Claudia's OBLICON Reviewer For Balane

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes
Updated by Claudia Squillantini

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OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Introduction
Our Civil Code follows the Gaian order which is of three parts: Persons, Things and Obligations.
The title of Book IV of the Civil Code is inaccurate. While the title is Obligations and C
ontracts, it should only be Obligations since by including Contracts in the title, it is
putting the latter on equal footing with the former; but this is not correct since contracts is only one
of the sources of obligations.
Obligations is the most important, most abstract and most difficult of all of civil law.
It is the entirety of private law.
A. The term obligations was derived from the words ob and ligare which means
to bind or tie together. Ligare is the source of several common words such as
ligament and ligation.
B. Obligatio was initially a physical act of being chained (with shackles). Before, under
Roman law, if the debtor cannot pay, the creditor can bring him to the magistrate and the
magistrate can authorize the creditor to cuff the debtor and offer him for sale for 3 days, the
proceeds of which go to the creditor. The debtor then becomes a slave. If he is not bought,
the creditor can have him chopped into little pieces or have him sold to the barbarians.
C. As time passed, cruelty softened. By the time of Cicero, ligatio does not mean vincu
lum of chains but vinculum juris (bond of law). Obligation became metaphorical and not
literal.
I. OBLIGATIONS:
A. DEFINITION OF OBLIGATION:
Art. 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.
This was borrowed from Sanchez Roman.

However, many commentators say it is incomplete because the obligation is only from
the point of view of the debtor. To make it complete, it must cover the points of view of both the
debtor and creditor. Obligations are bilateral. It should include what can be required, the remedy
and the means by which the creditor can take to pursue the remedy.
Balanes definition: An obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person should engage or refrain
from engaging in a certain activity for the satisfaction of the private interest of another who, in
the case of non-fulfillment of such duty, may obtain from the patrimony of the former through
proper judicial proceedings the very prestation due or in default thereof, the economic equivalent
that it represents (Diaz Piero).
An obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person (called a creditor) may demand from another
(called the debtor) the observance of a determinate conduct, and, in case of breach, may obtain
satisfaction from the assets of the latter (Arias Ramos).

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B. CHARACTERISTICS OF OBLIGATIONS:
1. It represents an exclusively private interest.
2. It creates ties which are by nature transitory.
3. Because obligations are extinguished. But the period is relative could be seconds (e.g.,
buying coke) and could be years (e.g., partnership, lease)
4. It involves the power to make the juridical tie defective in case of nonfulfillment
through satisfaction of the debtors property.
C. TRENDS IN THE MODERN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS:
1. Progressive spiritualization of the law on obligations.

Before, obligations were very formal and ritualistic. If it was not in the proper form, no
obligations will assume. Now, the emphasis is in the meeting of the minds, and not on the specific
form.
There is even no need that it be in writing, as a General Rule, since consensuality is the
prevailing doctrine. As long as it can be manifest and any kind of manifestation will do it is
sufficient.
Roman Law was formalistic. Vestiges of Roman Law in the Civil Code can be seen in the law
governing donations, which is very formal. Even for sales, the requirement of form is only for
enforceability and not for validity. This is to make it conducive to business and facilitate
commercial transactions.
This is still an ongoing trend: e-commerce added another option in form and proof of contracts
(but this is not applicable to all, usually only for business, not applicable to wills).
2. The principle of autonomy of will of the parties is now subject to several
restrictions.
While the principle still operates, the exceptions (prohibited areas) have grown larger and larger.
Article 1306 gives the five restrictions: not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.
Those which are against these five restrictions are void, as can be seen in Article 1409.
However, now we have restrictions such as social justice, environmental preservation.
Environmental restrictions sale of ivory, of a tamaraw
Economic Law corp code
Labor Code
3. The mitigation of the principle that the debtor should answer with all his property
Before, the debtor had to answer his debts with all his property. Now, certain properties are
exempt and these can be found in substantive law (i.e., home) and in procedural law (i.e. support,
etc.)
Also, the debtor may not be imprisoned for non-payment of debts.
The theory is to leave the debtor something to live decently by

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4. The weakening of the principle that liability arises from responsibility

This is basically the principle in quasi-delicts. Now, in many cases, a person may be held liable
even if not responsible.
For example, under workmans compensation, the employer is liable to compensate
the employee even if the employer was not negligent.
5. The tendency of unity in modern legislation
This can be manifest in the rise of a global village.
This can be seen particularly in trade laws.
The tendency now is to make things uniform especially in commerce. Different rules in shipping
for example would impede commerce.
Example: ASEAN integration
D. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF OBLIGATIONS:

1. Active Subject:
The active subject is called a creditor if the obligation is to give. The active subject is called an
obligee if the obligation is to do.
The active subject is always a person whether juridical or natural.
2. Passive Subject:
The passive subject is called a debtor if the obligation is to give. The passive subject is called an
obligor if the obligation is to do.
The passive subject must be determinate or determinable
How can both subjects be determinate or determinable? You can have 3 possibilities:
a. Both are completely and absolutely determined at the birth of an obligation.
o If A and B are parties to a contract of sale and B doesnt
comply. A cannot sue C.
b. Only one subject is determined at the moment of the birth of the obligation and the other
subject is to be determined subsequently in accordance with a predetermined criterion.
o B makes a promissory note payable to M or order. In this case, the creditor is not
necessarily M. The creditor is either M or to whomever the promissory note is endorsed.
o Tolentino: promise of a prize or reward for anyone performing a certain act.
c. Subjects are determined in accordance with its relation to a thing.
o At the time of the birth of the obligation, the payee is not yet known but the obligation is
valid.
o The real rights
o A mortgaged property to X pursuant to a loan. The mortgage attaches to the property. If
A sells the property to B, the annotation in the TCT
will follow and B becomes the mortgagor. If A doesnt pay, X goes against B.
o Obligor in this case is whoever owns the land. X doesnt care whether its A or B.
3. Object of the Obligation
The object of the obligation always consists in an activity or conduct to be observed by the debtor


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towards the creditor. This conduct to be observed is also known as the prestation
In a contract of sale for example, the object of the obligation is the conduct of the vendor in
delivering the car. The car, on the other hand, is the object of the prestation.
Sometimes, commentators confuse the car as the object of the obligation. The object is not the car
but the prestation.
The distinction between the object of the obligation and the object of the prestation has been
blurred by Articles 1347-1349.
Requisites of the Object of the Obligation:
o Licit (Legal):
Example: Cant validly enter into a contract for sexual services
o Possible both in fact and in law:
Determined by the rules of experience
o Determinate or determinable
Cant say that I promise to sell you something.
Example of determinate: I promise to sell you my car.
Example of determinable: I promise to sell you my riceland in Bicol in November (will
become determinate when time comes).
o Must have pecuniary value:
Tolentino: may be for the benefit of a 3rd person
Tolentino: but need not be of an economic character to have a pecuniary value. There are
prestations which are purely moral, but when they are violated the sanction becomes
pecuniary in nature. The criterion to determine whether an obligation has a pecuniary
value is not limited to the object or prestation but extends to the sanction which
corresponds to the juridical duty.
4. Vinculum juris
The vinculum juris is the legal tie. It consists of the enforceability of the obligation. If the
debtor does not conform, the creditor has the power to go to court to make the debtor
perform coercive.
What makes an obligation is the power of the creditor to haul the debtor before the court,
summoning powers of the state if needed.
Voluntariness goes into entering into an obligation. But once you enter, it becomes
involuntary.
5. Causa
Castan adds a 5th essential requisite causa. Also known as causa debendi or causa
obligationes. Causa means the why of an obligation.
The object of an obligation answers the question What is owed? (Quid).
The causa answers the question Why is it owed? (Cur).
For example, A will deliver a car to B since A expects to get P300,000. The P300,000 is the
causa of the obligation.
6. Form
Another commentators say that the 6th essential requisite is form. Form means some manifestation


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of intent. In some cases the manifestation is specific such as in the case of donations.
According to Professor Balane that the general rule is that there is no specific form for a valid
obligation. However, if form means that there is some external manifestation, fine, since we are
not telepathic after all. However, there should still be no specific form.
E. SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS (ARTICLE 1157)

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
French civilist says that an obligation is derived from either contractual or non-contractual source.
Sanchez Roman says contract or acts.
Balane performs acts of negotiorium gestio--> saves your goods. immediate source: Quasicontract; ultimate= law.
It would be correct to say that obligations arise from law ALONE.
Law is the only mediate or direct source YES! Same can be said about acquiring property. Law is
the ultimate source.
There is really only one source of obligations just law. Without the law saying that a particular
contract is enforceable, the contract will not give rise to an obligation.
However, source can be understood in both the ultimate and immediate sense. In the
ultimate sense, law is the solitary source. In the immediate sense, there are 5, those enumerated in
Article 1157.
Law is therefore both an immediate and ultimate source. Examples of law being an immediate
source are payment of taxes and accession. And support.
The Supreme Court in the case of Sagrada Orden vs. NACOCO seem to suggest that the
enumeration is exclusive. However, this is only by implication or indication. The Court did not
make an explicit statement that it is.
Many commentators including Professor Balane believe that the list is not exclusive. At present,
there is one more possible source of obligations public offer (but not under our law).
Example: In commercials, there is an offer to replace 30 sachets of Tide for one Venetian-cut glass
until the end of the year. There is no contract or quasi-contract. But if before the end of the year,
you present your Tide sachets, you can demand for your glass.
Public offer is a source of obligation under the BGB (the German Civil Code), Article 657 which
provides that a person who by public notice announces a reward in the performance of the act is
liable even if such person did not act in view of such reward.
o This is unilateral, so its not a contract
o Tolentino calls it a unilateral promise
o Applies even if the person did not intend to get the reward
o Balane thinks bounty should be a source too.
Although public officers are supplemented by DTI regulations, Professor Balane thinks that public


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offer should be made part of the law since regulations easily change.
1. Law (Article1158)

Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined
in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the
law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this
Book.
This talks about law as an immediate source of the obligation. Like support.
2. Contract (Article1159)

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Contract is only 1 of the sources of obligations.
This provision combines two concepts of Roman law equity or good faith (bona fides/ ius
gentium) and strict compliance (stricti iuris) by the parties (ius civile).
A contract is a meeting of minds between 2 persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the
other, to give something or to render some service (Article 1305)
The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy (Article 1306).
Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law (Article 1315).
In case of doubt, the interpretation consistent with good faith is followed. SC did not espouse a
literal view, but a gf view (Peoples Car vs. Commando Security).
Party cannot excuse themselves on the ground that it has become unprofitable. Law will not
protect you from your own bad judgment.
3. Quasi-contract (Article 1160)

Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book.
Tolention: a quasi-contract is a juridical relation which arises from certain lawful, voluntary, and
unilateral acts, to the end that no one may be unjustly enriched or benefitted at the expense of
another (Art 2144-2175).
4. Delict (Article 1161)

Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal
laws, subject to the provisions of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,


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Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
General Rule: If you commit a crime, you are liable both criminally and civilly.
Exception: No private offended party (e.g. contempt, etc.)
The Civil Code deals with the civil aspect (i.e. indemnification for loss of earning capacity).
5. Quasi-delict (Article 1162)

Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws.
Quasi-delict is a civil law term while tort is a common law term.
Its really Aquilian fault negligence. Based on the concept of culpa aquilana in Spanish law. Our
Code Commissioners invented the term Quasi- delict.
Difference between Contractual Liability and Quasi-Delict
In quasi-delict, the obligation arises only when there is a violation. Without violation, there is no
obligation. It is the breach itself which gives rise to the obligation.
In contracts, there is already an obligation which exists prior to or even without a breach. The
breach of the contract is immaterial to the legal obligation.
Example: Contract of sale of watch. If both parties perform their obligation, the contract is
extinguished. There is no breach, but there is an obligation. (Compare the above example with
the one below)
Example: Driving recklessly, A hits a child. When did the obligation came to being? When there
was injury due to negligence. (Negligence per se does not give rise to a quasi-delict unless there is
injury.)
Breach and quasi-delict are inseparable. But contract and breach may be separable.
Question: Are contracts and quasi-delicts mutually exclusive? No.
Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez: there was a collision between a bus and a car and a passenger of the bus was
injured. It was proven that the driver of the car was a minor and an incompetent driver. The
passenger sued against them all. The Supreme Court held that the bus driver, bus owner and the
driver of the car (through his father) are jointly and severally liable to the passenger. The liability
of the owner of the bus and the bus driver rests on that of a contract. On the other hand, the
father is responsible for the acts of his son and is therefore responsible for the negligence of the
minor. Here, it is clear that breach of contract and quasi-delict are separate.
However, they can overlap as can be seen in the following example: Bus driver drives recklessly and
the bus hits a tree. A passenger is injured. The passenger and sue the driver for quasi-delict (due to
negligence) or for crime or the bus company for breach of contract of carriage or for quasi- delict
(negligence in the selection and supervision).
The cause of action one chooses determines the:
Parties involved
Degree of proof
Defenses
One can tailor his suit depending on the cause of action he chooses.
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Can there be multiple sources in one? Yes.

o Leon rides a taxi. It gets into an accident because the driver is speeding.
o Can he sue for a quasi-delict? Yes.
There were decisions before that said that you cant have quasi-delict if there is a preexisting contract between the parties. Note: Art. 2176 says ..such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
However, in Cangco, the SC ruled that quasi- delict is broader in scope than contract.
Thus, you can choose, but there are consequences of that choice.
Difference between contract, quasi-delict and delict in a situation where a passenger is injured in an
accident. (Parties: passenger, driver, bus co).
Contract
Quasi- Delict
Delict
Who can you sue?
Only your privies, so

only the bus co.
Driver, Bus Co, or

both.
Only driver (have to

convict in order for
bus co to be
subsidiarily liable.)
What to prove
Mere breach of
contract
Must prove
negligence of driver.
If the drivers
negligence is proven,
then the negligence
of the bus co in the
selection and
supervision of the
driver is presumed.
Must prove drivers

guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. To
be able to claim from
the bus Co, you need
to prove insolvency
of the driver. No
need to prove
negligence of bus co.
Presumptions
Presumed negligent
unless you can prove
fortuitous event
LRTA Case: If it is the tort that breaches the contract, you can chose either
Limitation you cant recover twice from the same act.
Mercury Drug Cases: Dude had diabetes. He went to Mercury. Instead of giving him his meds, they
gave him dormicum!
o Sued on quasi-delict. Failed to prove diligence in supervision.
Mercury Drug again: Some dude prescribed eye drops to his friend on a napkin. They gave him ear
drops instead of eye drops.
o They argued that they train their people, and the prescription did not specify cortisporin
ophthalmic and not cortisporin otic. Also, only the latter is marketed in the Ph.
o SC held Mercury liable. They have to observe extra-ordinary diligence coz they are dealing


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with drugs!
F. NATURE AND EFFECT OF OBLIGATIONS
1. Kinds of Prestations
a. To give (Articles 1163-1166)
Art. 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also obliged to take care of it with
the proper diligence of a good father of a family, unless the law or the stipulation of the
parties requires another standard of care.
Art. 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of the thing from the time the obligation
to deliver it arises. However, he shall acquire no real right over it until the same has been
delivered to him.
Art. 1166. The obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of delivering all its
accessions and accessories, even though they may not have been mentioned.
i. To give a determinate thing

A specific thing Inova, black with motor number 3444, plate no. AAA 566
To give is a real obligation it attaches to the res
Primary Obligation: Giving what is supposed to be given.
Tolentinos definition of a determinate or specific thing: one that is individualized and can be
identifies or distinguished from others of its kind.
Tolentinos definition of a determinable thing: one that is indicated only by its kind, without being
designated and distinguished from others of the same kind.
o The moment of delivery it becomes determinate
3 Accessory/Auxilliary Obligations:
o These 3 DO NOT apply to generic things
1. After constitution of the obligation and before delivery, to take care of it with the proper
diligence of a good father of the family (Article 1163)
o General Rule: Diligence of a good father of the family
o Exception: Law or stipulation requires different standard of care
o If through negligence, something causes the thing damage, the debtor is liable for damages.
o This is not applicable to a generic thing.
o On Feb 10, 2015, Santos and Nitura agree to sell Santos Vios 2013 with motor number
12345 on Feb 28, 2015 for P300,000. From Feb 10-28, Santos is still the owner; however,
Nitura has an expected right by virtue of the Contract. Santos has the obligation to take
care of the car with the diligence of a good father of a family until Feb 28, 2015. If he
doesnt deliver it on the 28th, the obligation still continues.
o Gerona binds himself to deliver to Nitura 1000kg Milagrosa rice. Its genericspecific only
as to kind and quantity. If he has a warehouse and its flooded and the rice is damaged, it
doesnt matter. Hes still liable for the rice.

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2. To account and deliver to the creditor the fruits if the thing bears fruits upon the time the
obligation to deliver it arises (Article 1164).
o However, ownership is transferred only by delivery. Hence, creditors right over the fruits
is merely personal.
o Example: A sold B a mango plantation to be delivered on January 1. Come January 1, A did
not deliver. A instead sold the fruits to C, a buyer in good faith. B sues A for specific
performance. Court awards the plantation to B. Does B have a right to the fruits? Yes, as
against A. No, as against C, because Bs right over the fruits is only personal. Bs remedy
is to go against A for the value of the fruits.
o Example (2015): Meer owns a mango plantation in Misamis Oriental. Meer binds himself to
sell the mango plantation in Misamis Oriental to Nitura on Feb 28, 2015. Nitura demands
on Feb 28. Meer doesnt comply and he is in delay. However, Nitura will have a right to all
fruits derived from Feb 28 to when he actually delivers. If Meer delivers in May, Nitura can
get the fruits from Feb 28. If the fruits are rotten, then he can ask Meer for the value.
o Meer sells the fruits to Giltendez. Giltendez is in good faith. Nitura cannot go after Giltendez.
However, if she knew of the contract then she is an accomplice.
o Note: with respect to term there is a dispute whether the obligation to deliver the fruits is
from arrival of term or from perfection. (I guess he thinks its the former coz he gave the
above example.)
3. To deliver the accessions and accessories (Article1166)
o Dont take accession in the technical sense (or else, it might overlap with ii). Understand it to
mean things that go with the thing to be delivered (i.e. radio of the car).
Remedies:
1. Specific performance the debtor must perform it personally (1 of 1165)
2. Equivalent performancedamages
Remedies Available to the Creditor
Art. 1165. When what is to be delivered is a determinate thing, the creditor, in addition to
the right granted him by article 1170, may compel the debtor to make the delivery.
If the thing is indeterminate or generic, he may ask that the obligation be complied with at
the expense of the debtor.
If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more persons who
do not have the same interest, he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event until he has
effected the delivery.
1. Specific performance the debtor must perform it personally (1 of 1165)
2. Substitute performance (2 of 1165)
3. Equivalent performancedamages (3 of 1165)
Damages may be obtained exclusively or in addition to the 1st 2 actions.
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ii. To give a generic thing

Generic: an Innova you cant give a thing of better or less quality.
Generic: specific only as to kind and quantity
1. Specific performancethe debtor must perform it personally
2. Substitute performance done by someone else (perform at the expense of the debtor)
b. To do (Article 1167):
Art. 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his
cost.
This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the obligation.
Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be undone.
This is a personal obligation. To give is real because it relates to the res.
Specific performance is not available, because it would violate the constitutional proscription
against involuntary servitude.
There can always be performance for contracts, but it depends what kind of performance.
Example: Yaya took out a loan from employer. She wanted to leave, but the employer asked the
court to compel her to keep working until her debt is paid. SC: NO! You would be making her a
slave.
i. Only the obligor can do (personalisimo)
1. Equivalent performancesdamages
ii. Anyone else can do it (not personalisimo)
1. Substitute performance done by someone else (perform at the expense of the debtor)
Nitura was a carpenter. He agreed to construct a fence for Balane. He failed to do so. If
Balane contracts with another carpenter but for a higher price than that offered by Nitura,
then Nitura is liable for damages equivalent to the difference between the prices. Hes also
liable for damages if a robber enters the house, because that is precisely why Balane
wanted a fence.
c. Not to do (Article1168)

Art. 1168. When the obligation consists in not doing, and the obligor does what has been
forbidden him, it shall also be undone at his expense.

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This includes the obligation not to give.

All negative obligations are subsumed here.
i. Substitute performance - done by someone else (perform at the expense of the debtor)
ii. Equivalent performance-damages
Some things cant be undone (like revelation of trade secrets). Damages will be given
instead.
Specific
Substitute
Equivalent
a. Determinate
Thing
b. Determinable
Thing
2.To do
a. Personalisimo
b. Not
Personalisimo
3. Not to do
1. To give
2. Irregularity in Performance
There are 2 types: culpable (a) and non-culpable (b)
Under culpable there are 3 kinds: fraud (i), negligence (ii), or mora (iii).
Under non- culpable: fortuitous event (i).

a. Attributable to the Debtor (culpable)
Article 1170 provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.
According to Professor Balane, the phrase who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof
is a catch-all provision. However, such is unnecessary. Nothing will escape fraud, negligence or
delay.
Arrieta v. NARIC: The court relied on contravention. Balane thinks this is very generic, but
NARIC could have been liable under any of the other 3.
Arrieta v. NARIC: Arrieta will deliver Burmese rice while NARIC committed to pay for the said
rice by means of a L/C in favor of Arrieta and/or supplier. Arrieta informed NARIC that 5% of the
F.O.B price of the 20k tons will be forfeited if the there is no L/C before Aug. 4. PNB approved

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NARICs application for the opening of L/C subject to the condition that it must pay the marginal
cash deposit and that drafts are to be paid upon presentment. However, NARIC failed to comply
with the requirement. Thus, the 5% deposit was forfeited. Held: NARICs failure to immediately
open the L/C amounted to a breach of the contract. What delayed the opening of the L/C and which,
caused the cancellation of the allocation in Burma, was the inability of NARIC to meet the condition
of the Bank. NARICs liability stems not only from this failure to satisfy the requirements of the bank
but also from its willful and deliberate assumption of contractual obligations even as it was well aware
of its financial incapacity to undertake the prestation. Despite knowing that was it financially
incompetent to open a L/C immediately, it agreed to pay immediately "by means of an irrevocable,
confirm and assignable L/C," It must be held to have bound itself to answer for all and every
consequences that would result from the representation. In general, every debtor who fails in
performance of his obligations is bound to indemnify for the losses and damages caused thereby. The
phrase "any manner contravene the tenor" of the obligation includes any illicit act which impairs the
strict and faithful fulfillment of the obligation or every kind or defective performance.
i. Fraud (Articles 1170, 1171)

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence,
or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of
an action for future fraud is void.
The problem with fraud is the term. It is used in different meanings in the Code.
Fraud may be defined as the voluntary execution of a wrongful act, or willful omission, knowing
and intending the effects which naturally and necessarily arise from such act or omission. Fraud is
the deliberate and intentional evasion of the normal fulfillment of the obligation. It is distinguished
from negligence by the presence of deliberate intent, which is lacking in the latter (Legaspi Oil vs.
CA).
Fraud under Article 1170 is more properly called malice.
Fraud under Article 1170 must not be confused with fraud under Article 13381. Fraud under Article
1338 is more properly called deceit.
In Article 1338, fraud preexists the obligation, thus the obligation is voidable. Deceit vitiates
consent in contracts. Deceit is antecedent fraud. The deceit occurs by using insidious words
machinations. Without this deceit, the other party would not have entered into the contract.
In Article 1171, there was already an obligation before the fraud exists. Malice is subsequent fraud.
Fraud here is in the performance.
Example: Francis undertakes to bake a low fat, sugar free cake. He uses a ton of sugar. There is
malice.
Example of fraud as deceit under Article 1338: A and B entered into a contract of sale of a diamond
necklace. However, the necklace was really made of glass. Fraud here is deceit. There was vitiation

1
Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is
induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to.
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of consent hence the contract is voidable.

Example of fraud as malice under Article 1171. A and B entered into a contract. B will deliver
furniture made of narra but B delivered one made of plywood. Fraud here is malice. It will not
affect the validity of the contract.
Can you waive fraud that has already occurred? Yes.
Effects of Fraud (Articles 1170, 1171)
1. Creditor may insist on proper substitute or specific performance (Article 12332); or
2. Rescission/Resolution (Article11913)
3. Damages in either case (Article1170)
Cases:
Legaspi Oil v. CA: Private respondent Oseraos and Legaspi had several transaction for the sale of
copra wherein Oseraos and his agents would sell copra to the company. Between May to December
1975, there were several contract of sale and delivery of copra, the price of the copra varying from
P79 to P102). However, during the Feb 1976 contract (contract price of copra was P82 per 100kilos),
Oseraos and his agent Llover failed to deliver sufficient number of copra. They only sold around
46,000 leaving behind a balance of around 53,600. Despite repeated demands, Oseraos failed to
comply with the delivery prompting Legaspi Oil to buy the same in the open market (value of copra
is P168, double the amount in the contract). Held: Oseraos should be liable for damages arising from
fraud or bad faith in deliberately breaching the contract of sale. Despite repeated demands, Oseraos
failed to comply with his obligation. He was warned in the last demand letter that Legaspi Oil would
get the deficient amount in the open market, but there was still no compliance. Thus, there was fraud.
In general, fraud may be defined as the voluntary execution of a wrongful act, or a wilfull omission,
knowing and intending the effects which naturally and necessarily arise from such act or omission;
the fraud referred to in Article 1170 is the deliberate and intentional evasion of the normal
fulfillment of obligation; it is distinguished from negligence by the presence of deliberate intent,
which is lacking in the latter. Pursuant art. 1170, private respondent is liable for damages equal to the
net loss shouldered by Legaspi Oil.
Go v. CA: The video coverage of the wedding of Sps. Ong held in Dumaguete City was contracted to
Sps. Go. The newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of the wedding but failed 3 times. The tape had
been erased and could no longer be delivered. Held: Go is liable. Nancy Go failed to provide Sps.

2
Art. 1233. A debt shall not be understood to have been paid unless the thing or service in which the obligation consists
has been completely delivered or rendered, as the case may be.
3
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages
in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with
articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
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Ong with their tape. She is guilty of contravening their obligation and thus liable for damages. Note:
Moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract because this case is not among
those enumerated in Art. 2219. Except: liability for a quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence
of contractual relations, that is, the act which violates the contract may also constitute a quasi-delict.
Consequently, moral damages are recoverable for the breach of contract which was palpably wanton,
reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppresive or abusive.
RCBC v. CA: Lustre purchased a car from Toyota, the balance of purchase price of which were to be
paid in installments. In order to secure the payment, he executed a chattel mortgage over the
purchased Corolla in favour of Toyota. The contract of mortgage provided for an acceleration clause
in case of failure to pay. When Lustre issued an unsigned check, RCBC (assignee of Toyotas rights)
invoked the acceleration clause and demanded payment of the entire balance. RCBC claims that
Lustre's check representing the fifth installment was "not encashed," such that the installment for
August 1991 was not paid. By virtue of paragraph 11, RCBC submits that it "was justified in treating
the entire balance of the obligation as due and demandable." Held: assuming that Lustre was guilty of
delay in the payment of the value of unsigned check, Lustre cannot be held liable for damages. There
is no imputation, much less evidence, that Lustre acted with malice or negligence in failing to sign the
check. Such omission was mere "in advertence" on the part of Lustre.
Telefast v. Castro: Consolacion died in the Ph. Her daughter, Sofia sent a telegram thru Telefast to
her husband and kids who was living in the US. The telegram never reached the addressees and
Consolacion was buried with only the daughter in attendance. Held: Telefast and Sofia entered into a
contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said her message overseas by telegram. This,
Telefast did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the
required charges. Telefast was therefore guilty of contravening its obligation to said private
respondent and is thus liable for damages. This liability is not limited to actual or quantified damages.
To sustain petitioner's contrary position in this regard would result in an inequitous situation where
Telefast will only be held liable for the actual cost of a telegram fixed thirty (30) years ago.We find
Art. 2217 of the Civil Code applicable to the case at bar. It states: "Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission." Here, Telefast's act or omission, which amounted to gross negligence, was precisely the
cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo.
NPC v. CA: Rayo et. al filed a case against NPC to recover actual and other damages for the loss of
lives and the destruction to property caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, which was
caused by the negligent release by the NPC of water through the spillways of the Angat Dam
(Hydroelectric Plant) during the typhoon Kading. Held: NPC was guilty of "patent gross and
evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat
Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released,
are all but products of NPC's headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness." If upon the happening of a
fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation
or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the
Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability. NPC cannot be heard

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to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage since they, the
petitioners, were guilty of negligence.
ii. Negligence
Negligence is the absence of due diligence (Article 1173)
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance,
that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
Jimenez v. Manila: Jimenez went to the market when it was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. He
stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a
dirty and rusty four- inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce his left leg penetrating
to a depth of about one and a half inches. He confined for 15 days and incapacitated to walk and work
for 15 days. Held: City of Manila should be solidarily liable with Asiatic Integrated Corp for the
injuries petitioner suffered. As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasi-delict, one must have
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. (Art. 1173 of CC). It is the duty of the City to
exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people going to the market
which it failed to do. Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation being joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to
the circumstances.
Like fraud, negligence results in improper performance. But it is characterized by lack of care,
unlike fraud which is characterized by malice.
Lack of care means lack of due diligence or the care of a good father of the family (bonus pater
familias) under Article 1163.
In English law, due diligence is called the diligence of a prudent businessman, since they are more
commerce-oriented.
2 Types of Negligence: (1) Simple and (2) Gross.
The determination of due diligence is always relative. It will depend on:
1. The nature of the obligation
2. Nature of the circumstances of
a. Person
b.Time
c. Place
Example: The diligence required in shipping hinges is different from the diligence required in
shipping the Pieta de Michaelangelo. The shipper must observe the diligence of a good father of the

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family in both cases but the standard of care is different. It is much higher for the Pieta.
The diligence of a good father of the family is the imaginary standard.
Can you have negligence in an positive obligations? Yes.
What about in negative? Yes.
o Example: Taruc and Balane enter into a contract and the stipulation is Balane should not enter
into Cavite. He didnt know he was crossing the boundary.
Can you waive future negligence? Commentators say that you can waive simple negligence, but not
fraud, since gross negligence is equivalent to fraud. Gross negligence is governed by Art. 1171.
Effects of Negligence (Articles 1170, 1172)
1. Creditor may insist on proper substitute or specific performance (Article 1233);
2. Rescission/Resolution (Article1191)
3. Damages in either case (Article1170)
Cases:
Metrobank v. CA: On the basis of a credit memo with Metrobank, Katigbak (president of Rural Bank
of Padre Garcia) issued checks to several people, including Spouses Roque. These checks were
dishonored several times. Katigbak asked someone to verify her bank records with MBTC to
determine what caused the bouncing of the checks as she was pretty sure that the same were covered
by the credit memo. The assistant cashier of MBTC insulted said person instead. Held: MBTC was
negligent in its duty and obligation to treat RBPGs account with the highest degree of care,
considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. It must bear the blame for failing to discover the
mistake of its employee despite the established procedure.
Mitsubishi v. Mitsubishi: The CBA provides that the company shoulder the hospitalization expenses
of the dependents of covered employees subject to certain limitations and restrictions. Covered
employees pay part of the hospitalization insurance premium through monthly salary deduction
while the company, upon hospitalization of the covered employees' dependents, shall pay the
hospitalization expenses incurred for the same. The conflict arose when a portion of the
hospitalization expenses of the covered employees' dependents were paid/shouldered by the
dependent's own health insurance. While the company refused to pay the portion of the hospital
expenses already shouldered by the dependents' own health insurance, the union insists that the
covered employees are entitled to the whole and undiminished amount of said hospital expenses.
Held: If an injured person receives compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent
of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from the damages which he would otherwise
collect from the tortfeasor. It finds no application to cases involving no-fault insurances under which
the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance companies, regardless of who was at fault in the
incident generating the losses. Here, it is clear that MMPC is a no-fault insurer. Hence, it cannot be
obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of its employees which had already been
paid by separate health insurance providers of said dependents.
Notes from Tolentino:
Art. 1172 refers to culpa contractual. Thus, mitigation of liability under this article doesnt apply to

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culpa aquilana.
The special faculties of a particular individual are not taken into account in determining negligence,
unless the contract presupposes a special confidence or reliance upon such special faculties.
iii. Delay (Mora)
Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the
obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:
(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or
(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the
designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a
controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or
(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to
perform.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not
ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment
one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins.
Delay has nothing to do with quality but only with punctuality.
Delay is the non-fulfillment of the obligation with respect to time. In fraud and negligence, the
question is the quality even if performed on time. In delay, even if the quality is excellent but the
performance is not in due time, the debtor is liable.
There is no delay in negative obligations, only positive.
Requisites of delay (SSS vs. Moonwalk):
1. Obligation is demandable and already liquidated
Raquel-Santos v. CA: A debt is liquidated when the amount is known or is determinable by
inspection of the terms and conditions of relevant documents.
2. The debtor delays performance
3. The creditor demands the performance judicially and extrajudicially.
In reciprocal obligations, you have to show that you are willing to perform in order for there
to be a demand.
Example: Santos sole Nitura his car. They agreed to meet in the Ateneo parking lot at 10am
on Saturday. Santos said heres the car. Wheres my money? Nitura doesnt have the cash.
Nitura is in delay because Santos was ready to give the car. Here, it is reciprocal and
simultaneous.
If the contract is not simultaneous, this doesnt apply. If Santos has to deliver on Feb 14, but
Nitura will pay on the 28th, then Nitura doesnt have to be ready to pay on the 14th to
demand the car.
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In reciprocal obligations (obligations with a counterpart prestation) which require simultaneous

performance, demand is still needed.
What is the form of such demand? Any communication of a party that he is ready and willing to
comply with his obligation. If after receipt of demand and the other party does not comply with
his obligation, he is in delay.
3 Kinds of Delay
1. Mora Solvendi
Delay in performance incurred by the debtor.
Requisites:
a. The obligation is demandable and liquidated
b. Debtor delays performance either because of dolo or culpa
c. The creditor demands the performance either judicially or extrajudicially
General Rule: Demand is necessary (mora solvendi ex persona). Thus, no demand, no delay.
Exceptions: (mora solvendi ex re) Article 1169
a. When the obligation or the law expressly so declares
Mere setting of due date is not enough. This does not constitute automatic delay.
There must be an express stipulation to the following effect: Non-performance on that
day is delay without need of demand. (Dela Rosa vs. BPI)
BPI v. CA: BPI granted 8 loans to Noahs Ark, evidenced by 8 PNs, signed by Jimmy,
which were secured by a real estate mortgage. Noaks Ark defaulted and so FEBTS
extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage. Jimmy claimed that demand was not made
upon him. Held: demand unnecessary because he waived demand and the PNs contain an
acceleration clause. The PN said: Upon the happening of any of the following events,
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY or the holder, may at its option,
forthwith accelerate maturity and the unpaid balance of the principal, as well as interest
and other charges which have accrued, shall become due and payable without demand or
notice[:](1) default in payment or performance of any obligation of any of the
undersigned to FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY or its affiliated
companiesI/We hereby waive any diligence, presentment, demand, protest or notice of
non-payment o[r] dishonor with respect to this note or any extension thereof.
b. When it appears from the nature and circumstances of the obligation that time was a
controlling motive for the establishment of the contract.
Example: The wedding gown has to be ready before the wedding.
Lorenzo Shipping v. BJ Marthel: BJ supplies Lorenzo with spare parts. Sometime in 1989,
Lorenzo asked for a quotation for machine parts. In response, BJ sent a formal quotation
which included the date of delivery and the terms of payment. Thereafter, Lorenzo issued
2 purchase orders for cylinder liners. The purchase order contained the terms of payment
but did not contain the date of delivery. BJ delivered the cylinder liners on April 20,
1990. After having demanded that Lorenzo pay the cylinder liners, the latter refused to
pay on the ground that the cylinder liners were delivered late. Lorenzo argues that time
was of the essence in the contract. Held: BJ was not in delay. While the quotation
provided by respondent evidently stated that the cylinder liners were supposed to be

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delivered within 2 months from receipt of the firm order of petitioner, the purchase
orders prepared by petitioner clearly omitted these significant items. If time was really of
the essence, Lorenzo should have stated the same in the said purchase orders, and
not merely relied on the quotation. Since time was NOT of the essence in the contract,
BJ was merely obliged to deliver within a reasonable time.
c. When demand would be useless, when obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.
Example: A sold the fruits of the mango plantation he already sold to B to C. B need not
make a demand on A to deliver the fruits since demand would be useless.
Effects of Mora Solvedi
a. When the obligation is to deliver a determinate thing, the risk is placed on the part of the
debtor (Article 1165)
b. Damages
c. Rescission/ Resolution (Article 1191)
Cases:
Agcaoili v. GSIS: GSIS approved the application of Agcaoili for the purchase of a house and lot
subject to the condition that the latter should forthwith occupy the house. This condition Agacoili
tried to fulfill but could not bec. the house was absolutely uninhabitable. Agcaoili, after paying the
first installment and other fees, thereafter refused to make further payment of other stipulated
installments until GSIS had made the house habitable; and GSIS refused to do so, opted to cancel the
award and demand the vacation by Agcaoili. Held: Since GSIS did not fulfill that obligation, and was
not willing to put the house in habitable state, it cannot invoke Agcaoili's suspension of payment of
amortizations as cause to cancel the contract between them. It is axiomatic that "(i)n reciprocal
obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a
proper manner with what is incumbent upon him." Also, Agcaoili did attempt to comply with the
condition by immediately occupying the house.
SSS v. Moonwalk: Moonwalk contracted an interim loan with SSS for 30M and executed several
deeds of mortgage to secure such loan. About 12M was released and Moonwalk executed a
promissory note and Moonwalk paid about 23.6M for the entire loan (principal and interest) based on
the statement of account prepared by SSS. SSS then released the properties from the mortgage.
However, SSS sent letters to Moonwalk stating that it committed an honest mistake for releasing
Moonwalk from its obligation because the penalty charges, as stated in the contract, were not
included in the computation. Held: SSS is not excused from making demand because the case does
not fall under the exceptions. Mere delinquency in payment by Moonwalk does not necessarily mean
delay in the legal concept. The provision on the promissory note (providing for the time when
payment by amortization is to be made) does not excuse SSS from making a demand. Penalty cannot
be collected because Moonwalk was never in delay. SSS failed to demand when demand is not
excused.
ASJ v. Spouses Evangelista: For the incubation and hatching of eggs, Sps. Evangelista availed of the
hatchery services of ASJ, a corp registered in the name of San Juan. Initially, the service fees were paid

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Digests by 4A 2015
upon release of the eggs and by-products to Sps. Evangelista. But as their business went along, Sps.
Evangelistas delays on their payments were tolerated by San Juan, who just carried over the balance
into the next delivery. One day San Juan refused to release the chicks and by products due to Sps.
Evangelistas failure to settle accrued service fees. Held: San Juans retention of the chicks and byproducts on account of the Sps. failure to pay the corresponding service fees was justified. It was Sps.
Evangelista who violated the very essence of reciprocity in contracts, consequently giving rise to San
Juans right of retention. This case is clearly one among the species of non-performance of a reciprocal
obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, wherein each party is a
debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the
simultaneous fulfillment of the other. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation,
delay by the other party begins. Since Sps. Evangelista are guilty of delay, they are liable to pay San
Juan actual damages.
Raquel-Santos v. CA: A debt is liquidated when the amount is known or is determinable by
inspection of the terms and conditions of relevant documents. Under the attendant circumstances, it
cannot be said that Finvests debt is liquidated. At the time PSE left the negotiating table, the exact
amount of Finvests fines, penalties and charges was still in dispute and as yet undetermined.
J Plus v. Utiliy: J Plus & Mabunay entered into a Construction Agreement for a 72-storey condotel in
Boracay to be completed within a year from day after the signing of the agreement. An evaluation
and status report showed that after 7 months, the project remains to be 1/3 complete, and that there
was an overpayment made by J Plus. CA held that it is only from the completion date that default
should be reckoned because the Construction Agreement provided only for delay in the completion
of the project and not delay on a monthly basis using the work schedule approved by petitioner as the
reference point. Held: The work schedule was intended, not only to serve as its basis for the payment
of monthly progress billings, but also for evaluation of the progress of work by the contractor. The
Construction Agreement provides that the contractor shall be deemed in default if, it had delayed
without justifiable cause the completion of the project "by more than 30 calendar days based on
official work schedule duly approved by the OWNER." Records showed that as early as April 2008,
or within 4 months after Mabunay commenced work activities, the project was already behind
schedule. As of Nov 2008, the project was only 31.39% complete. Instead of doubling his efforts as
the scheduled completion date approached, Mabunay did nothing to remedy the delays and even
reduced the deployment of workers at the project site. Neither did he ask for an extension to
complete the project. Thus, J Plus advised Mabunay of its decision to terminate the contract on
account of the tremendous delay the latter incurred.
Cruz v. Gruspe: Cruzs minibus collided with Gruspes car. Cruz went to Gruspes office and
executed a Joint Affidavit of Undertaking promising jointly and severally to replace the Gruspes
damaged car in 20 days, or until November 15, 1999, of the same model and of at least the same
quality; or, alternatively, they would pay the cost of Gruspes car amounting to P350,000.00, with
interest at 12% per month for any delayed payment after November 15, 1999, until fully paid. When
Cruz and Leonardo failed to comply with their undertaking, Gruspe filed a complaint for collection
of sum of money against them on November 19, 1999. Held: 12% per annum interest imposed on
the amount due shall accrue only from Nov 19, 1999, when judicial demand was made. In the absence
of a finding that Gruspe made a demand prior to the filing of the complaint, the interest cannot be

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computed from Nov 15, 1999 because until a demand has been made, Cruz and Leonardo could not
be said to be in default. Demand could be considered to have been made upon the filing of the
complaint on Nov 19, 1999.
Notes from Tolentino:
The effects of mora only apply when delay is imputable to debtor
Art. 1169 2 the law does not require expressly that the debtor should know that the fixing of
the date for performance was a controlling motive on the part of the creditor; but this knowledge
is essential in order that it can be said that the debtor has tacitly consented to incur in delay
without necessity of demand. This knowledge, however, may be shown by the express provisions
of the written contract, or by the very nature of the obligation, or from the circumstances under
which it was created.
Art. 1169 3 like when debtor is hiding or absent.
2. Mora accipiendi (well deal with this in Art. 1256):
The creditor incurs in delay when debtor tenders payment or performance, but the creditor refuses
to accept it without just cause.
Mora accipiendi is related to payment (consignation).
Requisites:
a. An offer of performance by the debtor who has the required capacity
b. The offer must be to comply with the prestation as it should be performed
c. The creditor refuses the performance without just cause.
Effects of Mora Accipiendi
a. Responsibility of debtor for the thing is limited to fraud and gross negligence
b. Debtor is exempted from risk of loss of thing w/c automatically pass to creditor
c. Expenses incurred by debtor for preservation of thing after the delay shall be chargeable to
creditor.
d. If the obligation has interest, debtor shall not have obligation to pay the same from the time
of the delay
e. Creditor becomes liable for damages
f. Debtor may relieve himself by consignation of the thing
3. Compensatio morae
Delay on both sides in reciprocal obligations, cancel each other out.
b. Not Attributable to the Debtor (non-culpable)
i. Fortuitous event

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
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Digests by 4A 2015
were inevitable.
Also governed by Article 12214 but it is called loss there, a cause for extinguishment of
obligation.
Also called caso fortuioto, force marjeure, act of God, caso mayor.
Requisites (Nakpil vs. CA)
1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure to comply with his
obligations, must be independent of the human will
2. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in
a normal manner
4. The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor
General Rule: When a debtor is unable to fulfill his obligation because of a fortuitous event or force
majeure, he cannot be held liable for damages or non-performance.
Exceptions:
1. When the law so provides
Article 1165:5 you are punished for delay or wrongful conduct.
Also possessors in bad faith for fruits that were received and could have been received.
2. When there is express stipulation:
Fortuitous event yields to contrary stipulation.
3. When the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk
Insurance contracts
Cases:
Nakpil v. CA: PBAs office building was damaged due to a 7.3 earthquake (United was responsible
for its construction while the Nakpils were responsible for the plans, specifications and designs). After
the earthquake, PBA sued UNITED and the Nakpils. Commissioner Hizon, to whom the technical
issues were referred to during the pre-trial, ruled that the damage to the PBA building was caused by
(1) the earthquake; (2) defects in the plans and specifications prepared by the Nakpils; (3) UNITEDs
deviations from said plans and specifications and its failure to observe the requisite workmanship in
the construction of the building; and (4) failure of PBA to exercise the requisite degree of supervision
in the construction of the building. Held: Although the earthquake was an act of God, Nakpil and
United are not excused from liability because of their negligence. To exempt the obligor from
liability for a breach of an obligation due to an act of God, the following must concur: (a) the cause

4
Art. 1221. If the thing has been lost or if the prestation has become impossible without the fault
If there was fault on the part of any one of them, all shall be responsible to the creditor, for the price and the payment of
damages and interest, without prejudice to their action against the guilty or negligent debtor.
If through a fortuitous event, the thing is lost or the performance has become impossible after one of the solidary debtors
has incurred in delay through the judicial or extrajudicial demand upon him by the creditor, the provisions of the
preceding paragraph shall apply.
5
Article 1165, 2. If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more persons who do not
have the same interest, he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event until he has effected the delivery.
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Digests by 4A 2015
of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be
either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in,
or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. The defects in the construction and in the plans and
specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA building unable to withstand the
earthquake.
In recit, Balane said that there was no fortuitous event. But earlier he said is it not correct to say
that there was a fortuitous event, but Nakpil is still liable? He went through the requisites (1&2)
present, but (3&4) were not.
Quisumbing v. CA: PALs plane was hi-jacked while in flight by 4 robbers. As a result, petitioners
were divested of properties. They are now claiming against PAL. Held: hi-jacking is force majeure
and therefore, PAL is discharged from liability. Also, the evidence shows that PAL was not negligent
in preventing hi-jackers from boarding its plane and they handled the situation in the best possible
way the could at the time.
Bachelor Express v. CA: A passenger of Bachelor stabbed another passenger. Nagkagulo. Ornominio
Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were shoved out the only door of the bus. They died. Bachelor argues
that such event could not be foreseen or controlled. Held: Bachelor and driver Rivera are liable.
Although it was within the context of a fortuitous event, in order that a common carrier may be
absolved from liability it must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting
from such accident. Bachelor was negligent because the bus driver did not immediately stop; the bus
was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way
while the bus was still running; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with
law. Other examples of caso fortuito: destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of
robbers, as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning, compulsion, insurrections,
destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other occurrences of a similar nature.

NPC v. CA: Rayo, et al, sought to recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the
destruction to property caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27
October 1978. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the NPC of water
through the spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). NPC, et al. alleged that written
notices were sent and the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the
dam and avoid greater damage to people and property. Held: NPC liable. The proximate cause of the
loss and damage was the negligence of the NPC, and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice"
supposedly sent to the affected municipalities was insufficient. The effect then of the force majeure in
question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus,
the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of
God.
Sia v. CA: Sia rented a safety box in Security Bank where he stored his stamp collection. The box was
located at the lowest level. During the floods in 1985-86, water seeped into box, which damaged the
stamps. Held: Bank is liable. The stipulation stating that it will only prevent the opening of the safe
by any other person and that the bank assumes absolutely no liability in connection therewith is

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void for being contrary to law and public policy. A contract for the use of a safety deposit box is a
contract of lease. It is a special kind of deposit. Said provisions are inconsistent with Security
Bank's responsibility as a depositary under Section 72 (a) of the General Banking Act. Both
exempt the latter from any liability except as contemplated in condition 8 thereof which limits its
duty to exercise reasonable diligence only with respect to who shall be admitted to any rented safe.
Further, although the floods can be considered a fortuitous event, not all requisites for exemption of
liability are present since SB was negligent. It was aware of the floods; it knew that the floodwaters
inundated the room where the Deposit Box was located. It should have notified Sia of the damage as
early as that time to prevent aggravating the damage to the stamps.
Southeastern v. CA: When Typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila, the roof of SCI was blown away and
destroyed the roofing of the house of the Dimaanos. An ocular inspection was conducted thereafter
and the report showed that 2 possible reasons why the roof was ripped off (1) with strong winds, the
formation of the building became funnel-like and (2) the steel bars embedded on the concrete roof
beans were not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Held: SCI is not liable. SCI has not been shown
negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and
that typhoon "Saling" was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Dimaanos' house. In
fact, SCI obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy. These are, at the very least,
prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of subject school building. SCI cannot be
made to answer for a purely fortuitous event. Note: Civilist Tolentino (and Balane agrees) adds that
"[f]ortuitous events may be produced by 2 general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms,
floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits,
governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc. Balane said riots are included too.
Mindex v. Morillo: Morillo and Mindex for the lease of the formers cargo truck for use in
MINDEXs mining operations. However, the truck was burned by unidentified persons while it was
parked unattended. Held: Mindex is not excused by a fortuitous event. Mindex was negligent
because it failed to employ reasonable foresight, diligence and care that would have exempted it from
liability resulting from the burning of the truck. Showing that the immediate or proximate cause of
the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is
found to be partly the result of a persons participation -- whether by active intervention, neglect or
failure to act -- the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God. There were no guards to look after the truck at night, and they left a truck on land owned by
dismissed employees.
3. Other Provisions
Art. 1175. Usurious transactions shall be governed by special laws.
Article 1175 is dead letter law because of the lifting of the ceiling on interest rates. Thus, usury has
been decriminalized, but the decriminalization cannot be given retroactive effect (with respect to
the civil aspect).
Some decisions have struck down high interests, not because they were usurious but because such
rates were unconscionable.
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Correlate Article 1175 with Articles 1957,6 14137 and 1961.8

5/6 system although not usurious, its unconscionable.
SC: unconscionable rates are not demandable because they are contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy.
Makalinaw v. BPI (600 SCRA 2009): 3% per month and above = unconscionable
But this is fluctuating
Despite the fact that there is no maximum rate, the court can lower the rates.
Unconscionable rates are not demandable. Principal is always demandable.
Legal rate of interest: 6%. Loans and Forebearace= 12% (acc. to monetary board)
Now, Monetary Board in 2013 lowered the rate for loans and forbearance to 6%
Art. 1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor without reservation with respect to the
interest, shall give rise to the presumption that said interest has been paid.
The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior installments, shall
likewise raise the presumption that such installments have been paid.
2 Presumptions regarding:
1. Interest bearing debt
Presumption that interest has been paid if the principal has been received without
reservation regarding interest,
Correlate with Art. 1253: If the debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not
be deemed to have been made until the interests have been covered.
Based on Art. 1253, then if the payment is applied
Can prove that it was a mere book keeping error.
2. Debt payable in installments
Presumption that earlier installments have been paid if the later installment has been
received without reservation regarding the previous installments.
What about rentals? This applies although this is not a debt on installment. Its akin to a
debt on installment
Perez v. Garcia Bosque (7 Phil): Start renting in January. If you pay and you are credited
with payment for November, then it is presumed that you have paid all other rents from
Jan.
These are only rebuttable presumptions, you can prove through other evidence. You can prove
mistake.
Tolentino: this doesnt apply to taxes.

