam veritatem
et vere sicutestjudicatur;..." DM 8, 8, n. 10
quatenuscomplexe
cognoscatur,
addsto
Suarez(alongwithotherScholastics)
contexts,
(XXV, p. 310). In different
thesea fourth
"moral";seee.g.,DeDiv.Subst.
I, c. 8, n. 1 (I, p. 20).
truth,
namely,
truth
of speechand moraltruth;cf.
But thenagainhe comescloseto identifying
Tractatus
defideI, d. 3, s. 4, n. 1 (XII, 52).
50

12:45:07 PM

truth,which is transcendentaltruth,the propertyof being.24But also,

he tells us, fromwhatever part we approach it, "rel" truthconsists
in a certain adequation or conformitybetween reality and the intellect,whetherthatbe fromthe side of the intellectto reality,or from
the side of reality to the intellect,or, proportionatelyfor "truth of
reason or signification", in an adequation between a signifyingproposition and somethingsignified.25
(Here let me note threethings. One, with regard to truthin signifying, it seems clear enough that Suarez regards "non-ultimate" concepts as on a line with words and writing. Thus words signify
"things". Writing signifieswords and in that signifiesthings. And
non-ultimate concepts signify either writing and words or words
alone, and in that to some extenttheysignifythings.26We will return
to this. Two, the terminologyused between the firstand the second
truthat least in part reflectsthe Augustinin doctrine of a sign as
somethingwhich, as firstknown itself,makes us aware of something
else.27And, three
, Suarez in most places that I have seen reservesthe
24Cf. "... quiaomneshaeveritates
interse habentconvenientiam
aliquamvelpro... MaximequiaomnisaliaVeritas,
si realissit,aliquomodosubveritate
portionem,
si autemsitrationis,
et proportionem
ad
transcendentli
continetur;
peranalogiam
est." DM 8, prol.(XXV, p. 275).
veritatem
realemdeclaranda
25"... supponimus,
ex communi
veritatem
realemconsistere
omnium
in
consensu,
interremetintellectum,
sivesitconformitas
adaequatione
quadamseuconformitate
intellectus
ad rem,sivereiad intellectum,
... Hincverosumptaanalogiavelproporinadaequatione
rationis
seusignifications
consistit
interpropositionem
tione,Veritas
' DM
etremsignificatami
8, prol.(XXV, p. 275).Letus notetheadesignificantem
thesignifying
and"thething
Thelatter
quationherebetween
proposition
signified".
as such,tobe theobjective
seems,precisely
concept;cf."... illudipsum,quodest
immediatum
vocis
objectumformalisconceptus,est immediatum
significatum
..." DM 2, 2, n. 23 (p. 78); alsocf.DM 8, 8, n. 10,textin
adaequataeilliconceptui;
note23 above.On theanalogybetween
truth
ofcognition
andtranscendental
truth,
cf.DM 8, 8, n. 12 (pp. 311-312).On thedistinction
oftheformal
andtheobjective
cf.ibid.1, n. 1 (pp. 64-65).
concept,
26On thisminimally
ofthenon-ultimate
semantic
character
cf.note22,
concept,
above.
27ForSuarezon St. Augustine
in thiscontext,
cf."Quia de ratione
signisensibilis
est: Utpraeter
aliudfaciatincognitionem
venire
sensibus,
, ut
speciem,
quamingerii
aliquid
inprincipio
et scholasticis
1.2 de Doct.Christ.,
et dialecticis
, tradidit
Augustinus,
est."De Div.Subst.
II, c. 31,n. 5 (I, p. 183);ibid.n. 14(p. 185);also,cf.De
vulgare
ingenere
sacramentis
totheplaceSuarezcites
d. 1, s. 3, . 2 (XXI, p. 18).In addition
from
cf.also "Pseudo" (?) Augustine:
Augustine,
"Signumestquod et se ipsum
sensuietpraeter
se aliquidanimoostendit."
De dialctica
tr.
, cap. 5, ed.J. Pinborg,
. Jackson
and Boston,1975),p. 86. On Augustine's
doctrine
ofsigns,
(Dordrecht
cf.R.A. Markus,"St. Augustine
on Signs,"Phronesis,
2 (1957),pp. 60-83,and B.
TheTheory
De doctrina
in: Revuedes
Christiana,
Jackson,
ofSignsinSt.Augustine's
tudesaugustiniennes,
15 (1969),pp. 9-49.
51

12:45:07 PM

language of "signification" ( significato

) for external, and especially
"
'
deliberate, signs and has used representation' ( repraesentatio
) when
of
the
internal
natural
which
is
in
of
instances
speaking
sign
employed
formalconception.28)
SectionIII -

Theproblemregarding
beingsof reason

1. BeingsofReasonas OpposedtoBeingswhichare Independent

oftheMind
Customarily, in Suarez' s time, therewere differentways in which
somethingmightbe called a "being of reason" (ensrationis).It might,
firstof all, be a being which was effectedby the reason, "with a true
and real efficiency". In this way, all artificialthingsmightbe called
"beings of reason".29 In practice, however, this appellation was not
in use.30 Second, and more properly,somethingcould be called a being of reason froma relation it mighthave with the intellectas with a
subject of inhesion. In this way, all kinds of mental accidents and
perfectionsmightbe so called. But the question beforeus is not about
such.31 In yet another way, somethingmightbe termed a "being of
28Perhaps
thisusageisinDisputatio
thebestplacetoseeSuarezconsistently
following
seuConceptu
"De RationeEssentiali
2 (XXV), wherehespeaksatlength
metaphysica
formales
Entis"{ibid.p. 64). Cf. e.g. "... sicutvocesexprimunt
mentis,
conceptus
immediate
ita etiamimmediate
objectaquae perhujusmodi
conceptus
significant
in quantum
namin tantum
deserviunt
ad exprimendos
conceptus,
repraesentantur;
naturaliter
vocesex impositione
illudipsum,quodconceptus
signifirepraesentant,
cant; ..." ibid.s. 2, n. 23 (p. 78). The closestI have seen in theDisputationes
eamdem
habent
toan exception
from
thisruleis: "... genusetdifferentia
metaphysicae
ilia significetur
aut
essentiam
per conceptus
quam species,quamvisdiversimode
verbasignificantia
..." DM 6, 9, n. 24(p. 244);andinDM 29,
genusetdifferentiam,
de signisipsis,sed de re
s. 3, n. 34 (XXVI, p. 59): "... quia non tractamus
sedde objectivis,
de conceptibus
...", wherehe drawsa
formalibus,
significata,
andobjective
and(b) formal
concepts.
signified,
(a) signsandthings
parallelbetween
are"almost"the
and"to signify"
Butforhimelsewhere
sayingthat"to represent"
same,cf.De Angelis
II, . 26, . 10(II, p. 238).
29"Est enimquoddamens,quodeffective
veratarnen
etrealiefficienfita ratione,
..." DM 54, 1, n. 5
entiarationis
tia; quomodoomniaartificiata
appellari,
possunt
(XXVI, p. 1016).
30Ibid.
31"Aliudesthabitudo
etestmagispropria
utad subjectum
ad rationem
inhaesionis,
esteninquo est,quia accidens
esseejussubjecti
namaccidensdicitur
denominatio,
siveab iliofiant,sive
tisens,et ita omnesperfectiones,
intellectui,
quae inhaerent
Sed nuncnonest
vel infundantur,
dicipossuntentiarationis.
aliundeproveniant
ofbeingsof
sermode illis,..." DM 54, 1, n. 5 (XXVI, p. 1016).Theunderstanding
reasonwhichSuarezbypasseshereis at leastin partsimilarto thatof Ockham
Gal,etBrown(St.
, I, c. 40,ed. Boehner,
earlier;cf.e.g. G. Ockham,Summa
Logicae
N.Y., 1974),p. 113; also: Quodl.V, q. 21, as givenbyL. Baudry,
Bonaventure,
d'Ockham
deGuillaume
, Paris1958,p. 90.
Lexique
philosophique
52

12:45:07 PM

reason" as an object of thought.In this way somethingknown is said

to be in the knower (or, specifically,in his reason) not only by inhesion ( inhaesive
) throughits image (or formalconcept32)but also "ob33
jectively according to itself'
With respectto this last meaning, a furthersubdivision is in order.
What is objectivelyin the mind sometimeshas, or can have, in itselfa
"true real being", consequent upon which it is objected to the
reason.34Absolutelyconsidered, this is not a being of reason. For this
real being is what simplyand as such belongs to it, whereas to be an
object of reason is only extrinsicand accidental to it.35But at other
times, there is objected to and considered by the reason something
which does not have a furtherreal and positive being in itself,that is,
besides its being objected to the intellector reason thinkingabout it.36
It is this last which is most properlycalled "a being of reason", for
thisis in some way, i.e., objectively,in the reason and it does not have
any other more excellent or more real mode of being ( essendi
) from
which it could be called a being (ens).37Exactly then, a being of reason
forSuarez is "one which has being only objectivelyin the intellect";
or it is "that which is thoughtby the reason as being, although it does
not have entityin itself'.38 As such, it has its total realityin objective
being (esseobjectivum
) or in being known (essecognitum).39
32On theequivalence
ofimageandformal
cf.DM 2, 1, n. 11(XXV, p. 69);
concept,
alsoseeDe Trinitate
IX, 8, n. 4 (I, p. 744);ibid.n. 9 (p. 745).
33"Alioergomododicitur
nam... dicitur
permodumobjecti,
aliquidesseinratione
sedetiam
essein cognoscente,
nonsoluminhaesive
rescognita
persuamimaginem,
of
secundum
seipsam."DM 54, 1,n. 5 (XXVI, p. 1016).On theinherence
objective
theformal
in theintellect,
cf.DM 25, 1, nn. 26-28(XXV, pp. 906-907).
concept
34"Id autem,quodsicestobjective
habereinse
inmente,
interdum
habet,velpotest
..." ibid.
verumessereale,secundum
quodrationi
objicitur,
35"... ethocabsolute
sedreale,quia hoc
et simpliciter
nonestverumensrationis,
estilliextrinsecum
et
essequodsimpliciter
ac perse illiconvenit,
objiciautemrationi
accidentale."
DM 54, 1, n. 5 (XXVI, p. 1016).
36"Aliquidverointerdum
a ratione,
seuconsideratur
quodnonhabetinse
objicitur
seu rationide ilio
aliud reale positivm
esse praeterquam
objiciintellectui
..." DM 54, 1, n. 5 (XXVI, p. 1016).
cogitanti,
37"... et hoc proprissime
vocaturens rationis,
quia est aliquomodoin ratione,
et nonhabetaliumnobiliorem
aut magisrealemessendimodum,
scilicet
objective,
undepossitensappellari."DM 54, 1, n. 5 (XXVI, p. 1016).
38"Et ideorectedefiniri
esseobjective
tantum
in
esseillud,quodhabet
solet,ensrationis,
nonhabeat.
inseentitatem
seuesseid, quoda ratione
utens,cumtarnen
intellectUy
cogitatur
DM 54, 1, n. 6 (XXVI, p. 1016).
39Cf. "... vocantur
in intellectu."
entiarationis
quia solumhabentesseobjective
DM 2, 1,n. 1 (XXV, p. 65). On theequivalence
ofobjective
beingandbeingknown,
cf.DM 23,8, n. 8 (p. 880);also: ibid.4, n. 11(p. 862);andDM 54, 1, n. 7, textin
note124below.
53

12:45:07 PM

It is, he tells us, importantto avoid equivocation in this. ' 'Being

known' ' can be taken in two ways: (1) it may mean what is known, or
(2) it may mean the being somethinghas preciselyinasmuch as it is
known.40Taken in the firstway, " being known'' is presentin the case
of both real beings and beings of reason.41 While real beings may
have, in addition to this, theirown actual or possible intrinsicreality,
beings of reason have no such addition.42Taken in the second way,
4
'being known" is not objectivelybut formally(as in a subject of inhesion) in the mind, whenever anything is known (whether such
anythingis a real being or a being of reason).43 When, as we know
ourselves to be knowing,we reflectupon this second " being known",
it becomes in its turn 4'being known" in the firstway, i.e., objectively.44But this is not all it is, forit also in itselfhas some formsilreality
To ilin addition to the objective being it has as it is known reflexly.45
known
a
here
between
(essecognitum)
lustrate,he draws parallel
being
and being loved (esse amatum
). When the intellectknows a thing is
loved, that "being loved" is indeed objectivelyin the intellect. But
this is not its whole reality(esse), forin actuad fact(in reipsa) a certain
act of love tends toward and terminatesin a certain thing, and this
itself is the very fact of that thing's being loved.46 Most properly,
40"Unde cavendaest aequivocatio,
quando agimusde esse cognito,aut aliis
illudesse
Potestenimvocariessecognitum,
intellectus.
denominationibus
similibus
velpotestvocariesse
estobjective
in intellectu;
quodqueproprie
quod cognoscitur,
ex eo praecisequod cognoscitur,
esse quod reshaberedicitur,
illudmet
cognitum,
distinction
is
..." DM 54, 2, n. 13 (p. 1021).Notethata seemingly
equivalent
and essecognitum
between
essecognitum
as falling
quoad
quoaddenominationem
regarded
cf.DM 25, 1,nn.31 and32 (XXV, p. 908);ibid.23,8, nn.5, 6, 8,
rem
denominatum'
and9 (pp. 879-881);and Suarez,De ultimo
, d. 1, s. 3, nn. 3-4(IV, pp.
finehominis
theextrinsic
between
denominasimilarin thedistinction
6-7).Alsosee something
denominata
tionas suchandtheratio
; DM 2, 2, n. 35 (p. 81).
41"... esseautemobjective
sedetiamfictis
in intellectu,
nonsolumverisentibus,
convenire
potest;..." DM 6, s. 7, n. 2 (XXV, p. 229).
42DM 54,s. 1,n. 5, textinnote37,above.On "themore"whichactualorpossible
, in: The Modern
ofthePossibles
beingsadd, cf.J. P. Doyle,SuarezontheReality
ofBeing,in:
XLV (1967),esp.pp. 40-42;idem
, Suarezon theAnalogy
Schoolman,
XLVI (1969),esp. pp. 331-333.
The ModernSchoolman,
43Cf. "... quodex vi cognitionis
in intellectu,
sedpotius
directae
nonestobjective
..." DM 54,s. 2, n. 13(XXVI, p. 1021).
ab actuquo rescognoscitur,
estformaliter
44"... objectiveautemest in cognitione
reflexa,qua intellectus
cognoscitse
ibid.
remessecognitam."
velpotiusqua cognoscit
cognoscere,
45"... forma,
inmente,
nonesttantum
sedinre
a qua estiliadenominalo,
objective
ipsa." ibid.
46"Sicut quandointellectus
remesse amatam,est quidemillud,esse
cognoscit
nontarnen
hocesttotumesseillius,ut ea ratione
in intellectu,
amatum,objective
et
namin reipsatalisactusamoristendit
in intellectu,
essetantum
dicatur
objective
54

12:45:07 PM

then, beings of reason are contrastedwith both independent real beings and withthebeing ofbeing known in the second way inasmuch as
beings of reason have in themselvesonly the being of being known in
the firstway.47
Beings of reason in this proper sense exist only when they are actually being known.48Were it otherwise, they would in fact be real
beings, independentof the mind.49This will serve in a firstinstance to
differentiate
beings properlyof reason fromnegations and privations,
which, as we shall see, Suarez thinkscan "be" even withoutbeing
known. Also, as a result of this, beings of reason cannot truly and
properlybe said to endure (of themselves, that is, with intrinsicendurance), and yet we could imagine an endurance forthem (e.g. that
a centaur lived for 50 years).50
At thispoint, therefore,let us say thatbeing can be spoken ofin two
basic ways. In one way, it is real and independent of the mind. In
'
another, it has no realityapart frombeing thought.51When 'being"
ad talemrem,ethocipsumestremillamesseamatam."ibid.Notethat
terminatur
an opposite
situation
isapparently
i.e. thatessecognitum
as suchcanbe theobpossible,
jectofan actofloveordesireon thepartofthewill;cf.DM 23, 8, n. 9 (XXV, p.
ofthetextinDM 23 Suarezmakesitclear
880).Butalsonotethatinthecontinuation
thatinthiscasecognition
oressecognitum
as itisa
is anobjectofthewill,notinasmuch
offinalcausality,
condition
butinasmuch
as an actionofthe
as ithasessereale
itself
intellect.
47"... vocantur
entiarationis,
in intellectu."
DM
quia solumhabentesseobjective
2, s. 1, n. 1 (XXV, p. 65).
48"... hujusmodi
entiapropriesolumdicuntur
esse objectivein intellectu;
unde
solumsunt,quandocognoscuntur
autfinguntur
ab intellectu,
..." DM 3, s. 1, n. 10
(p. 106);cf.also:DM 6, s. 7, n. 2 (p. 229);DM 8, s. 2, n. 20 (p. 283);DM 25, 1, n. 5
IV, . 3, . 26 (III, p. 730).
(XXV, p. 900); andDe Anima
49
etiamquandonon cognoscuntur,
"Certe,si ejusmodientiarationisexisterent
realiaplaneessent:nonenimmedium
daturinteressefurtum
etreale:..." DeAnima
IV, c. 3, n. 26 (III, p. 730);cf.alsoDM 10,1, n. 4 (XXV, p. 329).
50Cf. "... resautemfictae,
autentiarationis,
vere proprie
nondicuntur
durare,
sed eo modoquo finguntur,
vel apprehenduntur
ac si vereexquia nonexistunt;
etiamac si durarent,
et hocipsumconvenit
velattribuitur
eis
isterent,
concipiuntur
" DM
duratetexistit
actusmentis,
velcuiobjiciuntur.
50,s.
quatenus
quo finguntur,
1, n. 1 (XXVI, p. 913). Amongthe17thcentury
Suarez,Thomas
Jesuits
following
universa.
, d. XVII, s. 1, nn. 1-2,Antwerpiae
ComptonCarleton
Logica
(Philosophia
tobe inplaceand
1649,p. 79)makesthepointthata beingofreasoncanbe imagined
therefore
tohavelocalmotion
timecouldbe founded).
(on whosesuccession
51"... de entedupliciter
tantum
vera
possenosloqui:unomodo,utcomprehendit
entiarealia,etillaomniatranscendit
etsubse continet.
Aliomodo,utextenditur
ad
entianonsunt,solumque
multa,quae vereetintrinsece
perquamdamattributionem
extrinsecam
entia dicuntur,
ut sunt privationes,
vel omninoper accidensaut
rationis."
Index
herethepossible
inIV, c. 2, q. 2 (XXV, xv). Letus remark
locup.
ference
to a "supertranscendental"
more
conceptof being.For suchan inference
55

12:45:07 PM

is said of both beings of reason and real beings, according to Suarez

there is no common concept, or real likeness ( convenientia
), but only a
common name between them.52 At times, he tells us, the term

'being" is said equivocally of these two sorts of being.53It may be

noted that this is not an altogetherequivocal use of the term,since on
occasion he will findsome minimal unityhere (even in an analogy of
proportionality).54But such unity seems restrictedto the level of the
term.55For a common (formal) concept it is required, he says, thatthe
form signified(i.e. the objective concept) be truly and intrinsically
participatedby its inferiors.56
sense will not onstrictest
As we shall see, beings of reason in the very
will
be
such that they
from
have
no
thought. They
reality apart
ly
whohasextendClemensTimpler,
cf.theProtestant
Scholastic,
anticipated,
clearly
estensto "tcocv
inquantum
hoc
ed thesubjectofmetaphysics
votjtv,
beyondens[reale]
methodicum
est omneintelligibile",
I, c. 1, prob.5 (Hanoviae,
Metaphysicae
Systema
ofSuarez,
actually
beingdrawnamonglaterdisciples
1616),p. 6. Fortheinference
entis
ita
realis
etentisimpossibilis;
sicutdaturconceptus
cf."Praeterea
quidditativus
a possibili
seu realiet impossibili,
entisabstrahentis
etiamdaturconceptus
qui con..." MaximilianVVietrowski,
S.J.,
ceptusvocaturens supertranscendentale;
, conci.13,cap. 1,n. 1 (p. 232).Forsomeof
, Pragae1697,Logica
Philosophia
disputata
de la
suarzien
of this,cf. J.F. Courtine,Le projet
the pre-Kantian
implications
de Philosophie,
42
dela thse
suarzienne
dunant
, in:Archives
pourunetude
mtaphysique:
(1979),pp. 235-274.
52"... ensrationis,
necrealemconvenientiam
... nonhabetcommunem
conceptum,
nonrecteinterdivisiones
cumentereali,et ideodivisioentisin ensrealeet rationis
entisnumeratur,
quamrei;..." DM 4, s. 7, n. 4
quia illamagisestdivisionominis
IV, cap. 1,n. 4
(XXV, p. 138);cf.DM 54,s. 1,n. 9 (XXVI, p. 1017)andDeAnima
p.
714).
(III,
53"Entiaautemrationis
unumvelmulta,in
seu fictain tantum
aequivocedicuntur
" DM s.
4, 1,
aequivoceetiamsuntentia,velpotiusutentiaconcipiuntur.
quantum
n. 19(XXV, p. 120);cf.ibid.s. 3, . 2 (p. 126).AlsoseeDM 3, s. 2, . 4 (p. 108),
realbeingsand beingsofreason;also
where"res" is saidto be equivocalbetween
DM 4, s. 4, n. 3 (p. 132)andibid.s. 9, n. 12(p. 144),whereagain"unum"issaidto
them.
be equivocalbetween
54Cf. "... ensrationis,
nomenentis,et nonmere
quamvisaliquomodoparticipet
ad
et proportionalitatem
aequivoceet casu (ut aiunt),sed peraliquamanalogiam
verumens,..."ZW 54,s. 1, n. 9 (XXVI, p. 1017).Alsocf.DM 1, s. 1,n. 5 (XXV,
locup.IV, c. 2, q. 2 (XXV, xv).
p. 3); andDM, Index
55Cf. note52, above.
56"... hujusmodi
ut formasignificata
autemconceptus
requirit
pernomenvereet
..." DM 54,s. 1, n. 10 (XXVI, p. 1018);cf.
ab inferioribus;
intrinsece
participetur
alsoDM 2, s. 1, n. 14(XXV, p. 70); andDM 8, 8, n. 12(p. 31). On theproportion
andtheword,cf.:"Haec enimtria,
theobjective
concept
concept,
amongtheformal
interse servant,
et ideoab unoad
et vox
, proportionem
formalis,
objectivus
conceptus
sed de
circulum
non quidemvitiosum
aliud saepe argumentamur,
committendo,
DM
videtur."
concessum
autab aliisfacilius
quodnobisnotius,
unoquoquesumendo
2, s. 2, n. 24 (XXV, p. 78); butatthesametime,heis awareofdangerhere,cf.DM
2, s. 3, n. 12(p. 86).
56

12:45:07 PM

cannotpossiblyhave a realityof this kind. But firstlet us consider what

Suarez says of the varietywhich obtains among beings of reason.
2. A DivisionofBeingsofReason
Suarez accepted a division, common in his time and going back to
Aristotle,of beings of reason into negations, privationsand relations
of reason.57He then went on immediatelyto subdivide this trimembral division in two bimembral stages. First, beings of reason are
eitherpositiveor negative.58All positivebeings of reason are relations
of reason,59whereas negative beings are divided into privations and
negations more strictlytaken.60In contrast to some who, making a
distinctionbetween beings of reason having a foundationin reand beings of reason having no such foundation,would then restrictthese
divisionsto beings of reason having a foundation,61Suarez regards all
of
beings of reason, even those which, as we shall see, are impossible
as
in
re
foundation
and
he
them
some
includes
realization,
having
under his divisions. More exactly, he regards impossible beings as a
species of negation.62Accordingly,a full schema of his divisions will
be as follows:
BeingsofReason
^
positive
ofreasons)
(relations

negative
negations

privations
simple
negations

impossible
things63

57Forthedistinction
and itslineage,cf.DM 54, s. 3, n. 1 (XXVI, p. 1026);for
Suarez'sownacceptance
ofit,cf.theentire
3.
section
58Forsomething
cf.alsoSt. Thomas,De Ventate
similar,
, q. 21, art.1.
59Cf.DM54, 4, n. 9 (XXVI, p. 1030).
60Cf.DM 54, s. 3, n. 8 (p. 1028).
61Cf. e.g.: A. Ruvio,S.J.,Logicamexicana.
Tractatus
denatura
entis
rationis
, dub. 3,
. , d. 19,s. 4, . 70
Lugduni1620,pp. 71-72;P. Hurtadode Mendoza,Disp.Metaph
ands. 5, . 87, Lugduni1624,pp. 953,955.JohnofSt. Thomas,O.P. Cursus
Phil.
a similar
Log.II, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Reiser,Taurini1930,p. 287)attributes
opinionto
Serna[Commentaria
in Logicam
Aristotelis
Sum, Hispali1624]and to Cabero[Brevis
mularum
ofthisunderstanding
fVallesoleti
recapitulado
1623].ForSuarez'sawareness
ofthedivision
ofbeingsofreason,cf.DM 54,4, nn. 2-9(XXVI, pp. 1029-1031).
62Cf. "Addereveropossumus
modumalium,quo iliadivisioadaequatasitde toto
enterationis,
subnegatione
entiafictaetimpossibilia,
..." DM 54,
comprehendendo
inreofallbeingsofreason,cf.textsin
4, n. 10(XXVI, p. 1031).Forthefoundation
notes79 and97 below.
63Forthiscoordination,
cf.esp.DM 54, 3, n. 8 (XXVI, p. 1028).Fora different
57

12:45:07 PM

side: simple negations and privationstruly

(a) First on the negative
belong to thingsthemselves;64and to that extent,as I have indicated,
theyare independentof the mind. As belonging to things,theycan be
predicated trulyand absolutely of them withoutresortto any intellectual fiction.65Such predication, which Suarez says is itselffirst"by
seu negationis
way of division or negation" {permodumdivisionis
), simply
removes one thing from another.66 This predication expresses a
negative judgment, which itselfis the mental counterpartof eithera
total or a partial defectof being in things.67
In contrastto this, the predicationof negations and privationscan
be also "by way of composition and affirmation,,{permodumcompositions et affirmationis
).68 When we predicate negations or privationsin
this way, we do somehow conceive them as being.69This is because in
this second way, throughthe positive copula (est), being is somehow
attributedto thatwhich has no being, in which attributionwe have an
inchoative basis for regarding negations and privations as beings of
reason.70 However, when we actually predicate negations and privaofensrationiss
coordination
cf.J. SanchiezSedegno,O.P., Eruditissimae
atqueUtiliss.
Aristotelis
ad universam
Logicam,
q. 29, Venetiis1609,p. 229;alsocf.ConQuaestiones
...In Isagoge
Commentarii
imbricenses,
cap.degenere,
q. 2, a. 1, Lugduni1607,
Porphy.
pp. 188-189.
64Cf. "... negationes
videntur
inter
entiarationis,
numerari
etprivationes
immerito
namin re
sedvererebusipsisconveniunt,
quia nonsuntaliquidmenteconfictum,
ethomoestnonalbus,si sitniger."DM 54,
etcarenslumine,
ipsaaeresttenebrosus
in oculo,
utcaecitatem
s. 3, n. 2 (p. 1026);"... dicimusdariin rebusprivationes,
tenebras
inaere,maluminactionibus
humanis,
sicqueAristoteles
posuitprivationem
cf.the
ibid.n. 3 (p. 1027).Foranother
naturalis."
example,
principium
generationis
- itis something
ofbeing
yetitis realandtruein
negative,
unitywhichis a property
DM 4, 1, n. 12 (XXV, p. 118).
themselves:
things
65"... tamnegatioquamprivatio
de resineulla
vereetabsolute
praedicari
possunt
..." DM 54,5, n. 5 (p. 1032);cf.alsoDM 4, 1, n. 12(XXV, p.
fictione
intellectus;
118).
66Cf. "... primopermodumdivisionis
et tuncproprie
seunegationis;
cognoscitur
ab alio; ..." DM
removetur
tantum
unumextremum
sicutest,quia perdivisionem
54, 5, n. 6 (pp. 1032-1033).
67Fortotalandpartialdefects
ofbeing,cf.:DM 54,5, n. 25, textinnote83 below.
68Cf. "... secundopermodumcompositionis
utcumdicimus
Homo
etaffirmationis,
modus
admisceri
estcaecus
, et tuncjam videtur
, vel,estnonalbus
quidamimproprius
..." DM 54,s. 5, n. 6 (p. 1032).
etconcipiendi;
coenoscendi
69Cf. "... inhacaffirmatione,
includitur
Homoestcaecus,virtute
entis;
praedicatio
non
namverbumestincludit
entis;tumetiamquia nosterintellectus
participium
nisiconcipiat
illudpermodumentis."DM 54,
concipit
aliquidutin rebusexistens,
3, n. 4 (p. 1027).
70"... namcuminverbo,est, ipsumensaliquomodoincludatur,
per
jam attribuitur
altera
seuinchoatur
modumentisid,quodreveranonestens,atqueinhocfundatur
58

12:45:07 PM

tionspermodumaffirmationis
, we do not predicate the precise mode in
which we conceive them. Instead, we leave this mode aside and
predicate only what is conceived or ultimatelysignified,i.e. the lack
of some reality.71Accordingly, when a negation or a privation is
predicated in this second way, a way which is somewhat "odd or improper",72 it is signifiednot as positing some being or reality in its
subject, but ratheras removing such.73In this manner, inasmuch as
both remove rather than posit, the second way of composition
becomes equivalent to the firstway of division- and by the copula
which it contains there is not affirmedany positive realitybut "only
the truthof cognition".74
To be sure, explicitbeings of reason may be formedalong with, or
in the wake of, predicationsof negations and privationspermodumaf. 75 Thus negations and privations can become beings of
firmationis
reason precisely when we conceive them as positive independent
realities.76They are in this given, as it were, a certain ontological
densitywhich theywould not otherwisehave. Accordingly,he can at
timessay thatprivationas such is a being of reason.77But again, with
total consistency,he can say that privations as such are not fictions;
et privationis,
considerado
sunt,..." ibid.5, n. 6
negationis
quatenusentiarationis
(p. 1032);cf.ibid.3, n. 4, textin note69 justabove.
71Cf. "... in hisaffirmationibus
nonattribuitur
subjectomodusquo praedicatum
ut iliomodosubjectoattribuatur,
sed solumtribuiid quod concipitur,
concipitur,
seu privationem
nempenegationem
ipsam;..." DM 54, 5, n. 6 (XXVI, pp.
1032-1033).
72Cf. "... extraneus
seu improprius
modusconcipiendi
et praedicandi,
..." ibid.3,
n. 4 (p. 1027);alsosee ibid.5, n. 6, textin note68, above.
73Cf. "... nonsignificai
DM 11,3, . 8
ponerealiquid... sed potiusremovere."
(XXV, p. 366);alsosee:DM 54, 3, n. 3 (XXVI, p. 1027);ibid.1, n. 4 (p. 1016).
74"... in reiliaaffirmatio
ad remotionem
aequivalet
quantum
negationi
praedicati,
velsolumperillamcopulamaffirmatur
..." DM 54, 5, n. 6 (p.
Veritas
cognitionis,
1033).
75
Cf.DM 54,5, n. 6, textinnote68above;ibid.3, n. 4, textinnote76,immediately
following.
76Cf. "... ut haec nonsolumconcipiantur
a nobispurenegative,
sed etiamper
modumentispositivae;
habentrationem
sub qua consideratione
entis,nonrei,sed
4 Metaph.,cap. 2, ubiAristoteles
idemsentit."
utrecteD. Thomasnotavit
rationis,
Whenwe
ibid.3, . 4 (p. 1027).Muchthesamecanbe saidofmerely
things.
possible
an
themas somehow
realin themselves,
we createa fiction,
conceive
independently
"actualpossible",as itwere;cf."Quocirca,si essentia
creaturae
praeciseac secundumse sumpta,
utactuens,... ac inse habensesse,sic
etnondum
facta,consideretur
verum
nonesseensreale,sedrationis,
earnconsiderationem,
est,secundum
quianon
estin se,sedobjective
tantum
in intellectu."
DM 31, 2, n. 10 (XXVI, p. 232).
77"... privatio
secundum
se sumptaensrationis
est,nihilquerealein rebusponit;
..." DM 47, 10,n. 5 (XXVI, p. 822).
59

12:45:07 PM

theyare simplydefectsof being, i.e., in no manner themselvesbeings,

either real or rational.78
While, as we have seen, for Suarez all beings of reason have some
foundationin realityindependentof the mind,79thereare a number of
differencesamong them with respect to such foundation. Specifically
here between negations and privations: a negation does not need a
subject in re naturally apt to receive an opposite form,while a privation does require a subject of this sort.80Privations thus are always
conceived as inheringin something; but not so negations- forexample, absolute nothingis not conceived as inheringin anything.81(For
this reason, an imagined absolute space or absolute time will be
classed under negation rather than strictprivation.82)In this a pure
negation differsnot only from a privation but also from a partial
negation, a not being thisor that,which inheresin some positivething
or is conceived as so inhering.83
A second difference,and one which is importantforthis article, is
that when a negation has a subject of inherence (i.e. when the negation in question is not pure), it can have a necessaryfoundationin that
subject.84 For example, the negation of the facultyof neighing {hin78"Sic igiturtamnegatioquam privatio,
si considerentur
praecisequatenusnon
entiasunt,ut sic,necsuntentiarealia,nee rationis,
quia nonsuntentia, con..." DM
utentia,sedutnonentia,ethocmodononsuntaliquidfictum,
siderantur
54, 3, n. 3 (p. 1027).
79Cf. "... fictaentianonconcipiuntur,
nisiperaliquamhabitudinem
vel propor... omnino
ad veraentia,..." DM 6, 7, n. 2 (XXV, p. 229);"... ensrationis
tionem
ensreale:..." De Anima
IV, cap. 1, . 4 (III, p. 714); "... dicendum,
praesupponit
modoaliquo,semper
tarnen
etcognosci
entiarationis
a nobisfingi,
perorejusmodi
dinemad realia,..." ibid.
; alsoseeDM 54, 6, . 2, textin note97 below.
80Cf. "... privatio
in subjectoaptonato,negatioverodicitcarendicitcarentiam
" DM
tiamin subjecto
absolutoetsimpliciter.
54, 3, n. 8 (XXVI, p. 1028).
81"... privatio
alicuisubjecto,
ut
veladjunctum
semperconcipitur quidadhaerens
namipsumnihilestquaedamnegatio,quae nullirei
... negatioverononsemper,
..." ibid.s. 5, n. 8 (p. 1038).
adhaerere
intelligitur,
82Cf. "... licetverumsithujusmodi
esseensrationis,
sicconceptum
comspatium
vel privatione
late sumpta,quia spatiumillud,seclusis
sub negatione
prehenditur
dimensionibus,
quidest; ... Ut estetiam... de successione
imaginaria,
negativum
seclusotempore
reali,de qua eademratioestquae de spatioimquamconcipimus
thesimilar
treatment
acaginario."DM 54,4, . 7 (XXVI, p. 1030).Letus remark
cordedheretoimaginary
time;cf.alsoDM 50,9, nn. 10-11(p.
spaceandimaginary
treated
as privations,
cf.DM 54,6, n.
spaceandtimeseemingly
586).Forimaginary
3, textin note103below.
83"Negatioenim,quae concipitur
ex ratione
sua,
quasiperse, et extrasubjectum
etiamab illa negatione,
et consequenter
a privatione,
differt
formaliter
quae ex se
utadhaerens
alicui,..." DM 54, 5, n. 25 (XXVI, p. 1038).
concipitur
84Cf. "... negatio... fundari
naturatalissubjecti,
..." DM
potestin ipsaintrinseca
in subjecto,
54, 5, n. 4 (p. 1032);also,"... negatio,
aptitudinem
quia nonsupponit
60

12:45:07 PM

nibilitas)or of roaring ( rugibilitas

) in a man is such that it stems
from
nature
of
the
the man.85 As opposed to this, a
necessarily
very
in
a
does not necessarilystem from
such
as
blindness
man
privation
the very nature of the man which is its subject. Instead, beyond its
subject it is contingentlybased upon some furtheraptitude which the
subject has, but which may or may not be realized.86 Immediately
flowingfromthis is the fact that while negations must be necessarily
predicatedoftheirsubjects, privationsmust be said of theirsubjects in
a contingent way.87 Furthermore, inasmuch as negations are
necessarilystemmingfromthe nature of their subjects, they are in a
sense indifferent
to the existence of those subjects, and can be said of
them withnecessityeven when theydo not exist.88Thus we can (and
must) say that a possible man would not have the faculty of
neighing.89In line with this, negations can be presentlyattributed
(even permodumaffirmationis
) withtruthto what we shall see are beings
of reason in the very strictestsense. For example, it is true to say "a
chimaera is a non-being", precisely as Aristotledeclares it true that
non-beingis non-being.90But privations,inasmuch as they require a
talisesse potest,ut sitnecessaria,
et oppositaaffirmatio
in quo dici
impossibilis,
habereexactam
..." ibid.n. 11(p. 1034);"...
potest
quamdamrationem
negationis;
in
et quasi essentiale
fundamentum
negatiohaberepotestintrinsecum
positivm
cuiattribuitur;
subiecto
..." ibid.
85Cf. "... ut in hominenegatiohinnibilis
etc.fundatur
in intrinseca
vel rugibilis,
differentia
hominis."ibid.n. 4 (p. 1032).
86"At veroprivatio
cumconnotet
in subjecto,
nonpotestin iliout sic
aptitudinem
seuin solaintrinseca
sedin aliquaalia forma
velconditione
adejusnaturafundari,
illaprivatio
inpraecisahominis
natura,
juncta.Ut si homositcaecus,nonfundatur
sedin aliquaalia causa,quae removet
formam
quae neeatillaprivatio."ibid.
87Cf. "... privatio
essenecessaria,
vero,si propizissima
sit,nunquampotest
respectu propriisubjecti,
ad oppositum
actum;ubi autemest
quia supponit
potentiam
neutrumextremumest simpliciterimpossibilevel
potentiacontrariorum,
..." DM 54,5, n. 11(XXVI, p. 1034);also: "... privatio
veropropria
necessarium,
cumperaccidensconveniat,
aliundeprovenit,
et quasi ab extrnseco
fundamento,
..." ibid.
88Cf.DM 54,5, n. 16,textin note90, below.
89Cf.DM 54,5, n. 4, textin note85, above;alsoibid.. 16,textin note90.
90"At veronegationonsolumverisentibus,
et existentibus,
sedetiamfictis
et non
existentibus
attribu
sed etiamcomponendo
et affirpotest,nonsolumdividendo,
inrigore
veraest,Chymaera
sermonis
estnonens;nam
mando;haecenimpropositio
si estensfictum,
4 Metaph.,cap. 2, hanclocuergoestnonens; undeAristoteles,
tionem
veramessedicit,nonensessenonens,seunihil
: quodsiestnonens,etiamestnon
aliudsimilecontentum
subnonente."DM 54, 5, .
homo,nonequus,etquodlibet
16(XXVI, p. 1035).Therearetwoways,hetellsus,toexplainthis.First,although
suchpropositions
havetheformofan affirmation,
"in meaning
and signification"
to negations:"... licethae habeantformam
theyare equivalent
affirmationum,
61

12:45:07 PM

subject to which they just contingentlyor accidentally belong, can

with truthbe attributedonly to true, actually existingthings; a non
existing man, for example, cannot be blind.91 However, with truth
and necessityprivationscan ht possiblyattributedto things.Thus, it is
necessarily true that some man could be blind. But rather than a
privation, what would be attributedhere would be a positive and intrinsiccapacity.92
Still with respect to their foundation in realityindependent of the
mind, the differencebetween a negation and a privation may be no
more than a mere (extrinsic) denomination or a relation. This is the
case, forexample, between an absence of sight,which in relationto an
angel is denominated as a negation, and an absence of sightin relation
to a man, which is denominated a privation.93Consequent upon this
may be the differencebetween something's being an evilor unnatural
(forthe man) or not (forthe angel).94Again, consequent upon thiswill
be the factthatsome judgments will be contingentwhile otherswill be
necessary, e.g., it is contingent that a man is without sight, it is
necessary that an angel be withoutsight.95
... ibid.Second,itmaybe
in sensuetsignificatione
tarnen
negationibus,
aequivalent
isnotboundtoanyparticular
saidthatthecopulainsucha proposition
time,because
is intrinsically
the(infinite)
to be a figment
as thesubjectis conceived
predicate
itselfis notonlytruebut also
properto it, withtheresultthattheproposition
"Vel aliterdicipotestillacopulaabsolvia tempore,
quia eo modoquo
necessary;
ratione
et
estde intrinseca
utensfictum,
subjecti,
praedicatum
concipitur
subjectum
ilia non solumveraesse,sed etiamnecessaria."ibid.(pp.
ideo potestpropositio
between"meaning"and
in late Scholasticism
1035-1036).On the distinction
Chimeras
and
cf.E.J.Ashworth,
withfurther
regardto supposition,
"signification",
XV
inthePost-Medieval
: A Study
, in: Vivarium,
ofSignification
Theory
Objects
Imaginary
(1977),esp.pp. 59-60.
91"... privatio
nisiveriset realibus
nonpotestattribu
entibus;... Imo attribu
ad formam,
nonconvenit
aptitudinem
quia cumsupponit
potestnisireiexistenti,
et conautem
accidentalia
...
sed
ex
necessitate,
contingenter,
praedicata
subjecto
nisiin reexistentibus.
vereattribu,
rebus, eispossunt
tingenzanonconveniunt
de inesse;homoenimnonexistens
propositiones
Quod quidemverumestsecundum
nonpotestverediciessecaecus;..." DM 54,5, n. 15 (XXVI, p. 1035).
92"... secusveroent,si fiatpropositio
vereenimdicitur
modalisseu de possibili;
sed capacitasprivationis,
illiprivatio,
posseesse caecus;sed tuncnon attribuitur
Dei II, c. 2, n. 12(XI, p. 300).
est." ibid.
et intrinseca
' cf.De Scientia
quae positiva
93Cf. "Quandoveroprivatio
diveret negatiosuntejusdemformae
comparatione
etAngeli,tuncquidemin rahominis
utnegatiovisusrespectu
sorumsubjectorum,
aut
sedtantum
essentialiter
nonvidentur
tioneentisrationis
differre,
denominatione,
ex ordinead diversasubjecta."DM 54,5, n. 26 (XXVI, p. 1038).
relatione
sumpta
94Ibid.
95"Haec enimnegatio,
est
Angelus
Angelusnonhabetvisum,authaecaffirmatio,
nonvidens,longediversaesuntab his,Homoestcaecus,autcaretvisu;namillae
62

12:45:07 PM

For the moment, let us postpone treatmentof that species of negation which is impossiblebeings and instead say something about
positive beings of reason.
(b) On thepositivesideofthegeneraldivisionof beings of reason, a relationof reasonis described as one which the intellectfashions afterthe
manner of a real relation.96Like otherbeings of reason, a relation of
reason must have, at least remotely, a basis in mind-independent
reality.97There is, however, a differencebetween a relation of reason
and both a negation and a privation inasmuch as the basis of such a
relation is something positive.98At the same time, as relations of
reason mimic real categorical (rather than transcendental) relations,
they are "adventitious", that is, not necessarilyrooted in the nature
of what they relate.99Again, while relations of reason may have a
as theyare relapositive foundationin realityoutside the mind, precisely
tions mimicking categorical relations some have no foundation
while others have only a partial foundation,inasmuch as they have
none or only some of the conditions (i.e. a real subject, a real term,
and a real foundation)required fora categorical relation.100This is to
use the term "foundation" in at least two, or better,threeways. All
beings of reason, includingrelationsof reason, are founded in re. But,
as it were additionally, relations of reason inasmuch as they mimic
real relations, which need real subjects, bases, and terms, can be
totallyor partiallywithoutfoundation.
suntnecessariae
haeverocontingentes:
..." ibid.. 27 (p. 1039).Note
propositiones,
thattheformer
are immediately
baseduponthenatureof theangel,
judgments
whereas
thelatter
whichis extrinsic
tothenatureofa man.
requiresomecondition
96Cf."... relatio
rationis
incommuni
definiri
esserelationem,
positive
potest,
quam
intellectus
formae
ordinatae
ad aliud,seureferentis
unumad aliud,
permodum
fingit
autrelatum
nonest." ibid.6, . 1 (p. 1039).
quodin reipsaordinatum
97"Dico autemnecessarium
essealiquidin rebus,quodsaltemremotefundet,
vel
occasionem
huicrelationi,
praebeat
quia,ut saepedixi,agimusde entibusrationis,
ad cognitionem
entium
habentin
realium,
quae aliquomodoconferunt
quae semper
realiquodfundamentum."
ibid.n. 2.
98Cf. "Quod verorelatio
sitinilioordineetlatitudine
diversum
ensrationis
ab aliis
namfundamentum,
duobus,constat
fundamenti;
primoex diversitate
quod habet
intellectus
ad concipiendam
relationem
nonestnegatioaliquavel remotio
rationis,
sedpotiusestaliquapositiva
entitatis,
entitas,
quae a nobisnonperfecte
concipitur
nisipermodumrespectus."
DM 54, 3, n. 5, (XXVI, p. 1027).
99"... finguntur
ad instarrelationum
et non transcendenpraedicamentalium,
adventitiiperextrinsecam
et
talium,
quiasuntillirespectus
intellectus,
conceptionem
nonconcipiuntur
ut intrinsece
ad constitutionem
pertinentes
alicujusentis,quodest
de ratione
transcendentalis."
DM 54, 4, n. 6 (XXVI, p. 1030).
100Cf.note106,below.
63

12:45:07 PM

In line withthis, relationsof reason can be sub-divided in a number

of ways. First they can be partitioned into those which, precisely as
having none of the conditions, do not have any (proximate) foundation ex parte rei and those which have only an insufficient
foundation.101In the prior member are contained all those which are
fashioned between or among other beings of reason, especially those
which are " merely fabricated" ( mereconficta
), e.g., the relation of
between
two
chimaerae
or
of
similarity
dissimilarity between a
chimaera and a goat-stag, etc.102Again in this member are relations
between two or more privations, e.g. that one dark place is like
another, that in imaginary space there is distance, or that in imagThese last, he tells us,
inary time there is priorityand posteriority.103
at
least
more
in
foundation
have,
remotely,
independent realitythan,
e.g., relationsamong chimaerae.104Once more in thismember, there
belong relations between or among real possible things,e.g. the relation of temporal priorityof a (non-existing)Adam to the Antichrist.
These also have a greaterfoundationin realityinasmuch as the terms
of the relation are not altogether( omnino
) mind-dependent,although
as termsthey are so dependent.105
as they are apprehended precisely
101"... dicipotestprimadivisiorelationis
inearnquae omninoestconficta
rationis,
ex parterei,et inearnquae inre habetaliperintellectum
absqueullofundamento
licetnonsufficiens;
nuncintelligo
nomineautemfundamenti
quod fundamentum,
DM 54, 6, n. 3 (XXVI, p.
ad relationem
realemnecessarias."
omnesconditiones
1039).
10244In priorimembro
continentur
omnesrelationes
rationis,
quae interalia entia
ut estrelatio
rationis
si taliaentiarationis
sintmereconficta,
praesertim
cogitantur,
interduaschymaeras,
veldissimilitudinis
similitudinis
interchymaeram
et hircocer"
vum,etsimilis. DM 54, 6, n. 3 (XXVI, p. 1039).
103"Hue etiampertinere
rationisinterduas privationes,
possuntrelationes
quo
dicitur
similisalteri,etin spatioimaginario
modounuslocustenebrosus
concipitur
"
relatiodistantiae,
et in successione
relatioprioriset posterions.ibid.
imaginaria
Notethatpriority
and posteriority
herecan onlybe extrinsic
which
denominations,
be further
as theyfollow
upona beingofreason,wouldthemselves
beingsofreason.
A comparable
occurwhenonechimaera
wouldbe imagined
tobe at
examplemight
orleftofanother.
In thisway,wecouldhavea second,third,
fourth
theright
(toinbased upon beingsof reason,which
finity)level of extrinsicdenomination
entis"
. Fordiscussion
ofthemorenormalwouldnotbe 41
sublatitudine
denominations
realistic
character
of extrinsic
denomination
forSuarez,cf.J.P. Doyle,Proly
intheWork
Suarez
toa Study
Denomination
, in:Vivarium,
ofExtrinsic
ofFrancis
legomena
XXII (1984),pp. 119-160.
4
104 'Quamquamhae relationes
fundatae
in privationibus
vel negationibus
rerum,
ibid.On the
saltemremotum."
aliquodmajusin rebusipsishabeantfundamentum
and a
in foundation
of reasonand botha negation
distinction
betweena relation
cf.DM 54, 3, n. 5, textin note98, above.
privation,
10544Tertio,
ad hocmembrum
reducirelationes
interentiarealiapossibilia,
possunt
etsimiles,
utestrelatioantecessionis
Adamiad Antichristum,
nontarnen
existentia,
64

12:45:07 PM

In the second member (i.e. with some insufficientfoundation)

again there is a sub-division, on the basis of the various lacks such
relationsof reason have of the conditions required fora real relation
(i.e. a real subject, term, and foundation106). Thus under this
member can be located relations in which only one of the termsis existing, e.g. the priorityin time of an existing Peter to a futureAntichristor the diversityof Peter froma chimaera (or vice versa),107or
even the presence of God in imaginary space.108 In this order there
can be a furthersubdistinction,inasmuch as the relations in question
can be founded on any member of the traditionalAristoteliantriad:
(a) unity,(b) action, or (c) measure.109Second, under this member can
be located relationsamong extremeswhich although theyare real are
not really distinct. Again there is a new subdistinctionhere of (a) a
relation which is entirelyrational ( rationisratiocinantis),
as, e.g., the
eorumnonsuntomnino
quia extrema
quae majushabentin rebusfundamentum,
sint
velsubjectarelationum,
utextrema
entiarationis,
utapprehenduntur
quamvis,
DM 54, 6, n. 3 (XXVI, p. 1039).
entiarationis."
106"... relatio
a veritate
relationis
rationis
deficiat
realis,... utinea nonconcurrant
realem,qualia suntsubjectum
omnia,quae soientesse necessariaad relationem
et realisterminis
actu
realecum debitarationefundandi,
capax,fundamentum
cumsufficienti
fundamento
existens
reali,seu ex naturarei,..." DM 54, 6, . 2
(XXVI, p. 1039);alsocf.DM 47, ss. 6, 7, and8 (pp. 808-818).
107"Undesubhocmembro
relationes
illae,quae tribuuntur
possunt
primoconstimi
sivefictum,
ut
nonexistentis,
siveilludsitenspossibile,
termini
reiexistenti
respectu
vel diversitatis
Petri
Petriexistentis
ad Antichristum
relatioprioritatis
futurum,
correlatiorationis
ad huncordinem
a chymaera.
Et pariratione,
existentis
spectat
ad ensreale;..." DM
nonentisad ens,seuentisrationis
respondesinalioextremo
reinonexistentis,
tribuitur
54,6, n. 4 (XXVI, p. 1040);alsocf."Interdum
respectu
DM Index
utegodicorpriortempore
Antichristo."
V, c. 11 (XXV, xxii).
locup.
108Cf."Undepraesentia
etsignificatur
ilia,licetutconcipitur
permodumrelationis,
illudautemabsolutum,
nihilsit,et mererelatiorationis,
quodperhancrelationem
reveraest aliquidin ipsoDeo, quod
nosvolumusin divinasubstantia
declarare,
DM 30, 7, n. 17 (XXVI, p. 100).On DivineImimmensitatem
ejusappellamus."
below.
andimaginary
mensity
space,cf.notes139-144
109"Et in hoc ipso ordinesubdistingui
tresmodi
cum proportione
poterunt
vel in actione,vel in rationemensurae;
vel in unitate,
relativorum,
qui fundantur
..." DM 54,6, n. 4 (XXVI, p. 1040);cf.Aristotle,
V, c. 15, 1020a26ff.
Metaphysics
ofthetriad,i.e. measure,
Letus noteherethatrelations
baseduponthelastmember
of
oftherelation
seemalsways
tobe rational.
Indeed,theyseemtobe a subdivision
involved
between
deliberate
(On this,cf..
signsandwhattheysignify
signification
Scheibler,
I, . 25 [pp. 825-844],esp.: "Sub signoet signatocomOpusmetaph.
mensura
etmensuratum."
prehenduntur
[p. 825]).On bothsides,forSuarezsuchis
a rational
denomination
relation
founded
(cf.note111justbelow).
uponan extrinsic
in note103,above)
mentioned
withtheexceptions
that(perhaps
Againletus remark
ofbeing.Andas such,theyofarewithin
thelatitude
forSuarezsuchdenominations
relations
realfoundation
forrational
fera minimal
which,as theyarepurelymindareextra
latitudinem
entis.
dependent,
65

12:45:07 PM

relation of identity(or of distinction)of a thingwith itself,and (b) a

which has some virtual foundation in
relation ( Talionisratiocinatae)
the
of distinction among the Divine Atrelation
reality, as, e.g.,
tributes.110Third, under this member belong those relations which
lack an actually existing intrinsic
foundation in either one or both of
the extremes(subject and term). The latter,forinstance, would be in
conventional signs (whetherthese be words or things),which in both
extremes are founded upon a merely extrinsicdenomination.111The
11044Secundoconstituuntur
subiliomembro
relationes
interexquae concipiuntur
in renonhabentdistinctionem
realem... Intertrema,quae suntrealequid,tarnen
ut estin relatione
distinctio
rationis
identitatis
dumenimesttantum
ratiocinantis,
rationis
ratiocinatae,
quaeinreest
ejusdemad se ipsum;aliquandoveroestdistinctio
utestrelatio
distinctionis
interattributa
fundamentalis
seuvirtualis,
divina,etsicde
aliis." DM 54, 6, n. 5 (XXVI, p. 1040).Thismaybe as closeas Suarezcomesto
ratiocinantis
vs. rationis
ratiocinatae.
Butthisis
beingsofreasonas rationis
distinguishing
ofthatofRuvioandHurtado(cf.note61 above),whichis to
notthesamedistinction
ofbeingsofreasonandnotrestricted
as itis here
be placedat theheadofa treatment
forSuarezto onlysomesuchbeings.Formoreon a distinction
ofreason,cf."...
ex praecisione
nonestperconceptionem
distinctio
intellectus,
rationis,
quae oritur
conentitatis,
quae nonsitin re,sedpermodumsoluminadaequatum
alicujusfictae
veramrem;potestergoesseattributum
reale,quamvismodusattributionis
cipiendi
sit solumper rationem.
et distinctionis
Quin potius,si proprieloquamur,ut ata realisubjecto,oportet
tributum
sit sola rationedistinctum
quod sitattributum
reale,et non rationistantum,vel privativum;
alioqui,formaliter
loquendo,plus
ut nonensab ente,velutab enteveroensficscilicet
distingueretur,
quamratione
a distinctum."DM 3, 1,n. 6 (XXV, p. 104).It maybe notedherethat,although
itandthedistincta
there
between
tionofreasonmaybe itself
mind-dependent,
purely
fallsa realdistinction,
suchas alsofallsbetween
anybeingofreasonandanyrealbefallsbetween
twobeings
pointofwhatkindofdistinction
ings.Thisraisesthefurther
ofreason.In at leastoneplace,Suarezsaysthatsuchwouldbe "quasi-real";
purely
cf. "Possuntauteminterdum
duo entiarationis,
quae non possuntdici
distingui
realiter
equeetiamdicipossunt
distingui,
quiaentiarealianonsunt;tarnen
proprie
rationedistingui
et intrinsece,
quia eo modoquo sunt,nonjam ex fictione
proprie
sed ex se veredistinguuntur.
Nam,cumdistinctio
rationis,
negatiosit,communis
etitapotiusestilladistinctio
essepotestetiamfictis
entibus,
quasirealis,sicutsupra
..." DM 7, 1, n. 7 (p. 252).
intertenebras,
etcaecitatem;
de distinctione
dicebamus
cf.
wouldbe rational;
thatsucha distinction
hemight
Butelsewhere
appeartothink
aut
essedebetinterrealesentitates,
e.g. "... namomnistalis[i.e. realis]distinctio
etmodum
interrealementitatem
ejus." DM 5, 2, n. 11(p. 151).Suarez'sviewonall
"Unde ilia distinctio,
ofthisseemsfurther
quae inby thefollowing:
complicated
solumest
et individuum,
communem
abstracte
interrationem
intellectum,
telligitur
in mente."DM 5, 2, n. 15
rationis,
quia ilianaturaut sicnullibiest,nisiobjective
(XXV, p. 153).
111"Unde ad hoc genusspectant
relationes
omnes,quae in utroqueeximprimis
ut est relatiosigniad
tantumin denominatione
tremofundantur
extrnseca,
sitvox,
sivesignum
estrelatio
rationis,
quae taminsigno,quaminsignato
placitum,
DM 54,6, 6 (XXVI, p. 1040).
sivesitres,utsacramentum."
utnomen,
autverbum,
as it is
inasmuch
Let us remark
denomination,
againthatforSuarezan extrinsic
66

12:45:07 PM

same, he says, is true of the relations of reason between master and

slave, husband and wife, buyer and seller, etc., all of which are
founded on extrinsicdenominations fromthe wills of the parties involved.112Again, in thisorder belong all non mutual relations insofar
as theyare rational in one of theirextremes,e.g. the relation of seen
to one seeing, of seeable to sight,or ofknowable to knowledge, or also
the relations of God to existing creatures.113Fourth
, there is another
kind of relation of reason with some remote basis in existing things
and some proximatefoundationin an extrinsicdenomination. Of this
kind are those relations of reason which are called ' 'logical
intentions": relations of genus, species, predicate, subject, and the
like. In these relations, sometimes, although the extremes are real,
thereis not enough distinctionbetween them, as e.g. between animal
and rationalwhen theyare compared as genus and difference.Or, the
opposite, sometimesthere is not enough unity in actual existence (in
re) as e.g. in the case of a universal with respectto singular things.114
a quasientis
notedaboveat 103)sublatitudine
, provides
exceptions
(withthepossible
latitudinem
entis
.
realfoundation
forrelations
ofreason,which,
as such,areextra
112"Deinde,ejusdemsuntmodirelationes
dominietserviinterhomines,
namillae
et
non fundantur
denominatione
nisiin quadamextrnseca
sumptaa volntate;
ex contractibus
similessuntaliae multae,ut omnesquae oriuntur
et voluntatibus
et uxoremin rationeconjugum,interementemet
humanis,ut intermaritum
vendentum
ex volntate
et sic de aliis." DM 54, 6, n. 6 (XXVI, p.
contrahendi,
ofdiscrete
similarin theextrinsic
1040).Forsomething
(and "rational")character
innulloeorumest
hominum
se consideres,
cf."... si ternarium
secundum
quantity,
primaunitas,secunda,aut tertia;nullaenimratiotalisordinispotestintereos
illeergoordosi quisest,solumestrationis
..." DM 41, 1, n. 2 (XXVI, p.
assignari;
ofconin themeasurement
588);alsocf.ibid.n. 17 (p. 592). Fora likesubjectivity
cf. "... in propriaquantitate
tinuous
ut mensuram
continuamensuram
quantity,
esseperhumanam
accomodationem,
quianullaestmajorratioquodhaecres
semper
DM 40,3, n.
mensuret
siresipsaesecundum
sespectentur."
illam,quame converso,
8 (p. 540);ibid.4, 6, n. 4 (XXV, p. 136).On thislast,letus remember
Scheibler
(cf.
note121,above)treating
ofsignification.
measurement
as a subdivision
On itsface,
thiswouldseemtobe related
toquestions
scientific
cf.note183
constructs;
regarding
below.
113"Rursusad aliud membrum
non
omnesrelationes
hujus generispertinent
inunoextremo
visiad videntem,
rationis
aut
mutuae,
sunt,utsuntrelatio
quatenus
visibilis
ad visum,aut scibilisad scientiam,
etc. ... Et hueetiamrevocari
possunt
omnesrelationes
..." DM 54, 6, n. 7 (XXVI, p. 1040).
Dei ad creaturas
existentes,
114"Quartoet ultimopossumus
earumrelationum,
in
aliudmembrum
constituere
ex praedictis
ad relationem
realemconcurrunt,
defectibus
exnecessariis
quibusmulti
cumaliquofundamento
exinaliquadenominatione
remoto
ex parterei,etproximo
et hujusmodi
videntur
esse relationes
trnseca;
rationis,
quae intentiones
logicales
utsuntrelationes
etsimiles.... In
appellantur,
speciei,praedicati,
generis,
subjecti,
hisergorelationibus,
licetinterdum
extrema
distinctio
sintrealia,saepetamendeficit
utinteranimaletrationale,
utgenusetdifferentia;
sufficiens,
quatenus
comparantur
67

12:45:07 PM

In instances of this fourthkind, the proximate foundationis in an

Since
extrinsicdenomination resultingfroman act of the intellect.115
such acts are threefold:conception, judgment, and reasoning, relaFrom conception,
tions of this fourthkind are likewise threefold.116
there arise relations of genus, species, definition,definitum
, etc.; from
and
of
proposition;
predicate, subject, copula,
judgment, relations
fromreasoning, relations of antecedent, consequent, mean, extreme,
etc.117These relations are not gratuitouslyfashioned; theyhave bases
in things existing independent of the mind (ex r), bases such as: (i)
real similarity( convenientia
), (ii) real identityor real union of one
thingwith another (the basis forthe relationexpressed by the copula),
or (iii) a real emanation of one item from another, or real con, is
comitance, etc. (on which inference,whethera priorior a posteriori
founded
so
of
this
Relations
kind,
immediately upon
founded).118
denominations coming fromacts of the intellect,are in a special way
in alteroextremo
utsicrelato,
unitasetexistentia
etiamnonestsufficiens
interdum
universalis
namquatenus
utsicrespectu
utestin reuniversali
est,esingularium,
8
DM
n.
unitatem."
in
re
talem
habet
6,
54,
pp.
existit,
(XXVI,
neque
que
cf.alsoDM 6, 6, . 12(XXV, p. 228).
1040-1041);
115"... proximefundanturin aliqua denominatione
ab actu
proveniente
DM 54, 6, n. 8 (p. 1041).
intellectus.,,
"Undejuxtatriplicem
etiamestordotaliumrelaintellectus
triplex
operationem
tionum."DM 54, 6, n. 9 (XXVI, p. 1041).
117"... ex primaoperatione
relationes
generis,speciei,definitionis,
consurgunt
relatiopraedicati,
definiti,
etc.; ex secundaoperatione
subjecti,copulaeproposietc." ibid.
relatioantecedentis,
medii,extremitatis,
tionis;ex tertia,
consequentis,
ne "Non tarnen
sedsumpto
sunthae relationes
aliquofundamento
gratisconfictae,
abstractio
in qua fundatur
ex re,qualisestautrealisconvenientia,
universalis,
quae
in genus,speciem,
etiamvariatur
etc.,ex eo quodconvenientia
majorestvelminor;
uniusab alio,
affirmatio
autuniouniuscumalio,inqua fundatur
velrealisidentitas
velaliquidsimile,in qua fununiusab alio,autconcomitantia,
velrealisemanatio
ibid.
vela posteriori."
daturillatioa priori
; cf.ibid.2, n. 16(p. 1022).On convenientia
inthe(universal)
whichresults
fortheabstraction
as a foundation
orsimilitudo
objeccf.DM 35, 3, n. 40 (XXVI, p. 452);DM 38, 1, n. 3 (p. 492). Letus
tiveconcept,
comesingrades;cf.DM 2, 2, n. 18(XXV,
notethattherealsimilitude
amongthings
DM 36, 1,
(XXVI, pp. 304ff.);
p. 76);DM 6, 9, n. 19(p. 242);DM 31, 13,nn. 19ff.
atthislevelconn. 3 (p. 479).Fora denialofreal"identity"
things
amongdifferent
respluresdicia
cf."Unde solumpossunt
oftheintellect,
thefirst
operation
fronting
esseinter
cum
dicatur
enim
est
haec
id
rei
identitas,
similis;
naturae,
parte ejusdem
..." DM 6,
essepraeter
nonpotestin reipsaquidpiam
resdistinctas,
similitudinem,
2, n. 13(XXV, p. 210);alsocf.DM 7, 3, nn.3-5(pp. 272-273).Atthesecondlevel
- identity
on that;cf.notes281
ofreasonfounded
is a relation
whatis realis unity
of"emanation"and
and 282,below.Atthethirdlevel,theobviousunderstanding
andthesecondwitha posteriori
witha priori
thefirst
wouldconnect
"concomitance"
reasoning.However,on occasion,Suarez will treatbothemanationand conon whatappearsto be a singlea priori
comitance
line;cf.e.g. DM 18,3, nn. 2-10
(XXV, pp. 615-619).
68

12:45:07 PM

(peculiariter
) called "second intentions".119This is (in part, at least)
because they are objects of a second formal intending.120Of course,
the mind can furtherreflecton these second intentions- to formsucBut any foundation
ceeding (3rd, etc.) intentions121;to infinity.122
theyhave in existingthingsmust be understoodof the firstrelationsof
such a succession.123
3. Explicitly"Impossible"Beings
As we have seen, for Suarez all beings of reason somehow involve
conceivingsomethingto be which in factis not. But beyond this,there
are certain beings of reason which so involve internal contradiction
that they cannot exist and these he has explicitlylabeled "impossible".124 Keeping to the common classificationof beings of reason,
he has located them under negations, for the reason that they are
nothing in themselves.125In contrast to otherJesuit philosophers of
119"... soienthae ultimaerelationes
rationis
peculiariter
appellarisecundaeintentiones,..." DM 54,6, n. 10 (XXVI, p. 1041).
120"... quia secundaenotioni
seu intentioni
ibid.
formali
objiciuntur."
121"... possitintellectus
secundasintentiones
etconiterum
reflecti,
supraipsasmet
veldifferentiae
interipsasconsiderare,
et eas definire,
velex eis discurvenientias,
..." DM 54, 6, n. 11 (XXVI, p.
rere,atqueita in eis similesrelationes
fundare;
1041);ibid.2, n. 17(p. 1023).
122"... in infinitum
feremultiplican
velreflexiones
intellectus,
possunt
perfictiones
..." DM 54,6, n. 11(XXVI, p. 1041);cf.DM 6, 9, n. 20 (XXV, p. 242).Alsocf.
DM 15, 11,n. 19(XXV, p. 563); andDM 3, 2, n. 13 (XXV, p. Ill) wherehe excertain
andcallsthem" inplicitly
speaksofmultiplying
beingsofreasonto infinity
utiles
ofa process
"; as wellas DM 2, 6, n. 5 (p. 100)wherehenotesthemind'shorror
to infinity.
In thisconnection,
consider
A. Ruvioon theunscientific
character
of
thosebeingsofreasonwhichhe regards
as altogether
without
"... etde
foundation:
hocsecundocertum
... Primo,quia ea de
est,ad nullamscientiam
perse pertinere.
essedebent:sed Entiarationis,
quibusscientiaperse agit,determinata
quae non
habentfundamentum,
ab intellectu;
possuntin infinitum
multiplicari
ergonulla
scientia
Mexicana
entis
rationis
, De natura
, dub.6, p.
potest
perse agerede illis."Logica
79. For Suarez'recognition
ofsuchan objection,
cf.DM 54, 4, n. 2 (XXVI, p.
1029).
123"... cumdicuntur
haerelationes
fundari
est
aliquomodoinrebus,intelligendum
de primis
relationibus
hujusordinis."ibid.
124Cf.e.g.: "Itemmultacogitantur
etmodopossibilium
enquae suntimpossibilia,
tiumfinguntur,
utchymaera,
DM 54, 1,
quae nonhabentaliudessequamcogitari."
n. 7 (XXVI, p. 1017); ibid.n. 8; "... potestfingererem impossibilem,
ut
ibid.2, n. 18(p. 1023);ibid.4, n. 10(p. 1031);"... aequereperitur
in
chymaerum."
rebusimpossibilibus
ac in possibilibus:
..." DM 31, 12,n. 45 (XXVI, p. 297); "...
resimpossibilis,
utchimaera,
..." DeAnima
III, . 2, . 27(III, p. 622);ibid.. 28(p.
623).
125Cf. "... cumenimhujusmodi
entiafictasimpliciter
sintnonentia,merito
sub
..." DM 54,4, n. 10(XXVI, p. 1031),cf.alsonote65
negatione
comprehenduntur;
69

12:45:07 PM

his own time and after,126Suarez will allow their formationby the
imagination inasmuch as this faculty in human beings shares
somehow in reason.127 But their chief cause, he says, is the very
fecundityof the intellect itself,which in formingthem, from parts
which separately mightbe real, does not err, since it does not affirm
them actually to exist.128For this reason, the compositioninvolved in
fabricatingthem seems to be "non-ultimate".129 Even though it is
minimallysemantic,130this composition is not a finaljudgment of asweconsider
above;alsoDM 3, s. 2, n. 13,textinnote155below.Noteagainthatwhen
a merely
wemakeita beingofreason:cf.
beingas actualbythatverystroke
possible
note76, above.
126Cf. e.g.: P. Hurtadode Mendoza,Disput,
d. 19,s. 5, . 84; A. Ruvio,
metaphys.
, II, d. 2, q. 1,s.
, pp. 74-75;andG. De Rhodes,Philosophia
peripatetica
Logicamexicana
2, n. 2 Lugduni1671,p. 19.
127"... dicendum
... etiamposse
est,ea entiarationis,
quae suntmereimpossibilia,
humanain hocparticipai
tarnen,
quia imaginado
aliquo
fingiperimaginationem;
alsocf.DM 47,8, .
... ZW 54,2, . 18(XXVI, pp. 1023-1024);
modovimrationis,
6 (p. 816),andDe Trinitate
, IX, . 2, . 11(I, 725).
128Cf. "Est tarnen
tertiacausaproveniens
ex quadamfoecunditate
intellectus,
qui
partesquae in recomponinon
conjungendo
potestex verisentibusfictaconficere,
autquidsimile,
etitaformat
illaentiarationis,
chymaerum,
possunt,
quomodofingit
In hisautem
et ab aliquibusdicuntur
entiaprohibita.
impossibilia,
quae vocantur
itaessein re,sicutea connonfallitur
intellectus,
quia nonaffirmai
conceptionibus,
DM 54, 1,n. 8 (XXVI, p. 1017).To
inquo nonestfalsitas."
simplici,
cipitconceptu
Deus
thislast,he makesa similar
pointas regards
imaginary
space:"... nondicitur
ac
rebuspossibilibus,
sicutspatiisimaginariis,
essepraesens
quae itaapprehendimus
ea existere,sed per
non per deceptionem,
si existerent,
quia non affirmamus
..." DM 30, 7, n. 17 (XXVI, p. 100).
simplicem
apprehensionem,
129Cf. DM 8, 4, n. 8, textin note138below.
130Cf. De Trinitate
for
there,
IX, . 2, . 12,textin note22 above;as weremarked
theultimate
to someextent
Suarezthenon-ultimate
signifies
concept
conventionally
tradition
beforeSuarez,
conceptand thethingbeyond.Notethat,in theScholastic
ofsuch
thenon-ultimate
character
D. Soto,Summulae
, I, . 3, . 6 (6r.),compares
itself
leadstotheknowledge
tothatofan instrumental
sign,whichas known
concepts
of something
this,Fonsecaregardsthefirst
beyond.Not necessarily
contradicting
hoc
of the non-ultimate
conceptas natural:"Interquos conceptus
signification
naturaliter
discrimen
significai
ipsam
perspice,
quod Medius[i.e. nonultimtus]
ex im... Ultimusveroab ipsa eademvoce,aut scriptura
vocem,aut scripturam,
"
dialect
. , I, . 11 (ed. Ferreira
positionesignificatur.P. Fonseca,S.J., Institut,
thenis both
concept
saythatthenon-ultimate
Gomes),I, p. 40. The Conimbricenses
c. 1,q. 2, a. 3 (p. 20)andq. 2, a. 3,
andan instrumental
a formal
sign;cf.Indelnterp.
fromtheres. 2 (p. 27), in whichlastplace,theydispensea non-ultimate
concept
beforeit lead to the
thatan instrumental
signbe itselffirstperceived
quirement
conButtheyalsosaythatwe canhavenon-ultimate
ofwhatitsignifies.
knowledge
any semanticcarryoverto thingsbeyond,e.g., whenwe recite
ceptswithout
wordssuchas "Blictri")ofa
words(as opposedto non-significative
significative
their
without
meaning:
"Atqueadeosaepenosvoces
understanding
language
foreign
reisignificatae,
utetiameduntqui latina
edereabsqueullacognitione
significativas
nonadvertunt.
In quo
aut quamvisintelligunt,
intelligunt,
vocabularecitant,
70

12:45:07 PM

sent or dissent.131Suarez speaks of such beings as complex and im'

possible but fashioned by a 'quasi-simple concept" and gives examples of a chimaera (which he may understand as a composite of
horse and lion132)and a flyingox ( bos volans
).133(We might, I think,
add otherexamples such as an irrationalman134or a square circle.135)
medios
haberepotestconceptus
sed etiamintellectus
eventunonmodophantasia,
a little
thanthe
earlier
IndeInterp.
c. 1,q. 3, a. 3 (p. 37).Publishing
absqueultimis."
Summularum
Conimbricenses,
1590]
Villalpando
[Compiuti,
GasparGardillo
(Summa
L. I, p. 2, q. 2 [p. 10]) woulddenythata non-ultimate
conceptcouldbe nontis
vocissignifican
esseconceptum
cf."Dixi conceptum
nonultimum
significative;
convocisexpertis
rem,quia si sitconceptus
jam nonestexistimandus
significatus,
et
estconceptus
ultimus
sedpotiusconceptus
Blytiri,
hujusmodi
ceptusnonultimus,
attheendofthisarticle.
Tothisweshallreturn
scyndapsus."
131Cf. "... quandoenimintellectus
assenet suspendit
compositionem
apprehendit
sintin re,sicutper
itaconjuncta
an reveraillaextrema
sum,ideoestquia ignort
" DM
8, 4, n. 5 (XXV, p. 291); Suarez's imcompositionem
apprehenduntur.
of
hereis withnon-ultimate
mediate
concern
, butfromthecontinuation
propositions
aboutbeingsofreason.Alsocf.:DM
thetext,itis clearthathe hassimilar
thoughts
54, 1, n. 8 and30, 7, n. 17,textin note128above.
132Among16thand 17thcentury
aboutthe
therewasnottotalagreement
authors,
onOvid,saysitismadeupofthe
ofa chimaera.
Thus,e.g. Soto,relying
composition
andthebackofa goat,cf.Summulae
Summularum
headofa lion,thetailofa serpent,
,
In
I, c. 7, arg.3. (Salamancae,1554),p. 12r.; forthesame,seetheConimbricenses,
Dialecticam inpraef.Porphyrii
universam
, q. 6, a. 1, (p. 144). But Georgede
ofan ox,a lion,anda goat(Philosophia
Rhodes,S.J.speaksofitas: (1) a combination
ofa goat,a lion,anda dragon
, I, d. 2, s. 2, [p. 16]),and(2) a combination
peripatetica
(iibid.p. 17).
133"Et quia impossibile
estequumesseleonem,ideoilluciens,quodconcipitur
per
et chymaeram
vel aliquidsimile
modumequi et leonissimul,dicimusessefictum,
nominamus:et ad eumdemmodum,ut explicemushanc negationemesse
bos volantem,
ut quid imBos non potestvolare,apprehendimus
necessariam,
et ensrationis."DM 54, 4, n. 10 (XXVI, p. 1031).Notethattheseimpossibile
a
in thequasi-simple
evidence
beings,
concept
bywhichtheyarefashioned,
possible
kindofinternal
inthisthatthey,as impossible,
"conIndeed,itis precisely
identity.
sist".Thisidentity
wouldbe ina specialwaythena relation
ofreason.Whereas
other
as relations
ofreason,mightbe immediately
founded
identities,
uponrealunities,
thisidentity
wouldhaveno suchfoundation.
Manufactured
bythemind,itwouldbe
- perhapssupposing
thebottom
lineof therelation
extrinsic
itself
only(remotely)
in things
as theyareknown.Forsomethoughts
ofentia
foundations
on theidentity
... Metaphysica
rationis
cursus
, Cont.XII, punct.2, nn.5-7
, cf.F. Oviedo,S.J.,Integer
of the
of itsobject)character
(pp. 432-433).On the"absolute"(i.e. independent
outofpossibleparts,cf.De Anima
humanintellect
chimaerae
fashioning
impossible
III, . 2, . 28 (III, pp. 622-623).
134Cf.DM30, 16,n. 14 (XXVI, p. 210).
135In thecourseofhisarticle,
El Entederazn
enSuarez
IV, nmero
, in; Pensamiento
extraordinario
(1948),pp. 271-303,
JuanF. Yela-Utrilla
(p. 294)givesthisexample
without
text.I havenotfounditinSuarez,butI agreethatitwouldbe acceptable
to
him. For the same examplein theJesuittradition
afterSuarez,cf. Maximus
1765Ontologia,
d. I, a.
Tomusprior,Ingolstadii
recentior,
Mangold,S.J.,Philosophia
1, n. 3 (p. 51).
71

12:45:07 PM

He also seems to say that such impossible beings are fashioned by

This would give another
puttingwordsratherthan thingstogether.136
reason why, even though these concepts are minimallysemantic not
just of words but of possible (or impossible) thingsbeyond,137theyare
"not ultimate".138
In at least one place, he has expresslycontrastedimpossible beings
with another being of reason. This is "imaginary space", which, as
we have noted,139he treats in the same way as "imaginary time".
The contrast is that while imaginary space is a being of reason, it is
not, like impossible beings, fashioned gratuitously.It ratherhas, he
tells us, a foundationtaken fromreal bodies inasmuch as theyare apt
to constitutereal space not only where theynow are but also to infini136Cf. "... quo mododicuntaliqui,tuncmagisapprehendi
vocis
significationem
si haevelilid quodconsurgeret,
quamremaliquam.Undetuncsolumcognoscitur
lae partesconjungerentur,
..." DM 8, 4, n. 7 (XXV, p. 291); cf.ibid.n. 8, textin
theviewof"some",hedoes
note129above.WhileinthisplaceSuarezis reporting
toagreewithit. Also,whilewe do oftenformconcepts
bymeansof
appearhimself
andthenwordstoexpress
orderis toform
first
them;cf.
words,thenatural
concepts
mediisvocibus,tamensecundum
"Nam licetquoadnosconceptus
saepeformentur
et est
se et simpliciter,
priorestconceptus,
qui ex se paritvocemqua exprimitur,
rei
estsimpliciter
et absoluteconceptus
ejus; ergotalisconceptus
origoimpositionis
inordinead significationem
dicatur
secundum
se,etnontantum
vocis,uthacratione
seuquidnominis."
DM 2, 1, 13(p. 69). In thislastcitation,
note
nominis,
conceptus
inordine
between
theconceptus
reiand theconceptus
ad significationem
vocis
thecontrast
Butalsonotethatinthetradition
totheconceptus
nominis.
towhich
whichis equivalent
to whattheword(nomen
is ultimately
reducible
Suarezbelongsthequidnominis
)
cf. e.g. P. Fonseca:"Quidditasveroet naturanominisest ipsa eius
signifies;
et naturamexplicare,
quo fitut nihilaliudsit,nominisquidditatem
significatio:
dialect.
Institut,
V, c. 2 (p. 288).
patefacere."
quameiussignificationem
137On theminimally
ofnon-ultimate
semantic
character
cf.notes22 and
concepts,
whoapparently
130 above.For at leastone of Suarez'disciples
regardsthenonwhichitrepresents,
cf.
as notsemantic
ultimate
concept
beyondthebareworditself
se nudesumpti."F.
estcognitio
ipsiussignisecundum
"Conceptusnonultimtus
cursus
... Logica
, Cont.I, punct.2, n. 6 (p. 4).
Oviedo,S.J.,Integer
138Cf. "... hujusmodi
mentales,
quaesuntabsquejudicio,regulariter
compositiones
vocumpotiusquamrerum,
fieriperconceptus
quia cumin reipsanoncognoscitur
secundum
cumsubjecto,non etiamapprehenditur
rem,sed
praedicati
conjunctio
vocemseucopulam
talemunionem.
secundum
significantem
Quodsi itaest,tuncilla
etinea estVeritas
vel
nonultimata,
estinmente,
utvocant,
apprehensiva
compositio
ad placitum,
nonutincognitione,
sedutinsignotantum
sicutestinvocevel
falsitas,
thispassageis directly
DM 8, 4, n. 8 (p. 292). Although
concerned
in scriptura."
affirm
as trueor
with"suspended
judgments"
(i.e. thosewhichwe do notactually
it is clearthatit appliesto impreceding
paragraph,
false),fromtheimmediately
Alsohereletus recallwhatSuarezhassaidabout
beingssuchas chimaerae.
possible
or apprehended
"God exists",whichmaybe conceived
theproposition,
onlyas
oftheir
in anywayaffirming
thereality
themeaningofitswords,without
regards
cf.De Div.Subst.
I, . 1, nn.8-9(i, p. 3), sometextin note259below.
referent;
139Cf. note82 above.
72

12:45:07 PM

ty outside the last heavenly sphere.140Again, while as we have just

seen, impossible beings are classified under negations, imaginary
space and time can be broadly ( latesumpta)classified(first,at least) as
privations.141Here it should be recalled that Suarez will admit that
negations and privations are in some sense real in themselves, or
All of which, especially when it is linked to
mind-independent.142
Suarez' doctrineof ubication as an intrinsicmode of being,143signals
fairlyrealisticnotions of imaginary space and time.144
The importanceof impossible beings of Suarez' doctrineis evident
froma closer examination of his main division of beings. This as we
saw, was into those which are mind dependent and those which are
independent.When we speak of independentbeing we mean, he tells
us, "that which has a real essence, that is one which is not fictionalor
140"Itaque,quatenushocspatium
distincti
apprehenditur
permodumentispositivi
a corporibus,
mihividetur
esseensrationis,
nontarnen
gratisfictum
opereintellecex ipsiscorporibus,
sed sumptofundamento
ts, sicutentiaimpossibilia,
quatenus
sua extensione
aptasuntconstituere
spatiarealia,nonsolumquae nuncsunt,sedin
de Dei
infinitum
extracoelum,proutsupraetiam,indisp.30,dictum
est,tractando
cf.DM
DM 51, 1, n. 24 (XXVI, p. 979).On theDivineImmensity,
immensitate."
30, 7, nn. 1-51(pp. 95-112);andDe Div.Subst.
II, . 2, nn. 1-12(I, pp. 48-54).To
better
understand
therelationship
ofDivineImmensity
andimaginary
space,cf."...
nontarnen
licetDeusdesinat
esseincreatura
desinaiesseibi,ubi
[i.e. iliadestructa],
in
eratcreatura;
hocenimconvenit
Deo ratione
immensitatis,
quae estimmutabilis
a posteriori
velpropinquitatis
nam
distantiae,
ipso;quodex relationibus
intelligitur;
omnescreaturae
ileamdemretinent
habitudinem
ad Deum,praeter
propinquitatis
estconjuncta
lamquaedesinit
tamintime
Deo, velDeus
esse;cuisi aliquasuccessit,
in ipsa,sicutquae antecessit;
si autemnullaillisuccessit
(utpotequae annihilata
ut sine sui mutatione,
ita manetDeus in se dispositus,
possitesse in
fingitur)
ibifiat;qua ratione
Deus manerein iliospatioimdicitur
creatura,
quotiescumque
d. 54, 1, n. 4 (XXII, p. 255); also
replebat."De Eucharistia
aginario,
quodcreatura
ofDivineImmensity
cf.DM 30,7, n. 17(XXVI, p. 100).Foran evencloserrelation
andimaginary
cf.G. De Rhodes,S.J.,Phil,
spaceamongSuarez'Jesuitconfreres,
L. II, disp.IV, q. 1, s. 2 deLocoetVacuo
perip.
(Lugduni,1671),p. 219.On thisquestionin Suarez,cf.J. Hellin,S.J.,Sobre
la immensidad
deDiosenSuarez
, in: Estudios
22 (1948),pp. 227-263,esp. 253-257.
eclesisticos,
141Cf.DM 54,4, n. 7,textinnote82,above;alsocf.DM 54,6, n. 3, textinnote103
above.
142Cf. e.g. "... ratiodubitandi
breviter
essepotest,
et privationes
quia negationes
immerito
numerari
videntur
interentiarationis,
quia nonsuntaliquidmenteconfie
in
sed
nam
re
aer
est
et
carens
vere
rebus
tum,
tenebrosus,
ipsisconveniunt,
ipsa
ethomoestnonalbus,si sitniger."DM 54, 3, n. 2 (XXVI, p. 1026).
lumine,
143On this,see J.I. Alcorta,La Teoriade los modos
enSuarez,Madrid1949,pp.
295-313.
144Forsuchan understanding
ofSuarez,see P. Hoenen,S.J., Cosmologia,
Romae
1945,pp. 81-108,esp. 81-83.Foran opposite
view,cf.J. Hellin,loc.cit.[cf.note
in thiscontext,
ibid.p. 257,andalsoAlcorta,
138,above];on themodeofubication
op.cit.p. 301.
73

12:45:07 PM

chimerical, but one which is [transcendentally]true in itselfand apt

for real existence."145A true, real being in this sense is nothingelse
but a non-fiction,a non-chimaera.146As such, it is in itselftrue and
Each thingin factis intelligibleto the degree that it has
intelligible.147
being.148Contrariwise, mental fictionsare beings of reason,149which
have no intelligibilityor (transcendental) truthin themselves.150The
core of distinction,therefore,between a real or independent being
and a being of reason, that is, what a real being has, in addition to the

being known" it shares with a being strictlyofreason, seems to be at

least an internal aptitude forexistence.151Again, a true being is one
In the sense that Suarez speaks of it, a fiction,
which is not a fiction.152
which is obviously mind-dependent,at a minimum involves conceiving somethingas though it were real when in fact it is not.153When
they are so conceived, relations of reason, privations, and simple
negations become beings of reason.154But even more strictly,a being
145cf."... si enssumatur
hujusvocisin vi nominis
sumptae,
proutestsignificatimi
nec
in hoc,quodsithabensessentiam
realem,id estnonfictam,
ejusratioconsistit
DM 2, s. 4, n. 5 (p. 89).
existendum."
sedveramet aptamad realiter
chymericam,
versusensutparticipium
onthe
On ensutnomen
, cf.JohnP. Doyle,Suarez
Analogy
ofBeing
..., pp. 224-231,esp. n. 30. Forimpossible
beingsofreasontakenbothnominaliter
afterSuarez,cf.M. Wietrowski,
in thetradition
andparticipialiter
S.J.,Philosophia
, conci.14,cap. 2, . 1 (p. 276).
disputata.
Logica
146"... dicitur
... DM 3, s. 2, n. 12(XXV,
enimverumens,quodnonestfictum;
aliumconceptum
ensrealenullum
dicit,quamesseensreale,
p. 110); "... esseverum
DM 8, s. 7, n. 2 (p. 295);andDM 2, s. 4, n.
id est,nonfictum,
nequechymericum."
5, textin note145,immediately
preceding.
147Thus,e.g.,withregard
tointrinsic
modes,hesaysthattheyare:"... verum[sic],
etperse intelligibiles
sunt."DM 2, s. 5, n. 11(XXV, p. 96).
quia nonsuntconficti,
148"... quantum
..."
habetde intelligibilitate,
habetde esse,tantum
unumquodque
. . 34 (p. 307;DM 30,s. 15,. 22 (XXVI, p. 176);De
DM 8, s. 7, n. 7 (p. 297);ibid
Dei I, . 8, . 3 (XI, . 328).
Scientia
149"... ensfabricatum
...' DM 31,2, n.
estensrationis)
ab intellectu
(quodproprie
10(XXVI, p. 232).
150"... licetentiarationis,
dicipossunt
habereconforeo modoquo cognoscuntur,
mitatem
cumintellectu,
tamen,quia ex se nonhabentintelligibilitatem,
nequeenilla conformitas,
ideo nequeveritatem
in qua fundetur
titatem
habent,quae est
passioentis."DM 8, s. 7, n. 36 (XXV, p. 307). NotethatSuarezwillat timesallow
cf.De Anima
IV, cap. 1, . 4 (III, p.
intelligibility":
beingsofreasona "secondary
714).
151Cf. "... in primarationequidditatis
ad existendum,
et in
realisintrat
aptitudo
realisa nonrealiseu ficta."DM 3, s. 2, . 4 (p.
hocprimodistinguitur
quidditas
108).
152Cf. DM 8, s. 7, n. 2, textin note146above.
153"... ensrationis
entisidquodensnon
nonformatur
nisiconcipiendo
permodum
est;..." DM 54, s. 2, n. 20 (XXVI, p. 1024).
154Cf. DM 54, 3, n. 4, textin note76 above.
74

12:45:07 PM

of reason is something which involves intrinsicrepugnance or imPrecisely as such, it does not just lack aptitude forexpossibility.155
istence. Instead, it excludessuch aptitude, and in so doing it is (in contrastto an extrinsicdenomination)156outside the range of being ( extra
In thisthe centralplace of impossible beings within
latitudinem
entis).157
the ambit of beings of reason stands revealed.
At this point, let me say that the problem of truthrelates to all beings of reason, but in a special way it regards so-called impossible beings. Simply stated: if truthis in a conformitybetween the mind and
reality,how can there be any truthwhere there is no independent
reality? But most of all, how can there be any truth where such a
realitywould be impossible of realization?
St. Louis, Missouri
St. Louis University

(to becontinued)

155Cf."... illudenimestproprie
utin
ensfictum,
apprehendi
potest,
quoditamente
se involvat
et impossibilitatem,
repugnantiam,
quae estnegatioquaedam,..." DM
3, s. 2, n. 13(XXV, p. 111).
156Foran insightful
ofSuarezon thereality
ofextrinsic
denominaunderstanding
d. 19,s. 1, esp.nn.
tion,cf.P. Hurtadode Mendoza,S.J.,Disputationes
metaphysicae
too
9, 15-18,Lugduni1624,pp. 943-945.Butalso,letusnotethat:(1) wecanconfer
a beingofreason;
muchreality
and thusfabricate
denomination
uponan extrinsic
froman actofsightas some
e.g. we mightregard"thebeingseen" whichresults
ofa wallwhichis seen(cf.DM 54,2, n. 16 [XXVI, p. 1022]);and
"quasi-property"
denomination
notresulting
froma realform,
which
(2) we couldhavean extrinsic
denomination
woulditself
be a beingofreason(cf.note103above).
157Cf. "... quodinvolvit
estextralatitudinem
entis."DM 30, s.
contradictionem,
17,n. 10(p. 209);alsosee: DM 6, 4, n. 7 (XXV, p. 219).