6
Art. 1957. Contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent the laws against
usury shall be void. The borrower may recover in accordance with the laws on usury.
7
Art. 1413. Interest paid in excess of the interest allowed by the usury laws may be recovered by the debtor, with interest
thereon from the date of the payment.
8
Art. 1961. Usurious contracts shall be governed by the Usury Law and other special laws, so far as they are not
inconsistent with this Code.
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Art. 1177. The creditors, after having pursued the property in possession of the debtor to
satisfy their claims, may exercise all the rights and bring all the actions of the latter for the
same purpose, save those which are inherent in his person; they may also impugn the acts
which the debtor may have done to defraud them.
Enforcement of Creditors Remedies:
1. Levy and execution of the debtors non-exempt properties (Art. 1177, 22369)
2. Accion Subrogatoria
Subrogatory action premised on the theory that the debtor of my debtor is my debtor.
You are subrogated or substituted in the rights of your debtor.
This is an agency created by law. You sue as representative of your debtor.
Nitura owes Balane 500K. Meer owes Nitura P1M. Balane can get the WHOLE P1M, but
he must turn over the 500K to Nitura (minus expenses of litigation etc).
Requisites:
a. Creditor has a right of credit against the debtor.
b. Credit against the 3rd party is due and demandable.
c. Failure of debtor to collect his own credit from a third person either through malice
or negligence.
d. Insufficiency of assets of the debtor to satisfy the creditors credit
e. Right (of account) is not intuitu personae
3. Accion Pauliana (Articles 1380-1389)
Right of creditors to rescind alienations by debtor which are prejudicial to them to the
extent of the prejudice.
Example: A donates land to C, worth P1M but A owes B, P500K. A has no other
property. B can rescind the donation to C to the extent of 500K.
This is different from accion subrogatoria because you dont stand in your debtors shoes.
YOU CANNOT RESCIND THE WHOLE DONATION. ONLY AMOUNT BY
WHICH YOU WERE PREJUDICED.
Requisites:
a. There is a credit in favor of the plaintiff
b. The debtor has performed an act subsequent to the contract, giving advantage to
other persons.
c. The creditor is prejudiced by the debtors act which are in favor of third parties and
rescission will benefit the creditor.
d. The creditor has no other legal remedy.
e. The debtors acts are fraudulent.
Examples by Tolentino: alienations of property, payment of debts which are not due,
renunciation of rights, such as usufruct or inheritance, assignment of credit and remission of
debts. The debtors renunciation of a prescription which has already been acquired.
Tolentino again: The creditors are protected, not only from voluntary acts of the debtor, but
also from judicial acts, such as, when the debtor, in connivance with another, permits the

9
Art. 2236. The debtor is liable with all his property, present and future, for the fulfillment of his obligations, subject to
the exemptions provided by law.
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latter to bring an action against him and obtain a judgment by default or confession and such
judgment is enforced against the debtors property. But payments of pre-existing obligations
already due whether natural or civil, cannot be impugned by an accion pailuana.
Siguan v. Lim: LIM was charged with estafa. Siguan alleged that a Deed of Donation executed by
Lim in favour of her daughters (executed in 1989 but registered only in 1991) was antedated and was
a conveyance done in fraud of creditors and as such, must be rescinded. Held: Lim won. Accion
pauliana has the ff requisites: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation,
although demandable later: (2) the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial
benefit to a third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim; (4) the act
being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third person who received the property conveyed, if it is by
onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. Rescission requires the existence of creditors at the
time of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial
pronouncement setting aside the contract. In the case at bar, failed to prove that the requisites were
complied with.
REQUISITE#1and 2: We are not convinced with the allegation of the Siguan that the questioned
deed was antedated to make it appear that it was made prior to Siguans credit.
REQUISITE#3: It is essential that the party asking for rescission prove that he has exhausted all
other legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. Siguan neither alleged nor proved that she did
so.
REQUISITE#4: It was not sufficiently established that the properties left behind by LIM were not
sufficient to cover her debts existing before the donation was made. Hence, no presumption of fraud.
4. Accion Directa
A direct (not subrogatory) action by the creditor against his debtors debtor, a remedy
which gives the creditor the prerogative to act in his own name, such as the actions of the
lessor against the sublessee (Article 165210), the laborer of an independent contractor
against the owner (Article 172911), the principal against the subagent (Article 189312), and
the vendor-a-retro against the transferee of the vendee (Article 160813).
This is an exception to the relativity of contracts.
Example 1: A leases apartment out to B. B sub-lets to C. There are two separate contracts

10
Art. 1652. The sublessee is subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any rent due from the lessee. However, the sublessee shall
not be responsible beyond the amount of rent due from him, in accordance with the terms of the sublease, at the time of
the extra-judicial demand by the lessor.
Payments of rent in advance by the sublessee shall be deemed not to have been made, so far as the lessor's claim is
concerned, unless said payments were effected in virtue of the custom of the place.
11
Art. 1729. Those who put their labor upon or furnish materials for a piece of work undertaken by the contractor have
an action against the owner up to the amount owing from the latter to the contractor at the time the claim is made.
However, the following shall not prejudice the laborers, employees and furnishers of materials: (1) Payments made by the
owner to the contractor before they are due; (2) Renunciation by the contractor of any amount due him from the owner.
This article is subject to the provisions of special laws.
12
Art. 1893. In the cases mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article, the principal may furthermore bring an
action against the substitute with respect to the obligations which the latter has contracted under the substitution.
13
Art. 1608. The vendor may bring his action against every possessor whose right is derived from the vendee, even if in
the second contract no mention should have been made of the right to repurchase, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Mortgage Law and the Land Registration Law with respect to third persons.
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here: The contract of lease between A and B and the contract of sub-lease between B and
C. C owes B P7000. B owes A P5000. Ordinarily, A cannot sue C since there is no
relationship between them, but in Article 1652, A can sue C for P5000 (not the full
amount of P7000)
Example 2: A, customer, and B, contractor, enter into an agreement for a piece of work.
B has a labor contract with C, worker. Again, there are two separate contracts here: The
contract for a piece of work between A and B and the contract of labor between B and C.
A owes B P10,000 which is not fully paid yet. B owes C P5000 for unpaid wages. C can
go after A directly for P5000.
Art. 1178. Subject to the laws, all rights acquired in virtue of an obligation are transmissible,
if there has been no stipulation to the contrary.
Rights are transmissible unless the rights are personal.
Nature, law, stipulation
G. DIFFERENT KINDS OF OBLIGATIONS
1. According to Demandability (Articles1179-1192)

Art. 1179. Every obligation whose performance does not depend upon a future or uncertain
event, or upon a past event unknown to the parties, is demandable at once.
Every obligation which contains a resolutory condition shall also be demandable, without
prejudice to the effects of the happening of the event.
a. Pure
A pure obligation is one which has neither a condition nor a term attached to it. It is one which is
subject to no contingency.
A pure obligation is demandable at once (Article 1179).
Art. 1179 oblique definition of pure.
Pay v. Palanca: Pay is the creditor of the late Palanca. The latter and his wife, Rosa issued a
promissory note payable on demand in 1952, in the amount of P26,900 with interest of 12% per
annum. Held: the creditor is barred from collecting. More than fifteen years after the execution of
the promissory note this petition was filed. The defense interposed was prescription. Its merit is rather
obvious. Article 1179 of the Civil Code provides: "Every obligation whose performance does not
depend upon a future or uncertain event, or upon a past event unknown to the parties, is demandable
at once." The obligation being due and demandable (payable on demand), it would appear that the
filing of the suit after 15 years was much too late.
b. Conditional
A condition is a future and uncertain event upon which an obligation is made to depend.
o The Code says or this is wrong!
All conditions are future.
Article 1179 mentions the term past event unknown to the parties. This has been criticized

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by many commentators. This is a contradiction in terms. The condition in a past even unknown to
the parties is knowledge by the parties of the past event.
o What this means is that the condition is the knowledge, not the event.
o Example: Guy went to Balane and said that if my father wins the election then Ill buy you
lunch. The election was done when he talked to Balane, but he didnt know if his dad had
won. After class 2 hours later, he found out his dad lost. Note: when this happened there were
no cellphones yet.
A past event CAN NEVER BE A CONDITION. Its impossible.
In conditional obligation, the happening of the condition determines its birth or death. In term, the
happening of the term determines its demandability.
Tolentino: The condition must be imposed by the will of a party and must not be a necessary legal
requisite of the act. Thus, a promise to give a donation proper nuptias if the donee gets married
cannot be considered conditional.
1st Classification of Conditions:
i. Suspensive
ii. Resolutory

2nd classification of conditions:
i. Potestative
ii. Casual
In a casual condition, the fulfillment of the condition depends upon chance and/or upon the will of
a 3rd person and not on the will of a party.
Example: I will give you my house if the Philippines renounces its foreign debt in 5 years.
(Dependent solely on the will of a third person or on chance).
Example of casual: I will sell you my house in the Kiev, if the situation in the Ukraine improves.
iii. Mixed
In a mixed condition, the fulfillment of the condition depends partly upon the will of a party to the
obligation and partly upon chance and/or the will of a 3rd person.
When the condition depends not only upon the will of the debtor, but also upon chance or will of
the others, the obligation is valid.
Example: I will give you my house if you marry him within 3 years. (The condition here is a mixed
condition. In this case, the condition of marriage depends partly on the creditor, a party to the
obligation, and partly on a 3rd person.)
3rd way of classifying conditions:
i. Possible
ii. Impossible

4th way of classifying conditions:
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i. Positive
A condition is positive when the condition involves the performance of an act.
ii. Negative
A condition is negative when the condition involves the non-performance of an act.
i. Indivisible
A condition is indivisible when the condition is not susceptible of partial realization.
ii. Divisible
A condition is divisible when the condition is susceptible of partial realization.
i. Conjunctive
When there are several conditions all of which must be realized.

ii. Alternative
A condition is alternative when there are several conditions, only one of which must be realized.
i. Express
A condition is express when the condition is statedexpressly.
ii. Implied
A condition is implied when the condition is tacit.
Art. 1180. When the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so, the
obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period, subject to the provisions of article 1197.
This is a term, so well deal with it later.
Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment
or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which
constitutes the condition.
Also called a condition precedent.
Suspensive has the opposite effect of resolutory.
The fulfillment of a suspensive condition results in the acquisition of rights arising out of the
obligation.
Art. 1182. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the
conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third

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person, the obligation shall take effect in conformity with the provisions of this Code.
In a potestative condition, the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the will of a party to the
obligation.
Tolentino definitions:
o A potestative condition is one which depends upon the will of one of the contracting parties
Acc. to Tolentino there are 2 kinds: simple and purely potestative.
Simple= presupposes not only a manifestation of will but also the realization of an external
act, such as if you sell your house
Pure= depends solely and exclusively on the will, such as if I like
Simple does not prevent the formation of a valid obligation
o A casual condition is one which depends exclusively upon chance or other factors, and not
upon the will of the contracting parties.
o A mixed condition is one which depends on the will of one of the contracting parties and other
circumstances.
If the condition depends upon the will of the creditor, then the obligation is valid. In this case, there
is a vinculum juris. The creditor can compel the debtor to perform the obligation.
Example: I will give you my pomelo plantation if you establish permanent residence in Davao. This
is a suspensive condition dependent on the sole will of the creditor. It becomes pure and
demandable at once.
Article 1182 prohibits a suspensive potestative condition dependent on the will of the debtor. The
entire obligation is void.
Example: I will sell you my car if I want to.
Why does it annul the entire obligation? Because there is no juridical tie. Remember, an obligation
is one which has to be performed regardless of the will of the debtor. There is no element of
compulsion. In the example above, the creditor can never compel, can never have a cause of action.
In reciprocal obligations, the law only talks about the first prestation, the reciprocal prestation is not
taken into consideration.
Requisites:
1. Suspensive if resolutory, then no problem
2. Dependent on the will of the debtor
3. Potestative
Smith Bell v. Matti: Smith Bell and Vicente Sotelo entered into contracts of sale where the former is
the seller and the latter is the buyer. In the contracts, they agreed the shipment of (a) 2 steel tanks
within 3 or 4 months; (b) 2 expellers in the month of Sept. 1918, or ASAP; (c) 2 electric motors,
approximate delivery within 90 daysThis is not guaranteed. In the contracts, there were clauses
that the shipment shall be subject government regulations/certificates/requirements, embargoes, etc.
This was during the war; transportation was difficult. Held: Smith Bell was able to perform its
obligations in due time. From the stipulations in the contracts, it cannot be said that any definite date
was fixed for the delivery of the goods. Considering these contracts in the light of the civil law, we
cannot but conclude that the term which the parties attempted to fix is so uncertain that one cannot
tell just whether, as a matter of fact, those articles could be brought to Manila or not. If that is the
case, as we think it is, the obligations must be regarded as conditional. And as the export of the
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machinery in question was, as stated in the contract, contingent upon the sellers obtaining certificate
of priority and permission of the United States Government, subject to the rules and regulations, as
well as to railroad embargoes, then the delivery was subject to a condition the fulfillment of which
depended not only upon the effort of the herein plaintiff, but upon the will of third persons who
could in no way be compelled to fulfill the condition. In cases like this, which are not expressly
provided for, but impliedly covered, by the Civil Code, the obligor will be deemed to have
sufficiently performed his part of the obligation, if he has done all that was in his power, even
if the condition has not been fulfilled in reality.
Security Bank v. CA: Security Bank (SB) contracted Ferrer to build a building in Davao. Ferrer was
able to complete it within the specified time, but incurred extra expenses, due to drastic increases in
cost of construction materials. He priced these extra expenses at P300K, supported by receipts and
other docs. These extra expenses were also made known to SB. SB looked at it internally, and verified
Ferrers claims, however, recommending that only P200K be paid. But, instead of paying either
amount, SBTC suddenly refused to pay. This contract reads: If at any time prior to the completion
of the work to be performed hereunder, increase in prices of construction materials and/or labor shall
supervene through no fault on the part of the contractor whatsoever [] SB shall equitably make the
appropriate adjustment on mutual agreement of both parties. SB thus claims that there was no
mutual agreement as to the payment of any extra expenses to Ferrer. Held: SC disagreed with SB.
First, a conditional obligation shall be void if the fulfillment of the condition depends on the sole will
of the debtor. The abovequoted provision is exactly that, since, obviously, Ferrer would agree to
being paid for the extra amount he incurred by reason of price increase. Secondly, to allow SB to
enjoy a building while paying much less than its worth is tantamount to unjust enrichment which is
also prohibited by the law.
Romero v. CA: Romero was offered a parcel of land registered in the name of Respondent vda. De
Ongsiong. Upon inspection of the property, it was deemed suitable except for some informal settlers
occupying parts of the land. The brokers offered that upon downpayment of Php 50000 (to be used
for evicting the informal settlers) the respondent is willing to sell. A deed of conditional sale was
executed between the parties. The contract stipulates that respondent has 60 days to evict the
informal settlers from the signing. Despite filing an ejectment case, respondent delayed in fulfilling his
obligation to evict. Thus, respondent wrote petitioner that she is returning the 50,000 down
payment. Petitioner, through counsel, replied that since a favorable judgment has been rendered then
petitioner is willing to undertake the eviction and pursue the sale. Respondent, through counsel
insisted that the non compliance of the obligation rendered the conditional sale null and void. Held:
the vendor may not demand rescission for a cause traceable to his own failure to evict the squatters
within the contractually-stipulated period. The condition in the contract was imposed upon the
vendor and not upon the perfection of the contract. Hence, under the law, it is the oblige (vendee in
this case) that has the option either to proceed with the agreement (accept the return of the 50,000 as
stipulated in the contract) or waive the condition (the 60 day period to evict). (NOTE: it would be
different if the condition was imposed on the perfection of the sale. If condition was not met under
this kind, then the juridical relationship would not arise). The undertaking of the respondent is not a
potestative condition solely dependent on his will (void according to Art. 1182) but a mixed
condition dependent not on the will of the respondent-vendor alone but also of third persons like the
informal settlers and government agencies and personnel concerned. Where the so-called "potestative

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condition" is imposed not on the birth of the obligation but on its fulfillment, only the obligation is
avoided, leaving unaffected the obligation itself. Respondent had no right to rescind being the guilty
party.
Art. 1183. Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or public policy and those
prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. If the obligation is
divisible, that part thereof which is not affected by the impossible or unlawful condition shall
be valid.
The condition not to do an impossible thing shall be considered as not having been agreed
upon.
A condition is possible when it is capable of realization according to nature, law, public policy or
good customs.
A condition is impossible when it is not capable of realization according to nature, law, public
policy or good customs.
Impossibility can be physical (contrary to law of nature) or juridical (contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy).
o Tolentino: juridically impossible when it restricts certain essential rights like not to change
domicile, to change or not change religion, not to get married.
The effect of an impossible condition is to annul the obligation (Article 1183). The effect of an
impossible condition regarding donations and succession is different. In donations and succession,
an impossible condition is simply disregarded. The distinction can be explained by the fact that
Article 1183 refers to onerous obligation whereas donations and succession are gratuitous.
However, if the obligation is divisible and that part of the obligation is not unaffected by the
impossible condition, then the obligation is valid (Article 1183).
Justice Paras distinguishes as follows:
1. Positive condition to do something impossible: whole obligation is void (condition and
obligation).
2. Negative condition not to do something impossible: Disregard the condition, the obligation is
valid
3. Negative condition not to do something illegal: Valid condition and obligation.
Balane sells his property to you and 1 stipulation is that you should not cook meth on the
premises VALID!
Its a resolutory condition
A negative suspensive is the same as a positive resolutory.
Tolentino notes:
o The condition must be impossible when the contract is entered into; otherwise, art. 1266 or art.
1184 will apply.
o The difference is that under art. 1266 and 1184, there is a valid obligation, which became
extinguished. Under art. 1183 the obligation never comes into existence. Effect is the same in
either case.
Art. 1184. The condition that some event happen at a determinate time shall extinguish the

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obligation as soon as the time expires or if it has become indubitable that the event will not
take place.
This is suspensive.
Art. 1185. The condition that some event will not happen at a determinate time shall render
the obligation effective from the moment the time indicated has elapsed, or if it has become
evident that the event cannot occur.
If no time has been fixed, the condition shall be deemed fulfilled at such time as may have
probably been contemplated, bearing in mind the nature of the obligation.
This is suspensive.
Art. 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
fulfillment.
Doctrine of Constructive Compliance
The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor

Only applies to potestative
It can apply to mixed.
If the debtor must do something to give birth to the obligation
The principle underlying constructive fulfillment of conditions is that a party to a contract may not
be excused from performing his promise by the non-occurrence of an event which he himself
prevented.
Requisites:
1. Intent of the debtor to prevent fulfillment of the obligation
Where the act of the debtor, however, although voluntary, did not have for its purpose
the prevention of the fulfillment of the condition, it will not fall under the doctrine of
constructive compliance.
2. Actual prevention of compliance
Tayag v. CA: Sellers entered into a contract of sale with a purchaser. 1 of the conditions of which,
purchaser agreed to assume the indebtedness of the seller with phil veterans bank. Purchaser only paid
6,900 of the 10,000 peso debt to phil. veterans bank, the co-seller paid the remaining balance. RTC:
this was a ploy under art. 1186 that prematurely prevented the purchaser from paying the debt fully.
Sellers argue that they are only obligees in the contract so the principle of constructive fulfillment
cannot be invoked against them (codal says, when obligor voluntarily prevents fulfillment). Held: In
a reciprocal obligation, like in a contract of purchase, both parties are mutually obligors and obligees.
it is puerile for the sellers to say that they are the only obligees under the contract since they are also
bound as obligors to respect the stipulation in permitting the purchasers to assume the loan with the
Philippine Veterans Bank which sellers impeded when they paid the balance of said loan.
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Bonrostro v. Luna: Luna bought a piece of land from Bliss Dev., less than a year she entered into a
contract to sell with Bonrostro. B failed to pay the subsequent installments so L filed an action for
rescission and payment of unpaid obligations. Sps. Bonrostro also alleged that the Sps. Luna sent a
letter to BLISS instructing the company to refuse acceptance of amortizations of the lot from anyone
other them, also paying the amortization, thereby preventing the Sps. Bonrostro from complying
with the contract..B alleged that they are willing to pay and sought a 60-day extension. B argued that
they were prevented by Sps. Luna from fulfilling such obligation. Held: that Art. 1186 speaks of a
situation where it is the obligor who voluntarily prevents fulfillment of the condition, not the
obligee. Moreover, the mere intention to prevent the happening of the condition or the mere placing
of ineffective obstacles to its compliance, without actually preventing fulfillment is not sufficient for
the application of Art. 1186. Two requisites must concur for its application, to wit: (1) intent to
prevent fulfillment of the condition; and, (2) actual prevention of compliance. Here, Sps. Luna is not
the obligor but the obligee, and their actions were only sought to ensure and not defeat the
fulfillment of the contract. Their payment (1) avoided the cancellation of both the contract of sale,
and consequently, the contract to sell; and (2) avoid the penalty for unpaid amortizations equivalent
to 1/10th of 1% per day of delay shall be imposed for all payments made after due date (3% monthly
or 36% per annum rate of interest).
Lim v. DBP: Lim obtained 2 loans from DBP to finance their cattle raising business. To secure the
loans, petitioners executed a mortgage in favor of DBP over real properties. Petitioners failed to pay
the loan amortizations. Lim eventually received a Notice of Foreclosure. In order to stop the
foreclosure proceedings, Lim offered to restructure the loan settlement by paying it over five years.
DBP at first refused but eventually agreed to the Restructuring Agreement provided that Lim
complies with certain conditions. Lim failed to comply with the conditions causing the foreclosure of
his properties. WON DBPs acts and omissions in discharging its reciprocal obligations to petitioners
effectively prevented the petitioners from paying their loan obligations in a proper and suitable
manner hence the obligation should be deemed fully complied with and extinguished in accordance
with the principle of constructive fulfillment. Held: NO. Article 1186 enunciates the doctrine of
constructive fulfillment of suspensive conditions, which applies when the following three (3)
requisites concur, viz: (1) The condition is suspensive; (2) The obligor actually prevents the
fulfillment of the condition; and (3) He acts voluntarily. Suspensive condition is one the happening of
which gives rise to the obligation. It will be irrational for any Bank to provide a suspensive condition
in the Promissory Note or the Restructuring Agreement that will allow the debtor-promissor to be
freed from the duty to pay the loan without paying it. Besides, petitioners have no one to blame but
themselves for the cancellation of the Restructuring Agreement. It is significant to point out that
when the Regional Credit Committee reconsidered petitioners proposal to restructure the loan, it
imposed additional conditions which petitioners failed to do. DBP therefore had reason to cancel the
Restructuring Agreement.
Art. 1187. The effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been
fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. Nevertheless, when
the obligation imposes reciprocal prestations upon the parties, the fruits and interests during
the pendency of the condition shall be deemed to have been mutually compensated. If the
obligation is unilateral, the debtor shall appropriate the fruits and interests received, unless
from the nature and circumstances of the obligation it should be inferred that the intention of

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the person constituting the same was different.

In obligations to do and not to do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the retroactive
effect of the condition that has been complied with.
This is suspensive.
By the principle of retroactivity, therefore, a fiction is created whereby the binding tie of the
conditional obligation is produced from the time of its perfection, and not from the happening of
the condition.
The law does not require the delivery or payment of the fruits or interests accruing before the
happening of the suspensive condition. The right to the fruits of the thing is not within the
principle of retroactivity of conditional obligations (Article 1187)
If the obligation imposes reciprocal prestations, fruits and interest are deemed mutually
compensated.
Example: I promise to sell my mango plantation at P5000/hectare if you pass the bar examination
in 2015. I do not have to give you the fruits from the time of the agreement to the release of the bar
exams.
o Deemed to have effect when they agreed
o Effect: If Balane sells the property before Nitura takes the bar in 2015, then Nitura has a better
right (we arent talking about registered land)
If the obligation is unilateral, debtor appropriates the fruits.
Art. 1188. The creditor may, before the fulfillment of the condition, bring the appropriate
actions for the preservation of his right.
The debtor may recover what during the same time he has paid by mistake in case of a
suspensive condition.
This is suspensive.
JBL Reyes criticizes the use of the word bring. The 1st of Article 1188 does not limit itself to
judicial actions. Thus, the word take is better.
o Example: Could publish a letter. Can have a claim annotated on the Torrens title.
2: you can only recover if you discover your mistake BEFORE the condition happens
If the condition happened but you didnt know, you still cant recover.
Tolentino: if he gives it knowing the condition has not been fulfilled, there is no mistake. There is a
waiver.
Art. 1189. When the conditions have been imposed with the intention of suspending the
efficacy of an obligation to give, the following rules shall be observed in case of the
improvement, loss or deterioration of the thing during the pendency of the condition:
(1) If the thing is lost without the fault of the debtor, the obligation shall be extinguished;
(2) If the thing is lost through the fault of the debtor, he shall be obliged to pay damages; it is
understood that the thing is lost when it perishes, or goes out of commerce, or disappears in

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such a way that its existence is unknown or it cannot be recovered;

(3) When the thing deteriorates without the fault of the debtor, the impairment is to be borne
by the creditor;
(4) If it deteriorates through the fault of the debtor, the creditor may choose between the
rescission of the obligation and its fulfillment, with indemnity for damages in either case;
(5) If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the
benefit of the creditor;
(6) If it is improved at the expense of the debtor, he shall have no other right than that
granted to the usufructuary.
Requisites (there are 4. Im missing 1!):
1. Must be a determinate thing
2. Condition happens
3. Loss, deterioration
4. Theres a suspensive/resolutory condition or term
2: choice is with the injured party
4: creditor may choose specific perf or recission.
o Correlate with Art. 1191 deterioration must be substantial
o If the damage is minimal, then you can only get damages but you cannot seek recission.
6: Usufructuary Art. 579 and 58014
Art. 1190. When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to
give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they
have received.
In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with
respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who
is bound to return.
As for the obligations to do and not to do, the provisions of the second paragraph of article
1187 shall be observed as regards the effect of the extinguishment of the obligation.
Resolutory condition. Also called condition subsequent.
The fulfillment of the resolutory condition results in the extinguishments of rights arising out of
the obligation.

14
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere
pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be
indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the
property.
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against any damage to the
same.
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If the resolutory condition is fulfilled, the obligation is treated as if it did not exist. Thus, each
party is bound to return to the other whatever he has received, so that they may be returned to
their original condition before the creation of the obligation (Article 1190).
1263,15 1264,16 126517 fault presumed
Tolentino: return fruits, but not for reciprocal obligations.
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation,
with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing
of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired
the thing, in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
Why is this here? This is the section on rescission. Because the breach is a resolutory condition.
It is a tacit resolutory condition.
Resolution (Article 1191) is found in the conditional obligations because if there is a breach, the
breach is a resolutory condition which extinguishes the obligation.
Article 1191 uses the term rescission.
The better term is resolution. The term rescission is also found in Article 1381,18 rescissible
contracts. Resolution is different from rescission. Resolution is based on the non-fulfillment of the
obligation. Rescission is based on economic prejudice. Furthermore, the character of resolution is
principal and retaliatory while the character of rescission is subsidiary. This means that in
resolution there is no need to show that there is no other remedy. In rescission, the plaintiff must
show that there is no other recourse.
Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a

15
Art. 1263. In an obligation to deliver a generic thing, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind does not
extinguish the obligation.
16
Art. 1264. The courts shall determine whether, under the circumstances, the partial loss of the object of the obligation is
so important as to extinguish the obligation.
17
Art. 1265. Whenever the thing is lost in the possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed that the loss was due to his
fault, unless there is proof to the contrary, and without prejudice to the provisions of article 1165. This presumption does
not apply in case of earthquake, flood, storm, or other natural calamity.
18
Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer lesion by more than onefourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion stated in the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge
and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority;
(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.
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debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation
of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously, so that the performance of one is
conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other [Tolentino].
o Example of Tolentino: A person may be a debtor of another by reason of agency, and his
creditor by reason of loan. They are mutually obligated, but the obligations are not
reciprocal.
Balane: prestations arise from the same source. The obligations must be interlocked. They must be
counterparts of each other.
o Example: Sale of a Car. 2 prestations: Balane must deliver his car, while Leon must pay him.
The right of resolution applies to reciprocal obligations.
A reciprocal obligation has 2 elements:
1. 2 prestations arising from the same source
2. Each prestation is designed to be the counterpart of the other
An example of a reciprocal obligation is a contract of sale.
Summary of Rulings on Resolution
1. The right to resolve is in inherent in reciprocal obligations.
2. The breach of the obligation must be substantial. Proof of substantial breach is a prerequisite
for resolution.
o Proof is a condition precedent [Zulueta v. Mariano].
o Not just casual [Palay v. Clave].
3. The right of resolution can be exercised extrajudicially and will take effect upon
communication to the defaulting party. This notice of resolution is necessary.
4. The exercise of this right can be the subject of judicial review.
5. Upon resolution, there must be mutual restitution of the object and its fruits
6. The parties are returned to their original situation status quo ante.
7. If the aggrieved party has not performed the prestation and resolves extrajudicially, then all
the aggrieved party has to do is to refuse to perform his prestation.
8. If the aggrieved party has performed the prestation, the aggrieved party can demand
recovery. If the defaulting party refuses to return it, the aggrieved party must go to court in
order to recover.
9. The injured party must not have breached the contract.
In Ilingan v.CA (September 26, 2001), there was an obiter dictum that the operative act that
resolves a contract is the decree of court and the right should be exercised judicially. Professor
Balane says this is wrong. However, the ratio of the case said that the communication must be a
notarial notice.
4 Questions:
1. Does the right to resolve have to be stipulated between the parties? No. Law provides it.
o Like warranty of eviction and warranty from hidden defect, its deemed written in,
because the law provides it.
2. Is this a remedy of last resort? No. According to JBL, rescission is in principal action
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retaliatory in character [Universal Foods v. CA].

3. Can it be done extra-judicially? Yes. But the offended party proceeds at his own risk because
there is nothing that stops the other party from questioning the propriety of the rescission
[UP v. ALUMCO]. Court can find 2 things:
a. Rescission is proper effectivity as of the time it was availed of by the offended party
b. Rescission not proper then the contract will stand.
o Theres a line of decisions that says you have to go to court. Balane thinks that it is not
necessary.
4. Is there a duty of mutual restitution? Yes. See Magdalena v. Myrick below. Must return to
status quo ante. In this respect, Art. 1191 shares similar effect with Art. 1381
o Sidenote: developers coz of this case used to provide that in the event of default, the
buyer would forfeit installments. This is no longer allowed by the Maceda Law, which
says that if you pay x amount of installments, you are entitled to a cash surrender value.
o Recto Law also.
Cases:
Universal Food v. CA: The formula of Mafran sauce was invented by Magdalo. Magdalo secured the
financial assistance of Reyes which lead to the execution of the Bill of Assignment with Universal.
Magdalo became the chief chemist and Victorian, the auditor and superintendent. Tirso Reyes made
Ricardo Francisco the Chief Chemist and eventually, Magdalo was terminated. Held: BOA can be
rescinded. Universal Foods argue that there can be no rescission because it can only be granted if the
person suffering economic damage has no other recourse for reparation. This is not the case here. In
this case, there is no controversy that the provisions of the Bill of Assignment are reciprocal in nature.
The corporation violated 5-(a) and (b) of the BOA by terminating the services of the Magdalo
without lawful and justifiable cause. Rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or
casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very
object of the parties in making the agreement. The question of whether a breach of a contract is
substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances. The fact remains that the Franciscos had no
alternative but to file the present action for rescission and damages.
JBL concurring: The rescission on account of breach of stipulations is not predicated on injury to
economic interests of the party plaintiff but on the breach of faith by the defendant, that violates the
reciprocity between the parties. It is not a subsidiary action, and Article 1191 may be scanned without
disclosing anywhere that the action for rescission thereunder is subordinated to anything other than
the culpable breach of his obligations by the defendant. This rescission is in principal action
retaliatory in character, it being unjust that a party be held bound to fulfill his promises when
the other violates his. Hence, the reparation of damages for the breach is purely secondary. On the
contrary, in the rescission by reason of lesion or economic prejudice, the cause of action is
subordinated to the existence of that prejudice, because it is the raison d'etre as well as the measure of
the right to rescind. Hence, where the defendant makes good the damages caused, the action cannot
be maintained or continued, as expressly provided in Art.1383 and 1384. But the operation of these 2
articles is limited to the cases of rescission for lesion in Art. 1381, and does not, apply to cases under
Art. 1191.
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Magdalena v. Myrick: Magdalena Estate sold to Myrick lots providing that the price shall be payable
in 120 equal monthly installments. Myrick made several monthly payments however made a default
on payment. Magdalena notified Myrick that agreement has been cancelled as of that date, thereby
relieving him of any further obligation and that all the amounts already paid by him had been
forfeited in favor of Magdalena. Held: Myrick should recover sums he paid. The contract was
rescinded. Magdalena argues that the letter was just a notification and since Myrick did not reply
there was no rescission. Magdalenas acts of taking possession of the lots, not demanding the balance
and reiterating the intent to cancel show that it intended to cancel the contract. The fact that the
parties did not provide for resolution is now of no moment. The obligations arising from the contract
of sale being reciprocal, such obligations are governed by art. 1191, which declares that the power to
resolve, in the event that one of the obligors should not perform his part, is implied. The contract of
sale contains no provision authorizing the vendor, in the event of failure of the vendee to continue in
the payment of the stipulated monthly installments, to retain the amounts paid to him on account of
the purchase price. Magdalenas claim that it has the right to forfeit said sums is untenable. Magdalena
may choose between demanding the fulfillment of the contract or its resolution. These remedies are
alternative and not cumulative, and Magdalena, having elected to cancel the contract cannot avail
himself of the other remedy of exacting performance.
Note from Tolentino: the party seeking rescission cannot have performance as to a part and
rescission as to the remainder. But in your prayer you can ask for fulfillment and rescission in the
alternative.
UP v. De los Angeles: UP and ALUMCO entered into a logging agreement whereby ALUMCO was
granted exclusive authority to cut, collect and remove timber from the Land Grant given to UP in
consideration of payment of royalties and forest fees. On Dec. 8, 1964, ALUMCO incurred an unpaid
account of P219,362.94 and despite repeated demands, failed to pay. So UP sent a notice to rescind
the logging agreement. ALUMCO executed an instrument which stipulated that in the event that
the debtor fails to comply with any of its promises, the Debtor agrees without reservation that
Creditor shall have the right to consider the Logging Agreement rescinded, without the necessity of
any judicial suit. ALUMCO again incurred an additional unpaid account. On July 19,1965, UP
informed ALUMCO that it had, as of that date, considered rescinded the logging agreement. Held:
U.P. can treat its contract with ALUMCO rescinded, and may disregard the same before any judicial
pronouncement to that effect. UP and ALUMCO expressly stipulated that upon default by the
debtor, UP has the right and the power to consider the Logging Agreement rescinded without the
necessity of any judicial suit. There is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into
agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation thereof, even without
court intervention. In other words, it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court
for rescission of the contract. It must be understood that the act of a party in treating a contract as
cancelled or resolved on account of infractions by the other contracting party must be made known to
the other and is always provisional, being ever subject to scrutiny and review by the proper court. the
party who deems the contract violated many consider it resolved or rescinded, and act accordingly,
without previous court action, but it proceeds at its own risk. For it is only the final judgment of the
corresponding court that will conclusively and finally settle whether the action taken was or was not
correct in law.
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BALANE: SC was confused by the terminology. Resolver/Resolucion in the Spanish Code is correct.
Zulueta v. CA: Zulueta and Avellana entered into a contract to sell Zuluetas house and lot. The
contract allowed Zulueta to extrajudicially recover possession of the house, lot and improvements in
case Avellana failed to meet the conditions of the contract, and the forfeiture of money obligations
with the installments already paid considered as rentals. The parties agreed on a purchase price of
P75,000 payable in twenty years with Avellana assuming to pay a down payment of P5,000.00 and a
monthly installment of P630.00 payable in advance before the 5th day of the corresponding month,
starting with December, 1964. Avellana failed to pay. Zulueta filed an ejectment case. Avellana
averred that the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case as it involved the interpretation and/or
rescission of a contract; and that prior to the execution of the contract to sell, Zulueta owed him
P31,269, which was understood to be the down payment of the property. Held: MTC had no
jurisdiction as it was for rescission of a contract. When the contract between the parties provided
for extrajudicial rescission, this takes legal effect only when the other party does not oppose
it. Where it is objected to, a judicial determination of the issue is still necessary. Zulueta had
alleged violation by Avellana of the stipulations of their agreement to sell and thus unilaterally
considered the contract rescinded. Avellana denied any breach. Proof of violation is a condition
precedent to resolution or rescission. It is only when the violation has been established that the
contract can be declared resolved or rescinded. Upon such rescission, in turn, hinges a pronouncement
that possession of the realty has become unlawful. Thus, the basic issue is not possession but one of
rescission or annulment of a contract which is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC. A stipulation
entitling one party to take possession of the land and building if the other party violates the contract
does not ex proprio vigore confer upon the former the right to take possession thereof if objected to
without judicial intervention and determination.
Palay v. Clave: Palay sold a parcel of land to Dumpit. 6 of the contract provided for automatic
extrajudicial rescission upon default in payment of any monthly installment after the lapse of 90 days
from the expiration of the grace period of 1 month, without need of notice and with forfeiture of all
installments paid. Dumpit failed to pay some installments. Almost 6 years later, Clave wrote Palay
offering to update all his overdue accounts and sought consent to the assignment of his rights to
Dizon. Palay informed him that the Contract had long been rescinded pursuant to 6, and that the lot
had already been resold. Held: Demand is necessary to rescind the contract. The judicial action for
the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and
cancelled for violation. However, in the cited cases, there was at least a written notice sent to the
defaulter informing him of the rescission. A written notice is indispensable to inform the
defaulter of the rescission. Hence, the resolution by petitioners of the contract was ineffective and
inoperative against Clave for lack of notice. There was no waiver by Clave of his right to be notified
since it was a contract of adhesion, a standard form of Palay, and Clave had no freedom to stipulate.
Angeles v. Calasanz: Calasanz and Angeles entered into a contract to sell a piece of land for
P3,920.00 plus 7% interest p.a. Angeles made a downpayment of P392.00. Angles paid the monthly
installments of P41.2 until July 1966, when their aggregate payment already amounted to P4,533.38.
On Dec 7, 1966, Calasanz wrote Angeles a letter requesting the remittance of past due accounts.
Upon failure of Angeles, Calasanz cancelled the contract. Held: contract not validly cancelled. While
it is true that 2 of the contract obligated Angeles to pay P3,920 plus 7% interest p.a, it is likewise

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true that under 12 the seller is obligated to transfer the title to the buyer upon payment of the said
price. The contract to sell, being a contract of adhesion, must be construed against the party causing
it. Since the principal obligation under the contract is only P3,920.00 and Angeles has already paid
P4,533.38, the courts should only order the payment of the few remaining installments but not
uphold the cancellation of the contract. Upon payment of the balance without any interest thereon,
the Calasanz must immediately execute the final deed of sale in favor of the Angeles. Art. 1234 also
militates against the unilateral act of the defendants-appellants in cancelling the contract
Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions: Boysaw and his Manager, Ketchum, signed with Interphil
represented by Lope Sarreal, Sr., a contract to engage Gabriel "Flash" Elorde in a boxing contest. It
was stipulated that the bout would be held on Sept 30, 1961 or not later than thirty [30] days
thereafter should a postponement be mutually agreed upon, and that Boysaw would not, prior to the
date of the boxing contest, engage in any other such contest without the written consent of Interphil.
Boysaw fought Louis Avila in Vegas. Ketchum assigned to Araneta the managerial rights over
Boysaw. Araneta assigned to Yulo the managerial rights over Boysaw. Yulo wrote to Sarreal
informing him of his acquisition of the managerial rights over Boysaw and indicating Boysaw's
readiness to comply with the boxing contract. The GAB scheduled the Elorde-Boysaw fight for Nov
4, 1961. Yulo refused to accept the change in date, maintaining his refusal even after Sarreal offered
to advance the date to Oct 28, 1961 which was within the 30-day period of allowable postponements
provided in the principal boxing contract. The fight contemplated in contract never materialized.
Boysaw and Yulo sued Interphil, Sarreal for damages occasioned by the refusal of Interphil and
Sarreal to honor their commitments.
Held: there was a violation of the contract, but since it was Boysaw and Yulo who caused it, they are
not entitled to damages. Boysaw violated the contract when w/o the approval of Interphil, he fought
Avila. While the contract imposed no penalty for such violation, this does not grant any of the parties
the unbridled liberty to breach it with impunity. Our law on contracts recognizes the principle that
actionable injury inheres in every contractual breach. There is no doubt that the contract in question
gave rise to reciprocal obligations. The power to rescind is given to the injured party. Where the
plaintiff is the party who did not perform the undertaking which he was bound by the terms of the
agreement to perform, he is not entitled to insist upon the performance of the contract by the
defendant, or recover damages by reason of his own breach.
Another violation of the contract was the assignment and transfer, first to Araneta, and subsequently,
to Yulo, Jr., of the managerial rights over Boysaw without the knowledge or consent of Interphil.
The assignments, from Ketchum to Araneta, and from Araneta to Yulo, were in fact novations of the
original contract which, to be valid, should have been consented to by Interphil. When a contract is
unlawfully novated by an applicable and unilateral substitution of the obligor by another, the
aggrieved creditor is not bound to deal with the substitute. The consent of the creditor to the change
of debtors, whether in expromision or delegacion is an indispensable requirement.
In a show of accommodation, the appellees offered to advance the fight just to place it within the 30day limit of allowable postponements stipulated in the original boxing contract. The refusal of Yulo
to accept a postponement without any other reason but the implementation of the terms of the
original boxing contract entirely overlooks the fact that by virtue of the violations they have
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committed of the terms thereof, they have forfeited any right to its enforcement. The violations
of the terms of the original contract by Yulo vested Interphil with the right to rescind and repudiate
such contract altogether. That they sought to seek an adjustment of one particular covenant of the
contract, is under the circumstances, within its rights.
Pilipinas Bank v. IAC: Hacienda entered into a contract to sell land with Pilipinas Bank. The
contract contained an automatic rescission clause that allowed the vendor to resell the property and to
forfeit installments already made in favor of the vendor when the vendee fails to pay installments
when due. Hacienda sent series of notices to the Bank for the latters balances. The Bank partially
complied and requested for extensions. Hacienda, for the last time, reminded the Bank to pay their
balance. After more than 2 years, the Bank sent a letter expressing their desire to settle their desire to
fully settle their obligation. Hacienda wrote a letter to the Bank, informing them that the contract to
sell had been rescinded. TC and CA held that Hacienda waived the automatic rescission clause by
accepting payment and by sending letters advising Bank of the balances due. Held: Not automatically
rescinded. An automatic rescission clause in a contract, while valid, may be waived through the
actions of the obligee when the obligee allows the obligor to continue the fulfillment of the terms of
the contract despite the initial breach bringing into force the automatic rescission clause. Haciendas
many extensions granted to the Bank never called attention to the proviso on "automatic rescission."
Hacienda, by its own actions, waived the automatic rescission clause. A contractual provision
allowing "automatic rescission", without prior need of judicial rescission, resolution or cancellation, is
VALID. The remedy of one who feels aggrieved in a contract with an automatic rescission clause is
to go to Court for the cancellation of the rescission itself, in case the rescission is found unjustified
under the circumstances.
Tolentino: a stipulation that a contract will be automatically rescinded is in the nature of a facultative
resolutory condition.
Ong v. CA: Ong entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with the Robles spouses
concerning 2 parcels of land. The spouses undertook to deliver the titles upon full payment. The
checks of Ong were dishonored. Held: the agreement may be set aside, but not because of a breach of
Ong for failure to complete payment. Rather, his failure to do so brought about a situation which
prevented the obligation of spouses to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. A careful
reading of the parties Agreement shows that it is in the nature of a contract to sell, as distinguished
from a contract of sale. In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the
delivery of the thing sold; while in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the
vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. In a contract to sell,
the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a
breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title
from acquiring an obligatory force. The promise of the spouses to sell was subject to the fulfillment of
the suspensive condition of full payment of the purchase price. The non-fulfillment of the condition
of full payment rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. The breach in
Art. 1191 is the obligor's failure to comply with an obligation.
Fil-Estate v. Vertex: FEGDI sold, on installment to RSACC 1 Class "C" Common Share of Forest
Hills. Prior to the full payment of the purchase price, RSACC sold them to Vertex. Vertex enjoyed
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membership privileges in Forest Hills. 17 months after the sale, Vertex wrote FEDGI a letter
demanding the issuance of a stock certificate in its name. FELI replied, initially requested Vertex to
first pay the necessary fees for the transfer. Although Vertex complied with the request, no certificate
was issued. Held: there was substantial breach. In a sale of shares of stock, physical delivery of a
stock certificate is one of the essential requisites for the transfer of ownership. Here, Vertex fully
paid the purchase price by February 11, 1999 but the stock certificate was only delivered on January
23, 2002 after Vertex filed an action for rescission against FEGDI. FEGDI clearly failed to deliver the
stock certificates within a reasonable time from the point the shares should have been delivered. This
was a substantial breach of their contract that entitles Vertex the right to rescind the sale under Art.
1191. It is not correct to say that a sale had already been consummated as Vertex already enjoyed the
rights a shareholder can exercise. The enjoyment of these rights cannot suffice where the law, by its
express terms, requires a specific form to transfer ownership.
Gotesco v. Spouses Fajardo: Sps. Fajardo entered into a Contract to Sell with GPI for the purchase of a
lot. Despite its full payment of the purchase price and subsequent demands, GPI failed to execute the
deed and to deliver the title and physical possession of the subject lot. GPI claimed that the failure to
deliver the title was beyond their control because while GPI's petition for inscription of technical
description was favorably granted by the RTC the same was reversed by the CA; this caused the
delay in the subdivision of the property. GPI thus argued that Article 1191 remained inapplicable
since they were actually willing to comply with their obligation but were only prevented from doing
so due to circumstances beyond their control. HELD: Sps. Fajardo have a right to rescind the
contract. In a contract to sell, the seller's obligation to deliver the certificates of title is simultaneous
and reciprocal to the buyer's full payment. 25 of PD 957, which regulates the subject transaction,
imposes on the subdivision owner or developer the obligation to cause the transfer of the
corresponding certificate of title to the buyer upon full payment. GPI acquired the subject property
through a Deed executed between it and the former registered owner. However, no explanation was
advanced as to why the petition for inscription was filed only after almost 8 years from the acquisition
of the subject property. Neither did GPI sufficiently explain why GPI took no positive action to
cause the immediate filing of a new petition for inscription within a reasonable time from notice of
the CA Decision which dismissed GPIs earlier petition based on technical defects, this
notwithstanding Sps. Fajardo's full payment of the purchase price and prior demand for delivery of
title. Clearly, the long delay in the performance of GPI's obligation from date of demand was
unreasonable and unjustified. It cannot therefore be denied that GPI substantially breached its
contract to sell with Sps. Fajardo which thereby accords the latter the right to rescind the same
pursuant to Article 1191. It is noteworthy to point out that rescission does not merely terminate the
contract and release the parties from further obligations to each other, but abrogates the contract from
its inception and restores the parties to their original positions as if no contract has been made.
Consequently, mutual restitution, which entails the return of the benefits that each party may have
received as a result of the contract, is thus required. To be sure, it has been settled that the effects of
rescission as provided for in Article 138519 of the Code are equally applicable to cases under Article

19
ART. 1385. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with
their fruits, and the price with its interest; consequently, it can be carried out only when he who demands rescission can
return whatever he may be obligated to restore.
Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are the object of the contract are legally in the possession of third
persons who did not act in bad faith.
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1191. Fajardo must be able to recover the price of the property pegged at its prevailing market value.
Reyes v. Rossi: Reyes and Advanced Foundation, represented by Rossi, executed a deed of
conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Dredging Pump.
Reyes failed to pay. Reyes was charged with estafa and BP22. Held: action for rescission of contract
is not a prejudicial question. The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground that
Advanced Foundation did not comply with its obligation actually seeks one of the alternative
remedies available to a contracting party under Art. 1191. Art. 1191 recognizes an implied or tacit
resolutory condition in reciprocal obligations. It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the
extinguishment of the obligatory relation as if it was never created, the extinguishment having a
retroactive effect. The rescission is equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie, leaving
things in their status before the celebration of the contract. However, until the contract is
rescinded, the juridical tie and the concomitant obligations subsist. The civil action for the
rescission of contract was not determinative of the guilt or innocence of Reyes. Under the law on
contracts, vitiated consent does not make a contract unenforceable but merely voidable, the remedy
of which would be to annul the contract since voidable contracts produce legal effects until they are
annulled. On the other hand, rescission of contracts in case of breach pursuant to Art. 1191 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines also presupposes a valid contract unless rescinded or annulled.
Sandoval v. PMMA: PMMA and Sandoval Shipyard entered into a Ship Building Contract, whereby
Sandoval will build two lifeboats for PMMA. PMMA filed a case for rescission when Sandoval failed
to follow the contract specifications (a different engine was used; not delivered w/in 45 working days
from date of contract). Both RTC and CA found Sandoval to have breached the contract and ordered
rescission. Sandoval is now questioning whether the case is for rescission and not damages/breach of
contract. Held: the failure or breach of PMMAs contractual rights is the cause of action. Rescission
or damages are part of the reliefs. Rescission requires a mutual restoration of benefits received.
However, Sandoval Shipyard failed to deliver the lifeboats; their alleged delivery to Rosario was
invalid, as he was not a duly authorized representative named in the contract. Hence, Sandoval
Shipyard could not compel PMMA to return something it never had possession or custody of.
Eds v. Healthcheck: Eds got health insurance from HCI. 2 months into the program, HCI notified Eds
that its accreditation with DLSUMC was suspended and advised it to avail of the services of nearby
accredited institutions. In a quickly convened meeting, HCI agreed that there would be No renewal
of contract w/ HC should there be another suspension of services in any hospitals. Despite this
commitment, HCI failed to preserve its credit standing with DLSUMC prompting the latter to
suspend its accreditation. Due to this, EMI notified HCI that it was rescinding the contract. Held:
although a ground exists to validly rescind the contract between the parties, it appears that EMI failed
to judicially rescind the same. In Iringan v. CA, this Court reiterated the rule that in the absence of a
stipulation, a party cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially rescind a contract. A judicial or notarial act
is necessary before a valid rescission (or resolution) can take place. The operative act which produces
the resolution of the contract is the decree of the court and not the mere act of the vendor. Since a
judicial or notarial act is required by law for a valid rescission to take place, the letter written by
respondent declaring his intention to rescind did not operate to validly rescind the contract.
Art. 1192. In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation, the liability of the
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first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. If it cannot be determined which of
the parties first violated the contract, the same shall be deemed extinguished, and each shall
bear his own damages.
Applies if both breach independently, not if 1 causes the other to breach.
Not retaliatory
Resolutory also
CB v. CA: Tolentino took out a loan for P80K from Island Savings Bank secured by a mortgage. ISB
only released 17k. Tolentino failed to pay the 17k. ISB filed extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Held: Rescission only of the remaining 63K. Tolentino is bound by the promissory note he released
WRT the P17k loan. He has a reciprocal oblig to pay such when it falls due. So WRT to this amount,
hes not entitled to recission since hes also a party in default (CC Art. 1191). As a matter of fact, right
to rescind belongs to the aggrieved party, ISB. Had he not signed a promissory note, Tolentino
would be entitled to ask for recission of entire loan there being no date for him to perform his
reciprocal oblig to pay. Since both parties were in default, theyre both liable for damages. Thus, ISBs
liability for damages is offset by Tolentinos liability for damages in the form of penalties &
surcharges.
c. Term (Articles 1193-1198):

A term is a length of time which, exerting an influence on an obligation as a consequence of
juridical acts, suspends its demandability or determines its extinguishment.
Term or period.
Similarity between condition and term: both future. Dissimilarity: uncertainty.
A term is a future and certain event (i.e. death)
Term may be certain as to time (i.e. June 3, 2015), or certain as to event (i.e. death, when Pnoy
steps down from the presidency, when the bar results of 2015 will be released)
Tolentinos examples of certain as to event (indefinite or indeterminate period): movable religious
holidays like Holy Week, events in civil or political life.
Tolentino: if the term is when the person turns 18 and the person dies before that, the term is not
converted to a condition. The period will be computed just the same in spite of the death of the
person. (Idk what Balane thinks tho).
Art. 1180 When the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so, the
obligation is one with a term.
Although Article 1180 looks like a condition dependent on the sole will of the debtor, the law
treats it as a term.
Strictly speaking it is not a term; speaking it is a condition, but the law says its a term so too bad.
Tolentino: the creditor should file an action to fix a period for the payment of the obligation. An
immediate action to enforce the obligation, without a period having been previously fixed by the
court, would be premature.
Art. 1193. Obligations for whose fulfillment a day certain has been fixed, shall be demandable
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only when that day comes.

Obligations with a resolutory period take effect at once, but terminate upon arrival of the day
certain.
A day certain is understood to be that which must necessarily come, although it may not be
known when.
If the uncertainty consists in whether the day will come or not, the obligation is conditional,
and it shall be regulated by the rules of the preceding Section.
Art. 1194. In case of loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing before the arrival of the
day certain, the rules in article 1189 shall be observed.
Art. 1195. Anything paid or delivered before the arrival of the period, the obligor being
unaware of the period or believing that the obligation has become due and demandable, may
be recovered, with the fruits and interests.
If prepayment is made without the debtor being aware that the period had not yet arrived, then the
thing and the fruits can be recovered.
If prepayment is made and the debtor was aware that the period had not yet arrived, then the
debtor waives the benefit of the term.
Tolentino: only in obligations to give
An obligation was entered on May 1, 2002 between A and B. The obligation is to be performed on
October 1, 2002. A delivers on September 1, 2002 by mistake to B. A discovers his mistake and
tells B to return the object and the fruits delivered.
Cant collect when:
1. The term has come He realizes his mistake on Oct 30
2. He waives the period He knows its due on Oct 1, but chooses to pay on June 1.
Article 1195 does not answer who is entitled to the fruits that have been produced in the meantime
(May 1, 2002 to October 1, 2002).
According to the Spanish Code, the debtor (A) can get only the fruits.
There are 2 views:
1. The debtor is entitled to the fruits produced in the meantime (Tolentino)
o This is because delivery is not required until October 1.
2. The creditor is entitled to the fruits since the obligation is demandable only when the period
arrives
o This is because the obligation is already existing although it is not yet demandable.
o BALANE believes that the fruits belong to the debtor. Why would Article 1195 allow the
debtor to recover the fruits if he should still give them back after the term comes?
Instances when the Fruits Cannot be Recovered
1. When the obligation is reciprocal and there has been pre-payment of both sides
2. When the obligation is a loan and the debtor is bound to pay interest

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3. When the period is exclusively for the creditors benefit

4. When the debtor is aware of the period and pays anyway waiver
Art. 1196. Whenever in an obligation a period is designated, it is presumed to have been
established for the benefit of both the creditor and the debtor, unless from the tenor of the
same or other circumstances it should appear that the period has been established in favor of
one or of the other.
The effect of this presumption is that the creditor cannot demand payment before the period
arrives nor can the debtor demand the creditor to accept payment before the period arrives.
Example: A issues a promissory note to B demandable on October 15. A cannot insist on
prepayment nor can B insist that he be paid on September.
If the period is for the benefit of the creditor only, the creditor can demand performance at any
time, but the debtor cannot compel him to accept payment before the period expires
If the period is for the benefit of the debtor only, the debtor can oppose a premature demand for
payment, but may validly pay at any time before the period expires.
Acc. to case law the ff wording means that the term is for the benefit of the debtor
o I promise to pay within 6 months from date, the period is for the benefit of the debtor.
o I promise to pay on or before June 1, 2015 the period is for the benefit of the debtor.
Art. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it
can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the
debtor.
In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances have
been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be
changed by them.
Araneta Inc v. Phil. Sugar Estates: Art. 1197 inapplicable because the period was clear: the eviction of
the squatters.
2 steps:
1. Did they intend a period?
2. What did they intend?
Cant ask for specific performance and ask for the period because a period is future.
2 steps involved in an action for fixing a period:
1. The court should determine that the obligation does not fix a period but it can be inferred
that a period is intended due to the circumstances OR the period is dependent
on debtors will.
2. Court shall decide what period was probably contemplated by the parties.
Court should make an educated guess.
Court should not fix a period which it thinks is fair or reasonable but rather the period which was
probably contemplated by the parties.
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Instances When Court May Fix a Period:

1. Article1197,1: If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration
thereof.
o Exceptions:
a. Articles 168220 and 1687, 1st sentence21
b. Pacto de retro sales (Article1606)22
c. Contract of services for an indefinite period
o Court cannot fix a period or else it would amount to involuntary servitude.
2. Article1197,2: The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the
will of the debtor.
3. Article1191,3: The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause
authorizing the fixing of a period.
4. Article 1687, 2nd, 3rd and 4th sentences: However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and
no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the
lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may
likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months.
In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the
place for over one month.
5. Article1180: When the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so, the
obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period, subject to the provisions of Article 1197.
Cases:
Chaves v. Gonzales: Chaves delivered to Gonzales a portable typewriter for routine cleaning and
servicing. Gonzales was not able to finish the job after some time despite repeated reminders. After
getting exasperated with the delay of the repair, Chaves went to the house of Gonzales and asked for
the return which was done. Gonzales contends that he is not liable for damages because his contract
with Chaves did not contain a period, so Chaves should have first filed a petition for the court to fix
the period. Held: Gonzales cannot invoke Article 1197 of the Civil Code for he virtually admitted

20
Art. 1682. The lease of a piece of rural land, when its duration has not been fixed, is understood to have been for all the
time necessary for the gathering of the fruits which the whole estate leased may yield in one year, or which it may yield
once, although two or more years have to elapse for the purpose.
21
Art. 1687, 1st sentence. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent
agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to
day, if the rent is to be paid daily.
22
Art. 1606. The right referred to in article 1601, in the absence of an express agreement, shall last four years from the
date of the contract.
Should there be an agreement, the period cannot exceed ten years.
However, the vendor may still exercise the right to repurchase within thirty days from the time final judgment was
rendered in a civil action on the basis that the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase.
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nonperformance by returning the typewriter that he was obliged to repair in a non-working

condition, with essential parts missing. They intended that the defendant was to finish it at some
future time, although such time was not specified; and that such time had, passed without the work
having been accomplished, for the defendant returned the typewriter cannibalized and unrepaired,
which in itself is a breach of his obligation, without demanding that he should be given more time to
finish the job, or compensation for the work he had already done. The time for compliance having
evidently expired, and there being a breach of contract by non-performance, it was academic for the
plaintiff to have first petitioned the court to fix a period for the performance of the contract before
filing his complaint in this case.
Encarnacion v. Baldomar: Encarnacion leased his house to Baldomar with rentals paid on a monthly
basis. After 6 years, Encarnacion asked Baldomar to vacate. Baldomar argued that the contract
authorized them to continue occupying the house indefinetly and while they should faithfully fulfill
their obligations as respects the payment of the rentals. Held: Baldomar should GTFO. The defense
would leave to the sole and exclusive will of one of the contracting parties (defendants) the validity
and fulfillment of the contract of lease, within the meaning of art. 1256, since the continuance and
fulfillment of the contract would then depend solely and exclusively upon their free and uncontrolled
choice between continuing paying the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of all say in the
matter. If this defense were to be allowed, so long as defendants elected to continue the lease by
continuing the payment of the rentals, the owner would never be able to discontinue it; conversely,
although the owner should desire the lease to continue, the lessees could effectively thwart his
purpose if they should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment
of the rentals. This, of course, is prohibited by the aforesaid article of the Civil Code.
Eleizegui v. Manila Lawn: A contract of lease was entered into by Eleizegui, as lessor, with Manila
Lawn Tennis Club, as lessee. It was stipulated that the lessee can make improvements thereon, and the
lessee may lease it for all the time the members of the said club may desire to use it . . . Third. . . . the
owners of the land undertake to maintain the club as tenant as long as the latter shall see fit. Eleizegui
terminated the contract, relying on article 1581 (legal term), which states that if the term has not been
fixed, it shall be understood to be for months when the rent is monthly. Held: a period has been fixed
but must be determined by the court. The parties have agreed on a term. Since a there was a
conventional term, the judge can not apply the legal term fixed in subsidium to cover a case in which
the parties have made no agreement whatsoever with respect to the duration of the lease. Since this is
a lease contract, it is, by nature, for a determinate period. On the other hand, it cannot be concluded
that the termination of the contract is to be left completely at the will of the lessee, because it has been
stipulated that its duration is to be left to his will. In every contract there is always a creditor who is
entitled to demand the performance, and a debtor upon whom rests the obligation to perform the
undertaking. In bilateral contracts the contracting parties are mutually creditors and debtors. Thus, in
this contract of lease, the lessee is the creditor with respect to the rights enumerated in article 1554,
and is the debtor with respect to the obligations imposed by articles 1555 and 1561. The term within
which performance of the latter obligation is due is what has been left to the will of the debtor. This
term it is which must be fixed by the courts. Unlawful detainer cannot be maintained, the court has to
determine if the term/period has expired. The judgment was entered below upon the theory of the
expiration of a legal term which does not exist, as the case requires that a term be fixed by the courts
under the provisions of article 1128 with respect to obligations which, as is the present, are terminable

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at the will of the obligee.

Philbanking v. Lui She: Justina Santos is an old rich lady who lived with 17 dogs (cute) and 8 maids.
She leased her property to Wong. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right
to withdraw at any time from the agreement. In another contract, she gave Wong an option to buy
the property within 10 year. Later, she extended the lease to 99 years and the option to 50 years. The
stipulation that "the lessee may at any time withdraw from this agreement" is claimed to offend
against art.1308 which provides that the contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or
compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them. Held: art. 1308 creates no impediment to the
insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the
contract by one of the parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make either the
validity or the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded
the privilege of cancellation; for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall
exist, the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which
may have been the subject of agreement. Indeed, the cancellation of a contract in accordance with
conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment. In contrast to Encarnacion v. Baldomar, the right of
the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it
cannot be said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term
had been fixed in the agreement, this case would at most justify the fixing of a period but not the
annulment of the contract.
Lim v. People: Lim offered to sell Ayrosos tobacco and agreed to turn over the price as soon as it [is]
sold. Held: Art. 1197 does not apply because this is a contract of agency because the proceeds of the
sale of the tobacco should be turned over to the complainant as soon as the same was sold, or, that the
obligation was immediately demandable as soon as the tobacco was disposed of. The fact that Lim
received the tobacco, the proceeds to be given to complainant as soon as it was sold, strongly negates
transfer of ownership of the goods to the petitioner. The agreement constituted her as an agent with
the obligation to return the tobacco if the same was not sold.
Araneta Inc. v. Phil Sugar: Araneta sold land to Phil Sugar. Phil. Sugar was obliged to build Sto.
Domingo Church on a portion of the land, while Araneta was supposed to construct the streets
around it. Araneta failed to comply. It argued that the action was premature since its obligation to
construct the streets in question was without a definite period which needs to be fixed first by the
court in a proper suit for that purpose before a complaint for specific performance will prosper. Held:
period fixing is not justified. Neither of the courts below seems to have noticed that what the answer
put in issue was not whether the court should fix the time of performance, but whether or not the
parties agreed that the petitioner should have reasonable time to perform its part of the bargain. If the
contract so provided, then there was a period fixed, a "reasonable time;" and all that the court should
have done was to determine if that reasonable time had already elapsed when suit was filed if it had
passed, then the court should declare that petitioner had breached the contract, as averred in the
complaint, and fix the resulting damages. On the other hand, if the reasonable time had not yet
elapsed, the court perforce was bound to dismiss the action for being premature. But in no case can it
be logically held that under the plea, the intervention of the court to fix the period for performance
was warranted, for Article 1197 is precisely predicated on the absence of any period fixed by the
parties.