75

12:45:07 PM

Vivarium
XXV, 1 (1987)
Reviews

TheMetaphyDesmondPaul Henry,Thatmost
subtle
question
(Quaestiosubtilissima).
andContemporary
sicalBearing
, Manchester
Linguistic
Disciplines
(ManofMedieval
chester
University
Press)1984,pp. XVIII + 337.30- ISBN 0 719009472.
Mr. Henry'sreputation
of medieval
One solidpillarsupporting
amonghistorians
of
refined
ofAnselm
is hisincreasingly
studyindepthofthelogicalworks
philosophy
In threepenetrating
booksin succession
(1964,1967,1974)he hasconCanterbury.
ofparonymy,
histheory
s Degrammatico
, whichcontains
arguedthatAnselm'
vincingly
is not,as Prantland otherscholars
rashlyheld,a well-nigh
unintelligible
pieceof
andinstructive
a veryinteresting
ofa shrewd
butrather
technique
example
rigmarole,
in themaximthat
s aim is concisely
of philosophical
analysis.Anselm'
expressed
to
of1972,inwhichheundertook
tohisMedieval
LogicandMetaphysics
Henryprefixed
broaderperspective:
"We oughtnotto
ofhislabourin a somewhat
placethefruits
butshouldrather
attend
to
adheretotheimproprieties
ofwordswhichhidethetruth,
'.
ofourwaysoftalking'
thatlieshiddenunderthemultiplicity
oftruth
theproperty
artificialized
wasoneofthefirst
tousea highly
brandofLatininordertosubAnselm
toan acutelogical
surface
shapesofordinary
misleading
jectthefrequently
language
the
fundamental
difference
between
and so to bringoutthephilosophically
critique
ofan utterance.
andthelogicalform
grammatical
inovertoassisthisauthor
In suchcasesitisverytempting
fora modern
interpreter
a natural
difficulties
connected
withtransforming
theconsiderable
inevitably
coming
toelucidate
toolbyanendeavour
thosenecessariintoa logically
satisfactory
language
terms
ofoneofthe
in themuchmoreefficient
at formalization
lydefective
attempts
in ourtime.As a matter
offactHenryhas
specialcalculithathavebeendeveloped
theservices
writers
hestudies
ofoneparticular
offered
themedieval
logical
consistently
Leniewski
by thePolishlogicianStanislaw
language:a system
designed
originally
Czeslaw
andelaborated,
byHenry'sManchester
colleague
amongothers,
(1886-1939)
Thissystem,
ofa
to whomthebookunderreviewis dedicated.
consisting
Lejewski,
an ontology
(logicofnames)and a mereology
protothetic
(logicof propositions),
whichmakeit
to Henry,severalfeatures
ofpartandwhole),has,according
(theory
itis
instrument.
Asthenameontology
as an hermeneutic
suitable
indicates,
eminently
ofeverything
ofthemostgeneralcharacteristics
as an interpreted
theory
presented
terms
andcombetween
distinction
thereis. It doesnotmakeanycategorial
singular
inclusion
andexclufora variety
offunctors
ofexistence,
monnames,andprovides
and n (name)as
sion,and identity.
Beinga categorial
language,withs (sentence)
to his
it enablestheuserto extendthesemantical
according
categories
primitives,
needs.BothinthisbookandinMedieval
Henryequipsthereader
LogicandMetaphysics
ofthislanguage.
ofthetechnicalities
withampleexplanations
andmorefully
bookis bestregarded
as a moreambitious
The present
developed
bookof1972.Notably,
itisbasedon
inthemuchshorter
defence
oftheses
putforward
in particular
a richerselection
of texts,containing
manypassagesfromtheModi
76

12:45:15 PM

authorofa philosophical
ofDacia,a thirteenth-century
gramsignificandi
byBoethius
to
mar.It is typically
readerwhois prepared
a bookthatmustbejudgedbya patient
theLatintexts,
ofcarefully
takethetrouble
andcritically
Henry'stranslascrutinizing
in termsof Lesniewski's
tionof them,and theelucidations
categorial
language.
theauthor
Laudably,
alwaysputsallhiscardsonthetableandthusenablesus toexsetofsuchthorny
aminehisviewsinduedetail.Theseviewsrangeoveran impressive
thestatusofuniversais,
as non-referential
aboutessences,
names,discourse
problems
the distinction
betweenessenceand existence,
and, in general,the relationship
hasfurnished
thosewhodelight
In sum,theauthor
in
between
logicandmetaphysics.
- whicharenevertheless
naturethattheystill
subtlequestions
ofsucha fundamental
- witha fascinating
of
vexcontemporary
students
ofthephilosophy
oflogic
collection
exercises
in conceptual
flexibility.
As itis tobe hopedthata secondedition
willprovetobe necessary
(nottomention
I
thedesirability
ofa paperback
a
few
remarks
on
minor
add
points.The
edition),
references
onp. 13,1.9-10,andon p. 153,1.20,arenotquiteright.
Amongtherare
intheLatintexts
causesomepuzzlement:
thereis onethatmight
onp. 144,
misprints
1.6from
As regards
thetranslations,
onp. 21, 1.7from
below,nonshouldbe deleted.
thatthereare
maintained
below,suchshouldbe replaced
byother
(thegrammarians
onp. 22; 1.3,tobe taken
brakes
for
eightpartsofspeech);andhasthetranslation
frena
intheobsolete
senseofbridles!
itwouldbe wrong.Further,
onp. 30, 1.20,
; otherwise,
Etintelligendum
extremi
estdeistadistantia,
rem
suamutnoncedentem
inunitatem
quodsignificai
cumeo,dequoenuntiatur
shouldrather
be rendered
as follows:
Andas regardsthat
itshouldbeunderstood
whatever
itsignifies
thattheverbsignifies
as not
separateness,
withthatofwhichit is predicated
oneextreme
forming
(comparep. 31, 1.6 from
is perhaps
annexedtotheprinciple
tooreadily
of
below).On p. 50 theworddignitas
itseemstomethatitsimply
means.Thepassage
meansthatthewordaxiom
aloofness;
WalterBurleigh
on p. 153is notas clearas one might
wish;evenafter
concerning
I couldnotdecide
itwithsimilar
passagesinMedieval
comparing
LogicandMetaphysics
whether
ornotitis correct.
Such trifles,
do notin theleastdetractfrommyadmiration
forthe
however,
ofa moreprofound
author's
to thesteadygrowth
and
manysagaciouscontributions
exactinsight
intotheintricacies
texts
inthefieldoflogicandlinguistics.
ofmedieval
If
hereandtherea critical
itwillmostly
readerwillreacha different
concern
a
opinion,
forwhichHenryhasopenedhiseyes.
problem
Leiden
GabrielNuchelmans
. Nachdruck
Rudolfvon Biberach,De septem
itineribus
aeternitatis
der Ausgabevon
Peltier
1866miteinerEinleitung
indielateinische
undCorrigenUberlieferung
da zumTextvonMargotSchmidt,
inGeschichte
undGegenwart,
Tex(Mystik
I: Christliche
te undUntersuchungen,
von
Abteilung
Mystik,
herausgegeben
Band 1), Frommann-Holzboog,
MargotSchmidtund HelmutRiedlinger,
1985.
Cannstatt,
Stuttgart-Bad
ofthisnewseriesdealwithRudolfofBiberach's
The first
threevolumes
De
treatise,
itineribus
aeternitatis.
The first
volumepresents
theLatintext,thesecondconseptem
tainsa synoptical
editionoftheHighAlemannic
anda modern
translation
German
offers
thethird
a studyofthedegrees
ofspiritual
basedonthe
translation,
experience
fromwhichRudolfofBiberachhas drawnthequotations
authors
usedin the VII
Itinera.
Mostofthefirst
volumeis notnew.The Latintextitself
oftheVIIItinera
(pp. [1]oftheeditionofPeltier(1866),and thegreater
reprint
[92])is a photographic
part
oftheintroduction
ofa totalofforty-six
(pp. XII-XXXIX- i.e., twenty-eight
pages)
is a partialreprint
of Schmidt'sintroduction
to her former
editionof theHigh
77

12:45:15 PM

: Diesiben
strassen
zugot(1969).Thelatter
translation
secAlemannic
oftheVIIItinera
with
LatinMSS containing
theVIIItinera,
tiondealswiththelistofthe(ninety-one!)
thesametreatise,
andwiththeinfluence
themedieval
mentioning
library
catalogues
writers.
Neware thelistofcorrigenda
on othermystical
ofthetreatise
(pp. XLVintoPeltier's
andthe
anda fewpagesat thebeginning
edition,
XLVI) tobe inserted
endoftheintroduction
(pp. IX-XI andXL-XLIV).
forthe
one is mostgrateful
SincetheeditionofPeltieris almostunobtainable,
has notbeentaken
oftheLatintext.One onlyregrets
thattheopportunity
reprint
to thetextmucheasier.A
toadd line-numbers,
whichwouldhavemadereferences
someveryvaluablecorrections
is added.Theyprovide
listofalmostsixty
corrigenda
consist
fifteen
oftheinsertext.Amongthesecorrigenda
ofthePeltier
approximately
totheBible.I do notseeanycompeltionofsourcereferences,
references
especially
as havingexistedin theoriginal
thesereferences
criterion
to consider
linginternal
criteria
todo so. It is notclearwhythecontext,buttheauthormayhaveexternal
MS
cordance
ofthetwoBaselMSS (inmostcasesconfirmed
bytheHighAlemannic
external
ofEinsiedeln)
shouldbe a sufficient
argument.
totheedition
ofSchmidt's
introduction
As tothepageswhicharea partialreprint
a listofcorrigenda
wonder
whether
and
oftheHighAlemannic
onemight
translation,
heretoo.FromthelistofMSS containing
theVII
notbe appropriate
addendamight
to the
is saidto havebelonged
Itinera
K.B., 11489-91)
, numberthirteen
(Brussels,
ParlezLouvain" (p. XIII). There is indeedan abbey of
"Prmonstratenser
nearLouvain,at a placecalledPark."Parlez-Louvain"is apPremonstratensians
- i.e., Parknear
a rathercomicalslipofthepenfor"Parc-lez-Louvain"
parently
siben
to
Die
strassen
zu got
added
as
has
been
written
on
the
Louvain,
map
correctly
(betweenpp. 24*-25*).The mistakecouldhavebeenavoidedby usingFlemish
forFlemishplaces.
toponyms
Hendrik( + 1472)is called"Der flmische
Mystiker"
(p. XXXI). Though
hewas
Netherlands
hespenta considerable
(Mechlin),
partofhislifeinthesouthern
oftheBrethren
wherehewasrector
livedintheNorth,
bornandoriginally
probably
oftheCommonLifein DelftandGouda.Amongthesourcesofhistreatise,
Spieghel
arementioned,
butnotoneof
andseveralothers
dervolcomenheit
, RudolfofBiberach
inHerp's
ofRuusbroec
Thepresence
itsmostimportant
sources,
JanvanRuusbroec.
o.s.b.
Dom
much
so
that
so
most
the
is
J.
Huijben
prominent,
Spieghelquantitatively
has honouredHerp withthe title'De Hrautvan Ruusbroec'(the Heraldof
ofCanfield
to themanysourcesofBenedict
Furthermore,
(p. XXXV)
Ruusbroec).
Peer
shouldbe addedDie evangelische
le,as is madeclearbyP. Mommaers
(cf.Benot
48 (1972),pp.
de la Spiritualit,
etsessources
deCanfeld
, in: Revued'Histoire
flamandes
intheinremark
thesepagesofpartialreprint
concerning
423-434).A moregeneral
occurwhichcanonlybe identified
abbreviations
troduction:
by
manybibliographical
.
zugot
strassen
in Diesiben
thelistofabbreviations
consulting
theauthordeclaresthatthe
In theearlier(original)pagesof theintroduction
a familiarity
with
ofthemystical
andtheevaluation
implies
phenomenon
knowledge
tothe
thecourseofhistory.
ofmysticism
thevarioustestimonies
According
through
as a mostsuitable
lendsitself
itineribus
aeternitatis
RudolfofBiberach'
s Deseptem
editor,
morethan
successful
since
this
to
this
compilation
systematizes
entry-point history,
fromthesecondup to thethirteenth
writers
century.
forty
Schmidt
In theconcluding
givessomegeneralremarks
pagesoftheintroduction
istobe found
Thisimportance
oftheVIIItinera.
andthesignificance
onthestructure
of
and theparadoxaldescription
ofactioand contemplalo
in theorganicconception
ofunityin diversity.
unionas an experience
mystical
itineribus
aeternitatis
inLatin
ofDe septem
oftheeditions
A veryconcisebibliography
on Rudolfof
literature
andin MiddleHighGerman,andofsomesecondary
mainly
thebook.
Biberachconcludes
78

12:45:44 PM

ofthecover:
forthefinemake-up
witha wordofadmiration
Letmeendthisreview
on
in goldenletters
andthetitleofhisworkhavebeenprinted
RudolfofBiberach
linenofthe
whichin itsturnis surrounded
a blackbackground,
by theredbrown
Thishonouris wellpaidto Rudolfandhis VII Itinera.
binding.
G. de Baere

Nijmegen

I VonderPassio
Mittelalter.
imlateinischen
undEpochenstil
WalterBerschin,
Biographie
zur
zu denDialogiGregors
desGrossen
(Quellenund Untersuchungen
Perpetuae
Hiersemann
Anton
Bd.
des
lateinischen
Verlag,
Mittelalters,
8),
Philologie
1986,358 S.
Stuttgart
imlateiniderBiographie
DieserersteBandeinerzusammenfassenden
Darstellung
Da diemittelalterzu dereigentlichen
bildetdenAuftakt
schenMittelalter
Aufgabe.
unmittelbar
christliche
diesptantike,
licheBiographie
fortsetzt,
Lebensbeschreibung
Es
imvorliegenden
werden
zu
den
es
auf
der
Hand,
Anfangen
zurckzugehen.
lag
aus demIII. bis VI.
rund180lateinische
BandvonWalterBerschin
Biographien
Damit ist ein Werk
n. Chr. literaturwissenschafdich
dargestellt.
Jahrhundert
Fordas einerseits
allesntigeMaterialzu einereingehenderen
worden,
geschaffen
- wieetwaHinweiseaufTextausgaben
undaufdiewichtigsten
Stuenthlt
schung
FormeinesLesebuchs,
hates dieansprechende
dien- , andererseits
zumal,da den
ist.
lateinischen
Texteneinedeutsche
Ubersetzung
beigegeben
undPassionen,
denensichdieApowerden
Abschnitt
dieMrtyrerakten
Imersten
Ubermitdenlateinischen
dieMnchsvitae
undimzweiten
stelromane
anschliessen,
Die beidenletzten
der Vita Antoniials Ausgangspunkt,
besprochen.
setzungen
den Vitae
des MrderSptantike
sinddemBischofsleben
Abschnitte
(namentlich
bzw.den Schriften
des Venantius
und Fulgentius),
tius,Ambrosius,
Augustinus
des Grossen- gewidmet.
undjenenGregors
vonToursundGregors
Fortunatus,
nichtunbercksichtigt
derBiographie
hatauchdieRandzonen
Berschin
gelassen.
derbtissin
erdieberhmte
So bespricht
Egeria(S. 159-161;dasItineraPilgerreise
des Hieronymus
rium
(S. 146-149;De virisilluEgeriae
), den Schriftstellerkatalog
von
stribus
pontificalis
(S. 270 ff.;mitkurzenNotizenberdie Bischfe
), denLiber
unddie biographiundSententiae
(S. 128ff.;Mnchssprche)
Rom),Apophthegmata
vonTours(S. 289-291).
Francorum
desGregorius
aus derHistoria
schenGeschichten
Durch
Werkisbersichtlich
Stilgeschriebene
Das ineinemlebendigen
angeordnet.
derLesermitdenbesprochenen
kommt
Textstellen
treffsicher
zahlreiche,
gewhlte
sinddie vielevorzglihervorzuheben
Kontakt.
Besonders
Textenin unmittelbaren
MnchHilachenCharakterisierungen
(wieS. 143:dervordemRuhmflchtende
S. 313: GregorderGrosseredetin
rinwird'ein Held derAnti-Fama'
genannt;
dieGriechen
sind'Luft':'siesindda, aber
seinenDialogennichtvondenGriechen;
mansiehtsie nicht.').
klarzusammen
dieErgebnisse
derbisherigen
fasst
Berschin
Gewhnlich
Forschung
Analysevon GregorsDialogen)und spricht
(zB. S. 308: De Vog'sstrukturelle
des Stoffes
Urteilaus. SeineBeherrschung
dabeiauchnichtselteneinpersnliches
derbehandelten
dasbeiallerKrzeebendiewichtigsten
Aspekte
gehtdaraushervor,
ber
aufdieBemerkungen
insLichtgerckt
wofr
hierbeispielshalber
Vitae
werden,
sei.
laudatio-Charakter
derVitaetpassioCypriani
denrhetorischen
(S. 63-65)verwiesen
zu finden
StudieallesWichtige
EbenweilinBerschins
ist,kannmansichwundern,
Mann' (theholy
Aufstze
vonPeterBrownberden 'heiligen
dassdieanregenden
London1982).Ebensowenig
andtheholyinlateAntiquity,
man)fehlen
(siehe:Society
derdiesyrische
Ubersetwirddieaufsehenerregende
ThesevonR. Dragueterwhnt,
ensyriaque.
deS. Antoine,
conserve
Antonii
hat{La Vieprimitive
verffentlicht
zungderVita
79

12:45:44 PM

ettraduction,
eshabe
Discussion
CSCO 418,Lwen1980)unddieMeinungvertritt,
textus
vordemgriechischen
einenanderen,
Text
receptus
griechischen
koptisierenden,
der VitaAntonii
des Athanasius
in Frage
gegeben,wobeiauchdie Verfasserschaft
wird.
gestellt
MitRechthebtBerschin
eineParallelezwischen
einerStelleaus demPrologder
Antoniusvita
undXenophon,
Memorabilia
4,1,1 hervor
(bzw.:Tr michistschondie
blosseErinnerung
an Antonius
ein grosser
undntzlicher
Gewinn'- 'Schondie
an ihn(sc. Sokrates),
wenner nichtanwesend
keinen
war,bedeutete
Erinnerung
Hierzuistzu
Gewinndenen,die gewhnt
waren,mitihmzu verkehren').
geringen
dassneulicheinigeweitere
in Piatons
Parallelen
mitSokrates'
Auftreten
bemerken,
EchosausPiatons
Schriften
entdeckt
Phaedon
inder
wurden;sieheG. J. M. Bartelink,
? Mnemosyne
aus Piatons
VitaAntonii
37, 1984,S. 145-147;id., EineReminiszenz
inderVitaAntonii
Timaeus
40, 1987,S. 150.
, Mnemosyne
Interessant
von
ist,dassbei einerStellein der VitaFulgentii
(c. 9) des Ferrandus
si sicfulget
Romaterrecaelestis,
Karthago
(QuamspeciosapotestesseHierusalem
Paralleleaus dergriechischen
VitaPorphyrii
stris)sicheinegedankliche
(c. 47) des
MarcusDiaconusaufdrngt
derTauffeier
desspteren
KaisersTheo(Beschreibung
dosiusII inKonstantinopel,
demzweiten
dasnachkurzer
Rom):'WenndasIrdische,
Zeitverschwindet,
schonsolcheineHerrlichkeit
wievielmehrdas Himmlibesitzt,
bereitet
ist'.
sche,das denWrdigen
Berschin
umklarzumachen,
dassinTeilendesLiber
gibtS. 274-5Beispiele
pontificalisein biblischer
Stil vorherrscht
Autor
('Das Latein,das unserunbekannter
verrt
nureineSchule,diederlateinischen
schreibt,
Bibel').NebendenvomVerfasser
erwhnten
Parallelen
ausderevangelischen
Pilatusszene
findet
sichimzitierten
Textnochein weiterer
biblischer
Adhucea loquente(cf.Luc.22,47
fragment
Anklang:
Adhuceo loquente;Luc.22,60adhucilioloquente:auchhieram Satzanfang).
Die Ubersetzungen
derzitierten
sindlobenswert
Textstellen
klarundkorrekt.
Vielleichtknnte
manan zweiStelleneinekleinenderung
Ex aliainaliam
vorschlagen.
sensusoperitet velutilaetumgramensata
linguamad verbumexpressatranslatio
derVitaAntonii)
wirdvonBerstrangulat
(S. 121;Prologzu Evagrius'Ubersetzung
'Die wrtliche
schinbersetzt:
voneinerSprachein die anderedeckt
Ubersetzung
denSinnzu understickt
die Saatenwiedas ppigspriessende
Gras'. Besserwre:
ihnsowiedas ppigspriessende
'....decktdenSinnzu understickt
GrasdieSaaten'.
WeitersiehedenAnfang
derPassioAgnetis
sanctissimae
(S. 85): Diemfestm
virginis
Hincpsalmiresonent,
celebremus.
indeconcrepent
lectiones.
Hincpopulorum
turbae
indesubleventur
in domino
laetentur,
pauperesChristi.Omnesergogratulemur
feiern.
Von hiermgen
(Berschin:'Lasstunsden Festtagderheiligsten
Jungfrau
tnenPsalmen,
vondortLesungen.Hierfreuen
sichdieVolksmassen,
dortwerden
dieArmenChristi
Lasstunseinander
ist
Vielleicht
aufgerichtet.
beglckwnschen').
zu bevorzugen:
docheinemehrwrtliche
Wiedergabe
'...Mgendie Volksmassen
hierber
frohsein,mgendarin(nl. in denLesungen)
(nl. berdenPsalmgesang)
dieArmen
Christi
Trostfinden.
FreuenwirunsalsoindemHerrn'.FrdieUbersetmit'sichfreuen'
manThesaurus
Linzungdesabsolutverwendeten
gratulari
vergleiche
VI 22,55('ita utinsimplicem
notionem
abeatvocabulum'),
wo
guaelatinae
gaudendi
manauchmehrere
als Wiedergabe
vonx<*ipfciv
Beispielevongratulari
findet.1)
MitBerschins
istdieLiteratur
Arbeit
berdieBiographie
umeinewertvolle
Arbeit
Wirwnschen
bereichert
worden.
demVerfasser
zu,dasses ihmgelingen
wird,bald
auchdie brigen
Teilezu vollenden.
G. Bartelink
Nijmegen
S. 61 cumparent(VitaetpassioCypr.11):lies:cumparentibus;
S. 232Augustine
um 397 geschrieben
sindnicht387,sondern
worden.
Con/essiones
80

12:45:51 PM

Vivarium
XXV, 2 (1987)
DeterminateTruthin Abelardn

NEIL T. LEWIS

I
In his excellent overview of medieval discussions of future
contingents2,Calvin Normore suggests that Abelard' s view on the
determinancyof the truthof sentencesin the commentaryon De inter'
Z
pretation(DI) in the Logica Ingredientibus(LI) differsfromthat in his
4
Dialctica (D):
' Abelardclaimsthatfuture
In theLogica'Ingredientibus
sentences
contingent
true
arenotdeterminate;
orfalse,theyareindeterminately
though
theyaretrue
orfalse.Buthepointsoutthatsince(1) ' "Socrateswilleat" is true'entails(2)
and so admit
"Socrateswilleat", we musteither
denythat(1) is determinate
aredeterminate,
orassertthat
'about'thepastorpresent
thatnotall sentences
His reasonforadopting
the
doesnotpreserve
validinference
determinateness.
truths
whichwe
first
alternative
seemstobe thattherearesomepresent-tensed
In theDialcnotdeterminate
as defined.
cannotknowandwhicharetherefore
tica,
he optsforthesecondalternative.
, however,
Normore's commentsreferin particularto a briefpassage5 at the end
of a longer discussion. I wish to show in this paper that when read in
thisbroader contextwe can see (i) thatAbelard does notadopt different
views in LI and D, in that the same solution is offeredin each to this
line of argument; (ii) that Abelard in these passages does not rely on

1 I shouldliketothankProfessor
PeterKingforhishelpful
comments
on earlier
versionsofthispaperand formaking
availableto mehismicrofilm
copyofthemanuAmbrosiana
to Prof.L. M. de Rijkand
indebted
script
M63sup.I am alsogreatly
B in the
MissB. J. M. Jolywhoprovided
ofthemanuscript
mewiththereadings
oftheoriginal
in this
version
appendixand a reworked
appendix.All translations
noted.
paperare myownunlessotherwise
2 CalvinNormore,
Medieval
PhilosoFuture
, in: TheCambridge
History
ofLater
Contingents
1982,pp. 358-381.Forthepassagequotedsee
, ed. A. Kennyetal., Cambridge
phy
pp. 362-363.
'
3 PeterAbelard,
', ed. B. Geyer,Mnster1927.
LogicaIngredientibus
4 PeterAbelard,
Dialctica
, ed. L. M. de Rijk,Assen1956,2nded. 1970.
5 LI, p. 424.36-40.The longerdiscussion
of concernto us occupiespp. 421.16a numberofincorrect
422.40.The textofthispassagein Geyer'seditioncontains
and theapparatus
and omissions.
contains
The reedited
someerrors
text
readings
maybe foundin theappendixto thispaper.
81

12:41:26 PM

the claim that valid inferencepreservesdeterminancy.In section V I

4 4
argue that the claim that if the true consequence If 'Socrates will
eat" is true, Socrates will eat' has a determinateantecedent, it has a
determinateconsequent, rests,in Abelard' s presentationof the argument, (a) on an equation of 4isdeterminatelytrue' with 'is certain'an equation he will reject- and (b) on certain epistemic principles
4
relatingour knowledge or certaintyof sentences of the form "<p" is
true' to thatof thepropositionsor dictaexpressedby '9', and indirectly
to the sentence '9' itself.
Moreover, the tacit assumption that in the passage in question
Abelard is concerned with rebuttingarguments to show that future
contingent truths are determinatelytrue, tends to misconstrue the
dialectical structureof Abelard's discussion. As I show in detail in section III, Abelard's concern in this part of LI is primarilyto consider
arguments to show that certain present-tensedsentences, including
4 4'Socrates will eat" is
true. Failure
true', iftrue, are /determinately
to note thishas, I think,in part contributedto the view thatAbelard's
denial that all true present-tensedsentences are determinatelytrue is
his solution in LI to the problem raised by 4 44Socrates will eat" is
true'.
Before we consider these issues in detail it will prove useful to set
out some more general points pertaining to the concept of determinancy, an importantbut littlestudied notion in Abelard. I shall not
tryhere to iron out all of the considerable difficultiesAbelard's texts
pose, but rather I shall outline some general themes useful for the
more detailed discussion in section III on.
II
The originof theconceptof determinancy
Like so much else in LI, the concept of determinancycan be traced
back to Boethius, and in particular to his commentaries on DI,
especially DI.96. It is important to be clear from the start that for
Boethius determinancywas notconsidered to be a kind of necessity.
This is a point that may slip the modern reader, since talk of determinancy seems to functionvery much like recent talk of temporal or
6 Anicii
PeriHermene
ed.
inLibrum
Aristotelis
Commentarii
Boetii
ManliiSeverini
ias,/-//,
referred
toas In Per.I, II.
C. Meiser,Leipzig1877-80;hereafter
82

12:41:26 PM

accidental necessity,necessityhere oftenbeing explicated as a matter

of the unpreventabilityof a state of affairs7.Yet even if ourconcepts
of temporalnecessityresembleBoethian determinancy,modal notions
matterforBoethius. According to him the fundamental
are a different
aim of DI. 9 was to argue that ifall true singular categorical sentences
about future contingents are determinately
true, they must also be
this
with
it
disastrous consequences.
absolutely necessary,
bringing
This move from determinancyto necessitywas not supposed to be
obvious, hence the detailed argumentationfor it in DI. 9.
Thus when Boethius wrote his commentarieson DI there was no
indicationthathe thoughtof determinancyas a kind of necessity.The
concepts are explained quite differently,determinancy in quasi, necessity in
epistemic terms as a matter of what is knownto nature
termsof what cannot be otherwiseand ultimately,I should argue, in
terms of the naturesof things.
In LI8 and D Abelard closely followsBoethius on thispoint, talking
of the determinate as what is knowable of itself( ex se), rather than
known to nature, and explicitlyexplaining the modalities operative in
DI in termsof the fundamentalnotion of what a nature will or will not
allow {pati)9. Abelard often calls the concept of absolute necessity
. Moreover, he goes beyond
definedwithrespectto natures inevitability
Boethius in explicitlyclaiming what is only implicitin Boethius, that
the predicates'determinate' and 'necessary' do notjust differin their
:
meaning, but also in theirextension
It is alsoclearfromwhatcomesafterwards
<in Aristotle's
tcxt> thatthe
isnottakenas determinate,
that
whenhesaysthateverything
necessary
namely
tobe whileitis butis nottherefore
to be.
is, is necessary
necessary
absolutely
Forifheweretotakethenecessary
as determinate
thiswouldcertainly
be false.
In fact,whatis determinate,
whileitis,canbe absolutely
Andso
determinate.
is nottobe takenfordeterminate,
butforinevitable
necessary
[LI, p. 438. 1117,myemphasis]
Certain thingsmay be absolutely determinateand yet not absolutely
necessary.(The cases Abelard has in mind are presentstates of affairs
or sentences: Socrates being pale or the truthof 'Socrates is pale'.
7 Cf.J. Burgess,
TheUnreal
Future
, in: Theoria44 (1978),pp. 157-174:'thatis now
whichisa physical
ormetaphysical
ofthewaytheworldis now
necessary
consequence
andhasbeeninthepast:whatis nowunpreventable',
p. 157andR. H. Thomason,
Indeterminist
TimeandTruth-value
, in: Theoria36 (1970),pp. 264-281.
Gaps
8 LI, p. 420f.; D, pp. 210-213.
9 Cf. D, pp. 193.31-194.11.
83

12:41:26 PM

They are not necessary since being pale is not included in the specific
nature of Socrates, i.e. in what it is to be a man.)
Let us note, however, a point where confusionmay arise in reading
Abelard on this matter. For one thing,Abelard also indicates- as the
above passage attests- that when he wrote some people did thinkof
determinancyas a kind of necessity,hence the need forhim to stress
that in DI (and his own discussions) 4we take ' 'necessary'' for
inevitable ... not for determinateas some think'10.
The bearersof determinancy
i. Res, dictaand sentences in Abelard and Boethius
What sort of things are or are not determinate? Boethius views
Aristotlein his arguments in DI. 9 as employing two levels, the level
.
of what Boethius calls res and the level of sentences (propositiones)
Abelard shares this view, but instead of talkingof reshe usually talks
rerum
of dicta(literally'thingssaid') or, as in theDialctica, theexistentiae
of
'existences
things')11.
(literally
What are Boethius' resand Abelard' s dictaand what relations do
sentences bear to them? The answer to this is fairly clear and
uncontentious in the case of Abelard, but less so in the case of
Boethius.
. Dicta for
The key notion in both accounts is that of signification
Abelard are what are signifiedby sentences. Now foran expression to
signifyis for it to act as the sign of something: according to St.
Augustine's classic account 'a sign is both what shows itselfto the
sense and somethingbeyond itselfto the mind' ,2. To understand the
10LI, p. 437.37-39.In hisearlyglosson De interp.
Scritti
Abelardo,
(in:Pietro
filosofica,
Aristotelem
De Interpretatione
, ed. M. Dal Pra, Roma 1954)Abelardidentifies
Super
whathe callsthedeterminatum
necesse
witha kindof necessity,
, and
determinancy
ofnecessity:
Etcum
withthisconcept
concerned
ischiefly
arguesthatinDI. 9 Aristotle
hicaccipitur
necesse
tantum
totmodis
determinatum
, p. 99.43-44.In LI and D he
dicatur,
is whatis at issuein DI. 9.
seemsto holdthatabsolutenecessity
11Cf. LI, p. 443.31f.,andD, p. 221.4-9,whereAbelardclearly
Aristotle
interprets
shift
intheDialctica
hasbeen
The terminological
ofdictaandsentences.
tobe talking
butwhether
itmarks
notedbyrecent
commentators,
anyfundamental
changeofdocseeL. M. de Rijk,La
ofthedictum
trinehasnotbeenstudied.Fordiscussion
theory
le
Pierre
AblardchezAblard
dela proposition
, in: Pierre
(<dictum
propositionis)
signification
: Ancient
Theories
vnrable
, pubi.CNRS, Paris1982;G. Nuchelmans,
oftheProposition
andfalsity,
Amsterdam
andMedieval
1973;and M.
oftruth
ofthebearers
conceptions
1976.
onUniversais
, Amsterdam
Tweedale,Abailard
12Augustine,
Dordrecht
tr.B. DarreilJackson,
De dialctica
1975,
, ed. J. Pinborg,
p. 86.
84

12:41:26 PM

medieval view of what expressions act as signs of- what theyshow to

the mind- we must consider Aristotle'sextremelyinfluentialopening
remarksin DI (as rendered in Latin by Boethius) where he describes
threelevels of language: written,spoken and mental. Writtenexpressions are taken to signifyspoken expressions,and these in turnsignify
certain mental items called affectionsof the soul 'passionesanimae] by
Boethius and understandings[intellectus]
by Abelard13. So outlined the
relation,
theorysuggests that significationis a purely z'tttaz-linguistic
since understandingsthemselvesare not taken to have significationat
all; rather they are said to bear certain natural likenesses to extralinguisticitems. Yet Aristotle'sdescriptionof the levels of language is
developed by a number of medieval philosophers,including Boethius
and Abelard, in such a way that extra-linguisticitems are said to be
signified. Thus Boethius holds that words in spoken or written
- the appropriate items
language not only have a primarysignificate
mentioned above but also a secondarysignificationof the extralinguisticitems to which the affectionsof the soul they signifybear
likenesses.This is a view Abelard also adopts, but he, unlike Boethius,
explicitlyextends it to the level of sentences14:as words have dual
significationso do sentences; they not only signifyother sentences or
understandings,but also what Abelard calls their dicta.
What thenare dicta? Abelard takes great pains to stressthat theyare
not resin any strictsense. Although he occasionally calls them the res
, presumably in order to stress their extra-linguistic
propositionum15
character, when careful he states that they are not things. And a
number of later writers held dicta to be sui generis
, consituting an
eleventh non-Aristoteliancategory16.The problem these writersare
grappling with is that of the ontological status of contents. For the
modern reader, dicta are best viewed as akin to the contemporary
13Theyareviewed
as sentences
ina mental
bymanymedieval
philosophers
language
sharedby all speakersand whosetermsare not conventionally
endowedwith
meaning.
14Cf. LI, p. 367.9-13:'Justas namesandverbshavea dualsignification,
namely
orofunderstandings,
>
ofthings
so toowe grantthatthereis a dual < signification
whichare composedfromthe
of sentences,
namelyone of theirunderstandings,
oftheirparts,and <a signification
> oftheir<i.e. thesentences'
understandings
earum
foreorum
withthems.> dicta
, whichare, as it were,theresof the
reading
sentences,
nonetheless,
though,
theyare notat all essences'.We shouldnotethat
with12thcentury
essences.
Abelard,in keeping
usage,callsconcrete
things
15See LI, p. 367.13,translated
in thelastnote.
16SeeLogica
ed. L. M. de Rijk,Assen1967,vol.II, part2, p. 208.24-32
Modernorum,
and vol. II, part1, p. 358 (theArsMeliduna).
(theArsBurana)
85

12:41:26 PM

notion of 'proposition', the contentexpressedby a sentence. This view

is akin to the view proposed by De Rijk17: 4Abelard' s dictumis neither
an external object (res), nor the mental act as such, but is the objective
content
of this act, which, neitherbeing thingnor act, is called a quasithing(quasi~res)'. But ifdictaare akin to propositions,theyalso appear
to be viewed as statesofaffairs
, this perhaps accounting fortheirroles
as the x/ra-linguistic
significatesof sentences. This point may become
clearer afterconsidering Boethius' view.
Although there is no doubt that Boethius findsa dual signification
for nouns and verbs18,it has not generally been recognized that he
extends this to sentences. In one of the few studies on this topic
Nuchelmans19 only seems to recognize affectionsof the soul as the
significatesof sentences for Boethius, yet I want to suggest that the
theoryof a dual significationis presenthere too, thoughnot explicitly
stated. Thus in In Per. II Boethius writes:
sentences
is acquiredfromthetruth
andfalsity
of
The natureofpredicative
aredisposed,
so willthesentences
thatsignify
thethings
[res];foras thethings
holdanynecessity
in themselves,
the
thethings
be disposed.Forifthethings
But if,on theotherhand,theysignify
sentences,
too, are necessary.
only
4
hehasindicated
that
inherence
says A maniswalking',
(e.g. ifsomeone
[inesse]
only
signifying
walkinginheresin a man) theyare beyondany necessity,
Butifthethings
areimpossible,
thesentences
allnecessity.
freefrom
inherence,
Butifthethings
comeandgo
arenamedimpossible.
thatpointoutthosethings
themis calledcontingent.
thatproposes
thesentence
contingently,
[InPer.II p.
188. 14-27,myemphasis.]
The referenceto sentences signifyingresis not isolated; it occurs frequently in In Per20.What then are these res?It must be admitted that
Boethius is less expliciton thisthan Abelard is withregardto dicta, and
yet I thinkwe can identifyin Boethius certainclear prefiguringsof the
dictumtheory.To startwith, Boethius talks of the truthand falsityof
these res, and this indicates, I believe, that they are to be identified
with complexes, not concrete objects: the identificationof them with
something like propositions is plausible and goes nicely with other
('what are said')21,
passages where Boethius talksof resas quaedicuntur
17art.cit.p. 552.
18Cf. In Per
. II , p. 298.
19op.cit.,pp. 134-135.
20E.g. InPer.//,p. 198.16-19:
nor
..consist
insermones
sentences.
neither
'predicative
ofres'' p. 199.1-4:
but< consist
> inthesignification
a combination
ofpredications,
'He < Aristotle
>, by a finestandardof reasoning,
categorical
distinguishes
themselves
on thebasisoftheresthatthesentences
sentences...
Manyother
signify'.
discussion.
Boethius'
are to be foundthroughout
similarremarks
21E.g. In Per.//,p. 200.22-25,p. 206.9-11.
86