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Millare v. Hernando: Millare as lessor and Elsa Co, as lessee executed a 5-year contract of lease. The
parties agreed to rent out a commercial unit for a monthly rate of P350. Before the expiration of the
lease contract, the lessor informed them that the lessee can continue renting the unit as they were
amenable to paying increased rentals of P1,200.00 a month. In response, a counteroffer of P700.00 a
month was made by the lessee. At this point, the lessor allegedly stated that the amount of monthly
rentals could be resolved at a later time since "the matter is simple among us", which alleged remark
was supposedly taken by the spouses Co to mean that the Contract of Lease had been renewed. On 22
July 1980, Mrs. Millare wrote the Co spouses requesting them to vacate the leased premises as she had
no intention of renewing the Contract of Lease. Lessees responded by reiterated their unwillingness to
pay the P1,200.00 monthly rentals and by depositing the P700 monthly rentals in court. HELD: The
lessor and the lessee conspicuously failed to reach agreement both on the amount of the rental to be
payable during the renewal term, and on the term of the renewed contract. The respondent judge
cited Articles 1197 and 1670 when he ordered the renewal of the lease for another term of five years
and fixed monthly rentals thereunder at P700.00 a month. 1, Art. 1197 is clearly inapplicable, since
the Contract of Lease did in fact fix an original period of five years. The 2 of Art. 1197 is equally
inapplicable since the duration of the renewal period was not left to the will of the lessee alone, but
rather to the will of both the lessor and the lessee. The implied new lease during the continued
occupancy could not possibly have a period of five years, but rather would have been a month-tomonth lease since the rentals (under the original contract) were payable on a monthly basis. Most
importantly, Article 1197 applies only where a contract of lease clearly exists. It follows that the
judge's decision requiring renewal of the lease has no basis in law or in fact since courts have no
authority to prescribe the terms and conditions of a contract for the parties.
Art. 1198. The debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period:
(1) When after the obligation has been contracted, he becomes insolvent, unless he gives a
guaranty or security for the debt;
(2) When he does not furnish to the creditor the guaranties or securities which he has
promised;
(3) When by his own acts he has impaired said guaranties or securities after their
establishment, and when through a fortuitous event they disappear, unless he immediately
gives new ones equally satisfactory;
(4) When the debtor violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed
to the period;
(5) When the debtor attempts to abscond.
The debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period:
1. When after the obligation has been contracted, the debtor becomes insolvent unless he gives a
guaranty or security for the debt (Article 1198 (1))
o The insolvency here need not be judicial. It can be actual insolvency.
2. When he does not furnish to the creditor the guaranties or securities which he has promised
(Article 1198 (2))

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3. When by his own acts he has impaired the said guaranties or securities after their
establishment, and when through a fortuitous event they disappear, unless he immediately
gives new ones equally satisfactory (Article 1198 (3))
4. When the debtor violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed
(Article 1198 (4))
5. When the debtor attempts to abscond (Article1198(5))
6. When the creditor is deceived on the substance or quality of the thing pledged, the creditor
may either claim another thing in its stead or demand immediate payment of the principal
obligation (Article 2109)
Types of Periods
i. Suspensive (ex die)
The period is suspensive when the obligation becomes demandable only upon the arrival of the
period.
ii. Resolutory (in diem)
The period is resolutory when the performance must terminate upon the arrival of the period.
Classification according to source:
i. Legal
A period is legal when it is granted by law.
ii. Voluntary
A period is voluntary when it is stipulated by the parties.
iii. Judicial
A period is judicial when it is fixed by the courts.
If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred
that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof (Article 1197, 1st ).
i. Express
A period is express when the period is specifically stated.
ii. Tacit
A period is tacit when a person undertakes to do some work which can be done only during a
particular season.
i. Original
ii. Grace
A grace period is an extension fixed by the parties or by the court.
i. Definite
A period is definite when it refers to a fixed known date or time.
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ii. Indefinite
A period is indefinite when it refers to an event which will necessarily happen but the date of its
happening is unknown (i.e. death)
2. According to Plurality of Object (Articles 1199-1206)

How do you classify in terms of object? Simple or multiple. Conjuctive: have to do many things
for one consideration. Or it can be Alternative or facultative.
Art. 1199. A person alternatively bound by different prestations shall completely perform
one of them.
The creditor cannot be compelled to receive part of one and part of the other undertaking.
Alternative obligation!
Art. 1200. The right of choice belongs to the debtor, unless it has been expressly granted to
the creditor.
The debtor shall have no right to choose those prestations which are impossible, unlawful or
which could not have been the object of the obligation.
Choice= concentration
Can pick a third person to decide too.
Once the choice has been made, then the obligation is concentrated in 1 object.
After choice is communicated, it ceases to be alternative.
If you dont communicate there is no concentration.
Art. 1201. The choice shall produce no effect except from the time it has been communicated.
BALANE: you need to communicate to allow the person to prepare!
Before the choice is communicated then there are 2 objects.
From communication it becomes specific, not alternative.
So if Balane promises to give his car or a watch, and Nitura picks the car. If the car burns
(fortuitous event), then Nitura cant claim the watch coz he already picked the car. Obligation is
extinguished.
BUT, in Ong Guan vs. Century Insurance, the Supreme Court said that the purpose for notice to
the creditor is to give the creditor the opportunity to express his consent or to impugn the
election made by the debtor. Professor Balane does not agree with this statement since the
creditor does not have the right to impugn, otherwise, the obligation would not be an alternative
obligation. A better reason according to Professor Balane is to give the creditor time to prepare.
Example: The choice is either to give diamond ring or a Mercedes Benz. The debtor should notify
the creditor so the creditor can either rent a safety deposit box or prepare a garage.
However, according to Professor Balane, the best reason is because once the choice is
communicated, the obligation ceases to be alternative. The risk of loss belongs to the creditor
now.
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Effect of communication: if he chooses the ring then its lost by a fortuitous evet, then the
obligation is extinguished.
Art. 1202. The debtor shall lose the right of choice when among the prestations whereby he is
alternatively bound, only one is practicable.
Art. 1203. If through the creditor's acts the debtor cannot make a choice according to the
terms of the obligation, the latter may rescind the contract with damages.
Art. 1204. The creditor shall have a right to indemnity for damages when, through the fault
of the debtor, all the things which are alternatively the object of the obligation have been
lost, or the compliance of the obligation has become impossible.
The indemnity shall be fixed taking as a basis the value of the last thing which disappeared, or
that of the service which last became impossible.
Damages other than the value of the last thing or service may also be awarded.
Art. 1205. When the choice has been expressly given to the creditor, the obligation shall cease
to be alternative from the day when the selection has been communicated to the debtor.
Until then the responsibility of the debtor shall be governed by the following rules:
(1) If one of the things is lost through a fortuitous event, he shall perform the obligation by
delivering that which the creditor should choose from among the remainder, or that which
remains if only one subsists;
(2) If the loss of one of the things occurs through the fault of the debtor, the creditor may
claim any of those subsisting, or the price of that which, through the fault of the former, has
disappeared, with a right to damages;
(3) If all the things are lost through the fault of the debtor, the choice by the creditor shall fall
upon the price of any one of them, also with indemnity for damages.
The same rules shall be applied to obligations to do or not to do in case one, some or all of the
prestations should become impossible.
Art. 1206. When only one prestation has been agreed upon, but the obligor may render
another in substitution, the obligation is called facultative.
The loss or deterioration of the thing intended as a substitute, through the negligence of the
obligor, does not render him liable. But once the substitution has been made, the obligor is
liable for the loss of the substitute on account of his delay, negligence or fraud.
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a. Alternative
An obligation is alternative when several objects or prestations are due, but the payment or
performance of 1 of them would be sufficient.
A promise to deliver either 500 kgs of rice or 1000 liters of gas. The obligation is alternative. The
debtor cannot perform the obligation by giving 250 kgs of rice and 500 liters of gas unless the
creditor agrees. In which case there is a novation.
General Rule: The right of choice the right to belongs to the debtor.
Exceptions:
1. When it is expressly granted to the creditor
2. When it is agreed upon by the parties that a 3rd person shall make the choice
Choice Belongs to the Debtor
1. When through fortuitous event or through the debtors acts, there is only 1 prestation left,
the obligation ceases to be alternative (Article 1202).
2. When the choice of the debtor is limited through the creditors own acts, then the debtor has
the remedy of resolution (Article 1191) plus damages (Article 1203)
3. When all things are lost due to the debtors fault, the creditor can sue for damages
(Article 1204)
o Measure: value of the last prestation
4. When some things are lost due to the debtors fault but there are still some things remaining,
then the debtor can choose from whats left
5. When all the things are lost due to a fortuitous event, the obligation is extinguished
6. When all but 1 of the things are lost due to a fortuitous event and the last object is lost
through the debtors fault, then the creditor can sue for damages
7. When all but 1 of the things are lost through the debtors own acts and the last object is lost
through a fortuitous event, the obligation is extinguished
Choice Belongs to the Creditor (Article 1205)

1. When 1 or some of the objects are lost through fortuitous events, then the creditor chooses
from the remainder
2. When 1 or some of the objects are lost due to the debtors fault, the creditor may choose from
the remainder or get the value of any of the objects lost plus damages in either case
3. When all of the things are lost due to the debtors fault, the creditor can get the value of
any of the objects lost plus damages
4. When some are lost through the debtors fault, the creditor chooses from the remainder
5. When all the objects are lost due to a fortuitous event, then the obligation is extinguished
6. When all the objects are lost due to the creditors fault, the obligation is extinguished
b. Facultative
An obligation is facultative when only 1 object or prestation has been agreed upon by the parties
to the obligation, but the debtor may deliver or render another in substitution.
o Debtor reserves the right to substitute it with another prestation
Facultative obligations bear a resemblance to alternative obligations particularly when the choice
in an alternative obligation is with the debtor.
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In a facultative obligation, the right of choice is always with the debtor. Only debtor can make
the choice
In an alternative obligation, if 1 of the prestations is impossible, then there are other choices. In a
facultative obligation, if the principal obligation is impossible, then everything is annulled.
In theory, it is easy to distinguish a facultative obligation from an alternative obligation. In
practice, it is difficult to do so since most of the time, the words are ambiguous. For example, I
promise to deliver my Honda Accord, but I reserve my right to substitute this with my Gold
Rolex. In this case, it is not very clear whether the obligation is alternative or facultative.
According to Professor Balane, the rule is that one must look at the circumstances of the
obligation to determine the intent of the parties. If it is impossible to determine which one, then
the doubt should be resolved in the favor of an alternative obligation since its effects are less
radical.
Differences between alternative and facultative acc. to Tolentino
Contents
Nullity
Choice
Effect of loss
Alternative
Various prestations all of which
constitute parts of the
obligation
Nullity of 1 doesnt invalidate
the obligation
Either debtor or creditor
Only impossibility of all
without the fault of the debtor
will extinguish the obligation
Facultative
Only the principal prestation
constitutes the obligations, the
accessory being only a means to
facilitate payment
Nullity of the principal
invalidates the obligation
Only the debtor
The impossibility of the
principal is sufficient, even if
the substitute is possible.
3. According to Plurality of Subject (Articles1207-1222)

Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and
the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that
each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestation. There is a
solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature
of the obligation requires solidarity.
Ronquillo v. CA: Ronquillo was one of the 4 defendants of the Civil case filed by So for collection of
money amounting to 117M. They entered into a compromise agreement, which said that failure of
either party to comply with the terms and conditions, the innocent party will be entitled to an
execution. Because of failure of the other 2 defendants to pay their part of the obligation, a writ of
execution was issued against the properties of the 4 defendants including Ronquillo, single and jointly
liable. The compromise agreement provides that defendants individually and jointly agree to pay.
HELD: the liability of Ronquillo and the 4 other is solidary. By the terms of the compromise
agreement and the decision based upon it, the defendants obligated themselves to pay their obligation
individually and jointly. An agreement to be individually liable undoubtedly creates a several

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obligation. A several obligation is one by which one individual binds himself to perform the whole
obligation. Note: individually has the same meaning as collectively, separately, distinctively,
respectively or severally, juntos or separadamente.
Malayan Insurance v. CA: Sio Choy got 3rd party insurance for his jeep from Malayan for P20K. Sio
Choys jeep driven by an employee of San Leon. Passenger of jeep died and claimed against Malayan,
Sio Choy and San Leon. Held: Malayan is not solidarily liable with the tortfeasors. Only liable for
20k. An insurer is not a solidary debtor in a case of joint tortfeasors where a third party liability
insurance contract exists, as their liability for payment is based on different obligations: one is based
on tort and the other on contract.
RCBC v. CA: Ching was surety for PBM to guarantee PBMs payment to RCBC. In an injunctive
Order, all actions for claims against PBM were suspended by the SEC in order to give the
Commission the opportunity to pass upon the feasibility of any rehabilitation plans. Held: Ching still
has to pay, notwithstanding the injunction. The extent of a surety's liability is determined only by the
clause of the contract of suretyship. It cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the
contract. Conversely, liability therefor may not be restricted unless expressly so stated.
Quisumbing v. CA: Quisumbing and Biscocho were solidarily obliged to build a house. Once it was
built Quisumbing filed a case against sps Saligo who refused to pay. Held: The question of who
should sue the sps Saligo was a personal issue between Quisumbing and Biscocho in which the sps
Saligo had no right to interfere. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either one of the
parties is indispensable, and the other is not even necessary because complete relief may be obtained
from either.
Republic Planters Bank v. CA: Canlas and Yamaguchi signed promissory notes executed by World
Garment Manufacturing in favor of Planters. Held: Canlas is solidarily liable. Where an instrument
containing the words I promise to pay is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed to be
jointly and severally liable thereon. Canlas is solidarily liable on each of the promissory notes bearing
his signature for the following reasons: The promissory notes are negotiable instruments and must be
governed by the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Inciong v. CA: Where the promissory note expressly states that the three signatories therein are
jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of them may be proceeded against for the entire
obligation - the choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce
collection.
Joint: each of the creditors can demand only a proporationate part of the credit.
o Mancomunada, mancommunada simple, pro rata
Solidary: Each of the creditors can demand can demand the whole or anyone of the debtors can be
required to perform all
o In PN, if you use singular pronouns solidary if signed by 2 or more persons
o Joint and solidary, in solidum, solidaria
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o Other words indicating solidarity acc. to Tolentino: juntos o separadamente, individually and
collectively, individually liable, individually and jointly, mancomunada solidaria
Art. 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the obligations to which the
preceding article refers the contrary does not appear, the credit or debt shall be presumed to
be divided into as many shares as there are creditors or debtors, the credits or debts being
considered distinct from one another, subject to the Rules of Court governing the
multiplicity of suits.
Art. 1209. If the division is impossible, the right of the creditors may be prejudiced only by
their collective acts, and the debt can be enforced only by proceeding against all the debtors.
If one of the latter should be insolvent, the others shall not be liable for his share.
Tolentino notes:
o If the object is indivisible and there are several joint creditors, the obligation can be performed
only by delivering the object to all the creditors jointly. If the debtor delivers to only 1, he
will be liable for damages.
o If only some of the debtors ask for delivery, the debtor can refuse to perform.
Art. 1210. The indivisibility of an obligation does not necessarily give rise to solidarity. Nor
does solidarity of itself imply indivisibility.
Art. 1211. Solidarity may exist although the creditors and the debtors may not be bound in
the same manner and by the same periods and conditions.
Art. 1212. Each one of the solidary creditors may do whatever may be useful to the others,
but not anything which may be prejudicial to the latter.
Art. 1213. A solidary creditor cannot assign his rights without the consent of the others.
Tolentino: If a solidary creditor does so, then it produces no effect. If payment is made to the new
creditor, it is made to a third person. However, if assignment is to a co-creditor then Tolentino
thinks this is ok because the co-creditor already enjoys the confidence of his co- creditors.
Art. 1214. The debtor may pay any one of the solidary creditors; but if any demand, judicial
or extrajudicial, has been made by one of them, payment should be made to him.
Art. 1215. Novation, compensation, confusion or remission of the debt, made by any of the
solidary creditors or with any of the solidary debtors, shall extinguish the obligation, without
prejudice to the provisions of article 1219.
The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects the debt,
shall be liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding to them.
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Is there a conflict between Article 1212 and Article 1215? Article 1212 provides that each of the
solidary creditors may do whatever may be useful to the others, but not anything which may be
prejudicial to the latter. But Article 1215 allows novation, compensation, confusion or remission
on the part of the solidary creditor. Why? According to Professor Balane, this is absurd.
One way of reconciling is that under Article 1215, any creditor can remit or condone the
obligation. But because the obligation is extinguished, the condoning creditor must be liable for
the other creditors share. Here, there is no prejudice.
A, B and C are creditors of X. A can condone the entire 3M. However, A must pay B and C 1M
each.
o Its effective as to A and X, but not B and C
However, another problem arises if the condoning creditor later on becomes insolvent.
Tolentino: where the creditor in a solidary obligation has, by a subsequent instrument,
covenanted with some of the solidary debtors different periods of payment and different
conditions, the solidarity stipulated in the original contract is not thereby destroyed.
Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of
them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those
which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully
collected.
PNB v. Planters: PNB filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against several solidary
debtors. After PNB presented its evidence, one of the defendants, Ceferino Valencia, died. Thus, the
CFI dismissed the action holding that it should be prosecuted in the estate proceedings of the deceased
under Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Held: the death of one defendant does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction to proceed with the case against the surviving defendants an action for collection of a sum
of money based on contract against all the solidary debtors. Article 1216 grants the creditor the
substantive right to seek satisfaction of his credit from one, some or all of his solidary debtors. If, after
instituting a collection suit based on contract against some or all of them and, during its pendency,
one of the defendants dies, the court retains jurisdiction to continue the proceedings and decide the
case in respect of the surviving defendants.
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or
more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds
to each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the
debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the
debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to
the debt of each.
Art. 1218. Payment by a solidary debtor shall not entitle him to reimbursement from his codebtors if such payment is made after the obligation has prescribed or become illegal.
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Art. 1219. The remission made by the creditor of the share which affects one of the solidary
debtors does not release the latter from his responsibility towards the co-debtors, in case the
debt had been totally paid by anyone of them before the remission was effected.
Art. 1219. The remission made by the creditor of the share which affects one of the solidary
debtors does not release the latter from his responsibility towards the co-debtors, in case the debt
had been totally paid by anyone of them before the remission was effected.
A is the creditor of V, W, X, Y,and Z. W, X, Y, and Z owe A 10,000. The obligation is solidary.
A remits Xs share P2,000. A can go after V for only P8,000. The remission benefits X
initially since X only has to pay P8,000 instead of 10,000. However, X can only recover P2,000
each from the rest.
A is the creditor of V,W,X,Y, and Z. V, W, X, Y, and Z owe A P10,000. The obligation is
solidary. A remits Xs share P2,000. A can go after X for the balance since X is still a solidary
debtor for the balance. Otherwise, the effect of remission would be extended. However, X can
recover P8,000 from everyone.
A is the creditor of V, W, X, Y, and Z. V, W, X, Y, and Z owe A P10,000. The
obligation is solidary. A remits Xs share P2,000. Y becomes insolvent. A sues W for the
balance of P8,000.
o What happens? 3 views:
Creditor bears loss: A only gets 6,000 (10k-Xs share- Ys share=10k-2k-2k)
All of them except X bear the loss.
All will bear the loss (inc. X): Art. 1217 must be applied. Thus, the insolvency of Y is
shouldered by V, W, and Z. So, W can recover P2,000 from X and P500 from Y instead
of collecting P3,000. W has to shoulder P500 as a loss due to Zs insolvency.
Balane thinks this is most equitable. Only his 2000 share is remitted, but he remains
liable for his portion of the share of the insolvent debtor.
Art. 1220. The remission of the whole obligation, obtained by one of the solidary debtors,
does not entitle him to reimbursement from his co-debtors.
Art. 1221. If the thing has been lost or if the prestation has become impossible without the
fault of the solidary debtors, the obligation shall be extinguished.
If there was fault on the part of any one of them, all shall be responsible to the creditor, for
the price and the payment of damages and interest, without prejudice to their action against
the guilty or negligent debtor.
If through a fortuitous event, the thing is lost or the performance has become impossible after
one of the solidary debtors has incurred in delay through the judicial or extrajudicial demand
upon him by the creditor, the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply.
Art. 1222. A solidary debtor may, in actions filed by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses
which are derived from the nature of the obligation and of those which are personal to him,
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or pertain to his own share. With respect to those which personally belong to the others, he
may avail himself thereof only as regards that part of the debt for which the latter are
responsible.
3 Kinds of Defenses:
i. Real defenses
These are defenses derived from the nature of the obligation.
A real defense is a total defense. It benefits all the debtors.
Total: deliver drugs
ii. Personal defenses

Personal defenses may either be total or partial defenses.
An example of a total personal defense is if the consent of the debtors were all vitiated.
An example of a partial defense is that a certain amount is not yet due. It is partial since there may
be amounts which are already due. Thus, the debtor has to pay for those amounts which are due.
o A, B, C debtors. If Cs not yet due, he only has to pay 2/3. This is partial
iii. Defenses which are personal to the other co-debtors
The debtor can only avail himself of these defenses only with regard to the part of the debt which
his co-debtors are responsible for.
These defenses are partial.
The debtor sued can invoke all three kinds of defenses. The difference is whether such defense
would result in total or partial exculpation.
Universal Motors v. CA: Rafael Verendia, Teodoro Galicia and Marcelina Galicia purchased from
Universal Motors Corporation two (2) Mercedes Benz trucks. They were solidary debtors and they
failed to pay. Judgment was rendered against them. Held: the appeal of Verendia will inure to the
benefit of the others who have not appealed the decision. When the obligation of the other solidary
debtors is so dependent on that of their co-solidary debtor, the release of the one who appealed,
provided it be not on grounds personal to such appealing private respondent, operates as well as to the
others who did not appeal.
a. Single
An obligation is single when there is only 1 debtor and 1 creditor.
b. Joint
An obligation is joint when each of the debtor is liable only for a proportional part of the debt,
and each creditor is entitled only to a partial part of the credit.
General Rule: The obligation is joint since joint obligations are less onerous.
Exceptions:
i.
Agreement of the parties
ii.
Law (i.e.tortfeasors are solidarily liable)
iii.
Nature of the obligation
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o According to many commentators, this is superfluous since a solidary obligation arises because
of law.
o ESSENTIAL NATURE: There are as many obligations as there are creditors multiplied by as
many debtors.
Types of Joint Obligations
i. Active joint:
In active joint, there are multiple creditors.
A, B, and C are creditors, and X is the debtor. If the obligation is joint, there are 3 obligations
Xs obligation to A, Xs obligation to B, and Xs obligation to C.
The demand of 1 creditor on 1 debtor will not constitute a demand on the others.
The prescription of 1 of the debts will not affect the other debts.
So if the credit is about to prescribe, and A makes a demand on X the day before it prescribes. The
debt of B and C prescribe
ii. Passive joint:
In passive joint, there are multiple debtors.
X, Y, and Z are debtor, and A is the creditor. If the obligation is joint, there are 3 obligations
Xs obligation to A, Ys obligation to A, and Zs obligation to A.
The demand of 1 creditor on 1 debtor will not constitute a demand on the others.
The prescription of 1 of the debts will not affect the other debts.
The insolvency of 1 of the debtors will not affect the burden of
the other debtors.
iii. Mixed joint
In mixed joint, there are multiple creditors and debtors.
X, Y, and Z are debtors, and A, B, and C are the creditors. If the obligation is joint, there are 9
obligations Xs obligation to A
Xs obligation to B, Xs obligation to C, Ys obligation A, Ys obligation to B, Ys obl
igation to C, Zs obligation to A, Zs obligation to B, and Zs obligation to C.
c. Solidary
An obligation is solidary when any of the debtors can be hled liable for the entire obligation, and
any of the creditors is entitled to demand the entire obligation.
A solidary obligation is also called joint and several, joint and individual, and in solidum.
If a promissory says, I promise to pay, and it is signed by K, B, and M, then the
obligation is solidary.
An obligation is solidary when:
i.
The parties so agree
ii.
Law so provides (i.e.tortfeasors are solidarily liable)
o Tolentino: 2 or more persons acting jointly who are liable under art. 19-22 CC,
because of the nature of the obligation
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o Tolentino: liability from crimes, quasi-delict

o Tolentino: solidarity is imposed even on joint payees of things delivered by mistake
(art. 2157).
iii. When nature of the obligation requires the obligation to be solidary
According to many commentators, this is superfluous since a solidary obligation arises because of
law.
Types of Solidary Obligations:
i. Active solidary
In active solidary, there are multiple creditors.
Characteristics of Active Solidary:
A credit once paid is shared equally among the creditors unless a different intention appears.
The debtor may pay any of the creditors, but if any demand, judicial or extrajudicial is made on
him, he must pay only to the one demanding payment (Article 1214).
Article 1214 can be open to abuse. For example, if A writes Y demanding the performance of the
obligation and A takes no further action, B and C cannot demand from Y. This is open to
collusion.
Suppose A, B, and C are creditors of X. A demands the payment of the loan worth P9,000. X
instead pays to B. The payment to B will be treated as a payment to a 3rd person. Therefore, X
must still pay A the amount of the loan minus the share of B. So, X has to pay P6,000 to A.
Mutual agency acc. to Manresa.
o Kind of true because A has to give to B and C what he collected
o Balane: to a certain extent only
ii. Passive solidary
In passive solidary, there are multiple debtors.
Characteristics of Passive Solidary:
Each debtor may be required to pay the entire obligation but after payment, he can recover from
his co-debtors their respective shares.
Manresa: there is mutual guarantee
o Balane: only to a certain extent (pro tanto)
iii. Mixed solidary
In mixed solidary, there are multiple debtors and creditors.
Characteristics of Mixed Solidary
A credit once paid is shared equally among the creditors unless a different intention appears.
The debtor may pay any of the creditors, but if any demand, judicial or extrajudicial, is made on
him, he must pay only to the one demanding payment (Article 1214).
According to Professor Balane, Article 1214 is problematic. For example, X owes A, B and C. B
makes an extrajudicial demand on X. X cannot pay A or C anymore. The problem is when B does
not follow up the demand, it can keep the obligation in suspension indefinitely.
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The rule in the Spanish Code was that the debtor cannot pay the other non-demanding solidary
creditors only if one of the solidary creditor makes a judicial demand.
Suppose the debtor upon whom the demand is made pays a creditor who did not make a demand
The payment is considered a payment to a third person. Therefore the debtor can still be made to
pay by the one who made the demand on him.
Example: X owes A and B. B demanded from X. X pays A. X must still pay B P6000. But the
payment to the demanding creditor can be reduced by the share of the paid creditor.
o The debtor can still recover from the paid creditor (solution indebiti). SO in total X paid 15k.
o But if X sees B and says heres what I owe you valid. X will pay B P6000 nalang.
Suppose A and B are creditors while X and Y are debtors. A demands from Y. Now, X pays B.
The payment of X to B extinguishes the entire solidary obligation. X is not bound by the demand
by A on Y. There is no violation of Article 1214.
Each debtor may be required to pay the entire obligation but after payment, he can recover from
his co-debtors their respective shares.
What if A recovers from Y, and subsequently, B recovers from Z.
o The first payment extinguishes the obligation. There is solution indebti between B and Z.
4. According to Performance(Articles1223-1225)

Art. 1223. The divisibility or indivisibility of the things that are the object of obligations in
which there is only one debtor and only one creditor does not alter or modify the provisions
of Chapter 2 of this Title.
Art. 1224. A joint indivisible obligation gives rise to indemnity for damages from the time
anyone of the debtors does not comply with his undertaking. The debtors who may have
been ready to fulfill their promises shall not contribute to the indemnity beyond the
corresponding portion of the price of the thing or of the value of the service in which the
obligation consists.
Art. 1225. For the purposes of the preceding articles, obligations to give definite things and
those which are not susceptible of partial performance shall be deemed to be indivisible.
When the obligation has for its object the execution of a certain number of days of work, the
accomplishment of work by metrical units, or analogous things which by their nature are
susceptible of partial performance, it shall be divisible.
However, even though the object or service may be physically divisible, an obligation is
indivisible if so provided by law or intended by the parties.
In obligations not to do, divisibility or indivisibility shall be determined by the character of
the prestation in each particular case.
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Divisible and indivisible obligations have nothing to do with the object of the prestation. A
common misconception is if the object of the prestation is divisible, then the obligation is also
divisible.
We are talking about the prestation! Not the object of the prestation.
Doesnt matter what the underlying object of the prestation is!
Divisibility of the object does not mean that the obligation is also divisible. But indivisibility of
the object necessarily means an indivisible obligation.
So if you are obliged to deliver 100 sacks of sugar. The object of the prestation is divisible but the
obligation is not. You are not allowed to deliver it in installment.
a. Divisible
An obligation is divisible when it is susceptible to partial performance.
b. Indivisible
An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in parts.
General Rule: Obligations are indivisible.

Exceptions:
i.
When the parties provide otherwise (Articles 1225, 3rd , 124823)
ii.
When the nature of the obligation necessarily entails the performance
of the obligation in parts
o Example: Hiring a security guard to guard from 8pm to 2am daily for 6 months. This
obligation cannot be performed indivisibly. You cant compress time.
o When the obligation has for its object the execution of a certain number of days of work, the
accomplishment of work by metrical units, or analogous things, which by their nature are
susceptible of partial performance, it shall be divisible (Article 1225, 2nd )
o Exception to the Exception: However, even though the object or service may be physically
divisible, an obligation is indivisible if
1. So provided by law
2. Intended by the parties.
iii.
When the law provides otherwise
o There are provisions on payment which provide that performance may be divisible.
5. According to Sanction for Breach (Articles1226-1230)

Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for
damages and the payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to
the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or
is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.

23
Art. 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled partially to receive the
prestations in which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be required to make partial payments.
However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the debtor may effect
the payment of the former without waiting for the liquidation of the latter.
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The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the provisions
of this Code.
Bacharach v. Espiritu: Espiritu bought trucks from Bacharach. It was agreed in both sales that 12%
interest will be paid on the unpaid price, and in case of the non-payment of the total debt at maturity,
25% shall be the penalty. Espiritu failed to pay. Court ordered him to pay the interest and the penalty.
Held: the penalty clause can be imposed separately from the interest. Article 1152 permits the
agreement upon a penalty apart from the interest. Should there be such an agreement, the penalty, as
was held in Lopez vs. Hernaez, does not include the interest, and as such the two are different and
distinct things which may be demanded separately. The penalty is not to be added to the interest for
the determination of whether the interest exceeds the rate fixed by the law, since said rate was fixed
only for the interest. But considering that the obligation was partly performed, and making use of the
power given to the court by article 1154 this penalty is reduced to 10 per cent of the unpaid debt.
Robes- Francisco v. CFI: In May 1862, Robes-Francisco Realty & Devt Corp. agreed to sell to Lolita
Milan a 276 sq. m. parcel of land in Caloocan for the sum of Php3,864. Milan completed payments by
December 1971, having paid a total of Php5,193.63 inclusive of interests and expenses for registration
of title. Thereafter, she made repeated demands for the execution of the final deed of sale and the
issuance of a TCT over said lot. While the parties executed a final deed of sale a few months
thereafter, still, no TCT has been issued. Said deed of sale provided that should the vendor warrants
that a TCT shall be transferred to Milan within 6 months, and that should it fail to do so, it will
refund Milan with the total amount paid plus 4% interest. Six months lapsed and still no TCT was
transferred. Milan filed a complaint for specific performance. She won in the lower courts. Now,
Robes-Francisco is questioning the award of nominal damages and attorneys fees. It invokes Art.
1226, which provides that in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the
indemnity for damages and the payment of interests for non-compliance, if there is no stipulation to
the contrary. The Court, however, rejects this contention. It would have agreed with petitioner had
the clause in the deed of sale been an actual penal clause. It wasnt. Even without it, under Art. 2209,
the vendee is entitled to a refund plus interest rate which is higher than the 4% stipulated in the
contract. Thus, said clause in the deed of sale cannot preclude the award of damages to Milan.
Pamintuan v. CA: Pamintuan entered into an agreement to with Tokyo Menka Kaisha to ship his
corn to Tokyo, in exchange for plastic sheetings. He then contracted to sell the plastic sheetings to Yu
Ping Kun Co. Pamintuan was to deliver the sheetings to Yu Pings bodegas in Manila within one
month upon arrival of carrying vessels; Any violation of the contract of sale would entitle the
aggrieved party to collect from the offending party P10k liquidated damages. Upon arrival of the
plastic sheets in Manila, Pamintuan did not deliver all the shipments to Yu Pings bodega. During this
time, Pamintuan informed Yu Ping that he needed cash to pay his obligations and asked that he be
paid immediately. Thus, Pamintuan and Yu Ping agreed to fix the price of the plastic sheetings at
P0.782 a yard, regardless of the kind, quality or actual invoice value thereof. After Pamintuan
delivered some of the sheetings of inferior quality, he refused to deliver the remainder of the
shipments, saying that that the company failed to comply with the conditions of the contract and that
it was novated with respect to the price. Yu Ping entitled to recover liquidated and actual damages.
Pamintuan was guilty of fraud because he did not make a complete delivery of the plastic sheetings

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and he overpriced them. He is responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
nonperformance of the obligation. As a general rule, the penalty takes the place of the indemnity for
damages and the payment of interest. This is subject to three exceptions: (1) when there is an express
stipulation to that effect; (2) when the obligor having failed to comply with the principal obligation
also refuses to pay the penalty, in which case the creditor is entitled to interest in the amount of the
penalty, in accordance with Art.2209; and (3) when the obligor is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of
the obligation. The reason for the third exception is based on the principle that an action to enforce
liability for future fraud cannot be renounced, as that would be against public policy and would
contravene the express provisions of Article 1171 of the Civil Code which states that any waiver of an
action for future fraud is void. The second sentence of art. 1226 itself provides that nevertheless,
damages shall be paid if the obligor ... is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation".
"Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations." "In case of fraud, bad faith,
malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for an damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation" (art. 2201). There is no justification for the Civil
Code to make an apparent distinction between penalty and liquidated damages because the settled
rule is that there is no difference between penalty and liquidated damages insofar as legal results are
concerned and that either may be recovered without the necessity of proving actual damages and both
may be reduced when proper. After consideration of all the surrounding circumstances, justice would
be adequately done in this case by allowing Yu Ping Kun Co., Inc. to recover only the actual damages
proven and not to award to it the stipulated liquidated damages of 10k for any breach of the contract.
The proven damages supersede the stipulated liquidated damages. This view finds support in the
opinion of Manresa (whose comments were the bases of the new matter found in article 1226, not
found in article 1152 of the old Civil Code) that in case of fraud the difference between the proven
damages and the stipulated penalty may be recovered.
Balanes comments on Pamintuan: The penalty was 10k. But there was fraud so 90k of actual
damages was proved. Since the amount of the penalty is smaller than actual damages, then the penalty
is deemed merged with the actual. Fraud is one of the exceptions were you can claim both. This is a
deviant. Follow Bacharach, Country bankers.
Country Bankers v. CA: OVEC and Sy entered into a Lease Agreement for the lease of 3 theaters for
6 years. After more than 2 years of operation, OVEC demanded for repossession because Sy didnt
pay the monthly rentals and the amusement taxes. But they compromised and he was allowed to
continue upon entering a supplemental agreement. However, the amusement tax liability of the
theaters, which Sy had been deducting from the monthly rentals with the obligation to remit to
Cabanatuan Govt, was not paid despite 2 demands. Therefore, OVEC repossessed the property. Sy
filed the case for reformation of the agreement, damages, and injunction. Held: the forfeiture of the
deposit initially paid by Sy in favor of OVEC in case of default would not unjustly enrich OVEC. A
provision which calls for the forfeiture of the remaining deposit still in the possession of the lessor,
without prejudice to any other obligation still owing, in the event of the termination or cancellation
of the agreement by reason of the lessee's violation of any of the terms and conditions of the
agreement is a penal clause that may be validly entered into.
Heirs of Manuel Uy v. Meer Castillo: Parties entered into an agreement that Petitioner will finance the
litigation of the Deceased Respondent in the condition that if latter wins, he will sell a portion of the

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disputed land to petitioner. Agreement included a penal clause providing that any party violating the
Kasunduan would pay the aggrieved party a penalty fixed in the sum of P50,000.00, together with
the attorneys fees and litigation expenses incurred should a case be subsequently filed in court. So
obviously Respondent did not follow the agreement to the letter. SC said that the agreement is
binding. Since the parties fixed liquidated damages in the sum of P50,000.00 in case of breach, we
find that said amount should suffice as petitioners' indemnity, without further need of compensation
for moral and exemplary damages. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty generally substitutes
the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance. Usually
incorporated to create an effective deterrent against breach of the obligation by making the
consequences of such breach as onerous as it may be possible, the rule is settled that a penal clause is
not limited to actual and compensatory damages. The RTC's award of attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00 is also proper. Aside from the fact that the penal clause included a liability for said award
in the event of litigation over a breach of the Kasunduan, petitioners were able to prove that they
incurred said sum in engaging the services of their lawyer to pursue their rights and protect their
interests.
Art. 1227. The debtor cannot exempt himself from the performance of the obligation by
paying the penalty, save in the case where this right has been expressly reserved for him.
Neither can the creditor demand the fulfillment of the obligation and the satisfaction of the
penalty at the same time, unless this right has been clearly granted him. However, if after the
creditor has decided to require the fulfillment of the obligation, the performance thereof
should become impossible without his fault, the penalty may be enforced.
Art. 1228. Proof of actual damages suffered by the creditor is not necessary in order that the
penalty may be demanded.
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no
performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Lo v. CA: Lo acquired 2 parcels of land from Land Bank. Natl Onion Growers had a subsisting
contract of lease with Land Bank, which provided for the payment of P5000 for everyday of delay.
Natl Onion Growers delayed in vacating. Held: CA did not err in reducing penalty from P5000 to
P1000 a day for being unconscionable and iniquitous. It was unconscionable coz Natl Onion
Growers was obligated to pay monthly rent of P30,000, while the penalty was at P5,000 a day or
P150,000 per month, or 5 times the monthly rent. It was inequitable coz delay was caused by a wellfounded belief that of Natl Onion Growers right of preemption to purchase the subject premises had
been violated.
Art. 1230. The nullity of the penal clause does not carry with it that of the principal
obligation.
The nullity of the principal obligation carries with it that of the penal clause.
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A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability in case of breach (SSS vs.
Moonwalk).
Doesnt have to be money. But it usually is
Penal clauses are governed by Articles 2226-2228,24 the provisions on liquidated damages since a
penal clause is the same as liquidated damages (Lambert vs. Fox).
Penal clauses may be reduced by the courts if unconscionable.
2 Functions of a Penal Clause (SSS vs. Moonwalk)
i.
To provide liquidated damages
o The creditor can demand liquidated damages without having to prove actual damages.
o The only limitation that the courts will reduce the liquidated damages if the same is
scandalously unconscionable.
ii.
To strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in
case of breach
o Stipulates a penalty which is greater than one without a penal clause. Thus, Robes-Francisco
states that 4% interest is not a penal clause.
o If its less than the legal rate, it is not a penal clause. But it is nevertheless valid.
2 Characteristics of a Penal Clause

i. Subsidiary or alternative (Article 1227)
o General Rule: Upon breach of the obligation, the creditor has to choose whether to demand
the principal or the penalty.
o Exception: The principal obligation and the penalty can be demanded when the penal clause is
joint or cumulative. This occurs when it is the creditor has been clearly granted such right
(Article 1227, 2nd sentence), either expressly or impliedly. The implied right must be one
ascertainable from the nature of the obligation. An example is in the construction industry
where the contractor must pay the penalty if the work is completed after the stipulated time
frame but must also finish the agreed construction.
o Doesnt have to be explicit. It just has to be clear.
o Example: Govt enters into a contract to complete a fly over which must be completed in 6m.
If its not completed, there will be a penalty of 50k for everyday of delay. There was a 30 day
delay.
o Contractor cant say that I wont finish construction, but heres the 1.5M
ii. Exclusive (Article 1226)
o General Rule: The penalty clause takes the place of other
damages (thats why in imposing a penalty clause, make sure that the penalty is stiff).
o Exception (not just reparation but punitive): Both the penalty and actual damages may be
recovered in the following:

24
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are
iniquitous or unconscionable.
Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in
agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
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1. Express stipulation
2. Refusal by the debtor to pay the penalty
3. The debtor is guilty of fraud (malice) in the performance of the obligation.
H. EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS

Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance:
(2) By the loss of the thing due:
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
Other causes of extinguishment of obligations, such as annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a
resolutory condition, and prescription, are governed elsewhere in this Code.
So why are only 6 enumerated, and then 4 others given?

The first 6 have sub-sections. They are simple causes for the estinguishment of obligation
The ones in the paragraph have are multi-purpose. They have other natures
Are these complete? NO.
Examples:
1. Death
intuitu personae obligations like support
obligations in marriage, obligation to support, obligations in a partnership, etc.
2. Renunciation of the creditor
The creditor waives the obligation.
The renunciation need not be in any specific form.
Renunciation and remission are 2 different things. A renunciation is a refusal by the
creditor to enforce his claim with the intention of waiving it. A remission is in the nature
of a donation.
3. Compromise
akin to novation
4. Arrival of the resolutory term
the provision only speaks of the condition.
5. Mutual desistance (Saura v. DBP):
Saura v. DBP: Saura applied to RFC (now DBP) for a loan of P500,000. RFC passed Reso 145
approving the loan application for P500,000.00. RFC passed Reso 9083: That in view of
observations made of the shortage and high cost of imported raw materials, the DAR shall certify to
the following: 1. That the raw materials needed by the borrower-corporation to carry out its
operation are available in the immediate vicinity; and 2. That there is prospect of increased
production thereof to provide adequately for the requirements of the factory. Saura sent a letter to
RFC stating that according to a special study made by the Bureau of Forestry kenaf will not be
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available in sufficient quantity this year or probably even next year. RFC replied: With respect to
our requirement of the DAR certification, we wish to reiterate that the basis of the original approval
is to develop the manufacture of sacks on the basis of the locally available raw materials. With the
foregoing letter the negotiations came to a standstill. Saura did not pursue the matter further. Instead,
it requested RFC to cancel the mortgage, and so RFC executed the corresponding deed of
cancellation and delivered it to Saura. TC ruled that there was a perfected contract between the
parties and that the defendant was guilty of breach. Held: there was a perfected contract between
RFC (DBP) and Saura, but Saura, is not entitled to damages because the obligation was
extinguished by mutual desistance. It should be noted that RFC entertained the loan application of
Saura on the assumption that the factory to be constructed would utilize locally grown raw materials.
Evidently Saura realized that it could not meet the conditions required by RFC. This was a deviation
from the terms laid down in Reso 145 and embodied in the mortgage contract, implying as it did a
diversion of part of the proceeds of the loan to purposes other than those agreed upon. So instead of
doing so and insisting that the loan be released as agreed upon, Saura asked that the mortgage be
cancelled. The action thus taken by both parties was in the nature of mutual desistance, mutuo
disenso (Manresa) which is a mode of extinguishing obligations. It is a concept that derives from
the principle that since mutual agreement can create a contract, mutual disagreement by the parties
can cause its extinguishment (Castan).The subsequent conduct of Saura confirms this desistance. It did
not protest against any alleged breach of contract by RFC, or even point out that the latters stand
was legally unjustified. Its request for cancellation of the mortgage carried no reservation of whatever
rights it believed it might have against RFC for the latter's non-compliance.
Floro v. CA: Floro and Phil. Rabbit entered into an agreement denominated as Agreement for
Equipment Lease, Service and Maintenance whereby Floro, Inc. agreed to furnish Phil. Rabbit with
certain computer equipment including 4 Model 85 monitors. Appearing on the bottom portion of the
Agreement was a handwritten annotation, which read: 5 five years, the computer becomes your
property. The Agreement provided for the payment by Phil. Rabbit to Floro, Inc. of a
downpayment upon signing of the Agreement and certain monthly payments, plus certain other
amounts upon delivery of the computer equipment. The computer equipment specified in the
Agreement was delivered to Phil. Rabbit except for the 4 Model 85 monitors. In lieu thereof, Floro,
delivered and installed Model 82 monitors. Phil. Rabbit made several verbal and written demands on
Floro, Inc. to deliver the Model 85 monitors. Upon assurances made by Floro that the Model 85
monitors will be forthcoming, Phil. Rabbit made several payments in accordance with the terms of
the Agreement. However, despite the assurances made by Floro, the Model 85 monitors were never
delivered. Phil. Rabbit wrote Floro, Inc. asking for the cancellation of the Agreement alleging that
the computers were not placed in full operation due to the nondelivery of the Model 85 monitors.
Floroe xpressed its conformity to the mutual cancellation of the Agreement and demanded the
return of the computer equipment. Phil. Rabbit informed Floro that the computer equipment would
be returned only upon the reimbursement of P295,169. Held: The agreement between the parties is
one of sale on an installment basis and not of lease. The mutual restoration is in consonance with the
basic principle that when an obligation has been extinguished or resolved, it is the duty of the court to
require the parties to surrender whatever they may have received from the other so that they may be
restored, as far as practicable, to their original situation. Since the parties had agreed to a mutual
cancellation of the Agreement, the court ordered each to restore to the other what each had received
under the Agreement in accordance with Art. 1385. The computer equipment had been previously

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returned to Floro by virtue of the writ of replevin. Phil. Rabbit had been able to make use of the
computer equipment for 6 months; hence, Phil. Rabbit was ordered to pay the sum of P120,564 to be
deducted from the sum of P295,169.00 which it had already paid to Floro. Floro was ordered to
return the balance of P174,605.00.
6. Unilateral withdrawal
GR: unilateral withdrawals are not allowed
Ex: partnership
7. Change of civil status
voidable marriage, once voided extinguishes obligation to give support and to live
together
8. Rebus Sic Stantibus
9. Want of interest
Tiu v. Platinum: Non- compete clause valid limited in time, place and scope. But what if
the premium company imposing the non-compete clause goes out of business? Then no
more interest
Example: A owns a peking duck restaurant with a secret recipe for preparing peking
duck. A disclosed the secret recipe to B, his cook. B is then prohibited in his employment
contract to work in another restaurant.
10. Judicial insolvency
The effect of judicial insolvency is that all unpaid debts are written off for good. Thus,
even if the debtor has improved his financial situation because of judicial insolvency, there
is no need for the debtor to pay his unpaid debts.
They are not revived even if the status of the debtor should recover
1. Payment or Performance (Articles12321251)

This is the paradigmatic mode. Most people do not foresee that the obligation will be
extinguished by other means.
To give: payment
To do: performance
Art. 1232. Payment means not only the delivery of money but also the performance, in any
other manner, of an obligation.
Art. 1233. A debt shall not be understood to have been paid unless the thing or service in
which the obligation consists has been completely delivered or rendered, as the case may be.
Art. 1234. If the obligation has been substantially performed in good faith, the obligor may
recover as though there had been a strict and complete fulfillment, less damages suffered by
the obligee.
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Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the performance, knowing its incompleteness or
irregularity, and without expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed fully
complied with.
Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person
who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he
paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as
the payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
Art. 1237. Whoever pays on behalf of the debtor without the knowledge or against the will of
the latter, cannot compel the creditor to subrogate him in his rights, such as those arising
from a mortgage, guaranty, or penalty.
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the
debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor's consent. But the payment is in
any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.
Art. 1239. In obligations to give, payment made by one who does not have the free disposal
of the thing due and capacity to alienate it shall not be valid, without prejudice to the
provisions of article 1427 under the Title on "Natural Obligations."
Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
Art. 1241. Payment to a person who is incapacitated to administer his property shall be valid
if he has kept the thing delivered, or insofar as the payment has been beneficial to him.
Payment made to a third person shall also be valid insofar as it has redounded to the benefit of
the creditor. Such benefit to the creditor need not be proved in the following cases:
(1) If after the payment, the third person acquires the creditor's rights;
(2) If the creditor ratifies the payment to the third person;
(3) If by the creditor's conduct, the debtor has been led to believe that the third person had
authority to receive the payment.
Art. 1242. Payment made in good faith to any person in possession of the credit shall release
the debtor.
Art. 1243. Payment made to the creditor by the debtor after the latter has been judicially
ordered to retain the debt shall not be valid.
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Art. 1244. The debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor to receive a different one,
although the latter may be of the same value as, or more valuable than that which is due.
In obligations to do or not to do, an act or forbearance cannot be substituted by another act
or forbearance against the obligee's will.
Cathay Pacific v. Vasquez: Spouses Vasquez, together with their maid and friends, flew to HK for biz
and pleasure. On their return flight to Manila via Cathay Pacific, the ground attendant in HK
informed them that their Business Class ticket was upgraded to First Class because of overbooking.
They refused the upgrade, since they don't want to leave their companions in the Business Class.
They eventually relented. The Vasquezes filed a complaint for breach of contract. SC said that the
Vazquezes had every right to decline the upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation
they had booked for. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay breached its contract of carriage with the
Vazquezes. However, there was no bad faith or fraud on the part of Cathay. Hence, there can be no
award of moral or exemplary damages because of the absence of bad faith. Only entitled to nominal
damages of PhP5k because of the breach of contract.
Art. 1245. Dation in payment, whereby property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of
a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales.
Art. 1246. When the obligation consists in the delivery of an indeterminate or generic thing,
whose quality and circumstances have not been stated, the creditor cannot demand a thing of
superior quality. Neither can the debtor deliver a thing of inferior quality. The purpose of the
obligation and other circumstances shall be taken into consideration.
Art. 1247. Unless it is otherwise stipulated, the extrajudicial expenses required by the
payment shall be for the account of the debtor. With regard to judicial costs, the Rules of
Court shall govern.
Art. 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be
compelled partially to receive the prestations in which the obligation consists. Neither may
the debtor be required to make partial payments.
However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may
demand and the debtor may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the
liquidation of the latter.
Art. 1249. The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is
not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the
Philippines.
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile
documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when
through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.
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In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in the
abeyance.
DBP v. Sima Wei: The delivery of checks in payment of an obligation does not constitute payment
unless they are cashed or their value is impaired through the fault of the creditor.
Tibijia v. CA: Eden Tan filed a collection suit against the Tibajia spouses. The trial court ruled in
favor of Tan and ordered the spouses to pay the former. The spouses paid partly in check and partly
in cash. Tan refused to accept the payment and asked that the garnished funds be withdrawn to satisfy
the judgment obligation. Held: payment by means of check is not considered payment in legal
tender. A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a
check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee
or creditor.
New Pacific Timber: Held that a certified check is as good as cash.
Balane never thought so. What if the bank is put under receivership
For example, A gives B a managers check and bank closes for a bank holiday.
Citibank v. Sebeniano: Sabeniano was a client of both Citibank and FNCB, however their relationship
went awry. Sabeniano claimed to have substantial deposits and money market placements with the
petitioners as well as money market placements with the Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation, the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited automatically and directly to her
accounts with Citibank. Sabeniano alleged that petitioners refused to return her deposits and the
proceeds of her money market placements despite her repeated demands. Petitioners admitted that
Sabeniano had deposits and money market placements with them including dollar accounts.
However, they allege that the Sabeniano later obtained several loans from Citibank for which she
executed Promissory notes and secured by a declaration of pledge for her dollar account in
CitibankGeneva and Deeds of Assignment for her money market placements with petitioner
FNCB Finance. Held: The checks issued by Sabeniano as payment for her loans are not legal tender.
A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or
creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation
is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually
realized.
BPI v. Roxas: Roxas delivered stocks of vegetable oil to spouses Rodrigo and Marissa Cawili. As
payment, they issued a personal check therefor, spouses Cawili issued a personal check in the amount
of P348,805.50. However, when Roxas tried to encash the check, it was dishonored by the drawee
bank. BPI contends that the element of value is not present, therefore, respondent could not be a
holder in due course. Held: as general rule, every holder is presumed prima facie to be a holder in due
course. One who claims otherwise has the onus probandi to prove that one or more of the conditions
required to constitute a holder in due course are lacking. Value in general terms may be some right,
interest, profit or benefit to the party who makes the contract or some forbearance, detriment, loan,
responsibility, etc. on the other side. A cashiers check is really the banks own check and may be
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treated as a promissory note with the bank as the maker. The check becomes the primary obligation
of the bank, which issues it and constitutes a written promise to pay upon demand. The mere issuance
of a cashiers check is considered acceptance thereof.
Art. 1250. In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should
supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be
the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
Only during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945)

You need a declaration that there is extra-ord inflation by the BSP
o He said that youll see this in the cases, but actually you dont so IDK.
Velasco v. Meralco: In Art. 1250, the employment of the words "extraordinary inflation or deflation
of the currency stipulated" envisages contractual obligations where a specific currency is selected by
the parties as the medium of payment; hence it is inapplicable to obligations arising from tort and not
from contract.
Filipino Pipe v. NAWASA: NAWASA entered into a contract with the plaintiff FPFC for the latter
to supply iron pressure pipes to be used in the construction of the Anonoy Waterworks in Masbate
and the Barrio San Andres-Villareal Waterworks in Samar. NAWASA paid in installments.
NAWASA failed to pay so FPFC filed a collection suit. Held: no extraordinary inflation of the
currency justifying an adjustment of NAWASA's unpaid judgment obligation to FPFC.
Extraordinary inflation exists "when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of the
Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value said currency,
and such decrease or increase could not have reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond
contemplation the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation. While appellant's
voluminous records and statistics proved that there has been a decline in the purchasing power of the
Philippine peso, this downward fall of the currency cannot be considered "extraordinary." It is simply
a universal trend that has not spared our country.
Del Rosario v. Shell: Shell leased the land of Del Rosario located in Albay for P250 per month. 14 of
the lease contract stipulated that there shall be an adjustment of the rental in case of official
appreciation or devaluation of the Philippine currency. President Diosdado Macapagal promulgated
EO 195 titled "Changing the Par Value of the Peso from US$0.50 to US$0.2564103 (U.S. Dollar of
the Weight and Fineness in Effect on July 1, 1944). This took effect at noon of November 8, 1965.
Del Rosario sought to increase the rental fee to P487.50. The RTC denied Del Rosarios petition;
the RTC opined that there was no official devaluation, there was merely modification of the par
value of the Philippine Peso. Held: It will be noted that devaluation is an official act of the
government (as when a law is enacted thereon) and refers to a reduction in metallic content;
depreciation can take place with or without ailieged official act, and does not depend on metallic
content (although depreciation may be caused curency devaluation). Here, while no express reference
has been made to metallic content, there nonetheless is a reduction in par value or in the purchasing
power of Philippine currency. Even assuming there has been no official devaluation as the term is
technically understood, the fact is that there has been a diminution or lessening in the purchasing
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power of the peso, thus, there has been a "depreciation." Moreover, when laymen unskilled in the
semantics of economics use the terms "devaluation" or "depreciation" they certainly mean them in
their ordinary signification decrease in value. Hence as contemplated cuirrency the parties herein
in their lease agreement, the term "devaluation" may be regarded as synonymous with "depreciation,"
for certainly both refer to a decrease in the value of the currency. The rentals should therefore by
their agreement be proportionately increased.
Sangrador v. Valderama: Sps. Valderama loaned 1M pesos from Sangrador. As a security, there was a
real estate mortgage on the spouses' house and lot. A acceleration scluase provided that in the event
that an extraordinary inflation of the Philippine Peso should supervene between now and 8 months
after date, then the value of the Philippine Peso at the time of the establishment of this obligation,
shall be the basis of payment pursuant to Art. 1250, and for this purpose, we hereby acknowledge the
official exchange rate at P14.002 to $1. The corresponding adjustment in the value of the Philippine
Peso shall be made in the event that at the time of the maturity of this obligation, the rate of exchange
will have changed as a result of the supervening inflation. We further agree that the official rate of
exchange as set by the Central Bank of the Philippines for private transactions, shall be the basis of
this adjustment. When the defendants failed to pay the sum stated in the promissory note, a
complaint for foreclosure was instituted. Plaintiff said loan is now 1.4M. The defendants in their
answer denied that the loan was P1.4M. They alleged that it was only P1M and that the additional
P400,000 represented usurious interest. Held: the escalation clause is not valid. The rate of interest
for loans or forbearance of money, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall
continue therefore to be 12% per annum. Extraordinary inflation exists when 'there is a decrease or
increase in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common
fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such decrease or increase could not have been reasonably
foreseen or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of
the obligation. Since petitioners failed to prove the supervening of extraordinary inflation between 6
April 1984 and 7 December 1984no proofs were presented on how much, for instance, the price
index of goods and services had risen during the intervening periodan extraordinary inflation
cannot be assumed; consequently, there is no reason or basis, legal or factual, for adjusting the value
of the Philippine Peso in the settlement of respondents' obligation.
Telentagan v. US: US Lines filed a case against Telangtan Bros & Sons, Inc. seeking payment of
demurrage charges plus interest and damages because of the failure of Telangtan to withdraw its
goods from the containers within the 10-day freedom period provided for in Far East Conference
Tariff No. 12. This Tarriff provides that consignees who fail to take delivery of their containerized
cargo within the 10-day free period are liable to pay demurrage charges. Telangtan failed to withdraw
the goods. Both RTC and CA favored US Lines and awarded the sum for the demurrage who shall
bear interest and be recomputed in accordance with Art. 1250 of the Civil Code. Main issue for
Oblicon in this case is whether or not CA and RTC erred in ordering for the recomputation of the
judgment award in accordance with Article 1250 of the Civil Code contrary to existing jurisprudence
and without any evidence at all to support it. SC sad that while Telangtan was truly liable for the
demurrage charges, the recomputation under Art. 1250 was erroneous. Extraordinary inflation or
deflation exists when there is an unusual increase or decrease in the purchasing power of the
Philippine peso which is beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such
increase or decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the

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contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation. Extraordinary inflation
can never be assumed; he who alleges the existence of such phenomenon must prove the same. And
while courts may take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine
currency, such downward trend of the peso cannot be considered as the extraordinary phenomenon
contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Also, Article 1250 clearly provides that the value of
the peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall control and be the basis of payment of
the contractual obligation, unless there is "agreement to the contrary." It is only when there is a
contrary agreement that extraordinary inflation will make the value of the currency at the time of
payment, not at the time of the establishment of obligation, the basis for payment. No such
agreement was present in the agreement / bills of lading.
Art. 1251. Payment shall be made in the place designated in the obligation.
There being no express stipulation and if the undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing,
the payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment the obligation was
constituted.
In any other case the place of payment shall be the domicile of the debtor.
If the debtor changes his domicile in bad faith or after he has incurred in delay, the additional
expenses shall be borne by him.
These provisions are without prejudice to venue under the Rules of Court.
Like obligee and creditor, payment and performance are twin terms. Payment refers to
obligations to give while performance refers to obligations to do.
ayment and performance is the paradigmatic mode. When obligations are entered into, the parties
expect payment or performance. All other modes of extinguishing obligations are abnormal
modes.
Requisites of Payment:
a. As to prestation (3 requisites i-iii below):
i. Identity (identitas)
Identity means that the very prestation must be performed.
For example, if the obligation is to give a car, one cannot fulfill the obligation by giving a house.
If the prestation is specific, the debtor must give or deliver the specific thing which was agreed
upon (Article 1244).
If the prestation is generic, the creditor cannot demand a thing of superior quality. However, the
debtor cannot give a thing of inferior quality (Article 1246).
The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it not possible to
deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines (Article 1249,
1st ).
R.A. No. 529 has been repealed by R.A. No. 8183 which allows payment in different currency.
However, in the absence of an agreement, payment shall be made in Pesos.
o R.A. 529 This made it unlawful to be paid in currency.
o R.A. 8183 repealed 529. Its really a revival of Art. 1249
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Negotiable papers and other commercial documents can be refused by the creditor unless there is
stipulation to the contrary.
If the negotiable papers and other commercial documents are accepted by the creditor, it has only
a provisional effect. There is payment only in the following (Article 1249, 2nd ).
1. When they have been honored and cashed; or
2. When through the fault of the creditor, they have been impaired
o This will only apply when the check is the check of another person, not a party, before
there will be impairment [Namarco].
o For example, A gave B a check as payment for a loan. B did not encash the check as a
result of which, the check became stale. There is no impairment here. B can still ask A for
payment of the loan.
o However, if B endorsed a check made by A to C as payment for a loan and C did not
encash the check which became stale, then C can no longer ask B to pay him again.
Exceptions to the Requirement of Identity
1. Dacion en pago (Article 1245)
2. Novation
ii. Integrity (integritas)
Identity means that the entire prestation must be performed (Article 1233)
Also called completeness
If I owe you 500K, I cant just pay 300K
Exceptions to Integrity
1. Substantial compliance in good faith (Article1234)
2. Waiver (Article 1235)
3. In application of payments if the debts are equally onerous (Article 1254, 2nd )25
Legarda v. Saldana: Saldaa entered into 2 written contracts with Legarda Hermanos as subdivision
owner, whereby the latter agreed to sell to him Lots 7 and 8 of the subdivision. It was payable for 10
years divided into 120 monthly installments. Saldaa faithfully paid for 8 continuous years about 95
of 120 monthly installments. Since S failed to complete total payment of the 120 installments they
cancelled the contracts and all the amounts paid have been considered as rents paid and as payment for
damages suffered by their failure. Held: The total sum of P3,582.06 (including interests of
P1,889.78) already paid by S (which was more than the value of two lots), was already more than the
value of one lot of P1,500 and hence 1 of the 2 lots as chosen by S would be considered as fully paid,
is fair and just and in accordance with law and equity. Regardless, however, of the propriety of
applying said Art. 1592 thereto, Court finds that plaintiff herein has not been denied substantial
justice because of Art. 1234 of said Code.
JM Tuazon v. Javier: JM Tuazon and Javier entered into a contract to sell. It was stipulated in the
contract that upon failure of respondent to pay the monthly installment, she is given a 1 month grace