12:41:26 PM

prefiguringtalkofdicta.And again, it also appears appropriateto view

Boethius' resas states of affairs.Is this 'two-sided' character of dicta
and res coherent? No doubt many philosophers wedded to a correspondencetheoryof truthwould have troublehere, foron one common construal of this theory a sentence is true just in case the
propositionit expresses correspondsto a state of affairsthatobtainsa fact.Thus propositionsand statesof affairsare different
mattersand
must be kept distinct.But other philosophershave offeredviews that
collapse factsand true propositionsand that suggest a more general
identificationof propositionsand statesof affairs.Frege, forexample,
held that a factis a thoughtthat is true', where forhim thoughtsare
the contentsexpressed by sentences22.And the construal of propositions in the modern literatureas the sets of possible worlds in which
theyare true mightseem to apply also to states of affairs,the worlds
in question being those in which theyobtain. Moreover, the practice
both Boethiusand Abelard employ of pickingout resand dictaby 4that'
clauses {quodor accusative-infinitive
clauses) is equally appropriate to
propositionsand statesof affairs23.And thereis another concept to be
found in Boethius' and Abelard's discussion that suggests some such
construal. This is the concept of the eventusrerum.
ii The eventus
rerum
Both Abelard and Boethius make continual referenceto the eventus
rerum.Some commentators,without argument, treat this notion in
Abelard as equivalent to that of the dictum.While this has some
plausibility,anotherview can be arrived at by looking more closely at
Boethius' usage.
While Boethius usually predicates modal notions directlyof the res
signifiedand the sentencessignifyingthem,he adopts the fairlyconsistentpracticeof predicating'determinate' of the truth
of sentencesand,
at the non-sententiallevel, of the eventus
of res. It would be going too
farto suggestthata well workedout doctrineunderlies thisusage, but
it is nonethelesssuggestive. Boethius seems to be treatingthe eventus
as the ontological correlateof the truthof a sentence, and it is natural
then to look foran account of the eventus
that has it stand to the resas
22See TheThought
, in: EssaysonFrege
, ed. E. D. Klemke,Chicago1968,p. 531.
23Intheremainder
ofthispaperI adopttheconvention
ofreferring
tostatesofaffairs
and propositions
'that'clauses,e.g. thatSocrates
is sittinp.
byitalicized
87

12:41:26 PM

truthdoes to sentences. Now Latin certainlyallows us to read resas

'state of affairs'and if we do so the followingview is suggested: the
eventusrei is the obtaining
of that state of affairs.On this view, which
fitsmost naturallywith a view of sentences as true and false relative
to time, the statesof affairstoo may or may not obtain relativeto time.
That Socratesis pale, for example, may obtain at t, but not at .
The concept of the eventusis frequentlyused by Abelard, but his
usage is less consistent.As I have noted, some commentatorsassume
' Abelard
that by ' eventus
simply means dicta. But there is no explicit
claim to thiseffectin his writings.The closest he gets to such an identificationis in LI24, where he poses a dilemma forthose who hold that
all present-tensedtruthsare determinate, arguing that however we
whence such truthsare determinatelytrue, they
rerum
take the eventus
cannot adopt this view. He then identifiestwo possible views of the
eventus
: (i) they are res(here he seems to mean concrete objects and
events); or (ii) theyare dicta.But he never gives his own view on this
matter,and, as I shall indicate in the next section, his usage appears
to vacillate between these two alternatives.
The ExplanationofDeterminancy
The concept of determinancyhas its home in the firstplace withthe
rerum
or dicta- the obtainings of states of affairsor the statesof
eventus
affairsthemselves. It applies to the truthof sentences derivatively.
Earlier I mentioned the modern explanation of temporal necessityas
and suggested that, at least in its extension, this
what is unpreventable
comes close to the medieval concept of determinancy.Yet this notwithstanding, both Boethius and Abelard prefer to give quasiepistemicconstruaisof determinancy.Indeed, theyoftenuse the term
certusinterchangeablywith 'determinate', and this fact explains the
care Abelard takes in the passages we will consider in more detail in
sections III-V, to avoid errorsthat mightbe suggestedby this usage.
Boethius employs the Aristotelian notion of what is 'known to
nature' to explicate the notion of determinancy:
rerum
is definite25,
> theeventus
<As regardspast and presentsentences
it is
and contingent,
thatare future
whereasin thecase of thosesentences
notonlyto us whodo notknowthembutalso to
and uncertain,
indefinite
24LI, p. 422.41-p.423.27.
25BothBoethius
withdeterminatus.
and Abelardemploydefinitus
interchangeably
88

12:41:26 PM

nature.Foralthough
wemaynotknowwhether
thestarsareevenorodd <in
number
it is evident
in thenatureofthe
thatone is definitely
>, nonetheless
tous,butaltogether
knowntonature.Butit
stars,andthisindeedis unknown
is notthecaseas regards
mybeinggoingto see a friend
todayor notgoingto
seehim,thatwhatshouldhappenis unknown
tous, butknownto nature,for
butbychance.[InPer.//,p. 192.2-12.]
thiscomesaboutnotnaturally,
If we attemptedto gloss this notion of what is known to nature, we
mightsay that it is what can in principlebe known by purely natural
means, in particular by perception, traces and predictions based on
the naturesof things.Drawing out the implicationsof this is not a task
we can go into here, but it is clear that the deeper story,as Boethius
himselfindicates at the end of thispassage will concern distinguishing
statesof affairsthatobtain naturally
fromthose thatdo not. This is why
I say that Boethius gives a gwajz-epistemicaccount.
Abelard's approach is quite similar, though he replaces 'known to
nature' with 'knowable of itself [exse]. In LI he holds that an eventus
is determinateif 'of itselfit is knowable by us'. [LI, p. 422.26]. And
in D he writes that 'we call determinate whichever of those eventus
rerum
either can be known on the basis of their own existence or are
certain ex naturarei' . It seems that here he should be understood not
so much as giving a differentaccount than in LI, but as fleshingout
the way somethingmay be knowable of itself,since this will differin
the case of past and presentthingson the one hand, and determinate
futureones on the other:
andpastthings
onthebasisoftheir
couldbe known
own
Indeed,bothpresent
existence.
Forpastthings,
becausetheywereat sometimepresent,
wereable
tobe known
onthebasisoftheirpresence.
Butnecessary
orevennatural
future
aredeterminate
on thebasisofa characteristic
of < their
> nature.[D,
things
p. 211.7-11.]
These remarks, generally, are in line with those of Boethius; the
emphasis here, as in Boethius, is placed on the manner in which determinate states of affairscan be known, and it is clear- and Abelard
makes thisexplicitlater- thatnotjust any kind of knowabilitywill do.
Two kinds of knowabilityare here identifiedas sufficientand disjunctivelynecessary for a state of affairsto be determinate: either it is
knowable on the basis of the past or presentpresence
, or else,
ofsomething
in the case of futuredeterminatethings,on the basis of the nature of
something.
Let us startwith the latter case. Abelard (as well as Boethius) will
admit that some sentences about the futureare determinatelytrue.
The examples Abelard gives in the Dialcticaare the sentences 4God
89

12:41:26 PM

will be immortal' and 4Man will die'. The formeris a case of what he
calls the necessary future,the latter of the natural. Such sentences,
while determinatelytrue, are not so on the basis of what was or is happening; theyare determinateon the basis of the nature of the subject
in question. What Abelard means by this is, roughly,that it follows
from,forexample, man's nature, thathe will die and fromGod's that
he will not die and hence not just that he is but also that he will be
immortal26. The reason for adopting this approach to the determinancy of future-tensed sentences seems to be that, even ifone were
to say thatin some sense futureevents are, still,theycannot be known
on the basis of their(future)presence. And thiswould seem to reston
the view that the future is epistemicallyinaccessible to us. But one
mightobject, as Abelard takes pains to stress,thatit is not knowability
by us that is involved in the definition of determinancy, but the
, and given this it is unclear why
knowabilityof something of itself
futureevents should not be knowable exse on theirbasis of theirfuture
presence. The reply, I think, must involve construing Abelard as
offeringsomethinglike the view I ascribed to Boethius, according to
which the determinateis what can be known by us by certain'natural'
methods. Now we can know past and present events on the basis of
theirpresence withoutsupernaturalmeans. Present events, forexample, are known by perception, and past events may be known by
memory of direct experience of their occurrence or presence. But
futureevents differ.Even if we grant the reality of the future,no
naturalmeans gives us access to it on the basis of the futureevents
themselves.
Rather, the only natural means for knowing the futureis,
Abelard would seem to think,considerationof the specificnatures of
the entities involved in the futureevents. And accordinglyAbelard
defines determinancyin the case of future-tensedsentences in terms
of natures.
Abelard' s account of the determinancyof the truthof other types
of sentences also raises its own problems. Exactly what are the past
and futurethings[futura]at issue here?
present [praesentia]
[firaeterita],
Given the contextof his discussion we should expect them to be the
was once present,etc.
eventus
, and we must then hold thata past eventus
as what are said by indicativesentences,Abelard
But ifwe treateventus
offersa view incompatible with this. In the Dialcticahe writes:
26Somestatesofaffairs
in bothsenses,e.g. thaiGodis alive.
aredeterminate
90

12:41:26 PM

Butmaybethesentence
whichsaysthatwhichis notin factthecase is said
enunciate
whatis notyetthecase;
aboutthefuture
nottobe true;butsentences
I saythatwhilethething
whence
do notseemtobe true.Buttothesepoints
they
whatthe
dealsis stillfuture
nonetheless
itself
[resipsa] aboutwhichthesentence
a sentence
madeabouta future
canalsobe thecase;forexample,
sentence
says
4
thus:A battlewilltakeplace'.Forso longas itis notyettaking
battle,
place,
itis so as thesentence
says,namelythatitwilltakeplace;butso longas it is
place,itwillnotat thattimebe said <that> itwilltakeplace,butthat
taking
itis taking
place.[D, p. 213.21-28,myemphasis.]
The most natural reading of this passage is one holding that what the
- must itselfbe tensed: the sentences 'A batsentencesays- its dictum
tle will take place' and 'A battle is taking place' signifydifferently
tenseddicta21
. Moreover, ifwe thinkofdictaas statesof affairsasserted
we must say not that the formersentences states that a
sentences
by
certainstateof affairswill obtain, but ratherthat it states that a future
tensed-stateof affairs,thata battlewill takeplace, is obtaining, and ifthe
sentence is true this state of affairsobtains now. If then by praesentia
etc. Abelard has in mind past and present-tenseddicta, he would
simply be confused to say that praeterita
(for example) were at some
(past) timepresentbut now are not, forthe past-tensedstate of affairs
thatCaesarcrossedtheRubiconobtains now and did not obtain when he
was crossing it.
On the other hand, Abelard in this passage distinguishes the res
themselveshere that the sentences deal with [de quibus aguntpropositions] fromthe dictasignifiedby the sentences, and allows that in the
case of the sentence 'A battle will take place' the resitselfwill be present, but is not present now. Identifyingthe eventuswith the res ipsa
would renderthe otherpassages cited fromD consistentwiththis. But
what thenare these res?And, more importantly,what relationdo they
bear to the dictasignifiedby sentences? No straightforwardanswers
are forthcomingfrom the text. But the move between treating of
eventus
as such and as the significatesof sentencesstronglysuggeststhe
two alternativesdiscussed in LI and thatAbelard has not got clear on
what to identifythe eventuswith.
Thus the account of determinancyhere in the Dialcticacannot be
, but this elusive resipsa. By the resipsa
directlyin termsof the dictum
here I thinkwe should take Abelard to mean the actual past and present events themselves,as distinctfromthe states of affairsor dictain
question. Thus to the state of affairsthatCaesarcrossedtheRubiconcor27Theremaybe a similar
viewin Boethius,
andp.
cf.In Per.//,p. 188.30-189.35,
199.12-19.
91

12:41:26 PM

responds the past event Caesar's crossingof the Rubicon. The (pasttensed) state of affairsobtains now, just in case this event did exist.
Thus in Abelard' s writingson determinancyit seems we must recognize a tripartitestructureof sentences, dictaor states of affairs,and
concrete events.
'
'
The extension
of determinate
Which true sentences count as determinatelytrue? To understand
Abelard' s discussion of determinancyin LI it is importantto see that
he classifiessentencesaccording to the tense of theirmain verb, as we
should say, classifyingthem by the phrases depraesenti
tempore
('about
de
temand
de
past
futuro
praeterito
tempore
('about
time')
presenttime'),
will
often
abbreviate
these
Abelard
future
time')28.
pore ('about
In his
expressions, writing,forexample, defuturofordefuturotempore.
but
in
case the formerexpression simply has the sense of the latter,
otherwritersthese expressions are oftenused not to referto the tense
of the verb but ratherto the temporal status of what the sentence is
about29.
I suggested in the last section that the significatesof sentences are
to be taken as sharing in the tense of the sentences that state them:
thus an account parallel to that of sentences can be given in the
classification of dicta into determinate and indeterminate. In LI
Abelard discusses the extension of 'determinate' in terms of this
classificationon the basis of tense.
If we take Boethius as using termslike defuturoetc. in thisway (and
there seems to be no reason not to) we shall have to say that for
Boethius the truthof any sentence about the past or presentis determinate, whereas the truthof only some sentences about the futureis
so, namely those the obtaining of whose significatesis known to
nature, or, as we might say, unpreventable30.Other future-tensed
28Abelardis onlyconcerned
is
no indication
herewithsimplecategorical
sentences;
sentences.
givenas to how,ifindeedtheycan,thesetermsapplyto morecomplex
made
ofthesephrasessee LI, p. 420.34f.: 'Nowthosesentences
Forhisdiscussion
is not,whether
is or something
timearewhatever
aboutpresent
saythatsomething
is
or neverbe at all,forexample:"Tomorrow
be present,
thethings
pastorfuture,
> aboutpastor
> is not". < Sentences
is" or " <A chimera
a day",or 'A chimera
as something
future
timecan alsobe madeaboutthesamethings,
namelyas often
is or is not,we saythatitwas or willbe or denythis'.
29Forexample
tomorrow
wouldbea sea-battle
a sentence
like'It wastruethatthere
,
stateofaffairs.
in thepasttense,mightbe takenas reallyabouta future
though
30See forexampleIn Per.//,p. 192.2-5.
92

12:41:26 PM

sentences,those statingcontingentstatesof affairs,though eithertrue

or false, nonethelessdo not have determinatetruthor falsity31.Thus,
Boethius, thoughretainingthe principleof bivalence forall sentences
?:
'cp' is true or '9' is false,
rejectsuniversal application of the strongerprinciple:
cp'is determinatelytrue or 'cp' is determinatelyfalse,
though he will admit that for all sentences 9:
'9 or not-9' is determinatelytrue or false32.
This, of course, is centralto the Boethian and Abelardian interpretation of DI. 9.
Boethius' view on the extension of 'determinate' has weaknesses
thatbecome more apparent in the later literature.It does not seem to
be the case that all true sentences in the present and past tense have
determinatetruth;moreoverthereare argumentsthatpurportto show
that there cannot be indeterminatelytrue sentences in the future
tense. In LI Abelard devotes himselfprimarilyto the formerissue,
and it is to this discussion and Normore's commentson it that I now
turn. I shall consider the doctrine in D in section VI.
Ill
Boethius' view is subject to attack on two fronts,as I have mentioned. But in LI, p. 421.16-p. 422.40 - the passages Normore refers
to- Abelard only attacks the claim that all past and present-tensed
truthsare determinatelytrue. It is important to follow Abelard' s
dialectic closely here, forit is easy to see him as addressing the other
problemalso and thento misconstruethe intentof Abelard's following
text.But the firstargumenthe provides, fromthe determinancyof the
truthof ' "Socrates will eat" is true' to that of the determinancyof
the eventus
of thatSocrateswill eat, is, in effect,put forwardas a reductio
31See In Per./, p. 249.13.
32See In Per.//,p. 208.7-18:'Aristotle
doesnotsaythateach <of a contradictory
truenorfalse,butthatindeedanygivenoneofthemis either
true
pair> is neither
or false,yetnotdefinitely
as in thecaseofpast< sentences
> noras in thecaseof
>. Rather<he says> thatin a certainsensethereis a dual
present< sentences
nature
ofenunciative
there
wouldbe someinwhichnotonlymight
truth
expressions:
andfalsity
befound
butalsoinwhich
onewouldbedefinitely
true,theother
definitely
inthecaseofother< sentences
> indeedonewouldbe true,theother
false;whereas
andchangeably
as a result
oftheirownnatureandnotin relafalse,butindefinitely
tionto ourignorance
and knowledge'.
93

12:41:26 PM

of one of the premises: it is clear thatforAbelard thiseventus

is indeterit
that
the
seems
former sentence cannot be determinate, hence
minately true afterall: a reply will have to challenge this argument.
This argument is then directlyfollowed by morearguments for the
indeterminancy of present truths, not by a reply to the first
argument- that comes later. Thus the firstline of argument,which I
shall consider in detail, is set out as follows:
Yet withregardto certainpresentor past things,thequestionremains
whether
theyaredefinite,
namelyin nature,sincetheycan onlybe knownon
thebasisoffuture
indeterminate
Forexample,
when'Socrateswilleat'
things.
is said,thissentence
nowwithout
a doubtis presently
trueor false,and the
sentence
whichsays: ' "Socrateswilleat" is true'is aboutthepresent
and
- at leastin
trueordeterminately
false
determinately
alreadyeither
accordingly
thenatureof thepresent
of thetruthor falsity
inherence
thatit has. Butif
' "Socrateswilleat" <is true>'33is
trueitmustalsobe deterdeterminately
ofsentences
minatethatSocrateswilleat,forjustas thetruth
dependson the
oftruth
orfalsity
eventus
mustbe obtained
from
the
rerum
, so tootheknowledge
oftheeventus.
Foritis impossible
thata sentence
tobe true
be known
knowledge
in sucha mannerthatitnotbe knownthatit so is as it says,namely
sinceit
is certain
thatitis trueforno otherreasonthanthatitso saysbywayofenun] [LI, p. 421.26-39.FortheLatintextsee
ciatingas in factis thecase [inreest
theAppendix.]
This argument is clearly proposed to give reasons to doubt that
' "Socrates will ea' is true' if
true, is determinately
true, Abelard takthe
that
the dictum that
it
as
obvious
that
drawn,
consequence
ing
Socrateswill eat, if true, is determinatelytrue, is unacceptable. The
general structureof the argument, accepting the suggested emendation, is clear and may be outlined as follows;in the next section I present a more precise version. From the assumption of the truth of
'Socrates will ea we know that ' "Socrates will eat" is true' is true
and hence, since it is in the presenttense, it is determinatelytrue. But
this is to say that it is certain [certa].But our knowledge34of the truth
of sentences derives from that of eventus
, and accordingly Abelard
of
we
must
also
be
certain
the
dictumthatSocrateswill eat,
that
argues
which is to say that this dictummust itselfbe determinate.
It is a shortstep fromhere to the conclusion thatthe sentencesignifying thatSocrateswill eat must also be determinatelytrue, since a
33The interpolation
ofquotation
do nothavemanuscript
hereandplacement
marks
I believethatthey
a suggestion
butfollow
Geyermadeinhisedition.
closely
authority
and I defendthemin the
are necessary
formakingsenseof Abelard'sargument
to follow.
discussion
ofthisargument
34Abelardin hisdiscussion
andknowledge,
between
drawsno distinction
certainty
hislead.
and sincenothing
hingeson thisI follow
94

12:41:26 PM

sentence is determinatelytrue if its significateis determinate, and

Abelard later sums up the above line of argument slightlydifferently
as holding that in the consequence: 'If "Socrates will eat" is true,
Socrates will ea, if the antecedent is certain so must be the consequent, i.e. the sentence 'Socrates will eat', and hence, reading certaas
determinata
, we can inferthe determinancyof the truthof 'Socrates will
eat' fromthat of the antecedent35.There seems littledoubt that the
argumentationfor this view is that we have just outlined.
Such is the argument in broad outline. But on closer inspection it
presentsdifficultiesof interpretationthat I have glossed over. I will
now presenta more precise version of what I take to be the argument
under the most felicitousinterpretation,and then I shall discuss it in
more detail.
IV
The Argument
As presentedby Abelard this argument (what I'll call 'The Argument' forease of reference)is put forwardrather tersely.Abelard is
tryingto show that on the supposition that 'Socrates will eat' is true,
its significate,the dictumthatSocrateswill eat is determinate.This conclusion however is false, and thereforeAbelard will later attack The
Argument.In what followsI have tried to supply missing but needed
premises, and to preciselyformulateassumptions made by Abelard.
1. Every true present-tensedsentence is determinatelytrue, premise
2. A sentence cp(or dictum that<p)is determinateif it is known that
'9' is true (or that9 is known), premise
3. If it is known that ' "cp" is true' is true, then that<pis known.
premise
4. Assume
: 'Socrates will eat' is true.
'
5. "Socrates will eat" is true' is true. 4, Tarski: cp- 'cp' is true
6. ' "Socrates will eat" is true' is in the present tense, premise
7. ' "Socrates will eat" is true' is determinatelytrue. 5, 6, 1
8. It is known that ' "Socrates will eat" is true' is true. 7, 2
9. That Socrateswill eat is known. 8, 3,
10. That Socrateswill eat is determinate. 9, 2
11. If 'Socrates will eat' is true, then thatSocrateswill eat is determinate. 4-10
35LI, p. 422.36-40.
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12:41:26 PM

v
Discussionof The Argument
There seems no doubt that The Argument as formulatedabove is
valid; our attention must thereforebe focused on the premises.
Obviously the firstthreepremises are crucial here, and each presents
difficulties.Premise (5) relies on one side of the Tarski biconditional,
and I take it that it is uncontroversialformedieval as well as modern
philosophers. (6) makes the equally uncontroversial claim that the
sentence 4 "Socrates will eat" is true' is in the present tense. These
assumptions are not stated by Abelard, but are clearly needed if the
argument is to work.
Premise (1) states a claim that Abelard will deny in LI, though he
appears to accept it in D . I will discuss this mattermore fullyin the
next section; here it may sufficeto note that for the purposes of the
44
argument the weaker claim All true present-tensedsentences of the
4
form "<p" is true' are determinately true" would suffice for
Abelard' s argument, and I will show in section VI that he never
rejects this claim, neitherin LI nor in D.
Premise (2) is the focus of Abelard' s replyto the argument; insofar
as he denies that if a consequence of the form'If "9" is true, then 9'
has a determinateantecedent it has a determinateconsequent, this is
due to a parallel claim about the certaintyor knowledge of the antecedent and consequent and the assumption made here in (2) that certaintyor knowledge is equivalent to determinancy.He never gives up
the formerclaim, but he does give up the latter.
But why should anyone even thinkof accepting (2)? The obvious
problem here is that it would make what is determinatesimplya matter of what we know, but it is quite clear from the discussions in
Boethius, forexample, thatthe determinateis not so tightlybound up
with our actual knowledge; thus both Boethius and Abelard hold that
it is either determinatethat the number of the stars is odd or else it
is determinatethat it is even, but theydid not thinkanyone (save God
and some angels) knew the answer36.
36At one pointAbelardconsiders
are knownbyGod,
thatall truths
theobjection
He seemsto admitthat'all
aboutthefuture.
truths
evenso-called'indeterminate'
withrespect
tousthere
withrespect
toHim,whereas
canbecalleddeterminate
things
whichwe stillcannotat all comprehend.
aremanypresent,
hiddennatures
If,howis in
discussion
sincehereAristotle's
ever,we haveregardto humanknowledge,
seemdefinite'.
aboutthepresent
withhumanopinion,notall sentences
accordance
Whatever
otherproblems
[LI, p. 422.12-17.FortheLatintextsee theAppendix.]
96

12:41:26 PM

No doubt what must have given (2) an air of plausibiltyto some are
the idioms both Boethius and Abelard occasionally use to describe
'
determinancy.Boethius talks of what is knownto nature', Abelard of
what is 4certain
in itself, and of course by this theydo not mean what
is known by us or certain to us, and in fact they do not even mean
simply what is knowable or certifiableby us. But in less careful
momentstheydo talkloosely ofwhat is simplyknown or certain,omittingthe importantqualifications,and thismightlead a careless reader
to identifydeterminancywith what is known or certain to us. Insofar
thenas Abelard' s replyto the argumentfocuseson (2) we can see him
as in part concerned to dispel incorrectinterpretationsof his quasiepistemic account of determinancy.
Before going on to consider (3) we mightnote that (2) could, more
able by
plausibly, be rephrased in terms of what is knowable or certifi
us. So far as I can see the argument could be reformulatedin these
terms,and indeed strengthened.Yet not even thisversionof (2) would
satisfyAbelard, for, as I have said, his view is that the way it is
knowable is crucial to its being determinateor not.
Premise (3) 37is intended to license the move Abelard makes from
the determinatetruthof ' 4' Socrates will eat" is true' to the determinancyof the dictumthatSocrateswill eat. This move restson adopting
an emendationof the textat p. 421 .34-35 38.If we accept thisemenda4
tion, the move fromthe determinatetruthof "Socrates will eat" is
true' to that of thatSocrateswill eat, rests on the tacit equation (made
explicitin (2)) of determinancywithsubjective certaintyand the claim
that "it is impossible that a sentence be known to be true in such a
manner that it not be known that it is so as it says... since it is certain
that it is true forno other reason than that it so says by way of enunciating as in fact is the case". Now Abelard in this supportingargument appears to employ the followingprinciple:
[S] If it is known that '<p' is true, that<pis also known.
Here 'that<p' picks out the dictumsignifiedby '9'. Now, leaving to one
side for the moment the reasons for admitting [S], we must ask
thismight
inAbelard'
s discussion
toknowledge
raise,itmakesitclearthatreferences
are tobe takenas references
to ourknowledge.
37Premise
I propose
itsomewhat
ten(3) raisesconsiderable
interpretative
problems.
as mybestattempt
toreconstruct
lineofthought.
Itisthisprinciple
Abelard's
tatively
thatplaystherolein myinterpretation
oftheargument
thatNormore's
entailment
principle
playsin his.
38See below,p. 105andnote23 in theapparatus
in theappendix.
97

12:41:26 PM

whether it really licenses the move from the knowledge that

' "Socrates will eat" is true' is true to the
knowledge thatSocrateswill
eat. And I thinkit is clear that it does not license thisdirectly
, since (as
Abelard will elsewhere in effecthold39) thatSocrateswill eat is not
'
'
signifiedby "Socrates will eat" is true', but ratherthat Socrateswill
eat' is trueis signifiedby it.
Now thismightmake us wonder whetherthe suggestedemendation
is to be accepted afterall; forif we read the text as it stands Abelard
moves from the determinancy of 'Socrates will eat' to that of that
Socrateswill eat via the equation of determinancywith certaintyor
knowledge,and it is clear thatthe move here is directlylicensed by [S] .
But attractiveas this interpretationis, it has, I think,substantialdifficulties;moreover, as I shall show shortly,we can get to premise (3)
via repeated
use of [S].
What problems then does the textface ifleftunemended? It is clear
that Abelard is concerned to throwdoubt on the determinatetruthof
' "Socrates will eat" is true'
by ending up with the conclusion that if
it were determinatelytrue, the dictumthatSocrateswill eat would also
have to be determinate,which it is not. The fundamentalproblem the
unemended text faces is that it would have Abelard proceed to the
determinancy of that Socrateswill eat via the determinate truth of
'Socrates will ea, but nowhere does Abelard show that the sentence
'Socrates will eat' is determinatelytrue: its determinancycertainly
does not followfromthe claim thatall present-tensedtruthsare determinate, a claim Abelard seems to appeal to in the argument. As
unemended, the argument is thus seriouslyincomplete. On the other
hand, if (3) can be supported by use of [S], the determinancyof
' "Socrates will eat" is true' follows from the fact that it is a true
sentence in the present tense. Moreover, later in LI Abelard does
'
discuss the consequence fromthe determinatetruthof "Socrates will
eat" is true' to thatof 'Socrates will eat', and even thoughthis differs
, namely
slightlyfromthe inferenceto the determinancyof the dictum
thatSocrateswill eat, still, given the fact that if a dictumthat<pis determinate so is the sentence signifyingit, the latter formulationdoes
follow. Thus I conclude that the evidence points in favor of the suggested emendation.
39NamelyLI, p. 425.36-40.
98

12:41:26 PM

So what we need to show is that indeed premise (3) is supportedby

[S] . Now although (3) does not follow immediatelyfrom [S] it does
followby a repeated application of [S] as follows:
To show: if it is known that 4 "9" is true' is true,
then it is known that 9.
1. Assume: It is known that ' "9" is true' is true.
2. It is known that '9' is true. 1, [S]
3. It is known that 9. 2, [S]
4. If it is known that ' "9" is true' is true, then it is known that
9. 1-3.
But what about [S]? Is it reasonable? Primafacie [S] seems to be false.
It seems to be quite possible that that(<py
is truebe known, withoutit
being known that9, where that<pis the propositionor dictumsignified
by the sentence '9'. For example, German missionaries may have
informedan African native who knows no German that 'Schnee ist
weiss' is true,yetthe native, never having experienced snow, does not
know that snow is white. If we allow testimony to be a basis of
knowledge,this seems to be a counterexampleto [S] . In short, there
are cases in which one can come to know that a sentence is true without even knowingwhat it means and hence withoutknowingthe proposition it expresses.
It is likely that such cases were not obvious to Abelard and his
readers: such examples as the above rely on the use of a quotation
device which arguably allows us to formfroma sentence of a foreign
language an English (for example) name by enclosing it in quotation
marks. But Abelard did not have quotation marks and it is unclear
thathe would have accepted as a well-formedexpression of Latin, for
example, the followingstring:
Schnee ist weiss est vera.
This mightsuggest that Abelard's intentcould be formulatedin the
followingprinciple;
[S*] Where x is a speaker of L, '9' a schematic letter
' a
'
for sentences
ofL alone, and "9"
quotation
name of 9: If x knows that '9' is true, then x knows that 9.
But the idea that [S] mightbe reformulatedalong the lines of [S*] to
evade the problems[S] faces not only fallspreyto similarobjections40,
40Forexample,
raisedbyL-speakers
withlimited
vocabularies.
problems
99

12:41:26 PM

but again is besides the point. No formulationemployinga quotation

device will faithfullyrepresentAbelard's view. For him, if a speaker
understands that 'Snow is white' is true, as we should put it, he must
also understand the sentence 'Snow is white'. Abelard will not admit
such quotation-marknames which, as it were, insulate the meaning
of the quoted sentence from the person understanding the truth
predication. The problems posed by the formulationof [S] and [S*]
using quotation marks are simplynot problemsthatwould have occurred to Abelard.
Abelard also suggests another explanation of why he accepts [S]: it
seems to him to formulatethe epistemic priorityof our knowing that
certain statesof affairsobtain over our knowing,of the sentencesthat
signifythem,thattheyare true. Stated as [S], the thesisis verystrong,
and one wonders whetherthe thesisof epistemicprioritycan reallybe
made out. Now it is possible, of course, that Abelard is simply not
attackingthese issues with the sophisticationwe should employ; it is
also possible, however, that he would not accord knowledge on the
basis of e.g. testimonythe titleof knowledge,thoughhe seems to allow
so in LI41. But another, more plausible, view is that he feels that if
someoneknowsthat'<p'is true, then someone
, not necessarilythe former
At
some
our knowledge of the truth
must
know
that
9.
point
person,
of sentences must be grounded in epistemic contact with the states of
affairsthey signify,for example, by means of perception.
On this view a principle like [S] is not to be formulated with
referenceto a given person's knowledge, but, as I have been doing
I conclude then that [S] can be given
withoutcomment, impersonally.
a plausible formulationthat arguably will serve Abelard' s purposes.
Thus, to recapitulate,on the proposal being made, Abelard' s move
fromthe determinancyof 4 ' 4Socrates will eat" is true' to that of the
dictumthatSocrateswill eat, is grounded on an epistemicprinciplewhose
use by Abelard can be defended eitheron the grounds that he has no
quotation device, or that he thinksknowledgeof the truthof sentences
presupposes that someone knows the propositionsthey express.
It is clear then that I see Normore's entailmentprinciple- the view
that valid inferencepreserves determinancy- as playing no role in
Abelard's discussion. And, indeed, such an interpretationfaces major
difficulties.It is clear that Abelard makes the move fromthe deter11Whenhe saysat LI, p. 422.30thatwe couldacquireknowledge
on thebasisof
an angel'stestimony.
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12:41:26 PM

4
minancy of "Socrates will eat" is true' to that of thatSocrateswill eat
or 'Socrates will eat' on the basis of an equation of determinancywith
certaintyand some principle allowing us to move fromthe certainty
of the formerto that of the latter. If he is appealing to an entailment
principle then it must be one that holds for certainty.But it is quite
clear that the entailmentprinciple is false for certaintyor knowledge
and would not have been accepted by Abelard. For the claim thatvalid
inferencepreservesknowledge says that ifsome person a knows 9 and
9 entails c>then he knows c>:
If Ka<p & (<p=*c|>),
then Kac>.
Given no independent informationfor c|>,this principle could fail
either(i) because one did not know that 9 entailed c|>,or (ii) because
even though one knew this, he did not draw the conclusion c>.
This latterpoint also throwsdoubt on any suggestion to the effect
that Abelard is appealing to a related principle; the view that
42
knowledge distributesover entailment:
If Ka9 & Ka(9 =>c|>),then Kac>.
But thereis some textual support forAbelard' s acceptance of this. In
LI Abelard does admit thatifthe consequence: 'If "Socrates will eat"
is true,Socrates will ea be admitted[recipiatur],
then ifthe antecedent
is certain so is the consequent. And if one were to interpretrecipiatur
as being used in this contextsynonymouslywith 'certain', this would
fit the above distribution pattern. But this is rather inconclusive
evidence: recipiatur
here could simply mean that if we, the readers,
grantthe entailment,we must realize that if the antecedent is certain
to someone (not necessarilyourselves), so must be the consequent, this
being forthe reasons I have outlined in the discussion of [S], reasons
focussingessentiallyon the factthat the antecedentpredicates truthof
the sentence in the consequent. Furthermore,in parallel passages in
D the proposal does not fit the distributionscheme; here Abelard
simplysays: 'whoever is certain of the truthof the sentence, also cannot doubt about the eventus
, for if the antecedent is certain so is the
there
is no talk here of the consequence itself
consequent' [D, p. 212]
being certain.
42Cf. M. Slote,Selective
andFreeWill
79
, in: TheJournalofPhilosophy,
Necessity
agreedthat'A knowsthatp' and 'A knowsthat
(1982),pp. 5-24:"It is generally
substituends.
(p D q)' do notentail'A knowsthatq' forappropriate
Peoplemayfail
tomakeinferences
to make".,p. 11. Slote'spaperis an important
theyareentitled
recentattackon deterministic
for
arguments
usingthisand relatedprinciples
necessity.
101

12:41:26 PM

Let us note finallythat neithersuggestionmakes use of factsabout

signification,whereas Abelard clearly does use such. Thus whatever
one thinksof these two schemata, theydo not appear to play any role
in Abelard' s discussion in the move from the determinancy of
' " Socrates will eat" is true' to thatof thatSocrates
willeatand 'Socrates
will ea.
VI
s solution
Abelard.'
Denial of (1) is, pace Normore, not Abelard's solution. That it may
appear so perhaps resultsfromtwo things.First,Abelard does appear
to go on to deny (1) immediatelyafterpresentingThe Argument,and
second, formallyspeaking, denial of (1) would sufficeto undercutThe
Argumentas I have presented it. Yet the factis thatAbelard does not
want to say that sentences like ' "" is true' falsify(1), and accordingly it would be a simple matter to restate The Argument so as to
evade the solution proposed. Abelard's real solution lies in denying
(2) - the equation of a concept of subjective certaintywith that of
determinancy.And the same solution is presented, as I shall show in
the next section, to essentiallythe same argument in D. Let us consider these points in turn.
There is no doubt that Abelard denies (1). But denial of it in LI is
not introduced as a solution to The Argument. Rather, immediately
afterhaving stated this argument,Abelard continueswith a new43set
of argumentsforthe view that not all presentor past-tensedtruthsare
determinate. The solution to The Argument will come after these
arguments.
'Socratesis thenameofa
> aboutthepresent
Butnorcanthese< sentences
is Socrates'or
or 'A mangoingto eat tomorrow
mangoingto eattomorrow'
be determined
'I seea manabouttoeat tomorrow'
excepton thebasisofwhat
willeattomorrow':
ifwesayofhimwhosaidtoday'Socrates
isfuture.
Likewise,
it
aboutthepast,whether
'He has spokenfalsely'[mentiius
est],thisstatement
Andso not
be trueor false,can onlybe knownon thebasisofwhatis future.
trueor false,
or pastseemto be determinately
aboutthepresent
all sentences
onwhatisfuture.
oftheir
truth
orfalsity
viz,whenthediscernment
depends
[LI,
FortheLatintextsee theAppendix.]
pp. 421.39-422.7.
Abelard offersno furthercomment on thisargument, but seems to
accept it.
43As hisuse ofnecin thetextindicates.
102

12:41:26 PM

Abelars reason for denying these sentences determinate truth

would primafacie seem to apply also to sentences like ' ' 4Socrates will
eat" is true'. If theycannot be known except on the basis of what is
itselfindeterminateand hence, presumably,not ofthemselves
, similarly
it would seem that sentenceslike 4 "Socrates will eat" is true' are in
the same boat; for its truthdepends on what will happen- a future
- and one would think that its knowability
contingentstate of affairs
does also, at least its knowabilityex se. But forratherunclear reasons
Abelard does not extend rejection of (1) to these truth-valuepredica' 4'Socrates will
tions; rather,as I shall now show, such sentences as
eat" is true', if true, are held to be determinatelytrue.
The crucial passage in support of this view is as follows:44
Butthere
arethosewhosaythat'Socrates
willeat'- whichperhaps
atpresent
- is determinately
is < indeterminately
> true
truewithrespectto thetruth,
tothecharacteristic
itself
thatitpresently
ofthe
has;indeed,theeventus
namely
characteristic
in it is determinate,
and it alreadyhas truth
presently
inhering
itself
thesentence
true
But,although
determinately.
maybecalleddeterminately
withrespect
tothepresent
anddeterminate
inherence
oftruth< init> , yetwith
totheindeterminate
eventus
thatitstatesitis indeterminately
true;and
respect
inthispassageAristotle
callssentences
orindeterminately
trueor
determinately
falsewithrespect
totheeventus
orindeterminate
onesthey
, viz.,thedeterminate
FortheLatintextseetheAppendix.]
propose.
myemphasis.
[LI, p. 422.18-26,
Here Abelard distinguishestwo eventus
or states of affairs:(i) the state
of affairsthattruthinheres in the sentence 'Socrates will ea, and (ii)
the state of affairsthatSocrateswill eat. The latter state of affairsis
signifid(or proposed- Abelard uses the terms interchangeably)by
the sentence 'Socrates will eat', the formeris not. Now the firststate
of affairsis determinate
, and to the extentthereforethatit is determinate
thattruthinheresin 'Socrates will eat', we may say that this sentence
itselfmay be called determinatelytrue. But this,Abelard claims, is an
improper usage, for strictlyspeaking, a sentence is to be accounted
determinatelytrue only if its significateis determinate. Now the
significateof 'Socrates will eat' - thatSocrateswill eat- is indeterminate
,
and hence so too is the truthof 'Socrates will eat'.
It is evident that, as I noted earlier, Abelard treats (i) and (ii) as
distinctstates of affairsand holds that only the latter is signifiedby
'Socrates will ea. It is also a natural consequence of this view that
a sentence that signifies
the eventus
that'Socrateswill ea is true
, will be
true
in
the
strict
sense.
But
this
of
is,
course, precisely
determinately
44See alsothenextsection
whereparallelpassagesin D arediscussed.
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12:41:26 PM

what ' "Socrates will eat" is true' signifies. This consequence is

drawn by Abelard when he writes:
be admitted:
'If"Socrateswilleat" istrue,
Whencetooifsucha consequence
willcat',andtheantecedent
theconsequent
Socrates
be certain,
is certain
too.
Butperhaps
not:iftheantecedent
is determinate
so is theconsequent,
because
the presenteventus
of itselfis knowable,but not so the futurecontingent
<evenlus>. [LI, p. 422.36-40.FortheLatintextsee theAppendix.].
4
That is, the eventus
signifiedby the antecedent "Socrates will eat" is
'
true'- the presenteventus
(viz., that Socrateswill eat} is true) is deterfuture
conthe
the
minate, whereas
consequent the
significateof
tingenteventus(viz., thatSocrateswill eat) is indeterminate.
Let us now consider Abelard' s solution to The Argument. In the
passage just cited Abelard will not allow us to move fromthe deter4
minancy of "Socrates will eat" is true' to thatof 'Socrates will eat',
thoughwe can move fromthe certaintyof the formerto thatof the latter. Accordinglythiscrucial move in the argumentis blocked by splitting apart determinancyand certainty.Abelard writes:

thandoes'certain',
for
'Determinate'
alsoseemstomeansomething
different
an eventus
is calleddeterminate
whichofitself
beingknowable
byus, as is the
ofthe> stars,cangiveknowledge
ofitself
cvenessoroddnessofthe< number
thatithas.On theotherhand,thosethings
areceron thebasisofthepresence
ifI wereto
areactually
known.Forexample,
tainwhich,inwhatever
manner,
onthetestimony
ofan angel,itwould
arriveatknowledge
ofa future
contingent
to me,notofitself,
buton theauthority
oftheangel;butit
indeedbe certain
ofitself.
Andso
becauseitwouldnotbe knowable
wouldnotbe determinate,
is notcertain,
or conversely,
becausewe take'certain'in
whatis determinate
is clearto someone,
whereas
an actualsense,namelyas whatalreadyactually
ina possible
as whatis fitted
ofitself
tobe
wetake'determinate'
sense,namely
known.[LI, p. 422.26-36.FortheLatintextsee theAppendix.]
If we turn out attentionback to our formulationof The Argumentin
section IV, it failsat premise (2), in which a concept of subjective certainty is equated with determinancy.
VII
The Dialctica
Abelard considers the same set of problems in the Dialctica.After
having said that sentences about future contingents are indeterminately true or indeterminatelyfalse on the basis of the indeterminate eventuswhich they propose or signify[D, p. 211.30-32], he
raises the question whether in a certain sense they might not seem
determinatelytrue or determinatelyfalse 'according to the present
104