25
If the debts due are of the same nature and burden, the payment shall be applied to all of them proportionately.
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period to pay such installment together with the monthly installment falling on the said grace period.
Furthermore, failure to pay both monthly installments, respondent will pay an additional 10%
interest. And after 90 days from the end of the grace period, petitioner can rescind the contract, the
payments made by respondent will be considered as rentals. Javier religiously paid the monthly
installment until Jan 5, 1962. Javier was unable to the pay the monthly installments within the grace
period which JM Tuazon, subsequently, sent a letter to Javier on May 22, 1964 that the contract has
been rescinded and asked the latter to vacate. Upon failure to vacate, JM Tuazon filed for the
rescission. Held: Art. 1234 applies. Javier religiously satisfied the monthly installments for almost 8
years. It has been shown that Javier had already paid Php4,134.08 as of Jan5, 1962 which is beyond
the stipulated amount of Php3,691.20. Javier has offered to pay all installments overdue including the
stipulated interest, attorneys fees and the costs which the CFI accordingly sentenced respondent to
pay such installment, interest, fees and costs. Thus, JM Tuazon will be able recover everything that
was due thereto. Under these circumstances, in the interest of justice and equity, the contract to sell
has not yet been rescinded.
Presbitero v. CA: Presbitero and Canoso entered into a contract wherein Caoso would negotiate
with the Land Bank and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for the sale of Presbiteros land which was
to be accomplished within 120 days. Once his claim was approved, he sent a letter to the Bank to
release part of the proceeds. However, when a part of the proceeds was released, Caoso was not
given his share as agreed upon. This was accomplished past the 120-day period. Caoso filed against
Presbitero for his share 17.5%. Held: no substantial breach was committed by the private respondent
sufficient enough to warrant a rescission. From all indications, private respondent was able to perform
his obligation; this conclusion follows in the wake of the approval of the claim. Presbitero
substantially performed the obligation in good faith, thus, he may recover as if he strictly complied
with the obligation. There was no proof presented that Caoso was negligent and that Presbitero
closed the deal based on his sole acts.
Tayag v. CA: Siblings Juan Galicia and Ceterina Labuguin entered into a contract to sell a parcel of
land to Albrigido Lewa. Lewa is to pay 3k upon agreement, 10k after agreement, 10k representing the
vendor's indebtedness to Phil Veterans Bank, and 27k within 1 year from execution of contract. Lewa
defaulted as he didnt pay in full, on time. However, even after the grace period for payment and
during litigation of the claim for specific performance, the petitioners still allowed Lewa to pay.
Respondent now claims that petitioners, in accepting payment even after the grace period, are now
barred to take action by the principle of estoppel. Held: barred. The right to rescind is not absolute
and will not be granted where there has been substantial compliance by partial payments. Petitioners
accepted Lewas delayed payments not only beyond the grace periods but also during the pendency of
the case for specific performance. Indeed, the right to rescind is not absolute and will not be granted
where there has been substantial compliance by partial payments. By and large, petitioners actuation
is susceptible of but one construction that they are now estopped from reneging from their
commitment on account of acceptance of benefits arising from overdue accounts of private
respondent.
Azcona v. Jamandre: Azcona leased 80 of his 150 hectare pro indiviso share of Hacienda Sta. Fe, the
agreed yearly rental was P7,200 to Jamandre. The lease was for three agricultural years beginning
1960, extendible at the lessee's option to two more agricultural years, up to 1965. The first rental due

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was not paid because the property was not yet delivered. Jamandre only entered the property on
October 1960 by paying 7,000. Azcona issued a receipt which acknowledges the 7,000 as payment for
1961-62. On 1961, Azcona notified Jamandre that the lease was deemed terminated because the rental
was short of 200. Held: It seems to us that this meaning was adequately conveyed in the
acknowledgment made by the petitioner that this was "payment for the rental corresponding to crop
year 1961-62" and "corresponds to the rentals due on or before January 30, 1961, as per contract." On
the other hand, if this was not the intention, the petitioner does not explain why he did not specify in
the receipt that there was still a balance of P200.00 and, to be complete, the date when it was to be
paid by the respondent. The petitioner says that he could not demand payment of the balance of
P200.00 on October 26, 1960, date of the receipt because the rental for the crop year 1961-62 was
due on or before January 30, 1961. But this would not have prevented him from reserving in the
receipt his right to collect the balance when it fell due. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record
that when the due date arrived, he made any demand, written or verbal, for the payment of that
amount.
Pagsibigan v. CA: Pagsigiban obtained a loan from Planters Development Bank ("Bank") for
P4,500.00, secured by a mortgage over a parcel of land. The Promissory Note for the said loan
stipulated for the first payment to be made on May 3, 1977 and payments every six months thereafter
at P1,018.14 with 19% interest for unpaid amortizations. It also contained an acceleration clause.
Initial payment was made in July 6, 1977, followed by several payments in the total amount of
P11,900.00. However, only four of these payments were applied to the loan, while the rest were
"temporarily lodged to accounts payable since the account was already past due". In 1984, the
property was foreclosed extrajudicially upon Petition by the bank for failure to pay an outstanding
balance of P29,554.81. This resulted in the property being sold to the bank for P8,163.00, and later
claimed a deficiency of P21,391.81. Held:The legality of the foreclosure cannot be sustained because
of substantial performance on the part of petitioner. When the creditor accepts performance,
knowing its incompleteness and irregularity without protest or objection, the obligation is
deemed complied with. There is no question that the respondent bank has the right to foreclose the
mortgage upon the first default of petitioner on May 3, 1977, but the records show that it did not.
When it received payment of petitioner on July 6, 1977, which had been 2 months and 3 days
delayed, it applied P154.80 to the principal, P210.00 to interest, and only P25.20 to penalty. From
this act of receiving delayed payment, it is clear that the respondent bank had waived its right under
the acceleration clause so that instead of claiming penalty charges on the entire amount of P4,500.00,
it only computed the penalty based on the defaulted amortization payment which is P1,018.14. If it
computed the penalty charge at 19% of the entire amount of P4,500.00 which would have been due
and demandable by virtue of the acceleration clause, the penalty charges would be much more than
P25.20. We also noticed that in Exhibit D-3, the receipt which the respondent bank issued to
petitioner for the August 26, 1978 partial payment, it waived its right under Article 1253 of the Civil
Code on Application of Payments when it applied the payment to the principal instead of the interest.
Thus, on that date the outstanding obligation of petitioner was already reduced to P3,558.21 after she
had paid a total of P2,200.00 over a period of nine months from the time the loan was obtained.
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iii. Indivisibility
Indivisibility means that the obligor must perform the prestation in one act and not in
installments (Article 1248). The creditor can validly refuse if the performance is not in one act.
Exceptions to Indivisibility (Cases when the law allows installment performance)
1. In case of express stipulation (Article1248)
2. In prestations which necessarily entail partial performance (Article 1225, 2nd )26
3. If the debt is liquidated in part and unliquidated in part (Article 1248)
4. In joint divisible obligations (Article1208)27
5. In solidary obligations when the debtors are bound under different terms and conditions
(Article 1211)28
6. In compensation where there is a balance left (Article1290)29
7. If the work is to be delivered partially, the price or compensation for each part having been
fixed (Article 1720)30
8. In case of several guarantors who demand the right of division (Article 2065)31
9. In case of impossibility or extreme difficult of a single performance
For example, A is obligated to deliver 1 million bags of cement. Under the circumstances, this
may be extremely difficult.
Nasser v. Cuevas: An agreement provided for the payment of the attorney's fees of Atty. Paterno
Canlas for P600,000 in property and in cash. The agreement also contained a provision creating a
charging lien in Canlas' favor. The provision stated that until there has been full payment, all the
properties are charged with a lien for attorneys fees. Held: the stipulation does not provide for
payment in instalments. The proviso that upon full payment of the corresponding liability of a party
the lien on his/ her share is extinguished, evidently contemplates the probability that the heirs who
are obliged to pay the attorneys fees would pay at different times, and denotes nothing more than
that if one of the obligors separately pays his share in the attorneys fees, the lien on his share of the
estate is thereby extinguished. The clause cannot be construed as granting to any of the obligors, by

26
Art. 1254, 4When the obligation has for its object the execution of a certain number of days of work, the
accomplishment of work by metrical units, or analogous things which by their nature are susceptible of partial
performance, it shall be divisible.
27
Art. 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the obligations to which the preceding article refers the
contrary does not appear, the credit or debt shall be presumed to be divided into as many shares as there are creditors or
debtors, the credits or debts being considered distinct from one another, subject to the Rules of Court governing the
multiplicity of suits.
28
Art. 1211. Solidarity may exist although the creditors and the debtors may not be bound in the same manner and by the
same periods and conditions.
29
Art. 1290. When all the requisites mentioned in article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law,
and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the
compensation.
30
Art. 1720. The price or compensation shall be paid at the time and place of delivery of the work, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary. If the work is to be delivered partially, the price or compensation for each part having been
fixed, the sum shall be paid at the time and place of delivery, in the absence if stipulation.
31
Art. 2065. Should there be several guarantors of only one debtor and for the same debt, the obligation to answer for the
same is divided among all. The creditor cannot claim from the guarantors except the shares which they are respectively
bound to pay, unless solidarity has been expressly stipulated.
The benefit of division against the co- guarantors ceases in the same cases and for the same reasons as the benefit of
excussion against the principal debtor.
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implication, the option to pay in installments, or as impliedly binding the obligee to accept payment
by parts. The legal principle, in any event, is that the creditor cannot be compelled partially to
receive the presentations in which the obligation consists unless there is an express stipulation to
that effect, in much the same way that the debtor may not be required to make partial payments.
b. As to the parties
i. Payor, Obligor, Debtor
Who may be the Payor?
1. Without the consent of the creditor
a. The debtor himself
b. The debtors heirs or assigns
c. The debtors agent
d. Anyone interested in the fulfillment of the obligation (e.g. guarantor)
2. With the consent of the creditor
Anyone can pay if the creditor consents
Effect of Payment by a 3rd Person
1. Payment was with the Debtors Consent
o General Rule: The payor steps into the shoes of the creditor and becomes entitled not
only to recover what he has paid, but also to exercise all the rights which the creditor
could have exercised subrogation (Articles 1236, 1237).
o There is no extinguishment of the obligation but a change in the active subject.
o Exception: No subrogation if intended to be a donation (Article 1238).
2. Payment was without the Debtors Consent
o The 3rd person may demand repayment to the extent that the debtor has benefited (Article
1236, 2nd ).
ii. Payee,Obligee,Creditor
Who may be the Payee
1. The creditor himself (Articles1240,1626)
2. The creditors successor or transferee (Article 1240)
3. The creditors agent (Article 1240)
4. Any third person subject to the following conditions:
a. Provided it redounded to the creditors benefit and only to the extent of such benefit
(Article 1241, 2nd par)
b. If it falls under Article 1241 2 (1), (2) and (3), the benefit is total.
5. Anyone in possession of the credit(Article1242)
6. In all these 5 instances, it is required that the debt should not be garnished (Article 1242). If
there is payment despite garnishment, then there is no payment.
Aranas v. Tutaan: In a decision rendered on May 3, 1971 by the CFI, said court declared that Araas
was the owner of 400 UTEX shares of stock issued in the names of defendants Gene Manuel and B.R.
Castaeda, including the stock dividends that accrued to said shares. UTEX was then ordered to
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cancel said certificates and issue new ones in the name of Araas. UTEX filed a motion for
clarification. This was granted which ruled that its judgment against UTEX was to pay Luisa Araas
cash dividends which accrued to the stocks after the rendition of this decision, excluding those paid to
Manuel and Castaeda. Araas asked for a writ of execution. However, UTEX moved for partial
consideration, alleging that cash dividends of the stocks corresponding to the periods of 1972-79 had
already been paid and delivered to M & C who then still appeared to be the registered owners of the
shares. Held: UTEX paid the wrong parties, notwithstanding its full knowledge of the final
judgment; thus, it was liable to pay all dividends accruing after the trial courts judgment in 1971 to
Aranas as the lawfully declared owners. It only had itself to blame. The burden of recovering the
supposed payment of the cash dividends made by UTEX to the wrong parties Castaeda and Manuel
squarely falls upon itself by its own action and cannot be passed by it to Aranas as innocent parties. It
is elementary that payment made by a judgment debtor to a wrong party cannot extinguish the
judgment obligation of such debtor to its creditor.
PAL v. CA: Respondent Tan commenced a complaint for damages against PAL. CFI ruled in favor
of Tan. The writ of execution was duly referred to Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes of CFI Manila for
enforcement. 4 months later, Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution saying that the
judgment had remained unsatisfied. It turns out that Reyes failed to surrender the amounts paid to
him by PAL; he could no longer be found as he has absconded or disappeared. Held: The payment
made to the absconding sheriff by check in his name did not satisfy the judgment debt. Under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, the payment to the absconding sheriff by check in his name did not
operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt. In general, a payment, in order to be effective to
discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person. Under Art. 1240, payment must be made
to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to receive the particular
payment. Payment made to one having apparent authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be
treated as though actual authority had been given for its receipt. Likewise, if payment is made to one
who by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work a discharge. The receipt of money due
on adjudgment by an officer authorized by law to accept it will, therefore, satisfy the debt.
The circumstances of this case, however, compel a different conclusion. The payment made by the
petitioner to the absconding sheriff was not in cash or legal tender but in checks. The checks were not
payable to Amelia Tan or Able Printing Press but to the absconding sheriff. Such payment did NOT
extinguish debt. In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied, payment means the
discharge of a debt or obligation in money and unless the parties so agree, a debtor has no rights,
except at his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of cash as medium of payment of his debt.
Consequently, unless authorized to do so by law or by consent of the obligee a public officer has no
authority to accept anything other than money in payment of an obligation under a judgment being
executed. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner's checks, in the case at bar,
does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt. Since a negotiable instrument is only a
substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as
payment. If bouncing checks had been issued in the name of Amelia Tan and not the Sheriff's, there
would have been no payment. After dishonor of the checks, Ms. Tan could have run after other
properties of PAL. The theory is that she has received no value for what had been awarded her.
Because the checks were drawn in the name of Emilio Z. Reyes, neither has she received anything.
The same rule should apply. In the first place, PAL did not pay in cash. It paid in cheeks. Payment in
money or cash to the implementing officer may be deemed absolute payment of the judgment debt

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BUT As a protective measure, therefore, the courts encourage the practice of payments by check
provided adequate controls are instituted to prevent wrongful payment and illegal withdrawal or
disbursement of funds. If particularly big funds are involved, escrow arrangements with a bank and
carefully supervised by the court would be the safer procedure. It is, indeed, out of the ordinary that
checks intended for a particular payee are made out in the name of another. Making the checks
payable to the judgment creditor would have prevented the encashment or the taking of undue
advantage by the sheriff, or any person into whose hands the checks may have fallen, whether
wrongfully or in behalf of the creditor. By doing so, PAL, in this instance, without prudence,
departed from what is generally observed and done.
c. As to the time and place of performance
i. When Payment Should be Made
Payment should be made when it is due.
Even if the payment is due, the General Rule is that demand is still necessary.
Article 1169 provides the instances when demand is not necessary
1. When the obligation or the law expressly so declares
2. Time is the controlling motive for the establishment of the contract
3. Demand would be useless
ii. Where Payment Should be Made:

Primary Rule: Agreement of the parties
Secondary Rule: Place where the thing was at the time the obligation was constituted if the
obligation is to deliver a determinate thing
Tertiary Rule: Debtors domicile (not residence)
4 Special Forms of Payment:

a. Dacion en pago (Article 1245)
Dacion en pago is the act of extinguishing the obligation by the substitution of payment. It is the
delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted
performance/payment of an obligation.
Filinvest v. Phil. Acetylene: dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor offers another
thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt.
By agreement of the parties, the prestation is changed.
Dacion en pago is a special form of payment since it does not comply with the requisite of
identity.
Other terms for dacion en pago include dation in payment, dation en paiement and datio in solutum.
Dacion en pago is governed by the law on sales (Article 1245).
o Balane will sell Nitura an Innova in 10 days. Balane says we have no Innovas right now, but
we do have fortuner for a lower price. BALANE: Ooops!!! This is novation pala!
o Balane borrows 500k from Nitura. On due date he said, I have no cash moneyz. But I have
an Innova. Want it? Nitura says k.
o Here, the debt is in money but payment is in something else.
o Because it is as if Balane is the vendor and Nitura the vendee

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o All the rules on sales apply!

Lo v. KJS: Lo owed KJS P335,462.14. In order to settle this obligation, Lo executed a Deed of
Assignment in favor of KJS wherein Lo assigned his receivables from Jomero. When KJS tried to
collect from Jomero, Jomero refused because Lo still had unpaid obligations to it. Held: The Deed of
Assignment did not extinguish the obligation. In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the
debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding
debt. In order that there be a valid dation in payment, the following are the requisites:
(1) There must be the performance of the prestation in lieu of payment (animo solvendi) which may
consist in the delivery of a corporeal thing or a real right or a credit against the third person;
(2) There must be some difference between the prestation due and that which is given in
substitution (aliud pro alio);
(3) There must be an agreement between the creditor and debtor that the obligation is
immediately extinguished by reason of the performance of a prestation different from that
due.
The undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying
the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged against the debtors debt. As
such, the vendor in good faith shall be responsible, for the existence and legality of the credit at the
time of the sale but not for the solvency of the debtor, in specified circumstances.
According to the old traditional concept, it is like a sale because P100,000 seemed to be the
purchase price and the car is the object. However, the modern view is to look at dacion en pago as
a novation (change in object)
3rd school (acc. to Balane most accurate) Castan has another view of dacion en pago. He believes
that it is neither a sale nor a novation but a special form of payment. It is a species/variation of
payment implying an onerous transaction similar to but not equal to a sale. It is not novation since
there is no new obligation. It is species of payment that is similar to sale.
o Its special because it departs from the requisite of identity.
o Theres no novation coz the obligation is extinguished in novation.
Dacion en pago will take place only if the parties consent.
What is the effect? Dacion en pago extinguishes the obligation up to the value of the thing
delivered unless the parties agree that the entire obligation is extinguished (Lopez vs. CA).
o So you have to appraise it, unless the parties agree otherwise.
Filinvest v. Phil. Acetylene: This case involves a sale of a motor vehicle. Phil. Acetylene Co (PAC)
bought a car from Lim, and undertook to pay it in installments. There was a chattel mortgage
executed on the car for security of the debt. Lim assigned his rights to Filinvest Credit Corporation
(FCC). PAC defaulted on several of the payments, so FCC sent letters demanding that the payment
be made. PAC instead delivered to FCC the car. PAC claimed that the delivery of the car to FCC
extinguished the obligation. Held: the mere return of the vehicle does not constitute dation in the
absence of evidence of the true intention of the parties. Dation is the transmission of the ownership of
a thing by the debtor to the creditor as accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. The
debtor offers another thing which the creditor accepts as equivalent payment. Its really a sort of sale.
The creditor buys the property, and he pays by charging it against the debtors debt. The elements of
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a sale are present consent, object certain, and cause or consideration. Dacion is an objective
novation, where the thing offered in lieu of money is accepted as an equivalent this is the object
certain and the debt is considered as the purchase price. CONSENT is a prerequisite for the
novation or sale to extinguish the obligation. This consent was not present here, since there is no
indication that FCC intended or consented to the mere delivery being construed as actual payment, or
dation.
Citizens Surety v. CA: Petitioner, a surety company, issued two surety bonds in behalf of respondent
to guaranty the fulfillment of an obligation under a contract of sale the latter had entered into with
the Singer. In consideration of the bonds, two indemnity agreements were executed by respondent
followed by a deed of assignment executed on the same date. After respondents failure to comply
with its obligation under the contract of sale, petitioner was compelled to pay under the surety bonds.
When respondent failed to reimburse it, petitioner filed a collection suit. Respondent opposed the
money claim, and asserted that the surety bonds and the indemnity agreements had been extinguished
by the execution of the deed of assignment. Held: The transaction could not be dation in payment.
When the deed of assignment was executed, the obligation of the assignor to refund the assignee had
not yet arisen. There was no obligation yet on the part of the petitioner to pay Singer Sewing
Machine Co. There was nothing to be extinguished on that date, hence, there could not have been a
dation in payment. The deed of assignment cannot be regarded as an absolute conveyance whereby
the obligation under the surety bonds was automatically extinguished. Respondents subsequent acts
showed that the deed of assignment was intended merely as a security for the issuance of the two
bonds. Partial payments were made after the execution of the deed of assignment to satisfy the
obligation under the two surety bonds. Moreover, a second real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner
was executed by respondent. These circumstances showed that no debt was extinguished upon the
execution of the deed of assignment, which was intended merely as another security for the issuance
of the surety bonds.
b. Application of payments/ Imputacion (Articles 1252-1254)

Designation of the debt of the debtor who has several obligations of the same kind to the creditor,
to whom payment is made.
Requisites:
1. Several debts
2. All must be due
3. Cant pay all
If the debts due are of the same nature and burden, the payment shall be applied to all of them
proportionately.
Application payment is the designation of the debt which is being paid by a debtor who has
several obligations of the same kind in favor of the creditor to whom payment is made.
The situation in application of payments is that a debtor owes his creditor. There are several debts
due, but the debtor cannot pay all of the debts due.
Example: A owes B P2000, P3000 and P10,000. A gives B P15,000. There is no application of
payment here because it is equal to the total amount due.
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The creditor can always not accept application of payments since the creditor cannot be
compelled to accept partial performance of the obligation. However, this may not be wise since
the debtor may have other creditors.
The rules on application of payment solve the problem of distributing the payment which is less
than the total obligation.
Rules in Application of Payment

1st Rule: Apply in accordance with the agreement
2nd Rule: If there is no agreement, the debtor has the right to apply
3rd Rule: If the debtor does not choose, the creditor can choose.
4th Rule: Apply to the most onerous debt (Article 1254, 1)
Rules to Determine Which is the More Onerous Obligation

1. An interest bearing obligation is more onerous than a non-interest bearing obligation.
2. An older debt is more onerous than a recent debt
3. An obligation where the party is bound as a principal is more onerous than an obligation is
bound as a surety
4. An obligation which is secured is more onerous than an obligation which is unsecured
5. An obligation with a penal clause is more onerous than an obligation without a penal clause
5th Rule: If equally onerous, apply proportionately (Article 1254, 2)
o Exception to the rule on indivisibility provided by the law!
What makes it special? Violates indivisibility and integrity.
Rapanut v. CA: Flunker decided to sell her property in Pasay. It was to be paid on installments.
Rapanut has been paying the 500 per month installments until a letter was sent to him by Flunkers
counsel informing him that for his failure to pay the monthly installments plus 10% per annum
interest on the balance and rescinding the contract. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Flunker. The trial
court and the appellate court agreed with private respondent's theory that the above payments should
be applied to the unpaid accrued interest (10% per annum on the balance) for the years 1986 to 1989
totalling P10,966.18. Held: A liberal interpretation of the contracts in question is that at the end of
each year, all payments made shall be deducted from the principal obligation. The 10% interest on the
balance is then added to whatever remains of the principal. Thereafter, petitioner shall pay the
monthly installments on the stipulated dates. In other words, the interest due are added to and paid
like the remaining balance of the principal. Thus, we must rule that the parties intended that
petitioner pay the monthly installments at predetermined dates, until the full amount, consisting of
the purchase price and the interests on the balance is paid. Significantly, private respondent accepted
the payments petitioner religiously made for four years. Private respondent cannot rely on the clause
in the contract stating that no demand is necessary to explain her silence for four years as to the 10%
interest, as such clause refers to the P500.00 monthly installments. In a contract involving installment
payments with interest chargeable against the remaining balance of the obligation, it is the duty of the
creditor to inform of the amount of interest that falls due and that he is applying the installment
payments to cover said interest. Otherwise, the creditor cannot apply the payments to the interest and
then hold the debtor in default for non-payment of installments on the principal.
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Gobongseng v. CA: Gobonseng sps filed with the SIHI an application for a P2M loan. The parties
agreed to reduce the amount of the loan from P2M to P900K. SIHI granted the Gobonsengs credit
lines for such amounts which they desire to avail of. The availments of such amounts, renewable from
time to time, have an average term of 60 days each. Gobonsengs availed of the full amount of 900K
which they renewed from time to time. With respect to the loan of 800K, the Gobonsengs obtained
various amounts in installments. Claiming that the Gobonsengs failed to pay the two loans on their
due date on May 2, 1984 and that despite demands, failed to remit the payment due, SIHI instituted
an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Gobonsengs filed with the court a quo a complaint for
annulment/reformation of documents and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Held: If the debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not be
deemed to have been made until the interests have been covered. As a matter of fact, an amount of
P7,417.86 was credited to the principal in the promissory note per Official Receipt dated 2 May
1984. This partial payment for the principal clearly proves that the interest due had been paid. Article
1253 of the Civil Code provides that if the debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not
be deemed to have been made until the interests have been covered. Consequently, automatic renewal
of the loans by way of promissory notes for the succeeding interest period was unavoidable.
c. Payment by cession (Article 1255)
Art. 1255. The debtor may cede or assign his property to his creditors in payment of his
debts. This cession, unless there is stipulation to the contrary, shall only release the debtor
from responsibility for the net proceeds of the thing assigned. The agreements which, on the
effect of the cession, are made between the debtor and his creditors shall be governed by
special laws.
Tolentino: the assignment or cession contemplated by this article is the abandonment of the
universality of the property of the debtor for the benefit of his creditors in order that such
property may be applied to the payment of the credits.
1 debtor several creditors: Balane owes Loque, Nitura and Caguioa. Balane will give you some
land and they will sell it and divide the proceeds.
o Remember: they have to agree!
o This is different from dacion because ownership is not transferred over the land. They only
acquire the authority to sell.
o This is a SPA to sell
o If the sale doesnt cover everything, then he will still owe the balance.
The situation is contemplated here is that the debtor has several creditors and several debts. He
turns over property to his creditors who are given the authority to sell the property and to apply
the proceeds to his debt.
In payment by cession, property is turned over by the debtor to the creditors who acquire the
right to sell it and divide the net proceeds among themselves.
In payment by cession, the creditors do not own the property to be sold. The creditors only have
the power to sell. The net proceeds of the sale will be distributed according to the agreement.
Payment by cession is a special form of payment because there is no completeness of performance
integrity. In most cases, there will be a balance due.
More differences acc. to Tolentino:
o Dation: only 1 specific thing v. Cession: all property.

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o Dation: only in favor of 1 creditor; Cession: several creditors

Payment by Cession Distinguished from Dacion en Pago
In dacion en pago, there is a transfer of ownership from the debtor to the creditor. In payment by
cesion, there is no transfer of ownership. The creditors simply acquire the right to sell the
properties of the debtor and apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of their credit.
Payment by cession does not generally terminate all debts due since normally there is still a
balance due. The balance will continue to be due unless the parties agree otherwise. Usually, the
termination is only to the extent of the net proceeds. The extinguishment of the obligation is pro
tanto.
What makes it special? Violates indivisibility and integrity
Payment by cession must be distinguished from insolvency.
2 Kinds of Insolvency (not discussed)
i.
Extrajudicial or Voluntary (this is voluntary)
o In extrajudicial insolvency, if there is a balance left, the debtor must still pay.
o However, the debtor may limit which properties will be sold by the creditors since the
agreement is contractual.
ii.
Judicial
o In judicial insolvency, the obligation is totally extinguished even if theres still a balance.
o In judicial insolvency, every property which is not exempt from attachment or execution is
made available for sale.
d. Tender of payment and consignation (Article1256-1261)
Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due w/ the court or judicial authorities whenever
the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior tender of
payment.
It is defined in the case of Soco v. Militante as a deposit of the object of the prestation in a
competent court in accordance with the rules prescribed by law, after tender of payment was
refused or circumstances which render payment impossible or inadvisable.
According to Balane, the title of the subsection is wrong. It should have been consignation only
because that is the special mode of payment and not the tender of payment.
Tender of payment is a manifestation made by the debtor of his willingness, readiness and ability
to pay.
Tolentino notes: it only applies to discharge a debt and not to exercise a right. So in redemption
or right to repurchase, tender is sufficient.
It is a special mode of payment because payment is made not to the creditor but to the court.
Consignation is an option on the part of the debtor because consignation assumes that the creditor
was in mora accipiendi when the creditor without just cause, refuses to accept payment. Of course,
if the creditor without just cause refuses to accept payment, the debtor may just delay payment.
But something still hangs above his head. He is therefore, given the option to consign.
Mora accipiendi will not extinguish. But stops running of interest from time of mora.
Requisites (Soco v. Militante):
i.
That there was a debt due
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ii.
That the consignation of the obligation had been made because of some legal cause, either
because
a. Tender of payment was unjustly refused by the creditor:
o tender= manifestation to comply with the obligation coupled with the offer of
immediate performance
b. There is no need for tender of payment due to circumstances which make tender of
payment impossible or inadvisable
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
o Circumstances Which Make Tender of Payment Unnecessary (Article 1256)

The creditor was absent or unknown, or does not appear at the place of payment
o Tolentino: absence need not be judicially declared. He must also have no legal
representative, or the debtor does not know of such legal representative.
The creditor was incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it was due
o Payment made to an incapacitated person does not count except to the extent that
the incapacitated person is benefited or if he has kept the thing.
The creditor, without just cause refuses to give a receipt
o According to Professor Balane, this is wrong. This presupposes that there has been
a prior tender of payment.
Several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due
o The debtor should file interpleader with consignation
The title of the obligation has been lost
iii.
First notice: That previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person
interested in the performance of the obligation (Article 1257)
iv.
That the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court (consignation proper)
v.
That after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof
(second notice.)
Tolentino: this second notice can be service of summons.
All persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation, whether passive or active must be
notified.
Failure of any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective.

Why is it special? You have to pay the creditor or his successor in interest. Here, you pay the
court.
Soco v. Militante: Soco leased her commercial building and lot to Francisco at P800 monthly rental,
other terms of which were in a Contract of Lease. Claiming that 11 was in fact not part of the
contract because it was cancelled, Soco filed for annulment and/or reformation of the contract. Before
this case, Soco also learned that Francisco sub-leased a portion of the building to NACIDA, at a
monthly rental of more than P3,000. Since Soco felt he was on the losing end of the contract, he
looked for ways to terminate it. Soco served notice to the Francisco to vacate the premises leased.
Soco stopped sending his collector to Francisco and has not accepted payment. As a response,
Francisco informed Soco that all payments of rental due were in fact paid by Commercial Bank and
Trust Company through the Clerk of Court since Soco was not collecting anymore directly from
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Francisco. Held: Militante has utterly failed to prove the following requisites of a valid consignation:
First, tender of payment of the monthly rentals to the lessor. Second, respondent lessee also failed to
prove the first notice to the lessor prior to consignation. From their arrangement, it was the lessees
duty to send someone to get the cashiers check from the bank and logically, the lessee has the
obligation to make and tender the check to the lessor. This the lessee failed to do. Third, respondent
lessee likewise failed to prove the second notice that is after consignation has been made, to the lessor.
And the fourth requisite that respondent lessee failed to prove is the actual deposit or consignation of
the monthly rentals except the two cashiers checks. Not a single copy of the official receipts issued by
the Clerk of Court was presented at the trial of the case to prove the actual deposit or consignation.
Alfonso v. CA: Sps. Danilo and Luzviminda Basco are the owners of an apartment building, having
acquired it by purchase from Pacifico Vibar and Antonia Mapay Vibar (former owners). The fourth
door unit of the apartment was being rented out by the former owners to Roland Alfonso at a
monthly rental of P185. After Sps. Basco had purchased the property from the former owners, they
sent to Alfonso a letter saying that Sps. Basco are giving Alfonso 90 days within which to vacate the
premises and deliver possession to them because the spouses will use the said property as their
residence. Alfonso refused to vacate said unit and instead he sent by registered mail his April 1984
rental payment, which was rejected by Sps. Basco. Sps. Basco proposed to give Alfonso a period of 1
year from April 1, 1984 within which to stay at the premises free from rental in exchange for the
voluntary surrender of the premises. Alfonso insisted that he could not be ejected from subject
premises. Sps. Basco a complaint for ejectment. On November 5, 1984, Alfonso, filed a motion
praying that the rentals from April 1984 up to the current month of November, be ordered deposited
in court. Sps. Basco manifested that the deposit of the unpaid rentals for 8 months, April to
November, 1984 cannot render ineffective the provision of Sec. 5(b) of BP 25 which allows the
ejectment of a lessee in case of arrears in payment of rent for (3) months at one time, provided, that in
case of refusal by the lessor to accept payment of the rental agreed upon, the lessee shall either deposit
by way of consignation, the amount in Court or in a bank in the name of and with notice to the
lessor. Held: Mere tender of payment is not enough. Consignation must follow to extinguish the
obligation. It must be noted that the free rent offer was merely a proposal of Sps. Basco to Alfonso
who rejected it by tendering his payment corresponding to the April 1984 rental and by consistently
refusing to vacate the premises. Such rejection rendered the proposal of free rental without force and
effect. Alfonso was duty bound to pay the rentals as they fall due in order to abort any ejectment
proceedings against him. If the lessor refuses to accept the payment, as in the case at bar, Alfonso had a
remedy provided for by law, namely consignation in court or deposit in a bank in the lessors name
with due notice to the lessor. Alfonso did not avail of such remedy so that when Sps. Basco filed the
ejectment proceedings against him, the rentals corresponding to the month of April to July 1984 had
not yet been paid by Alfonso. Tender of payment is not enoughconsignation must follow in order
to extinguish the debt. Otherwise, failure to comply with the requirements provided for under Sec. 5,
paragraph (b) BP 25 is a ground for ejectment. Delayed consignation or deposit will not do.
Moreover, when Alfonso filed his Motion to Consign Rentals in November 1984, he was already 8
months delayed in the payment of his rentals.
Tayag v. CA: The late Juan Galicia, Sr., together with his sister, Celerina Labuguin, executed a deed
of conveyance in favor of Abrigido Leyva involving a piece of land for the sum of Php50K. Said deed
of conveyance is now the subject matter of litigation. Galicia Sr.s heirs are contending that there was

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a breach of compliance with the stipulations therein by herein private respondents. Because of the
heirs reluctance, Leyva (private respondent herein) filed a suit for specific performance. Held:
Consignation alone produced the effect of payment in the case at bar because it was established below
that two or more heirs of Juan Galicia, Sr. claimed the same right to collect (Article 1256, (4), Civil
Code; pp. 4-5, Decision in Civil Case No. 681-G; pp. 67-68, Rollo). Moreover, petitioners did not
bother to refute the evidence on hand that, aside from the P18,520. which was consigned, private
respondent also paid the sum of P13,908.25. These two figures representing private respondent's
payment of the fourth condition amount to P32,428.25, less the P3,778.77 paid by petitioners to the
bank, will lead us to the sum of P28,649.48 or a refund of P1,649.48 to private respondent as
overpayment of the P27,000.00 balance.
Parishca v. Luis Dison: Luis Dison Realty, and Pasricha executed two Contracts of Lease over a
building in Ermita as lessor and lessees respectively. Lessees agreed to pay monthly rentals. While the
contracts were in effect, Pacheco, then General Manager was replaced by a certain Bautista. Lessees
paid monthly rentals until May 1992 then stopped. Despite final demand by respondents, lessees did
not comply. Pasricha admitted their failure to provide for the stipulated rent but claimed it is justified
because of the confusion as to the person authorized to receive the payment because of the change in
management. HELD: Not knowing to whom payment should be made does not justify the failure of
lessees to pay because they were not without remedy. They should have availed provisions of the
Civil Code on consignation of payment by depositing things due at the disposal of judicial authority
and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. Here, consignation alone would have produced the effect
of payment. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming
more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him. The Pasrichas claim that they
made a written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But wellsettled is the rule that tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in order that the
effects of payment may be produced.
Go Cinco v. CA: Manuel Cinco obtained a commercial loan from MTLC and it was secured by a real
estate mortgage over his land and building. When Ms obligation amounted to P1,071, 256.66. To be
able to pay such loan, they applied for a loan from PNB. The latter granted the application on the
condition that the existing mortgage be cancelled so the land can be used as a security for the new
loan. Manuel went to the house of MTLCs Presiden, Estert and informed her that payment was
ready at PNB. M executed a SPA authorizing the Este to collect the proceeds of his PNB loan.
Outraged that the Go Cinco used the same properties mortgaged to MTLC as collateral for the PNB
loan, Ester refused to sign the deed and did not collect the P1.3 Million loan proceeds. Held: the
obligation was not extinguished but Go Cinco was freed from the obligation to pay interest on the
outstanding amount from the time the unjust refusal took place. While Esters refusal was unjustified
and unreasonable, Manuels position that this refusal had the effect of payment that extinguished his
obligation to MTLC is wrong because a refusal without just cause is not equivalent to payment; to
have the effect of payment and the consequent extinguishment of the obligation to pay, the law
requires the companion acts of tender of payment and consignation. Tender and consignation have
the effect of payment, as by consignation, the thing due is deposited and placed at the disposal of the
judicial authorities for the creditor to collect. While no completed tender of payment and
consignation took place sufficient to constitute payment, Go Cinco duly established that they have
legitimately secured a means of paying off their loan with MTLC; they were only prevented from

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doing so by the unjust refusal of Ester to accept the proceeds of the PNB loan through her refusal to
execute the release of the mortgage on the properties mortgaged to MTLC. MTLC and Ester in fact
prevented the Go Cinco from the exercise of their right to secure payment of their loan. Court
ordered to release the mortgage to MTLC as a condition to the release of the proceeds of the PNB
loan and to accept the proceeds, sufficient to cover the total amount of the loan to MTLC, as payment
for Manuels loan with MTLC.
Bonrostro v. Luna: There are 2 contracts to sell involving the same house and lot in Diliman. The first
one was entered into by Luna, as buyer, with Bliss. Barely a year later, Luna (this time as seller)
entered into another contract to sell with Bonrostro over the same property; the 2nd contract was for
1.2M Php, and provided for payment on installment basis; it provided for interest in case of default,
rescission and forfeiture in certain cases. Bonrostro defaulted so Luna filed a case for rescission with
the RTC. Also, in order for the 1st contract to remain valid despite the default of the Bonrostros, the
Lunas paid the amortization to Bliss. The Lunas sought reimbursement for this, plus damages. In the
RTC, the spouses Bonrostro claimed that they were wiling to their total balance of 630k Php to
spouses Luna after they sought from the latter a 60-day extension to pay the same. However, during
the time they were ready to pay, neither the spouses Luna nor their lawyer had appeared. Later, the
Bonrostros sent a letter to the lawyer of Luna expressing their desire to pay the balance but received
no response from the latter. Bonrostros claimed that the Lunas had instructed Bliss not to receive
amortization payments from anyone. Held: the act of sending of the letter does not constitute a valid
tender of payment. The Bonrostros assert that their letter amounts to tender of payment of the
remaining balance, thus accrual of interest must be suspended from that date. Tender of payment "is
the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation. If refused without
just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the debtor of the obligation to pay but only after a
valid consignation of the sum due shall have been made with the proper court." "Tender of payment,
without more, produces no effect." "To have the effect of payment and the consequent
extinguishment of the obligation to pay, the law requires the companion acts of tender of payment
and consignation." As to the effect of tender of payment on interest, Tolentino explained: When a
tender of payment is made in such a form that the creditor could have immediately realized payment
if he had accepted the tender, followed by a prompt attempt of the debtor to deposit the means of
payment in court by way of consignation, the accrual of interest on the obligation will be suspended
from the date of such tender. But when the tender of payment is not accompanied by the means of
payment, and the debtor did not take any immediate step to make a consignation, then interest is not
suspended from the time of such tender. Here, the subject letter merely states Lourdes willingness
and readiness to pay but it was not accompanied by payment. She claimed that she made numerous
telephone calls to Atty. Carbon reminding the latter to collect her payment, but, neither said lawyer
nor Constancia came to collect the payment. After that, the spouses Bonrostro took no further steps
to effect payment. They did not resort to consignation of the payment with the proper court despite
knowledge that under the contract, non-payment of the installments on the agreed date would make
them liable for interest thereon. Bonrostro erroneously assumed that their notice to pay would excuse
them from paying interest. Their claimed tender of payment did not produce any effect whatsoever
because it was not accompanied by actual payment or followed by consignation. Hence, it did not
suspend the running of interest. The spouses Bonrostro are therefore liable for interest on the subject
installments from the date of default until full payment of the sums of P300,000.00 and P330,000.00.
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Cacayorin v. AFPMBAI: Petitioner got a loan from the bank to buy a house and lot from
respondent. The bank later went into receivership. Later, respondent was able to obtain the loan
documents (like the promissory note) how, nobody knows. So petitioner now did not know to
whom they will pay to the bank or respondent. So they filed a case for consignation. The contention
of respondent is that there is no proper consignation since petitioner did not first made a tender of
payment. Held: consignation is proper as it appears that there are 2 entities which petitioners must
deal with in order to fully secure their title to the property the bank (the named creditor in the loan
agreement) and Respondent (the holder of the loan documents). Clearly, the allegations in the
Complaint present a situation where the creditor is unknown, or that two or more entities
appear to possess the same right to collect from petitioners. The lack of prior tender of payment
by the petitioners is not fatal to their consignation case. Petitioners filed the case for the exact reason
that they were at a loss as to which between the two the Bank or respondent was entitled to such a
tender of payment. Article 1256 authorizes consignation alone, without need of prior tender of
payment, where the ground for consignation is that the creditor is unknown, or does not appear at
the place of payment; or is incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due; or when,
without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt; or when two or more persons claim the same right to
collect; or when the title of the obligation has been lost. Consignation is necessarily judicial; hence,
jurisdiction lies with the RTC, not with the HLURB. Tender of payment must be distinguished from
consignation. Tender is the antecedent of consignation, that is, an act preparatory to the consignation,
which is the principal, and from which are derived the immediate consequences, which the debtor
desires or seeks to obtain. Tender of payment may be extrajudicial, while consignation is necessarily
judicial, and the priority of the first is the attempt to make a private settlement before proceeding to
the solemnities of consignation.
2. Loss of the Thing Due (Articles1262-1269)

Loss of the thing due is appropriate for to give. Impossibility of performance= to do.
Tolentino: In reciprocal obligations, it extinguishes the entire juridical relation. The debtor must
return to the creditor whatever the latter may have already delivered.
Art. 1262. An obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing shall be
extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and before he
has incurred in delay.
When by law or stipulation, the obligor is liable even for fortuitous events, the loss of the
thing does not extinguish the obligation, and he shall be responsible for damages. The same
rule applies when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk.
Art. 1263. In an obligation to deliver a generic thing, the loss or destruction of anything of
the same kind does not extinguish the obligation.
Genus numquam perit: the genus does not perish

Exceptionally if the whole genus is lost, then it will excuse
If the genus becomes contraband.
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Art. 1264. The courts shall determine whether, under the circumstances, the partial loss of
the object of the obligation is so important as to extinguish the obligation.
Art. 1265. Whenever the thing is lost in the possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed that
the loss was due to his fault, unless there is proof to the contrary, and without prejudice to the
provisions of article 1165. This presumption does not apply in case of earthquake, flood,
storm, or other natural calamity.
Art. 1266. The debtor in obligations to do shall also be released when the prestation becomes
legally or physically impossible without the fault of the obligor.
People v. Franklin: Franklin was accused of estafa. She was arrested and was granted bail, which was
guaranteed by ASIC. When the time for arraignment came, Franklin didnt show up. ASIC asked for
time to produce her for arraignment, but even with extensions granted, they were unable to make her
show up to be arraigned. Thus, the bond posted by ASIC was forfeited. ASIC tries now to escape
liability by invoking Art. 1266. They say that they were unable to produce Franklin because she was
allowed by the Philippine government to leave the country. Therefore, they say, the obligation has
become impossible without their fault. Held: the relationship of Debtor-Creditor contemplated in
1266 is different from the relationship of State and Surety upon a bail bond. The Surety, by posting
the bail bond, becomes absolutely responsible for the accuseds custody, and is responsible for any
flight that might occur. ASIC could have informed the DFA and other government agencies that she
was free on bail.
Immaculata v. Navarro: This is a MR on the courts decision denying Immaculatas petition to set
aside a decision in another civil case. In the latter case Victoria filed for specific performance
compelling Immaculata to execute the document in relation to the sale of parcel of land. In giving its
ruling, the court inadvertently missed a point wherein Immaculata alternatively prayed therein that,
in case the validity of the sale is upheld, he be allowed to legally redeem the parcel of land previously
obtained through a free patent. Held: Immaculata may legally redeem the land. The court held that
while the sale was originally executed sometime in December, 1969, it was only on February 3, 1974
when a "deed of conveyance" was formally executed. Since offer to redeem was made on March 24,
1975, this was clearly within the five-year period of legal redemption allowed by the Public Land
Act. The allegation that the offer to redeem was not sincere, because there was no consignation of the
amount in Court is devoid of merit. The right to redeem is a RIGHT, not an obligation, therefore,
there is no consignation required to preserve the right to redeem.
PNCC v. NLRC: PNCC hired Romeo Buan to work as Civil Engineer III in Saudi Arabia for a
period of 2 years. While in Saudi Arabia, Buan was assigned to work in the Saudi Governments
Mecca Stormwater Drainage Project. He renewed his contract. Held: Appraising the second
employment contract between PNCC and Buan in terms of Philippine law, there are 3 reasons why
PNCC cannot be held liable under that contract for breach thereof. First, it will be seen that the
renewal of Buans Residence and Work permit constituted a condition to his continued employment
in Saudi Arabia. That condition was resolutory in nature, that is, the non-renewal of private Buans
permit had the effect of resolving, or rendering cancellable, that contract. The second reason is found
in the rule that an obligor shall be released from his obligation when the prestation has become legally

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or physically impossible without fault on his part. The supervening impossibility of performance,
based upon some factor independent of the will of the obligor, releases the obligor from his obligation
after restitution of what he may have received, if any, in advance from the other contracting party;
the obligor incurs no liability for damages for his inability to perform. Lastly, Paragraph 13 of the
second contract expressly envisaged the possibility that renewal of the Residence and Work permit of
private Buan could be denied by the concerned authorities for any reason, in which case, the
contract would be cancelled. Buan was, of course, aware that his original permit was about to
expire when he left for Saudi Arabia the second time. He must or should have been also alerted by the
second contract of employment to the possibility of non-renewal of his Residence and Work permit
and the ensuing cancellability of the contract. PNCC did not, in other words, conceal the legal and
practical situation from private Buan.
PNCC v. CA: PNCC refused to pay the rentals as stipulated in the contract of lease on an undivided
portion of land owned by Raymundo. PNCC refused to pay since it would no longer pursue their
rock crushing project and that the contract of lease would only begin upon the approval of their
license. PNCC wants to terminate the contract due to financial and technical difficulties. Held:
PNCC must pay. Art. 1266 is applicable only to obligations to do and not to obligations to give.
The obligation to pay rentals or deliver the thing in a contract of lease falls within the prestation to
give; hence, it is not covered within the scope of Article 1266. At any rate, the unforeseen event and
causes mentioned by petitioner are not the legal or physical impossibilities contemplated in said
article. It is therefore only in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances that equity demands
assistance for the debtor.
Art. 1268. When the debt of a thing certain and determinate proceeds from a criminal
offense, the debtor shall not be exempted from the payment of its price, whatever may be the
cause for the loss, unless the thing having been offered by him to the person who should
receive it, the latter refused without justification to accept it.
Art. 1269. The obligation having been extinguished by the loss of the thing, the creditor shall
have all the rights of action which the debtor may have against third persons by reason of the
loss.
Loss of the thing here is not to be taken in the strict legal meaning of
loss. Loss can be applied in an obligation to give a determinate thing (Article 1262), in an
obligation to give a generic thing (Article 1263) and in an obligation to do (Article 1266)
The term loss embraces all causes which may render impossible the performance of the prestations
impossibility of performance
A thing is lost when it perishes, or goes out of commerce, or disappears in such a way that its
existence is unknown or it cannot be recovered.
When the debt of a thing certain and determinate proceeds from a criminal offense, the debtor
shall not be exempted from the payment of its price, whatever may be the cause for the loss,
unless the thing having been offered by him to the person who should receive it, the latter refused
without justification to accept it (Article 1268).
Kinds of Impossibility According to Time:
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a. Original Impossibility
If the impossibility had already existed when the contract was made, then the result is not
extinguishments but inefficacy of the obligation under Art.134832 and 1493.33 The contract is
void.
b. Supervening Impossibility
The impossibility of performance must be subsequent to the execution of the contract in order to
Change in the Circumstances

Rebus sic stantibus literally means things as they stand. It is short for clausula rebus sic
stantibus agreement of things as they stand. Also called Riesgo imprevisible (Spanish), Theorie
dimprevision (French) and Verschuvinden des Grundgeschaftes (German).
Art. 1267. When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part.
In Roman law, no matter how difficult the obligation is, it has to be performed or else the obligor
may be liable for damages (pacta sunt servanda). In Medieval times, although agreements should
be complied with, in certain extreme circumstances, the debtor can be released because of the
difficulty in performance.
This is a principle of international law that holds that when 2 states enter into a treaty, they enter
taking into account the circumstances at the time it was entered into and should the circumstances
change as to make the fulfillment of the treaty very difficult, one may ask for a termination of the
treaty. This principle of international law has spilled over into Civil law.
The underlying philosophy here is that when parties enter into an agreement, the parties
contemplate existing circumstances. When things supervene, the parties may be discharged
because they did not contemplate such difficult circumstances.
This doctrine is also called the doctrine of extreme difficulty and frustration of commercial object
or enterprise.
The attitude of the courts on this doctrine is very strict. This principle has always been strictly
applied. To give it a liberal application is to undermine the binding force of an obligation. Every
obligation is difficult. The performance must be extremely difficult in order for rebus sic stantibus
to apply.
Frustration of the enterprise or frustration of commercial objects= English term for rebus sic
stantibus
Requisites
i.
The supervening event or change could not have been foreseen at the time of the
execution of the contract
ii.
The event or change makes the performance extremely difficult but not impossible

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Art. 1348. Impossible things or services cannot be the object of contracts.

Art. 1493. If at the time the contract of sale is perfected, the thing which is the object of the contract has been entirely
lost, the contract shall be without any effect.
But if the thing should have been lost in part only, the vendee may choose between withdrawing from the contract and
demanding the remaining part, paying its price in proportion to the total sum agreed upon.
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iii.
iv.
This is what distinguishes this from loss or fortuitous event.

The event must not be due to an act of either party
The contract is for a future prestation.
Performed over a long period of time or over successive performances
Some commentators like J. Caguioa is to do only. But see Naga Telephone v. CA where it
was applied to obligations to give.
Naga Telephone v. CA: NATELCO and CASURECO entered into a contract wherein NATELCO
shall use CASURECOs electric light posts in Naga City. In consideration, CASURECO agreed to
install free of charge, 10 telephone connections for NATELCOs use. After the contract has been
enforced for 10 years, CASURECO filed a case for reformation of the contract on the ground that it
has become too one-sided in favor of NATELCO because after 11 years of NATELCOs use of the
posts, the telephone cables strung by them have become much heavier with the increase in the volume
of their subscribers, worsened by the fact that their linemen bore holes through the posts at which
points those posts were broken during typhoons. Held: Art. 1267 is applicable. The report of the
Code Commission reveals that the rationale behind the article is that when the service has become so
difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the court should be authorized
to release the obligor in whole or in part. This article is based on the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
which recognizes that the parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing conditions, and once these
conditions cease to exist the contract also ceases to exist. Considering practical needs and the demands
of equity and good faith, the disappearance of the basis of a contract gives rise to a right to relief in
favor of the party prejudiced. Further, service under 1267 should be understood as referring to
performance of the obligation. In this case, the performance contemplated is CASURECOs
obligation to allow NATELCO to use its posts. Also, 1267 does not require that the contract be for
future service with future unusual change, contrary to NATELCOs argument. Finally, the Occea
ruling which provides that courts cannot modify the contract is inapplicable in this case since the
Court is NOT making a new contract for the parties herein, but instead finds the compensation
necessary in order not to disrupt the basic and essential services being rendered by both parties herein
to the public and to avoid unjust enrichment by appellant at the expense of plaintiff.
Laguna v. Manabat: Binan leased their certificates of public convenience to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co.
and Batangas Transpo separately. Laguna and Batangas stopped paying rent due to a rally conducted
by their employees and the reduction in the amount of dollars allowed by the Monetary Board for
the purchase of spare parts needed in the operation of their trucks, the alleged difficulty encountered
in securing said parts, and their procurement at exorbitant costs, the high cost of operation, coupled
with the lack of passenger traffic on the leased lines resulted in financial losses. Held: the alleged
causes for the suspension of operations on the lines leased, namely, the high prices of spare parts and
gasoline and the reduction of the dollar allocations, already existed when the contract of lease was
executed. The cause of petitioners' inability to operate on the lines cannot, therefore, be ascribed to
fortuitous events or circumstances beyond their control, but to their own voluntary desistance. 3rd ,
performance is not excused by subsequent inability to perform, by unforeseen difficulties, by unusual
or unexpected expenses, by danger, by inevitable accident, by breaking of machinery, by strikes, by
sickness, by failure of a party to avail himself of the benefits to be had under the contract, by weather
conditions, by financial stringency or by stagnation of business. Neither is performance excused by
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the fact that the contract turns out to be hard and improvident, unprofitable, or impracticable, illadvised, or even foolish, or less profitable, unexpectedly burdensome.
Occena v. Jabson: Tropical Homes, Inc. filed a complaint for modification of the terms and conditions
of its subdivision contract with petitioners, alleging that due to the increase in price of oil and its
derivatives and the concomitant worldwide spiraling of prices, which are not within the control of
plaintiff, of all commodities including raw materials required for such development work, the cost of
development has risen to levels which are not within the remotest contemplation of the parties at the
time said agreement was entered into. It further alleges that further performance by the plaintiff
under the contract, will result in situation where defendants would be unjustly enriched at the
expense of the plaintiff. Tropical homes prays for the modification of the terms and conditions of the
contract by fixing the proper shares that should pertain to the herein parties out of the gross proceeds
from the sales of subdivided lots. Held: The complaint seeks not release from the subdivision contract
but that the court "render judgment I modifying the terms and Conditions of the Contract. 1267 does
not grant the courts this authority to remake, modify or revise the contract or to fix the division of
shares between the parties as contractually stipulated with the force of law between the parties, so as
to substitute its own terms for those covenanted by the parties themselves.
Magat v. CA: Guerrero Transport Services, owned by Guerrero, won a bid for the operation of a
fleet of radio-controlled taxicabs within the Subic Naval Base. LOI 1 was passed by Marcos seizing all
privately owned media facilities, including radio facilities. The Radio Control Office also issued AC
4, suspending acceptance of application for permits to own and/or possess radio transmitters and
transceivers. Thereafter, Guerrero and Victorino entered into a contract for the sale of transceivers
and Victorino placed an order with his Japanese supplier. However, since the government refused to
grant the permit to import the transceivers, the order was cancelled by Guerrero. Held: no breach of
contract and even if there was, such will not give rise to damages. The law provides that "[w]hen the
service (required by the contract) has become so manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties,
the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part." Here, Guerrero's inability to secure a
letter of credit and to comply with his obligation was a direct consequence of the denial of the permit
to import. For this, he cannot be faulted. Note: Nowhere in the LOI and Admin. Circular is there an
express ban on the importation of transceivers. Possession and importation of the radio transmitters
and transceivers was legal provided one had the necessary license for it. Transceivers were not
prohibited but merely regulated goods.
If the contract is of immediate fulfillment, the gross inequality of the reciprocal prestation may
involve lesion or want of cause.
Obligations to give:
a. Obligation to give a determinate thing
The happening of a fortuitous event in itself does not necessarily extinguish an obligation to
deliver a determinate thing. An obligation consisting in the delivery of a specified thing, shall be
extinguished when the said thing is lost or destroyed without the fault of the obligor and before
he is in default.
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Whenever the thing is lost in the possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed that the loss was
due to his fault, unless there is proof to the contrary, and without prejudice to the provisions of
Article 1165. This presumption does not apply in case of earthquake, flood, storm or other
natural calamity (Article 1265)
b. Obligation to give a generic thing:
The happening of a fortuitous event does not extinguish the obligation to deliver a generic thing
Genus nunquam perit genus never perishes. This is the general rule. Sometimes, though, the
entire genus perishes because it becomes illegal.
What is not covered by this rule is an obligation to deliver a limited generic.
Example: I promise to deliver to you one of my Amorsolos (I have 4). This is not generic because
I only have four but not specific because I did not specify which one. This is governed by Article
1262. In this case, the obligation may be extinguished by the loss of all the things through
fortuitous event.
Obligation to do
The debtor in obligations to do shall also be released when the prestation becomes legally or
physically impossible without the fault of the obligor (Article 1266).
The impossibility here must be supervening. If it is original, then the contract is void.
Kinds of Impossibility According to Nature:
a. Objective Impossibility
In objective impossibility, the act cannot be done by anyone. The effect of objective impossibility
is to extinguish the obligation.
b. Subjective Impossibility
In subjective impossibility, the obligation becomes impossible only w/ respect to the obligor.
There are 3 views as to the effect of a subjective impossibility:
i.
The obligation is not extinguished. The obligor should ask another to do the obligation.
ii.
The obligation is extinguished.
iii.
A third view distinguishes one prestation which is very personal and one which are not
personal such that subjective impossibility is a cause for extinguishes a very personal
obligation but not an obligation which is not very personal.
Effect of Loss on Creditors Rights
The obligation having been extinguished by the loss of the thing, the creditor shall have all the
rights of action which the debtor may have against the third person by reason of the loss.
A common example of this is insurance.
In a reciprocal obligation of the thing is lost, one party is absolved. Is the other party still bound
to perform?
o Example: Balane sells car to Nitura for 10k. He will deliver and Nitura will pay in 10 days. If
his car is lost, is Nitura still liable to pay?
o This is disputed.
o Tolentino and Castan: no! They are counterparts, so if one is lost then the counter part is lost
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Follows res perit domino. I lost the car, so I lost the payment
o JBL Reyes: res perit creditore. Roman rule: Nitura has to pay!
Basis: Art. 1269.
3. Condonation or Remission of the Debt Due

Art. 1270. Condonation or remission is essentially gratuitous, and requires the acceptance by
the obligor. It may be made expressly or impliedly.
One and the other kind shall be subject to the rules which govern inofficious donations.
Express condonation shall, furthermore, comply with the forms of donation.
Condonation or remission is an act of liberality by virtue of which, without receiving any

equivalent, the creditor renounces enforcement of an obligation which is extinguished in whole
or in part.
Requisites
a. The debt must be existing
You can remit a debt even before it is due.
Doesnt have to be due. But you cant make one if there is no debt yet
Balane cannot say that tomorrow, I will enter into a loan with you and then I will condone it.
Thats not a condonation. If today Balane contracts a loan with Fajardo, tomorrow he can
condone it even if its due next week. Example: I owe A P1M. I promised to pay on July 31, 2002
with interest. On May 31, A condones the obligation. The obligation is existing but not yet due
but it can be condoned.
b. The renunciation must be gratuitous
If renunciation is for a consideration, the mode of extinguishment may be something else. It may
be novation, compromise or dacion en pago for example.
c. There must be acceptance by the debtor
d. The parties must have capacity
The creditor must have capacity to give away.
The debtor must have capacity to accept.
Form
a. If the renunciation is express, then it is a donation.
o The form of donation must be observed. If the condonation involves movables, apply Article
748.34 If it involves immovables, apply Article 749.35

34
Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.