12:41:26 PM

inherence of truth or falsity <in them>' [p. 211.32-35]. For

'whatever sentencealready has truthhas it determinately,and maybe
can be called determinatelytrue in accordance with its taking on of
truth,not according to the certitudeof the euentusit deals with'. This
is preciselythe view we have seen proposed in LI: thatin a loose sense
a true sentence about a futurecontingentmay be determinatelytrue
dequo
withrespectnotto the determinancyof its significate- the eventus
of
And
of
affairs
true.
its being
agit but with respect to the state
Abelard now sees thatone mightinferfromthe factthatthe inherence
of truthis determinatethat the sentence's significateis too:
For
Butperhapstheeventus
[dequoagit
] itselfis also said to be determinate.
reimayneverappearto be
fromthetruthofa sentence
theeventus
although
ofthesentence
alsocannotdoubtabout
whoever
is certain
ofthetruth
inferred,
so is theconsequent
theeventus
iscertain
; foriftheantecedent
[D, p. 212. 10-13]
That is, even though epistemicallywe start fromthe eventus,not the
sentence, nonetheless if I am certain that the sentence 'q>' is true, I
must also be certain of the eventussignifiedby '9': no doubt for the
reason thatmy certaintyof the truthof the sentence derives fromthat
- a point explicitlymade in LI, though omitted here.
of the eventus
Abelard's solution here is precisely that proposed in LI:
another.Foronlythosethings
are
But'certain'is one thing,'determinate'
Butfuture
are
determinate
whichcan alreadybe knownofthemselves.
things
ifoneweretohavesomecertitude
notabletobe knownofthemselves,
though
a divineresponse
orsomesigns,indeedtheycouldbe
offuture
things
through
unlesstheywereknownon the
however
certain,
known,butnotdeterminate
we do notadmitthatiftheantecedent
is
basisoftheirowneventus.
Therefore
is determinate,
too.Butmaybeiftheantecedent
is
theconsequent
determinate,
theconsequent
willalsobe certain45.
certain,
[D, p. 212.13-21.]
This is preciselythe solution put forwardin LI. However Abelard in
D does seem to accept premise (1), the view that all past and presenttensed truthsare determinatelytrue:
Foritappearedthatnosentence
couldbe calledtrueexceptwhichwasdeteraboutthepresent
or
true,andlikewise
false,as areall thosesentences
minately
ofall present,
ornaturalfuture.
Forbecausetheeventus
pastandthenecessary
is determinate
initsnature,
ornatural
whatever
future
pastornecessary
things
sentences
aretrueaboutthemaredeterminately
true,and whatever
false,are
thedeterminate
eventus
oftheres
false,viz. inthattheyenunciate
determinately
theydealwith[D, p. 210.34-p.211.5.]
Whether this is a mattermerely of carelessness on Abelard' s part or
a differencein doctrine, the text fails to make clear.
45One might
notethetentative
tonehere,unlikein LI.
105

12:41:26 PM

VIII
Conclusion
Abelars views on determinatetruthare more complex than has
hithertobeen thought. We have seen that one line of argument to
show certain present-tensed truths to be indeterminatelytrue is
rejected for the same reason by Abelard in both LI and D, since it
wronglyequates subjective certaintywithdeterminancy.Moreover, it
is wrong to see any logical principleabout determinancybeing carried
by valid inference or distributingacross such at play in Abelard' s
discussion. Rather, Abelard appeals to a principle relating our
knowledge of the truthof sentences to that of the dictathey signify;
thus underlyinghis discussion lurks the frameworkof sentences and
dictaoutlined earlier in this paper. Yet LI and D do seem to differon
whether all present-tensed truths are determinatelytrue. Abelard
rejectsthisin LI, thoughhis rejectionis not proposed as a replyto The
Argument, but he seems to accept it in D.
Lancaster, Pa.
Franklinand Marshall College

APPENDIX
Rdition of L.I. (ed. Geyer, pp. 421, 16-422, 40) 1
[p. 421,16-26] Propositiones vero de praesenti vel praeterito,
quaecumque verae sunt vel falsae, vera vel falsa2 determinateindicant, quia etsi nobis3 actualiter cognita non sit4 Veritas earum vel
falsitas,in natura tarnendefinitaest, quia iam in rerumpraesentia vel
est vel fuit5. Unde notitiam de se conferrepossunt et6, quantum in
ipsis est, cognosci. Nam cum7 astra paria sintvel imparia alterumque
1 A = codexAmbrosianus
M 63 Sup., 60 va-vb);B = codex
(Milan,Bibi.Ambros.,
Preussische
derStiftung
Preussischer
Berolinus
Kulturbesitz,
(formerly
(Staatsbibl.
Lat. fol.624,121va-vb);g = Geyerineditione
sua;] = scripsi
(scripStaatsbibliothek)
coni.= coniecit;
coli.= collecto
add= addidit(addiderunt);
sit,scripserunt);
(collectis);
= sup= superscripsit;
= correxit;del.= delevit; om.= omisit; superscr.
corr.
suppl.
plevi(t).
2 veravelfalsa] g verasvelfalsasA verasvelfai.B 3 nobis] A B g deteriate
add.etdel.A 4 sit] B g sintA 5 estvelfuit]A g fuitvelestB 6 et] A g
B
om.B 7 cum] A g superscr.
106

12:41:26 PM

in rerum praesentia definitumsit8, licet non sit9 actualiter homini

cognitum, tamen est in natura determinatum, quia iam id10 rei
eventus habet, unde de se notitiamprastar possit et, quantum in se
est, iam est definitus11,cum nondum12 pro infirmitatenostra a13
nobis14teneatur.
[p. 421, 26-39] De quibusdam tamen praesentibus sive praeteritis
restt quaestio, utrum definita sint scilicet15 in natura16, cum
nonnisi17per futuraindeterminatasciri queant. Veluti18 cum dicitur
'Socrates comede, haec propositio iam profectopraesentialiterest
vera vel falsa et haec propositio quae dicit ' 4Socrates comede'19
vera es de praesenti est et ideo iam20 vel determinatevera est21vel
determinatefalsa, saltem22in natura praesentis inhaerentiae veritatis
vel falsitatisquam habet. At vero si ' Socrates comede est vera23
determinate,oportetet determinatumesse24 quod Socrates comedet,
quia sicut Veritaspropositionumex eventu rerumpendei, ita et Cognitionen! veritatis vel falsitatis ex cognitione eventuum necesse est
haberi. Impossibile enim est cognosci [B 121 va] veram esse propositionem ita ut25nesciaturquod ita sit ut ipsa dicit, cum videlicet26ertm sit earn aliunde27 non esse veram nisi ex eo quod ita dicit
enuntiando28sicut in re est.
[p. 421,39-422,17] Sed nec istae de praesenti 'Socrates est nomen
hominiscomesturi29in crastino', vel 'homo comesturusin crastinoest
Socrates', vel 'video hominem30comesturumin crastino' determinan
possunt nisi per futurum.Similitersi dicamus de eo qui hodie dixit31,
'Socrates eras comede: 'iste mentitusest'32, haec enuntiatiode praeteritoutrum33vera sitvel falsa, nonnisi ex futurocognosci potest. Non
itaque omnes de praesentivel praeteritopropositionesverae vel falsae
determinate esse videntur, quando videlicet34veritatis vel falsitatis
earum35 discretio ex futuro pendei. Nam et iustitia uniuscuiusque
hominis, etsi modo sit, nec ipsi qui earn habet36 adhuc certa est nec
8sit] B estvelfitAg
9nonsit]Ag etiamfitB
10id] Ag super
scr.B
12nondum]B undus(7,M
A definitum
ndefinitus]
Bg
(m)undus
g
13a] Ag superset.
14
15
B
nonadd.Ag
ABg
nobis]
scilicet]
ve'ABg
16innatura] A B indefinita
17nonnisi]
18veluti]
nisiAB
perperam
legens
g
19
20
21est]
B itaAg
B
comedit
B
est
comedet]Ag
iam] Ag
22
23
Ag om.B
saltimi?
est
B
,<4
est estveraest
saltem] Ag
vera]
24determinatum
com.
estveraestvera?]
B determinate
g [anlegendum
esse]
Ag 25ut] Ag quodB 26videlicet]Ag scilicet
B 27aliunde]aliAB aliter
A g comesturi
B
hominis
g 28enuntiando]B om.A g 29hominis
comesturi]
30hominem]B g homines
A 31dixit] ABg quodadd.Ag 32mentitus
est]
33
B estmentitus
A
B
utrum]A g utraque(!) B 34videlicet]A g scilicet
35vel falsitatis g
A g 36habet] A g habentB
earum] B earumvel falsitatis
107

12:41:26 PM

esse valet nisi per examen extremi iudicii37,et quod mulier concipit,
ex aliquo futuroeventu38notitiam expectat certam39.Si quis autem
dicat quod mulierem concipere si non sit nobis cognitum, salternDeo
patet [A 60 vb], idem etiam de quolibet futuro40dici potest41,quia
omnia determinatadici possunt42quantum ad Ipsum; quantum43 ad
nos vero multae sunt occultae naturae praesentesquae a nobis nullatenus comprehendi adhuc44 valent. Si autem ad humanam scientiam
respiciamus, cum hic Aristoteles45 iuxta46 humanam opinionem
disputt47,non omnes propositionesde praesenti48definitaevidentur.
[p. 422,18-40] Sunt autem qui dicunt quod 'Socrates comede
51 vera50
est
indeterminate
>
<
fortassis49
praesentialiter
quae
determinate vera est quantum ad veritatem ipsam scilicet
52
quam praesentialiterhabet; quippe determinatus
proprie< tatem>
est eventus proprietatis53praesentialiterei inhaerentiset ipsam iam
determinateveritatemhabet. Sed, licet determinatevera dicatur propositio quantum ad praesentemet determinataminhaerentiamveritatis, quantum54tarnen55ad eventum quem loquitur indeterminatum56,
indeterminate57vera est; et hoc loco Aristoteles determinate vel
indeterminate58veras vel falsas propositionesdicit quantum ad eventus scilicet determinatos vel indeterminatosquos proponunt. Aliud
etiam59sonare videtur 'determinatum'60quam 'certum', quia determinatus dicitureventus qui ex se cognoscibilisest61nobis, ut paritas
et imparitas astrorumex ipsa praesentia quam habet62de se cognitionem dare potest; certa vero sunt quae quoquomodo63 actualitercognita sunt, ut si quid64 de futuro contingenti65testimonio angeli ad
discretionem<meam venerit> 66, certumquidem67 illud68esset mihi
non ex se sed ex auctoritateangeli; sed determinatumnon esset, quia
37extremiiudicii] B g extermini
B
indicit(!) A 38eventu] A g affectu
39certam]g m (!) A nostram
B
B 40quolibetfuturo]A g futuro
quolibet
41potest] A g con. ex possumusB 42quia...possunt] A g superscr.
B
43quantum]A g om.B 44adhuc] A B g tenent
add.etdel.A 45aristoteles]
B 48praesenti]
A g autemB 46iuxta] B om.Ag 47disputt]A g superscr.
49fortassis]A B fortassese
futuro(!) add. B
A B G vel preterito
51 < indeterminate
50vera...praesentialiter]B om. A g
>
om. B
g
52proprietatem]
A B [viz.via itstruth:an legendum
B 53proprietatis]
proprie
55
A
veritatis?] 54quantum] A g om. B 57 tamen] B g superscr.
56indeterminatum]
A g quo deterA
B g indeterminatam
indeterminate]
add.
B om.A g 59etiam] A B g sonatur
minate(!) B 58velindeterminate]
Ag
sonarevidetur
B determinatum
etdel.A 60sonarevidctur
determinatum]
61est] B om.A g 62habet] A B habentg 63quoquomodo]B g quomodo
B 66 Cmeam
A g contingit
A 64quid] B g quide(!) A 65contingenti]
67quidem] Bg quodA 68illud] B
venerit>] suppl. <venerit> suppl.g
aliudA om.g
108

12:41:26 PM

ex se ipso cognoscibile non esset. Non est itaque determinatumertm,vel econverso,quia 'certum' actualiteraccipimus69quod iam scilicet actualiter alicui constat; 4determinatum' autem possibiliter
sumimus70quod videlicet aptum est ex71 se ipso sciri. Unde etsi talis
4 4'
consequentia recipiatur: Si Socrates comede' est vera, Socrates
comede et certumsit antecedens, certumest72et73consequens. Sed
non, fortasse:si determinatum[5 121 vb] sit antecedens74,et consequens, quia praesens eventus ex se cognoscibilisest, sed non ita futurus contingens75.
69accipimus]Ag accepimusi? 70sumimus]B sumamusi4^ 71ex] Bg
72certum
73et]Ag om.B
A certum
eritB
con.experA
est] g superset.
74antecedens]B g accidens
A 75contingens]A g contingit
B

109

12:41:26 PM

Vivarium
XXV, 2 (1987)
The Fallacy of Accidentand theDictum de omni: Late Medieval
overa ReciprocalPair
Controversy
HESTER GOODENOUGH GELBER

In the SophisticalRefutations
, Aristotle distinguished two sorts of
fallacies, fallacies that depend upon language and fallacies that do
not.1 But just what the distinction distinguishes is not completely
clear. His examples of fallacies independent of language, particularly
And
the first,the fallacyof accident, pose problemsof interpretation.2
yet matters of considerable moment appear to be at stake in the
distinction.What exactly did Aristotleinclude and exclude with the
and ea>xfjXeeo
or in the Latin tradition: in
words rcocp
tt)vXetv
refer
to everyaspect of speech,
Did
"diction"
and extradictionei
dictione
including syntax,or did it referonly to the nature of terms?What lay
outside speech? Did Aristotlehave in mind thingsor did he have in
mind some ideal logical structureindependentof and priorto speech?
What did his distinctionimply for the relation between logical form
and content? Medieval authors trying to comprehend and give
coherence to Aristotlehad to make decisions about the meaning of his
text, and the questions hanging over Aristotle'swords resultedin full
fledged controversyduring the fourteenthcentury.
I. Settingup theproblem
Discussions about the nature and application of the fallacyof accident served as one occasion for interpretingAristotle's distinction
between fallacies that depend on speech and fallacies that do not.
Aristotledescribed the fallacy of accident as occurrring: "whenever
any attributeis claimed to belong in a like manner to a thing and to
its accident. For since the same thinghas many accidents there is no
necessitythat all the same attributesshould belong to all of a thing's
1 Aristotles,
4.166b20-27.
De sophisticis
elenchis,
2 Aristotle
See C. L.
in laterdiscussions
offallacy.
himself
droppedthedistinction
, London1970,pp. 26-28,67-73,84-87.
Hamblin,Fallacies
110

12:41:36 PM

predicates and to their subject as well."3 Deception through such a

4
fallacy arises 'because we cannot distinguish the sameness and
othernessof terms,i.e. theirunity and multiplicity,or what kinds of
predicate have all the same accidents as their subject."4
For illustration,Aristotlegave the followingexample:
"You knowCoriscus,
Coriscusis theone approaching,
Therefore,
youknowCoriscusis theone approaching."5
The middle term 4'Coriscus' ' has two attributes- that he is known

to you and thathe is approaching, but inasmuch as he is approaching,

it may not be clear that he is known to you. He may be too distant
to recognize as Coriscus, or he may be in disguise.
Aristotle'sdefinitionof the fallacyhas been interpretedas reflecting
the essentialistview that some propertiesare essentiallypredicated of
theirsubjects and otherpropertiesare only accidentallypredicated of
theirs.If a propertythat is only accidentallyattached to its subject is
treatedas though it pertained to its subject essentially,the fallacyof
accident results.6On this interpretation,Aristotle'sCoriscus example
occurs because one accident of Coriscus is thathe is known to you and
anotheris thathe is approaching, but thereis no essential connection
between the two accidental propertiessuch that because he is the one
approaching,the one who is approaching should also be known as the
one known to you.
Medieval discussions of the fallacy of accident intersected with
anotherset of ideas about syllogismsgoverned by the dictumde omniet
denullo.Boethiushad interpreteda textstatingthe dictumin Aristotle's
: ' 'whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subCategories
ject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject
also,"7 witha restrictionthatlimitedthe dictumde omnito instances of
essential predication. He distinghuished two forms of predication:
accidens
, in which a predicate is predicated about
predicationsecundum
a subject but is not substantiallythe same as the subject, and predicationdesubiecto
, in whicha predicate is predicatedabout the subject and
is substantiallythe same as the subject or falls within its definition.
The dictumde omniin Boethius' view had efficacyonly in cases of de
3 Aristotles,
De sophisticis
elenchis
, 5.166b28-32.
4 Ibid.,7.169b3-6.
5 Ibid.,5.166b32-36.
6 Hamblin,Fallacies
, p. 27.
7 Aristotles,
, 3.lb10-11.
Categoriae
Ill

12:41:36 PM

subjecto
(or essential) predication.8Fallacies of accident came to be seen
as the result of infringingthis restriction.
The De Jallaciis attributed to Thomas Aquinas provides a good
example of the developed medieval view. Discussion of the fallacyof
accident begins in thatworkwitha distinctionamong threetraditional
kinds of predication: per se primomododicendi
, in which the predicate
definesthe subject or encompases the subject; peraccidens,in which the
'
'
predicate is extraneous to the 'ratio' or meaning of the subject term;
and perse secundomododicendi
, in which the definitionof the predicate
is subordinated to the definitionof the subject, but the predicateis not
convertible with the subject. When predication is per se primomodo,
whateveris true about the predicate is also true about the subject. But
when predication is per se secundomodoor per accidens
, that is not the
a
because
that
conclude
cannot
and
one
case,
propertyis true of the
also
be
to
the
it
should
subject. A fallacyof acciassigned
predicate,
dent would result.9
8 Boethius,
nunc
Aristotelis
In Categorias
, 1: "Patefacto
igitur
quidsitesseinsubjecto,
Duobusenimmodispraedicationes
uno
declarat.
de subjecto
fiunt,
quidsitpraedicari
de hominenamquepraedicatur
aliode subjecto:
secundum
album,dicitur
accidens,
enimhomo
de eodemhominepraedicatur
enimhomoalbus,rursus
animal,dicitur
accidens
animal.Sed illapriorpraedicatio,
est,
quaeest,Homoalbusest,secundum
sed nonin eo
namqueaccidens,quodestalbum,de subjectohominepraedicatur,
accidens
de substantia
homosubstantia,
quodquidsit,namcumalbumsitaccidens,
accidens
secundum
nonpotest,
in eo quod quidsitpraedicari
ergoistapraedicatio
veropraedicare
De subjecto
dicitur.
est,quotiesalteraresde alterainipsasubstantia
utanimalde homine;namquoniamanimalet substantia
est,et genus
praedicatur,
idcircoin eo quodquidsitde hominepraedicatur.
hominis,
Quareiliasolade subet in diffinitione
reisubstantia
dicuntur
quaecunquein cujuslibet
jectopraedicari
de alterout
utalterum
fuerit
praedicatio,
hujusmodi
ergoquotiescunque
ponuntur;
ut animaide homine,
id estut de eiussubstantia
de subjectopraedicetur,
dicatur,
necesseest,utsi de eo quodpraedicatur,
evenire
hancproprietatem
quidpiamutde
de praedicatio
idem
hoc
necessario
est
id
substantia,
quod
praedicetur
ejus
subjecto,
uthomopraedicatur
dicatur
etiamde praedicati
dicitur,
quidemde Socrate
subjecto,
in eo quodquidsit." In PL 64, 175D-176B.Alsosee ErnestA. Moody,TheLogic
ofOckham
ofWilliam
, NewYork1935,pp. 129-130.
9 ThomasAquinas,DeJallaciis
nobiles
artistas
ad quosdam
, 12: "Dicendumestergo
primode fallaciaaccidentis.
contraperse. Per se
hicaccipitur
Ubi sciendum
proutdistinguitur
quodaccidens
definirationem
inessealiquidalicui,quodinestei secundum
autemdicitur
propriae
inesseperaccidens;undede
hocautemquicquidinestalicui,dicitur
tionis;praeter
hocquodestinesseperse aut peraccidens,tripliciter
aliquidpotestse habere.
ut
substantiae
enimsuntquae omnimodosunteademsecundum
rationem,
Quaedam
et in hisestsolumperse, et nullomodoperaccidens.
vestiset indumentum;
utalbum
a ratione
alterius,
sunt,quorumunumestomninoextraneum
Quaedam
et homo;et in istisestsolummodo
peraccidens,et nullomodoperse.
licet
rationem
verosunt,quorumunumad alterius
aliquomodopertinet,
Quaedam
et inferius:
sicutse habetsuperius
nonsintomninoeademsecundum
definitionem,
112

12:41:36 PM

In sum, the view which predominated at the beginningof the fourteenth century interpretedAristotle's distinction between fallacies
withinand outside speech as a distinctionbetween fallacies that arise
fromthe nature of terms and fallacies that arise from the nature of
things. The fallacyof accident, the firstof the fallacies dependent on
the nature of things,was allied with a furtherdistinctionbetween two
kinds of predication:essential predicationand accidental predication.
Fallacies of accident arose when syllogismscontained premisses with
predicatesaccidentallypredicated about theirsubjects. Since Boethius
had restrictedthe dictumde omnito cases of essential predication, the
fallacyof accident came to define the extension of the dictumde omni.
However, this complex of ideas about predication and fallacious
inference,had an important result. It subordinated the power of
logical formto the nature of the cases to which it was applied. The
matteror contentof argument had an ultimate precedence over the
form of argument in determiningthe validity of inferencebecause
contentdeterminedthe nature of the predication involved, whetherit
was essential or accidental.
The idea that the converse was true, that logical formhad priority
over the matterof argumentation,was inherentin Aristotle'sdevelopment of syllogistic,however. Aristotle'streatmentof logic in the Prior
analyticsconstitutedthe foundation for the medieval discipline,10and
in that work, syllogismswere treated, not as a collection of sentences
which contain words with constant meaning, but rather as formulae
which contain variables, so that in the discursus:
"All A areB,
AllB areC,
all A areC,"
Therefore,
theoretically,any term can be substitutedfor any variable, and the
namsuperius
indefinitione
tamennonestomnino
eademdefinitio
inferioris,
ponitur
inferioris
et superioris,
ut animaliset hominis,
cumdefinitio
inferioris
addatsuper
definitionem
... Et in hisestquodammodo
superioris.
perse et quodammodo
per
secundum
definitionem
etpartim
differunt.
accidens,
conveniunt,
inquantum
partim
In hisergoquaeprimo
modo
se habent,
necesseestquodquicquidverumde unosit,
sitetiamverum
de alio,eo quodtaliasuntpenitus
eademsecundum
remetdifferunt
secundum
nomensolum;undein hisnoncontingit
essefallaciam
accidentis.
Sed in
omnibus
aliisnonestnecessarium
quodquicquidestverumde uno,sitetiamverum
de altero.Et ideosi ex hocquodaliquidestde unoverum,concludatur
esseverum
de altero,
estfallacia
accidentis."
In Opuscula
M. Spiazzi,
, ed. Raymundo
Philosophica
Rome1954,pp. 233-234,nos.677-678.
10I. M. Bocheski,
A History
, trans.Ivo Thomas,2d ed., NewYork
ofFormal
Logic
1970,p. 23.
113

12:41:36 PM

relationship among the terms will hold if the meaning of the terms
remains constant. The formal relations should obtain even in a case
like the following:
"All menare musicians,
All musicians
are green,
all menare green."
Therefore,
and what the terms of the propositions stand for should be quite
incidental.
During the teens and early twenties of the fourteenthcentury,
Richard Campsall and William of Ockham each perceived these conflictingcurrents in the Aristotelian tradition and developed a new
position on the relationshipbetween the form and content of logic.
Both Campsall and Ockham rejected the prevailing Boethian tradition, turningit on its head to emphasize the priorityof logicatiform
over content.The resultwas a realignmentof the relationshipbetween
logic and metaphysicswith importantimplicationsforphilosophyand
theology.11
Richard Campsall formedhis views while studyingarts at Balliol,
in the years priorto going to Merton College as regentmasterin 13061307. Apparently while still dominusand not yet magister
, he wrote
which contained the ingredients
twentyquestions on the Prioranalytics
of
the
to
achieve
logic.12Thus, of the two men,
realignment
necessary
was
the
seminal figure,completing
and
Ockham, Campsall
Campsall
before the summer of
even his lectures on Peter Lombard's Sentences
13
1317, prior to the academic year 1317-1318, when Ockham began
his own lectures on the Sentences.However, while the fundamental
11 The controversy
to thesame
a discussion
subordinate
overuniversais
constituted
de
inlibrum
tohisExpositio
As Ockhamwrotein theintroduction
concerns.
Porphyrii
et consimiles
: "Quamvispraedictae
Praedicabilibus
quaestiones
[de naturauniversintpertinentes,
quia tarnenex
salium]non ad logicmsed ad metaphysicum
in multplices
etiaminlogicasuntprolapsi,
errores
earummultimoderni
ignorantia
. . . ." Ed. ErnestA. Moody,in Opera
ideode ipsisbreviter
3.10,lines
philosophical
17-21.
12EdwardA. Synan,ed. TheWorks
, Toronto1968,1.19.
ofCampsall
ofRichard
13EdwardA. Synan,Richard
,
, an English
Century
oftheFourteenth
Theologian
Campsall
in: MediaevalStudies14(1952),5. Katherine
Tachau,TheInfluence
CampofRichard
ed. AnnHudsonandM.
toWyclif
Ockham
sailon14th-Century
, in:From
Oxford
Thought
to Campsallas
a July,1317,reference
Wilks,Oxford1987,p. 150, interprets
ofPopeJohnXXII, as baccalarius
communes
intheology
intheLitterae
bachelor
formtus
notedthereference.
. Synan,ed. Campsall
rather
thansententiarius
Tachau,
, 1.15,first
in otherareasofthought,
art.cit.makesa case forCampsalPsseminalimportance
forleadingmetothink
I havehertothank
againaboutthe
epistemology.
particularly
placeofCampsallin theschemeofthings.
114

12:41:36 PM

elementsofthe new positionare presentin Campsall's writings,he did

not set them out in systematicformin any of his works that remain
14and the
extant. Two workson Aristotle'sPhysics
commentaryon the
are lost, preventingany definitiveevaluation of his thought.
Sentences
Whatever systematic presentation of Campsall's ideas might have
been contained in his commentary on the Sentences
, his work was
superseded when Ockham provided a quite extensivestatementof the
new way of thinkingc. 1321-1323, in his Expositiosuperlibroselenchorum
and Summalogicae.
Although Ockham was not the one to initiate the new way of
thought,because his work is by far the more developed and precise,
it is the place to begin in settingforththe outlines of debate.
II. Thefallacyofaccidentas a variationin theterms
In his ExpositiosuperlibrosElenchorum
, Ockham subjected Aristotle's
treatmentof the fallacy of accident to a thoroughgoinganalysis and
critique, and in the process engaged in a running argument against
the opinions of several of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries. Ockham' s primary opponent seems to have been Giles of
Rome, and he may also have had Walter Burley in mind.15 In
Ockham' s view, two difficulties
afflictedthe prevailingtraditionwhich
these authors exemplifed. He believed, for one, that they hopelessly
confused Aristotle's distinction between fallacies that arise from
speech and fallacies that do not, and foranother that theirrestriction
of the dictumde omnito cases of essential predication compromised the
universal applicabilityof logic.
Giles of Rome had writtena commentaryon Aristotle's Elenchiin
the early 12 70' s,16which very rapidly achieved renown, and became
one of the chief textbooks on the subject.17 The view which he
expounded on the fallacyof accident (not original withhim), seems to
14Synan,Richard
, p. 6, and idem,ed. Campsall
, 1.16.
Campsall
15Guillelmus
de Ockham,Expositio
libros
elenchorum
del Punta,
, ed. Franciscus
super
in: Opera
N. Y. 1979,50-51,88-89,229-260.The
3, St. Bonaventure,
philosophica
editorhas identified
GilesofRomeas Ockham'sopponent
on pages88,
or referent
WalterBurleyon pages231,and233
229,230,231,and232,andhehasidentified
as holding
in somewaysdifferent
fromOckham'sand in somewaysthe
opinions
same.
16Incertorum
elenchos
auctorum,Quaestiones
, ed. Sten Ebbesen,
supersophisticos
Hauniae1977,pp. xl-xlii.
17Ibid.,pp. xxvi-xlii.
115

12:41:36 PM

have held the fieldprior to Ockham.18 Giles had said that in order to
understand the nature of the fallacyof accident, one should note that
it includes three characteristicswhich follow one another in order.
First, the fallacy of accident occurs when the syllogismis diversified
and varied through the middle term. Second, since the middle is
varied, it has the power of several terms. And third, because the
middle is multiple, the major extremecannot be concluded about the
minor extreme throughthe middle term. Therefore, he said, we are
deceived througha fallacyof accident because we do not know when
the middle term remains the same and when it is diversified.We do
not know when the middle stands forone thingand when it stands for
several. Thus, the minor extrememay be extraneous to the middle as
the middle is related to the major extreme.19
As Giles sets it out, the fallacyof accident arises because of a process
analogous to that in Aquinas' De fallaciis. Alluding to the concept of
essential predication, Giles argued:
18The earliestglosseson Aristotle's
De sophisiicis
elenchis
, datingfromaboutthe
defined
thefallacy
ofaccident,
as wouldGiles,interms
middleofthetwelfth
century,
Modernorum:
A Contribution
inthemiddleterm.See L. M. deRijk,Logica
ofa variation
which
totheHistory
, I, Assen1962,82-97,146.Otherexamples
Logic
ofEarlyTerminist
ofthemiddletermpriorto Gilesof
ofaccident
to a variation
thefallacy
attributed
elenchos
inIncertorum,
Romecanbefound
, q. 84,lines36-45,pp. 194Super
sophisticos
, p. 234,no. 679.
195,and Aquinas,Defallaciis
and WalterChattonboth
FrancisofMayronnes
Of Ockham'scontemporaries,
ofaccident
occurred
onlywhentherewasa variation
espousedtheviewthata fallacy
: "Illudtamennonvalet,quiacum
ofMayronnes,
inthemiddleterm.Francis
Quaestio
. . . ."In Bartolomus
mediumvarietur
in omnifallaciaaccidentis
Roth,Franzvon
inGott
Lehre
vonFormalunterschied
seineWerke
OFM. SeinLeben,
, Werl
, seine
Mayronis
libros
Sententiarum:
Lectura
Inquatuor
, 1.2.6:Si enim
1936,p. 340;andWalterChatton,
diceremquod essetaliqua fallacia
diceremquod in talibussit fallaciaaccidentis,
. . . ." (Florence,
etaliquavariatio
mediitermini
accidentis
BNC,C. 5. 357),f.80rb
Elenchorum
and(Paris,BN. lat.15.886),f.127ra.Ockham,
, 2.9.2,OP 3:231,line24,
one.
refers
to a viewlikethatofGilesofRomeas thecommon
19GilesofRome,Expositio
autemquodin
Elenchorum
, 1.5: "Notandum
supralibros
diverhaectriase habentperordinem:
fallaciaaccidentis
primoenimpermedium
teret variatur;secundomediovariato,qualiterhabetvim multorum
sificatur
nonposmediimaiores
extremitates
estmulta,virtute
tertio
minorum;
quiamedium
suntconcludi
de minoribus.
accidentis,
quia nescimus
Decipimur
ergoperfallaciam
et quia manens
quandomediummanetidemet quandodiversificatur,
cognoscere
non
verohabetvim multorum,
mediumidemhabetvim unius,diversificatum
non
autemquando mediummanetidemet quando diversificatur
cognoscendo
ut
ut unumet quandout multa,et quia si accipitur
cognoscimus
quandoaccipitur
a medioetaccidit
extraneatur
multaminor
extremitas
ei,noncognoscendo
quaedicta
rei
minores
extremitates
accidunt
suntnoncognoscimus
qualibuspraedicationibus
subiectae
sivemedio."(Venice1496),f. 27v,citedin Ockham,Elenchorum
, 1.14.6,
OP 3:88, note1.
116

12:41:36 PM

ifitisverified
abouta middle
isthennecessarily
verified
"a majorextreme,
term,
areindifabouttheminor
extreme,
onlyinthosecasesinwhichthemiddleterms
ferent
becausethemiddletermmustnotbe variedor
to substance,
according
iftheconclusion
is to follow
ofnecessity."20
diversified
Giles believed that a failure to observe this rule would produce a
fallacy of accident.21If the predicate is not predicated of its subject
throughsome sort of perse identityrelation, then the predicate may
be ' 'diverse' ' or in some way "extraneous" to the subject. Any
syllogismconstructedofpropositionswithpredicatesof thisdiversified
sort, can give rise to a fallacyof accident, because the various terms
ofthe syllogismmay be relatedto one anotheraccording to theirdiversity rather than according to their unity.
What Giles had in mind is clarifiedin his treatmentof Aristotle's
sample of a fallacy of accident:
"Coriscusis knownto you,
Coriscusis theone approaching,
is knownto you."
theone approaching
Therefore,
Giles said that in this argumentit is as if there are fourterms,rather
than the requisite three, because the middle term ' 'Coriscus' ' is
diverse. "Coriscus" is varied because it stands forsomethingdifferent
when it means the-Coriscus-who-is-known-to-you,
than when it
means the-Coriscus-who-is-approaching.22
Ockham was not the firstto take exception to Giles' position.
Walter Burley raised objections in his Tractatus
superlibrumElenchorum,
to Giles' contentionthat the fallacyof accident arises fromvariation
in the middle term. AftermentioningGiles by name,23he contended:
20Ockham,Elenchorum
"Nam quodmaiorextremitas,
, 2.9.2,citesGilesas follows:
si verificetur
de medio,oporteat
earnverificari
de minoriextremitate,
solumhabet
veritatem
iniismediisquaesunt
secundum
substantiam
medium
, quia oportet
indifferentia
si debeatsequide necessitate
conclusio."In OP 3:230nonvariarinecdiversifican
on Ockham,Elenchorum
231,lines14-24.See theeditorscomment
, 2.9.2, in OP
3:230,note2, thatOckhamherequotesGiles,Elenchorum
, 2.7 (Venice1496),f.55vb,
verbatim.
21Ockham,Elenchorum
lines14-26,attributes
theposition
, 2.9.2,in OP 3.230-231,
toGiles,whomhe is citing.
22Gilesof Rome,Elenchorum
, 2.7: "Dicendumquod non est intentio
Philosophi
etcognitum;
sedutostendat
quodhaec
negarequodnullomodositidemignoratum
fallacia
inquattuor
terminis
etsemper
diversificat
ideoaitquod
medium;
quasiarguit
nonidemcognoscitur
etignoratur,
'Coriscus'et quasihabetvim
quia diversificatur
duorum
utstatsubcognitione
etutestveniens.
Etquiasicdiversificatur
terminorum,
dicitur
etignoratur."
'Coriscus',utestnotusetignotus,
quodnonidemcognoscitur
, 2.9.2, OP 3:231,note3.
(Venice1496),f. 56ra,citedin Ockham,Elenchorum
23GilesofRome,Elenchorum
, 1.3 and2.7 (Venice1496),ff.16vband 55v,citedin
Ockham,Elenchorum
, 2.9.2,OP 3:231,note3.
117

12:41:36 PM

Whatis necessary
ifthereis tobe a fallacy
is thatsometerm[in
[ofaccident],
theargument]
is compared
totheothertwoterms
inan extraneous
way.Hence
. . . thefallacy
ofaccident
occursfrom
variation
ofthemiddleterm
sometimes
fromvariation
ofthemajoror minorextreme."24
and sometimes
Burleyprovided an example in a versionof the Coriscus argument.
When the argument is presented in the form:
"Coriscusis knownto you,
Coriscusis theoneapproaching,
inasmuch
as he is theone approaching,
theone approaching,
Therefore,
is knownto you,"
a fallacyof accident occurs because the term"approaching" has a differentmeaning in the minor premiss and in the conclusion, but the
term "approaching" is not the middle term. Therefore, a fallacyof
accident could arise through variation in some term other than the
middle.25
In takingthisposition, Burley was heir to an earlier thirteenthcentury debate. In an anonymous commentary on Aristotle's Elenchi,
which its editors believe was writtena short time before Giles wrote
his commentaryin the early 1270' s,26the question was raised whether
in the fallacyof accident there is always diversityin the middle term
or in the major extreme or in the minor extreme. And an argument
was put forwardthat the fallacy always involved a variation in the
middle term. But the argumentin favorofdiversityin the middle term
was then countered:
24WalterBurley,Tractatus
"In
Elenchorum
librum
, cap. 'De fallaciaaccidentis':
super
accidenset res subiecta.Et
ista fallaciasoientassignaritria,scilicetattributum,
etmdiusterminus
res
estattributum
maiorextremitas
secundum
semper
Aegidium
accidens.De hoctamennonestmagnacura,sufficit
subiectaet minorextremitas
modocomparatur
extraneo
enimad hocquodhaecfallaciasit,quodaliquisterminus
in discursu.
Unde . . . fallaciaaccidentis
aliisduobusterminis
aliquandoacciditex
"
extremitatis.
velminoris
maioris
etaliquandoexvariatione
variatione
mediitermini
note
Elenchorum
OP
, 2.9.2, 3:231,
(London,Lambeth
70),f.141vb,citedinOckham,
andsome
Mertonians
3. JamesA. Weisheipl,
, in: MediaevalStudies,30
OP, Ockham
demodo
toan
s Tractatus
arguendi)
(whichhe callstheTractatus
(1968),assignsBurley'
earlydatein Burley'scareer.
25Burley,
accidentis
accidentis': . .est fallacia
Tractatus
, cap. 'De fallacia
respectu
'veniensin quantum
vel respectuilliusconclusionis
conclusionis
reduplicativae,
mediiterex variatione
a te', et tuncnonestfallaciaaccidentis
veniens
cognoscitur
'veniens'variomodo
minoris
extremitatis,
mini,sedexvariatione
quia isteterminus
in minoriet in conclusione."
(London,Lambeth70), f. 142ra,citedin
accipitur
, 2.9.2,OP 3:232,note4. See pages125and 126-9belowfora
Ockham,Elenchorum
of "in quantum"to theargument.
's addition
discussion
ofBurley
26Incertorum
, pp. xl-xlii.
auctorum,
Quaestiones
118

12:41:36 PM

ofaccident
notonlyarisesfroma variation
ofthemiddlein 'com"thefallacy
occurs
becausethefallacy
ofaccident
extremes,
parison'tothemajorandminor
to an
whenthereis a comparison
of one termto diversethingsaccording
extraneous
can be comparedto an
nature,and sincethemiddlesometimes
extreme
todiverse
andthemajorextreme
is sometimes
comnatures,
according
paredto the middleand to the minorextremeaccordingto diverseand
iscompared
extraneous
andsometimes
theminor
extreme
tothemiddle
natures,
I saythattherecanbe a fallacy
ofaccident
andtothemajorextreme,
therefore,
fromthediversity
ofanyone ofthosethree."27
So there is an example from about the time of Giles of Rome of
someone taking a position like the one Burley later espoused, that
variationcould arise notjust througha variation in the meaning of the
middle term,but also throughvariation in eitherone of the extremes.
John Duns Scotus expressed a similar view in his Ordinario:
"If oneortheothercondition
is lacking:
either
theunityofthemiddletermin
itself
or unityoftheextremes
to themiddle,therewillnotbe a syllogism
but
a paralogism
ofaccident."28
Therefore, Burley's critique of Giles does not represent a radical
departure fromprevious tradition. He viewed the fallacyof accident
as occurring because of something "extraneous" that gives rise to
variation in one of the three terms of the syllogism.While the argument on its face seems to have only three terms, it actually functions
as though there were four. Burley just did not want to restrictthe
fallacyof accident, as Giles had, to cases in which the middle termwas
the one that was diversified.
III. Williamof Ockhamand theprimacyof logicalform
Ockham, however, broke with the commonly held position. He
believed that the traditionof Boethius, Aquinas, Giles and Burley,
whichlocated the source of the fallacyof accident in an extraneouselement in the predicate, was deeply confused. On the one hand, those
27Incertorum
accidentis
non
auctorum,
Quaestiones,
q. 83: "Dicendumquodfallacia
tantumfit ex variationemedii in 'comparatonead' maioremet minorem
accidatex comparatione
uniussecundum
extremitatem,
quiacumfallaciaaccidentis
naturasextraneas
ad diversa,cum mediumaliquandopossetsecundumnaturas
diversascomparanextremis,
et maiorextremitas
aliquandosecundumdiversas
naturas
etextraneas
medioetminori
etminor
aliextremitas
extremitati,
comparatur
ex diversitate
quandomedioetmaiori,ideodicoquodpotestfierifallaciaaccidentis
illorum
trium."Citedfromp. 192,lines20-28.
cuiuscumque
28JohnDunsScotusOrdinatio
vel
, 1.2.2,qq. 1-4:"Omissaenimalteraconditione,
unitatismedii in se vel extremorum
ad medium,non est syllogismus,
sed
accidentis."In Operaomnia
, ed. CharlesBalie,VaticanCity1963,
paralogismus
2:362,no. 411.
119

12:41:36 PM

who espoused this tradition had interpretedAristotle's distinction

between fallacies that depend on speech and fallacies that do not, as
a distinctionbetween fallacies that depend on termsand fallacies that
depend on things. Burley explicitlystated as much.29 On the other
hand, theirdescriptionof the fallacyof accident, the premier fallacy
dependent upon things,as arising froma variation in the terms,conflated the fallacy of accident with the fallacy of equivocation, the
premier fallacydependent upon speech. Such a conflationof fallacies
destroyedAristotle'sdivision between the two categories of fallacious
argument. Thus, Ockham argued that"when thereis a fallacyof accident, and there is no other fallacy, there is nevera variation of the
middle term."30
If the traditionalinterpretationof Aristotle's words would not do,
what sort of interpretationshould take its place? Ockham' s decision
of two kinds of fallacies
to rejectthe idea thatAristotle'sdifferentiation
resulted from the distinction between words and things, seems to
depend on a patternof reasoning somethinglike the following.When
fallaciesare made to depend upon the nature of things,a hopeless confusion results, because in every argument words represent things.
Fallacies that depend upon things, become indistinctfrom fallacies
that depend upon words. On Ockham' s view, logic is embedded in
discourse. The arguments that comprise its subject matter are composed of propositions, and propositions are composed of terms.31If
fallaciesare failuresof argument,then theycould not arise completely
independent of language. In order to make sense of Aristotle's claim
that some fallacies lie outside speech, Ockham resortedto a different
4
29Burley,Tractatus
, cap. Circa falladasextradictionem:'Et sciendum
quod iste
vocis
in
nonratione
fallaciae
extradictionem
eis
est
fallaciae
dicuntur
deceptio
quia
sed rationerei." (London,Lambeth70), ff.141va-141vb.
30Ockham,Elenchorum
, 1.6.3: "Secundumnotandum
quod quandoest fallacia
estvariatio
medii. . . ."In OP 3:50,
accidentis
et nonestalia fallacia,numquam
ofthetradiascribed
to hisrepudiation
Ockhamhimself
lines6-7.The importance
tohis
in thePhysicorum
tionalposition
canbe gaugedbyhisgivinga crossreference
in Elenchorum
: "Nec valetratioeorum
as expounded
ofaccident
viewson thefallacy
ab ea quodsitpassioinquantum
etestextraneum
quandodicuntquodacciditactioni
Namin libroElenchorum
ostendi
quod
competit
agenti,etideoestfallaciaaccidentis.
Citedbytheeditorintheintroducaccidentis."
nonfacitfallaciam
talisextraneatio
tionto Ockham,Elenchorum
, OP 3:14*.
31Guillelmus
intendunt
de Ockham,Summa
, 1.1: "Omneslogicaetractatores
logicae
ex terminis
et propositiones
comex propositionibus
astruerequod argumenta
Boehner,GedeonGi and StephanusBrown,Opera
ponuntur."ed. Philotheus
1:7, lines3-4.
Philosophica
120