An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made
in writing, otherwise, the donation shall be void.
35
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect
unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
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Yam v. CA: Yam entered into three loan agreements with Manphil. These agreements were attended
with penalties for non-payment such as 12% annual interest, 2% monthly penalty, 1 1.2% monthly
service charge and 10% attorney's fees. Yam, after paying the first loan, only paid the second loan
partially. Yam wrote a letter to Manphil proposing to settle their obligation and Manphil replied
with an offer to reduce the penalty charges should the loan be paid on a certain date. The debt was
not paid so Manphil sent 2 demand letters. Yam contended that they fully paid their obligation with
Manphil's president agreed to waive the penalties. Held: Yam liable for the payment of the penaties.
Art. 1270 provides that express condonation must comply with the forms of donation. Art. 748, par.
3 provides that the donation and acceptance of a movable, the value of which exceeds P5,000,00,
must be made in writing, otherwise the same shall be void. Under Art. 417, par. 1, obligations,
actually referring to credits, are considered movable property. It is undisputed than the alleged
agreement to condone P266,196.88 of the second IGLF loan was not reduced in writing.
b. If the renunciation is implied, then it is tantamount to a waiver.
o There is no prescribed form in a waiver (Article 6).36 For example, the creditor can just refuse
to collect the debt.
Ways of Remission
a. will
b. agreement
Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by the
creditor to the debtor, implies the renunciation of the action which the former had against
the latter.
If in order to nullify this waiver it should be claimed to be inofficious, the debtor and his heirs
may uphold it by proving that the delivery of the document was made in virtue of payment of
the debt.
Art. 1272. Whenever the private document in which the debt appears is found in the
possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed that the creditor delivered it voluntarily, unless
the contrary is proved.
According to Balane, Articles 1271 and 1272 refer to a kind of implied renunciation when the
creditor divests himself of the proof credit.
The delivery of a private document, evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by the creditor to the
debtor, implies the renunciation of the action which the former had against the latter.
If in order to nullify this waiver it should be claimed to be inofficious, the debtor and his heirs
may uphold it by providing that the delivery of the document was made in virtue of payment of
the debt (Article 1271).

36
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
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Article 1271 has no application to public documents because there is always a copy in the archives
which can be used to prove the credit. Private document refers to the original in order for Article
1271 to apply.
By delivering the private document, the creditor deprives himself of proof.
The second paragraph of Article 1271 implies that the voluntary return of the title of credit is
presumed to be by reason of remission and not by reason of the payment of debt. According to
Professor Balane, this is anomalous. This provision is absurd and immoral in that it authorizes the
debtor and his heirs to prove that they paid the debt, when the provision itself assumes that there
has been a remission, which is gratuitous.
You are encouraging him to tell a lie.
Whenever the private document in which the debt appears is found in the possession of the
debtor, it shall be presumed that the creditor delivered it voluntarily, unless the contrary is
proved (Article 1272).
2 Presumptions: A presumption based on a presumption!
i.
If a private document is found in the possession of the debtor, then it is presumed that the
creditor voluntarily delivered it to him
ii.
Since the creditor voluntarily delivered the private document, then there is a presumption
of remission
Trans-Pacific v. CA: Trans-Pacific applied for and was granted loan accommodations by Associated
Bank. The loans were evidenced by 4 promissory notes and secured by 4 mortgages. Unable to settle
its obligation in full, Trans-Pacific asked for a restructuring of the remained of the loan, which
Associated Bank accepted. The restructured loan was evidenced by 3 new promissory notes. 3 new
mortgages were fixed, and the 4 original mortgages were released. Trans-Pacific sold the parcels of
land making up the 4 original mortgages, and the proceeds were used to pay off the restructured
loans. Subsequently, Associated Bank returned the duplicate original copies of the 3 new promissory
notes to Trans-Pacific with the word PAID stamped thereon. However, Associated Bank
demanded from Trans-Pacific the value of the interest accrued from the loan. The Bank claimed that
the promissory notes were erroneously returned. Initially, Trans-Pacific wanted to settle the interest
payment, but had a change of heart and instead filed a case for specific performance, demanding the
Bank to release the mortgages, and to have the loan be declared fully paid. Held: Trans-Pacific did
not pay its loan in full. The presumption created by the Art. 1271 is not conclusive but merely prima
facie. Here, theres sufficient justification to overthrow the presumption of payment generated by the
delivery of the documents evidencing petitioners indebtedness. There is no document presented by
Trans-Pacific showing that the debt has been fully paid. The testimony an employee of the Bank
reiterated that the interest had not been paid, though the principal obligation had already been
removed from [their] books. A letter from Trans-Pacific to the Bank showed that Trans-Pacific
proposed to have the interest payment be settled by dacion en pago instead, and also they
acknowledged the existence of the obligation to pay the interest. The returned document was not an
original copy, but an original duplicate. Art. 1271 raises a presumption, not of payment, but of the
renunciation of the credit where more convincing evidence would be required than what normally
would be called for to prove payment. The rationale for allowing the presumption of renunciation in
the delivery of a private instrument is that, unlike that of a public instrument, there could be just one
copy of the evidence of credit. Where several originals are made out of a private document, the

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intendment of the law would thus be to refer to the delivery only of the original rather than to the
original duplicate of which the debtor would normally retain a copy. It would thus be absurd if
Art.1271 were to be applied differently.
Art. 1273. The renunciation of the principal debt shall extinguish the accessory obligations;
but the waiver of the latter shall leave the former in force.
Art. 1274. It is presumed that the accessory obligation of pledge has been remitted when the
thing pledged, after its delivery to the creditor, is found in the possession of the debtor, or of
a third person who owns the thing.
Effect of Partial Remission

The renunciation of the principal debt shall extinguish the accessory obligations; but the waiver
of the latter shall leave the former in force (Article 1273).
Example: Loan secured by a mortgage. If I condone the loan, I condone the mortgage. But if I
condone the mortgage, I do not condone the loan which merely becomes unsecured.
The obligation of the guarantor is extinguished at the same time as that of the debtor, and for the
same causes as all other obligations (Article 2076).
The guarantors, even though they be solidary, are released from their obligation whenever by
some act of the creditor they cannot be subrogated to the rights, mortgages, and preferences of
the latter (Article 2080).
It is presumed that the accessory obligation of pledge has been remitted when the thing pledged,
after its delivery to the creditor, is found in the possession of the debtor, or of a third person who
owns the thing (Article 1274).
Based on 209337
According to Professor Balane, the accessory obligation of pledge is extinguished because pledge
is a possessory lien. The presumption in this case is that the pledgee has surrendered the thing
pledged to the pledgor. However, this is not a conclusive presumption according to Art.2110, 2.
This presumption is not applicable in a mortgage since there is no possessory lien.
In addition to the requisites prescribed in article 2085, it is necessary, in order to constitute the
contract of pledge, that the thing pledged be placed in the possession of the creditor, or of a third
person by common agreement (Article 2093)
The debtor cannot ask for the return of the thing pledged against the will of the creditor, unless
and until he has paid the debt and its interest, with expenses in a proper case (Article 2105).
4. Confusion or Merger of Rights

Art. 1275. The obligation is extinguished from the time the characters of creditor and debtor
are merged in the same person.

37
Art. 2093. In addition to the requisites prescribed in Article 2085, it is necessary, in order to constitute the contract of
pledge, that the thing pledged be placed in the possession of the creditor, or of a third person by common agreement.
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Art. 1276. Merger which takes place in the person of the principal debtor or creditor benefits
the guarantors. Confusion which takes place in the person of any of the latter does not
Art. 1277. Confusion does not extinguish a joint obligation except as regards the share
corresponding to the creditor or debtor in whom the two characters concur.
Confusion is the meeting in one person of the qualities of the creditor and debtor with respect to
the same obligation.
Confusion or merger of rights extinguishes the obligation because the creditor becomes his own
debtor. Therefore, how can the creditor sue himself.
Requisites of Confusion
a. It must take place between the creditor and the principal debtor (Article 1276)
o A borrowed P 1M from B with C as guarantor. If C acquires the right to collect the P 1M,
there is no confusion since C is neither a principal debtor or creditor. The effect is that the
guaranty is extinguished. The principal obligation remains.
o You cant be personal guarantor of your own debt
b. The very same obligation must be involved (Article1275)
Usual Causes of Confusion:
a. Succession (compulsory, testate, intestate)
b. Donation
c. Negotiation of a negotiable instrument
Confusion can overlap with remission or payment.
o Example of confusion overlapping with payment. A makes a promissory note and endorses it
to B. B endorsed it to C. C to D. D endorsed it back to A.
o Example of confusion overlapping with remission: X owes O P100,000. O bequeath to X
that credit. And then she died. In this case, there is extinguishment both by merger. But in
this case, merger could overlap with remission.
5. Compensation

Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are creditors
and debtors of each other.
Compensation is a mode of extinguishing, to the concurrent amount, the obligations of those

persons who in their own right are reciprocally debtors and creditors of each other.
Perhaps, next to payment, compensation is the most common mode of extinguishing an
obligation.
Compensation Distinguished from Confusion
In compensation, there are 2 parties and 2 debts, whereas in confusion, there are 2 debts and only
1 party.
Banks always do this
Kinds of Compensation:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
Legal (Art. 1279)

Facultative (Art. 1287-1288)
Conventional or Contractual (Article 1282)
Judicial (1283)
Gan Tion v. CA: Ong Wan Sieng was a tenant in certain premises owned by Gan Tion. In 1961 the
latter filed an ejectment case against the former, alleging non-payment of rents for August and
September of that year, at P180 a month, or P360 altogether. The defendant denied the allegation and
said that the agreed monthly rental was only P160, which he had offered to but was refused by the
plaintiff. CFI ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P500 as attorney's fees. That
judgment became final. On Oct 10, 1963 Gan Tion served notice on Ong Wan Sieng that he was
increasing the rent to P180 a month, effective November 1st, and at the same time demanded the
rents in arrears at the old rate in the aggregate amount of P4,320.00, corresponding to a period from
August 1961 to October 1963. Ong Wan Sieng was able to obtain a writ of execution of the
judgment for attorney's fees in his favor. Gan pleaded legal compensation before the CA, claiming
that Ong Wan Sieng was indebted to him in the sum of P4,320 f or unpaid rents. Held: There has
been legal compensation. It is the litigant, not his counsel, who is the judgment creditor and who may
enforce the judgment by execution. Such credit, therefore, may properly be the subject of legal
compensation. Quite obviously it would be unjust to compel petitioner to pay his debt for P500
when admittedly his creditor is indebted to him for more than P4,000. The nature of the award of
damages attorneys fees is that it is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and is justified
by way of indemnity for damages recoverable by the former in the cases enumerated in Article 2208.
PNB v. CA: Isabelas savings account with PNB, with Php2M, is the subject of 2 conflicting claims.
One is asserted by the Aceros who seek to enforce against said savings the final judgment in their
favor by the CFI. The other is by PNB, which claims that since Isabela was at some point both its
creditor and debtor, Isabelas deposit being deemed a loan to PNB, there had occurred a mutual setoff between them, which precludes the Aceros recourse to that deposit. Held: Art. 1278 does indeed
provide that "Compensation shall take when two persons, in their own right, are creditors and
debtors of each other. Nonetheless, these legal provisions cannot apply to PNB's advantage because it
has not proven by competent evidence that it is a creditor of Isabela. Their evidence only prove that
they may have opened a line of credit for Isabela, but not that it was ever availed of. There being no
indebtedness to PNB on Isabela's part, there is in consequence no occasion to speak of any mutual setoff, or compensation, whether it be legal, i.e., which automatically occurs by operation of law, or
voluntary, i.e., which can only take place by agreement of the parties.
Francia v. IAC: Francia is the owner of a residential lot and a two-storey house built upon it.
Pursuant to the road widening project in Buendia Ave, the Republic expropriated a portion (125
sqm) of the said property for P4,116.00. Francia failed to pay real estate tax on the property for 14
years amounting to P2,400.00. Because of this, his property was sold at public auction, with Ho
Fernandez as the highest bidder. Francia received a notice of hearing from buyer Ho because the latter
had filed a petition for the issuance of TCT over the property in Hos name. Bill of sale was given to
Ho. Auction sale and bill of sale were annotated in the TCT. Francia filed a complaint to annul the
auction sale. Held: there was no legal compensation. The circumstances of the case do not satisfy the
requirements provided by Article 1279. There can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that

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the taxpayer may have against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground
that the government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The
collection of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government. Internal Revenue
Taxes can not be the subject of set-off or compensation. A claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand,
contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off under the statutes of set-off, which are construed
uniformly, in the light of public policy, to exclude the remedy in an action or any indebtedness of the
state or municipality to one who is liable to the state or municipality for taxes. Neither are they a
proper subject of recoupment since they do not arise out of the contract or transaction sued on. Taxes
are not in the nature of contracts but grow out of duty to, and are the positive acts of the government
to the making and enforcing of which, the personal consent of individual taxpayers is not required.
The government and taxpayer are not mutually creditors and debtors of each other.
Mondragon v. Sola: Mondragon hired Sola to build a bodega where Mondragon would sell its
products. They agreed that Sola would be entitled to a service fee, or a commission based on Monthly
Sales. Before the contract was executed, however, Sola acknowledged in a letter to Mondragon that
his wife had a debt to Mondragon in the amount of P1,973,154.73. In this letter, he bound himself to
pay to Mondragon on installment the sums his wife owed. Thus, Mondragon withheld some
payments of the service fees, and applied these to the debts of Solas wife. Sola, feeling aggrieved,
closed the office where Mondragon was selling its products and tried to rescind the sale. Held:
withholding of payment was proper, and rescission could not be had. When Sola acknowledged that
he and his wife would pay in installment, he could no longer claim that his claim to the service fee and
his wifes indebtedness were separate. Since the parties were now mutually creditor and debtor of
each other, compensation took place and Mondragon acted properly.
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:

(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a
principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of
the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third
persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.
This is legal compensation

Legal compensation takes place automatically by operation of law once all the requisites under
Article 1279 are present.
Requisites:
1. The parties must be mutually debtors and creditors of each other in their own right and as
principals.
o There can be no compensation if 1 party occupies only a representative capacity (i.e. agent).
Likewise, there can be no compensation if in one obligation, a party is a principal obligor and
in another obligation, he is a guarantor.
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2. The things due must be fungible

o Article 1279 uses the word consumable. This is wrong. The proper
terminology is fungible which refers to things of the same kind which in payment can be
substituted for another.
o Fungibile is a thing deemed by the parties as the same as a thing of the same kind and quality.
3.
4.
o
o
The 2 debts must be due

The 2 debts must be liquidated and demandable
Because you have to know the amount for sure
Demandable means that the debts are enforceable in court, there being no apparent defenses
inherent in them. The obligations must be civil obligations, excluding those that are purely
natural. Before a judicial decree of rescission or annulment, a rescissible or voidable debt is
valid and demandable; hence, it can be compensated.
o A debt is liquidated when its existence and amount are determined. And a debt is considered
liquidated, not only when it is expressed already in definite figures w/c do not require
verification, but also when the determination of the exact amount depends only on a simple
arithmetical operation.
5.
6.
o
o
o
Neither of the debts should be garnished

Compensation must not be prohibited by law
Articles 1287, 1288 and 179438 are examples of when legal compensation is not allowed.
Legal compensation is not allowed when there is conventional or facultative compensation.
Balane thinks this is redundant.
Effect of Legal Compensation

If a person should have against him several debts which are susceptible of compensation, the rules
on the application of payments shall apply to the order of the compensation (Article 1289)
When all the requisites mentioned in article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by
operation of law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the
creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation (Article 1290)
You dont need any communication. Compensation takes effect by strict operation of law.
Republic v. de los Angeles: Sps. Farin mortgaged a land to Marcelo Steel. Pending the foreclosure,
Farin leased the building located in the land to RCA and other tenants. Marcelo Steel then, on the
basis of Article 5 of the Mortgage Contract, filed a motion requesting that rent be directly paid to it.
This was granted. RCA then filed an MR alleging that Farin has outstanding debts to RCA and
whatever rents due were compensated to such indebtedness. Trial court denied this and all subsequent
motion. It is relevant that the Trial Court based its decision on the ground that the records of the case
do not show that Farin was indebted to RCA. Held: there was compensation of debt. Proof of the
liquidation of a claim, in order that there be compensation of debts, is proper if such claim is disputed.

38
Art. 1794. Every partner is responsible to the partnership for damages suffered by it through his fault, and he cannot
compensate them with the profits and benefits which he may have earned for the partnership by his industry. However,
the courts may equitably lessen this responsibility if through the partner's extraordinary efforts in other activities of the
partnership, unusual profits have been realized.
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But, if the claim is undisputed, as in the case at bar, the statement is sufficient and no other proof may
be required.
Solinap v. Del Rosario: Solinap contends that respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in not
declaring the mutual obligations of the parties extinguished. Held: this argument fails to consider
Article 1279 which provides that compensation can take place only if both obligations are liquidated.
Solinaps claim against the respondent Luteros is still pending determination by the court in Civil
Case 12379. Moreover, the claim of Solinap in that case is disputed by the Luteros on both factual and
legal grounds. Upon this premise, Solinaps claim in that case cannot be categorized as liquidated
credit which may properly be set-off against his obligation. Compensation cannot take place where
ones claim against the other is still the subject of court litigation. It is a requirement, for
compensation to take place, that the amount involved be certain and liquidated.
Sycip v. CA: Jose Lapuz (JL) received from Albert Smith 2000 shares of stock owned by Dwight Dill
who left for Honolulu. JL was supposed to sell these stocks. Francisco Sycip (FS) approached JL and
told him he had good connections in stock exchange. FS sold 758 shares for 12,128. FS again sold
500 shares but this time, he gave JL a draft for the full value of 8000. When JL presented the draft to
the bank, it was denied due to lack of funds. So he ran after FS, FS gave JL a check in the amount of
P5000, but the check was still dishonored. FS contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not
applying the provisions on compensation or setting-off debts under Articles 1278 and 1279 of the
New Civil Code, despite evidence showing that JL still owed him an amount of more than P5,000
(Commission). Held: This contention is untenable. Compensation cannot take place in this case since
the evidence shows that Jose K. Lapuz is only an agent of Albert Smith and/or Dr. Dwight Dill.
Compensation takes place only when two persons in their own right are creditors and debtors of each
other, and that each one of the obligors is bound principally and is at the same time a principal
creditor of the other. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, Lapuz did not consent to
the off-setting of his obligation with petitioner's obligation to pay for the 500 shares.
CIA v. CA: Froilan purchased from Shipping Administration a boat for P200,000. Despite demands,
Froilan failed to pay a number of installments. Shipping Administration then moved to take
possession of the vessel. Pan-Oriental offered to charter the said vessel from Shipping Administration
paying for repairs and other useful expenses. However, the Cabinet revoked the cancellation of
Froilans purchase and restored all his rights to the vessel. The court ruled that Shipping
Administration, Compania Maritima (Purchased the vessel from Froilan) and Froilan are liable to PanOriental for damages and for the repairs and useful expenses incurred by Pan-Oriental. Shipping
Administration claimed that the amount payable to Pan-Oriental should be set-off with the rental
owed by Pan-Oriental. Held: all the elements for Compensation to take place were not present on
the date of dispossession. The amount expended for repairs and improvements had yet to be
determined by the Trial Court. At the time of dispossession also, PAN-ORIENTAL was still insisting
on its right to purchase the vessel. The obligation of REPUBLIC to reimburse PAN-ORIENTAL for
expenses arose only after this Court had so ruled. Rentals for the use of the vessel by PANORIENTAL were neither due and demandable at the time of dispossession but only after this Court
had issued its Resolution of August 27, 1965. But although compensation by operation of law cannot
take place as between REPUBLIC and PAN-ORIENTAL, by specific pronouncement of this Court
in its Resolution of November 23, 1966, the rentals payable by PAN-ORIENTAL in the amount of

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P59,500.00 should be deducted from the sum of useful expenses plus legal interest due, assuming that
the latter amount would still be greater. Otherwise, the corresponding adjustments can be made
depending on the totality of the respective amounts.
Intl Corp Bank v. IAC: Private respondent secured from petitioner's predecessors-in-interest, the
then Investment and Underwriting Corp. of the Philippines and Atrium Capital Corp., a loan in the
amount of P50,000,000. To secure this loan, private respondent mortgaged her real properties in
Quiapo, Manila and in San Rafael, Bulacan, which she claimed have a total market value of
P110,000,000. Private respondent made a money market placement with ATRIUM in the amount of
P1,046,253.77 at 17% interest per annum for a period of 32 days or until October 13, 1980, its
maturity date. Meanwhile, private respondent allegedly failed to pay her mortgaged indebtedness to
the bank so that the latter refused to pay the proceeds of the money market placement on maturity
but applied the amount instead to the deficiency in the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgaged
properties. With Atrium being the only bidder, said properties were sold in its favor for only
P20,000,000. Petitioner claims that after deducting this amount, private respondent is still indebted in
the amount of P6.81 million. Petitioner contends that after foreclosing the mortgage, there is still due
from private respondent as deficiency the amount of P6.81 million against which it has the right to
apply or set off private respondent's money market claim ofPl,062,063.83. Held: The argument is
without merit. There can be no doubt that petitioner is indebted to private respondent in the amount
of P1,062,063.83 representing the proceeds of her money market investment. However, legal
compensation cannot take place because compensation is not proper where the claim of the person
asserting the set-off against the other is not clear nor liquidated; compensation cannot extend to
unliquidated, disputed claim arising from breach of contract. It must be noted that Civil Case No. 8319717 is still pending consideration at the RTC Manila, for annulment of Sheriff s sale on
extrajudicial foreclosure of private respondent's property from which the alleged deficiency arose.
Therefore, the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and petitioner's claim for deficiency are
still in question, so much so that it is evident, that the requirement that the debts must be liquidated
and demandable has not yet been met. For this reason, legal compensation cannot take place.
Ong v. CA: Fermin borrowed money from Mariano. Fermin failed to pay. The Fermin says that he
stored in Mariano's warehouse a quantity of zippers valued at P181,000.00, from which he
occasionally made withdrawals in the presence of Mariano's son. When he subsequently tried to get
the rest of his zippers, Fermin claims Mariano refused to release them on the ground of non- payment
of the loan. Held: The instant case does not certainly satisfy the above because (1) appellant is not a
debtor of appellee, it is only the latter who is indebted to appellant; (2) the debts, even admitting that
the delivery of the zippers to plaintiff is a debt, do not both consist in a sum of money nor are they of
the same quality and kind. The petitioner says, however, that there was a judicial set-off under Article
1283. The trouble is that Fermin has not proved the right to any damage as a result of the claimed
retention of the zippers by Mariano. There was also no proof of the amount of such damages as he
could not even say how many of the zippers had been earlier withdrawn by him.
Pioneer Insurance v. CA: Pioneer Insurance issued general warehousing bonds in favor of the Bureau
of Customs for importation of raw materials. The bonds were issued on behalf of the private
respondents Wearever Textile and Vicente Lim. To secure the petitioner, the respondents jointly
executed jointly and severally in favor of the petitioner indemnity agreements. The respondents

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failed to comply with their commitment under the warehousing bonds. As such the BoC demanded
from the petitioner the payment of the value of bonds. In 1979, a fire gutted the Respondent's
factory destroying materials insured with the petitioner. Respondents demanded from the petitioner
payment of the proceeds of the insurance policy but the latter refused to pay claiming that the said
proceeds must be applied by way of partial compensation or set-off against its liability with the BoC.
Held: Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are creditors and debtors
of each other. When all the requirements under Article 1279 are met, then legal compensation must
take place. The two debts must be due and they must be liquidated and demandable. Here, at the
time of the fire, the liability of the private respondents, alongside the petitioner to the BoC has
already been set, due to the former's default. Clearly, the petitioner can demand reimbursement from
the respondents even before it has actually paid its obligation to the BoC. The liability has already
been fixed.
Silahis Marketing v. IAC: De Leon delivered to Silahis various items with the aggregate amount of
22k. De leon filed a claim in the CFI for the said amounts. Silahis in its answer alleged that there are
commissions which were not given to him. The lower court confirmed the liability of Silahis for the
claim of de Leon but at the same time ordered that it be partially offset by Silahis counterclaim.
Held: compensation (by the LC) was not proper. Compensation is not proper where the claim of the
person asserting the set-off against the other is not clear nor liquidated; compensation cannot extend
to unliquidated, disputed claim existing from breach of contract. Undoubtedly, petitioner admits the
validity of its outstanding accounts with private respondent in the amount of P 22,213.75 as
contained in its answer. But whether private respondent is liable to pay the petitioner a 20% margin
or commission on the subject sale to Dole Philippines, Inc. is vigorously disputed. This circumstance
prevents legal compensation from taking place.
Art. 1280. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the guarantor may set up
compensation as regards what the creditor may owe the principal debtor.
Art. 1281. Compensation may be total or partial. When the two debts are of the same
amount, there is a total compensation.
Art. 1282. The parties may agree upon the compensation of debts which are not yet due.
This is Conventional or Contractual

Contractual or conventional compensation takes place when parties agree to set-off even if the
requisites of legal compensation are not present.
The parties may agree upon the compensation of debts which are not yet due.
The parties may compensate by agreement any obligations, in w/c the objective requisites
provided for legal compensation are not present.
Art. 1283. If one of the parties to a suit over an obligation has a claim for damages against the
other, the former may set it off by proving his right to said damages and the amount thereof.
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This is judicial
By virtue of a final judgment
Judicial compensation is compensation decreed by the court in a case where there is a
counterclaim.
If one of the parties to a suit over an obligation has a claim for damages against the other, the
former may set it off by proving his right to said damages and the amount thereof.
When does it take effect?
Art. 1284. When one or both debts are rescissible or voidable, they may be compensated
against each other before they are judicially rescinded or avoided.
Art. 1285. The debtor who has consented to the assignment of rights made by a creditor in
favor of a third person, cannot set up against the assignee the compensation which would
pertain to him against the assignor, unless the assignor was notified by the debtor at the time
he gave his consent, that he reserved his right to the compensation.
If the creditor communicated the cession to him but the debtor did not consent thereto, the
latter may set up the compensation of debts previous to the cession, but not of subsequent
ones.
If the assignment is made without the knowledge of the debtor, he may set up the
compensation of all credits prior to the same and also later ones until he had knowledge of the
assignment.
There are 2 credits: credit I and credit II. In credit I, X is the creditor and Y is the debtor. In
credit II, X is the creditor and Y is the debtor. X wants to assign credit I to Z. X cannot assign
credit II since it is passive subjective novation. Can Y now invoke against Z the compensation of
credit II?
It depends:
a. If the assignment is with the debtors (Ys) consent
o Debtor cannot set up compensation at all unless the right is reserved.
b. If the assignment is with the debtors (Ys) knowledge but without consent
o The debtor can set up compensation with a credit already existing at the time of the
assignment.
c. If the assignment is without the debtors (Ys) knowledge
o Debtor can set up as compensation any credit existing at the time he acquired knowledge even
if it arose after the actual assignment.
Sesbreno v. CA: Petitioner made a placement with Philfinance. The latter delivered to him
documents, some of which was a promissory note from Delta Motors and a post-dated check. The
post-dated checks were dishonored. This prompted petitioner to ask for the promissory note from
DMC and it was discovered that the note issued by DMC was marked as non-negotiable. As
Sesbreno failed to recover his money, he filed case against DMC and Philfinance. Held: The nonnegotiability of the instrument doesnt mean that it is non-assignable or transferable. It may still be

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assigned or transferred in whole or in part, even without the consent of the promissory note, since
consent is not necessary for the validity of the assignment. In assignment, the assignee is merely placed
in the position of the assignors and acquires the instrument subject to all the defenses that might have
been set up against the original payee.
Art. 1286. Compensation takes place by operation of law, even though the debts may be
payable at different places, but there shall be an indemnity for expenses of exchange or
transportation to the place of payment.
Art. 1287. Compensation shall not be proper when one of the debts arises from a depositum
or from the obligations of a depositary or of a bailee in commodatum.
Neither can compensation be set up against a creditor who has a claim for support due by
gratuitous title, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 301.
Articles1287 and 1288 are facultative

There is some impediment to legal set-off, but only one party is allowed to claim it
Facultative compensation takes place when compensation is claimable by only one of the parties
but not of the other.
Compensation shall not be proper when one of the debts arises from a depositum or from the
obligations of a depositary or of a bailee in commodatum.
Depositary is a fiduciary relationship.
Neither can compensation be set up against a creditor who has a claim for support due by
gratuitous title, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 301 (Article 1287)
The prohibition of compensation when one of the debts arises from a depositum or commodatum
is based on justice. A deposit is made or a commodatum is given on the basis of confidence in the
depositary or the borrower. It is therefore, a matter of morality, that the depositary or the
borrower should in fact perform his obligation; otherwise, the trust or confidence of the
depositor or lender would be violated.
With respect to future support, to allow its extinguishments by compensation would defeat its
exemption from attachment and execution (Article 205, Family Code) and may expose the
recipient to misery and starvation. However, support in arrears can be compensated.
The depositary cannot set up compensation w/ respect to the things deposited to him. But the
depositor can set up the compensation. There can be facultative compensation, even if there
cant be legal.
Example: A is a warehouseman. B deposits 1000 quedans of rice with A. B also owes A 1000 kilos
of rice. A cannot claim compensation but B can set up compensation.
When does it take effect? From communication
Art. 1288. Neither shall there be compensation if one of the debts consists in civil liability
arising from a penal offense.
Neither shall there be compensation if one of the debts consists in civil liability arising from a
penal offense (Article 1288)
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If 1 of the debts consists in civil liability arising from a penal offense, compensation would be
improper and inadvisable because the satisfaction of such obligation is imperative.
The person who has the civil liability arising from the crime cannot set up compensation.
However, the offended party is entitled to set up compensation.
This is coz of public policy
Art. 1289. If a person should have against him several debts which are susceptible of
compensation, the rules on the application of payments shall apply to the order of the
compensation.
Art. 1290. When all the requisites mentioned in article 1279 are present, compensation takes
effect by operation of law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even
though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation.
Mindanao Cement v. CA: Atty. Laquihon, in behalf of Pacweld as the latters attorney, filed a motion
to direct payment of attorneys fee to counsel (himself), invoking the fact that in the decision of the
court MPCC was adjudged to pay Pacweld the sum of P10,000 as attorneys fees. MPCC filed an
opposition to Atty. Laquihons motion, stating that said amount is set-off by a like sum of P10,000.
MPCC argue that it has collectible in its favor from Pacweld also by way of attorneys fees which
MPCC recovered from the same CFI in another civil case to which a writ of execution had already
been issued. Held: There was compensation between MPCC and Pacweld, therefore MPCC should
not be ordered to pay Atty. Laquihon. MPCC and Pacweld, were creditors and debtors of each other,
their debts to each other consisting in final and executory judgments of the CFI in 2 separate cases,
ordering the payment to each other of the sum of P10,000 by way of attorneys fees. The two (2)
obligations, therefore, respectively offset each other, compensation having taken effect by operation
of law and extinguished both debts to the concurrent amount of P10,000 even though the creditors
and debtors are not aware of the compensation.
6. Novation

Art. 1291. Obligations may be modified by:
(1) Changing their object or principal conditions;
(2) Substituting the person of the debtor;
(3) Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
Foundation Specialist v. Bentoval: FSI and Betonval executed 3 contracts for the delivery of ready
mixed concrete by Betonval to FSI. The contract provided for FSI to pay Betonval within 7 days
after presentation of the invoices plus 30% interest p.a. in case of overdue payments. Betonval
delivered the ready mixed concrete but FSI failed to pay its outstanding balances starting Jan 1992. As
an accommodation to FSI, Betonval extended the 7 day credit period to 45 days. FSI sent Betonval a
proposed schedule of payments devised with a liability for late payments fixed at 24% p.a. FSI paid
Betonval according to the terms of its proposed schedule of payments (with 24% interest rate. FSI
opposed the CAs imposition of a 24% p.a. interest on the award to Betonval allegedly because: (a) the
grant to FSI of a 45-day credit extension novated the contracts insofar as FSIs obligation to pay any
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interest was concerned; (b) Betonval waived its right to enforce the payment of the 30% p.a. interest
when it granted FSI a new credit term and (c) Betonvals prayer for a 24% p.a. interest instead of 30%,
resulted in a situation where, in effect, no interest rate was supposedly stipulated, thus necessitating
the imposition only of the legal interest rate of 6% p.a. from judicial demand. Held: Only
modificatory novation. Interest=24%. Novation may: Either be extinctive or modificatory, much
being dependent on the nature of the change and the intention of the parties. Extinctive novation is
never presumed; there must be an express intention to novate. Novation is merely modificatory
where the change brought about by any subsequent agreement is merely incidental to the main
obligation (e.g change in interest rates or extension of time to pay; the new agreement will not have
the effect of extinguishing the first but would merely supplement it or supplant some but not all of its
provisions.) The grant by Betonval to FSI of a 45-day credit extension did not novate the contracts so
as to extinguish the latter. The grant of a 45-day credit period merely modified the contracts by
extending the period within which FSI was allowed to settle its obligation. Since the contracts
remained the source of FSIs obligation to Betonval, the stipulation to pay 30% p.a. interest likewise
remained. However, FSIs proposed schedule of payments, referring to Betonvals statement of
account, contained computations of FSIs arrears and billings with 24% p.a. interest. There can be no
other conclusion but that Betonval had reduced the imposable interest rate from 30% to 24% p.a. and
this reduced interest rate was accepted, albeit impliedly, by FSI when it proposed a new schedule of
payments and, actually made payments to Betonval with 24% p.a. interest. By its own actions, FSI is
estopped from questioning the imposable rate of interest.
Land Bank v. CA: Spouses Suarez were former owners of agricultural lands that was subjected to the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT). As part of the financing support for OLT, Land Bank issued 3 Land
Bank Interim Bond Certificates registered in the name of Sps. Suarez as partial payment for their
agricultural lands with a maturity of 25 years from date of issue and bear interest at the rate of 6% per
annum, tax-free and payable semi- annually on May 20 and November 20 of each year. Sps. Suarez
requested the Bank to convert their bonds from registered bonds to bearer bonds, in preparation for
their intended delivery or transfer to third parties. Respondents were required to fill up three (3) sets
of LBP Form No. 64 Request for Transfer/ Redenomination of Bonds. In each of said LBP forms,
respondents themselves inserted the following notation: It is understood that the interest from
November 21, 1974 to March 17, 1975 shall accrue to the transferor. This notation was typed in by a
clerk of the Bank at the exclusive request of Sps. Suarez, and was done not in response to any question
posed by the LBP Form 64 nor to fill in any blank line required by LBP Form 64 to be filled up. The
LBP Forms 64 were processed and signed by the manager of Banks Cash Department, Mr. Bajada.
Thereafter and upon the surrender by respondents of their registered bonds, 8 new bearer bonds with
different denominations but of equivalent aggregate face value were issued by the Bank to the
Spouses Suarez. The new bonds were covered by the same terms and conditions as the prior registered
bonds. On the first interest payment date after the conversion, Sps. Suarez demanded from the Bank
the payment of P11,877.24 representing that part of the accrued interest on the three (3) registered
bonds formerly held by them which corresponded to the period from 21 November 1974 to 17
March 1975. The Bank declined to honor the demand when Sps Suarez refused or failed to present
the Bearer Bond Certificates as required by Land Bank Implementing Guidelines and Procedures on
The Processing Payment of Interest on LBP Bonds. Held: The printed terms of the new bearer bonds
were not novated by the notation the spouses inserted in LBP Forms 64 and Land Bank was not
thereby bound or obligated to pay a portion of the November 21, 1974-May 20, 1975 interest to the

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spouses. None of the requirements of novation either of the subject matter of the bond agreement or
of (partial) subrogation of the creditor (obligee) thereunder, is visible in the instant case. Of equal
importance is the fact that the unilateral notation of the respondents was not inserted in the new
bearer bond certificates. The new terms were inserted by a unilateral notation done by the spouses
on the LBP Forms 64. The notation apportioned the interest from November 21, 1974 to May 20,
1975 between the spouses (from November 21, 1974 to March 17, 1975 or P11,877.24) and the third
party transferees (from March 18, 1975 to May 20, 1975 or P6,822.96). This was done without the
consent of either Land Bank or the unknown third party transferee.
Reyes v. CA: In concluding that a novation took place, the respondent court relied on the two letters
dated March 19, 1991, which, according to it, formalized petitioners and respondent Eleazars
agreement that BERMIC would directly settle its obligation with the real owners of the fundsthe
AFP-MBAI and DECS-IMC. Be that as it may, a cursory reading of these letters, however, clearly
and unmistakably shows that there was nothing therein that would evince that respondent AFPMBAI agreed to substitute for the petitioner as the new creditor of respondent Eleazar in the contract
of loan. It is evident that the two letters merely gave respondent Eleazar an authority to directly settle
the obligation of petitioner to AFP-MBAI and DECS-IMC. It is essentially an agreement between
petitioner and respondent Eleazar only. There was no mention whatsoever of AFP-MBAIs consent
to the new agreement between petitioner and respondent Eleazar much less an indication of AFPMBAIs intention to be the substitute creditor in the loan contract. Well settled is the rule that
novation by substitution of creditor requires an agreement among the three parties concernedthe
original creditor, the debtor and the new creditor. It is a new contractual relation based on the mutual
agreement among all the necessary parties. Hence, there is no novation if no new contract was
executed by the parties. Novation is never presumedthere must be an express intention to
novate.The fact that respondent Eleazar made payments to AFP-MBAI and the latter accepted
them does not ipso facto result in novation. There must be an express intention to novateanimus
novandi. The mere circumstance of the creditor receiving payments from a third party who
acquiesced to assume the obligation of the debtor when there is clearly no agreement to release the
debtor from her responsibility does not constitute novationat most, it only creates a juridical
relation of co-debtorship or suretyship on the part of the third party to the contractual obligation of
the debtor, and the creditor can still enforce the obligation against the debtor.The consent of the
creditor to a novation by change of debtor is as indispensable as the creditors consent in conventional
subrogation in order that a novation shall legally take place. The mere circumstance of AFP-MBAI
receiving payments from respondent Eleazar who acquiesced to assume the obligation of petitioner
under the contract of sale of securities, when there is clearly no agreement to release petitioner from
her responsibility, does not constitute novation, at most, it only creates a juridical relation of codebtorship or suretyship on the part of respondent Eleazar to the contractual obligation of petitioner
to AFP-MBAI and the latter can still enforce the obligation against the petitioner.
Quinto v. People: There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence of novation and
thereby produce the effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same. The
first is when novation has been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms. The second is
when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. The test of incompatibility is
whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. If
they cannot, they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes

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that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility
must take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal
conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to
extinguish the original obligation.
Art. 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitute the
same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new
obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.
Deganos v. People: The Office of Prosecutor Brigida D. Luz, alias Aida Luz, and Narciso Degaos
with estafa. Prosecution: Private complainant Lydia Bordador, a jeweler, testified that Brigida/Aida
Luz was the one who gave instructions to Narciso Degaos to get gold and jewelry from Lydia for
them to sell. Narciso Degaos returned the jewelry and Aida/Brigida Luz called her to ask if she could
trust Narciso Degaos to get the pieces of jewelry from her for Aida/Brigida Luz to sell. Lydia agreed
on the condition that if they could not pay it in cash, they should pay it after one month or return the
unsold jewelry within the said period. They were able to pay only up to a certain point. Receipt nos.
614 to 745 were no longer paid and the accused failed to return the jewelry covered by such receipts.
Held: novation had not converted the liability of the accused into a civil one. There are two ways
which could indicate, in fine, the presence of novation and thereby produce the effect of
extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same. 1. The first is when novation has
been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms. 2. The second is when the old and the new
obligations are incompatible on every point. The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two
obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. The changes that breed
incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must take
place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions
thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish
the original obligation. Although the novation of a contract of agency to make it one of sale may
relieve an offender from an incipient criminal liability, that did not happen here, for the partial
payments and the proposal to pay the balance the accused made during the barangay proceedings
were not at all incompatible with Deganos liability under the agency that had already attached.
Rather than converting the agency to sale, therefore, he even thereby confirmed his liability as the
sales agent of the complainants.
Millar v. CA: Eusebio Millar obtained a favorable judgment from the CFI in a collection case against
Antonio Gabriel. After the remand of the CA of the case, the petitioner moved ex parte for the
execution of the judgment. The respondent, however, pleaded with the petitioner to release the jeep
under an arrangement whereby the respondent, to secure the payment of the judgment debt, agreed
to mortgage the vehicle in favor of the petitioner. The petitioner agreed to the arrangement; thus, the
parties executed a chattel mortgage on the jeep. It was stipulated that upon failure to pay the first
instalment, a writ of execution would be obtained against respondent Gabriel. Held: no novation.
Where the new obligation merely reiterates or ratifies the old obligation, although the former effects
but minor alterations or slight modifications with respect to the cause or object or conditions of he
latter, such changes do not effectuate any substantial incompatibility between the two obligations
Only those essential and principal changes introduced by the new obligation producing an alteration
or modification of the essence of the old obligation result in implied novation. In the case at bar, the

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mere reduction of the amount due in no sense constitutes a sufficient indictum of incompatibility,
especially in the light of (a) the explanation by the petitioner that the reduced indebtedness was the
result of the partial payments made by the respondent before the execution of the chattel mortgage
agreement and (b) the latter's admissions bearing thereon. At best, the deed of chattel mortgage simply
specified exactly how much the respondent still owed the petitioner by virtue of the judgment in civil
case 27116. The parties apparently in their desire to avoid any future confusion as to the amounts
already paid and as to the sum still due, decided to state with specificity in the deed of chattel
mortgage only the balance of the judgment debt properly collectible from the respondent. All told,
therefore, the first circumstance fails to satisfy the test of substantial and complete incompatibility
between the judgment debt and the pecuniary liability of the respondent under the chattel mortgage
agreement.
Cochingyan v. R&B Surety: Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or
change of the obligation by a subsequent one which terminates it, either by changing its object or
principal conditions, or by substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third
person to the rights of the creditor. Novation through a change of the object or principal conditions
of an existing obligation is referred to as objective (or real) novation. Novation by the change of
either the person of the debtor or of the creditor is described as subjective (or personal) novation.
Novation may also be both objective and subjective (mixed) at the same time. In both objective and
subjective novation, a dual purpose is achievedan obligation is extinguished and a new one is
created in lieu thereof.
Balila v. IAC: The fact therefore remains that the amount of P84,000.00 payable on or before May
15, 1981 decreed by the trial court in its judgment by compromise was novated and amended by the
subsequent mutual agreements and actions of petitioners and private respondents. Petitioners paid the
aforestated amount on an installment basis and they were given by private respondents no less than
eight extensions of time to pay their obligation. These transactions took place during the pendency of
the motion for reconsideration of the Order of the trial court dated April 26, 1983 in Civil Case No.
U-3501, during the pendency of the petition for certiorari in AC-G.R. SP 01307 before the
Intermediate Appellate Court and after the filing of the petition before Us. This answers the claim of
the respondents on the failure of the petitioners to present evidences of proofs of payment in the
lower court and the appellate court.
Peoples Bank v. Syvel: It is clear, therefore, that a novation was not intended. The real estate
mortgage was evidently taken as additional security for the performance of the contract.
Broadway Centrum v. Tropical Hut: It is hardly necessary to add that the rule that novation is never
presumed, is not avoided by merely referring to partial novation. The will to novate, whether totally
or partially, must appear by express agreement of the parties, by their acts which are too clear and
unequivocal to be mistaken.
Ajax v. CA: The attendant facts do not make a case of novation. There is nothing in the records to
show the unequivocal intent of the parties to novate the three loan agreements through the execution
of PN BDS-3065. The provisions of PN BDS-3065 yield no indication of the extinguishment of, or
an incompatibility with, the three loan agreements secured by the real estate mortgages over TCT

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No. 105233. On its face, PN BDS-3065 has these words typewritten: secured by REM and 9.
COLLATERAL. This is wholly/partly secured by: (x) real estate which strongly negate petitioners
asseveration that the consolidation of the three loans effected the discharge of the mortgaged real
estate property. Neither can it be validly contended that there was a change or substitution in the
persons of either the creditor (Metrobank) or more specifically the debtors (petitioners) upon the
consolidation of the loans. The bare fact of petitioners conversion from a partnership to a
corporation, without sufficient evidence, either testimonial or documentary, that they were expressly
released from their obligations, did not make petitioner AJAX, with its new corporate personality, a
third person or new debtor within the context of a subjective novation. If at all, petitioner AJAX
only became a co- debtor or surety. Without express release of the debtor from the obligation, any
third party who may thereafter assume the obligation shall be considered merely as co-debtor or
surety. Novation arising from a purported change in the person of the debtor must be clear and
express because, to repeat, it is never presumed.
Cruz v. CA: A notarized deed of partial partition and a memorandum of agreement were executed by
the Cruz children and their mother on lands. The MOA states that despite the execution of this
Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or sale of their respective shares, the contracting
parties herein covenanted and agreed among themselves and by these presents do hereby bind
themselves to one another that they shall share alike and received equal shares from the proceeds of
the sale of any lot or lots allotted to and adjudicated in their individual names by virtue of this deed of
partial partition; That this Agreement shall continue to be valid and enforceable among the
contracting parties herein up to and until the last lot covered by the Deed of [P]artial [P]artition
above adverted to shall have been disposed of or sold and the proceeds thereof equally divided and
their respective shares received by each of them. The documents were registered and annotated in
the TCTs of the properties involved. Meanwhile, Sps Malolos filed a complaint against one of the
Cruz children for sum of money. The case was decided in favor of the spouses thus the sheriff of the
court levied upon the lands in question. For failure to redeem the property, the Malolos asked for the
owners duplicate copy of the 7 titles of the land but Nerissa Cruz refused to give such title. The
Malolos couple then asked the court to declare the titles null and void. The other Cruz children then
moved for intervention by alleging that they are co-owners of the land. The court then issued an
order directing the surrender of the titles and annotation of the interests of the Malolos.
A case was then subsequently filed by the Cruzes for the partition of the lands in question. Held: no
novation. The stipulation that the petitioners and Spouses Tamayo were co-owners was merely the
introductory part of the MOA. Following the above-quoted stipulation is a statement that the subject
parcels of land had in fact been partitioned, but that the former co-owner intended to share with
petitioners the proceeds of any sale of said land. The MOA falls short of producing a novation,
because it does not express a clear intent to dissolve the old obligation as a consideration for the
emergence of the new one. Likewise, petitioners fail to show that the DPP and the MOA are
materially and substantially incompatible with each other. Petitioners admit that, under the MOA,
they and the Tamayo spouses agreed to equally share in the proceeds of the sale of the lots. Indeed,
the DPP granted title to the lots in question to the co-owner to whom they were assigned, and the
MOA created an obligation on the part of such co-owner to share with the others the proceeds of the
sale of such parcels. There is no incompatibility between these two contracts. Verily, the MOA
cannot be construed as a repudiation of the earlier DPP. Both documents can exist together and must
be so interpreted as to give life to both. The basic principle underlying this ruling is simple: when the

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text of a contract is explicit and leaves no doubt as to its intention, the court may not read into it any
intention that would contradict its plain import.
Art. 1293. Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original
one, may be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not
without the consent of the creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives him the rights
mentioned in articles 1236 and 1237.
Rodriguez v. Reyes: By buying the property covered by TCT No. 48979 with notice that it was
mortgaged, respondent Dualan only undertook either to pay or else allow the lands being sold if the
mortgage creditor could not or did not obtain payment from the principal debt when the debt
matured. Certainly the buyer did not obligate himself to replace the debtor in the principal
obligation, and he could not do so in law without the creditors consent. The obligation to discharge
the mortgage indebtedness remained on the shoulders of the original debtors and their heirs since the
record is devoid of any evidence of contrary intent.
Art. 1294. If the substitution is without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, the
new debtor's insolvency or non- fulfillment of the obligations shall not give rise to any
liability on the part of the original debtor.
Art. 1295. The insolvency of the new debtor, who has been proposed by the original debtor
and accepted by the creditor, shall not revive the action of the latter against the original
obligor, except when said insolvency was already existing and of public knowledge, or
known to the debtor, when the delegated his debt.
Art. 1296. When the principal obligation is extinguished in consequence of a novation,
accessory obligations may subsist only insofar as they may benefit third persons who did not
give their consent.
Art. 1297. If the new obligation is void, the original one shall subsist, unless the parties
intended that the former relation should be extinguished in any event.
Art. 1298. The novation is void if the original obligation was void, except when annulment
may be claimed only by the debtor or when ratification validates acts which are voidable.
Art. 1299. If the original obligation was subject to a suspensive or resolutory condition, the
new obligation shall be under the same condition, unless it is otherwise stipulated.
Art. 1300. Subrogation of a third person in the rights of the creditor is either legal or
conventional. The former is not presumed, except in cases expressly mentioned in this Code;
the latter must be clearly established in order that it may take effect.
Art. 1301. Conventional subrogation of a third person requires the consent of the original
parties and of the third person.
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Art. 1302. It is presumed that there is legal subrogation:

(1) When a creditor pays another creditor who is preferred, even
without the debtor's knowledge;
(2) When a third person, not interested in the obligation, pays with the express or tacit
approval of the debtor;
(3) When, even without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of
the obligation pays, without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latter's share.
Art. 1303. Subrogation transfers to the persons subrogated the credit with all the rights
thereto appertaining, either against the debtor or against third person, be they guarantors or
possessors of mortgages, subject to stipulation in a conventional subrogation.
Art. 1304. A creditor, to whom partial payment has been made, may exercise his right for the
remainder, and he shall be preferred to the person who has been subrogated in his place in
virtue of the partial payment of the same credit.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation

by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object of
principal conditions, or by substituting the person of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person
in the rights of the creditor.
Its odd because it is relative, meaning the old obligation is extinguished but another takes it place
Its an imperfect mode of extinguishment.
Novation is the most unusual mode of extinguishing an obligation. It is the only mode whereby
an obligation is extinguished and a new obligation is created to take its place. The other modes of
extinguishing an obligation are absolute in the sense that the extinguishment of the obligation is
total. Novation, on the other hand, is a relative mode of extinguishing an obligation.
A compromise is a form of novation. The difference is that a compromise has some judicial
participation. The effect of compromise is the same as novation.
Classification of Novation
a. Subjective or Personal Novation change of one of the subjects
i. Active subjective
This a change of creditor.
This is also known as subrogation.
2 Kinds of Subrogation
1. Legal (Article1302)
o It is presumed that there is legal subrogation:
a. When a creditor pays another creditor who is preferred, even without the debtor's
knowledge;
b. When a third person, not interested in the obligation, pays with the express or tacit approval
of the debtor
c. When, even without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the
obligation pays, without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latter's share;
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2. Conventional
o Conventional subrogation of a third person requires the consent of the original parties and of
the third person (Article 1301)
Effect of Subrogation
1. A creditor, to whom partial payment has been made, may exercise his right for the remainder,
and he shall be preferred to the person who has been subrogated in his place in virtue of the
partial payment of the same credit (Article 1304)
2. Subrogation transfers to the person subrogated the credit with all the rights thereto
appertaining, either against the debtor or against third persons, be they guarantors or
possessors of mortgages, subject to stipulation in a conventional subrogation (Article 1303)
ii. Passive subjective
This is a change of debtor.
Types of Passive Subjective
1. Expromission (Article 1293)
o In expromission the changing of the debtor is not upon the old debtor's initiative. It could be
upon the initiative of the creditor or of the new debtor.
o This requires the consent of the creditor since the changing of the debtor may prejudice him.
This requires the consent of the new debtor since he is the one who will pay.
o The consent of the old debtor is not required.
o The intent of the parties must be to release the old debtor. The release of the old debtor is
absolute even if it turns out that the new debtor is insolvent.
o Cases of expromission are quite rare.
o Initiative is not from the debtor. May come from new debtor or creditor
2. Delegacion (Article 1295)
o In delegacion the change is at the debtors initiative. Release is qualified, unless it turns out
the new debtor was insolvent at the time of the substitution and was publicly known
o The consent of the old debtor (delegante), the new debtor (delegado), and the creditor
(delegatario) are all required.
o The intent of the parties must be to release the old debtor. However, release of the old debtor
is not absolute. He may be held liable:
a. If the new debtor was already insolvent at the time of the delegacion; and
b. Such insolvency was either known to the old debtor or of public knowledge
b. Objective or Real Novation

In objective novation there is a change in the object or in the principal conditions.
Novation by a change in the principal conditions is the most problematic kind of novation
because one has to determine whether or not the change in the conditions is principal or merely
incidental.
o When are the conditions principal and when are they not?
o Go by jurisprudence! Look at the cases!
o Modificatory novation
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If the amount of debt is increased, Castan thinks that there is a novation while Caguioa thinks
there is no novation. Professor Balane thinks that Castan is correct. The old obligation is merged
with the new.
If the amount of the debt is decreased, according the SC in Sandico vs. Piguing, there is no
novation. One can look at the decrease of the amount as a partial remission.
o Sandico vs. Piguing: We adjudge the respondents judgment debt as having been fully satisfied.
We see no valid objection to the petitioners and the respondent entering into an agreement
regarding the monetary obligation of the latter under the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
reducing the same from P6,000 to P4,000. The payment by the respondent of the lesser
amount of P4.000, accepted by the petitioners without any protest or objection and
acknowledged by them as in full satisfaction of the money judgment in civil case 1554,
completely extinguished the judgment debt and released the respondent from his pecuniary
responsibility.
In Millar vs. CA, there is no novation if the terms of the payment are changed. In this case, there
was a change from lump sum to installment payments.
In Fua vs. Yap, not only was the amount reduced, mode of payment was changed from single
payment to installment. Finally, a mortgage was constituted. The SC said in Fua vs. Yap that
there was a novation. Therefore, a mere change in the amount or mode of payment if taken singly
is not a novation. But taken together, there is a novation.
o Fua vs. Yap: We concur in the theory that appellants liability under the judgment in civil case
No. 42125 had been extinguished by the settlement evidenced by the mortgage executed by
them in favor of the appellee on December 16, 1933. Although said mortgage did not
expressly cancel the old obligation, this was impliedly novated by reason of incompatibly
resulting from the fact that, whereas the judgment was for P1,538.04 payable at one time, did
not provide for attorney's fees, and was not secured, the new obligation is or P1,200 payable
in installments, stipulated for attorney's fees, and is secured by a mortgage.
In Inchausti vs. Yulo, the SC said that the mere extension of time is not a novation for the period
does affects only the performance and not the creation of an obligation. In another case, the SC
said that the shortening of the period is a novation.
c. Mixed Novation
Mixed is a combination of both subjective and objective novation.
Requisites of Novation
a. There must be a previous valid obligation
o The novation is void if the original obligation was void, except when annulment may be
claimed only by the debtor, or when ratification validates acts which are voidable (Article
1298)
b. There must be an agreement of the parties to create the new obligation
o If the original obligation was subject to a suspensive or resolutory condition, the new
obligation shall be under the same condition, unless it is otherwise stipulated (Article 1299)
c. There must be an extinguishments of the old obligation
o Professor Balane considers this as an effect rather than a requisite of novation.
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o In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitute the same, it is
imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations
be on every point incompatible with each other (Article 1292)
d. The new obligation must be valid
o If the new obligation is void, the original one shall subsist, unless the parties intended that the
former relation should be extinguished in any event (Article 1297)
Effect of Novation
Accessory obligations may subsist only insofar as they may benefit third persons who did not give
their consent, e.g., stipulation pour autrui
General Rule: In a novation, the accessory obligation is extinguished.
Exception: In an active subjective novation, the guarantors, pledgors, mortgagors are not
released.
Under Article 1303, accessory obligations are not extinguished. So there is a conflict? How do
you resolve? According to commentators, Article 1303 is an exception to Article 1296.
B owes K P1M. M is a guarantor of B. B is substituted by U. B is released. M is also released under
Article 1296. M is released since he guarantees Bs performance and not Us. B might have a good
credit standing but U may not. M might be prejudiced if he has to guarantee Us performance.
If there is a change in the creditor under Article 1303, the guarantor is not released since it doesnt
make a difference. What the guarantor guarantees is the integrity of the debtor.
II.

CONTRACTS
Comes from the words cum and trahere
Trahere is to draw
Means to be brought together
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. Definition
Art. 1305. A contract is a meeting of the minds between 2 persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
Professor Balane thinks that the definition in Article 1305 is inaccurate. The term persons
should be submitted by the term parties. Also, contracts may be multilateral; there can be more
than 2 parties involved (i.e. partnership).
o There can be an auto-contract. You can have only one signatory, if he represents another.
o See Art. 189039
o If Squil is Fajardos atty. In fact and Fajardo wants to borrow money, Squil can lend him the
money at the current rate. So Squil will sign a PN on behalf of Fajardo as debtor and on her
own behalf as creditor.

39
Art. 1890. If the agent has been empowered to borrow money, he may himself be the lender at the current rate of
interest. If he has been authorized to lend money at interest, he cannot borrow it without the consent of the principal.
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More academic definition of a contract: A bilateral, legal transaction to create, modify or

terminate a legal tie between the parties.
Batchelder v. CB: Monetary Board Reso. 857 requires Filipino and American resident contractors for
constructions in U.S. military bases to surrender to the CB their dollar earnings under their respective
contracts but were entitled to utilize 90% of their surrendered dollars for importation at the preferred
rate of commodities for use within or outside said U.S. military bases. Reso 695 moreover, denies
their right to reacquire at the preferred rate ninety per cent of the foreign exchange the sold or
surrendered earnings to CB for the purpose of determining whether the imports against proceeds of
contracts entered into prior to April 25, 1960 are classified as dollar-to-dollar transactions or not.
George Batchelder surrendered to the CB his dollar earnings amounting to U.S. $199,966.00. He
compels Central Bank of the Philippines to resell to him$170,210.60 at the preferred rate of exchange
of P2.00375: $1 which was denied by the court. He contended that said decision failed to consider
that if there was no contract obligating the bank to resell to him at the preferred rate, the judgment of
the lower court should nevertheless be sustained on the basis of there being such an obligation arising
from law. Held: Monetary Board resolutions do not create contracts between Central Bank and
dollar earner - Considering the fundamental meaning of contracts under the Civil Law and the
nature of the administrative authority of the Monetary Board to promulgate rules and regulations
governing the monetary and banking system of the Philippines, the Monetary Board Resolutions
Nos. 857 dated June 17, 1960 and 695 dated April 28, 1961 are not contracts that give rise to
obligations which must be fulfilled by the Central Bank in favor of affected parties. These resolutions
merely lay down a general policy on the utilization of the dollar earnings of Filipino and resident.
American contractors undertaking projects in U.S. military bases.
Capitol Medical Center v. CA: We, therefore, hold that the lower court gravely abused its discretion
in compelling the CMCC to reopen and re-admit the striking students for enrollment in the second
semester of their courses. Since their contracts with the school were terminated at the end of the first
semester of 1987, and as the school has already ceased to operate, they have no clear legal right to
re-enroll and the school has no legal obligation to reopen and re-admit them. The contract between
the college and a student who is enrolled and pays the fees for a semester, is for the entire semester
only, not for the entire course. The law does not require a school to see a student through to the
completion of his course. If the school closes or is closed by proper authority at the end of a semester,
the student has no cause of action for breach of contract against the school.
2. Characteristics of Contracts

a. Obligatory force
Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law.
General Rule: Contracts are perfected by mere consent the principle of consensuality (Article
1315)
Exception: Real contracts, such as deposit, loan, pledge, and commodatum are not perfected until
the delivery of the object of the obligation (Article 1316)
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Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the parties and should be
complied with in good faith (Article 1159)
Some are formal like chattel mortgage, donation.
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party.
This is a new provision. Based on jurisprudence.
It is not clear whether Article 1314 is a tortious liability or a contractual liability. Professor Balane
considers it as only a tortious liability so it is not violative of the rule on relativity of contracts.
Article 1314 is really a quasi-delict.
Requisites:
i.
Existence of a valid contract
ii.
Knowledge by the 3rd person of the existence of the contract
iii.
Interference by the 3rd person in the contractual relation without legal justification.
It doesnt have to be malicious!

In Indencia some priests were concerned that a contract of an old lady was not in her best interest,
so they induced her to break it.
Innocencio v. Hospicio: A contract of lease was entered into by HDSJ and German. German
constructed 2 buildings, which he subleased, and designated his son, Ramon, as the administrator.
After German died, Ramon continued to collect rentals from the sublesses. HDSJ notified Ramon
that it was terminating the lease contract. The sublessees were given notices to vacate. HDSJ also
posted a Patalastas stating that it is willing to work out an amicable arrangement with the sublessees,
although the latter are not considered as legal occupants or tenants of the property. Because of this,
some of the sublessees refused to pay rentals to Ramon. Held: HDSJ is not guilty of tortious
interference. The facts of the instant case show that there were valid sublease contracts which were
known to HDSJ. However, we find that the third element is lacking in this case. There is no tortious
interference if the intrusion was impelled by purely economic motives. The evidence shows that
HDSJ entered into agreements with Ramons former sublessees for purely economic reasons
(payment of rentals). HDSJ had a right to collect the rentals from the sublessees upon termination of
the lease contract. It does not appear that HDSJ was motivated by spite or ill will towards the
Inocencios.
Daywalt v. Recoletos: Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to
convey to Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P4000. They agreed that a deed should be
executed as soon as Endencias title to the land was perfected in the Court of Land Registration and a
Torrens title issued in her name. When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out that the
property measured 1248 hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, she
became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so
large an amount and that she had been misinformed as to its area. Daywalt filed an action for specific
performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the entire tract to Daywalt. Meanwhile, Recoletos,
was a religious corp., w/c owned an estate immediately adjacent to the property sold by Endencia to
Daywalt. Fr. Sanz, the representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy over

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Endencia. Fr. Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her from
conveying the entire tract. Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the ground
that it unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of the
land in question and to withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Daywalts claim for damages against
the Recoletos was for the huge sum of P 500,000. Held: Recoletos not liable. The stranger who
interferes in a contract between other parties cannot become more extensively liable in damages for
the non-performance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermediates. Hence, in order
to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there is first a need to consider the liability of Endencia to
Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt from Endencia cannot be recovered from her, first,
because these are special damages w/c were not w/in the contemplation of the parties when the
contract was made, and secondly, these damages are too remote to be the subject of recovery. Since
Endencia is not liable for damages to Daywalt, neither can the Recoletos be held liable. As already
suggested, by advising Endencia not to perform the contract, the Recoletos could in no event render
itself more extensively liable than the principal in the contract.
b. Mutuality
Art. 1308. The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot
be left to the will of one of them.
Not necessarily reciprocal prestations, but it must bind both parties

Issue: Escalation clause creditor is given the right to adjust the interest rates
o The court has fluctuated on this
o Best statement of the rule is Polotan v CA (248 SCRA 247): An escalation clause is not per se
invalid. It is per se valid, as long as the change or modification is not left to the sole will of the
creditor. As long as not purely potestative.
o If it says as creditor sees fit void and oppressive. Its one-sided
o If it is pegged to a criterion that is independent of the will of the creditor then it is valid. Like
prevailing market rates. Pegged on something objective.
Cases:
Sampaguita v. PNB: NSBCI applied for a commercial loan with the PNB for P8M, mortgaging the
properties of its President and Chairman Dee as collateral. NSBCI executed various PNs and later on
failed to comply with its obligations under them. Dee wrote to PNB requesting for a 90-day
extension for the payment and restructuring of the loan, which PNB accepted. Dee tendered PDCs
but 2 of them bounced so PNB sent a demand letter again. This time, no answer so the properties
were foreclosed. There is a deficiency balance, however, so now PNB filed this instant case for
collection. Held: loans were bloated because the PNs contained a clause authorizing PNB to increase
the interest rates unilaterally. Courts have the authority to strike down or to modify provisions in
promissory notes that grant the lenders unrestrained power to increase interest rates, penalties and
other charges at the latters sole discretion and without giving prior notice to and securing the consent
of the borrowers. This unilateral authority is anathema to the mutuality of contracts and enables
lenders to take undue advantage of borrowers. One-sided impositions do not have the force of law
between the parties, because such impositions are not based on the parties essential equality. The
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clause cited earlier made the fulfillment of the contracts dependent exclusively upon the
uncontrolled will of respondent and was therefore void.
Lao Lim v. CA: Contrary to the ruling of the court, the disputed stipulation for as long as the
defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay said increases is a purely potestative condition
because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the
lessee. It is likewise a suspensive condition because the renewal of the lease, which gives rise to a new
lease, depends upon said condition. It should be noted that a renewal constitutes a new contract of
lease although with the same terms and conditions as those in the expired lease. It should also not be
overlooked that said condition is not resolutory in nature because it is not a condition that terminates
the lease contract. The lease contract is for a definite period of 3 years upon the expiration of which
the lease automatically terminates. The continuance, effectivity and fulfillment of a contract of lease
cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between
continuing the payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of any say in the
matter. Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor
and the lessee since the life of the contract is dictated solely by the lessee. Resultantly, the contract of
lease should be and is hereby construed as providing for a definite period of three (3) years and that
the automatic increase of the rentals by twenty percent (20%) will take effect only if the parties decide
to renew the lease. A contrary interpretation will result in a situation where the continuation and
effectivity of the contract will depend only upon the will of the lessee, in violation of Article 1308.
PNB v. CA: Spouses Fernandez, obtained a 50K loan under the CIGLF from PNB which is evidenced
by a Credit Agreement. A real estate mortgage on an unregistered agricultural land was executed to
secure a loan. The credit agreement provided that the bank may increase the interest rate at anytime
depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future. PNB then informed the Fernandez that the
interest rate of the loan is now 25% per annum plus a penalty of 6% per annum. It further increased
the interest rate to 30%, and later to 42%. Held: P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more
than allow contracting parties to stipulate freely regarding any subsequent adjustment in the interest
rate that shall accrue on a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. In fine, they can agree to
adjust, upward or downward, the interest previously stipulated. However, contrary to the stubborn
insistence of petitioner bank, the said law and circular did not authorize either party to unilaterally
raise the interest rate without the other's consent. It is basic that there can be no contract in the true
sense in the absence of the element of agreement, or of mutual assent of the parties. If this assent is
wanting on the part of the one who contracts, his act has no more efficacy than if it had been done
under duress or by a person of unsound mind. Similarly, contract changes must be made with the
consent of the contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed
modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. In the case of loan
contracts, it cannot be gainsaid that the rate of interest is always a vital component, for it can make or
break a capital venture. Thus, any change must be mutually agreed upon, otherwise, it is bereft of any
binding effect. We cannot countenance petitioner bank's posturing that the escalation clause at bench
gives it unbridled right to unilaterally upwardly adjust the interest on private respondents' loan. That
would completely take away from private respondents the right to assent to an important
modification in their agreement, and would negate the element of mutuality in contracts.
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Private respondents are not also estopped from assailing the unilateral increases in interest rate made
by petitioner bank. No one receiving a proposal to change a contract to which he is a party, is obliged
to answer the proposal, and his silence per se cannot be construed as an acceptance.
Florendo v. CA: In general there is nothing inherently wrong with escalation clauses. Escalation
clauses are valid stipulations in commercial contracts to maintain fiscal stability and to retain the value
of money in long term contracts. The unilateral determination and imposition of increased interest
rates by the herein respondent bank is obviously violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts.
Art. 1309. The determination of the performance may be left to a third person, whose
decision shall not be binding until it has been made known to both contracting parties.
Art. 1310. The determination shall not be obligatory if it is evidently inequitable. In such
case, the courts shall decide what is equitable under the circumstances.
An example of a determination made by a 3rd person (Article 1309) is the fixing of the price by
the 3rd person.
The contract may be revoked if there is mutual dissent.
c. Relativity
Art. 1311, 1. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except
in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value
of the property he received from the decedent.
General Rule: The contract is binding only upon the parties and their successors (Article 1311).
However, if the contract is purely personal (intuitu personae), then the contract will not bind
assigns and heirs.
Same principle involved in res inter alios acta. Things transacted between other persons cannot
affect 3rd persons.
Exception: 3 parties are affected by the contract in the following instances and can take
appropriate action
i.
Accion pauliana (Article 1177)40
o An rescissory action involving a contract in fraud of creditors. Art. 1313. Creditors are
protected in cases of contracts intended to defraud them.
ii.
Accion directa
o A direct (not subrogatory) action by the creditor against his debtors debtor, a remedy which
gives the creditor the prerogative to act in his own name, such as the actions of the lessor
against the sublessee (Art. 1652), the laborer of an independent contractor against the owner
(Art. 1729), the principal against the subagent (Article 1893), and the vendor- a-retro against
the transferee of the vendee (Art. 1608).

40
Art. 1177. The creditors, after having pursued the property in possession of the debtor to satisfy their claims, may
exercise all the rights and bring all the actions of the latter for the same purpose, save those which are inherent in his
person; they may also impugn the acts which the debtor may have done to defraud them.
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Velasco v. CA: Article 1311 of the Civil Code which GSIS invokes is not applicable where the
situation contemplated in Article 1729 obtains. The intention of the latter provision is to protect the
laborers and the materialmen from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous contractors and from
possible connivance between owners and contractors. Thus, a constructive vinculum or contractual
privity is created by this provision, by way of exception to the principle underlying Article 1311
between the owner, on the one hand, and those who furnish labor and/or materials, on the other. As a
matter of fact, insofar as the laborers are concerned, by a special law, Act No. 3959, they are given
added protection by requiring contractors to file bonds guaranteeing payment to them. And under
Article 2242, paragraphs (3) and (4), claims of laborers and materialmen, respectively, enjoy
preference among the creditors of the owner in regard to specific immovable property.
Kauffman v. PNB: Wicks, treasurer of the Company, requested that a telegraphic transfer of $45,000
be made to Kauffman in NYC. Wicks drew and delivered a check for P90,355.50, total cost of said
transfer, including exchange and cost of message which was accepted by the officer selling the
exchange in payment of the transfer in question. As evidence of this transaction a document was made
out and delivered to Wicks, which is referred to by the banks assistant cashier as its official receipt.
On the same day PNB dispatched to its New York agency a cablegram: Pay George A. Kauffman,
New York, account Philippine Fiber Produce Co., $45,000. However, the banks representative in
New York replied suggesting the advisability of withholding this money from Kauffman. The PNB
dispatched to its New York agency another message to withhold the Kauffman payment as suggested.
Meanwhile, upon advice of Wicks that the money has been placed to his credit, Kauffman presented
himself at the office of the PNB in New York and demanded the money. Payment was refused. Held:
Kauffman cannot claim the amount. Inasmuch as it never left the possession of the bank, or its
representative in NYC, there was no delivery in the sense intended in 16 of NIL. In this connection
it is unnecessary to point out that the official receipt delivered by the bank to the purchaser of the
telegraphic order, and already set out above, cannot itself be viewed in the light of a negotiable
instrument, although it affords complete proof of the obligation actually assumed by the bank.
Marimperio v. CA: A party who has not taken part in it cannot sue or be sued for performance or for
cancellation thereof, unless he shows that he has a real interest affected thereby. In a sub-lease, there
are two leases and two distinct judicial relations although intimately connected and related to each
other, unlike in a case of assignment of lease, where the lessee transmits absolutely his right, and his
personality disappears; there only remains in the juridical relation two persons, the lessor and the
assignee who is converted into a lessee. In other words, in a contract of sublease, the personality of
the lessee does not disappear; he does not transmit absolutely his rights and obligations to the sublessee; and the sub-lessee generally does not have any direct action against the owner of the premises
as lessor, to require the compliance of the obligations contracted with the plaintiff as lessee, or vice
versa
Barfel v. CA: a party who has not taken part in it cannot sue or be sued for performance or for
cancellation thereof, unless he shows that he has a real interest affected thereby. A real interest has
been defined as a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
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Capital Insurance v. Central Azucarera: The binding effect of the March 3, 1960 Agreement does not
extend to those not parties to the contract, Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. in this instance.
Thus, Article 1311, Civil Code of the Philippines provides, inter alia: ART. 1311. Contracts take
effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of
law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. x x x x
Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., cannot, therefore, be prejudiced by the terms of the March 3,
1960 Agreement. Insofar as the insurance company is concerned, Central Azucarera del Danao is and
shall remain to be its debtor until payment is made.
iii.
Article 1312
Art. 1312. In contracts creating real rights, third persons who come into possession of the
object of the contract are bound thereby, subject to the provisions of the Mortgage Law and
the Land Registration Laws.
A mortgagee and mortgagor are the parties, but a 3rd person who acquires it can be sued, provided
that the mortgage is registered
Bel Air v. Dionisio: purchasers of a registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of
the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. Petitioners contention that he has no privity
of contract with respondent association, not persuasive. In effect, the petitioners contention that he
has no privity of contract with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the petitioner
voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all
encumbrances except the notations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he
automatically becomes a member of the respondent association.
iv.
Stipulation pour autrui: stipulation in favor of a 3rd person
Art. 1311, 2. If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may
demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its
revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting
parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
This was unknown in Roman law. Its from the Code Napoleon.
Agreement between 2 parties which is intended to benefit a 3rd person. Exceptionally, such 3rd
person can sue the obligor even if he isnt a party
Requisites
1. There must be a stipulation in favor of a 3rd person
2. That stipulation in favor of a 3rd person should be a part and not the whole of the contract
o If its the whole contract, then the 3rd person is a party.
3. A clear and deliberate intent to confer a benefit on a 3rd person and not merely incidental
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o In the case of Mandarin Villa vs. CA, the credit card holder was held to have a right to sue
under the contract between the establishment and the bank. The Supreme Court said that its
a stipulation pour autrui to confer benefit on the customer to purchase on credit.
o However, Professor Balane believes that it is debatable whether an agreement between a
credit card company and establishment is a clear and deliberate conferment of benefit on a
third party. He would have concurred with the decision in Mandarin Villa if the basis was
quasi- delict. (This is from the old notes. He did not mention this is 2015).
o This must clearly appear. This is really an exception.
4. That the favorable stipulation should not be conditioned or compensated by any kind of
obligation whatever
o Because the 3rd person becomes a contracting party.
5. Neither of the contracting parties bears the legal representation of authorization of the 3rd
parties
o If the 3rd parties is represented, then the principles of agency apply. Thus, the 3rd party is
really a contracting party
6. The 3rd person must have communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation.
Mandarin Villa v. CA: De Jesus went to a restaurant and offered to pay with his credit card. It was
rejected for being expired. Held: An Agreement between Mandarin Villa and BANKARD
provides: The MERCHANT shall honor validly issued PCCCI credit cardsprovided that the card
expiration date has not elapsed While De Jesus may not be a party to the said agreement, the
stipulation conferred a favor upon him, a holder of credit card validly issued by BANKARD. This
stipulation is a stipulation pour autri and under Art. 1311 De Jesus may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the Mandarin Villa before its revocation. De Jesus offer
to pay by means of his BANKARD credit card constitutes not only an acceptance of the said
stipulation but also an explicit communication of his acceptance to the obligor. Also, Mandarin posted
a logo inside the restaurant stating that Bankard is accepted here.
Baluyot v. CA: UP was going to donate 15.8379 hectares to the Association. Association proposed to
accept and the defendant UP manifested in writing consent to the intended donation directly to the
plaintiff Association. UP backed-out from the arrangement to Donate directly to the plaintiff
Association for the benefit of the qualified residents and high-handedly resumed to negotiate the
donation thru the defendant Quezon City Government. UP executed that Deed of Donation, in
favor of the defendant QC for the benefit of the qualified residents of Cruz-na-Ligas. UP had
continuously despite requests to comply with their reciprocal duty, to deliver the certificate of title to
enable the Donee, the QC, to register the ownership so that the QC can legally and fully comply with
their obligations under the said deed of donation. For alleged non-compliance of QC,UP issued AO
21 declaring the deed of donation revoked and the Donated property be reverted to defendant UP.
Held: complaint states a cause of action. While, admittedly, petitioners were not parties to the deed
of donation, they anchor their right to seek its enforcement upon their allegation that they are
intended beneficiaries of the donation to the Quezon City government. Under Art. 1311, the
following requisites must be present in order to have a stipulation pour autrui: (1) there must be a

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stipulation in favor of a third person; (2) the stipulation must be a part, not the whole of the contract;
(3) the contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person,
not a mere incidental benefit or interest; (4) the third person must have communicated his acceptance
to the obliger before its revocation; and (5) neither of the contracting parties bears the legal
representation or authorization of the third party. Respondent UP has an obligation to transfer the
subject parcel of land to the city government so that the latter can in turn comply with its obligations
to make improvements on the land and thereafter transfer the same to Baluyot, et al. For the purpose
of determining the sufficiency of petitioners' cause of action, these allegations of the amended
complaint must be deemed to be hypothetically true. So assuming the truth of the allegations, we
hold that petitioners have a cause of action against UP.
Uy v. CA: Uy and Roxas were agents authorized to sell eight parcels of land by their owners. They
sold the lands located in Benguet to NHA, and Deeds of Absolute Sale were concluded. However,
only 5 were paid for by the NHA, since a study showed that the other three lots were prone to
landslides and were not suitable for housing. The NHA thus cancelled the sale over the three parcels,
and offered the landowners the amount of 1.225M as daos perjucios. Held: CA did not err in
dismissing the complaint. Based on Art. 1311, as petitioners are not parties, heirs, assignees, or
beneficiaries of a stipulation pour autrui under the contracts of sale, they do not, under substantive law,
possess the right they seek to enforce. There is no stipulation in the Deeds of Absolute Sale clearly
and deliberately conferring a favor to any third person. An agent entitled to receive a commission
from his principal upon the performance of a contract which he has made on his principals account
does not, from this fact alone, have any claim against the other party for breach of the contract, either
in an action on the contract or otherwise.
Benefit was merely incidental
Constantino v. Heirs of Constantino: Respondents inherited parcels of land from their predecessors
land which was contained in a document called Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman. Petitioners filed
this case to annul such document and to get a portion of that land. Held: "privity in estate denotes the
privity between assignor and assignee, donor and donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and
remainderman or reversioner and their respective assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote
vendee or assignee. A privy in estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in
question by purchase; one who takes by conveyance." As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his
predecessor in interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before
the property was transferred to him. He is a proper, but not an indispensable, party as he would, in
any event, have been bound by the judgment against his predecessor. Thus, any condition attached to
the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is applicable to respondents who merely
succeeded Maria.
Bonifacio Bros v. Mora: The fairest test to determine whether the interest of a third person in a
contract is a stipulation pour autrui or merely an incidental interest, is to rely upon the intention of the
parties as disclosed by their contract. A policy of insurance is a distinct and independent contract
between the insured and insurer. A third person has no right in law or equity to the proceeds of an
insurance unless there is a contract or trust, expressed or implied, between the insured and third
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person. The clause in an insurance policy, authorizing the owner of the damaged vehicle to contract
for its repair does not mean that the repairman is entitled to collect the cost of repair out of the
proceeds of the insurance. It merely establishes the procedure that the insured has to follow in order
to be entitled to indemnity for repair.
Florentino v. Encarnacion: The stipulation is part of an extra-judicial partition duly agreed and signed
by the parties, hence the same must bind the contracting parties thereto and its validity or compliance
cannot be left to the will of one of them (Art. 1308). Under Art. 1311, this stipulation takes effect
between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Considering the nature and purpose of the stipulation,
said stipulation is a stipulation pour autrui. The fairest test to determine whether the interest of third
person in a contract is a stipulation pour autrui or merely an incidental interest, is to rely upon the
intention of the parties as disclosed by their contract. In applying this test, it matters not whether the
stipulation is in the nature of a gift or whether there is an obligation owing from the promisee to the
third person. That no such obligation exists may in some degree assist in determining whether the
parties intended to benefit a third person. The evidence on record shows that the true intent of the
parties is to confer a direct and material benefit upon the Church. The fruits of the aforesaid land
were used thenceforth to defray the expenses of the Church in the preparation and celebration of the
Holy Week, an annual Church function. While a stipulation in favor of a third person has no binding
effect in itself before its acceptance by the party favored, the law does not provide when the third
person must make his acceptance. As a rule, there is no time limit; such third person has all the time
until the stipulation is revoked. Here, the Church accepted the stipulation in its favor before it is
sought to be revoked by some of the co-owners, namely the petitioners-appellees herein. It is not
disputed that from the time of the death of Dona Encarnacion Florentino in 1941 til May 1964, the
Church had been enjoying the benefits of the stipulation. The enjoyment of benefits flowing
therefrom for almost 17 years without question from any quarters can only be construed as an implied
acceptance by the Church of the stipulation pour autrui before its revocation.
Bank of America v. IAC: Contract between foreign bank and a local bank asking the latter topay an
amount to a beneficiary, is a stipulation pour autrui. The opening of a letter of credit in favor of the
exporter becomes ultimately but the result of a stipulation pour autrui. Similarly, when KYOWA
asked BANKAMERICA to pay an amount to a beneficiary (either ACTC or Minami), the contract
was between KYOWA and BANKAMERICA and it had a stipulation pour autrui.
Summa Insurance v. CA: Petitioner was subrogated to the rights of the consignee. The relationship
therefore between the consignee and the arrastre operator must be examined. This relationship is
much akin to that existing between the consignee or owner of shipped goods and the common
carrier, or that between a depositor and a warehouseman. In the performance of its obligations, an
arrastre operator should observe the same degree of diligence as that required of a common carrier
and a warehouseman as enunciated under Article 1733 and 3(b) of the Warehouse Receipts Law,
respectively. Being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operators duty is
to take good care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession.
In the performance of its job, an arrastre operator is bound by the management contract it had
executed with the Bureau of Customs which is a sort of a stipulation pour autrui which is also binding
on the consignee (and the insurer, as successor-in-interest of the consignee) including those which are
intended to limit the liability of the arrastre operator. A management contract is also binding on a

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consignee because it is incorporated in the gate pass and delivery receipt which must be presented by
the consignee before delivery can be effected to it. The insurer, as successor-in- interest of the
consignee, is likewise bound by the management contract. Indeed, upon taking delivery of the cargo,
a consignee (and necessarily its successor-in-interest) tacitly accepts the provisions of the management
contract, including those which are intended to limit the liability of one of the contracting parties, the
arrastre operator. However, a consignee who does not avail of the services of the arrastre operator is
not bound by the management contract. Such an exception to the rule does not obtain here as the
consignee did in fact accept delivery of the cargo from the arrastre operator.
Sps. Mamaril v. BSP: owners parked their six (6) passenger jeepneys inside the BSP compound for a
monthly fee of P300.00 for each unit and took the keys home with them. BSP contracted with a
guard service. Paragraph 3(a) thereof which provides that the security agency shall indemnify
defendant-appellant for all losses and damages suffered by it attributable to any act or negligence of
the former's guards. Held: not a stipulation pour autrui. defendant-appellant sought the services of
defendant AIB Security Agency for the purpose of the security and protection of its properties, as
well as that of its officers and employees, so much so that in case of loss of [sic] damage suffered by it
as a result of any act or negligence of the guards, the security agency would then be held responsible
therefor. There is absolutely nothing in the said contract that would indicate any obligation and/or
liability on the part of the parties therein in favor of third persons such as herein plaintiffs-appellees.
d. Autonomy of will

Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.
Public policy is the invasion of public law in the area of private law.
Republic v. PLDT: The Bureau of Telecommunications entered into an agreement with PLDT for
the rental of the latters trunk lines. The agreement prohibited the public use of the service. Since then
however, the Bureau has extended its service to the general public using PLDTs trunk lines. PLDT
thereafter severed the connections. The Republic now seeks to compel PLDT to enter into an
interconnection agreement with it. Held: PLDT may not be forced to enter into an agreement.
Parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the
principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of
the essence of our contractual system.
Cui v. Arellano: Emetrio Cui enrolled in Arellano Unis College of Law from 1st year until 1st
semester of his 4th year. He was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a
total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last at Abad Santos University. To take the bar,
he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the
TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant, which Emetrio refunded as he could not
take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR. Terms of scholarship were: "In consideration of
the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to another
school without having refunded to the University the equivalent of my scholarship cash. Held: the
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provision of the contract whereby Cui waived his right to transfer to another school without
refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash is void. The stipulation in question,
asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is
contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights and hence, null and void.
Notes:
Public policy: In determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of
the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.
Manresas definition of morals: It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of
morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation
Saura v. Sindico: 2 candidates contending for nomination as the official candidate of the Nacionalista
party for the congressional elections entered into a contract. They agreed that each will respect the
result of the convention and no one will run as an independent candidate after losing. Saura was
elected and proclaimed the official congressional candidate of the Nacionalista party. Nonetheless,
Sindico filed her certificate of candidacy. Held: the contract is void. Among those that may not be
the subject matter (object) of contracts are certain rights of individuals, which the law and public
policy have deemed wise to exclude from the commerce of man. Among them are the political rights
conferred upon citizens, including, but not limited to, one's right to vote, the right to present one's
candidacy to the people and to be voted to public office, provided, however, that all the qualifications
prescribed by law obtain. Such rights may not, therefore, be bargained away curtailed with impunity,
for they are conferred not for individual or private benefit or advantage but for the public good and
interest.
Balane: Void contract because it is not within the commerce of man. You cant bargain away your
right to run.
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges: Regino is a 1st year computer science student at PCST. PCST held a
fund raising campaign, Rave Party and Dance Revolution, the proceeds of which were to go to the
construction of the schools tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for 2
tickets at the price of P100 each. Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending
dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On her final examinations in
logic and statistics, her teachers allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests, failing to pay for her
tickets. Held: schools have a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to
complete the course they seek to pursue. School-student relationship is contractual in nature. It is also
reciprocal. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the
academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations. Barring any violation of
the rules on the part of the students, an institution of higher learning has a contractual obligation to
afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. PCST imposed the
assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party
fee as a condition for the students taking the final examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of
their ability to finish a course. The fee was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the
start of the school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.
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Duncan v. Glaxo: Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative. Before such employment,
he signed a contract stating that he should report any relationship with his co-employees or
employees of competing companies and should management determine that there exists a conflict of
interest, he would be deemed resigned. He entered into a relationship with Bettsy, an employee of
Astra Pharmaceuticals and eventually married her. He was repeatedly reminded by his superiors of
the existing conflict of interest but he did nothing. He was then transferred by the company to
another location. He claimed constructive dismissal. Held: The assailed company policy which forms
part of respondents Employee Code of Conduct and its contracts with its employees, such as that
signed by Tecson, was made known to him prior to his employment. Since Tecson knowingly and
voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein gave the force
of law between them and thus, should be complied with in good faith. The prohibition against
personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a
competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
Star v. Simbol: Simbol and Comia were compelled to resign after marrying their co- employees,
pursuant Stars policy against employees getting married. This is in pursuant to the company policy
promulgated in 1995 wherein new applicants will not be hired if he/she has a relative up to the 3rd
degree of relationship if one is already employed by the company. Also, if two employees decided to
get married, one of them must resign. Held: the policy is invalid because Star was unable to show a
reasonable business necessity, and how such policy relates to their qualifications. This pertains to the
prerogative of the company to make stipulations in their employment contract. However, the same
must policies will be valid if it is a bonafide occupational qualification (BFOQ). To justify a BFOQ,
the employer must prove: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential
operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially
all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. In
this case, there was no compelling business necessity for which no alternative exists other than the
discriminatory practice. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other
will be less efficient. If SC upholds the rule without valid justification, the employer can create
policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employees
right to security of tenure. Note: SC cited the ff provisions: Art 1700 of CC and Consti and LC on
protection of workers.
Acol v. PCCCI: Manuel Acol he lost his Bankard and on the following morning he called PCCCI to
report the loss. He again called on another day and asked if there were additional requirements to
report the loss. He was told to write a letter notifying the company of the loss, which he did.
Unfortunately, somebody was able to use the card on April 19 and 20. These charges appeared on
Manuels April 30 billing statement. Manuel informed PCCCI he would not pay for the purchases
made after the day he notified PCCCI of the loss. An investigation confirmed that it was not Manuel
who used his Bankard on April 19 and 20, 1987. Nevertheless, he was still required to pay. PCCCI
cited provision no. 1 which states that holder's responsibility for all charges made through the use of
the card shall continue until the expiration or its return to the Card Issuer or until a reasonable time
after receipt by the Card Issuer of written notice of loss of the Card and its actual inclusion in the

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Cancellation Bulletin. Held: the provision was not valid. A stipulation providing that the
effectivity of the credit card cancellation rests on an act entirely beyond the control of the cardholder
is void for being contrary to public policy. Article 1306 prohibits contracting parties from
establishing stipulations contrary to public policy.
Aznar v. Citibank: Aznar, a known businessman in a Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred Mastercard
credit card issued by Citibank. He made a total advanced deposit with Citibank with the intention of
increasing his credit limit. During his Asian Tour with his wife and grandchildren, his Citibank credit
card was not honored in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. He filed a
complaint for damages. Citibank invoked 7 (Citibank is not responsible if the Card is not honored
by any merchant affiliate for any reason) & 15 (Citibanks liability shall not exceed P1,000.00 or the
actual damages proven, whichever is lesser) of the terms and conditions governing the issuance of its
Mastercard. (see below). Held: such stipulations are invalid. Par. 7 is vague and as a contract of
adhesion, any ambiguity in its provisions must be construed against the party who prepared the
contract, Citibank. Par. 15 is unconscionable as it precludes payment of a larger amount even though
damage may be clearly proven. But notwithstanding their invalidity, the Court cannot grant damages
to Aznar as he failed to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation
that would make it answerable for his emotional suffering.
Macalinao v. BPI: BPI filed a complaint for a sum of money against Macalinao for the latters failure
to pay its credit card purchases. In its Complaint, BPI originally imposed the interest and penalty
charges at the rate of 9.25% per month or 111% per annum. MeTC and RTC found such rate
unconscionable and thus reduced it to 2% per month or 24% per annum. On appeal, CA modified the
rate of interest and penalty charge and increased them to 3% per month or 36% per annum based on
the Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card. Held: 2%
per month or 24% p.a. Jurisprudence has considered the interest rate of 3% per month as excessive
and unconscionable. As such, it is void, and it is as if there was no express contract thereon. Hence,
courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand. The same is true with respect to the
penalty charge. Article 1229 allows the judge to equitably reduce the penalty if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable, considering the circumstances of each case.
Castro v. Tan: Tan mortgaged their Bulacan property for a P30k loan with the Castros as embodied
in a kasulatan. The interest stipulated was 5% monthly interest rate, or 60% per annum,
compounded monthly. After maturity of the loan, Tan offered to pay the 30k with a portion of the
interest but the Castros demanded P359k. Failing to pay the said amount, the Castros foreclosed the
property. Held: The interest rate is void ab initio for being violative of Article 1306. despite the
suspension of the Usury Law, interest rates may still be declared illegal whenever they are found to be
unconscionable. The Castros stress that it is a settled principle that the law will not relieve a party
from the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing. However, the freedom of contract is not
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, morals, safety and welfare.
Tiu v. Platinum Plans: Platinum Plans is a domestic corporation engaged in the pre-need industry. In
1993, Daisy Tiu was appointed as senior AVP and territorial operations head in charge of its Hong

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Kong and Asean operations. They executed a contract for 5 years. In 1995, Tiu stopped reporting for
work, and after a couple of months, she suddenly entered into another pre-need company as its VP
for sales. Platinum sued Tiu for damages for violation of the non-involvement clause in her
employment contract which states that during her employment with Platinum and for the next 2
years thereafter, she cannot engage herself with the work of another pre-need company. Tiu argues it
was void since it was contrary to public policy. Held: non-involvement clause is valid. A noninvolvement clause is not necessarily void for restraining trade so long as the limitations as to time,
trade, and place are reasonable. The non-involvement clause here was reasonable as it only prohibited
Tiu for only 2 years and only for the same business (pre-need company). This was only to protect the
company since Tius position with them allowed her to be privy to highly-confidential and sensitive
marketing strategies.
Mallari v. Prudential: Sps. Mallari obtained 2 loans from Prudential Bank. For the first loan, the
interest rate was 21% per annum while the penalty charge was 12% per annum. For the second loan,
the interest rate was 23% per annum while the penalty charge was also 12% per annum. Held: interest
and penalty rates are not unconscionable. 23% and 12% are not unconscionable under jurisprudence.
Spouses Mallari cannot back out on their obligation under the contract. Note: stipulated interest rates
of 3% per month and higher are excessive, unconscionable and exorbitant.
Leal v. IAC: Public order signifies the public weal-public policy. Essentially, therefore, public order
and public policy mean one and the same thing.
Non v. Dames: The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is
imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and
the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. A school
cannot refuse to enroll a student on the simple ground that his contract expires every end of a
semester. Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on 137 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, which provides that when a student registers in a school, it is
understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester for collegiate courses, which the Court in
Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his
contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired. The termination of contract theory
does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls
for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an
installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance
before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was
enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for
the whole semester before he is given his credentials for transfer.
De Luna v. Abrigo: Paragraph 11 of the "Revival of Donation Intervivos, has provided that
"violation of any of the conditions (herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area to
the donor, his heirs, . . ., without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and
without obligation on the part of the DONOR". Said stipulation not being contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding upon the foundation who
voluntarily consented thereto.
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Llorin v. CA: For a stipulation on an escalation clause to be valid, it should specifically provide (1)
that there can be an increase in interest if increased by law or by the Monetary Board, and (2) it must
include a provision for reduction of the stipulated interest in the event that the applicable maximum
rate of interest is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. The purpose of the law in mandating the
inclusion of a de-escalation clause is to prevent one-sidedness in favor of the lender, which is
considered repugnant to the principle of mutuality of contracts. The inescapable conclusion is that a
de-escalation clause is an indispensable requisite to the validity and enforceability of an escalation
clause in the contract. In other words, in the absence of a corresponding de-escalation clause, the
escalation clause shall be considered null and void. There is no dispute that the escalation clause in the
promissory note involved in this case does not contain a correlative de- escalation clause or a
provision providing for the reduction of the stipulated interest in the event that the applicable
maximum rate of interest is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. Notwithstanding the absence
of such stipulation, however, it is similarly not controverted but, as a matter of fact, specifically
admitted by petitioner that respondent APEX unilaterally and actually decreased the interest charges
it imposed on herein petitioner on three occasions. Consequently, we hold that with this actuality,
the escalation clause involved in this case remains valid and enforceable.
Heirs of Manuel Uy v. Meer Castillo: Parties entered into an agreement that Petitioner will finance
the litigation of the Deceased Respondent in the condition that if latter wins, he will sell a portion of
the disputed land to petitioner. Agreement included a penal clause providing that any party violating
the Kasunduan would pay the aggrieved party a penalty fixed in the sum of P50,000.00, together
with the attorneys fees and litigation expenses incurred should a case be subsequently filed in court.
So obviously Respondent did not follow the agreement to the letter. SC said that the agreement is
binding. Since the parties fixed liquidated damages in the sum of P50,000.00 in case of breach, we
find that said amount should suffice as petitioners' indemnity, without further need of compensation
for moral and exemplary damages. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty generally substitutes
the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance. Usually
incorporated to create an effective deterrent against breach of the obligation by making the
consequences of such breach as onerous as it may be possible, the rule is settled that a penal clause is
not limited to actual and compensatory damages. The RTC's award of attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00 is also proper. Aside from the fact that the penal clause included a liability for said award
in the event of litigation over a breach of the Kasunduan, petitioners were able to prove that they
incurred said sum in engaging the services of their lawyer to pursue their rights and protect their
interests.
Advocates v. BSP: By lifting the interest ceiling, CB Circular No. 905 merely upheld the parties'
freedom of contract to agree freely on the rate of interest. It cited Article 1306 of the New Civil
Code, under which the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. However, the lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not
authorize stipulations charging excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest. Stipulations
authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable interests have been invariably struck down for being
contrary to morals, if not against the law.
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Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the
latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is
ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it
is revoked by the other contracting party.
Remember, the contract is only unenforceable; thus, capable of performance.
3. Elements of a Contract
a. Essential Elements
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Root word of consent= Cum-sentive: to feel together

Its the concurrence of the offer and the acceptance
The essential elements are those without which there can be no contract. These elements are, in
turn, subdivided into common (communes), special (especiales), and extraordinary
(especialisimos). The common elements are those which are present in all contracts, such as
consent, object certain, and cause. The special elements are present only in certain contracts, such
as delivery in real contracts or form in solemn ones. The extraordinary elements are those which
are peculiar to a specific contract (i.e. price in sales).
Ong Yiu v. CA: The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he
adheres, he gives his consent. And as held in Randolph v. American Airlines, 103 Ohio App. 172, 144
N.E. 2d 878; Rosenchein vs. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 349 S.W. 2d 483, a contract limiting
liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding one from
contracting against his own negligence. Considering, therefore, that petitioner had failed to declare a
higher value for his baggage, he cannot be permitted a recovery in excess of P100.00. Besides,
passengers are advised not to place valuable items inside their baggage but to avail of our V-cargo
service (Exh. 1). It is likewise to be noted that there is nothing in the evidence to show the actual
value of the goods allegedly lost by petitioner.
i. Consent
Consent in General
Definition of Consent
Art. 1319, 1st sentence. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance
upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.
Elements of Consent
a. Plurality of subjects
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b.
c.
d.
o
o
e.
Capacity
Intelligent and free will
Express or tacit manifestation of the will
Can be body language. Like nodding your head.
Manifestation to be taken in the widest possible understanding
Conformity of the internal will and its manifestation
Velasco v. CA: It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that the petitioners
themselves admit that they and the respondent still had to meet and agree on how and when the
down-payment and the installment payments were to be paid. Such being the situation, it cannot,
therefore, be said that a definite and firm sales agreement between the parties had been perfected over
the lot in question. Indeed, this Court has already ruled before that a definite agreement on the
manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and
enforceable contract of sale. The fact, therefore, that the petitioners delivered to the respondent the
sum of P10,000.00 as part of the down-payment that they had to pay cannot be considered as
sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale agreement between the parties under article
1482 of the new Civil Code.
Weldon v. CA: the first proposal submitted by Weldon Construction for rendering service under a
contract of supervision is simply that, a proposal. It never attained perfection as the contract between
the parties. Only an absolute or unqualified acceptance of a definite offer manifests the consent
necessary to perfect a contract (Article 1319). The advance payment of P10,000 was not an
unqualified acceptance of the offer contained in the first proposal as in fact an entirely new proposal
was submitted by Weldon Construction subsequently. If, as claimed by the petitioner, the parties had
already agreed upon a contract of supervision, why then was a second proposal made? Once a contract
is shown to have been consummated or fully performed by the parties, its existence and binding effect
can no longer be disputed. It is irrelevant and immaterial to dispute the due execution of a contract.
i.e. the date of signing by one of the parties, if both of them have in fact performed their obligations
thereunder and their respective signatures and those of their witnesses appear upon the face of the
document. Thus, even assuming that the Building Contract was signed by the private respondent
only after the Gay Theater building had been completed and the stipulated price of P600,000.00
Pesos fully paid, such fact can no longer negate the binding effect of that agreement if its existence
and especially, its consummation can be established by other evidence, e.g by the contemporaneous
acts of the parties and their having performed their respective obligations pursuant to the agreement.
Maria Christina v. CA: Whether deemed to be an offer or an acceptance, the letter obviously is far
from the requisite offer or acceptance contemplated under Article 1319. An offer must be clear and
definite, while an acceptance must be unconditional and unbounded, in order that their concurrence
can give rise to a perfected contract. The letter of MCFC and MSC referred to in the questioned
decision of the appellate court, cannot be so considered as a perfected agreement between the parties
as it proposed new terms and conditions for the alleged contract it was a counteroffer.
What vitiates consent?
Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
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(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
What if there is a 17 year old girl who is very precautious, she misrepresents that she is of age.
The other party says she looks over 18. So the other party contracts with her. She sues. Is she
estopped? SC in Mercado said that he is estopped. He cannot take advantage of his own wrong. He
misrepresented his age.
Alcantara: also said the kid is estopped. Dissenting opinion of Padilla said that if he is too young to
contract, he is too young to be estopped.
Braganza: he is too young to contract, he is too young to be estopped. This is the better view. He
cannot be estopped because of his active misrepresentation.
Art. 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to in a
state of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable.
Art. 1329. The incapacity declared in Article 1327 is subject to the modifications determined
by law, and is understood to be without prejudice to special disqualifications established in
the laws.
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or fraud is voidable.
Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the
thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally
moved one or both parties to enter into the contract.
Mistake as to the identity or qualifications of one of the parties will vitiate consent only when
such identity or qualifications have been the principal cause of the contract.
A simple mistake of account shall give rise to its correction.
Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the
contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he
would not have agreed to.
Offer
offer is a unilateral proposition which 1 party makes to Another for the celebration of a contract.
Art. 1321. The person making the offer may fix the time, place, and manner of acceptance, all
of which must be complied with.
Requisites of Offer
a. Definite
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o The offer must be definite, so that upon acceptance, an agreement can be reached on the
whole contract.
o Thats why ads are not usually offers. The ad will just say a house in a nice residential
area. Call for further inquiries.
b. Complete
o The offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended
and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract as well as the nonessential ones desired by the offeror.
c. Intentional
o An offer without seriousness, made in such manner that the other party would not fail to
notice such lack of seriousness, is absolutely without juridical effects and cannot give rise to a
contract (i.e. must not be made in jest, or a prank).
Acceptance
Requisites of Acceptance
i.
Unequivocal
ii.
Unconditional
iii.
Absolute
If the acceptance is qualified, then that is a counteroffer (Article 1319, 3rd sentence).
An amplified acceptance may or may not be an acceptance of the original offer. It depends on the
circumstances.
o Example: A offers to sell 2000 kilos of rice. B says he wants to buy 5000 kilos of rice. Is the
2000 kilos accepted? It depends. If buyer wants a block sale, that is, only 5000 kilos and
nothing less, then it is a counter-offer.
o But if you wanted to buy in bulk, 5000 or nothing, then Bs statement is just a counter offer.
Manifestation of Acceptance
Art. 1320. An acceptance may be express or implied.
Silence is ambiguous. Silence in itself is neither acceptance nor rejection. Can it mean acceptance?
One must look at the circumstances.
Examples: A and B are own stalls which sell rice. C delivers 1000 kilos of rice to A every Sunday.
If A is not there, C just leaves it with As assistant. C tries to do business with B. B is not there
though. C leaves rice with Bs assistant. B does not call C. Both A and B are silent. A accepted the
rice because of the arrangement. If A did not want to accept the rice, then A should have called.
Bs silence is not acceptance.
This is so even if C explains that if B doesnt want the rice, then he should call him the next day.
Cognition Theory
Article 1319, 2nd . Acceptance made by letter of telegram does not bind the offerer except
from the time it came to his knowledge.
This is known as the Cognition Theory. Commercial law uses the Theory of Manifestation.
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Offer and acceptance take effect only from the time knowledge is acquired by the person to
whom it is directed. If during intervening time, the offer or acceptance is extinguished by
death/insanity, such offer or acceptance has no more effect.
Example: Offeror gave offer on March 1. The offer reached the offeree on March 5. From the
point of view of the offeror, offer is counted from March 5. He can still countermand before
March 5.
If the parties are face to face, then there is no problem since there is no time gap.
The problem arises when there is a time gap. Under Article 1319, there is perfection of the
contract when there is knowledge of the other partys acceptance. This has serious consequences.
Example 1. The offer was made in Davao on February 1. The offer was sent through mail which
is received in Manila on February 5. On the same day, the offer is accepted. Mail is sent to Davao
on February 5 signifying acceptance. On February 8, the party in Manila becomes insane. On
February 13, the mail reaches Davao. According to Professor Balane, under Article 1323, there is
no contract since there was no contractual capacity.
Example 2. The offer was made in Bacolod on March 1. It was received in Quezon City on March
3. On March 4, the offeree sends his acceptance. On March 5, the offeror countermands offer.
Now, both acceptance and countermand of offer are in the mail. Whichever reaches the
destination first will be counted.
Balane makes an offer to Nitura to sell. Balane writes a letter to Nitura offering to sell his
plantation with the terms. He mails it March 3. Nitura gets it March 4th. Nitura accepts and mails
the letter on March 9. On the 8th, Balane changes his mind. Both letters are in transit. Balbarosa
says whichever letter is received first. If Nitura gets the withdrawal first, then he doesnt get the
plantation. If Nituras acceptance reaches him first then Balane is bound to sell the land
o Coz of Cognition theory.
Instances when the Offer is withdrawn:
1. Art. 1323
2. Lapse of period stated in the offer without acceptance of offeree
3. Qualified or conditioned acceptance
4. Communication of offeror to offeree of revocation before communication of acceptance
5. I am missing one
Offers Through Agents

Art. 1322. An offer made through an agent is accepted from the time acceptance is
communicated to him.
Effect of Death,Insanity
Art. 1323. An offer becomes ineffective upon the death, civil interdiction, insanity or
insolvency of either party before acceptance is conveyed.
Withdrawal of the Offer
Art. 1324. When the offeror has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the offer may
be withdrawn at any time before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except
when the option is founded upon consideration, something paid or promised.

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Article 1324 is related to Article 1479, 2.41 They actually say the same thing.
1. Unilateral offer to buy or to sell
o S offers to sell a car to B for P300,000. B needs to think about it, and so B asks for 30 days. B
does not pay S for time, but S promises to give B 30 days. In this case there is no option
contract (Falls under #1 above)
o Cannot be exercised whimsically; otherwise, Art. 19 is triggered.
o However, in Sanchez vs. Rigos, the Supreme Court said that even if there was no option
contract, S must still communicate the withdrawal of the offer to B. If S does not
communicate his withdrawal, that is tantamount to a continuing offer. Professor Balane does
not agree with this
o Applies if there is no consideration distinct from the price.
According to him, if there is no valid option contract, there should be no continuing offer.
According to Professor Balane, the Supreme Court should have explained that.
2. Option Contract:
o Definition: a preparatory contract which one party grants to another for a fixed period the
privilege to buy or to sell and it must be supported by a consideration distinct from the price
[Vasquez v. Ayala].
o S offers to sell a car to B for P300,000. B needs to think about it, and so B asks for 30 days and
pays S P5,000. The payment of P5,000 is a distinct consideration from the price of the car.
This distinct consideration of P5,000 is payment for the 30 days. B is paying for time. The
option contract is separate from the contract of sale. S cannot sell the car to anybody else
within that 30-day period. If S sells the car to someone else within the 30- day period, he is
guilty of contractual breach. But B can buy the car before the end of the 30-day period and
such will be a valid sale.
o Now S cant pre-terminate the contract.
o Subject matter of the sale is the time.
o Option contract must be onerous. Cannot be gratuitous [Sachez v. Rigos].
o Commentators say that this can be compelled by specific performance.
o But if you sold it to a buyer in good faith sorry
S offers to sell a car to B for P300,000. B needs to think about it, and so B asks for 30 days and
pays P5,000 to S. B decides to buy the car within 30 days. The car is not sold to anybody else. S
does not want to sell the car to B. B can sue S for specific performance compel S to sell him the
car.
S offers to sell a car to B for P300,000. B needs to think about it, and so B asks for 30 days and
pays P5,000 to S. B decides to buy the car within 30 days. Before B is able to buy the car, S sells
the car to X. B can sue S for damages. B cannot sue for specific performance since the car has been
sold to an innocent purchaser.
3. Right of first refusal

41
Art. 1479, 2. An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the
promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
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Definition: It is a contractual grant, not for the sale of property but of the first priority to buy in
the event the owner decides to sell the same [Villegas v. CA].
Rules:
a. Is it valid? Yes.
b. Does it have to have consideration? Yes.
The consideration in the lease can be also for RoR.
Must be separate and distinct.
c. Is it enforceable? Yes.
d. If its sold to a 3rd person, you can enforce it against him if the buyer had knowledge
If no knowledge damages
e. Is it covered by the Statute of Frauds? No.
Its not a sale of realty, but the right to be the 1st offeree.
A right of first refusal is different from an option contract. A right of first refusal is the right to
have first opportunity to purchase or the right to meet any other offer. On the other hand, an
option contact limits the promissors power to revoke an offer. The right of first refusal is
not covered by the Civil Code.
Differs from option because in option, you get all the terms. In RoR, you dont set anything.
You just say that if I ever decide to sell, Ill make you the first offer.
A right of first refusal is a statement by a person to another that if the former decides to sell the
object, the latter will have the first offer. Here, the object is determinable. But the exercise of the
right to buy is conditioned on the sellers decision to sell on terms which are not yet certain.
According to Equatorial vs. Mayfair, the requirement of separate consideration is not applicable in a
right of first refusal.
o According to Professor Balane, this is peculiar since an option contract is more firm and yet it
requires the payment of separate consideration but a right of first refusal does not.
o RoR is valid but not expressly provided in the Code, because of autonomy of will.
However, in Litonjua vs. CA, the Supreme Court said that in a right of first refusal, the
consideration for the loan or mortgage is already a part of the consideration for the right of first
refusal.
In Ang Yu vs. CA, the SC said that an action for specific performance will not lie against the
promissor. However, a complaint under Article 19 for damages may be filed if the actions of the
promissor are whimsical. In Equatorial vs. Mayfair the right of first refusal was violated when the
vendor sold the object to another person. The SC in Equatorial vs. Mayfair said that an action for
specific performance may be filed. Equatorial vs. Mayfair is totally inconsistent with Ang Yu vs.
CA.
The Supreme Court has held (Equatorial vs. Mayfair, Paranaque Kings vs. CA, Litonjua vs. CA,
PUP vs. CA) that the right of first refusal is enforceable by an action for specific performance.
And that the actual vendee may be required to sell the property to the holder of the right of first
refusal at the price which he bought it.
However, in a recent case, Rosencorr vs. CA (March 8, 2001), the Supreme Court has held that
the right of first refusal need not be written to be enforceable since it is not included in the Statute
of Frauds. Also, if the vendee is in good faith, he may not be compelled by specific performance
since he relied on a title which is clean. The remedy is to go after the vendor.
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In a right of first refusal, there is no definite offer since the vendor has to option of deciding not
to sell the object. Also, in a right of first refusal, there is no need for a separate consideration. In an
option contract, there is a definite offer. According to Professor Balane, the right of first refusal is
inferior to an option contract since there is no definite offer. Professor Balane does not understand
why an action for specific performance is allowed in violations of rights of first refusal but not in
the case of option contracts when the object is sold to another person. Why is the SC giving
greater legal effect to a right of first refusal which is more tentative? Also, where the SC get these
rules since the right of first refusal is not covered by the Civil Code.
Sanchez v. Rigos: Nicolas Sanchez and Severina Rigos executed an instrument entitled "Option to
Purchase," whereby Mrs. Rigos "agreed, promised and committed ... to sell" to Sanchez the sum of
P1,510.00, a parcel of land, within 2 years from said date with the understanding that said option shall
be deemed "terminated and elapsed," if "Sanchez shall fail to exercise his right to buy the property"
within the stipulated period. Held: Rigos should sell the property to Sanchez. The offer can be
withdrawn in this case since it is not supported by consideration, but only before the promissee
communicates his acceptance. In other words, since there may be no valid contract without a cause or
consideration, the promisor is not bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it. Pending
notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell
which, if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale.
Ang Yu v. CA: In the 1st case, Ang Yu Asuncion and Keh Tiong, et al. are tenants or lessees of
residential and commercial spaces owned by Bobby Cu Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan. The
owners decided to sell the property and gave Ang Yu priority to buy it. However, despite
negotiations, the parties did not reach a final agreement. Ang Yu sued the owners then to compel
them to sell the property. The court held that the offer to sell was never accepted by the plaintiffs for
the reason that the parties did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence,
there was no contract of sale at all. Also, the court ruled that should the defendants subsequently offer
their property for sale at a price of P11-million or below, plaintiffs will have the right of first refusal.
Later on, the owners sold the property to Buen Realty for 15M. Ang Yu then filed a motion for
execution to compel the owners to sell them the property (2nd case). Held: Motion for Execution is
without merit because the judgment of the court only gave Ang Yu et al the right of first refusal (but
it did not decree a contract of sale). Its breach cannot justify correspondingly an issuance of a
writ of execution under a judgment that merely recognizes its existence, nor would it
sanction an action for specific performance without thereby negating the indispensable
element of consensuality in the perfection of contracts. It held that the option to buy, given to
the buyer is not the contract of sale itself. The optionee has the right, but not the obligation, to buy.
Once the option is exercised timely, i.e., the offer is accepted before a breach of the option, a bilateral
promise to sell and to buy ensues and both parties are then reciprocally bound to comply with their
respective undertakings. At any time prior to the perfection of the contract, either negotiating party
may stop the negotiation. The offer, at this stage, may be withdrawn; the withdrawal is effective
immediately after its manifestation, such as by its mailing and not necessarily when the offeree learns
of the withdrawal. If the period is not itself founded upon or supported by a consideration, the
offeror is still free and has the right to withdraw the offer before its acceptance, or, if an acceptance
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has been made, before the offeror's coming to know of such fact, by communicating that withdrawal
to the offeree.
Equatorial v. Mayfair: Carmelo owned a parcel of land, together with two 2-storey buildings
constructed thereon. He entered into two contract of leases with Mayfair. Both leases contained a
clause giving Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject properties. Carmelo sold its entire
land and building, which included the leased premises housing the "Maxim" and "Miramar" theatres,
to Equatorial by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, for the total sum of P11,300,000. This was NOT
offered first to Mayfair. Mayfair instituted the action a quo for specific performance and annulment
of the sale of the leased premises to Equatorial. Held: The rule so early established in this jurisdiction
is that the deed of option or the option clause in a contract, in order to be valid and enforceable, must,
among other things, indicate the definite price at which the person granting the option, is willing to
sell. 8 grants the right of first refusal to Mayfair and is not an option contract. It is evident that the
provision granting Mayfair "30-days exclusive option to purchase" the leased premises is NOT AN
OPTION in the context of Arts. 1324 and 1479, second paragraph. Although the provision is certain
as to the object (the sale of the leased premises) the price for which the object is to be sold is not stated
in the provision. Otherwise stated, the questioned stipulation is not by itself, an "option" or the "offer
to sell" because the clause does not specify the price for the subject property. In the instant case, the
right of first refusal is an integral part of the contracts of lease. The consideration is built into the
reciprocal obligations of the parties. Since Equatorial is a buyer in bad faith, this finding renders the
sale to it of the property in question rescissible. Equatorial was aware of the lease contracts because its
lawyers had, prior to the sale, studied the said contracts.
Bible Baptist Church: Bible Baptist Church entered into a contract of lease with spouses Villanueva.
Bible Baptist seeks to buy the leased premises from the spouses Villanueva, under the option given to
them. Petitioners claim that they (Baptist Church) agreed to advance the large amount needed for the
rescue of the property but, in exchange, it asked the Villanuevas to grant it a long term lease and an
option to buy the property for P1.8 million. However, the spouses Villanueva did not agree saying
that there is no separate consideration. Bible Baptist argue that there is a consideration the
consideration supporting the option was their agreement to pay off the Villanuevas P84,000 loan
with the bank, thereby freeing the subject property from the mortgage encumbrance. Spouses
Villanueva argue that the amount of P84,000 has been fully exhausted and utilized by their
occupation of the premises and there is no separate consideration to speak of which could support the
option. Held: no separate consideration that would render the option contract valid and binding. An
option contract, to be valid and binding, needs to be supported by a separate consideration. The
consideration need not be monetary but could consist of other things or undertakings. However, if
the consideration is not monetary, these must be things or undertakings of value, in view of the
onerous nature of the contract of option. Furthermore, when a consideration for an option contract is
not monetary, said consideration must be clearly specified as such in the option contract or clause.
Villegas v. CA: This involves 2 consolidated cases involving a parcel of land in Quiapo, Manila owned
by the heirs of Dr. Lorenzo Reyes which was being leased by the petitioner-lessees (the 2 Villegas and
the 2 Sanchez). The Administrative Committee of the heirs informed petitioner-lessees of the heirs
decision to sell the property and given them the opportunity to exercise their right of pre-emption.