12:41:36 PM

distinction, one between internal mental language and external

spoken or written speech. He considered Aristotle's fallacies that
depend upon speech, as dependent on external speech alone, arising
. The
because of the ambiguities of what is instituted ad placitum
fallacies that lay outside speech, he considered fallacies that arose
within mental language.32
To explain the differencebetween these two kinds of fallacy,
Ockham compared the fallacyof equivocation with the fallacyof accident. A fallacy of equivocation occurred, he contended, when a
spoken or writtenargument could representtwo differentarguments
in mental language. People deceived throughthe fallacyof equivocation were deceived because they only thought of one of the two
arguments,and that argument, in itself,was a valid one.33 So in the
discursus:
"Everydogruns,
A hotdogis a dog,
a hotdogruns,"
Therefore,
people mightbe deceived into accepting the conclusion because they
had in mind only one conceptual argument about animals, even
thoughthereis another invalid argumentabout sausages and animals
that this collectionof spoken or, as here, written,symbols might also
represent.
Thus, Ockham argued that the fallacy of accident, which is supposed to be independent of external speech, could not involve any
variation of the middle term. The middle termwas only varied when
it stood for substantially(and not accidentally) differentthings, as
32Ockham,
Elenchorum
dicuntur
extradic, 1.6.1: "Ad videndum
quareistaefallaciae
tionem
etaliaeindictione,
estsciendum
habet
Boethium,
quod,secundum
propositio
inmente
invoceetinscripto;
etideoquandoaliquaargumentatio
esse,scilicet
triplex
deficit
omnivocesignificativa
et omniscripto,
et universaliter
omni
circumscripta
tuncestdefectus
ex prosolumin argumento
instituto,
signovoluntrie
composito
ettuncdicitur
positionibus
quaehabentesseinmentetantum;
peccareperfallaciam
extradictionem."In OP 3:48-49.For a fulldiscussion
of Ockhamon mental
see HesterGoodenough
Tella Lie:HughLawton's
Gelber,I Cannot
language,
Critique
onMental
in: Franciscan
Studies44 (1984),forthcoming.
ofOckham
Language,
33Ockham,Elenchorum
non
, 1.6.1: "Unde deceptusperfallaciam
aequivocationis
illossyllogismos
sed tantum
concipit
qui importantur
prolatum,
persyllogismum
unumillorum
Undequandoaliquisarguitsic:'omniscanis
concipit,
qui nondeficit.
caeleste
sidusestcanis;igitur
caeleste
siduscurri,illequi decipitur,
inmente
currit;
sua non concipitnisi tantumunumsyllogismum
non prolatum,
qui est bonus
et ideo non
tamenprolatusimportt
syllogismus
syllogismus;
pluressyllogismos,
In OP 3:49.
valet,sedhoccredens
decipitur."
121

12:41:36 PM

when the same termfirststands fora man and thenstands foran ass.34
But since mental termsare natural signs of the thingsforwhich they
stand, they never representmore than one kind of entity.35Mental
termsin his systemare not subject to the sortof variation assigned in
the fallacyof equivocation. Fallacious deception about the efficacyof
an argumentcontainingtermswith more than one meaning was only
possible if the argument were situated in external speech. Deception
resultedfromthe relationbetween the spoken termsand theirmental
equivalents.
In Ockham's view, the fallacy of accident must originate in some
way other than a variation in the terms. Instead, he believed it
representeda breakdown in the formalstructureof the argument as
formed firstand foremostin the mind in mental language. While a
fallacyof speech mightand oftendid accompany a fallacyof accident,
no variation of terms, whether in the mind or in the spoken and
writtenlanguage used to representmental content,accounted forthe
fallacy of accident.36
For an example, Ockham said that a fallacyof accident occurs in
the followingcase:
44
Everywhitethingis colored,
Socratesbeginsto be white,
Socratesbeginsto be colored,"
Therefore,
There is always, he says, a fallacyof accident when a syllogismof the
firstfigure has an affirmativemajor premiss and a negative minor
premiss, because such a syllogism does not conformto the rules of
4
argument. In the syllogismin question, the term 'begins" on its face
seems affirmative,but it is an exponible term, and, therefore,one of
the thingsthe proposition: "Socrates begins to be white," means, is
that Socrates was not white immediatelybeforehe startedto become
white. The negative exponent invalidates the syllogism.37A semantic
34Ibid.,1.6.3:". . . quandoestfallaciaaccidentis
etnonestaliafallacia,
numquam
estvariatiomedii;quia mediumnonpotestvariarinisivel quantumad substan- sicutsi primoponeretur
'homo'etpostea'asinus'- , ettunenonessetfallacia
tiam,
. ..." In OP 3:50.
accidentis
35See Philotheus
Articles
in: Collected
OFM, Ockham's
Boehner,
Theory
ofSignification,
N. Y. 1958,pp. 214-217,and
St. Bonaventura,
onOckham
, ed. EligiusM. Buytaert,
, forthcoming.
Gelber,Mental
Language
36Ockham,
lines1-45;ibid.,2.9.4,inOP 3:237Elenchorum
, 2.9.3,inOP 3:236-237,
Summa
lines100-260;
,
Ockham,
logicae
238,lines1-16;ibid.,2.9.4,inOP 3:240-245,
lines38-64.
3.4.11,in OP 1:819-820,
37Ockham,Summa
ad
, 2.19: Ex praedictis
colligipotestquod ab inferiori
logicae
sicutnon
superiuscumhoc verbo'incipit'vel 'desininon valetconsequentia,
122

12:41:36 PM

property of mental terms, that they can be connotative and

exponible,38disguises a deeper syntacticproblem, the presence of a
negative minor premiss which nullifiesthe dictumde omni, producing
a fallacyof accident and invalidating the mental syllogism.
From Ockham's perspective, to say that a fallacy of accident
originated in a variation of the middle term, involved a kind of
category mistake. If someone committed that category mistake,
Ockham believed Aristotle's distinction between the two kinds of
fallacies lost all meaning.
However, there was another sort of variation in the terms that
mighthave been admissible, even in Ockham's system. Besides proposing thata fallacyof accident arose because of some extraneous element in the terms,Burley had contended that the fallacy might also
arise froma variation in supposition. The followingis an example:
"Man is a species,
Socratesis a man,
Socratesis a species."
Therefore,
In themajor premiss,the middle term"man" has simple supposition,
representingthe universalman, while in the minor premissit has personal supposition, representing a particular instantiation of the
universal.39
Ockham had admitted that ambiguity could sometimes arise in
mental language froma variation in supposition.40Unlike the varia'Sortesincipit
essealbus,ergoSortesincipit
essecoloratus.'Similiter
non
sequitur
'FiliusDei incipit
essehomo,ergoFiliusdei incipit
essealiquid.'. . . sed
sequitur
est fallaciaaccidentis.
Sicutenimsemperest fallaciaaccidentis
quandoin prima
et minornegativa,ita semperest fallaciaaccidentis
figuramaiorest affirmativa
maiorestaffrmativa
et minorhabetaliquamexponentem
quandoin primafigura
.... Sic autemestin proposito,
namistaminor'FiliusDei incipit
esse
negativam
homo'habetistamnegativam
'FiliusDei non fuitimmediate
ante
exponentem
estfallaciaaccidentis."
In OP 1:315,lines138-151.
homo,'et ideoin talidiscursu
38Guillelmus
de Ockham,Quodlibet
, 5.25, ed. JosephC. Wey,C. S. B. in Opera
9:582-584,lines1-46,and Ockham,Summa
1.10,in OP 1:35-38,
Theologica
logicae,
lines1-94.
39Burley,
Tractatus
"Hic estfallacia
accidentis:
accidentis
'homoest
, cap.De fallacia
esthomo;ergoetc.' ex variatione
huiustermini
'homo',et itaex
species;Socrates
variatione
medii."(London,Lambeth70, f. 141vb),citedin Ockham,Elenchorum
,
2.9.2,OP 3:233,note8.
40Ockham,Summalogicae
, 3.4.4: "Et est notandumquod iste tertiusmodus
inpropositione
aequivocationis
potest
reperiri
purementali,
quamvisduoprimimodi
nonhabeant
locumnisiinsignisad placitum
institutis.
Undeistapropositio
mentalis
'homoestspecies'distingui
eo quodsubiectum
potest,
potestsupponere
significative
velprose ipso." In OP 1:763,lines113-118.
123

12:41:36 PM

tion in meaning that conflatedthe fallacyof accident with the fallacy

of equivocation, an identificationof the fallacyof accident withvariation in supposition would seem theoretically compatible with
Ockham's system. Nevertheless,he argued against Burley's position.
Variation in the supposition of the middle termcould have nothingto
do withwhetheror not therewas a fallacyof accident in a given argument, he said, because sometimes variation in the supposition gives
rise to a perfectlygood argument, as in the following:
"Everymanruns,
Socratesis a man,
Socratesruns,"
Therefore,
and sometimes failure to vary the supposition gives rise to a faulty
argument:
"A manruns,
Socratesis a man,
Socratesruns."
Therefore,
So in no way could variation of the middle term, even a variation of
supposition, account for the presence of a fallacy of accident.41
If a variation in supposition were allowed to determinethe presence
of a fallacy,because of the occurrenceof argumentsthat are otherwise
formallysound but contain a variation in supposition,syllogisticform
would not be the key to a valid inference. Logical form would be
subordinate to the matterof an argument,and Ockham was intenton
preservingthe universal efficacyof logical form.
witheliminatingconfusionabout the universalityof
The difficulties
logic were compounded because several of the examples which
Aristotlehad used in explaining the fallacyof accident, in Ockham' s
view included no fallacy, but constitutedperfectlygood arguments.
Ockham pointed out, for instance, that when Aristotleargued:
"Coriscusis knownto you,
Coriscusis approaching,
is knownto you,"
theone approaching
Therefore,
41Ockham,Elenchorum
nisi
, 2.9.2: "Ex eodempatetquod variadosuppositionis,
medii
Namaliquandoubiestvariatio
accidentis.
aliudaddatur,nonfacitfallaciam
sedidentitas
etsi nonessetvariatio
nonestfallacia,
ad suppositionem
supquantum
Sortes
'omnishomocurrit;
essetfallacia.Sicutinistisduobusdiscursibus
positionis,
ubiestvariatio
esthomo;igitur
Sortescurrit'
medii,ethic'homocurrit;
suppositionis
medii.Nec
Sortesesthomo;ergoSortescurrit'ubi nonestvariatiosuppositionis
sicutin primolibroest
tarnensuntin isto ultimodiscursuquattuortermini,
ostensum."In OP 3:233-234,lines79-87.
124

12:41:36 PM

the argument is sound. Its validity is apparent because the standard

testforvalidity: forminga syllogismfromthe opposite of the conclusion and the minor premissto yield the opposite of the major premiss
as a conclusion, shows the argumentto be well formed.The argument
in whichAristotlebelieved therewas a fallacyof accident is, therefore,
a valid syllogismgoverned by all or none.42
Burleyhad noted the same problemwithAristotle'sargumentabout
Coriscus, citingthe same line of reasoning to support its validity,that
from the opposite of the consequent with the minor is inferredthe
opposite of the major. But ratherthan-drawingOckham's conclusion,
he had said that he believed Aristotleunderstood the problems with
the example as set forth,and thatAristotlehad really intended to propose the argument in the followingform:
"Coriscusis knownto you,
Coriscusis approaching,
theone approaching,
as he is approaching,
inasmuch
is known
Therefore,
to you."43
Burley treated the difficultyin Aristotle's example as an isolated
problem.
But Ockham believed that Aristotle's example representeda more
general difficulty.For ifAristotle'sproposed example were allowed to
stand as a fallacyof accident, then the normal mode of verifyingthe
validityof a syllogismwould lose its efficacy.No longer would combining the opposite of the conclusion with the minor premiss to infer
the opposite of the major premiss as a conclusion, prove the validity
of a given syllogism.The matterof an argumentwould determinethe
efficacyof its form. Ockham even appealed to Aristotleas authority
42Ockham,
Elenchorum
conclusionis
, 2.9.2: ". . . etpotest
probari,
quia ex opposito
etminore
sic: nullusveniens
a te;Coriscus
maioris,
sequitur
oppositum
cognoscitur
estveniens;igiturCoriscusnoncognoscitur
a te. Quod istesyllogismus
sitbonus
patet,quia regulatur
perdicide nullonec indigetaliquoalio ad hocut appareat
necessarius."
In OP 3:231,37-42.
43Burley,Tractatus
, cap. De fallaciaaccidentis:Secundumistam fallaciam
sic:veniens
a te;Coriscus
estveniens;
paralogizatur
cognoscitur
ergoetc.. . . Contra:
videtur.
Namexopposito
cumminore
infertur
quodhicnonsitfallacia,
consequentis
maiorissyllogistice.
. . . Tunc videtur
oppositum
quod in primodiscursunonsit
fallaciaaccidentis
huiusconclusionis
'venienscognoscitur
a te', et hoc
respectu
sed estfallaciaaccidentis
conclusionis
Aristoteles,
intelligit
respectu
reduplicativae,
velrespectu
illiusconclusionis
'veniens
inquantum
veniens
a te',ettunc
cognoscitur
nonestfallaciaaccidentis
ex variatione
mediitermini,
sed ex variatione
minoris
'veniens'variomodoaccipitur
inminori
etinconcluextremitatis,
quiaisteterminus
sione."(London,Lambeth70), f. 142ra,citedin Ockham,Elenchorum
, 2.9.2, OP
3:232,note4.
125

12:41:36 PM

for the primacy of logical formover content. He argued, if the Corsicus argument contained a fallacy of accident:
ofaccident
"Then therewouldbe a fallacy
in thefollowing
instance:
'Socratesis a musician,
Socratesis white,
somewhiteis a musician,'
Therefore,
inas muchas heis a musician.
becausethewhiteofSocrates
is extraneous
And
createdfromitsopposite
thesyllogism
wouldnotbe valid:
consequently
'No whiteis a musician,
Socratesis white,
Socratesis nota musician/
Therefore,
teachesthat
when,indeed,it is governed
byall or none,and thePhilosopher
hold notonlyin thecase of essentialtermsbut also in
validconjunctions
accidental
terms,indeedevenin impossible
propositions."44
In the name of Aristotle,Ockham specificallyrepudiated the Boethian
traditionlimitingthe dictumde omnito cases of essential predication.
The editorsof Ockham' s textsuggestOckham had in mind Aristotle's
45
PriorAnalytics
, c. 5, (27b 31-39), where Aristotleproposed "white,"
"snow," "raven," "swan," and "man," among others, as terms
appropriate for syllogismsgoverned by all or none. In regard to the
two currentsin the Aristoteliantradition,one givingprecedence to the
matterof logic over its form and the other giving precedence to the
formof logic over its matter,Ockham emphaticallychose formalism.
Since he believed Aristotletaughtthatall conjunctionsgovernedby all
or none were valid, whether or not they involved essential or
accidental terms, he rejected Aristotle's example about Coriscus as
badly formed.
testfor a fallacyof accident
IV. The reduplication
Those who accepted the essentialist view that the dictumde omni
applied only in cases of essential predication, had developed a test to
44Ockham,
accidentis
'Sortesest
tuncessethicfallacia
Elenchorum
, 2.9.2: "Similiter,
Sorti
Sortesestalbus;igitur
musicus;
quiaextraneatur
aliquodalbumestmusicum,'
ex opposito
non
istesyllogismus
albumin quantumestmusicus;et perconsequens
Sortesestalbus;igitur
Sortesnonestmusicus,'
valeret'nullumalbumestmusicum;
doceatquod coniugationes
cumtamenreguletur
perdicide nullo,et Philosophus
immo
essentialibus
sed etiamaccidentalibus,
utilesnontantumtenentin terminis
Peridempatetquod tertius
etiamin propositionibus
paralogismus
impossibilibus.
In OP 3:232,
estbonusdiscursus."
namillediscursus
maleformatur,
qui formatur
lines48-57.
45Ockham,Elenchorum
, 2.9.2, OP 3:232,note5.
126

12:41:36 PM

establish the presence of a fallacy of accident.46 To check for the

presence of the fallacy, as Ockham reportsit, they had inserted the
' 'inasmuch as it
is," (or its
reduplicative term "inquantum,"
into
a
secundum
and
equivalents:
quod
propositioncomposed of the
ut)
minor proposition and the major extreme. So in the case of the
argument:
"Man is an animal,
is a man,
Socrates
Socratesis an animal,"
Therefore,
the minor premisswould be joined to the major extreme to formthe
'
"
proposition: Socrates is a man inasmuch as he is an animal/ If the
proposition formed in this way were true, those using this device
thoughttherewas no fallacy. If the propositionso formedwere false,
then a fallacyof accident was believed present. Since the proposition:
'
4Socrates is a man inasmuch as he is an
animal/ is true, the sample
argumentin this instance is true, and thereis no fallacyof accident.47
48
Siger of Courtrai, master in arts at Paris by 1309, provides an
example in his Fallaciae of the test for the fallacy of accident using
reduplication.Siger asserted that in a syllogismcontaininga fallacyof
accident there are three terms, and that the fallacy arises because of
the appearance of their unity when they are in fact diverse. If the
terms are understood according to their diversity,the fallacy arises,
but if they are understood according to their identity,it does not.49
46Aquinasoffers
a goodexampleofan essentialist
whousesthereduplication
test.
See theDefallaciis,
Coriscusestveniens.Igiturcognosco
12: "CognoscoCoriscum.
. . . Hoc enimfalliiquandoaliquidestverum
venientem.
de unosecundum
quodest
diversum
ab altero,
sicuthic:CognoscoCoriscum.
Coriscus
enimnonsubiacet
cognitionisecundum
Undepatetquodestdiversificatio
medii,et
quodestidemvenienti.
sicestfallaciaaccidentis."
In Opuscula
, p. 234,no. 681.
47Ockham,Elenchorum
cum prioribus,
et cum
, 2.9.2: "Alii, quasi concordantes
omnibusmodernisquasi communiter
loquentibus,dant istam regulamad
fallaciam
est
accidentis,
cognoscendum
quodsemperminorpropositio
reduplicanda
estsi sitveravelfalsa:si sitveranonest
etvidendum
extremitatem,
supermaiorem
si sitfalsaestfallaciaaccidentis.
'homoestanimal;Sortesest
Sic arguendo
fallacia,
'Sortesest homoin
homo;igiturSortesest animal,'minorest sic reduplicanda
quantumanimal,'quae est vera; ideo in praedictodiscursunon est fallacia
accidentis."
In OP 3:234,lines88-96.
48Sigerde Cortraco,
in: LesOeuvres
Fallaciae
deSiger
deCourtrai
, ed. G. Wallerand,
,
Louvain1913,p. (3).
49Sigerde Cortraco,
Fallaciae'.
"Fallaciaautemaccidentis
estdeceptio
ex
proveniens
eo quod quilibetassignatum
fuerit
similiter
inesserei subiectaeet accidenti
cum
dissimiliter
eis insit.Causa autemapparentiae
est unitaseorumquae secundum
accidensconiunguntur.
Causa autemnon existentiae
est diversitas
praedictum
In istafallaciasunttrestermini
eorundem.
ali/idem,
quorumduo suntaliqualiter
127

12:41:36 PM

The fallacy can be made apparent through reduplication, as in the

followingcase:
"Coruscus[sic]is otherthana man,
Coruscusis a man,
Coruscusis otherthanhimself."
Therefore,
4
The fallacy arises because 'Coruscus" and "man" are somehow
the same and somehow diverse. Therefore,while it is true that "Coruscus is a man," it is false to say that "Coruscus is a man according
as (or inasmuch as) he is other than a man."50 The minor premiss
reduplicated on the major extreme produces a false propositionindicating the presence of the fallacy.
An interpretationof terms like inquantum
, evident in the works of
Scotus, lent itselfto the development of the reduplicationtest. In his
third quodlibetal question, Scotus described two uses of terms like
"inquantum," "secundum quod" and "ut." An example of the first
use occurs in the proposition: "Homo consideratus inquantum homo
est praecissime consideratus." In this case, the term "inquantum"
indicates that the precise meaning or "ratio" of the subject "homo"
is at issue. The second use of the term occurs in the proposition:
"Homo inquantum homo est rationalis." In the second case, what
follows"inquantum" provides the "ratio" or cause of the inherence
of the predicate in the subject.51 Scotus said the firstuse denoted
non
ad identitatem,
terminus
tertius
pertinens
qualiterdiversi.Si autemaccipiatur
Oeuvres
Ed. G. Wallerand,
...
estfallaciaaccidentis
, p. 80.
50Siger,Fallaciae
ad diversitatem
terminus
tertius
: 44Si autemaccipiatur
pertinens
interiliaduo,proportionem
iliaduo,si redupliceretur
inter
primoveramfacitfalsam,
ut: Coruscusestalterab homineet Coruscusesthomo,ergoestaltera se ipso.
inesse
similiter
ab homine'assignetur
'essealterum
exeo quodattributum
Solvitur
etdiversimode
scilicet
scilicet
reisubiectae,
insit,quia
homini,
Corusco,etaccidenti,
rem
eademetaliqualiter
Coruscusethomosuntaliqualiter
diversa,
quia secundum
nec'esse
suntdiversa;
subquibussignificantur
intellectum
sunteadem,sedsecundum
interilia duo, quia interea nonest
ad diversitatem
alterumab homine'pertinet
Ideoaccidit
estinAntepraedicamentis.
utdictum
nisisecundum
alteritas
intellectum,
ab
alterum
ad
'esse
Corusco'essehominem'
homine,'
quia est
percomparationem
vera:Coruscusesthomo;istatamenestfalsa:Coruscusesthomosecundum
quod
Oeuvres
alterab homine."Ed. Wallerand,
, p. 81. Sigeruses"secundum
quod" rather
term.
than"inquantum"as thereduplicative
51JohannesDuns Scotus,Quodlibet
3.2: "Quantumautemad logicam,istaproest res,' videturdistinguenda;
quia ista
positio,'relatiocomparataad essentiam
vel'secundum
aliquandoenim
accipiuntur;
quod,'vel'ut,' dupliciter
'inquantum,'
notantrationem
hae dictiones
peripsam;aliaccipiendiilludquod determinatur
inhaerencausalitatem
respectu
important
quandoedamnonsolumhoc,sedproprie
...
tiaepraedicati.
in alio
In primoergosensuconsideratur
praecisaratioipsiusquoddeterminatur;
128

12:41:36 PM

''specification" and termed the second use "reduplication."52 If

reduplicationindicates the reason for the inherence of a predicate in
its subject, a false proposition resulting from the reduplication test
would reveal the diversityof reasons for such inherence among the
propositions in a syllogism and the inherent diversity of such a
syllogism.
In the De Puntateartislogicaetractatus
brevior
, a work that probably
,53Walter Burley followedScotus in
predates Ockham's Summalogicae
"
the
senses
of
the
term
dividing
"inquantum" into the specificative"
and "reduplicative." When the term"inquantum" was specificative,
it denoted that the predicate was considered present in the subject
according to a certain mode or "ratio." When the term was
reduplicative,then it expressed the cause of inherenceof the predicate
in the subject.54 Burley's reformulation of Aristotle's Coriscus
example, withthe conclusion: "The one approaching, inasmuch as he
is approaching, is known to you,"55 seems to indicate thatprior to his
reading Ockham, he accepted reduplication as a test for the validity
of inference.
In the Summalogicae
, Ockham offereda highly refinedanalysis of
reduplicativeterms that made the reduplication test so cumbersome
and confusingas to almost rule out its application. Like Scotus, he
divided the uses of termslike "inquantum" into the specificativeand
the reduplicative(which could be either positive or negative), but he
furtherdivided reduplication into reduplication by grace of concomitanceand reduplicationby grace of cause. The truthof reduplications of concomitance required the truth of four exponent propositions:
sensunotatur
sitratioinhaerentiae
cumsubiecto.
quodrelatioreduplicati
praedicati
Primomododicimus
homoestpraccissime
conquodhomoconsideratus
inquantum
siderata;secundomodo,homosecundum
quodhomoestrationalis;
quia quodconest ratioinhaerentiae
In Cuestiones
sequiturreduplicationem
praedicati;.
Cuodlibetales
O. F. M., Madrid1968,pp. 101-102.
, ed. and trans.FelixAlluntis,
52Scotus,Quodlibet
3.2, Cuodlibetales
, p. 102,and ibid.3.3, p. 108.
53WalterBurleigh,
De Puntate
artislogicae
a Revised
tractatus
: With
Edition
longior
ofthe
Tractatus
ed. Philotheus
N.Y. 1955,p. xii.
Brevior,
Boehner,
OFM., St. Bonaventure,
54Burleigh,Tractatus
brevior
, cap. Inquantum,secundumquod: "Sciendumest
consideran.
Uno modospecificative,
igitur,
quodistaedictiones
possunt
duplicitur
alio modoreduplicative.
Secundumquod accipitur
sic non dnott
specificative,
causalitatem
subquo consideratur.
...
aliquam,sed modumconsiderationis,
Sedquandotenetur
tuncexprimit
causaminhaerentiae
ad
reduplicative,
praedicati
subiectum."
In De Puritatis
, ed. Boehner,
250,lines14-17and 26-27.
p.
55See note25 above.
129

12:41:36 PM

in which the principal predicate is predicated of the principal

subject,
2. in which the term(s) on which the reduplicationfallsis predicated
of the principal subject,
3. in which the principal predicate is universallypredicated about
the term(s) on which the reduplication falls,
4. a conditional proposition made up of the term(s) on which the
reduplicationfallsand the principalpredicate,in the way in which
a good consequence is formedfroman inferiorto a superior and
in which one of two convertibleterms is said to follow fromthe
other.
If the reduplication is one of cause, then for its truth,the same four
exponent propositionsmust be true along with a fifthcondition that:
5. the term(s) on which the reduplication falls express the cause of
whateveris conveyed by the predicate, or that it be that to which
the principal predicate is firstpredicated (inest),or that [it be the
cause] of the principal predicate being predicated( insit) of thatfor
which the pronoun demonstrating the principal subject sup1.

posits.56
The reduplication test depended on the reduplicative meaning of
"
terms like " inquantum being limited to the reduplicationof cause.
In the traditionalinterpretationof the fallacyof accident, conclusions
of syllogisms containing the fallacy exemplified variations of the
56Ockham,Summalogicae2.16: "Circa propositiones
est primo
reduplicativas
vocaturreduplicativa
in qua ponitur
haecdictio'in
sciendum
quod ilia propositio
et tenetur
aliquospotest
reduplicative;
quia secundum
quantum,'vel aequivalens,
ettuncfacitpropositionem
vam,etpotest
reduplicati
aliquandotenerireduplicative,
...
et tuncnonfacitpropositionem
reduplicativam.
aliquandotenerispecificative,
eo quodpotest
estquodtalispropositio
Circaprimum
sciendum
potestdistingui,
vel gratiacausae.Si fiatreduplicatio
essereduplicatio
gratia
gratiaconcomitantiae
tamtuncad veritatem
concomitantiae,
quatuorpropositiones
ipsiusrequiruntur
de
verepraedicetur
earn:una, in qua praedicatum
principale
quam exponentes
de
alia in qua illudsuperquod caditreduplicatio
subiectoprincipali;
praedicetur
de iliosuper
subiectoprincipali;
tertia,in qua praedicatum
praedicetur
principale
universaliter;
vera,ab iliosuper
quartaeritunacondicionalis
quodcaditreduplicatio
ab inferiori
ad
ilio
ad
modo
cadit
principale,
quo
praedicatum
reduplicatio
quod
et quo mododicitur
essebonaconsequentia
dicitur
quod ex uno conversuperius
...
tibilium
reliquum.
sequitur
talisreduplicativae,
fiatgratiacausae,tuncad veritatem
Si autemreduplicatio
quod illud superquod cadit
requiritur
praeterquatuorpraedictasexponentes,
velquodsitilludcuiprimo
causamimportati
perpraedicatum,
exprimt
reduplicatio
velquod illipriusinsitpraedicatum
inestpraedicatum
quam
principale
principale,
In OP 1:289illudproquo subiectum
demonstranti
supponit."
principale
pronomini
291,lines3-8,21-31,38-43.
130

12:41:36 PM

sophism: "Some, inasmuch as they conform, differ," or "Some,

inasmuch as they differ,conform." (Siger's Coruscus example is a
dramatized versionof this sophism.) In his discussion of the sophism,
Ockham pointed out that it rests on a conflationof the two kinds of
reduplication.If the reduplicationis a reduplicationof concomitance,
all such propositionsare true, but if the reduplication is a reduplication ofcause, theyare false.57The reduplicationtestdepended on such
reduplicative statements always being false. However, as they
expressed the reduplication of concomitance, they may be true. In
effect,reduplicationof concomitance respectsthe identityof the terms
of the syllogismratherthan theirdiversity,and as Siger noted, about
identitythere is no fallacy. Thus, simple reduplication of the major
extreme on the minor premiss will not give a clear answer as to
whethera fallacyis present or not.
In the De puritate
artislogicaetractatus
, which dates fromafter
longior
his exposure to Ockham's Summalogicae,58Walter Burley closely followed Ockham' s analysis of reduplication in the Summalogicaeand
added some furtherembellishmentsof his own.59He proposed an even
more elaborate analysis than Ockham of the sophisms: "Some
inasmuch as they conform, differ," and "Some inasmuch as they
differ, conform," but the result is the same as for Ockham.
Reduplicative termshave multiplemeanings and the truthof the propositions which contain them depend on which meaning is
appropriate.60Since that is the case, where thingsboth differand are
57Ockham,
Summa
solvitaliasophismata
, 2.16:"Perpraedicta
possunt
logicae
'aliqua
in quantum
Nam
conveniunt
conveniunt.'
differunt,'
'aliquain quantumdifferunt
'convenire'
secundum
inrerum
de omnibus
exsistentibus
accipiendo
quodverificatur
natura
et'differre'
mododifferunt,
hocestsuntetnon
quaequocumque
proomnibus
suntidem,sic omnestaleset consimiles
veraesuntsi fiatreduplicatio
gratiacontaliumsunt
comitantiae,
quia sicutmanifeste
patet,quatuorpraedictae
exponentes
verae.Si autemfiatreduplicatio
non
gratiacausae,sicsuntfalsae,nam'convenire'
nec diciturde differentibus
nec etiam
priusconvenit
quam de convenientibus,
causamtalem,ideofalsaesunt,sic accipiendo
eas." In OP 1:292,lines
importt
75-84.
58Burleieh,
De Puritate
, ed. Boehner,
p. vii-viii.
59Burleigh,
Tractatus
lonpior,
2.3.3, in De Puritate
, ed. Boehner,
pp. 175-178.
60Burleigh,Tractatus
, 2.3.3: "Ex praedictispossuntsolvi huiusmodi
longior
differunt
conveniunt,
differunt,'
'Aliquainquantum
sophismata:
'Aliquainquantum
orationes
ex eo quodli 'inquantum'
suntmultiplices,
conveniunt,'
quia huiusmodi
teneri
velpositive.
Si negative,
sicsuntfalsae;sipositive,
ulterius
sunt
potest
negative
exco quodli 'inquantum'
teneri
velspecificative;
distinguendae,
potest
reduplicative
si teneaturspecificative,
falsae sunt; si teneaturreduplicative,
ulteriussunt
ex eo quod potestfierireduplicatio
vel gratia
distinguendae,
gratiaconcomitantiae
causae.Si fiatreduplicatio
nonest
gratiacausae,sic suntfalsae,quia convenientia
131

12:41:36 PM

the same, simply insertinga reduplication will not produce a clearly

false proposition, because the reduplication may be of concomitance
ratherthan of cause. The Scotistconflationof concomitanceand cause
produced the plausibilityof the reduplication test. Ockham's distinction between the two, rendered the testof littleutility.It seems likely
that Burley would have abandoned it in his later work.
However, Ockham ultimatelyrejected the reduplication test, not
because it was subject to confusiongiven his analysis of reduplication,
but because he believed that the concepts of essential and accidental
predication were irrelevant for the application of the "dictum de
omni." As he says, he could produce an infinitenumber of instances
where a reduplicated minor is false, and yet the discursus is governed
by the dictumde omni.61The form of the syllogismwas sufficientto
guarantee inference. No test for a particular sort of predication was
necessary. Valid inferencewas separable fromthe metaphysicalrelationshipbetween what the subject and predicate termsof the propositions in a syllogismrepresented.
Like those who came before him within the Boethian tradition,
Ockham interpretedthe fallacyof accident as arising at the boundary
where the dictumde omniceased to extend. But unlike his predecessors,
Ockham did not restrictthe extension of the dictumto certain formsof
predication. The dictumhad universal applicability to any sort of
syllogisticvariable whetheressential, accidental or impossible. Thus,
forhim the fallacyof accident was not tied to any kind of predication
but to a breakdown in the general rules governing syllogistic as
Aristotleset them forthin the Prioranalytics.He was able to take this
tack because he redefinedthe locus of fallacies arising outside speech,
so that where his predecessors believed such fallacies originated from
the nature of things, he believed they originated within mental
language. This complex of positions allowed Ockham to stand foursquare for the primacy of logical form.
sic
Si verofiatreduplicatio
nececonverso.
causadifferentiae
gratiaconcomitantiae,
In De
necessario
se concomitantur."
et differentia
suntverae;namconvenientia
24-36.
Puritale
, ed. Boehner,
p. 179,4lines
4
61Ockham,Elenchorum
falsa,quia frequenter
, 2.9: Sed istaregulaestsimpliciter
falsa et
est simpliciter
talis minorreduplicatasuper maioremextremitatem
nonestibi aliquafallacia.Namhicnullaestfallacia'omnis
et tarnen
impossibilis,
ista
omnisasinusestlapis,'et tarnen
homoestlapis;omnisasinusesthomo;igitur
falsa:omnisasinusesthomoin quantumestlapls. ... Et
minorestsimpliciter
discursus
et tarnen
suntubi minorestfalsasicreduplicata,
talesinstantiae
infinitae
estregulatus
perdicide omni."In OP 3:234,lines100-109.
132

12:41:36 PM

V. RichardCampsall
Richard Campsall provided a supporting context within which
Ockham developed his critique of the established tradition.Just prior
to Ockham' s lectures on Peter Lombard's Sentences
, in the years
around 1306-1317, Campsall advocated many of the ideas which
Ockham came to espouse in realigningthe relationshipbetween logic
and metaphysics. In his Quaestionessuperlibrumpriormanaleticorum
,
omni
as
the
de
fundamental
to
asserted
of
the
dictum
primacy
Campsall
4
logic: 'Conversion is the principleof perfectingimperfectsyllogisms,
just as the 'dici de omni et de nullo' perfectsperfectsyllogisms."62
While he did not take up the Boethian restrictionof the dictumde omni
to instances of essential predication, he did propose a rule that
indicates opposition to the Boethian tradition. He asserted: 4'from a
universal [premiss] and any of its singular premisses, there follows
some singular conclusion, because of the relation to the universal."63
A syllogismof the sort which Ockham proposed as counter to his
opponents:
"No whiteis a musician,
Socrates
is white,
Socratesis nota musician,"64
Therefore,
which includes accidental terms and is governed by a universal first
premiss, follows from Campsall's rule, because the rule places no
restrictionson the subject matterof universal syllogisms.
Campsall also developed a position on mental language that
foreshadowedOckham's. The key passage reads:
orsyllogism
doesnothavetobe resolved
"One shouldsaythata proposition
. . . because,ifit
norconcepts,
norintovoicesfrom
intothings,
spokenterms,
wouldbe good:
thissyllogism
fromthings
or fromconcepts,
werecomposed
'Everymanruns,
Socratesis a rational
animal,
Socratesruns,'
Therefore,
becausethesamethingis signified
by 'man' and by'rationalanimal.'
62RichardofCampsall,Quaestiones
librum
analeticorum
, 5, ad I: "conpriorm
super
sicuddicide omnietdenullo
versioestprincipium
sillogismos
inperfectos,
perficiendi
In Synan,ed. Campsall
, 1:112,no. 5.41.
perficiunt
perfectos."
sillogismos
63Campsall,
necessarius
11,ad III: "et istemodusarguendi
Librum
est,quia
priorm,
etqualibetsingulari,
ex universali,
aliquaconsequitur
arguitur
perhancregulam:
. . . ."in Synan,ed. Campsall
clusiosingularis,
hocad universalem
,
quodpropter
1:196,no. 11.69.
64See note44 above.
133

12:41:36 PM

sincetwodifferent
namescansignify
thesameconcept
Andsimilarly,
orone
wouldbea goodsyllogism
wherever
there
onenamewassubstituted
singlething,
foranother,
whichisagainstAristotle
inthefirst
ofElenchi
, becausetheonewho
aboutgarments
did notsyllogize
aboutclothing.65
syllogized
Andtherefore,
oneshouldsaythat[propositions
and syllogisms]
haveto be
voices
as follows:
a thing
resolved
intoimagined
first
, whichshouldbe understood
and ifit oughtto be enunciated
to someoneelse,theoneenunis conceived,
whichhe oughtto
a voicesimilarto theone through
imagines
ciatingit first
enunciate
thethingtosomeone
else,andthatvoicedoesnothavebeingoutside
thatan object
thesoul,likethething
ofthepredicate,
becauseitisnotnecessary
intheimagination
thatithavesomesortofbeing
havetruebeing.Butitsuffices
ofthesortthat'nowhere'
and'vacuum'have,andfrom
whichis onlyobjective,
and syllogism
are composed,
and notfromvocal
suchvoicestheproposition
ifsomeone
as follows:
a letter,
that
sounds.Thiscanbeclarified
oughttoproffer
as in thecaseof
is nota truevocalsound,butonlyitssignis profferred,
letter
toproffer
a consonant
andsays'b,' andspeaksa vocal
someone
whois supposed
is not
ofthesound'e' andanother
soundcomposed
sound,andthatcomposite
whichis inthe
theletter.
Therefore,
[thespokensound]is thesignoftheletter
voice.Andinthesamewaythespoken
voiceisnota proposisoul,theimagined
and syllogisms].66
tionor a syllogism,
butonlya signof[propositions
'
4
Campsall's distinctionof a mental 'imagined' language from the
spoken language that is its sign, is roughlycomparable to Ockham's
early "fictum" theory,in which the termsof mental propositionshad
only objective being.67
65Aristotles,
6.168a28-33.
De sophisticis
elenchis,
66Campsall,Librum
estquodproposicio
velsillogismus
2, ad I: "dicendum
priorm,
. . . quia
necin vocesex terminis
in res,necconceptus,
nonhabetresolvi
prolatas,
istesillogismus
essetbonus:'omnis
si componeretur
ex rebus,vel ex conceptibus,
socrates
estanimalracinale;igitur,
homocurrit;socrates
currit,'
quia eademres
et per'animalracinale.'
significatur
per'hominem'
vel unam
eundemconceptum,
et similiter,
cumduo nominapossuntsignificare
unumnomenproaltero,quodest
bonusubicunque
rem,essetsillogismus
poneretur
de 'tunica'nonsillogizavit
de 'veste,'primo
contraaristotelem
quia,qui sillogizavit
elencorum.
est
invocesymaginatas,
etideo,dicendum
quodintelligendum
quodhabentresolvi
enuncians
sic:primoresconcipitur
et,si debeatalterienunciari,
primoymaginatur
illiperquamdebetremalterienunciari,
etiliavoxnonhabetesse
vocemconsimilem
<in > ymaginasieudrespraedicati,
extraanimam,
quodobiectum
quianonoportet
cuius
essealiquale,quodestobiectum
cionehabeatesseverum,sedsufficit
tantum,
et
esse habentinsitumet vacuum,et ex talibusvocibuscomponitur
proposicio
etnonex vocibusprolatis.
pareresic:quia,si aliquisdebeat
quodpotest
sillogismus,
illa literanonestveravoxprolata,sed solumsuumsignumproliterm,
proferre
etdicit'b,' dicitunamvocemcomconsonans
sicudsi aliquisdebeatproferre
fertur,
nonestlitera;igitur
estsignum
ex hacvoce'e' etalio,et illudcompositum
positam
nonestproposicio
eteodemmodovoxprolata
litee
que estinanima,voxymaginata.
In Synan,ed. Campsall
istorum."
velsillogismus,
sedsolumestsignum
, 1:62-63,nos
2.81-2.83.
67Philotheus
ontheSentences
Dateoj Ockham's
,
OFM, TheRelative
Boehner,
Commentary
N.Y.
onOckham
in: Collected
Articles
OFM, St.Bonaventure,
, ed. EligiusM. Buytaert,
1958,pp. 99-107.
134

12:41:36 PM

While there are differencesin the mental language theories of the

two men,68what is importanthere, is the possibilitythatin Campsall's
view the Aristoteliancategoryof fallacies dependent on speech might
be located in spoken speech and the fallacies independent of speech
might be located within mental language. The quote suggests the
fallacy of equivocation lies outside mental and Campsall would
apparently have located the fallacy of accent, one of the fallacies
dependent on speech, in external speech, as well, for he argued:
4'exterior
spoken speech is firstand properlyinformedwith the acute
and grave accents,but thatis not the speech which is called a 'proposition,' and that speech which is called a proposition is not informed
with accent except accidently, because its sign is informed with
accent."69
Whether Campsall actually espoused an identification of the
fallacies of speech with external speech and the fallacies independent
of speech with mental language, like Ockham, cannot be definitively
determined from his extant works, but Walter Chatton, the Franciscan criticof both Campsall and Ockham, cites a suggestivepassage
:
fromCampsairs commentaryon the Sentences
"A thingis notthereasonfora proposition
for
beingperse, buttheintellect,
itis inourpowerthattheintellect
an inferior
aboutitssuperior
and
predicates
a proposition
modo
creates
which
isnotperseprimo
dicendi
perse, andyetitsignifies
whichitsconverse
whichis a perseprimo
thething
modo
signifies,
proposition."70
It would be difficultto reconcile such a passage with the traditional
view that the fallacyof accident arises fromthe nature of thingsand
the differential
sortsof predicationwhich theyproduce. In any event,
Campsall's position lent itselfto the identificationof fallacies outside
speech withfallaciesthatarise withinmental language, and may have
influencedOckham.
68Ockhamhas Augustine
in thebackground
as a sourceforhis ideason mental
butCampsalldoesnotseemtorelyonAugustine
at all. See Gelber,
Mental
language,
, forthcoming.
Language
69Campsall,
Librum
etprimoinfor, 2, ad I: "oracioexterius
prolataproprie
priorm
matur
accentu
necilla
gravietacuto,sedillanonestoracioque dicitur
'proposicio,'
oracioque dicitur
informatur
accentunisiperaccidcns,
proposicio
quia informatur
in suo signo."In Synan,ed. Campsall
, 1:63,no. 2.88.
70WalterChatton,
Lectura
estperse,
, 1.2.6.4:"res nonestcausaquarepropositio
sedintellectus,
naminnostrapotestate
estquodintellectus
de suo
inferius
praedicet
et tunenonestpropositio
superiori,
perse primomododicendiperse, et tamen
remquamsignificat
sua conversa
signifcat
quaeestpropositio
perse primomodo."
BNC. C. 5. 357),f. 79va,and (Paris,BN lat. 15.886),f. 126ra.
(Florence,
135

12:41:36 PM

On the fallacyof accident itself,Campsall, like Ockham afterhim,

rejected the prevailingBoethian and Aegidian traditionwhich defined
the fallacy as resulting from accidental predication and some
extraneous elementin the middle term,givingrise to a diverse middle.
He accepted the possibilityof diversityoccasioned by the relation of
the extremes to the middle term, for as he says:
from
variathatsometimes
ofaccident
"one shouldunderstand
thereis a fallacy
as is evident
inthefollowing:
tionoftheextreme,
as toitsdiverse
acceptations,
'manis a species,
Socratesis a man,'
and in thesecondfor
themiddleis takenforan intention,
becausein thefirst
thesupposit."71
Thus, Campsall accepted the view which Burley espoused and
Ockham rejected, that the fallacyof accident might arise fromvariation in the supposition of the middle term created by a diverse relationship with the extremes of the syllogism.
The fallacy might also, and more commonly, arise for other
reasons. As he added:
of
ofaccident
becauseofan insufficient
"Sometimes
thereis a fallacy
identity
isnotsufficient
tojointheextremes
so thatthisunity
themiddletotheextremes,
ofthissortshouldbe assignedin such:
.... Anda defect
'The one comingis known,
Coriscusis theone coming,'
there
thesameas theextremes.
becausethemiddletermis partially
Therefore,
aboutthe
in thesepremisses
to concludeoneextreme
is notsufficient
identity
ofaccias theargument
is notherea fallacy
there
other.And,therefore,
proves,
of
ofanyterm,butbecauseoftheinsufficiency
dentbecauseofthediversity
ofthemiddleto eachoftheextremes."72
identity
hocaliquidforthe dictumde omni
If the middle termwere insufficiently
to govern the syllogism,then a fallacy of accident might result, but
71Campsall,Librum
, 12, IV: "intelligendum
quod aliquandoest fallacia
priorm
eiusaccepciones,
sicudpatet
accidentis
ex variacione
extremi,
quantumad diversas
mediumpro
esthomo,'quia in primaaccipitur
in ista:'homoestspecies,socrates
In Synan,ed. Campsall
et posteaprosuppositis."
, 1.207,no. 12.41.
intencione,
72Campsall,Librum
insufaccidentis
, 12,IV: "Aliquandoestfallacia
propter
priorm
ad
ita quod istaunitasnonestsufficiens
mediiad extrema,
ficientem
ydentitatem
intalibus:'veniens
estassignandus
.... ethuiusmodi
defectus
extrema
copulandum
est idemcum
'iste coriscusest veniens,'quia mediumpartialiter
cognoscitur,'
unum
ad concludendum
identitas
in istispremissis
ideononestsufficiens
extremis,
extremum
de alio,et ideo,sicudprobatracio,nonesthicfallaciaaccidentis
propter
identitatem
mediiad
alicuiustermini,sed propterinsufficientem
diversitatem
In Synan,ed. Campsall
alterum
extremorum."
, 1.207,no. 12.41.
136

12:41:36 PM

did not arise in Campsall's view froma quasisuch an insufficiency

of
term.
the
middle
equivocation
The elementsbasic to Ockham' s position: recognitionof the dictum
de omnias fundamentalto logic, assertion of the primacy of logical
formover content, a division between mental and spoken language
capable of accounting forAristotle's two categories of fallacy, and a
rejectionofthe Aegidian treatmentof the fallacyof accident as a variation of the terms, are present prior to Ockham in Campsall's work.
Whether Campsall also predated Ockham in putting the various
elements togetherto form a coherent whole, cannot now be determined from those of Campsall's writingsthat remain to us. In his
, Ockham made
commentary on Aristotle's De sophisticiselenchis
manifestthe pictureof fallaciesthat seems hidden just behind the surface in Campsall's writings.
VI. Ockhamand theMasterofAbstractions
Ockham returned to the subject of the fallacy of accident while
. 73 He did not change the substance of the
writingthe Summalogicae
positionwhich he had set forthin his commentaryon Elenchi, but the
Summalogicaecontains a veryconcise statementof his position and the
list of his adversaries came to include the Master of Abstractions.
The key passages begin with Ockham settingout his views about
how syllogismsin the firstfigureshould be formedin order to have
utility.Since the dictumde omniis fundamental to logical argument,
thesemost basic of syllogismsare governed immediatelyby the dictum.
For thatto be the case, two principlesmust obtain: the major premiss
must be universal, and the minor premiss affirmative.74
He added:
73See Ockham,Opera
A. Moody,GedeonGi, Angelus
eds. Ernestus
philosophical
N.Y.
Gambatese,StephanusBrown,and Philotheus
Boehner,St. Bonaventure,
oftherelative
libros
datesofOckham'sExpositio
1978,2:13*-14*, fora discussion
super
elenchorum
andSumma
logicae.
74Ockham,Summalogicae
est quod omnis
, 3.1.2: "Tertiumpraeambulum
immediate
velmediate,
perdicide omnivelperdicide nullo.
syllogismus,
regulatur
enimin primafigura
immediate
Syllogismi
perdicide omnivelperdici
regulantur
in syllogismos
de nullo.Syllogismi
autemsecundaeet tertiaefiguraereducuntur
. . . ."In OP 1:362-363,
lines32-36.Andibid.,3.1.3: "Et estprimo
primae
figurae,
sciendum
immediate
sitomnesyllogismos
quod,cumdictum
regulri
primaefigurae
duo
circamodosprimaefigurae
servare
perdicide omnivelperdicide nullo,oportet
principia.
estquod maiorsitpropositio
Primum
...
universalis.
Exeodempatetquodminor
. ..." InOP 1:363-364,
debetesseaffirmativa
semper
lines2-6,24.
137

12:41:36 PM

". . . oneshouldobserve
thattoprovethata conjunction
ormodelacksutility,
tofindan exception
inthesubstantial
itis notnecessary
as someerringly
terms,
tofindan exception
inanykindofterm,
whether
substansay,butitissufficient
. . . Andtherefore,
thefourmodesofthefirst
orwhatever.
tial,accidental
figure
whatkindsoftermsareusedin them. . . ,"75
holdgoodno matter
The some who "erringly" believed that only substantialterms could
give rise to valid conjunctions in a syllogismincluded Giles of Rome,
whom Ockham had quoted verbatimto thateffectin his Expositiosuper
librosElenchorum.76
Giles, as we have seen, believed that a failure to
observe this rule would produce a fallacy of accident.77
Ockham, however, believed that a universal syllogismgoverned by
all or none was valid, no matterwhat kinds of termswere employed
in settingup the syllogism.He argued thatthe fourmodes of the first
figuregive rise to a good syllogism:
is affirmed
"whenthefirst
or deniedof
denotesthatthepredicate
proposition
andthesecondproposition
to whichthesubjectrefers,
denotes
all thosethings
is affirmed
aboutthesubthatthesubjectofthefirst
unequivocally
proposition
ofthefirst
andthenthepredicate
jectofthesecondproposition
(theassumptum),
is affirmed
ordeniedofall thattowhichthesubjectofthesecond
proposition
referred."78
proposition
Such a rule gives rise to a syllogismof the form:
"All A are B,
C is A,
C is B."
Therefore,
and any syllogism following this pattern would produce a valid
inferenceas long as the terms remained constant in meaning.
For examples of what he was rejecting, Ockham turned to the
Master of Abstractions, or Richard Sophista, the author of a work
75Ockham.Summa
con, 3.1.4: "Et esthicadvertendum
quodad probandum
logicae
interminis
invenire
instantiam
nonoportet
inutilem
velmoduminutilem
iugationem
in
invenireinstantiam
sicutaliqui errantesdicunt,sed sufficit
substantialibus,
sive
substantialibus
sive
accidentalibus
sive
terminis,
quibuscumque.
quibuscumque
terminis
. . . ."In OP
tenent
inomnibus
... Et ideoquatuormodiprimaefigurae
1:366,lines20-26.
76See note20 above.
77See note21 above.
78Ockham,Summalogicae
dummodoper primampropositionem
, 3.1.4: "...
subiectum
ab omniiliode quo dicitur
veredicivelremoveri
denotetur
praedicatum
non
illudquod priusfuitsubiectum
denotetur
et per secundampropositionem
illudquod
concludatur
etposteainconclusione
dicideassumpto,
aequivoceacceptum
in
de iliopraecisequod fuitsubiectum
in primadicivelremoveri
fuitpraedicatum
" In OP 1:366-367,
lines29-34.
secundapropositione.
138

12:41:36 PM

79
entitledtheAbstractions,
probably writtenprior to 1240. The textof
a collectionof sophismata
the Abstractions,
, has been discovered and is
available for study.80 Ockham cites the Master of Abstractions'
sophismsas evidence of the common confusionover the nature of the
fallacyof accident and over the nature of the syllogismin general.
For example, Ockham says that the Master of Abstractions had
argued that syllogismsof the sort:
"Everycoloredthingis,
Everywhitethingis a coloredthing,
Therefore,
everywhitethingis."
And:
"Everyanimalis a man,
Everyass is an animal,
Therefore,
everyass is a man,"
were not good syllogismsbecause theyinvolved a fallacyof accident.81
Each of these syllogisms is governed by the dictumde omni, so on
Ockham's view, while there might be other fallacies present, there
would be no fallacyof accident.
Unfortunately,comparing what Ockham says with the texts from
Richard Sophista' s Abstractions,produces some mysteries. The
Master of Abstractionsdoes not say what Ockham attributesto him
(at least not in the two manuscriptsI have been able to check). In the
firstexample, where Ockham believed the Master thoughtthere was
a fallacy of accident, the Master in fact says there are fallacies of
79L. M. De Rijk,LogicaModernorum
Richard
, II. 1 Assen1967,62-72,established
as theauthor
oftheAbstractions
andsuggested
hemight
be RichardFishacre.
Sophista
in: CIMAGL
Abstractionum,
, 18 (1976),1-4,believedthework
Magister
JanPinborg,
shouldprobably
bedatedpriorto 1240?andfoundtheattribution
toFishacre
unconHe suggested
RichardRufusofCornwall
instead.
towhich
Ofthesophisms
vincing.
Ockhamrefers,
Pinborgedited"Omnishomoestsingulare,""Omne coloratum
est,"and"Omnisfenix
est,"from
Oxford,
Bodl.,Digby24. William
J. Courtenay,
An Introduction
AdamWodeham:
to His Lifeand Writings
, Leiden1978,pp. 54-56,
thatGedeonGi,O. F.M. hassuggested
indicates
RichardRufusorRichardofConas possible
candidates
forRichardSophista.
ington
80I owe manythanksto Katherine
Tachau,Paul Streveler,
MarySirridgeand
CalvinNormore
whoarecurrently
onan edition
oftheAbstractiones
and
collaborating
allowedmeto use theirfilmsand preliminary
kindly
transcriptions.
81Ockham,
Summa
suntboni
, 3.1.4: "Ex istosequitur
logicae
quodtalessyllogismi
'omnecoloratum
est; omnealbumest coloratum;
ergoomnealbumest'; 'omne
animalesthomo;omnisasinusestanimal;ergoomnisasinusesthomo.'Etideoerrat
in praedictis
fallaciam
accidentis,
MagisterAbstractionum
assignando
syllogismis
cumistisyllogismi
In OP 1:367,
regulentur
perdicide omnietsintde se evidentes."
lines35-40.
139

12:41:36 PM

equivocation and consequent. Two explanations forthe discrepancies

seem plausible. There may have been several redactionsof theAbstractions of which Ockham used one differentfromthe one now in our
,
possession. Or, Ockham might have misconstruedthe Abstractions
of
as
the
a
of
accident
even
text
the
fallacy
implying
presence
reading
though the Master of Abstractionshad asserted other fallacies in its
place.
set up the sophism:
In one of the textsin question, the Abstractiones
'4
Every colored thing is," as follows:
andoneblackthing
"Let itbe thecasethatthereis onlyonewhite
thing
and one middle.
And:Thisis provedthus:
A whitethingis, a blackthingis, a middleis, therefore
everycolored
thingis.
But:Against:
Everycoloredthingis,
Everywhitethingis colored,
Therefore,
everywhitethingis."82
4
4
The statement: Every colored thingis" appears paradoxical because
a stateof affairscould be set up in which the statementwould be true,
but a falseconclusion would seem to followfromit, namely thatevery
possible white thing exists.
Richard Sophista offeredseveral solutions to this paradox, among
them the assertion that a fallacyof consequent arises in the course of
the argument. He applied the so-called rule of three- a rule also found
in the works of William Sherwood and Roger Bacon - that the term
"omnis" or ' 'every" can only be used properlywhere thereare three
'
or more instances of the thingit modifies.83If one says: 'Every man
4
82RichardSophista,Abstractiones
, 11: 'OMNE COLORATUM EST. Sit unum
sic: album
unumsolummedium.Et probatur
solumalbum,unumsolumnigrum,
est.
est,mediumest,ergoomnecoloratum
est,nigrum
Sed contra:omnecoloratum
est,omnealbumestcoloratum,
ergoomnealbum
est." (Oxford,Bodl.,Digby24), f. 62ra,and (Brugge,Stadsbibliotheek,
497), f.
14va.CheckedagainstPinborg,
, p. 2.
Magister
83The ruleofthreecanbe foundin WilliamofSherwood,
Treatise
onSyncategorematic
Words
1968,p. 23,andinRoger
ychap.5, trans.NormanKretzmann,
Minneapolis
etdistinctionibus
desophismatibus
1937,p. 147,
, ed. RobertSteele,Oxford
Bacon,Summa
OMNE FENIX EST, justas Richard
withthesophism
whocitesit in connection
(Brugge,Stadsbibliotheek,
Sophistadoes:(Oxford,Bodl.,Digby24), ff.62ra-62rb,
Decelo1.1. 268al5-19,gives
, p. 3. Aristotle,
Magister
497), f. 14vb,and Pinborg,
sucha ruleas well.
140

12:41:36 PM

is green,'' it impliesthatthereare at least threemen to whom the term

44
'
4
'green' may be applied. In the sophism: Every colored thing is,"
"
the proofsand disproofshad relied on statementslike: Every white
thingis," even thoughat the beginningonly one white thingwas said
'
to be in existence, and, therefore,the statement: 'Every white thing
is," was badly formedand could not give rise to a proofthat: "Every
colored thing is," because of a fallacy of consequent.84
The fallacyof consequent was traditionallyallied with the fallacyof
accident. As Ockham set out the relation, the fallacy of consequent
only had status as a separate fallacy when it occurred within consequences. If an argument constituteda true syllogism, the fallacy of
accident would also be present. Since Ockham treated consequences
as enthymaticsyllogisms,the fallacy of consequent equaled a subordinate formof the fallacyof accident.85The sophism in question is set
up as a syllogism.In Ockham's system,the Master's assertion of the
84RichardSophista,"Abstractions,
11: "Et nonvalet:'Non omnealbumest,non
omnenigrum
est'; sed est
est,nonomnemedium[est],ergononomnecoloratum
falladaconsequentis.
est,et
Sequiturenim:'Si omnealbumest,et omnenigrum
omnemediumest,ergoomnecoloratum
est,'et nonconvertitur
quia ex veronon
consea positione
estfallacia
falsum,
consequentis
arguendo
ergoe contrario
sequitur
'Nonomnealbumest,nonomnenigrum
est,nonomne
quentis.
Quaresicarguendo:
mediumest, ergonon omnecoloratum
est,' eademest fallaciaa destructione
'Omnecoloratum
antecedentis.
Nonenimsequitur:
est,etergoomnealbum,omne
cumex verisnon
e contrario
omnemedium.'Quarenonsequitur
negando,
nigrum,
veraeetconclusio
falsum.
Suntenimpraemissae
falsa,sustinendo
quodhoc
sequitur
quidam,et perhoc
signum'ornnis'exigitad minustriaappellata.Sic sustinent
solviturillud sophisma."(Oxford,Bodl., Digby 24), f. 62ra, and (Brugge,
checked
, pp. 2-3.PinStadsbibliotheek,
Magister
againstPinborg,
497)ff.14va-14vb,
citedabove,butboth
forthefirst
borghas "fallaciaaccidentis"
fallaciaconsequentis
indicate
thatthisisa misreading,
andthesenseofthepassagewouldalso
manuscripts
in thiscase.The readingis important
indicate
is therightfallacy
fallacia
consequentis
Abstractionum
s apparent
beliefthattheMagister
becauseofOckham'
arguedfora
in thissophism.
ofaccident
fallacy
85Ockham,Elenchorum
fallaciaconsequentis
Aristotelem
, 3.4.12: "Quia secundum
fallacia
estparsaccidentis,
.... Undesciendum
estquodquandoquecommittitur
ex pluribus
etquandoquearguendo
proposienthymematice
consequentis
arguendo
ad hoc quod sit consequens
tionibus.Si arguaturex pluribuspropositionibus,
inantecedente,
inferat
quamlibet
propositionem
positam
quodconsequens
requiritur
et none converso.Et si arguaturin figura,sempersimulcum hoc eritfallacia
Et universaliter
etiamin enthymemate,
accidentis.
quandoestfallaciaconsequentis
si remaneat
fallaciaconsequentis
et illaconsequentia
reducitur
in figuram
debitam,
in figura,eritnon solum
in iliodiscursucomposito
ex propositionibus
dispositis
In OP 3:826-827,
lines2-4,
fallacia
sedetiameritfallaciaaccidentis."
consequentis,
26-35.Idem,Summa
, 3.3.1, OP 1.589,lines46-54.CalvinG. Normore,
logicae
Ockham's
, unpublished
Consequences
May 30, 1986,fortheStanford
paperpresented
an extensive
ofOckham'sposiUniversity
Philosophy
provides
analysis
Department,
in latemedieval
tionand theconverse
thought.
141

12:41:36 PM

presence of a fallacyof consequent would, therefore,imply the concomitant presence of a fallacy of accident. Perhaps he read his own
s text. In any event, he would not
view of the matterinto the Magister1
have agreed with the Magisteri analysis, since he rejected the rule of
three.86
The Magisteralso asserted that the same sophism contained a fallacy
of equivocation. He argued thatthe "is" in the syllogism:"Every colored thingis, everywhitethingis colored, therefore,everywhitething
is," is an equivocal term, because "is" can have two meanings. In
one case, "is" can stand for an operation of being, asserting the
existence of something,and that is the meaning of the term "is" in
the firstproposition: "Every colored thing is." But "is" could also
stand for the being of consequence or habitude, and in the second
proposition, "is" stands for this second kind of being, so that the
statement: "Every white thing is colored," must be understood to
mean: "If thereis a white thing,it is colored." Because of the change
in meaning of the term "is," Richard Sophista believed therewas an
equivocation in the syllogismthat preventedone frominferringfrom
the statement: "Every colored thing is," that: "Every white thing
is."87
In anothercontext,Ockham had assailed theMagister's treatmentof
the copula, citingthe same sophism and the Master's solution, as an
example of faultyreasoning. Ockham believed that to grant varying
meanings to the term"is" in a syllogismwould completelydestroythe
effectivenessof syllogisticreasoning. It would then be possible to say
that the term "is" has either of these meanings at will, and an
equivocation could be introduced into any syllogism whenever it
seemed convenient.88Thus, Ockham seems to have known that the
86Ockham,Summa
a
2.4: Ex hocpatetfalsitas
quae ponuntur
quorundam
logicae,
Unumesthocsignum'omnis'exigittriaappellata.Namponatur
quod
quibusdam.
et nullushomo,tunchaecestvera'omneintelligens
unussolusangelusintelligat
estangelus,'. . . ." In OP 1.260,lines61-64.
creatum
87RichardSophista,
Abstractions
, 11: . . dicendum
quodhaecestverasimpliciter:
'omnecoloratum
est,omnealbumestcoloratum,
est,'etnonvalet:'omnecoloratum
'esse.' 'Esse'eniminprimapropositione
ergoomnealbumest,'eo quodequivocatur
'omne
estessequodestoperatio
entis,ethocesseestesseeiusquodest.Etcumdicitur
estesse
cuiusmodi
siveessehabitudinis,
estesseconsequentiae
albumestcoloratum,'
cumdicitur'si estalbumestcoloratum."'(Oxford,
Bodl,Digby24), f.62ra,and
, p. 2.
Magister
Stadsbibliotheek,
497),f. 14va.CheckedagainstPinborg,
(Brugge,
88Ockham,Summa
, 2.4: Ex istisetiamsequitur
quod ialsumestquod isti
logicae
unum
et tantum
unumnigrum
unumalbumet tantum
dicunt,quod si sittantum
est falsa'omnealbumest,' 'omnenigrum
est,'
mediumquod quaelibetistarum
142

12:41:36 PM

Master of Abstractionshad proposed a fallacyof equivocation rather

than a fallacyof accident in the sophism "Every colored thingis." But
as we have seen, the fallacyof accident, was commonly thoughtof as
a kind of equivocation, and again Ockham may have read Richard
Sophista as though he had posed a fallacy of accident.
forthe other
However, thereare no exact analogs in theAbstractiones
Master.
Instead
of engaging
attributes
to
the
which
Ockham
sophism
a
have
been
at
different
colin creativereading, Ockham may
looking
lection of sophisms than the one we now have to hand.89
and philosophy
VII. Someresults
for medievaltheology
The impact of the critique of Campsall and Ockham on the
Boethian traditionis most evident in theology. The doctrine of the
Trinityproduced a number of recalcitrantpuzzles when the termsof
the Trinitywere used as variables in Aristoteliansyllogismslike the
following:
'omnecoloratum
'omnemedium
istumsyllogismum
est;omnealbum
est;'etnegant
omnealbumest.'
estcoloratum;
igitur
'omneanimal
Similiter,
positoquodnullusasinussit,negantistumsyllogismum
omnisasinusesthomo,'dicentes
esthomo;omnisasinusestanimal;igitur
quod'esse'
maioribus
'esse'quodestoperatio
entis,ethoc
accipitur
aequivocatur,
quiainprimis
autemaccipitur
'esse' habitudinis
siveconseest'esse'eiusquodest,in minoribus
'esse' estcumdicitur'si estalbum,estcoloratum.'
cuiusmodi
quentiae,
omnemformam
namhocestdestruerc
Istudestomninoirrationabiliter
dictum,
Dicamenimquandocumque
placetmihiquod'esse'inpropositionibus
syllogisticam.
in quocumque
et ad placitumassignabofallaciam
aequivocationis
aequivocatur,
In OP 1:263,lines106-120.
sylloeismo."
89Thepuzzleoverwhether
inhandisdifficult.
TheconOckhamhadtheAbstractiones
tention
becausejustpriortothesophism
discussed
in the
thathedidis strengthened
lastnote(88) about"Everycoloredthingis," Ockhamrefers
to another
sophism:
OMNE COLORATUM EST. See
OMNIS FENIX EST alongwiththesophism
occurtogether
Summa
as
, 2.4, OP 1:261,lines72-90.Bothofthesesophisms
logicae
11 and 12 in RichardSophista'swork.Ockhamseemsto havehada text
numbers
is not
oftheAbstractiones
on thesepages,butthatassertion
at handwhileworking
without
becauseI havenotbeenable to findanother
Ockham
difficulties,
sophism
attributes
totheMagister
OMNE ANIMALEST HOMO, inthemanuAbstractionism,
at mydisposal.Thereis a sophism
OMNIS HOMO EST
oftheAbstractiones
scripts
ANIMALET OMNE ANIMAL EST HOMO, (Digby24), f.65rb,and(Brugge),
f. 16vb,butitdoesnotfollow
toOMNIS ANIMAL
thepattern
Ockhamattributes
EST HOMO.
Thereis stillanother
however,
"HOMO, INQUANTUM ANIMAL,
sophism,
DIFFERT ABASINO," (Digby24),f.73rb,(Brugge),
Ockhammight
f.22rawhich
havehadinmindifhisownsophism
resulted
from
thisoneoftheMagister's
reading
ofthereduplication
as an exemplification
rule.
143

12:41:36 PM

"The Fatherin God is theEssencein God,

The Essencein God is theSon in God,
theSon in God is theFatherin God."
Therefore,
The premisses of the syllogism are true and the conclusion is false
according to doctrine, but the formof the argument appears impeccable. According to the Boethian/Aegidian tradition, the fallacy of
accident could not provide a way out of the paradox, because the
fallacyof accident presumed a variation in the middle term, and the
middle term ' 'essence in God" stands forsomethingmost simple. By
rejectingthe traditionwhich defined a fallacyof accident in termsof
variation in the terms,and substitutinga lack of identityin the middle
forvariation in the middle, Campsall and Ockham could join a complex traditionincluding Scotus and Aureole, and argue that a fallacy
of accident was present in such syllogismsabout God. ' 4Essence in
God" functioned like an unquantified universal term, so that the
Trinitarian syllogismwas analogous to the syllogism:
"Socratesis man,
Man is Plato,
Socratesis Plato,"
Therefore,
determinateor hoc
in which the middle term "man" is insufficiently
dictum
to
the
for
the
de
omni
discursus.90
govern
aliquid
Considerable debate, which I have dealt with extensively elsewhere,91ensued over the suggested new solution for the Trinitarian
paradoxes. For example, Walter Chatton criticized Campsall and
Ockham on the grounds that the fallacyof accident required a variation of the middle term "essence" which would violate divine
simplicity.92Adam Wodeham came to the defense, saying that
Chatton's criticismswere beside the point, because neitherCampsall
nor Ockham definedthe fallacyof accident as a variationin the middle
term.93The fallacyof accident entered the delicate scholastic balance
between faithand reason on the side of reason against fideism.
90See HesterGoodenough
A ClashofValues
inScholastic
Gelber,LogicandtheTrinity:
ofWisconsin-Madison,
Ph.d.dissertation,
1974,pp.
, J300-1335,
University
Thought
119-124on JohnDuns Scotusand thegeneraldifficulty,
pp. 134-141on Peter
Aureole,pp. 208-209on Ockham,pp. 209-210on Campsall.
91Gelber,Logic
andpp.247andtheTrinity
, pp.206-234,forthegenerell
controversy,
involved.
261 on AdamWodeham's
verysophisticated
analysisofthedilemmas
92See note18 above.
93Gelber,Logic
Ordinatio:
"Ad terandAdamWodeham,
andtheTrinity
, pp.228-229,
mediinecilli,contra
enimestibinonessevariationem
tium,peridem,concedendum
ibi [fallaciam]
accidentis
proptervariationem
quos [Chatton]arguit,posuerunt
144

12:41:36 PM

The consequences of the new formalismforthe historyof logic are

not so clearly evident. I. M. Bocheski has pointed to Ockham' s
extension of Aristotelian syllogistic to cover singular terms and
premissesas innovative,and has connected Ockham' s rejectionof the
44rule of three" withhis
treatingsingulartermsas the names of classes
with only one member.94Ockham was able to treat singular termsin
these ways, however, because he considered the dictumde omnifundamental to syllogisticand extended the scope of the dictumto cover
all termsand predications.However, discoveringthe fullimpact of the
logical formalismof Campsall and Ockham on their contemporaries
and successors awaits furtherresearch.
Stanford,California
University
Stanford
ad concludendum
nonsufficit
eorumin recommuni
medii,sedsolumquia identitas
and (Paris,
interse . . .
eorumidentitatem
(Vat. Lat., 955), ff.183v-184r,
Mazarine,915),ff.107vb-108ra.
94Bocheski,
Formal
, p. 232,nos. 34.01-34.02.
Logic

145

12:41:36 PM

Vivarium
XXV, 2 (1987)
Ab omni hominehabeturaliquod capud: A Note on theConceptof WordOrderin 12th-CenturyGrammaticalThought1
C. H. KNEEPKENS

Throughout the twelfthcentury, a period commonly accepted as

crucial forthe organization and developmentof syntaxin the Western
grammatical tradition, grammarians came across the notion of the
proper word-order in a sentence and its counterpart,the notion of
deviant, but acceptable word-order, in both the grammatical and
rhetoricalsources which they had inheritedfromLate Antiquity. In
Priscian mentionsthe ordinatio
the seventeenthbook of his Institutiones
rectaand supplies it with an ontological basis by identifyingthe noun
and the verb throughthe
throughthe acting person with the substantia
accidens
act expressed with the accidens.On account of the substantial
hierarchyPriscian claims that in a properlyarranged sentencea noun
has to occur before the verb, which occupies the second place. He
) by nature
emphasizes that this is a word-order proper ( rectus
order
a
deviant
what
he
calls
from
He
it
{naturaliter). distinguishes
use
of
unlawful
the
and
which is merely brought about by
improper
:
the authors: the usurpatioauctorum
Inst,gram.,
XVII, 105(ed. Hertz,vol. II, 164,16-21)"Sciendum
Priscianus,
velnomenpraeponatur
utpronomen
verbo,
tamen,quodrectaordinatio
exigit,
et
etCiceroscripserun,
ut4egoettulegimus,
quippecumsubstantia
Virgilius
velnomensignificatur,
velpatientis,
quae perpronomen
personaipsiusagentis
licet
quamipseactus,qui accidensestsubstantiae.
prioressedebetnaturaliter
fretum".
auctorum
ea proferre
tamenet praepostere
usurpatione
As A. D. Scaglione pointed out,2 the Medievais owed the pair of
to the rhetorical
opposite notions of the ordonaturalisand ordoartificialis
traditionof Antiquity;it was Priscian who combined the notion of ordo
.3 The outcome of thisidentificationwas
naturaliswiththat of ordorectus
thatthe twelfth-century
grammarians saw themselvesconfrontedwith
1 A first
Condraftofthisnotewasreadas a shortpaperat theIVthInternational
oftheLanguageSciencesat Trier,August1987.
on theHistory
ference
2 A. Scaglione,TheClassicalTheory
A
tothePresent.
ofComposition
fromitsOrigins
Historical
, ChapelHill 1972,esp. p. 77sqq.
Survey
3 Cf. Scaglione1972,82-3.
146

12:41:41 PM

only one distinctionas regards the phenomenon of the correct and

acceptable word-order in sentences, viz. between the ordo rectus
.
auctorum
usurpationem
( = naturalis)and the ordosecundum
( = artificialis)
These notions played an importantrole in twelfth-century
grammar, especially in normativegrammar, taken as including the ars dictaminis
, and in exegetical grammar. As to normative grammar I only
wish to refer to the- since Thurot widely known- anonymous

eleventh-century
fragmenton syntax,whichhas been preservedon the
thirdfolioof the MS Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 7505,4 and to the remarks
on word-ordermade by Alexander de Villa Dei at the beginningof the
5 For the
of his Doctrinale.
chapter on constructio
concept of word-order
I
in twelfth-century
to
the observationmade
refer
exegetical grammar
in
the introductorysection of his Gloseon the
by William of Conches
minor.In thiswork the famous grammarianpoints out that the task of
the text-interpreter
consists in analyzing the authors' words fromthe
artificialorder into the natural order so thatthe proper meaning of the
sentence may be discovered.6
Considering this class-room interestit is remarkable that twelfthcentury grammarians did not develop an autonomous doctrine of
word-order with definitions, distinctions, divisions and the usual
explanations: in brief, that they did not build up a system of
theoreticalknowledge on this linguistic aspect like they did of such
other linguistic concepts as e.g. constructio
, transitivityand intranand
sitivity,
figurativespeech.
It is surprisingto notice that the master of the Glosuleon the minor
,
whom I am used to calling Master Guido,7 furtherWilliam of Con-

4 Ch. Thurot,Extraits
dedivers
manuscrits
latins
l'histoire
desdoctrines
pourservir
gramA Census
maticales
aumoyen
Latin
ge, Paris1869,87-9(cf.G. L. Bursill-Hall,
ofMedieval
Grammatical
Cannstatt
, Stuttgart-Bad
1981,no 208.42.1);cf.Scaglione
Manuscripts
1972,107sqq.
5 D. Reichling,
desAlexander
de Villa-Dei
Das Doctrinale
: Kritisch,
Exegetische
Ausgabe
Berlin1893(repr.NewYork,N.Y. 1974),vrs1390sqq:
"Contruesie:casum,si sit,praeponevocantem".
6 MS Paris,Bibliothque
fondslatin15130,f. 86ra:"Con (!) naturalis
Nationale,
ordoexigitnominatiuum
preponiin oratione,uerbumsequi, deindeobliquum
etsimilia,
et pedes
aduerbio
casum,aduerbium
aderere,
tempora
aliquandopropter
illeordomutatur
... necesseautemestin expositione
sua ad suumnaturalem
metri
ordinem
facilenonfieripotest";
dictiones
reducere,
quodsinescienciaconstruendi
cf.C. H. Kneepkens,
inde2de
HetJudicium
Constructionis.
HetLeerstuk
vandeConstructio
vande12deEeeuw
1987(Diss.
enInleidende
Studie
, Nijmegen
, Dl. I: EenVerkennende
Helft
Riiksuniversiteit
Leiden1987),579.
7 Cf. C. H. Kneepkens,
Master
16
GuidoandhisViewonGovernment
, in: Vivarium,
(1978),108-141.
147

12:41:41 PM

"
ches, the Anonymus of the Glose "LicetMulti In Arte preservedin the
MS Oxford, Bodl. Canon, misc. 281,8 and Peter Helias not only paid
no attentionto the notion of word-orderin their comments on Priscian's text ad litteram
, but also avoided discussing this subject in their
on
sections
construction
although, in my opinion, there was ample
opportunityand reason to do so in this connection.
Notwithstandingthe well-knownfact that the grammarians of the
second half of the centurybecame increasinglyinterestedin syntax
this situation did not change essentially,although it must be granted
that word-orderbecame an operative notion in grammatical discussions of a more speculative character. For example, in the Porretanic
the 44ideal' ' place of a term in a sentence was in fact of
Sprachlogik
essential importance for its semantic status and consequently forthe
meaning of the whole sentence. A referenceto the discussions in the
Porretanic Schools on such sentences as:9
(x) virgo concipiet10
and
(x) Deus Deum genuit,
might be sufficient.
This lack of a theoreticalfoundationof the concept of word-order
is sorelyfeltwhen we tryto get to gripswiththe developmentof grammatical thinkingconcerning this syntacticaspect in the twelfthcentury. It is beyond any doubt that compared with the previous period
remarkableprogresswas made in thisfieldat least as early as the first
part of the thirteenthcentury. In her study on transitivityand word8 Cf. C. H. Kneepkens
19871,pp. 47-9.
9 See theDialogus
ontheDocRatiietEverardi
, editedbyN. H. Hring:A LatinDialogue
trine
, in: MediaevalStudies,15 (1953),243-289,esp. 253-4.
ofPoitiers
ofGilbert
10Isai.7,14. The pointhereisthataccording
this
toPorretanic
doctrine
grammatical
onthe' 'ideal" placeofthe
in twoways,eachdepending
canbe interpreted
sentence
andconstructed
is usedinsubjectposition
NP "virgo".IftheNP "virgo"
personaliter
is:
ofthesentence
theverb,andtheinterpretation
withtheverb,itideallyprecedes
a true,butnot
willbecomepregnant",
whois nowa virgin,
i.e. a female
"a virgin,
If,on theotherhand,the"ideal" placeoftheNP "virgo"
proposition.
astonishing
substantive
withtheverb,i.e. without
theverbanditisconstructed
isafter
anyreferenis: 14
She willbecomepregnant
theinterpretation
tialor evendenotational
function,
thepoint
from
whichcanonlybe accepted
as (or:being)a virgin",a trueproposition
ofviewoffaith.
148

12:41:41 PM

order, I. Rosier11 pointed out that in 13th-centurytexts a fourprongeddistinctionoccurred withinthe notion of correctword-order,
which may be summarized as follows:
(1) the natural order: this is Priscian's ordinatiorecta= naturalis]
(2) the obligatoryorder: this order covers the obligatorydeviations
fromthe natural orderwhich occur e.g. in questions or in relative
clauses, where the relative always has to occupy the firstplace;
(3) the artificialorder
(4) the logical order: this order, which was not often referredto in
grammaticaltexts, merely requires that the word expressingthe
logical subject has to precede the predicate. However, one has to
bear in mind that the termexpressingthe logical subject does not
necessarilycoincide with the grammatical subject.
However, we are able to trace these fourkinds of word-orderback to
the grammaticaltextsof the twelfth-century,
although at the moment
I am not sure whetherthe syntacticiansof the last decennia of the centuryconsideredthe distinctionbetween the ordorectus
(1) and what has
been called the obligatoryorder (2) as essential. Neverthelessit is evident fromthe texts that they were well aware of the constructional
deviances within sentences in which this obligatory order occurs:
sit',ed. Kneepkens(1987II), p. 296, 5-15)
(Robertof Paris,Summa'Breue
"Secundumprimamopinionem
dicatur'ellum
queriturutrumconuenienter
uideo'et quareilleaccusatiuus
illuduerbum,quia transitiuum
estet
prcdt
transitiue
Et ideopociusdeberet
positum.
subsequiquamprecedere.
Etdicimus
illeaccusatiuus,
pecedit
quodmerito
quia inse habetimplicitum
aduerbium
demonstratiuum.
Et aduerbiademonstratiua
uerbumprecedunt
et
'Socrates
nonsequuntur,
' lileaccusatiuus
, quemuideo
quemadmodum
legit
quem
uerbumdeberetsubsequiet tamenpreponitur,
ne ad uerbumfierirelatio
uideatur.Similiter
et dictiones
negationes
que habentnegationes
implcitas,
uerbaprecedunt."
Rosier's fourthordo, sc. the logical order, deserves our special attention. It shows the differentapproaches to the concept of word-order
of the dialectician and the grammarian respectively.Rosier refersto
a text of Roger Bacon's Summagramatica
, who, incidentally,violates
the rules, since he treatsthe word-orderdifficultiesin the sentences:
11I. Rosier,Transitivit
desmots
etordre
chezlesgrammairiens
mdivaux
, in:Matriaux
pour
desthories
unehistoire
A. Joly,A. Nicolas,
, d. S. Auroux,M. Glatigny,
linguistiques
I. Rosier,Lille1984,181-190.
149

12:41:41 PM

(x) omnem hominem vidt aliquis

(x) nichil nichil est
and
(x) Sor curritquern video
as iftheywere of the same kind, whereas each sentenceshould be considered as involving a differenttype of problem, on the level of both
semantics and construction.
Bacon observes that in the firstsentence the accusative phrase
has its constructionalplace afterthe verb, although it
omnemhominem
is to be understood before the verb, for the meaning of the sentence
has to be: 4'every man is seen by somebody,,, at least if it concerns
a true proposition. This means that the suppositum
locutioni
, that is the
subject of discourse, is represented by the accusative phrase omnem
hominem.However, it should be noticed that Bacon omits the other
possibility of interpretingthe sentence as "somebody sees every
man", which is a false proposition:
ed. Steele,pp. 124,32- 125,8)"Item,cumsicse
gram.,
(RogerBacon,Summa
habentsuppositumet appositumapud gramaticum
sicut subjectumet
setidemsecundum
substanciam
nonpotest
essesubapudlogicm,
predicatum
in logicis,quareetc.
jectumet predicatum
Istiustamenoppositum
videtur
inmultis
sidicam'Sorcurscilicet
persimile,
ritquemvideo',quamvishocquoddico'quem'vultpreponi
verbonecessario,
a parteposttransitive;
etsimiliter
si dicam'nichilnichilest',
tamenconstruitur
de necessitate
intelligitur
negacioa parteante,quamvishocquoddico'nichiP
a partepost.Similiter
si dicatur'omnemhominem
construatur
videtaliquis',
a partepostquamvisintelligatur
necessario
construitur
acusativus
casusa parte
ante;"
When we now returnto the twelfth-century,
we findthat the same
problem puzzled the author of the Summa 'Absolutacuiuslibet'12
dating
from the end of the century, a text which the late Richard Hunt
ascribed to a masterPetrus Hispanus (non-papa).13In his discussionon
the linguisticfact that the subject nominative does not always reprelocutioni
sent the suppositum
, but that sometimes this functionis performedby an oblique case, Hispanus adduces the sentence:
(x) ab omni homine habetur aliquod capud.
12Fora working
edition
HetIndicium
ofthistextsee:C. H. Kneepkens,
Constructions,
1987.
Dl. IV, Nijmegen
13R. W. Hunt,ABSOLUTA.TheSummaofPetrus
onPriscianus
in:
minor,
Hispanus
2 (1975),1-22.
Historiographia
Linguistica,
150

12:41:41 PM

For in this sentence it is not the nominative phrase (capud' but the
ablative phrase 'omnihomine*
, which refersto the subject of discourse:
semperdesignairemsupp. 58-9)"Non cnimnominatiuus
(Ed. Kneepkens,
homine
habetur
immoquandoqueobliquus,ut 'ab omni
locutioni,
aliquod
positam
nontarnen
sedomnishomo,
sitnominatiuus,
id supponitur,
capu.Licetcaput
dicereindiuersis
tamenuidetur
significationibus
qui estobliquus...Expeditius
consideratione
utin eademgramatici
eandemesseconstructionem,
duplexfiat
'
ab utroque
dialetici
consideratio.
Sicutenimeademestconstructio
aliquiduidetur
istorum'
secundumgramticos,
sed diuersepropositiones
sunt secundum
dialeticos,
itaquein predicto..."
Earlier in the SummaPetrus Hispanus had also paid attention to a
similar difficultyin the discussion on the constructionof the clause:
(x) Tirynthiusvenies:14
enimaliterse habetratioconstruendi
quam
p. 40): "In multis
(Ed. Kneepkens,
ut 'abomni
homine
habetur
ordins,
capud'.Si constructionem
aliquod
significatio,
'
hominequoderitfalsum."
ab omni
ita fetaliquod
capudhabetur
Hispanus does not say that in this sentence we are confrontedwith a
problem of word-orderthat fallswithinthe grammarians' domain. In
thissentence,he stresses,thereis only one constructio
, that is, one syntactic structure:The nominative phrase is always constructedin the
preceding position with the finiteverb, i.e. "ex parteante". To the
of this sentence does not change,
grammarian the ordoconstructionis
regardlessof the orderin which itswords are uttered.This impliesthat
whetherone says "ab omnihominehabeturaliquod capud" or "aliquod
ab omnihomine in each case the nominative phrase "alicapudhabetur
44
is
quodcapud>} constructedexparteanteor as preceding" withthe verb
"habetur".The logician, on the otherhand, distinguishesbetween two
differentpropositions: (1) a true proposition, in which the ablative
"
phrase "omnihomine is the bearer of the utterance,which is indicated
by its preceding position, and (2) a false proposition, in which the
locutioni
nominative phrase "aliquod capud" representsthe suppositum
".
and obtains the firstposition: "aliquod capud habeturab omnihomine
The differencebetween both propositionsmust be looked for in the
distributiveforceof the universal sign omnis.If it occurs in preceding
position,not only the noun it qualifies, but also the nominativephrase
"
"aliquodcapud fallswithinits scope and is distributed,too, since the
meaning of the utterance is:
14luv. Sat.XI, 61.
151

12:41:41 PM

(x) for each man x there is a head y such thaty is possessed by x.