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However, after many offers & counter-offers and a failed conference meeting to establish the price,
the parties failed to reach an agreement. And so the respondent-heirs, owner of the 75% undivided
property, decided to sell their shares to Lita Sy. As a consequence of which, petitioner-lessees filed an
action against respondent-heirs and Spouses Sy for Annulment of the Sale/Title, Specific
Performance, and Consignation of Rentals with Damages. They contend that there was already a
perfected contract of sale when they accepted the P5 Million offer for the property in their letter
dated Oct. 18, 1988 and that the sale between respondent-heirs and Lita Sy should be annulled since it
violated their right of first refusal. Held: the respondent-heirs were correct that there was no
perfected contract of sale because there was no meeting of minds. Where a time is stated in an offer
for its acceptance, the offer is terminated at the expiration of the time given for its acceptance. The
offer may also be terminated when the person to whom the offer is made either rejects the offer
outright or makes a counter-offer of his own. Here, petitioner-lessees already exercised their right of
first refusal when they refused to respond to the latest offer of respondent-heirs (the letter dated Nov.
3, 1988 wherein only the 75% undivided interest of the property was for sale at P3,825,000). Upon
petitioner-lessees failure to respond to this latest offer of respondent-heirs, the latter could validly sell
the property to other buyers under the same terms and conditions offered.
Eulogio v. Sps. Angeles: A house and lot in Timog Avenue, QC was being leased out to Arturo by
Spouses Apeles. Upon Arturos death, Enrico (Arturos son) succeeded as lessor. Allegedly, Enrico and
Luz (authorized by SPA) entered into a Contact of Lease with Option to Purchase, affording Enrico,
before the expiration of the three-year lease period, the option to purchase the subject property for a
price not exceeding P1.5M. When Enrico wanted to exercise such right, the Spouses Apeles refused.
Enrico filed a complaint for specific performance and damages. Spouses Apeles contended that Luzs
signature in said contract was forged and they did not intend to sell such property. Held: the
Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase is unenforcable against Spouses Apeles. An option is a
contract by which the owner of the property agrees with another person that the latter shall have the
right to buy the formers property at a fixed price within a certain time. It is not a sale of property but
a sale of the right to purchase. Under the 2 thereof, an option contract to be valid and enforceable
against the promissor, there must be a separate and distinct consideration that supports it. We have
painstakingly examined the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase, as well as the pleadings and
testimonies, for any direct evidence or evidence aliunde to prove the existence of consideration for
the option contract, but we have found none.
Vasquez v. Ayala: On April 23, 1981, the Vasquez spouses entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with regarding the development of Ayala Alabang. Aside from a portion of the
land being reserved for the spouses, 4 lots were agreed to be offered for sale to the spouses at the
prevailing price at the time of the purchase. The pertinent portion of the moa provided 5.15. The
BUYER agrees to give the SELLERS a first option to purchase four developed lots next to the
"Retained Area" at the prevailing market price at the time of the purchase." The spouses now are
seeking to buy the lots at the 1984 prices while Ayala had offered to sell them at the 1990 price (when
the village was finally developed). Held: Contract is ROFR. In a right of first refusal, while the
object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right would be dependent not only on the
grantors eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms,
including the price, that are yet to be firmed up. Here, 5.15 is obviously a mere right of first refusal
and not an option contract. Although the paragraph has a definite object, i.e., the sale of subject lots,

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the period within which they will be offered for sale to petitioners and, necessarily, the price for
which the subject lots will be sold are not specified. Therefore, Ayala was free to set the price based on
1990. Moreover, since spouses refused to purchase the properties at the price given by Ayala, they
necessarily lost their ROFR.
Natino v. IAC: A commitment by the bank to resell a property within a specified period, although
accepted by the party in whose favor it was made, is considered an option not supported by
consideration distinct from the price, and therefore, not binding upon the promissor. Even if Mrs.
Brodeth is to be understood to have promised to allow the petitioners to buy the property at any time
they have the money, the Bank was not bound by the promise not only because it was not approved
or ratified by the Board of Directors but also because, and more decisively, it was a promise
unsupported by a consideration distinct from the re-purchase price. A commitment by the bank to
resell a property, within a specified period, although accepted by the party in whose favor it was
made, was considered an option not supported by a consideration distinct from the price and,
therefore, not binding upon the promissor. Pursuant to Southwestern Sugar and Molasses Co. vs.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company, it was void.
Serra v. CA: In a unilateral promise to sell, where the debtor fails to withdraw the promise before the
acceptance by the creditor, the transaction becomes a bilateral contract to sell and to buy, because
upon acceptance by the creditor of the offer to sell by the debtor, there is already a meeting of the
minds of the parties as to the thing which is determinate and the price which is certain. In which case,
the parties may then reciprocally demand performance. Jurisprudence has taught us that an optional
contract is a privilege existing only in one partythe buyer. For a separate consideration paid, he is
given the right to decide to purchase or not, a certain merchandise or property, at any time within the
agreed period, at a fixed price. This being his prerogative, he may not be compelled to exercise the
option to buy before the time expires. On the other hand, what may be regarded as a consideration
separate from the price is discussed in Vda. de Quirino v. Palarca wherein the facts are almost on all
fours with the case at bar. The said case also involved a lease contract with option to buy where we
had occasion to say that the consideration for the lessors obligation to sell the leased premises to the
lessee, should he choose to exercise his option to purchase the same, is the obligation of the lessee to
sell to the lessor the building and/or improvements constructed and/or made by the former, if he fails
to exercise his option to buy said premises. In the present case, the consideration is even more
onerous on the part of the lessee since it entails, transferring of the building and/or improvements on
the property to petitioner, should respondent bank fail to exercise its option within the period
stipulated. The bugging question then is whether the price not greater than TWO HUNDRED
PESOS is certain or definite. A price is considered certain if it is so with reference to another thing
certain or when the determination thereof is left to the judgment of a specified person or persons.
And generally, gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale. In the present dispute,
there is evidence to show that the intention of the parties is to peg the price of P210 per square meter.
Advertisements
Art. 1325. Unless it appears otherwise, business advertisements of things for sale are not
definite offers, but mere invitations to make an offer.
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Art. 1326. Advertisements for bidders are simply invitations to make proposals, and the
advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears.
Most advertisements are simply invitations to make an offer and are not offers in themselves since
not all the necessary terms can fit in the advertisement.
Even if the ad had all the necessary terms, its still an invitation to make offer since
there is no definite person to whom the offer is being made (public offer).
C&C Construction v. Menor: Moreover, it was not the ministerial duty of the Nawasa officials to
award the contract to C & C Commercial Corporation even if it was the lowest bidder. The Nawasa
in its addendum No. 1 to the invitation to bid dated July 6, 1966 reserved the right to reject the bid
of any bidder (p. 35, Record on Appeal). Therefore, a bidder whose bid is rejected has no cause for
complaint nor a right to dispute the award to another bidder
Simulated Contracts
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when
the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true
agreement.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when
it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.

Absolutely Simulated (contrato simulado)
Absolute simulation of a contract takes place when the parties do not intent to be bound at all
(Article 1345).
For example, X pretends to sell his car to avoid tax liability. However X has no real intention to
sell the car.
An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void (Article 1346)
All the requisites are missing.
o No consent they really had no intention to sell
o No object car was no delivered
o No cause no money changed hands
Gonzalez v. Trinidad: Pari delicto rule does not apply here, because Object and cause are not illegal
Relatively Simulated (contrato disimulado)
Relative simulation of a contract takes place when the parties conceal their true agreement
(Article 1345).
They intend to enter into a contract, but they disguise it as another.
o Like they make it a sale when its really a donation to avoid taxes.
o If there is enough evidence to establish the intent of the parties the law treats it under the
laws governing the intended contract. It will judged according to its real nature.
In a relatively simulated contract, the parties enter into a contract but disguise it as another.
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For example, X has many creditors, and they are going after Xs car. X cannot donate his car
to Y since the creditors will just resort to accion pauliana. So, X antedates a contract of sale,
selling his car to Y, except that Xs intention is to donate his car to Y .
A relatively simulated contract, when it does not prejudice a 3rd person and is not intended for
any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties
to their real agreement (Article 1346).
The law will apply the rules of the true contract and not the ostensible contract.
Payongayong v. CA: Mendoza is the original owner of a parcel of land. He mortgaged the property to
MESALA to secure a loan; this was duly annotated. Mendoza executed a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage over the parcel of land together with all the improvements thereon in favor
of Spouses Payongayong. The sale was never annotated. Later on, Mendoza mortgaged the same
property to MESALA to secure another loan; this was annotated on the title. Lastly, Mendoza
executed another Deed of Sale over the same property in favor of respondents spouses Salvador.
Getting wind of the second sale to Spouses Salvador, Spouses Payongayong filed a complaint for
annulment of deed of absolute sale and transfer of title with recovery of possession over the said land.
Held: the sale to Spouses Salvador was not fictitious. Simulation occurs when an apparent contract is
a declaration of a fictitious will, deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce,
for the purpose of deception, the appearance of a juridical act which does not exist or is different from
that which was really executed. Its requisites are: a) an outward declaration of will different from the
will of the parties; b) the false appearance must have been intended by mutual agreement; and c) the
purpose is to deceive third persons. The basic characteristic then of a simulated contract is that it is not
really desired or intended to produce legal effects or does not in any way alter the juridical situation
of the parties. The cancellation of Mendozas certificate of title over the property and the
procurement of one in its stead in the name of respondents, which acts were directed towards the
fulfillment of the purpose of the contract, unmistakably show the parties intention to give effect to
their agreement. The claim of simulation does not thus lie.
Ureta v. Ureta: Francisco suggested to his father, Alfonso, that in order to reduce inheritance taxes,
Alfonso should make it appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children. Alfonso executed 4
Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of 3 of his children and his common law wife.
Since the sales were made only for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given,
Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. Policronio, Alfonsos eldest,
was given under a Deed of Sale 6 parcels of land but he and his heirs only took possession of a portion
of parcel 5. When Alfonso died, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was entered into by Alfonsos heirs.
Policronios heirs now allege that the 6 parcels of land conveyed to Policronio under the Deed of Sale
should be excluded in the partition. Held: Deed was void for being absolutely simulated. Lacking in
an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and enforceable contract.
Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a
transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the
property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer
to Policronio purely for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer ownership over the subject
lands.It is clear that the Deeds of Sale were only executed for taxation purposes. There is clearly no
intent on the part of Alfonso to divest himself of ownership over the properties. The most
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protuberant index of simulation of contract is the complete absence of an attempt in any manner on
the part of the ostensible buyer to assert rights of ownership over the subject properties. Policronios
failure to take exclusive possession of the subject properties or, in the alternative, to collect rentals, is
contrary to the principle of ownership. Such failure is a clear badge of simulation that renders the
whole transaction void.
Umali v. CA: There is absolute simulation, which renders the contract null and void, when the parties
do not intend to be bound at all by the same. The basic characteristic of this type of simulation of
contract is the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to either produce legal
effects or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. The subsequent act of Rivera in
receiving and making use of the tractor subject matter of the Sales Agreement and Chattel Mortgage,
and the simultaneous issuance of a surety bond in favor of Bormaheco, concomitant with the
execution of the Agreement of Counter-Guaranty with Chattel/Real Estate Mortgage, conduce to
the conclusion that petitioners had every intention to be bound by these contracts. The occurrence of
these series of transactions between petitioners and private respondents is a strong indication that the
parties actually intended, or at least expected, to exact fulfillment of their respective obligations from
one another.
Carino v. CA: There is merit to the Encabos' claim that the simulated deed of sale in favor of the
Carinos was executed in order to protect the money Quesada invested in the purchase of the rights to
the lot in question, which transfer of said lot to his name was later on disapproved by the LTA. As can
be gleaned from the testimony of Josue Quesada, he did this by putting Cirila Vicencio as the vendee
in the simulated Deed of Sale, when in fact, Encabo and Quesada meant her only as a dummy for the
latter.
Javier v. CA: It is settled that the previous and simultaneous and subsequent acts of the parties are
properly cognizable indicia of their true intention. Where the parties to a contract have given it a
practical construction by their conduct as by acts in partial performance, such construction may be
considered by the court in construing the contract, determining its meaning and ascertaining the
mutual intention of the parties at the time for contracting. The deed of assignment of February 15,
1966 is a relatively simulated contract which states a false cause or consideration, or one where the
parties conceal their true agreement. A contract with a false consideration is not null and void per se.
Under Article 1346 a relatively simulated contract, when it does not prejudice a third person and is
not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Formaran v. Ong: The subject Deed of Sale is indeed simulated, as it is: (1) totally devoid of
consideration; (2) it was executed on August 12, 1967, less than two months from the time the subject
land was donated to petitioner on June 25, 1967 by no less than the parents of respondent Glenda
Ong; (3) on May 18, 1978, petitioner mortgaged the land to the Aklan Development Bank for a
P23,000.00 loan; (4) from the time of the alleged sale, petitioner has been in actual possession of the
subject land; (5) the alleged sale was registered on May 25, 1991 or about twenty four (24) years after
execution; (6) respondent Glenda Ong never introduced any improvement on the subject land; and
(7) petitioners house stood on a part of the subject land. These are facts and circumstances which may
be considered badges of bad faith that tip the balance in favor of petitioner. The sale of the land in
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question was purely simulated. It is void from the very beginning. If the sale was legitimate,
defendant Glenda should have immediately taken possession of the land, declared in her name for
taxation purposes, registered the sale, paid realty taxes, introduced improvements therein and should
not have allowed plaintiff to mortgage the land. These omissions properly militated against defendant
Glendas submission that the sale was legitimate and the consideration was paid. While the Deed of
Absolute Sale was notarized, it cannot justify the conclusion that the sale is a true conveyance to
which the parties are irrevocably and undeniably bound. Although the notarization of Deed of
Absolute Sale, vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it does not validate nor make binding
an instrument never intended, in the first place, to have any binding legal effect upon the parties.
ii. Object

Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things,
may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the
object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized
by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
Art. 1348. Impossible things or services cannot be the object of contracts.
Art. 1349. The object of every contract must be determinate as to its kind. The fact that the
quantity is not determinate shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided
it is possible to determine the same, without the need of a new contract between the parties.
Object is always an act or conduct.

The object of the contract is the prestation. Thus, it is always the conduct which is to be observed.
It is not a concrete object like a car. In a contract of sale, the object is the delivery of the object
and not the object itself.
The provisions on object however blur the distinction between the object of the contract, the
prestation, and the object of the prestation. According to Professor Balane, these provisions are
not fatal though.
Requisites of Object
1. The object must be within the commerce of man, either already existing or in potency
(Article 1347)
o Within the commerce of man means that the object is capable of appropriation and
transmission.
o The term in potency means that the object will come into existence in the future.
o Generally in reciprocal contracts particularly sales, the sale of future things is allowed. For
example, it is possible to sell the future harvest of a farm.
o The coming into being of the future thing is a suspensive condition.
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o Some future things are not allowed to be objects of the prestation. The law does not allow
contracts on future inheritance.
o Res existentes
o Res futurea cant dispose of it coz its future or you dont won it yet.
Exception: you cant donate future property and you cant sell future inheritance.
Emptio rei speratae is a conditional sale. There is a suspensive condition. If the future thing
does not come into existence, then there is no contract of sale.
Emptio spei is the sale of a hope. Even if the future thing does not materialize, the buyer
must pay since the buyer is taking a chance. (i.e. sale of lotto ticket). Hope is a present
thing.
2. The object must be licit, or not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public
order (Article 1347)
3.
o
o
o
The object must be possible (Article1348)

If the object is impossible, then the contract is void for lack of cause.
Article 1348 does not talk of supervening impossibility which is a mode of extinguishments.
Impossibility under Article 1348 must be actual and contemporaneous with the making of the
contract.
4. The object must be determinate as to its kind and determinable as to its quantity (Article
1349)
o The object need not be individualized. It must be determinate as to its kind or species.
o The quantity of the object may be indeterminate, so long as the right of the creditor is not
rendered illusory.
5. The object must be transmissible
o This is actually a redundancy since this is already in the requisite of being within the
commerce of man.
iii. Cause
Art. 1350. In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party, the
prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other; in remuneratory ones, the service or
benefit which is remunerated; and in contracts of pure beneficence, the mere liberality of the
benefactor.
Villamor v. CA: consideration is "the why of the contracts, the essential reason which moves the
contracting parties to enter into the contract." The cause or the impelling reason on the part of private
respondent in executing the deed of option as appearing in the deed itself is the petitioners' having
agreed to buy the 300 square meter portion of private respondents' land at P70.00 per square meter
"which was greatly higher than the actual reasonable prevailing price."
Art. 1351. The particular motives of the parties in entering into a contract are different from
the cause thereof.
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Olegario v. CA: In a contract of sale, consideration is, as a rule, different from the motive of the
parties. Consideration is defined as some right, interest, benefit, or advantage conferred upon the
promisor, to which he is otherwise not lawfully entitled, or any detriment, prejudice, loss, or
disadvantage suffered or undertaken by the promisee other than to such as he is at the time of consent
bound to suffer. As contradistinguished, motive is the condition of mind which incites to action, but
includes also the inference as to the existence of such condition, from an external fact of a nature to
produce such a condition. Under certain circumstances, however, the motive of the parties may be
regarded as the consideration when it predetermines the purpose of the contract. When they blend to
that degree, and the motive is unlawful, then the contract entered into is null and void. The primary
motive of Marciliano in selling the controverted 91-square meter lot to private respondents was to
illegally frustrate petitioners right of inheritance and to avoid payment of estate tax. In their
memorandum private respondents did not refute petitioners charge that the said sale is fictitious. The
conclusion is thus inescapable that the purported sale of April 15, 1986 of the subject lot is null and
void. Illegal motive predetermined the purpose of the contract.
Art. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatever. The
cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Lagunzad v. Gonzales: It is necessary to distinguish between real duress and the motive which is
present when one gives his consent reluctantly. A contract is valid even though one of the parties
entered into it against his own wish and desires, or even against his better judgment. In legal effect,
there is no difference between a contract wherein one of the contracting parties exchanges one
condition for another because he looks for greater profit or gain by reason of such change, and an
agreement wherein one of the contracting parties agrees to accept the lesser of two disadvantages. In
either case, he makes a choice free and untramelled and must accordingly abide by it. The Licensing
Agreement has the force of law between the contracting parties and since its provisions are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, petitioner should comply with
it in good faith.
Art. 1353. The statement of a false cause in contracts shall render them void, if it should not
be proved that they were founded upon another cause which is true and lawful.
Art. 1354. Although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and is
lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary.
Law v. Olympic Sawmill: Law loaned P10K to defendants. Defendants were not able to pay and asked
for extension. Law granted but added P6K for attorneys fees, legal interest, and other costs.
Defendants still unable to pay so collection case. Defendants said P6K is usurious. Held: Under
Article 1354 in regards to the agreement of the parties relative to the P6K obligation, it is presumed
that it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary. No evidentiary hearing having
been held, it has to be concluded that defendants had not proven that the P6K obligation was
illegal.P6K was liquidated damages so allowed unless proven illegal, which defendants did not do.
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate
a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.

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The cause of a contract is the why of the contract, the immediate and most
proximate purpose of the contract, the essential reason which impels the contracting parties to
enter into it and which explains and justifies the creation of the obligation through such contract.
Causa or cause. Consideration is a bad translation. The cause is different from consideration.
Consideration in the Anglo-American sense must always be valuable or capable of pecuniary
estimation. Cause, on the other hand, need not be material at all, and may consist in a moral
satisfaction for the promissor.
Causa is the immediate why, motive is the ultimate why.
Requisites of Cause
1. It must exist
2. It must be true/ real
Not simulated.
3. It must be licit
Cause is different from motive. Cause is the proximate why while motive is the ultimate why.
For example, A wants to sell his house for P60 M because A is moving to Canada. B is willing to
buy the house for P60 M. In this case, the cause for A is the
P60 M while the cause for B is the house. As motive is to dispose of the house
which he does not need since A is going to Canada.
Like failure of or lack of object, the failure of cause has an effect on the contract. If there is no
cause or the cause is illegal, then the contract is void. This is unlike the lack of consent. When
consent is lacking, the contract is not void. The contract is merely voidable.
General Rule: Failure of motive as a General Rule does not affect the contract.
Exception: Motive affects the contract when
1. The motive becomes a suspensive condition; or
o Balane will sell to Nitura his house for 20M on the condition that his visa to Canada is granted
2. The realization of the motive is the cause for the contract and there is an intervening serious
mistake of fact
o Contract will become voidable for mistake.
In onerous contracts, the cause is the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other
party.
It has been held that, as a mortgage is an accessory contract, its cause or consideration is the very
cause or consideration of the principal contract, from which it receives its life, and without which
it cannot exist as an independent contract (China Bank vs. Lichauco).
In remuneratory contracts, the cause is the service or benefit which is remunerated .
A remuneratory contract is one where a party gives something to another because of some service
or benefit given or rendered by the latter to the former, where such service or benefit was not due
as a legal obligation.
In gratuitous contracts, the cause is the mere liberality of the benefactor.
Delivery for real contracts
Form for formal contracts
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b. Natural Elements
The natural elements are those which are derived from the nature of the contract and ordinarily
accompany the same. They are presumed by law, although they can be excluded by the
contracting parties if they so desire.
i.
Right to resolve (Article 1191)
ii.
Warranties in sales contracts
c. Accidental Elements
The accidental elements are those which exist only when the parties expressly provide for them
for the purpose of limiting or modifying the normal effects of the contract (i.e. conditions, terms,
modes)
4. Stages of a Contract
a. Preparation, conception, or generation, which is the period of negotiation and bargaining,
ending at the moment of agreement of the parties
b. Perfection or birth of the contract, which is the moment when the parties come to agree on
the terms of the contract
General Rule: Contracts are perfected by mere consent the principle of consensuality (Article
1315)
Exception: Real contracts, such as deposit, pledge, and commodatum are not perfected until the
delivery of the object of the obligation (Article 1316)
c. Consummation or death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the terms agreed upon
5. Classification of Contracts
a. According to Degree of Dependence
i. Preparatory
A preparatory contract is one which has for its object the establishment of a condition in law
which is necessary as a preliminary step towards the celebration of another subsequent contract
(i.e. partnership, agency).
ii. Principal
A principal contract is one which can subsist independently from other contracts and whose
purpose can be fulfilled by themselves (i.e. sales, lease).
iii. Accessory
An accessory contract is one which can exist only as a consequence of, or in relation with, another
prior contract (i.e. pledge, mortgage).
b. According to Perfection
i. Consensual
A consensual contract is one which is perfected by mere agreement of the parties (i.e. sales, lease).
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ii. Real
A real contract is one which requires not only the consent of the parties for their perfection, but
also the delivery of the object by 1 party to the other (i.e. commodatum, deposit, pledge).
c. According to their Form

i. Common or informal
An informal contract is one which does not require some particular form (i.e. loan, lease).
ii. Special or formal

A formal contract is one which requires some particular form (i.e. donation, chattel mortgage).
d. According to Purpose
i. Transfer of ownership (i.e. sale)
ii. Conveyance of use (i.e.commodatum)
iii. Rendition of service (i.e. agency)
e. According to Subject Matter
i. Things (i.e. sale, deposit, pledge)
ii. Services (i.e.agency, lease of services)
f. According to the Nature of the Obligation

i. Bilateral
A bilateral contract is one which gives rise to reciprocal obligations for both parties (i.e. sale,
lease).
ii. Unilateral
A unilateral contract is one which gives rise to an obligation for only 1 of the parties (i.e.
commodatum, gratuitous deposit).
Can be cinelagmatic?
g. According to Cause
i. Onerous
An onerous contract is one in which each of the parties aspires to procure for himself a benefit
through the giving of an equivalent or compensation (i.e. sale).
ii. Gratuitous
A gratuitous contract is one in which one of the parties proposes to give to the other a benefit
without any equivalent or compensation (i.e. commodatum).
h. According to Risk
i. Commutative
A commutative contract is one in which each of the parties acquires an equivalent of his prestation
and such equivalent is pecuniarily appreciable and already determined from the moment of the
celebration of the contract (i.e. lease).
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ii. Aleatory
An aleatory contract is one in which each of the parties has to his account the acquisition of an
equivalent prestation , but such equivalent, although pecuniarily appreciable, is not yet
determined, at the moment of the celebration of the contract, since it depends upon the
happening of an uncertain event, thus charging the parties with the risk of loss or gain (i.e.
insurance).
i. According to Name
i. Nominate
A nominate contract is one which has a name and is regulated by special provisions of law (i.e.
sale, lease)
We have 18.
ii. Innominate

Art. 1307. Innominate contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the
provisions of Titles I and II of this Book, by the rules governing the most analogous nominate
contracts, and by the customs of the place.
An innominate contract is one that does not have a name and is not regulated by special provisions
of law.
A contract is not void just because it has no name. It is not a requisite for validity. A contract may
have no name but it can be valid provided it has all the elements of a contract and all the
restrictions are respected.
4 Classes of Innominate Contracts
o do ut des (I give that you give)
o do ut facias (I give that you do)
o facio ut des (I do that you give)
o facio ut facias (I do that you do)
Corpus v. CA: Moreover, the payment of attorneys fees to respondent David may also be justified by
virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give) which is based on the principle
that no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. Innominate contracts have been
elevated to a codal provision in the New Civil Code by providing under Article 1307 that such
contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the general provisions or principles of
obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts, and by the
customs of the people.
B. FORM OF CONTRACTS
Art. 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. However, when the law
requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a
contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable. In such
cases, the right of the parties stated in the following article cannot be exercised.
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Art. 1357. If the law requires a document or other special form, as in the acts and contracts
enumerated in the following article, the contracting parties may compel each other to
observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This right may be exercised
simultaneously with the action upon the contract.
Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document:
(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an
interest therein a governed by articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;
(2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal
partnership of gains;
(3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act
appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third person;
(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public document.
All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in
writing, even a private one. But sales of goods, chattels or things in action are governed by
articles, 1403, No. 2 and 1405.
General Rule: There is no need for a specific form, but there must still be some manifestation of
consent.
Exception: When the written form is required
1. For validity
o If it not written, the same is void.
o Examples are donations (Articles 748, 749),42 antichresis (Article 2134),43 interest in a loan
(Article 1956),44 sale of land by an agent (Article 1874),45 contribution of immovables in a
partnership (Article 1773)46
2. For enforceability

42
Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made
in writing, otherwise, the donation shall be void. (632a)
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect
unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step
shall be noted in both instruments.
43
Art. 2134. The amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise, the contract of
antichresis shall be void.
44
Art. 1956. No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
45
Art. 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in
writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void.
46
Art. 1773. A contract of partnership is void, whenever immovable property is contributed thereto, if an inventory of
said property is not made, signed by the parties, and attached to the public instrument.
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o The contract is unenforceable if it is not written.

a. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making
thereof (Article 1403 (a))
b. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another (Article 1403
(b))
c. An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry
(Article 1403 (c))
d. An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than
P500, unless the buyer accepts and receives part of such goods and chattels, or the
evidence, or some of them, of such things in action, or pay at the time some part of the
purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer
in his sales book, at the time of sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of
sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a
sufficient memorandum (Article 1403 (d))
e. An agreement of lease for a period of more than 1 year, or the sale of real property or of
an interest therein (Article 1403 (e))
f. A representation as to the credit of a 3rd person (Article 1403 (f))
g. No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by
parol evidence (Article 1443)
In neither case can you compel the other to reduce the agreement to writing or to comply with
the form. There is no cause of action.
3. For registrability (1358)

The following must appear in a public instrument:
a. Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest
therein governed by Articles 1403 (2) and 1405
o Like contract creating usufruct or easement
b. The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal

partnership of gains
c. The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act
appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a 3rd person
d. The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public document
o Contracts enumerated in Article 1358 are valid as between the contracting parties even when
they have not been reduced to public or private writings.
Except in certain cases where public instruments and registration are required for the validity of
the contract itself, the legalization of a contract by means of a public writing and its entry in the
register are not essential solemnities or requisites for the validity of the contract as between the
contracting parties, but are required for the purposes of making it effective as against 3rd person.
Article 1357 gives the contracting parties the coercive power to reciprocally compel the
execution of the formalities required by law, as soon as the requisites for the validity of the
contracts are present.
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Parties can compel each other to execute it in a public document.
Lao Sok v. Sabaysabay: Lao Sok made an offer which was duly accepted by the private respondents.
There was, therefore, a meeting of the minds between two parties whereby one bound himself with
respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. By the unconditional acceptance of
the offer that they would be paid separation pay, a contract was therefore perfected. Contracts in
whatever form they may have been entered into are binding on the parties unless form is essential for
the validity and enforceability of that particular contract.
Deloso v. SB: Sandiganbayans conclusions are erroneous. The lease in this case isnt one of those
required by law to be in writing / in any particular form to be valid / enforceable. Absence of bond
doesnt make transactions criminal. Theres also no evidence that canvass / bidding is a requirement.
PNB v. IAC: While Article 1358 requires that the revocation of Alcedos Special Power of Attorney
to mortgage his property should appear in a public instrument: nevertheless, a revocation embodied
in a private writing is valid and binding between the parties forThe legalization by a public
writing and the recording of the same in the registry are not essential requisites of a contract entered
into, as between the parties, but mere conditions of form or solemnities which the law imposes in
order that such contract may be valid as against third persons, and to insure that a publicly executed
and recorded agreement shall be respected by the latter.
Tapec v. CA: the said private instrument is a deed of sale in which all the requisites of a valid contract
are present and which is binding upon the parties. The trial court erroneously held that it is invalid
because it is not in a public document as required by Article 1358. Article 1358 does not invalidate the
acts or contracts enumerated therein if they are not embodied in public documents.
C. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS
Art. 1359. When, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their
true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by
reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask for the
reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.
If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of
the parties, the proper remedy is not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the
contract.
Art. 1360. The principles of the general law on the reformation of instruments are hereby
adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
Art. 1361. When a mutual mistake of the parties causes the failure of the instrument to
disclose their real agreement, said instrument may be reformed.
Art. 1362. If one party was mistaken and the other acted fraudulently or inequitably in such a
way that the instrument does not show their true intention, the former may ask for the
reformation of the instrument.
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Art. 1363. When one party was mistaken and the other knew or believed that the instrument
did not state their real agreement, but concealed that fact from the former, the instrument
may be reformed.
Art. 1364. When through the ignorance, lack of skill, negligence or bad faith on the part of
the person drafting the instrument or of the clerk or typist, the instrument does not express
the true intention of the parties, the courts may order that the instrument be reformed.
Art. 1365. If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real or personal property, but
the instrument states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right of repurchase,
reformation of the instrument is proper.
Art. 1366. There shall be no reformation in the following cases:
(1) Simple donations inter vivos wherein no condition is imposed;
(2) Wills;
(3) When the real agreement is void.
Art. 1367. When one of the parties has brought an action to enforce the instrument, he
cannot subsequently ask for its reformation.
Art. 1368. Reformation may be ordered at the instance of either party or his successors in
interest, if the mistake was mutual; otherwise, upon petition of the injured party, or his heirs
and assigns.
Art. 1369. The procedure for the reformation of instrument shall be governed by rules of
court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Once the minds of the contracting parties meet, a valid contract exists, whether the agreement is
reduced to writing or not. There are instances however, where in reducing their agreements to
writing, the true intention of the contracting parties are not correctly expressed in the document,
either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident. It is in such cases that
reformation of instruments is proper. The action for such relief rests on the theory that the parties
came to an understanding, but in reducing it to writing, through mutual mistake, fraud or some
other reason, some provision was omitted or mistakenly inserted, and the action to change the
instrument so as to make it conform to the contract agreed upon.
Reformation Distinguished from Annulment
The action for reformation of instruments presupposes that there is a valid existing contract
between the parties, and only the document or instrument which was drawn up and signed by
them does not correctly express the terms of their agreement. On the other hand, if the minds of
the parties did not meet, or if the consent of either one was vitiated by violence or intimidation or
mistake or fraud, so that no real and valid contract was made, the action is for annulment.
Annulment involves a complete nullification of the contract while reformation gives life to it
upon certain corrections.
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Operation and Effect of Reformation

Upon reformation of an instrument, the general rule is that it relates back to, and takes effect
from the time of its original execution, especially as between the parties.
Requisites of Reformation
1. There must have been a meeting of the minds upon the contract
2. The instrument or document evidencing the contract does not express the true agreement
between the parties
3. The failure of the instrument to express the agreement must be due to mistake, fraud,
inequitable conduct or accident
Requisites of Mistake
a. That the mistake is one of fact
o Whenever an instrument is drawn with the intention of carrying an agreement previously
made, but which, due to mistake or inadvertence of the draftsman or clerk, does not carry out
the intention of the parties, but violates it, there is a ground to correct the mistake by
reforming the instrument.
b. common to both parties
o A written instrument may be reformed where there is a mistake on 1 side and fraud or
inequitable conduct on the other, as where 1 party to an instrument has made a mistake and
the other knows it and conceals the truth from him.
o The mistake of 1 party must refer to the contents of the instrument and not the subject mater
or the principal conditions of the agreement. In the latter case, an action for annulment is the
proper remedy.
o If 2 parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real property or personal property, but the
instrument states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right of repurchase,
reformation is proper.
c. The proof of mutual mistake must be clear and convincing
Limitations of Reformation
1. Reformation is not proper in the following cases:
a. Simple donations inter vivos wherein no condition is imposed
b. Wills
c. When the real agreement is void
2. Who may ask for reformation
a. If the mistake is mutual
o Reformation may be ordered at the instance of either party or his successors in interest
b. If the mistake is not mutual
o Reformation may be ordered upon petition of the injured party or his heirs and assigns
3. Effect of enforcing an action
When one of the parties has brought an action to enforce the instrument, he cannot subsequently
ask for its reformation.

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D. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
Where the parties have reduced their contract into writing, the contents of the writing constitutes
the sole repository of the terms of the agreement between the parties. Whatever is not found in
the writing must be understood as waived and abandoned. Generally, therefore, there can be no
evidence of the terms of the contract other than the contents of the writing, unless it is alleged
and proved that the intention of the parties is otherwise.
Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall
prevail over the former.
When the terms of the agreement are so clear and explicit that they do not justify an attempt to
read into it any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to be understood literally just as they
appear on the face of the contract.
When the true intent and agreement of the parties is established, it must be given effect and
prevail over the bare words of the written agreement.
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to
comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the
parties intended to agree.
Repulic v. Castelvi: However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to
comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties
intended to agree. Intention cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract.
Intent is to be deduced from the language employed by the parties, and the terms of the contract,
when unambiguous, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraudthe
question being not what the intention was, but what is expressed in the language used. Moreover, in
order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts
shall be principally considered.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be
understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to
the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
Where the instrument is susceptible of 2 interpretations, 1 which will make it invalid and illegal,
and another which will make it valid and legal, the latter interpretation should be adopted.
In the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.
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Art. 1375. Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that which is
most in keeping with the nature and object of the contract.
Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the
ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations which are ordinarily
established.
When there is doubt as to the meaning of any particular language, it should be determined by a
consideration of the general scope and purpose of the instrument in which it occurs.
An instrument may be construed according to usage in order to determine its true character.
Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor
the party who caused the obscurity.
The party who draws up a contract in which obscure terms or clauses appear, is the one
responsible for the obscurity or ambiguity; they must therefore be construed against him.
Eastern Shipping v. Margarine: There is a clear and irreconcilable inconsistency between the YorkAntwerp Rules expressly adopted by the parties as their contract under the bill of lading which
sustains respondents claim and the codal article cited by petitioner which would bar the same.
Furthermore, as correctly contended by respondent, what is here involved is a contract of adhesion as
embodied in the printed bill of lading issued by petitioner for the shipment to which respondent as
the consignee merely adhered, having no choice in the matter, and consequently, any ambiguity
therein must be construed against petitioner as the author.
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the
preceding articles, and the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract,
the least transmission of rights and interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt
shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way that it cannot be
known what may have been the intention or will of the parties, the contract shall be null and
void.
Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall
likewise be observed in the construction of contracts.
Rule 130, Rules of Court
Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. The language of a
writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its
execution, unless the parties intended otherwise.
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of
an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.
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Sec. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provisions. In the
construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a
general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a
particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it.
When a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the particular provision will control.
Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of an
instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject
thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position
of those whose language he is to interpret.
Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. The terms of a writing are presumed to have been
used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that they
have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood
in the particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly.
Sec. 15. Written words control printed. When an instrument consists partly of written
words and partly of a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former controls the
latter.
Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings. When the
characters in which an instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the language is
not understood by the court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or
who understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters or the meaning of the
language.
Sec. 17. Of two constructions, which preferred. When the terms of an agreement have
been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against
either party in which he supposed the other understood it, and when different constructions
of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to
the party in whose favor the provision was made.
Sec. 18. Construction in favor of natural right. When an instrument is equally susceptible
of two interpretations, one is favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to
be adopted.
Sec. 19. Interpretation according to usage. An instrument may be construed according to
usage, in order to determine its true character.
Lim v CA: Considering the admitted fact that the contract of sale was prepared in the office of
respondent company by Generoso Bongato, Assistant to the Manager of the company, upon
instruction of General Manager Emiliano L. Abalos who is a lawyer, and We are now confronted with
the varying or conflicting interpretations of the parties thereto, the respondent company contending
that the stipulation Terms: Cash upon signing of this contract does not mean that the agreement
was a cash transaction because no money was paid by the petitioner at the time of the signing thereof
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whereas the petitioner insists that it was a cash transaction inasmuch as he paid cash amounting to
P142,975 upon the signing of the contract, the payment having been made to the cashier, Teodoro
Garcia, and Manager Abalos although the sale was agreed to in the morning of the same day, the
conflicting interpretations have shrouded the stipulation with ambiguity or vagueness. Then, the
cardinal rule should and must apply, which is that the interpretation shall not favor the party who
caused the ambiguity (Art. 1377). The above facts show contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the
parties in relation to the transaction between them as embodied in the Contract of Sale of Sugar (Exh.
A) from which the intention of the contracting parties may be judged correctly. The trial court
was correct in judging and deciding the intention of the parties from their actuations
contemporaneous with and subsequent to the agreement for the sale of the sugar in question, and we
sustain the trial court, applying Art. 1371, New Civil Code,
E. DEFECTIVE CONTRACTS
The remaining chapters deal with defective contracts. The Civil Code made major and important
improvements on this topic. Unlike the Spanish Code, the defective contracts were ambiguous
and had unclear classifications. They were simply void (nulos) or voidable (anulables). Here, in
our present code, there are for types of defective contracts, from the serious to less serious, in the
following order:
However, our Code still has some imperfections. As pointed out by Tolentino, there
must be a relatively void contract. For example, in an assignment of lease without
authority, this is void as to third parties, but valid as between the parties.
o A contract of lease cant be assigned unless there is express provision. The status of the lease is
relatively void. Void as between the lessor and lease, but valid between the assignor aad
assignee
o Balane owes Meer and Aquino. Aquino garnishes his debt against Meer. Balane paid Meer.
Valid between B and M, but invalid between B and A.
o There have been several cases decided by our Supreme Court wherein a chattel mortgage over
real property was declared void as to third parties but valid as between the parties.
Whatever imperfections the Code has, it still is better than other codes on this topic.
Kinds in ascending order of defect:

Rescissible: One which has caused economic damage and which can be set aside, although valid.
o it cant be cured because theres nothing really wrong with it.
Voidable either due to lack of capacity or consent. It is valid until set aside
o Good until set aside.
o Convalidated only in voidable and unenforceable
Unenforceable: lack of authority or of writing or for incompetence of both parties cannot be
given effect unless property ratified.
o This is why unenforceable is more defective. Its unenforceable til it is ratified. Voidable is
valid til set aside.
Void: Contract only in name. One which is an absolute nullity and produces no effect as if it had
never been executed or entered into.
o Void: cannot be cured.

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1. Rescissible Contracts
Art. 1380. Contracts validly agreed upon may be rescinded in the cases established by law.
Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent
suffer lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion stated in
the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect
the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the
defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial
authority;
(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.
Art. 1382. Payments made in a state of insolvency for obligations to whose fulfillment the
debtor could not be compelled at the time they were effected, are also rescissible.
Art. 1383. The action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be instituted except when the
party suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same.
Art. 1384. Rescission shall be only to the extent necessary to cover the damages caused.
Art. 1385. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the
contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest; consequently, it can be
carried out only when he who demands rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to
restore.
Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are the object of the contract are
legally in the possession of third persons who did not act in bad faith.
In this case, indemnity for damages may be demanded from the person causing the loss.
Art. 1386. Rescission referred to in Nos. 1 and 2 of article 1381 shall not take place with
respect to contracts approved by the courts.
Art. 1387. All contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates property by gratuitous title
are presumed to have been entered into in fraud of creditors, when the donor did not reserve
sufficient property to pay all debts contracted before the donation.
Alienations by onerous title are also presumed fraudulent when made by persons against
whom some judgment has been issued. The decision or attachment need not refer to the
property alienated, and need not have been obtained by the party seeking the rescission.
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In addition to these presumptions, the design to defraud creditors may be proved in any other
manner recognized by the law of evidence.
Art. 1388. Whoever acquires in bad faith the things alienated in fraud of creditors, shall
indemnify the latter for damages suffered by them on account of the alienation, whenever,
due to any cause, it should be impossible for him to return them.
If there are two or more alienations, the first acquirer shall be liable first, and so on
successively.
Art. 1389. The action to claim rescission must be commenced within four years.
For persons under guardianship and for absentees, the period of four years shall not begin
until the termination of the former's incapacity, or until the domicile of the latter is known.
Rescission: Process or remedy designated to render a contract validly entered into and normally
binding by reason of external conditions causing an economic prejudice, wither to a party or to
his creditors.
In a sense, a rescissible contract is a valid contract. Its defect is external, not internal. Thats why
you cant cure it.
Defect: damage to one of the parties or 3rd person.
IT IS VALID! But it is nonetheless defective.
This is not be to confused with resolution, discussed in Article 1191. This chapter on rescissible
contracts is the proper rescissible.
According to Scaevola, rescission is a process designated to render inefficacious a contract validly
entered into and normally binding, by reason of external conditions, causing an economic
prejudice to a party or to his creditors.
A rescissible contract is a contract which is valid because it contains all the essential requisites
prescribed by law, but which is defective because of injury or damage to either of the contracting
parties or to 3rd persons, as a consequence of which it may be rescinded by means of a proper
action for rescission.
Rescission is a process or remedy granted by law to the contracting parties, and even to 3rd
persons, to secure the reparation of damages caused to them by a contract, even if the same should
be valid, by means of the restoration of things to their condition prior to the celebration of the
contract.
Requisites of Rescission
a. The contact must be a rescissible contract under Article 1381 or Article 1382
The following contracts are rescissible:

i. Those entered into by guardians whenever the whom they represent suffer lesion
by more than 14 of the value of things which are the object thereof (Art. 1381 (1))
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Rescission shall not take place with respect to contracts approved by the court (Article 1386).
As a rule, when a guardian enters into a contract involving the disposition of the wards property,
the guardian must secure the approval of the guardianship court. A guardian is only authorized to
manage the estate of the ward. A guardian has no power to dispose of any portion of the estate
without approval of the court. If more than acts of mere administration are involved, judicial
approval is necessary.
In case of sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of any portion of the estate which does not have
judicial approval is an unenforceable contract (Article 1403 (1)).
Therefore, Article 1381 (1) is limited to contracts which constitute mere acts of administration
(i.e. the purchase of equipment for the cultivation of lands, purchase of materials for repair of
buildings, etc.).
Lesion is very difficult to apply in practice.
For example, A is the agent of B. B owns land worth P10 M. A sells the land for P7 M. From the
facts, the lesion suffered by B is 30%. In practice, are you sure that P10 M is the fair market value
of the land. What if the situation is urgent and that property must be disposed of right away?
Another example, A is the agent of B. B owns land worth P10M. Cwantstobuytheland.
CiswillingtopayP7M lump sum payment. D is willing to pay P 10 M but on installments.
Is it so low to amount of want of consideration?
ii. Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the absentee suffers lesion by
more than 14 of the value of things which are the object thereof (Art.1381 (2))
Rescission shall not take place with respect to contracts approved by the court (Article 1386).
As a rule, when the legal representative of an absentee enters into a contract involving the
disposition of the absentees property, he must secure the approval of the court. A legal
representative is only authorized to manage the estate of the absentee. He has no power to dispose
of any portion of the estate without approval of the court. If more than acts of mere
administration are involved, judicial approval is necessary.
In case of sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of any portion of the estate which does not have
judicial approval is an unenforceable contract (Article 1403 (1)).
Therefore, Article 1381 (2) is limited to contracts which constitute mere acts of administration
(i.e. the purchase of equipment for the cultivation of lands, purchase of materials for repair of
buildings, etc.).
Lesion is very difficult to apply in practice.
For example, A is the agent of B. B owns land worth P10 M. A sells the land for P7 M. From the
facts, the lesion suffered by B is 30%. In practice, are you sure that P10 M is the fair market value
of the land. What if the situation is urgent and that property must be disposed of right away?
Another example, A is the agent of B. B owns land worth P10M. Cwantstobuytheland.
CiswillingtopayP7M lump sum payment. D is willing to pay P 10 M but on installments.
Correlate with Art. 1386. If the court gives its approval then there can be no lesion.
But if you sell without court authority unenforceable.
So, it is only rescissible if the sale doesnt require prior judicial approval: sales of personalty which
are pure acts of admin (Rule 96, 1-2).
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iii. Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the creditors cannot in any other
manner collect the claims due them (Art.1381 (3))
This is an exception to the principle of relativity of contracts.
Creditors, after having pursued the property in possession of the debtor to satisfy their claims
may exercise all the rights and bring all the actions of the latter for the same purpose, save those
which are inherent in his person; they may also impugn the acts which the debtor may have done
to defraud them (Article 1177).
Creditors are protected in cases of contracts intended to defraud them (Article 1313).
In determining whether or not a certain conveyance is fraudulent, the question in every case is
whether the conveyance was a bona fide transaction or trick and contrivance to defeat creditors,
or whether it conserves to the debtor a special right.
All contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates property by gratuitous tile are presumed to
have been entered into in order to defraud creditors, when the donor did not reserve sufficient
property to pay all debts contracted before the donation (Article 1387, 1st ).
Alienations by onerous title are also presumed fraudulent when made by persons against whom
some judgment has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued. The
decision or attachment need not refer to the property alienated, and need not have been obtained
by the party seeking the rescission (Article 1387, 2nd ).
This is accion pauliana. Only applies if the alienation is subsequent. Also, good faith finds no
application in donation, since he didnt give anything.
Badges of Fraud
1. The fact that the consideration of the conveyance is inadequate
2. A transfer made by a debtor after suit has begun and while it is pending against him
3. A sale upon credit by an insolvent debtor
4. Evidence of large indebtedness or complete insolvency
5. The transfer of all or nearly all of his property by a debtor, especially when he is insolvent or
greatly embarrassed financially
6. The fact that the transfer is made between father and son when there are present any of the
above circumstances
7. The failure of the vendee to take exclusive possession of all the property
1387 is presumptive fraud
iv. Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the
defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent
judicial authority (Article 1381 (4))
Article 1381 (4) refers to a contract executed by the defendant in a suit involving the ownership
or possession of a thing, when such contract is made without the knowledge and approval of the
plaintiff or court.
As in the case of a contract in fraud of creditors, the remedy of rescission in this case is given to a
3rd person who is not a party to the contract. The purpose is to protect the plaintiff.
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v. All other contracts specially declared by law to be the subject of rescission (Article
1381 (5))
The following provision in sales are examples of rescissible contracts declared by law Arts 1526,
1534, 1538, 1539, 1540, 1556, 1560, 1567, 1659.
Payments made in a state of insolvency for obligations to whose fulfillment the debtor could not
be compelled at the time they were effected (Article 1382)
b. The person asking for rescission must have no other legal means to obtain reparation for the
damages suffered by him (Article 1383)
c. The person demanding rescission must be able to return whatever he may be obliged to restore if
rescission is granted (Article 1385, 1st par)
This requisite is only applicable if the one who suffers the lesion is a party to the contract.
This requisite does not apply when a defrauded creditor resorts to accion pauliana.
This will not apply to 3-4.
d. The things which are the object of the contract must not have passed legally to the possession of a
3rd person acting in good faith (Article 1385, 2nd )
Whoever acquires in bad faith the things alienated in fraud of creditors, shall indemnify the latter
for damages suffered by them on account of the alienation, whenever, due to any cause, it should
be impossible for him to return them (Article 1388,1st ).
If there are 2 or more alienations, the 1st acquirer shall be liable 1st, and so on successively (Article
1388, 2nd ).
e. The action for rescission must be brought within the prescriptive period of 4 years (Article 1389)
Guzman v. Bonnevie: The status of creditors could be validly accorded the Bonnevies for they had
substantial interests that were prejudiced by the sale of the subject property to the petitioner without
recognizing their right of first priority under the Contract of Lease.
Same; Rescissible contracts; Petitioner not deemed purchaser in good faith.A purchaser in good
faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has
a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. Good
faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another.
Tested by these principles, the petitioner cannot tenably claim to be a buyer in good faith as it had
notice of the lease of the property by the Bonnevies and such knowledge should have cautioned it to
look deeper into the agreement to determine if it involved stipulations that would prejudice its own
interests.
Siguan v. Lim: LIM was charged with estafa. Siguan alleged that a Deed of Donation executed by
Lim in favour of her daughters (executed in 1989 but registered only in 1991) was antedated and was
a conveyance done in fraud of creditors and as such, must be rescinded. Held: Lim won. Accion

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pauliana has the ff requisites: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation,
although demandable later: (2) the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial
benefit to a third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim; (4) the act
being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third person who received the property conveyed, if it is by
onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. Rescission requires the existence of creditors at the
time of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial
pronouncement setting aside the contract. In the case at bar, failed to prove that the requisites were
complied with.
REQUISITE#1and 2: We are not convinced with the allegation of the Siguan that the questioned
deed was antedated to make it appear that it was made prior to Siguans credit.
REQUISITE#3: It is essential that the party asking for rescission prove that he has exhausted all
other legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. Siguan neither alleged nor proved that she did
so.
REQUISITE#4: It was not sufficiently established that the properties left behind by LIM were not
sufficient to cover her debts existing before the donation was made. Hence, no presumption of fraud.
Cabaliw v. Sadorra: For the heart of the matter is that about seven months after a judgment was
rendered against him in Civil Case No. 43192 of the CFI and without paying any part of that
judgment, Benigno Sadorra sold the only two parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership to
his son-in-law. Such a sale even if made for a valuable consideration is presumed to be in fraud of the
judgment creditor who in this case happens to be the offended wife. Furthermore, the presumption
established by the law in favor of petitioners is bolstered by other indicia of bad faith on the part of
the vendor and vendee. Thus (1) the vendee is the son-in-law of the vendor. Close relationship
between the vendor and the vendee is one of the known badges of fraud. (2) At the time of the
conveyance, the vendee, Sotero, was living with his father-in-law, the vendor, and he knew that
there was a judgment directing the latter to give a monthly support to his wife Isidora and that his
father-in-law was avoiding payment and execution of the judgment. (3) It was known to the vendee
that his father-in-law had no properties other than those two parcels of land which were being sold to
him. The fact that a vendor transfers all of his property to a third person when there is a judgment
against him is a strong indication of a scheme to defraud one who may have a valid interest over his
properties. On the part of the transferee, he did not present satisfactory and convincing evidence
sufficient to overthrow the presumption and evidence of a fradulent transaction. His is the burden of
rebutting the presumption of fraud established by law, and having failed to do so, the fraudulent
nature of the conveyance in question prevails.
2. Voidable Contracts
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have
been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are
susceptible of ratification.

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Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
This period shall begin:
In cases of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of the consent
ceases.
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.
And when the action refers to contracts entered into by minors or other incapacitated
persons, from the time the guardianship ceases.
Art. 1392. Ratification extinguishes the action to annul a voidable contract.
Art. 1393. Ratification may be effected expressly or tacitly. It is understood that there is a
tacit ratification if, with knowledge of the reason which renders the contract voidable and
such reason having ceased, the person who has a right to invoke it should execute an act
which necessarily implies an intention to waive his right.
Art. 1394. Ratification may be effected by the guardian of the incapacitated person.
Art. 1395. Ratification does not require the conformity of the contracting party who has no
right to bring the action for annulment.
Art. 1396. Ratification cleanses the contract from all its defects from the moment it was
constituted.
Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby
obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the
incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation,
violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon
these flaws of the contract.
International House v. IAC: respondent CENTERTOWN is not qualified to acquire properties
under its Articles of Incorporation. The petitioner has confused a void contract with an ultra vires
contract which is merely voidable. Privity of petitioner to the deed of sale being absent, it cannot
assail the validity of the contract between the GSIS and the corporation and the assignment of the
deed by the corporation to its sister corporation. Petitioner is neither a party nor a privy to the Deed
of Conditional Sale and the assignment thereof: thus, it cannot assail the validity of the said contracts.
Malabanan v. Gaw Ching: The firmly settled rule is that strangers to a contract cannot sue either or
both of the contracting parties to annul and set aside that contract. It is the existence of of an interest
in a particular contract that is the basis of ones right to sue for nullification of that contract and that
essential interest in a given contract is, in general, possessed only by one who is a party to the
contract. From these legal provisions it is deduced that it is the interest had in a given contract, that is

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the determining reason of the right which lies in favor of the party obligated principally or
subsidiarily to enable him to bring an action for the nullity of the contract in which he intervened,
and therefore, he who has no right in a contract is not entitled to prosecute an action for nullity, for,
according to the precedents established by the courts, the person who is not a party to a contract, nor
has any cause of action or representation from those who intervened therein, is manifestly without
right of action and personality such as to enable him o to assail the validity of the contract. Mr. Justice
Torres went on to indicate a possible qualification to the above general principle, that is, a situation
where a non-party to a contract could be allowed to bring an action for declaring that o contract null:
He who is not the party obligated principally or subsidiarily in a contract may perhaps be entitled to
exercise an action for nullity, if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties; but, in order that such be the case, it is indispensable to show the detriment which positively
would result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention. Gaw Ching does not fall
within the possible exception. Gaw Ching had no legal right of preemption in respect of the house
and lot here involved. Even assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that the land here involved
was in fact embraced in a declared Urban Land Reform Zone (which it was not), Gaw Ching would
still not have been entitled to a right of preemption in respect of the land sold. The preemptive or
redemptive right of a lessee under P.D. No. 1517 exists only in respect of the urban land under lease
on which the tenant or lessee had built his home and in which he had resided for ten (10) years or
more and that, in consequence, where both land and building belong to the lessor, the preemptive or
redemptive right was simply not available under the law.
Art. 1398. An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore to each
other the things which have been the subject matter of the contract, with their fruits, and the
price with its interest, except in cases provided by law.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for damages.
Art. 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the
incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been
benefited by the thing or price received by him.
Art. 1400. Whenever the person obliged by the decree of annulment to return the thing can
not do so because it has been lost through his fault, he shall return the fruits received and the
value of the thing at the time of the loss, with interest from the same date.
Art. 1401. The action for annulment of contracts shall be extinguished when the thing which
is the object thereof is lost through the fraud or fault of the person who has a right to institute
the proceedings.
If the right of action is based upon the incapacity of any one of the contracting parties, the
loss of the thing shall not be an obstacle to the success of the action, unless said loss took place
through the fraud or fault of the plaintiff.
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Art. 1402. As long as one of the contracting parties does not restore what in virtue of the
decree of annulment he is bound to return, the other cannot be compelled to comply with
what is incumbent upon him.
Characteristics:
1. Effective until set aside
2. Capable of ratification/ confirmation
3. Elective (only one party can set it aside)
4. Prescriptible
A voidable contract is a contract in which all of the essential elements for validity are present, but
the element of consent is vitiated either by lack of legal capacity of 1 of the contracting parties or
by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud.
Voidable contracts are binding unless they are annulled by a proper action court. They are
susceptible to confirmation.
This is elective because only one can annul.
There is a difference between confirmation and ratification. Confirmation (1392-1396) is the
process of curing the defect of a voidable contract. Ratification is the process of curing contracts
which are defective because they were entered into without authority.
The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage
to the contracting parties
a. Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract

i. Unemancipated minors
Where necessaries are sold and delivered to a minor or other person without capacity to act, he
must pay a reasonable price therefore. Necessaries include everything that is indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, and medical attendance.
Contracts effected by minors who have already passed the age of puberty and adolescence and are
near the adult age, when they pretend to have already reached the age of majority, while in fact
they have not, are valid, and cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from
compliance with obligations assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in consonance with
the rules of estoppel. (Mercado vs. Espiritu).
However in Braganza v, De Villa, the SC said that the misrepresentation of an incapacitate person
does not estop him from denying that he was of age, or from asserting that he was under age, at
the time he entered into the contract. According to Professor Balane, this view is very logical. If
the minor is too young to enter into contracts, he is too young to be estopped.
ii. Insane or demented persons, and deaf mutes who do not know how to write
Art. 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to in a
state of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable.
Art. 1329. The incapacity declared in article 1327 is subject to the modifications determined
by law, and is understood to be without prejudice to special disqualifications established in
the laws.
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b. Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud is voidable.
i. Mistake
Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the
thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally
moved one or both parties to enter into the contract .
Mistake as to the identity or qualification of one of the parties will vitiate consent only when
such identity or qualifications have been the principal cause of the contract.
A simple mistake of account shall give rise to its correction.
Art. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not
understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must
show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.
Art. 1333. There is no mistake if the party alleging it knew the doubt, contingency or risk
affecting the object of the contract.
Art. 1334. Mutual error as to the legal effect of an agreement when the real purpose of the
parties is frustrated, may vitiate consent.
Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such
misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual.
Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but may constitute error.
ii. Violence
Art. 1335, 1st . There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force
is employed.
Violence shall annul the obligation, although it may been employed by a 3rd person who did not
take part in the contract (Article 1336).
Requisites of Violence
1. Irresistible physical force is employed
2. The force is the determining cause for giving consent
Collectively called duress

Violence and intimidation perpetrated by a 3rd person vitiates consent
Different rule for fraud.
De Leon v. CA: According to Article 1335, in order that intimidation may vitiate consent and render
the contract invalid, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the intimidation must be the
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determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be given; (2) that the
threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident
disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of the
contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact
that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened
injury. Applying the foregoing to the present case, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia threatened her to
bring Jose Vicente to court for support, to scandalize their family by baseless suits and that Sylvia
would pardon Jose Vicente for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage subject to the transfer
of certain properties to her, is obviously not the intimidation referred to by law. With respect to
mistake as a vice of consent, neither is Macarias alleged mistake in having signed the LetterAgreement because of her belief that Sylvia will thereby eliminate inheritance rights from her and
Jose Vicente, the mistake referred to in Article 1331. It does not appear that the condition that Sylvia
will eliminate her inheritance rights principally moved Macaria to enter into the contract. Rather,
such condition was but an incident of the consideration thereof which, as discussed earlier, is the
termination of marital relations.
iii. Intimidation
Art. 1335, 2nd . There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well- grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or
property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his
consent.
Requisites of Intimidation
1. The threat must be the determining cause for giving consent
2. The threatened act is unjust and unlawful
o GR: Threatened act must be unlawful
o Ex: even if its lawful
o Balane saw Nitura kill someone and he has footage. B says that if N doesnt sell his house to B,
B will go to the police with the tape. Acc. to Balane, this is voidable even if reporting is not
illegal. This is extortion, and an aspect of abuse of right.
o A threat to enforce ones claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or
legal, does not vitiate consent (Article 1335, 4th ).
o The threat to enforce a right, should not be aimed at a result which is contrary to law or
morals, or which is unjust and contrary to good faith. Although it is lawful to exercise rights,
it is not always lawful to use them for purposes different from those for which they were
created. Thus, although it is lawful to report crimes, the threat to report it may be illicit if the
purpose is not to cooperate in the discovery and prosecution of the crime, but to obtain some
prestation from the culprit which otherwise could not be obtained and which does not
constitute indemnity for damages for the crime committed.
o Thus, the rule is, generally, a threat to do something lawful does not constitute intimidation.
o Example: If you dont marry my daughter, Ill report you to the IBP. This is not
unlawful because the person did commit immorality.
o Sometimes, though, it may constitute intimidation.
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o Example: A saw B commit murder. A threatened B that he will report him to the police unless
B gives A his house. This is intimidation because there is no connection between the crime
and the contract.
3. The threat is real and serious
o For example the threat must be to kill you or burn your house and not merely to pinch you.
4. The threat produces a well-grounded fear that the person making it can and will inflict harm
o To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex, and condition of the person shall be
borne in mind (Article 1335, 3rd ).
o For example, a 75year old man who is bed ridden and says that he will kill you does not
produce a well- grounded fear.
o Intimidation shall annul the obligation, although it may have been employed by a 3rd person
who did not take part in the contract (Article 1336).
iv. Undue influence
Art. 1337. There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power
over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The
following circumstances shall be considered: the confidentiality, family, spiritual and other
relations between the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly
influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress.
Doesnt affect intelligence but free will.