However, if the universal sign is part of a constituentput at the end
of the utterance, it does not appear to have any distributiveforceon
the preceding parts of that utterance,what, incidentally,implies that
a distributivesign does not have any retrogressiveforce.15So the
meaning of this proposition is:
(x) there is a head y such that^yis possessed by everybody.16
From these textsit appears thatforPetrus Hispanus ( non-papa
) there
on the one
was a clear-cut distinctionbetween the ordoconstructions
hand which concerned the grammarianand which was not affectedby
theorder in whichthe words of the sentencewere actuallyuttered,and
on the other hand,17 the conthe ordoprolationisor the ordolocutionis
siderationof which belonged to the sphere of interestof the logician,
who examines the truthand falsityof propositions. It also turns out
thatthe grammarians and logicians of the twelfth-century
interpreted
'
the Priscianic term <(ordorectus' in their own ways, each withinthe
boundaries of their respective disciplines.
As was already observed above, we lack a definitionor even a
yy
description of the notion (tordorectus from the part of the twelfthcenturygrammarians; however, to sum up, it is beyond any doubt
that at least for some syntacticiansof the second half of the twelfth"
centurythe notion of {<ordorectus was primarilyoperative on the level
and not on the level of the locutioor the prolatio,i.e.
of the constructio
of the utterance.
Nijmegen
KatholiekeUniversiteit

15A similar
onthe
discussions
in theMediaevalgrammarians'
viewcanbe observed
a sentence.
and itsplacewithin
scopeofthenegation
16Forsimilardiscussions
see L. M. de Rijk,Each
in 13th-century
logictextbooks,
Itemin 13th-Century
Semantics
Ass. On an Important
Man'sAssis notEverybody's
, in:
7 (1980),221-30.
Historiographia
Linguistica,
17See on thistopicalso: A. de Libera,Introduction
mdivales.
, in: Smantiques
Cinq
aumoyen
etlagrammaire
surla logique
tudes
Langage,3/1
Epistmologie,
ge( = Histoire,
(1981)),7-17,esp. p. 14.
152

12:41:41 PM

BOOKS

REFERRED

TO

A Census
LatinGrammatical
G. L. Bursill-Hall,
, Stuttgart-Bad
ofMedieval
Manuscripts
Cannstatt
1981
N. H. Hring,A LatinDialogue
on theDoctrine
, in: Mediaeval
ofGilbert
ofPoitiers
Studies,15 (1953),243-89
R. W. Hunt,ABSOLUTA.TheSummaofPetrus
onPriscianus
minor,in:
Hispanus
2 (1975),1-22
Historiographia
Linguistica,
C. H. Kneepkens,
Master
andhisViewonGovernment
Guido
16(1978),
, in: Vivarium,
108-41
inde2de
C. H. Kneepkens,
HetJudicium
HetLeer
stukvandeConstructio
Constructionis.
vande12deEeuw
1987
, 4 vols.,Nijmegen
Helft
A. de Libera,Introduction
mdivales.
surla logique
etla gram, in:Smantiques
Cinqtudes
maire
au moyen
ge( = Histoire,
Epistmologic,
Langage,3/1(1981)),7-17
D. Reichling,
DasDoctrinale
Berlin
desAlexander
deVillaDei:KritischExegetische
Ausgabe,
1893
L. M. de Rijk,EachMan'sAssisnotEverybody's
Item
Ass.OnanImportant
in13th-Century
Semantics
7 (1980),221-30
, in: Historiographia
Linguistica,
I. Rosier,Transitivit
etordre
desmots
e.a.
chezlesgrammairiens
mdivaux
, in: S. Auroux,
desthories
, Lille 1984,181-90
(eds.),Matriaux
pourunehistoire
linguistiques
A. Scaglione,
TheClassical
tothePresent.
From
ItsOrigins
A Historical
Theory
ofComposition
, ChapelHill 1972
Survey
Ch. Thurot,Extraits
dedivers
manuscrits
latins
l'histoire
desdoctrines
pourservir
grammaticales
au moyen
ge, Paris1869.

153

12:41:41 PM

Vivarium
XXV, 2 (1987)
Reviews

onSupposition
's Logic
: TheTreatise
onConsequences.
Translated
Buridan
; TheTreatise
John
witha Philosophical
Introduction
byPeterKing,Dordrecht
(Reidel)1985,pp.
xii + 380, ISBN 90 277 19187.
a remarkable
wasclearly
whohadan immense
influence
on
logician,
JohnBuridan
thestudyoflogicthroughout
at Paris,in thetwocenturies
Europe,butparticularly
hisdeatharound1358.His majorwork,theSummulae
from
, is puttogether
following
on thetheory
ofsupposition,
ninetreatises
on logic,ofwhichthefourth,
makesup
halfofthepresent
ofanindependent
thefirst
volume.Thesecondhalfconsists
treatise
The twoworkssittogether
ablein hisendon consequences.
well,Kingbeingoften
ofthereaderoftheConsequentiae
notesto directtheattention
(TC) backto remarks
arepreceded
inDe Suppositionibus
(TS) toexpanda particular
point.The editions
by
an introduction
ofsome80 pages.
workin whichBuridandistinguishes
from
TS is an elementary
supposition
verification
(whatmakesa sentence
signification
(meaning),
true)and appellation
connotation
ofa term).After
thevariousmodes
anyadditional
explaining
(roughly,
- waysin whicha termcan standforobjects
- he proceeds
to discuss
ofsupposition
thatis,terms
backtoan antecedent;
thesupposition
ofrelative
and
terms,
referring
forwhicha term
andrestriction,
thatis,waysinwhichtherangeofthings
ampliation
or
or reducedbytheparticular
ofthesentence,
standsmaybe extended
predicate
in whichthetermoccurs.Forexample,'dead' ampliates
a
context
otherlinguistic
notonlyofthepresent
butalsoofthepast;'can' to things
termto standforthings
forwhichthetermnotonlydoesnowbutcouldstand;and so on.
Itstopicis farwiderthatitstitlewouldsugTC is a muchmoreadvancedtreatise.
thatthirdpartofa logic,dealingwithall sortsofargument.
gest,beingessentially
on propositions,
onlogicoften
consisted
ofthreeparts,on terms,
(Medievaltreatises
is any
Whatis noticeably
and on argument.
missingin thepresentcompilation
that
treatment
oftheproposition.)
Buridandealswithassertorie
extended
inference,
withmodalpropositional
is, the logic of unanalysedpropositions,
logic,with
Buridanis an unashamedand defiant
and withmodalsyllogisms.
syllogisms,
is validifeverymodeloftheantecedent
an argument
adherent
ofstrict
implication:
areparticularly
isa modeloftheconsequent.
BooksIII andIV, onthesyllogism,
rich,
fromanypairof
a verygeneralpictureofwhatcan be validlyinferred
presenting
syllogistic
premises.
(modalor non-modal)
in bothincunabula
andmanuscripts;
TC survives
TS, in itsoriginal
form,
really
on
oftheSummulae
containDorp'scommentary
onlyin manuscript
(theincunabula
theamendedtextalone,ofPeterofSpain'streatise
theamendedtext,orsometimes
Thereareat least16 manuwhichBuridanusedas thebasisforhiscommentary).
one
an edition
oftheLatintextofTS from
Reinaproduced
oftheSummulae.
scripts
diStoria
in 1957;Hubieneditedthe
critica
dellaFilosofia
ms.(CVP 5365)intheRivista
textsofTC in 1976.
andthreeprinted
Latintextfrom
thethreeknownmanuscripts
154

12:41:53 PM

withoneortworeferences
is basedonthesetwomodern
editions,
King'stranslation
to themanuscripts.
Recallthemixedfeelings
themedieval
scribes:
labour
onehastowards
their
clearly,
intransmitting
medieval
logicaltextstous is beyondprice;on theotherhand,their
and omissionsare infuriating.
the same feelingis
Unfortunately,
misreadings
on reading
are mistranslated,
Occasionalsentences
experienced
King'stranslation.
in logicalnonsense;
fromtimeto timewholeclauses,or in one case, a
resulting
are omitted;
and on nearlyeverypage thereare minortypographical
paragraph,
as towhatis reallymeant.Constant
notinfrequently
errors,
puzzlement
provoking
toresolve
suchpuzzles.In a word,theaccusareference
totheLatintextis necessary
tionofcarelessness
cannotbe avoided.Someerrors
haveclearly
ariseninthephysical
ofthebook.Butnotall. Thisis a greatshame:fordetailapart,thework
production
wellthought
iswellpresented,
out,andshouldhavebeena mostuseful
introduction,
forreaderswithout
Latin,to a greatlogician.
Thereader's
confidence
isshaken
nearthestart
oftheintroduction
when,ina brief
allusionto Russell'stheory
ofdescriptions,
thefinalclause'&Bx' is ommitted;
and
an extract
openswhen,inthesecondfootnote,
againas thetranslation
Kingprovides
fromBuridan'squestions
on De Interpretation
to explainthephrase'ad placitum':
"Butifyouwereto askaboututterances
witharenounsandverbsadplacitum
, ..."
wouldbe: "But if
PerhapsKingmeant'which'for'with'here;a clearertranslation
adplacitum,
whicharenounsandverbssignify
youweretoaskinwhatwayutterances
..." (KingtakesthetextfromPinborg's1976excerpts;
thewholeworkwasedited
to somewhich
byRia vanderLecq in 1983.)Buttheseslipsare minorcompared
follow.
BookI ofTC. Here,as toooften
8 from
Forexample,
consider
Theorem
elsewhere,
evenlogically
mistranslation
makesBuridan
incompeappearattheveryleastsloppy,
reads:
tent.Butthefaultis notBuridan's.King'stranslation
follow
withthesamenumber
ofcausesoftheirtruth
fromthe
(a) Allsentences
> follow
from
same< sentences
>; (b) all havingmore< causesoftheirtruth
> by some
anyhavingfeweror thesame < numberofcausesoftheirtruth
> ofthose< having
> more,but(c) notconversely,
< sentences
(p. 204)
The
in
is
marks
brackets
words
added
(As customary,
King
byangle
translation.)
P norQ' havethesamenumber
astutereaderwillbe puzzled.'P andQ' and'Neither
ofcausesoftheir
butthecausesaredifferent,
andso theyclearly
arenotimplied
truth,
thesamesentences.
Reference
toBuridan'stextrevealsthathe wasquite
byexactly
awareofthis.Whathe wrotewas:
withan equalnumber
andthesamecausesoftheirtruth
mutually
(a) Allsentences
oneanother
> follow
> havingmore< causesoftruth
; (b) all < sentences
imply
from
< ofcauses> , but
fewer
andthesame
assome
number
anyhaving
ofthat
greater
(c) notconversely.
(My italics.)
Another
inthetranslation
occursonp. 267.
oflogicalnonsense
introduced
example
King'stextreads:
ofonepremiss
is acceptable
follows
inwhichthecontradictory
(b) anysyllogism
thecontradictory
from
oftheconoftheotherpremiss
alongwiththecontradictory
clusion.
text.Again,
Theitalicised
words
donotappearinBuridan's
(Myitalics.)
quiterightly
in hisintroduction,
(p. 48):
KingmakesBuridanlooka foolwhenhe writes
A common
ifitis notsufficient
termhasconfused
forthe
ina sentence
supposition
155

12:41:53 PM

ofthatsentence
thatitbe truefora singular
term
underthecommon
truth
falling
term(TS 3.5.1).
Thiscannotbe right.For'animal'in 'Everymanis an animal'
(Italicsinoriginal.)
is entailedby'Everymanis Socrates'.
has confused
butthesentence
supposition,
Buridan'stextreads(King'stranslation,
p. 129):
inwhichit
thesupposition
ofsometermis called'confused'
whenthesentence
can be truewithout
is found,or an equiform
sentence,
beingtrueforsome
<one> determinate
undertheterm.
thingfalling
a necessary
anda sufficient
Buridanknewthedifference
between
Thatis quiteright.
to Buridantheclaimthat
Andon p. 197Kingattributes
condition.
iftheconisanacceptable
as a consequence
formed
consequence
(b) anysentence
follows
from
thecontradicoftheantecedent
oftheindicated
consequence
trary
oftheindicated
toryoftheantecedent
consequence.
words'contradichasthesensible
wordsBuridan
(Myitalics.)In placeoftheitalicised
tory'and 'consequent'
respectively.
Therearetoomanysuchcases.Thereis notspaceheretodealwiththemall. But
on p. 107King'stextreads,
therearealso simplecasesofomission.Forexample,
clausein italics:
addingtheomitted
universal
is neither
theass is running"
I saythatthesentence
"Of-every-man
norusedindefinitely
is neither
distributed
because
thewhole
norindefinite,
, but
subject
fortheoblique,...
anduniversal
it is indefinite
forthenominative
wordsin italics):
and on p. 108(again,addingthemissing
"
is seeing
soSocrates
isa horse}
isseeing
horse
ThesyllogismSocrates
} Brunellus
every
Brunellus"
is acceptable.
On p. 265we find:
twotermsof whichone is trulycalledthesameas some
(a) For whichever
callednotthesame,theoneis nottruly
discrete
term,ofwhichtheotheris truly
of[actually:
thesameas theother
called
, andso theonecan be inferred
negatively
from]theother.
ofBookIV is omitted
Finally,on p. 298,thethirdtheorem
entirely:
The thirdtheorem
is:
' andsimilar
IV-3] Composite
usesof'know 'believe'doubt
modes
donot
yield
[Theorem
validsyllogisms.
Hencethisis notacceptable:
andthateveryC is B is known
(426)ThateveryB is A is knownbySocrates,
thateveryC is A is knownbySocrates.
therefore,
bySocrates,
formthetitleof a
(Buridanis hardlylikelyto have givenan invalidsyllogistic
arepurecarelessness,
andwhenmultiplied
Suchomissions
theunreliability
theorem.)
of
reference
totheoriginal
reduces
theusefulness
without
constant
ofthetranslation
King'svolume.
devirtute
sermonis
withthephrases
anddevisermonis,
leaving
Kingalsohastrouble
thatitis "verydifficult
on p. 121,witha footnote
comment
theformer
untranslated
like'bythepoweroftheword'."Actually,
totranslate;
itmeanssomething
literally,
on p.
hasgoneverywrong
itmeans'literally',
or 'properly
speaking'.So something
> explicitly
comesoutas "if <the sentence
184,wheresi visexpresse
loquidevisermonis
is in thecontext
absurd.
dealswiththemeaning
(vis)ofitswords",whichmoreover,
156

12:41:53 PM

WhatBuridanmeansis: "If youwishtoputitproperly",

thepointbeinghowpropthefactthata formal
mustremainvalidunderuniform
erlytoexpress
consequence
substitution.
verysensibly
pointsoutthatBuridan,as a nominalist
Kingelsewhere
withgreat
forwhomonly(some)tokensentences
exist,mustexpresssuchcriteria
care.
is veryfull,covering
an immense
on the
King'sintroduction
rangeofmaterial
inquiteridiculous
wholeverywell.Occasionally
he indulges
suchas the
kite-flying,
isthesameas whatDonnellan
claim(p. 46)thatdeterminate
supposition
(Philosophical
and(merely,
ornon-distributive)
confused
Review,
1966)calleda referential
supposian attributive
tionmatches
from
to(presumably)
definite
use,extended
descriptions
all nounphrases.
His ideais this:whatis distinctive,
forDonnellan,
ofa referential
in a sentence
use ofa description
is thatthesentence
be trueof someparticular
referent
outbythespeaker,
notofwhatever
thedescription.
satisfies
Similarly,
picked
men
saysKing,'Somemanis F' maybe falseifsomemanis notF, evenifsomeother
" 'Some
are F, foron thatoccasiontheywerenotbeingreferred
to. Accordingly,
man'insuchsentence
refers
tosomeman... The sentence
is falsebecausethatparticularmanis notF" (ibid.).
Thisis a grossdistortion
if'Someman
ofthetheory
ofsupposition.
Forexample,
be falseevenwhensome(other)menareF, thenitwouldnotbe theconis F' might
of'No manis F'. Thereis nowarrant
inBuridan'
s textforKing'sperverse
tradictory
In fact,quitethecontrary.
is notthesameas verification:
interpretation.
Supposition
that'he' in'Somemanis running
andheis white'supposits
onlyforthosemenwho
arerunning,
doesnotentailthat'man'doeslikewise.
Buridansaysitexplicitly:
"the
'man' supposits
antecedent
forall menindifferently,
butthe
indefinitely,
although
term'he' doesnotsupposit
forall, butonlyforthoseforwhichthesentence
'Some
manis running'
is true"(p. 150).In thisBuridanstoodfour-square
witha centuryold tradition,
whichPeterofSpain,on whomhe is ostensibly
made
commenting,
in ['A manis running'
and 'Somemanis running']
'man'
quiteclear:"Although
forall menbothrunning
andnotrunning,
supposits
theyaretrueon accountofone
manalone.Forsupposition
andmaking
a sentence
truearequitedifferent."
running
is to be identified
with
neither
, ed. L. M. de Rijk,p. 82.) Supposition
( Tractatus
norwithreference.
verification,
Whatis perhaps
mostnotably
skatedoverin King'sintroduction
is anyhistorical
in Buridan'slifeor in thefourteenth
in general,forthesetwo
setting,
century
To be sure,factsaboutBuridan's
treatises.
lifeareregrettably
few.Butmorecanbe
inferred.
Forexample,
intheintroduction
tohisedition
ofTC, from
whichKingwas
Hubienaskswhether
thereis anyinternal
evidenceas to thedateofthe
working,
work.He isstruck
whichBuridan
usesatoneplace:sidicamus
bya particular
'example
'cardinalis
albusestelectus
inpapam
... et... 'egovideo
tuconcludes
unum
talem
hominem
certe
tuvides
unum
hominem'
'ergo
falsum
(seeHubien'sedition,
pp.9, 23). Sucha departurefrom
thestockexamples
oftwothousand
runs
yearsinwhichSocrates
repeatedly
and disputes,
needssomeexplanation.
in 1334-5of
Hubienfindsit in theelection
be called"thewhiteCardinal"
whowouldtherefore
XII, a Cistercian
PopeBenedict
from
thecolourofhishabit.Moreover,
hewasan avowedopponent
ofOckhamand
nominalism.
oneis surprised
examtofindKingtranslating
Buridan's
Consequently,
ple as 'CardinalWhitehas been electedPope' (p. 185), addingin a footnote:
in examples,
or evena personknownto Buridan's
"Perhapsthiswasa stockfigure
withno comment
on Hubien'sargument.
students",
In sum,then,thisbookmarksa marvellous
lost.Two wonderful
opportunity
in soreneedofmodern
havenotreceived
thecareand attention
works,
translation,
theydeserved.
University
ofSt.Andrews

StephenRead
157

12:41:53 PM

Tractatus
deuniversalibus
, editedbyIvanJ. Mueller,Oxford(Clarendon
JohnWyclif,
Press)1985,pp. CXIII + 403,35,ISBN 0-19-824680-3.
deuniversalibus
On Universais
byAnthony
Kenny,
( Tractatus
), translated
JohnWyclif,
withan introduction
byPaul VincentSpade,Oxford(Clarendon
Press)1985,
pp. L + 184,25,ISBN 0-19-824681-1.
s philosophical
inmodern
areaccessible
ediThatrelatively
manyofWyclif
writings
as a polemical
andthemorningtionsisnodoubtchiefly
duetohisrenown
theologian
founded
starofthereformation.
scholar
bytheVictorian
Amongthevarioussocieties
underwhoseauspicesthirty-nine
wastheWyclif
adventurer
Society,
F.J. Furnivall
in theyearsbetween1882and 1924.
volumes
ofmiscellaneous
textswerepublished
thedissolution
ofthesociety,
someworkswereaddedto thiscorpusafter
Although
AnAnnotated
a glanceat TheLatinWritings
, by WilliellR.
ofJohnWyclif.
Catalog
Thomson(SubsidiaMediaevalia,14, Leiden,Brill,1983)willshowthattheenteris stillfarfrom
production
priseofmakingavailablethewholeofhisphilosophical
Summa
deente
collection
ofphilosoEvenoftheso-called
, an important
completed.
thisdoes
pieces,severalpartsremainunedited.
Fortunately,
phicaland theological
themostfitting
notapplyanylongerto thetractthatis probably
keyto a proper
s ripest
ideas:thesixth(orfifth)
treatise
ofWyclif
ofthe
philosophical
understanding
deente
De universalibus.
first
ofthetwobooksoftheSumma
, entitled
hiscritical
The CzechscholarIvanJ. Muellerprecedes
editionoftheLatintext,
about1374inOxford,
wascomposed
whichinall probability
and
bya verythorough
and ofthetwenty-three
accountof itscharacter,
instructive
originand influence,
fallintotwo
on whichtheeditionhas beenbased.Thesemanuscripts
manuscripts
towhichtheeditorgenerally
tradition,
givespreference,
groups:thoseoftheEnglish
Thatthere
areso manyCzechmanuscripts
isexplaiandthoseoftheCzechtradition.
nablein thelightoftheclosetiesbetween
Englandand Bohemia,strengthened
by
themarriage,
in 1382,ofAnna,sisterofthekingofBohemia,toRichardII ofEngof
had a notableimpacton somecurrents
land. In particular,
Wyclifsteachings
in 1348.Suchthinkers
ofPrague,founded
thatdeveloped
at theuniversity
thought
influenced
as thefamous
Stanislaus
ofZnaimwerestrongly
JohnHus andhisteacher
an intellectual
climate
inwhichthelatter's
doctrines
andcreated
writings
byWyclifs
thesameallegiance
alsoledto theburning,
in 1410,
weremuchin demand;though
in thecourtyard
oftheArchvolumesofWyclifiana
twohundred
ofapproximately
bishop'spalace.
- a true
oftheLatintext
andverywelcome
edition
tothispainstaking
In addition
who
are
historians
interested
labouroflove,skillandperseverance
joinedtogether
nowalsohaveat theirdisposalan English
in Wyclifsphilosophy
translation,
bythe
himself
about1360,is at present
Kenny,who,likeWyclif
capablehandofAnthony
on
contributed
a smallmonograph
MasterofBalliolCollege,andhas,quitesuitably,
to theOxford'Past Masters'series(OxfordUniversity
Press,1985).HelpWyclif
a glossary
in whichsometechnical
scholastic
termsare
fully,Kennyhas provided
of
PaulVincent
an introduction
Moreover,
Spadehaswritten
summarily
explained.
as viewed
thegeneral
ofuniversais
aboutforty
problem
pages,inwhichheexpounds
on someaspectsofWyclifstheory
anddwellsspecifically
bymedieval
philosophers
notionofpredication.
and hisrather
and distinction
ofidentity
strange
ithastobe admitted,
evenby
allthesehighly
meritorious
efforts,
Notwithstanding
senseof
to makesatisfactory
thatthereaderwho is determined
Spade himself,
that
One of theidiosyncrasies
difficulties.
Wyclifstext,is facedwithformidable
so hardis, itseemsto me,Wyclifspractice
focused
render
a sharply
interpretation
andthought
to
tolanguage
a vocabulary
thatis primarily
oftransferring
appropriate
havea reasouniversal
itself.
Suchwordsas say,proposition
true,
, subject,
predicate,
reality
ofspokenand
as longas theyare appliedto theprovince
nablyclear-cut
meaning
158

12:42:02 PM

written
from
When,as wasusualintheMiddleAges,theyweretransferred
language.
so thatthinking
thatproper
domaintothefieldofthought,
cametobe characterized
wasnotwithout
buthadatleasttheadvanas mental
thisextension
speech,
problems,
rather
itsuserstoshedsomelighton an otherwise
intractable
tageofenabling
sphere
ofhumanactivity.
Mostphilosophers
withthissinglestep,
contended
themselves
ofsaying
thevocabulary
etc.totherealmofconventional
andnatural
restricting
signs
ina fairly
sense.Butthere
weresomeothers,
WalterBurleigh
straightforward
notably
whoboldlywentconsiderably
farther
and
and,moreor lessin hiswake,Wyclif,
thestatesofaffairs
and things
viewedevenreality
and
itself,
signified
by thought
withtheuniversais,
which,as extreme
realists,
speech,in lingualterms.Together
in theworldofthingsthatweresupposedto
theybelievedto existindependently
instantiate
overtotheoutside
worldthoseexpressions
thatare
them,
theyalsocarried
inthesphere
associated
withuniversais
as theyarepresent
ofthought
and
commonly
Forinstance,
sucha substance
as thatmanorthatstoneas
language.
Wyclif
regards
a proposition
in reality,
on thegroundthatithasan innerstructure
thatconsists
of
twoelements,
matter
and form,
and a tieor copulaconnecting
them.It is because
ofthistrinitarian
andpropositional
structure
ofthings
thattheymayoccasion
humans
to forma trueor falsementalor conventional
aboutthem.He further
proposition
holdsthatthethings
themselves
ofa proposition
in
maybe thesubjector predicate
The subject-thing
itself
as wellas thepredicate
thatis the
reality.
saysor manifests
universal
forminstantiated
in it.One consequence
ofthiswayof
byitandinhering
theworldis thatpropositions
inreality
aretruths
ina metaphysical
senseand
viewing
as suchthegenuineobjectsofscientific
and faith.ForWyclif,
themeaknowledge
as itis usedin thephrasea true
stone
andas itis appliedtopropositions
ningsoftrue
inbothcasesthewordindicates
coincide:
theconformity
ofthings
andstatesofaffairs
setbythedivineintellect.
tothestandards
truths
aretheextrinsic
Justas metaphysical
ofthederivative
oftheconventional
forms
truth
andmental
exemplary
propositions
thathappento be formed
aboutthem,God, as thesupreme
is theultimate
truth,
sourceofall metaphysical
thatis, ofeverything
thatreallyexists.God, too,
truths,
thedivineessenceis a wordor an eternalinwardsaying.Atthesame
sayshimself;
itis emphasized
thathissaying,
tohumansaying,
is never
time,though,
bycontrast
andpropositional;
whathethinks
isthetotality
ofabsolutely
universal
complex
simple
forms.
Thishugemetaphor,
tohumansayings
is darbywhichthevocabulary
applicable
totheworldas itexistsindependently
extended
ofspeechandthought,
andalso,
ingly
toGod,is typical
ofa tendency
thatis diametrically
partly,
opposedtotheapproach
favoured
Whiletheconceptualists
s contemporaries.
aimedat elibymanyofWyclif
as manyfeatures
as possiblefromtheoutsideworldbyexplaining
themas
minating
theoutcome
ofhumanthinking
andspeaking,
andhisfollowers
movedinthe
Wyclif
reverse
direction
andtriedtoelucidate
thestructure
oftheoutsideworldbytreating
itas a kindoflanguage:totus
rationaliter
dicipropositio
mundus
delogica
,
potest
( Tractatus
thisfascinating
demands
II, London,1896,p. 20). Naturally,
changeofperspective
from
a reader
whoisstriving
after
an unusualdegreeofflexibility.
fullunderstanding
he maysetto workin thespirit
Equippednowwithat leastpartoftherequisites
sSocraticwords(Ch. III, lines268-72):'ButtheruleI havelaid
expressed
byWyclif
downformyself
is thatwhenever
I seean overwhelming
reason,I giveup myformer
without
forreputation,
oraffection
forthemenI wasfollowing,
recalopinion,
regard
theinfirmity
ofnatureI havea greater
shareofignorance
thanof
lingthatthrough
certainty.'
Leiden

GabrielNuchelmans

159

12:42:02 PM

Vivarium
XXV, 2 (1987)
BooksReceived

- Musse
- Meditation.
zurVitaactivaundVitacontemplativa,
Arbeit
Betrachtungen
hrgg.
Zrich1985,xvi+ 311p.- Contents
vonBr. Vickers,
: G.
VerlagderFachvereine,
undbiospraktikos
beiAristoteles
undPlaton
; J.-M.Andr,La
Huber,Biostheoretikos
etsonrapport
la rflexion
duloisir
moderne
and
; P. Kuntz,Practice
antique
sociologie
Virtues
inPlotinus
andAugustine',
Br.Stock,Activity,
CivicandSpiritual
ConTheory:
between
theEleventh
andtheThirteenth
andLeisure
Centuries
, Work
; A. M.
templation
undactiva
derVitacontemplativa
inderDominikanermystik
des14.
Haas,DieBeurteilung
andtheContemplative
TheActive
; P. O. Kristeller,
LifeinRenaissance
Jahrhunderts
ontheActive
andContemplative
Lives
Humanism
Salutati
; V. Kahn,Coluccio
; L. A.
andContemplative
in Lorenzo
: TheFusionofOpposites
Valla
Panizza,Active
; Fr.
imRomanischen
Public
andPrivate
; Br. Vickers,
Schalk,Otium
LifeinSeventeenthB. Beugnot,
ouMarie,
TheMackenzieMarthe
Debate;
Century
England:
Evelyn
Diogene
au XV11e sicle
ouCicern:
lesmodles
existentiels
; Index
di Genova.Istituto
Arsrhetorica:
e nuova
di FilologiaClassicae
Antica
, Universit
Medievale,Genova1983( = Pubblicazioni,
83), 161 p. IT ISSN 0025-852
La naissance
: Ch. Perelman,
dela nouvelle
Contents
; G. Calboni,Oratore
rhtorique
Declamation
andLatin
senzamicrofono
; F. Quadlbauer,
; M. Winterbottom,
, Greek
undWandlung
desciceronischen
Rednerideals
ZurNachwirkung
; A. Michel,De Gerhard
: rhtorique
etcartsianisme
au P. Bernard
au XVIIe sicle'C. Vasoli,
Vossius
Lamy
nellacultura
metodo
e didattica
umanistica
Retorica,
europea
A Critical
Insolubilium.
Edition
Thomas
Tractatus
, byE. J. Ashworth,
Bricot,
Ingenium
Publishers,
Nijmegen1986,xxiv+ 155p. ISBN 90 7041912 2
toMedieval
Alexander
Press,Oxford1987,150
Broadie,Introduction
, Clarendon
Logic
p. ISBN 0 198249411
Vol. 49
de Copenhague),
del'Institut
du Moyen-Age
Cahiers
grecetlatin(Universit
N. Haastrup,
mss.
Esrom
Three
revisited
intheVatican
from
(1985),224p.- Contents'.
Instants
Richard
Lavenham
onTemporal
P. Ohrstram,
; St. Ebbesen& L. B.
Library,
with
's Summa
and Quaestiones
A PartialEdition
Mortensen,
Langton
ofStephen
Sunesen's
Hexaemeron
Parallels
Andrew
from
Vol. 50
de Copenhague),
de l'Institut
du MoyenCahiers
Agegrecetlatin(Universit
ber
undEinheit
contra
Ockham
Chr.Knudscn,
Chatton
Gegenstand
(1985)- Contents:
Sunesen's
TheSources
vonWissenschaft
undTheologie
; L. B. Mortensen,
ofAndrew
Hexaemeron
etlatin(Universit
Vol. 51 & 52
de Copenhague),
del'Institut
duMoyenCahiers
Agegrec
Azarchelis
de tabulis
de Siciliasupercnones
Johannis
Scriptum
(1986)- Contents:
ed. Fr. S. Pedersen,128+ 268 p.
Toletanis,
Vol. 53
de Copenhague),
de l'Institut
du Moyen-Age
Cahiers
grecetlatin(Universit
de
: B. P. McGuire,A Letter
byGuibert
ofPassionate
Friendship
(1986)- Contents
St. Ebbesen,TerinMedieval
Chant'
Raasted,Chromaticism
Byzantine
Gembloux',].
theLate13thCentury
Texts
miniaccidentales
concreti.
from
Vol. 54
de Copenhague),
de l'Institut
du Moyen-Age
Cahiers
grecetlatin(Universit
ona
Raasted'
J. Raasted,Thoughts
Bibliography
Jorgen
(1986),218 p.- Contents:
160

12:42:07 PM

Revision
RulesoftheMonumenta
Musicae
S. Engberg,
oftheTranscription
Byzantinae'
TheGreek
OldTestament
asa Liturgical
Textbook
TheCon; N. Ulff-Moller,
Lectionary
Between
nection
Melodic
Formulas
andStereotype
inOldRussian
P.
Text
Phrases
Stichera'
SomeObservations
ontheInterpretation
andAccidentals
inEast
Weincke,
ofSignatures
andWest
andContinuity
inPostChurch
Pain; A.-M. Gravgaard,
Change
Byzantine
K. Fledelius,
Mentalities:
TheLegislator
M. Byskov,
LeoVIat Work',
ting',
Competing
Das Evangelium
Gottes
undKanon
in
Parchment
; Chr. GormTortzen,Medieval
- A CaseStudy
Elsinore
Notes
ontheErasmus-Autograph
Ms. Gl. Kgl.
; E. Pedersen,
a Survey
Saml.95,2with
Azarchelis:
SomeVersions
id., Cnones
, anda
oftheLetters',
Text
I. Universit
Columbeis
di Genova.Istituto
di Filologia
Classicae Medievale,
Genova
1986( = Pubblicazioni,
G. PettiBalbi,
94),224p. IT ISSN 0025-0852-Contents:
Nelmondo
deicartografi:
Beccari
a Genova
Battista
maestro
nel1427'R. Rocca,Colombo
e la "isladeCrcegaF. dellaCorte,Il Colombo
diGirolamo
Fracastoro
; F. Bianchi,
Chiabrera
e Colombo:
"trovar
Nuovo
Mondo
V. Amoroso,
Il " Christophe
affogare"',
" di Michel
Colomb
de Ghelderode'
S. Fasce,Colombo
terrestre
e Mircea
, il Paradiso
Eliade
allascoperta
; M. Salotti,Admiral
oftheOceanSea. La radiodi OrsonWelles
dell'America
Commedie
LatinedelXII e XIII Secolo
di Genova.Istituto
di Filologia
, Universit
Classicae Medievale,
Genova1986( = Pubblicazioni,
95),236p. IT ISSN 0025F. Bertini.
0852- Contents:
da
, a curadi P. Gatti;Ricardo
Introduzione;
Rapularius
De Paulino
etPolla,a curadi St. Pittaluga;
Venosa,
Bibliografia
DasEndederRenaissance:
Kultur
um1600, hrgg.vonA. BuckundT. KlanicEuropische
Wiesbaden
1987( = Wolfenbtteler
zur
zay,OttoHarrassowitz,
Abhandlungen
: A. Buck,MonRenaissanceforschung,
6), 239p. ISBN 3 447026871- Contents
unddieKrisedesHumanismus
des
; T. Klaniczay,Die politische
taigne
Philosophie
Manerismus:
ParutaundLipsius'A. Buck, TraianoBoccalini
(1556-1613)als
B. Keser,Heterodoxie
undSpthumanismus
imstlichen
Zeitkritiker,
; N.
Mitteleuropa
vomErasmianismus.
Humanisten
undderniederlndische
K.
Mout,Abschied
Aufstand;
- mentalittsgeschichtliche
N. Hammereiner
Erdei,DieMeditation
Deutungen
Gattung',
imheiligen
Rmischen
Reich
Deutscher
Nation
amEndeder
stein,Universittsgeschichte
Renaissance
Patriotismus.
Die Verbreitung
derIdeen
der
; K. Pter,Derrosenkreuzerische
Rosenkreuzer
imMittelundOsteuropa
irische
Barbaren:
Zur
; K. Uhiig, Spensers
vonA View of thePresentStateof Ireland;A. Tarnai,
Argumentationsstruktur
alsZentrum
Deutschland
derinternationalen
lateinischen
imSpthumanismus
; F.
Dichtung
VonderIdylle
zurEnttuschung:
zur
.dieKrisederPastorale.
Zemplnyi,
Anmerkungen
Fbula de Polifemoy Galatea von Gongora
; S. K. Nmeth,Ungarische
deutscher
seit1968
; A. Thill,BaldeTodesbetrachtungen
Herkunft
Forschung
Favolisti
LatiniMedievali,
di Genova. Istitutodi FilologiaClassicae
Universit
Genova1984(= Pubblicazioni,
Medievale,
84), 105p. IT ISSN 0025-0852
S. Curletto,
Contents:
Il lupoe lagrudaEsopoa La Fontaine
; F. DellaCorte,Quattro
inedite
delTardoG. Garbugino,
La favoladelleone
e
ammalato
Rinascimento',
favole
dellavolpe
nelmondo
e medievale',
classico
G. Milanese,Notecritiche
e testuali
adalcune
nelviaggio
; G. Moretti,l'uomoe il leone:unmotivo
favoledi Ademaro
favolistico
intertestuale
e contesto
inunafavola
diAdemaro
diChabannes
; Id., Testo
; M. Ugolini-P.
di lettura
di duefavole
di Chabannes
di Ademaro
Lerza,Ipotesi
(XXIV,LXVI)
Robert
Decessatione
ed. byR. C. DalesandE. B. King,Clarendon
Grosseteste,
legalium,
1986( = Auctores
Britannici
MediiAevi,VII), xxx+ 215p. ISBN
Press,Oxford
0 19 7260446
inMedieval
Studies
School
Commentaries
on
RalphJ. Hexter,OvidandMedieval
Schooling.
Ovid'sArs Amatoria,Epistulaeex Ponto,andEpistulaeHeroidum,ArbeoMnchen1986 ( = MnchenerBeitrgezur Medivistik
und
Gesellschaft,
Renaissance-Forschung,
38), xiv+ 336 p. ISBN 3 92012839 7
161

12:42:07 PM

onLogic(Suppositions,
FoutTracts
First
Fallacie,
, Insolubilia).
Obligationes
John
ojHolland,
Edition
Critical
, byE. P. Bos,Ingenium
Publishers,
1985,xlviii+ 192
Nijmegen
5)
p. ISBN 90 7041911 4 ( = Artistarium,
: De Tempore,De SpirituFantastico,
Robert
O.P., OnTimeandImagination
Kilwardby
ed. by P. OsmundLewryO.P., Clarendon
Press,Oxford1987( = Auctores
+ 186p. ISBN 0 19 7260543
Britannici
MediiAevi,IX), xxxviii
deutschen
vonPetrarcas
"Glcksbuch".
Texte
und
Knabe,Dieltesten
Ubersetzungen
Joachim
, H. Kaiser-Verlag,Bamberg1986 ( = Gratia. Bamberger
Untersuchungen
Schriften
zurRenaissanceforschung,
15),308 p. ISBN 3 92183415 5
HetLeerstuk
HetJudicium
vandeConstructio
inde2de
Constructionis.
C. H. Kneepkens,
enInleidende
vande12deEeuw
dl. II: Eenkritische
, dl. I: EenVerkennende
Studie,
Helft
vanPrijs,Summa
'Breve
sit dl. III: Eenkritische
van
vanRobertus
uitgave
uitgave
inarte
dl. IV: Eenwerkuitgave
vanPetrus
Robert
Summa
Blund,
grammatica,
Hispanus
Summa'Absoluta
cuiuslibe,
IngeniumPublishers,
Nijmegen1987
(non-papa),
=
Diss.
RU Leiden),xxiv+ 712 p., x + 382 p., x + 249 p., x+109 p. ISBN
(
90 70419149/157/165/173
Leonardo
BruniTraduttore
diDemostene:
La ProCtesiphonte,
MariaAccameLanzillotta,
di FilologiaClassicae Medievale,
di Genova.Istituto
Genova1986
Universit
96), 196p. IT ISSN 0025-0852
( = Pubblicazioni,
AnIntroduction
&
LaterMedieval
, Routledge
Philosophy
(1150-1350).
JohnMarenbon,
KeganPaul, Londonand NewYork1987,xii+ 230 p. ISBN 0 71020286 5
andthe
Arts
AmsterdamAldoScaglione,TheLiberal
, Benjamins,
College
System
Jesuit
1986,248 p. ISBN 90 27221030 (Eur.) / 0 91502777 1 (US)
Philadelphia
Paperback
L. Holtz,A. Kibre,
Donati
Liberinpartibus
, curaet studioB. Lfstedt,
Smaragdus,
Cont.Mediaev.LXVIII),
Turnholti
1986( = CorpusChristianorum,
Brepols,
9
3/03000
xcvi+ 313 p. ISBN 2 503036813/03682
nelmondo
epatristico
di Genova.Istituto
La donna
biblico
, Universit
Mater,
Sponsa,
Virgo.
Genova1985( = Pubblicazioni,
Classicae Medievale,
di Filologia
92), 155p. IT
- Contents
: S. Sierra,La donna
nelmondo
biblico
ebraico
ISSN 0025-0852
; E. CornelNuovo
La conoscenza
dellnativit
Testamento
dalla
; A. Quacquarelli,
sini,La donna
secoli
attraverso
di Cornelio
deiprimi
; T. Maniero,Ungiudizio
gliapocrifi
iconografia
libera
nelle
culture
e romana
edalcunirilievi
sulladonna
e greca
; A. Pastorino,
Nepote
nelmedioevo
latino
neipadridellachiesa
La donna
La condizione
; F. Bertini,
;
femminile
P. Meloni,Mariadi Nazaret
: Thought
FrankTobin,Meister
Eckhart
andLanguage
ofPennsylvania
, University
Press,
1986,xiv+ 234 p. ISBN 0 81228009 1
Philadelphia
au XlIIe sicle
Roma
desuniversits
, Edizionidell'Ateneo,
Olga Weijers,Terminologie
1987,xlii+ 437 p. ( = Lessicointellettuale
Europeo,XXXIX)

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