This is very subjective. Depends on the respective personalities of the parties, and their
relationship with each other.
If your friend makes pa-cute and asks Nitura to sell his house due influence
If Nitura is in danger of failing the subject, and Balane says I know youre in danger of failing, so
sell me you house. undue influence
When Nitura is already a lawyer and Balane does the same thing not undue influence
v. Fraud
Art. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not
understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must
show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.
Tang v. CA: It is the position of the petitioner that because Lee See Guat was illiterate and spoke only
Chinese, she could not be held guilty of concealment of her health history because the applications for
insurance were in English and the insurer has not proved that the terms thereof had been fully
explained to her. Held: It should be noted that under Art. 1332, the obligation to show that the
terms of the contract had been fully explained to the party who is unable to read or understand the
language of the contract, when fraud or mistake is alleged, devolves on the party seeking to enforce
it. Here the insurance company is not seeking to enforce the contracts; on the contrary, it is seeking
to avoid their performance. It is petitioner who is seeking to enforce them even as fraud or mistake is
not alleged. Accordingly, respondent company was under no obligation to prove that the terms of the
insurance contracts were fully explained to the other party. Even if we were to say that the insurer is
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the one seeking the performance of the contracts by avoiding paying the claim, it has to be noted as
above stated that there has been no imputation of mistake or fraud by the illiterate insured whose
personality is represented by her beneficiary the petitioner herein. In sum, Art. 1332 is inapplicable to
the case at bar.
Cayabyab v. IAC: Indeed, the general rule is that whosoever alleges fraud or mistake in any
transaction must substanti-ate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care for
his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular. This rule is especially applied
when fraud or mistake is alleged to annul notarial documents which are clothed with the prima facie
presumption of regularity and due execution. Nevertheless, the general rule admits of exceptions, one
of which is Article 1332. Under the foregoing provision, where a party to a contract is illiterate, or
can not read nor understand the language in which the contract is written, the burden is on the party
interested in enforcing the contract to prove that the terms thereof are fully explained to the former
in a language understood by him. In all contractual, property or other relations, where one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his physical, mental or other handicap, the courts must be
careful and vigilant for his protection.
Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the
contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he
would not have agreed to.
This is known as deceit or dolo causante. This is different from dolo incidente which means fraud on
things which would not prevent you from entering into a contract but may hold the other liable
for damages.
Theres dolus bonus (1340).
It has a decisive effect on giving consent.
This is the only kind of dolo that will make a contract voidable.
Requisites of Fraud
1. Fraud is employed by 1 party on the other (Articles 1342, 1344)
2. The other party was induced to enter into the contract (Article 1338)
3. The fraud must be serious (Article1344)
o Incidental is not serious. dolo
4. There is damage or injury caused
Abando v. Lozada: The strategem, the deceit, the misrepresentations employed by Cuevas and Pucan
are facts constitutive of fraud which is defined in Article 1338 as that insiduous words or
machinations of one of the contracting parties, by which the other is induced to enter into a contract
which, without them, he would not have agreed to. When fraud is employed to obtain the consent of
the other party to enter into a contract, the resulting contract is merely a voidable contract, that is, a
valid and subsisting contract until annulled or set aside by a competent court. Thus, contrary to the
assertion of petitioners the joint venture agreement and the deed of assignment which they
unknowingly signed are not void contracts. In Rivero vs. CA, this Court held that when one party was
made to think by the other that the contract he had signed was one of mortgage when in fact it was
one of sale, the resulting contract is a voidable contract of sale.
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Alcasid v. CA: To invalidate consent, the error must be real and not one that could have been avoided
by the party alleging it. The error must arise from facts unknown to him. He cannot allege an error
which refers to a fact known to him or which he should have known by ordinary diligent
examination of the facts. An error so patent and obvious that nobody could have made it, or one
which could have been avoided by ordinary prudence, cannot be invoked by the one who made it in
order to annul his contract. Undue influence, therefore, is any means employed upon a party which,
under the circumstances, he could not well resist and which controlled his volition and induced him
to give his consent to the contract, which otherwise he would not have entered into. It must in some
measure destroy the free agency of a party and interfere with the exercise of that independent
discretion which is necessary for determining the advantages or disadvantages of a proposed contract.
If a competent person has once assented to a contract freely and fairly, he is bound thereby.
Samson v. CA: In contracts, the kind of fraud that will vitiate consent is one where, through insidious
words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract
which, without them, he would not have agreed to. This is known as dolo causante or causal fraud
which is basically a deception employed by one party prior to or simultaneous to the contract in order
to secure the consent of the other. Public respondent Court of Appeals was correct when it faulted
petitioner for failing to exercise sufficient diligence in verifying first the status of private respondents
lease. We thus quote with approval the decision of the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus: When
appellant Angel C. Santos said that the lease contract had expired but that it was impliedly renewed,
that representation should have put appellee on guard. To protect his interest, appellee should have
checked with the lessor whether that was so, and this he failed to do; or he would have simply
deferred his decision on the proposed sale until Miss Madrigals arrival, and this appellee also failed to
do. In short, as a buyer of the store and lease right in questionor as a buyer of any object of
commerce for that matterappellee was charged with the obligation of caution aptly expressed in
the universal maxim caveat emptor. In sum, we hold that under the facts proved, private respondent
cannot be held guilty of fraud or bad faith when he entered into the subject contract with petitioner.
Causal fraud or bad faith on the part of one of the contracting parties which allegedly induced the
other to enter into a contract must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. This petitioner failed
to do.
Art. 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a
duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes
fraud.
Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an opportunity to
know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent.
This is dolus bonus

Literally good fraud
Its called good fraud because everyone expects it.
Dealers fraud, tolerated fraud
Not prejudicial on free consent.
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Limit= usual exaggerations in trade. When it goes beyond this, it could cross over to dolo
causante
o This is the best ruby! Its fake pala dolo causante not dolus bonus anymore
Caveat emptor.
Art. 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud, unless made by an expert
and the other party has relied on the formers special knowledge.
Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a 3rd person does not vitiate consent, unless such
misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual.
Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but may constitute error.
Art. 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should
not have been employed by both contracting parties.
Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages.
If a 3rd person should commit violence or intimidation on 1 of the contracting parties and this
vitiates the contracting partys consent, then the contract may be annulled (Article 1336).
By analogy, if a 3rd person should exert undue influence on 1 of the contracting parties and this
vitiates the consent of the contracting party, then the contract may be annulled.
However, if the 3rd party commits fraud, damages is the only remedy unless the fraud committed
by the 3rd person has created a mutual substantial mistake (Article 1342).
Rules Regarding Voidable Contracts
a. Voidable contracts are effective unless set aside (Article1390).
b. The validity of a voidable contract can only be assailed in a suit for that purpose (i.e.
complaint or counterclaim).
The action for annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged
principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of
those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue
influence, or employed fraud, or caused ,mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract
(Article 1397).
The action for annulment shall be brought within 4 years. This period shall begin
i. Intimidation from the time the defect of the consent ceases
ii. Violencefrom the time the defect of the consent ceases
iii. Undue influence from the time the defect of the consent ceases
iv. Mistake from the time of the discovery of the mistake
v. Fraudfrom the time of the discovery of the fraud
The 4 year prescription period to annul contracts entered into by minors or other incapacitated
persons shall begin from the time the guardianship ceases (Article 1391, 4th ).
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An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore to each other the things
which have been the subject matter of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with its
interest, except in cases provided by law (Article 1398, 1st ).
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for damages (Article 1398,
2nd ).
When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of 1 of the parties, the incapacitated
person is not obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been benefited by the thing
or price received by him (Article 1399).
What if the Thing to Be Returned is Lost
i. Loss due to Fault of Defendant Defendant has to pay the plaintiff:
1. value of the thing;
2. Fruits if any
3. Interest
4. Proper damages ( if due to fraud, bad faith etc)
ii. Loss due to a Fortuitous Event or due to a 3rd party Defendant has to pay the
plaintiff
1. value of the thing;
2. Fruits if any
iii. Loss due to Fault or Fraud of Plaintiff
The plaintiff loses the right to annul (Article 1401).
There is fault on the part of the plaintiff once the plaintiff regains capacity.
iv. Loss without Fault on the Plaintiffs Part

Commentators have a difference of opinion
1. The right to annul is extinguished unless the plaintiff offers to pay the
value of the object at the time of loss
2. The plaintiff is entitled to annul without having to pay anything.
First is more equitable. Second is juridical. You decide!
As long as 1 of the contracting parties does not restore what in virtue of the decree of annulment
he is bound to return, the other cannot be compelled to comply with what is incumbent upon
him (Article 1402).
Commentators however say that there is no obligation of mutual restitution when it would result
in unjust enrichment.
o Example: Nitura= lease and Meer= lessor. When Nitura recovers from his bout of insanity, he
cannot ask Meer to give back the rent he paid, since he did use it.
The action for annulment will not prosper in the following:
i. If the contract has been confirmed (Article 1392)
ii. If the action to annul has prescribed(Article1391)
iii. When the thing which is the object of the contract is lost through the fault or fraud of the
person who has a right to institute the proceedings (Article 1401, 1st )
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o With respect to people without capacity, this will occur when the person entitled to sue
recovers minor grows up then losses the thing. Insane becomes sane and then losses the
thing
iv. Estoppel
c. Voidable contracts can be confirmed.
Confirmation extinguishes the action to annul a voidable contract (Article 1392).
Confirmation is the proper term for curing the defect of a voidable contract.
Confirmation cleanses the contract from all its defects from the moment it was constituted
(Article 1396).
Requisites of Confirmation
1. That the contract is a voidable or annullable contract
2. That the ratification is made with knowledge of the cause for nullity
3. That at the time the ratification is made, the cause of nullity has already ceased to exist
Confirmation may be effected expressly or tacitly. It is understood that there is tacit confirmation
if, with knowledge of the reason which renders the contract voidable and such reason having
ceased, the person who has a right to invoke it should execute an act which necessarily implies an
intention to waive his right (Article 1393).
d. Voidable contracts can be confirmed only by the party whose consent was vitiated
Confirmation does not require the conformity of the contracting party who has no right to bring
the action for annulment (Article 1395).
Confirmation may be effected by the guardian of the incapacitated person (Article 1394).
3. Unenforceable Contracts
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority
or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the
same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making
thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to
marry;
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(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than
five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and
chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the time
some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is
made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and
kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on
whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real
property or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
Art. 1404. Unauthorized contracts are governed by article 1317 and the principles of agency
in Title X of this Book.
Art. 1405. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2 of article 1403, are
ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same, or by
the acceptance of benefit under them.
Art. 1406. When a contract is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and a public document
is necessary for its registration in the Registry of Deeds, the parties may avail themselves of
the right under Article 1357.
Art. 1407. In a contract where both parties are incapable of giving consent, express or
implied ratification by the parent, or guardian, as the case may be, of one of the contracting
parties shall give the contract the same effect as if only one of them were incapacitated.
If ratification is made by the parents or guardians, as the case may be, of both contracting
parties, the contract shall be validated from the inception.
Art. 1408. Unenforceable contracts cannot be assailed by third persons.
Curing= acknowledgement
An unenforceable contract is a contract which cannot be enforced by a proper action in court,
unless they are ratified, because either they are entered into without or in excess of authority or
they do not comply with the Statute of Frauds or both the contracting parties do not possess the
required legal capacity.
The following contracts are unenforceable unless they are ratified (Article 1403):
a. Those entered into in the name of another person by 1 who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers
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Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the
latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified,
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked
by the other contracting party.
When a person enters into a contract for and in the name of another, without authority to do so,
the contract does not bind the latter, unless he ratifies the same.
The agent, who has entered into the contract in the name of the purported principal, but without
authority from him, is liable to 3rd persons upon the contract.
The proper term for this case is ratification.
Example: In a sale, Y claimed that he was an agent of X, even if not. The contract cannot be
enforced against X. Another example is when the agent is authorized to lease the property but the
agent instead sells the property. The principal is not bound.
Example of no authority: Nitura forges a SPA purportedly executed by Meer. Nitura sells his
house on the basis of the SPA. Meer is the quasi-principal. It is within his power to ratify it.
Example of beyond powers: Meer tells Nitura to lease his property. Nitura sells it.
b. Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds

This is the most famous variety.
1. For specific performance or for breach. Not applicable to suits for damages.
2. SOF doesnt make the contract void. Only unenforceable.
3. Applies only to executor and not to executed contracts.
o Executory means no execution in whole or in part on either side.
o Once their has been performance then you remove it from the SOF.
i. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof
In Babao vs. Perez, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase not be to performed within a year
to mean that the obligation cannot be finished within 1 year. Balane does not agree with this
interpretation. According to Professor Balane the phrase not to be performed within a year
should mean that the obligation cannot begin within a year. For practical reasons, the contract
must be in writing since the parties might forget. This rule was made to guard against fallibility
(forgetfulness) of man and fraud.
According to Professor Balane, the Supreme Courts interpretation is incorrect. If the
obligation cannot be finished within 1 year, the contract is not within the Statute of Frauds
because of partial performance.
In Babao, there was partial performance. So you cant interpret this phrase in this way.
Balane: It cannot be begun til more than 1 year.
Performed should be commenced.
ii. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another
This is only a subsidiary contract. It is a contract of guarantee.
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The test as to whether a promise is within the statute has been said to lie in the answer to the
question whether the promise is an original or collateral one. If the promise is an original one or
an independent one, that is, if the promisor becomes thereby primarily liable for the payment of
the debt, the promise is not within the statute.
If the promise is collateral to the agreement of another and the promisor becomes merely a surety
or guarantor, the promise must be in writing.
Militante owes Loque. Balane assured Loque that if Militante doesnt pay, Balane will pay. This
must be in writing.
Different if Balane said Ill pay the debt doesnt have to be in writing. That would be novation.
iii. An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to
marry
A mutual promise to marry does not fall within the Statute of Frauds since they are not made in
writing.
Example: Vergara asks Taruc to marry him. Taruc says I thought youd never ask! This need
not be in writing. If Taruc were to ask Vergara to reduce it to writing, it would ruin the moment.
If there is collateral damage, then a promise to marry is actionable. The promise need not be in
writing.
Case: a teacher quit her job because her fianc said that he didnt want her to work. She quit her
job. He left her at the altar L. She can sue his ass for damages.
Agreements made in consideration of marriage other than the mutual promise to marry are within
the Statute of Frauds.
In Cabague vs. Auxilio, the father of the groom promised to improve his daughter-inlaws fathers house in consideration of the marriage. The father of the groom made
improvements on the house. The wedding did not take place. The Supreme Court said that the
father of the groom could not sue on the oral contract which as to him is not
mutual promise to marry. Professor Balane disagrees with the Supreme Court. According to
Professor Balane, the father of the groom should be able to sue since there was partial
performance.
iv. An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less
than P500, unless the buyer accepts and receives part of such goods and chattels,
or the evidence, or some of them, of such things in action, or pay at the time some
part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made
by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of sale, of the amount and kind of
property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose
account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum
The requirement of a written instrument or a memorandum for sales of personal property for a
price not less than P500, covers both tangible and intangible personal property. It also covers the
assignment of choses in action.
Where a contract for the sale of goods at a price not less than P500 is oral, and there is neither
partial payment or delivery, receipt, and acceptance of the goods, the contract is unenforceable,
and cannot be the basis of an action for the recovery of the purchase price, or as the basis of an
action for damages for breach of the agreement.
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Where there is a purchase of a number of articles which taken separately does not have a price of
P500 each, but taken together, the price exceeds P500, the operation of the statute of frauds
depends upon whether there is a single inseparable contract or a several one. If the contract is
entire or inseparable, and the total price exceeds P500, the statute applies. But if the contract is
separable, then each article is taken separately.
v. An agreement of lease for a period of more than 1 year, or the sale of real property
or of an interest therein
As long there is a sale of real property, the sale must be in writing. There is no minimum.
An oral contract for a supplemental lease of real property for longer period than 1 year is within
the Statute of Frauds.
An agreement to enter into an agreement is also within the Statute of Frauds.
vi. A representation as to the credit of a 3rd person

This is quasi- delict. Its misplaced here. There is no contract, just a misrepresentation.
A wants to borrow money from C. C does not know A. C goes to B to ask about
As credit standing. B says that As credit standing is satisfactory even though B knows that A is
insolvent. Under Article 1403, C can go after B if Bs representation was in writing.
Professor Balane thinks that this does not belong in the Statute of Frauds. There is no contract
between C and B. B did not bind himself to pay C. What we have here is an unenforceable tort.
vii. Express trust over an immovable
Art. 1443. No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved
by parol evidence.
According to Professor Balane, a representation as to the credit of a 3rd person should be
replaced by Article 1443. Article 1443 provides that no express trusts concerning an immovable
or any interest therein may be proved by parol evidence.
When the express trust concerns an immovable or an interest therein, a writing is necessary to
prove it. This writing is not required for the validity of the trust. It is required only for purposes
of proof. When the property subject to the express trust, however is not real estate or an interest
therein, then it may be proved by any competent evidence, including parol evidence.
c. Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract

Neither party or his representative can enforce the contract unless it has been previously ratified.
The ratification by 1 party, however, converts the contract into a voidable contract voidable at
the option of the party who has not ratified; the latter, therefore, can enforce the contract against
the party who has ratified. Or, instead, of enforcing the contract, the party who has not ratified it
may ask for annulment on the ground of his incapacity.
The proper term is acknowledgement (and not ratification).
2 Principles in the Statute of Frauds:
a. Parol evidence is not admissible.
o However, there are 2 ways of bringing it out.
i. Failure to object by the opposing lawyer when parol evidence is used (Article 1405)
If there is no objection, then parol evidence is admitted.
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ii. Acceptance of benefits(Article1405)

If there has been performance on 1 side and the other side accepts, then the Statute of
Frauds is not applicable. Also, estoppel sets in so by accepting performance, the defect is
waived.
b. The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to those which have been
executed in whole or in part.
o Executed here means there has been performance in part and acceptance by the other.
How do you resist?

1. MTD
2. Plead SOF as an affirmative defense
3. You can object when parol evidence is offered.
Ortega v. Leonardo: Ortega and Leonardo claimed the same land. Leonardo asked Ortega to desist
from pressing her claim and promised that if and when he succeeded in getting title to Lot I3 , he
would sell to her a portion, provided she paid for the surveying and subdivision of the Lot and
provided that after he acquired title, she could continue holding the lot as tenant by paying a monthly
rental until said portion shall have been segregated and the purchase price fully paid. Oretega did all
this and even made improvements to the lot; however, Leonardo failed to comply and rejected
Ortegas tender of money. Held: If the statement of the CFI means that partial performance of a sale
contract occurs only when part of the purchase price is paid, it surely constitutes a defective statement
of the law. U.S. Jurisprudence lists other acts of partial performance, such as possession, the making
of improvements, rendition of services, payment of taxes, relinquishment of rights, etc.
As there was partial performance, the principle excluding parol contracts for the sale of realty, does
not apply. Here, the complaint described several circumstance indicating partial performance:
relinquishment of rights, continued possession, building of improvements, tender of payment plus the
surveying of the lot at Ortegas expense and the payment of rentals. "The making of valuable
permanent improvements on the land by the purchaser, in pursuance of the agreement and with the
knowledge of the vendor, has been said to be the strongest and the most unequivocal act of part
performance by which a verbal contract to sell land is taken out of the statute of frauds, and is
ordinarily an important element in such part performance.
Carbonnel v. Poncio: Carbonnel alleges she purchased from Poncio, at P9.50 a square meter, a parcel
of land. Carbonnel paid P247.26 on account of the price and assumed Poncio's obligation with the
Republic Savings Bank amounting to P1,177.48, with the understanding that the balance would be
payable upon execution of the corresponding deed of conveyance. Poncio alleged that he had
consistently turned down several offers made by Carbonnel, to buy the land in question, at P15 a
square meter, for he believes that it is worth not less than P20 a square meter. Poncio claims that
Carbonnel's action is barred by the Statute of Frauds. Held: remanded to TC to determine won there
is partial performance. The Statute of Frauds is applicable only to executory contracts, not to
contracts that are totally or partially performed. In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud
because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting
parties. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud." However, if a contract has been
totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith, for
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it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already denied by him from the transaction in
litigation, and, at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or
contracted by him thereby. The true basis of the doctrine of part performance is that it would be a
fraud upon Carbonnel if the defendant were permitted to escape performance of his part of the oral
agreement after he has permitted the Carbonnel to perform in reliance upon the agreement. The oral
contract is enforced in harmony with the principle that courts of equity will not allow the statute of
frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud. Carbonnel is entitled, legally as well as from the
viewpoint of equity, to an opportunity to introduce parol evidence in support of her allegations.
Babao v. Perez: Santiago Babao married the niece of Celestina Perez. In 1924, Santiago and Celestina
allegedly had a verbal agreement where Santiago was bound to improve the land of Celestina by
leveling, clearing, planting fruits and other crops; that he will act as the administrator of the land; that
all expenses for labor and materials will be at his cost, in consideration of which Celestina in turn
bound herself to convey to Santiago or his wife of the land, with all the improvements after the
death of Celestina. Shortly before Celestinas death, she sold the land to another party. Thus, Santi
filed this complaint alleging the sale of the land as fraudulent and fictitious and prays to recover the
land or the expenses he incurred in improving the land. Held: SOF applies. Contracts which by
their terms are not to be performed within one year, may be taken out of the statute through
performance by one party thereto. All that is required in such case is complete performance within
the year by one party, however many years may have to elapse before the agreement is performed by
the other party. But nothing less than full performance by one party will suffice, and it has been held
that, if anything remains to be done after the expiration of the year besides the mere payment of
money, the statute will apply. Santiago Babao has not fully complied with his part within the year
from the alleged contract in question. When, in an oral contract which, by its terms, is to be
performed within one year from the execution of the contracting parties has complied within the year
with obligations imposed on him by said contract, the other party cannot avoid the fulfillment of
those incumbent on him under the same contract by invoking the statute of frauds because the latter
aims to prevent and not to protect fraud. Assuming arguendo that the agreement in question falls also
under paragraph (a) of article 1403 of the new Civil Code, i.e., it is a contract or agreement for the
sale of real property or of an interest therein, it cannot also be contended that the provision does not
apply to the present case for the reason that there was part performance on the part of one of the
parties. In this connection, it must be noted that this statute is one based on equity. It is based on
equitable estoppel or estoppel by conduct. The parol contract must be sufficiently clear and definite to
render the precise acts which are to be performed thereunder clearly ascertainable. Its terms must be
so clear and complete as to allow no reasonable doubt respecting its enforcement according to the
understanding of the parties.
Cabague v. Auxillo: Felipe Cabague and son Geronimo sued the defendant Matias Auxilio and his
daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from defendants' refusal to carry out the previously
agreed marriage between Socorro and Geronimo. The complaint alleged: (a) that defendants promised
such marriage to plaintiffs, provided the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud and
spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride; (b) that relying upon such promises plaintiffs
made the improvement and spent P700; and (c) that without cause defendants refused to honor their
pledged word. Held: There is no question here that the transaction was not in writing. The only issue
is whether it may be proved in court. The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the

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defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement. One, the agreement between Felipe
Cabague and the defendants in consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another, the
agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry". For breach of that mutual
promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. This is such action, and evidence of such
mutual promise is admissible. However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because it is to
enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio
this action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to marry". Neither may it be
regarded as action by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry." Consequently, we
declare that Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such damages as may have resulted
from her failure to carry out their mutual matrimonial promises.
Yoshizaki v. Joy Training: Spouses Johnson, members of the Board of Trustees of Joy Training, sold a
parcel of land and building belonging to the latter to the Spouses Yoshizaki. The acting chairperson of
Joy Training filed an action to cancel the sale claiming that the spouses Johnson did not have the
authority from the board of trustees to sell the properties. Held: unenforceable. There is no contract
of agency between Joy Training and the spouses Johnson to sell the parcel of land with its
improvements. The 3 pieces of evidence presented by Yoshizaki fail to convince the Court that they
have the authority to sell the properties. TCT merely states that Joy Training is represented by the
spouses Johnson. The title does not explicitly confer to the spouses Johnson the authority to sell the
parcel of land and the building thereon. Moreover, the phrase "Rep. by Sps. RICHARD A.
JOHNSON and LINDA S. JOHNSON" only means that the spouses Johnson represented Joy
Training in land registration. The resolution which purportedly grants the spouses Johnson a special
power of attorney is negated by the phrase "land and building owned by spouses Richard A. and
Linda J. Johnson." Further, the certification is a mere general power of attorney which comprises all
of Joy Trainings business. Necessarily, the absence of a contract of agency renders the contract of
sale unenforceable. Joy Training effectively did not enter into a valid contract of sale with the
spouses Yoshizaki.
Yuvienco v. Dacuycuy: We hold that in any sale of real property on installments, the Statute of Frauds
read together with the perfection requirements of Article 1475 of the Civil Code must be understood
and applied in the sense that the idea of payment on installments must be in the requisite of a note or
memorandum therein contemplated. To put it the other way, under the Statute of Frauds, the
contents of the note or memorandum, whether in one writing or in separate ones merely indicative
for an adequate understanding of all the essential elements of the entire agreement, may be said to be
the contract itself, except as to the form.
Clarin v. Rulona: it cannot be denied that there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties
and that such contract was already partially executed when the petitioner received the initial payment
of P800.00. The latters acceptance of the payment clearly showed his consent to the contract thereby
precluding him from rejecting its binding effect. With the contract being partially executed, the same
is no longer covered by the requirements of the Statute of Frauds in order to be enforceable.
Therefore, with the contract being valid and enforceable, the petitioner cannot avoid his obligation
by interposing that Exhibit A is not a public document. On the contrary, under Article 1357 of the
Civil Code, the petitioner can even be compelled by the respondent to execute a public document to
embody their valid and enforceable contract.

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Bisaya Land v. Sanchez: The purpose of the Contracts was to create an agency for BISTRANCO
with Marciano Sanchez as its agent in Butuan City. 1, Article 1403 provides that contracts "entered
into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or
who has acted beyond his powers" are unenforceable, unless they are ratified. In the case at bar, it is
undisputed that Atty. Adolfo Amor was entrusted, as receiver, with the administration of
BISTRANCO and its business. But the act of entering into a contract is one which requires the
authorization of the court which appointed him receiver. Consequently, the questioned Contracts can
rightfully be classified as unenforceable for having been entered into by one who had acted beyond
his powers, due to Receiver Amor's failure to secure the court's approval of said Contracts. the
company cannot deny its ratification of the Contracts even before the time of Benjamin G. Roa,
because when Atty. Fulveo Pelaez succeeded Atty. Adolfo Amor as Receiver, he was represented by
BISTRANCO's shipping manager as having taken cognizance of these Contracts and sanctioned the
acts of Sanchez as shipping agent of BISTRANCO in Butuan City. This is shown by a letter, dated
15, February 1977, written by Capt. Federico Reyes, the shipping manager of BISTRANCO at that
time. The letter states that "the Receiver (Atty. Fulveo Pelaez) maintains that the previous agency
contract remains and (sic) basically the same except that the rates of the agency commission were
modified". Furthermore, it is clear that BISTRANCO received material benefits from the contracts
of agency of Sanchez, based upon the monthly statements of income of BISTRANCO upon which
the commissions of Sanchez were based A perusal of the Contracts will also show that there is no
single provision therein that can be said as prejudicial or not beneficial to BISTRANCO.
Hernandez v. CA: The respondents reliance on the Statute of Frauds to secure a contrary judgment is
misplaced. The Statute of Frauds finds no application to this case. Not every agreement affecting
land must be put in writing to attain enforceability. Under the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403(2) (e)
of the Civil Code, such formality is only required of contracts involving leases for longer than one
year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein. Hernandezs testimony is thus admissible
to establish his agreement with Fr. Garcia as to the boundary of their estates.
Victoria v. CA: Apparently, the trial court relied on the Statute of Frauds principle which requires
an agreement for the sale x x x of real property or an interest therein (Art. 1403(e)) to be in writing.
It overlooked the fact that this principle applies only to executory contracts. As correctly observed by
the Court of Appeals: The Statute of Frauds is applicable only to executory contracts, not to
contracts either totally or partially performed. Thus, where a contract of sale is alleged to be
consummated, it matters not that neither the receipt for the consideration nor the sale itself was in
writing, because oral evidence of the alleged consummated sale is not forbidden by the Statute of
Frauds and may not be excluded in court.
Mactan v. CA: Under Art. 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract for the sale of real property shall be
unenforceable unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing and subscribed by
the party charged or his agent. Evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or
a secondary evidence of its contents. In the case at bench, the deed of sale and the verbal agreement
allowing the right of repurchase should be considered as an integral whole. The deed of sale relied
upon by petitioner is in itself the note or memorandum evidencing the contract. Thus, the
requirement of the Statute of Frauds has been sufficiently complied with.
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Cebu v. Rubi: As stated, no deed of sale was ever formalized but there was compliance with the
requirements of the statute of frauds. Under this law, an agreement for the sale of real property or of
an interest thereon shall be unenforceable unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof be
in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his agent. We hold that the exchange of written
correspondence between the parties, earlier cited, constitutes sufficient writing to evidence the
agreement for purposes of complying with the statute of frauds.
Limketkai v. CA: contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds are ratified when the defense fails to
object, or asks questions on cross-examination. Counsel for respondents cross-examined petitioners
witnesses at length on the contract itself, the purchase price, the tender of cash payment, the authority
of Aromin and Revilla, and other details of the litigated contract. Even assuming that parol evidence
was initially inadmissible, the same became competent and admissible because of the crossexamination, which elicited evidence proving the evidence of a perfected contract. The crossexamination on the contract is deemed a waiver of the defense of the Statute of Frauds. Moreover,
under Article 1403, an exception to the unenforceability of contracts pursuant to the Statute of
Frauds is the existence of a written note or memorandum evidencing the contract. The memorandum
may be found in several writings, not necessarily in one document. The memorandum or memoranda
is/are written evidence that such a contract was entered into.
4. Void Contracts
Characteristics:
1. What is void is of no effect
2. You dont need judicial judgment. It is merely declaratory.
o In annulment, the pronouncement is constitutive of the nullity.
3. incapable of confirmation, ratification or acknowledgment
4. If prestation had been performed, restoration is in order, unless the parties are in pari delicto.
5. The right to set up the dfense of nullity cannot be waived.
6. An action for or against nullity does not prescribe
7. Anyone may invoke the nullity, whenever juridical effects founded thereon are asserted
against him. You dont have to be a party. Can be collaterally acted.
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy;
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;
(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;
(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract
cannot be ascertained;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be
waived.
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Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.
A void contract is an absolute nullity and produces no effect, as if it had never been executed or
entered into.
The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning (Article 1409)
a. Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals. Good customs, public order or
public policy
Purpose shouldnt be here
Like unconscionable interest.
b. Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious
c. Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction
According to Professor Balane, Article 1409 (3) should not be did not exist. Rather, the
correct phrase should be could not come into existence because there can be a contract over a
future thing.
Examples of could not come into existence are tangerine flying elephants and cars running on
urine.
This should be original impossibility
d. Those whose object is outside the commerce of men

Example: Balane sells to use his membership in the Philippine Bar Association.
e. Those which contemplate an impossible service

Here, there is no object.
f. Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract cannot be
ascertained
This is similar to being void for vagueness under the Constitutional law.
g. Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law

An example of this is sale between husband and wife, subject to exceptions. The Supreme Court
has held that contingent fees of lawyers wherein the latter receive part of the property subject of
litigation are valid, unless unconscionable in amount.
Article 1490:
Contract over future inheritance.
Sale of land to aliens
Characteristics of Void Contracts
a. The contract produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone
b. A judgment of nullity would be merely declaratory. There is no action for annulment
necessary as such is ipso jure.
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o Even when the contract is void or inexistent, an action is necessary to declare its inexistence,
when it has already been fulfilled. Nobody can take the law into his own hands.
o The intervention of a competent court is necessary to declare the absolute nullity of the
contract and to decree the restitution of what has been given under it.
o The judgment of nullity will retroact to the very day when the contract was entered into.
c. It cannot be confirmed, ratified or cured.
d. If it has been performed, the restoration of what has been given is in order, except if pari
delicto will apply.
e. The right to set the contracts nullity cannot be waived
f. The action for nullity is imprescriptible (Article 1410)
o As between the parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is
prohibited by law or is against public policy.
g. Any person can invoke the contracts nullity if its juridical effects are felt as to him
o The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to 3rd persons whose interests are not
directly affected (Article 1421).
Lao v. Republic: GSIS and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC), entered into a lease-purchase agreement (first contract). Lao offered
to purchase the property. GSIS and petitioner executed a lease-purchase agreement (second
contract). Respondents prayed for the nullification of the second contract. Our issue in this case is
whether the second contract valid as claimed by petitioner or null and void as decided by the courts
below? NULL AND VOID. The second contract was null and void ab initio for being in
contravention of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Agreement between [petitioner] and the GSIS had in fact transferred the
economic benefits which the Republic used to enjoy to Lao. It clearly shows that the second contract
caused undue injury to the government, gave petitioner unwarranted benefits and was grossly
disadvantageous to the government. Under Article 1409(7) of the Civil Code, the contract was null
and void from the beginning because it is expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
Rubias v. Batiller: Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to recover the ownership and possession of certain
portions of land which he bought from his father-in-law, Militante in 1956 against its present
occupant defendant, Batiller, who illegally entered said portions of the lot. Before the war with Japan,
Militante filed with the CFI an application for the registration of the title of the land. However, the
record of the case was lost before it was heard, so after the war, Militante filed a petition, wherein
Rubias was the counsel, to reconstitute the record of the case but it was dismissed. While on appeal,
Militante sold the land to Rubias. Respondent, on the other hand, claims that the land was originally
owned and possessed by his great-grandfather, and since succeeding his father, Batiller has the
possession of the land, with actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous possession in the concept of
an owner, exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants. Defendant further claimed
that the sale of the land to petitioner was void. Held: The contract of sale was void and could
produce no legal effect and cannot be ratified. Fundamental considerations of public policy render
void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase. Under Art. 1491, 4-5, such prohibited
contracts are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The permanent disqualification of public and
judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians,

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agents and administrators, as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by
means of and in "the form of a new contract, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by
the circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have
ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at
the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second
contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which
could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract
would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract.
But in the disqualification of public and judicial officers, even when the private parties seek to ratify
the private wrong, such cannot resurrect and validate a relationship, which continues to be tainted
with a public wrong.
Javier v. Cruz: Delfin Cruz did not have any means of livelihood. He was only the houseboy of
Eusebio Cruz. It is obvious that on January 17, 1941 Delfin Cruz could not have raised the amount of
P700.00 as consideration of the land supposedly sold to him by Eusebio Cruz. Although the deed of
sale purports to convey a parcel of land with an area of only 26,577 square meters, defendants, as heirs
of Delfin Cruz, claim a much bigger land containing an area of 182,959 square meters assessed at
P4,310.00. The consideration of P700.00 is not only grossly inadequate but is shocking to the
conscience. No sane person would sell the land claimed by the defendants for only about P40.00 per
hectare. In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that Eusebio Cruz did not voluntarily affix his
thumbmark on the deed of sale and did not receive any consideration for said sale.
However, the undisputed facts of record support the evidence of the plaintiff that the deed of sale of
the land in question is void and inexistent for lack of consent and consideration.
Menil v. CA: Further, noteworthy is the fact that the second contract of sale over the said homestead
in favor of the same vendee, petitioner Potenciano Menil, is for the same price of P415.00. Clearly,
the unvarying term of the said contract is ample manifestation that the same is simulated and that no
object or consideration passed between the parties to the contract. It is evident from the whole record
of the case that the homestead had long been in the possession of the vendees upon the execution of
the first contract of sale on May 7, 1960; likewise, the amount of P415.00 had long been paid to
Agueda Garan on that same occasion. We find no evidence to the contrary.
Director of Lands v. Ababa: Atty. Alberto Fernandez was previously hired by Maximo Abarquez as
counsel in litigation against the latters sister, Agripina. The litigation was over two lots in Cebu that
Maximo. Litigating as a pauper, Maximo agreed to reimburse Atty. Fernandez for his services by
agreeing to pay him on a contingent basis. This meant that, should Maximo win the case against his
sister, Atty. Fernandez would receive 1/2 of whatever might be recovered in the two lots that were
subject of litigation. After Maximo won the case against his sister, and hence ownership of the two
lots, he inexplicably refused to give Atty. Fernandez his one-half share. Instead, Maximo (petitioner)
offered the whole parcels of land to petitioner-spouses Larrazabal. Held: Article 1491 prohibits only
the sale or assignment between lawyer and his client of property which is the subject of litigation. In
other words, for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property. A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by
Art. 1491 because the transfer or assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only after the
finality of a favorable judgment.

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Tonggoy v. CA: Considering the law and jurisprudence on simulated or fictitious contracts as
aforestated, the within action for reconveyance instituted by herein respondents which is anchored on
the said simulated deeds of transfer cannot and should not be barred by prescription. No amount of
time could accord validity or efficacy to such fictitious transactions, the defect of which is permanent.
Lita Enterprises v. IAC: Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement,
commonly known as the kabit system, whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of
convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a
fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government. Abuse of
this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. The kabit system has been identified
as one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the government transportation
offices. Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the kabit system is invariably
recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent under Article 1409
of the Civil Code. It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an
illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them. Upon this premise, it was flagrant error
on the part of both the trial and appellate courts to have accorded the parties relief from their
predicament. Article 1412 of the Civil Code denies them such aid.
Arsenal v. IAC: Being void, the foregoing principles and rulings are applicable. Thus, it was
erroneous for the trial court to declare that the benefit of the prohibition in the Public Land Act does
not inure to any third party. Such a sweeping declaration does not find support in the law or in
precedents. A third person who is directly affected by a void contract may set up its nullity. In this
case, it is precisely the petitioners interest in the disputed land which is in question. At first blush, the
equities of the case seem to lean in favor of the respondent Suralta who, since 1957, has been in
possession of the land which was almost acquired in an underhanded manner by the petitioners. We
cannot, however, gloss over the fact that the respondent Suralta was himself guilty of transgressing
the law by entering, in 1957, into a transaction clearly prohibited by law. It is a long standing
principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law
and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. Equitable reasons will not control against any
well-settled rule of law or public policy.
Manotok Realty v. IAC: Sale of the paraphernal property of the deceased wife by the husband who
was neither an owner nor administrator of the property at the time of sale is void ab initio; Sale which
is void cannot be subject of ratification by the company or the probate court.We are, therefore, led
to the inevitable conclusion that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is
void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such
being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or
the probate court.
Portugal v. IAC: The alleged contract of sale is vitiated by the total absence of a valid cause or
consideration. The petitioners in their complaint, assert that they, particularly Cornelia, never knew
of the existence of the questioned deed of sale. They claim that they came to know of the supposed
sale only after the private respondent, upon their repeated entreaties to produce and return the
owners duplicate copy of the transfer certificate of title covering the two parcels of land, showed to

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them the controversial deed. And their claim was immeasurably bolstered when the private
respondents co defendant below, his brother Emiliano Portugal, who was allegedly his co-vendee in
the transaction, disclaimed any knowledge or participation therein. If this is so, and this is not
contradicted by the decisions of the courts below, the inevitable implication of the allegations is that
contrary to the recitals found in the assailed deed, no consideration was ever paid at all by the private
respondent. Applying the provisions of Articles 1350, 1352, and 1409 of the new Civil Code in
relation to the indispensable requisite of a valid cause or consideration in any contract, and what
constitutes a void or inexistent contract, we rule that the disputed deed of sale is void ab initio or
inexistent, not merely voidable.
Board of Liquidators v. Roxas: Since it is not disputed that petitioner PDCI is the titled owner of Lot
3247 having acquired the same by assignment from its owner Maria Roxas Lisao for and in
consideration of her subscription to shares of capital stocks in the PDCI, petitioner PDCI is therefore
the absolute owner of the property. And even if, as claimed by respondent Jose Roxas, Maria Roxas
Lisao had subsequently executed a quitclaim, deed and donation of said property in favor of her
brothers and sisters who in turn allegedly verbally sold the same to respondent, such subsequent
disposition is of no legal effect whatsoever inasmuch as Maria has no more right or title whatever
over the property in question to convey to her brothers and sisters including respondent Jose Roxas.
since what appears to have been conveyed by Maria to her brothers and sisters was no longer her
property, the quitclaim, deed and donation that she executed are null and void. As a matter of fact
even prior to said conveyance, the property had been mortgaged by PDCI to the NFPC who is
certainly a mortgagee in good faith.
Fiestan v. CA: The prohibition mandated by par. (2) of Articles 1491 in relation to Article 1409 of the
Civil Code does not apply in the instant case where the sale of the property in dispute was made
under a special power inserted in or attached to the real estate mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135, as
amended. It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that, as between a specific statute and general
statute, the former must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than a general
statute does. The Civil Code (R.A. 386) is of general character while Act No. 3135, as amended, is a
special enactment and therefore the latter must prevail. Section 5 of Act No. 3135, as amended,
creates and is designed to create an exception to the general rule that a mortgagee or trustee in a
mortgage or deed of trust which contains a power of sale on default may not become the purchaser,
either directly or through the agency of a third person, at a sale which he himself makes under the
power. Under such an exception, the title of the mortgagee-creditor over the property cannot be
impeached or defeated on the ground that the mortgagee cannot be a purchaser at his own sale.
Ouano v. Echavez: Ouano and Echavez had promised to share in the property in question as a
consideration for Ouano's refraining from taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted
to cause and in fact succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from the auction in order to
cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned. In so doing, they committed the felony of
machinations in public auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code. The
agreement therefore being criminal in character, the parties not only have no action against each other
but are both liable to prosecution and the things and price of their agreement subject to disposal
according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in accordance with the so-called pari delicto
principle set out in the Civil Code.

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DBP v. CA: The Court of Appeals, after an extensive discussion, found that there had been no bad
faith on the part of either party, and this remains uncontroverted as a fact in the case at bar.
Correspondingly, respondent court correctly applied the rule that if both parties have no fault or are
not guilty, the restoration of what was given by each of them to the other is consequently in order.
This is because the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab initio operates to restore things
to the state and condition in which they were found before the execution thereof. the contract of loan
executed between the parties is entirely different and discrete from the deed of sale they entered into.
The annulment of the sale will not have an effect on the existence and demandability of the loan. The
fact that the annulment of the sale will also result in the invalidity of the mortgage does not have an
effect on the validity and efficacy of the principal obligation, for even an obligation that is
unsupported by any security of the debtor may also be enforced by means of an ordinary action.
Where a mortgage is not valid, as where it is executed by one who is not the owner of the property,
or the consideration of the contract is simulated or false, the principal obligation which it guarantees
is not thereby rendered null and void. That obligation matures and becomes demandable in
accordance with the stipulations pertaining to it.
Borromeo v. Mina: In other words, transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after
October 21, 1972 is allowed only in favor of the actual tenant- tillers thereon. Hence, the sale
executed by Philbanking on January 11, 1985 in favor of petitioner was in violation of the
aforequoted provision of P.D. 27 and its implementing guidelines, and must thus be declared null and
void. In consequence, petitioner cannot assert any right over the subject landholding, such as his
present claim for landholding exemption, because his title springs from a null and void source. A void
contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or
extinguish a juridical relation.
Recio v. Altamirano: The records disclose that the Altamiranos were the ones who offered to sell the
property to Nena but the transaction did not push through due to the fault of the respondents.
Thereafter, the petitioner renewed Nenas option to purchase the property to which Alejandro, as the
representative of the Altamiranos verbally agreed. The determinate subject matter is Lot No. 3, which
is covered under TCT No. T-102563 and located at No. 39 10 de Julio Street (now Esteban Mayo
Street), Lipa City, Batangas. The price agreed for the sale of the property was Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). It cannot be denied that the oral contract of sale entered into between
the petitioner and Alejandro was valid.
Yanas v. Acaylar: We hold that the sale was fictitious and fraudulent. Among the badges of fraud and
fictitiousness taken collectively are the following: (1) the fact that the sale is in English, the alleged
vendor being illiterate; (2) the fact that his wife did not join in the sale and that her name is indicated
in the deed as Maria S. Yanas when the truth is that her correct name is Maria Aglimot Yanas; (3)
the obvious inadequacy of P200 as price for a 13- hectare land (P15.40 a hectare); (4) the notarization
of the sale on the day following the alleged thumbmarking of the document; (5) the failure to state
the boundaries of the lot sold; (6) the fact that the governor approved it more than two years after the
alleged sale; (7) its registration more than three years later, and (8) the fact that the Acaylars were able
to occupy only four hectares out of the 13 hectares and were eventually forcibly ousted therefrom by
the children and agents of the vendor. It was not a fair and regular transaction done in the ordinary

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course of business. The fact that the alleged sale took place in 1950 and the action to have it declared
void or inexistent was filed in 1963 is immaterial. The action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe
Pari Delicto (in equal guilt)
Art. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract,
and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal
Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the
things or the price of the contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one may
claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.
Yu Bun Guan v. Ong: Ong and Yu Bun Guan are husband and wife. Ong purchased out of her
personal funds, a parcel of land (JP Rizal Property). Before their separation in 1992, she reluctantly
agreed to the Guans importunings that she execute a Deed of Sale of the J.P. Rizal property in his
favor, but on the promise that he would construct a commercial building for the benefit of the
children. The consideration for the simulated sale was that, after its execution in which he would
represent himself as single, a Deed of Absolute Sale would be executed in favor of the three (3)
children and that he would pay the Allied Bank, Inc. the loan he obtained. Guan on the other hand
claimed Ong could not have purchased the property because she had no financial capacity to do so; on
the other hand, he was financially capable although he was disqualified to acquire the property by
reason of his nationality. Ong was in pari delicto being privy to the simulated sale. The Court held
that the principle of in pari delicto provides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves
them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. However, this principle does not apply
with respect to inexistent and void contracts, as in this case.
Barsobia v. Cuenco: A parcel of coconut land was sold by its Filipino owner, petitioner Epifania, to a
Chinese, Ong King Po, and by the latter to a naturalized Filipino, respondent herein. In the
meantime, the Filipino owner had unilaterally repudiated the sale she had made to the Chinese and
had resold the property to another Filipino. Held: There should be no question that the sale of the
land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning
because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is
an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. The litigated property is now in the
hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a
naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no
more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in
the hands of a qualified person. While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondents vendor,
had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on
her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be
held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property.
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Godinez v. Fong: The Krivenko ruling that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or
agricultural lands, including residential lands is a declaration of an imperative constitutional policy.
Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits.
However, we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale
executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luenwhether void ab initio, illegal per se, or merely
prohibited. It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing.
But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility because the
land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional
prescription was never intended to apply. The lower court erred in treating the case as one involving
simply the application of the statute of limitations. From the fact that prescription may not be used to
defend a contract which the Constitution prohibits, it does not necessarily follow that the appellants
may be allowed to recover the property sold to an alien. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the
disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen
qualified to acquire real property.
Yap v. Grageda: There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania
to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning because it was a contract executed
against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to
conserve lands for the Filipinos. But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in
the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer-owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a
naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no
more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in
the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and
Li Seng Giap & Sons: if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands,
as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nations lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful
the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino Citizens by naturalization.
Pineda v. De la Rama: Whether or not the supposed cash advances reached their destination is of no
moment. The consideration for the promissory noteto influence public officers in the performance
of their dutiesis contrary to law and public policy. The promissory note is void ab initio and no
cause of action for the collection cases can arise from it.
Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has
given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given
by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The
other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any
obligation to comply his promise.
Articles 1411 and 1412 refer to the pari delicto rule, which literally means in equal kind, or also
in equal guilt in pari delicto oritur actio and sometimes in equal guilt, the position of the
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defendant is stronger in pari delicto potior est condicio defendentis. The position of the
defendant is stronger because the plaintiffs claim is not really granted.
The pari delicto rule applies only to contracts which is void for illegality of subject matter. Thus,
if the contract is void for simulation, the pari delicto rule does not apply so a party can claim the
object back through reconveyance.
Constantino v. Heirs of Constantino: Respondents inherited parcels of land from their predecessors
land which was contained in a document called Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman. Petitioners filed
this case to annul such document and to get a portion of that land. Issue: w/n in pari delicto doctrine
applies? NOPE! (walang issue sa 1311 there was just a brief discussion) HELD:47The petition at bench
does not speak of an illegal cause of contract constituting a criminal offense under Article 1411.
Neither can it be said that Article 1412 finds application although such provision which is part of
Title II, Book IV of the Civil Code speaks of contracts in general, as well as contracts which are null
and void ab initio pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code such as the subject contracts, which as
claimed, are violative of the mandatory provision of the law on legitimes. Article 1412 of the Civil
Code that breathes life to the doctrine speaks of the rights and obligations of the parties to the
contract with an illegal cause or object which does not constitute a criminal offense. It applies to
contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to contracts rendered void for being
simulated, or those in which the parties do not really intend to be bound thereby. Specifically, in pari
delicto situations involve the parties in one contract who are both at fault, such that neither can
recover nor have any action against each other.
Liguez v. CA: The doctrine of in pari delicto applies only where the fault on both sides is more or less
equivalent. It does not, therefore, apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other is not
or where one party was a man who was advanced in years and mature experience and the other was a
minor of 16 years who was not fully aware of the terms of the agreement she had entered into. The
rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by the law but will both be
left where it finds them, has been interpreted by this Court as barring the party from pleading the
illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a defense. In our opinion, the Court of Appeals
erred in applying to the present case the pari delicto rule. First, because it can not be said that both
parties here had equal guilt when we consider that as against the deceased Salvador P. Lopez, who was
a man advanced in years and mature experience, the appellant was a mere minor, 16 years of age,
when the donation was made; that there is no finding made by the Court of Appeals that she was fully
aware of the terms of the bargain entered into by and between Lopez and her parents; that her
acceptance in the deed of donation did not necessarily imply knowledge of conditions and terms not
set forth therein; and that the substance of the testimony of the instrumental witnesses is that it was

47
Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes
a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be
prosecuted.
xxx xxx
Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the
following rules shall be observed:xxx xxx
1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the
contract, or demand the performance of the others undertaking;xxx xxxx
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the appellant's parents who insisted on the donation before allowing her to live with Lopez. These
facts are more suggestive of seduction than of immoral bargaining on the part of appellant. It must
not be forgotten that illegality is not presumed, but must be duly and adequately proved.
In the second place, the rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by
the law but will both be left where it finds them, has been interpreted by this Court as barring the
party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a defense. In the
present case, it is scarcely disputable that Lopez would not have conveyed the property in question
had he known that appellant would refuse to cohabit with him; so that the cohabitation was an
implied condition to the donation, and being unlawful, necessarily tainted the donation itself.
The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land on the strength of a donation regular on its face. To
defeat its effect, the appellees must plead and prove that the same is illegal. But such plea on the part
of the Lopez heirs is not receivable, since Lopez himself, if living, would be barred from setting up
that plea; and his heirs, as his privies and successors in interest, can have no better rights than Lopez
himself. In this regard, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Lopez could not donate the entirety
of the property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo, because said property was
conjugal in character, and the right of the husband to donate community property is strictly limited
by law. The text of the articles makes it plain that the donation made by the husband in contravention
of law is not void in its entirety, but only in so far as it prejudices the interest of the wife.
Philbanking v. Lui She: If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of
land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to
last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby
the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi,
jus fruendi, and jus abutendi), but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi)rights the sum
total of which make up ownership It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow the use,
the next day the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up
are consolidated in an alien. If this can be done, then the constitutional ban against alien landholding
in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds is indeed in grave peril. It does not
follow that because the parties are in pari delicto they will be left where they are without relief.
Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule of in pari delicto that when the
agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed for the
protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he had paid or
delivered. The Constitutional provision is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the
Filipinos.
Avila v. CA: While it is true that Marciana Avila, their mother and predecessor-in- interest,
purchased the questioned property at a public auction conducted by the government; paid the
purchase price; and was issued a final bill of sale after the expiration of the redemption period, it is
however, undisputed that such purchase was prohibited under Section 579 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended. x x x Thus, the sale to her of Lot 594 is void. Moreover, Marciana
Avila was a party to an illegal transaction, and therefore, under Art. 1412 of the Civil Code, she
cannot recover what she has given by reason of the contract or ask f or the fulfillment of what has
been promised her.
Teja v. IAC: Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement, commonly known

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as the "kabit system" whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience
allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. A
certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government. Abuse of this
privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. The "kabit system" has been identified as
one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the government transportation
offices. Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the kabit system is invariably
recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent under Article 1409
of the Civil Code. It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an
illegal contract, but will leave both where it finds them.
PNB v. De los Reyes: Petitioner accedes to the redemption by respondents of the 2 parcels covered by
free patent titles, pursuant to the provisions of the Public Land Act, the period of five (5) years after
the grant of the patents not having expired. This is correct since pursuant to Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public Land Act which is the applicable law in this case, the
mortgagor had five (5) years from the date of conveyance within which to redeem the property. It is
not even necessary for the preservation of such right to repurchase to make an offer to redeem, or
tender payment of the purchase price within said period of 5 years. The filing of an action to redeem
within that period is equivalent of a formal offer to redeem. There is not even a need for the
consignation of the redemption price. That the situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within the
purview of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious since the aggregate number of the lots which
comprise the collaterals for the mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction.
There is no partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of. The aforesaid
doctrine, which is actually intended for the protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the
release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the indebtedness and naturally presupposes
that the mortgage is existing. Once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof,
said doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since, with the full payment of the debt, there is nothing
more to secure. While the law bars recovery in a case where the object of the contract is contrary to
law and one or both parties acted in bad faith, we cannot here apply the doctrine of in pari delicto
which admits of an exception, namely, that when the contract is merely prohibited by law, not illegal
per se, and the prohibition is designed for the protection of the party seeking to recover, he is entitled
to the relief prayed for whenever public policy is enhanced thereby. Under the Public Land Act, the
prohibition to alienate is predicated on the fundamental policy of the State to preserve and keep in the
family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to him,
and recovery is allowed even where the land acquired under the Public Land Act was sold and not
merely encumbered, within the prohibited period. This is without prejudice to such appropriate
action as the Government may take should it find that violations of the public land laws were
committed or involved in said transaction and sanctions are in order.
Outline:
a. If it constitutes a criminal offense
i. If both parties are in pari delicto
No action for specific performance can prosper on either side (Article 1411, 1st ).
No action for restitution can prosper on either side (Article 1411, 1st ).
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Example: A shabu supplier supplies shabu to the shabu dealer. If the shabu supplier does not
deliver the shabu, the dealer cannot file an action for specific performance.
ii. If only 1 party is guilty
No action for specific performance can prosper on either side.
An action for restitution will be allowed only if the innocent party demands. The guilty party is
not entitled to restitution.
b. If it does not constitute a criminal offense

Like Art. 1490.
i. If both parties are in pari delicto
No action for specific performance can prosper on either side (Article 1411, 1st ).
No action for restitution can prosper on either side (Article 1411, 1st ).
ii. If only 1 party is guilty

No action for specific performance can prosper on either side.
An action for restitution will be allowed only if the innocent party demands.
Exceptions to Pari Delicto:
Art. 1413. Interest paid in excess of the interest allowed by the usury laws may be recovered
by the debtor, with interest thereon from the date of the payment.
This is dead letter. But what if it were merely unconscionable? Open question.
Briones v. Cammayo: To discourage stipulations on usurious interest, said stipulations are treated as
wholly void, so that the loan becomes without stipulation as to payment of interest. It should not,
however, be interpreted to mean forfeiture even of the principal, for this would unjustly enrich the
borrower at the expense of the lender. Furthermore, penal sanctions are available against a usurious
lender, as a further deterrence to usury. The principal debt remaining without stipulation for
payment of interest can thus be recovered by judicial action. A contract of loan with usurious interest
consists of principal and accessory stipulations; the principal one is to pay the debt; the accessory
stipulation is to pay interest thereon. And said two stipulations are divisible in the sense that the
former can still stand without the latter. In simple loan with stipulation of usurious interest, the
prestation of the debtor to pay the principal debt, which is the cause of the contract, is not illegal. The
illegality lies only as to the prestation to pay the stipulated interest; hence, being separable, the latter
only should be deemed void, since it is the only one that is illegal. The debt earns interest from the
date of demand (in this case from the filing of the complaint). Such interest is not due to stipulation,
for there was none, the same being void. Rather it is due to the general provision of law that in
obligations to pay money, where the debtor incurs in delay, he has to pay interest by way of damages
Art. 1414. When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may
be repudiated by one of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any
damage has been caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if the public interest

212

Digests by 4A 2015
will thus be subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or
property.
To encourage people to desists from committing crime.
Art. 1415. Where one of the parties to an illegal contract is incapable of giving consent, the
courts may, if the interest of justice so demands allow recovery of money or property
delivered by the incapacitated person.
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the
prohibition by the law is designated for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public
policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.
Like anti- profiteering laws. Consumer may recover.
Art. 1417. When the price of any article or commodity is determined by statute, or by
authority of law, any person paying any amount in excess of the maximum price allowed may
recover such excess.
Art. 1418. When the law fixes, or authorizes the fixing of the maximum number of hours of
labor, and a contract is entered into whereby a laborer undertakes to work longer than the
maximum thus fixed, he may demand additional compensation for service rendered beyond
the time limit.
40 hour work week.
Art. 1419. When the law sets, or authorizes the setting of a minimum wage for laborers, and a
contract is agreed upon by which a laborer accepts a lower wage, he shall be entitled to
recover the deficiency.
The above contracts are void but there is some remedy for policy considerations. An example is
the minimum wage law under Article 1419 wherein the employer and the employee freely agree
to the terms of employment below the minimum wage. Although they are in pari delicto, you
dont follow the rules of pari delicto. There is a policy consideration of social justice involved.
This is similar to the preferential option for the poor of churches.
Final Provisions
Art. 1420. In case of a divisible contract, if the illegal terms can be separated from the legal
ones, the latter may be enforced.
Like when there is a loan with unconscionable interest. The interest can be divided from the
principle.
Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of contract is not available to third persons whose
interests are not directly affected.
If the effects are set-up against you then you can set it up as a defense.

213

Digests by 4A 2015
Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and
inexistent.
214

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Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Updated by Claudia Squillantini

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

This was borrowed from Sanchez Roman.

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

4. The weakening of the principle that liability arises from responsibility

D. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF OBLIGATIONS:

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Can there be multiple sources in one? Yes.

Who can you sue?

Only your privies, so

Driver, Bus Co, or

Only driver (have to

Must prove drivers

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

ii. To give a generic thing

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

This includes the obligation not to give.

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

of consent hence the contract is voidable.

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

In reciprocal obligations (obligations with a counterpart prestation) which require simultaneous

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Correlate Article 1175 with Articles 1957,6 14137 and 1961.8

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

the person constituting the same was different.

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

such a way that its existence is unknown or it cannot be recovered;

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

retaliatory in character [Universal Foods v. CA].

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes

Balane Obligations and Contracts Lecture Notes