Sarah Bastian

11/7/14
From Enemy to Ally to Competitor: The Power Shift in the
Relationship Between the Peoples Republic of China and the United
States During the Cold War
Although China, the culture, has perhaps the longest continuous history in
the world, spanning all the way back to the 2000s BC, China, the nation we know
today, has a much shorter history. In 1949, following nearly a century of civil war,
invasion, and disaster, Mao Tse-Tung rose to power and formally declared the
formation of the Peoples Republic of China. At this time, China was still deep in the
midst of her economic and social struggles, and more would come as Mao led the
nation through a series of dramatic changes. While all these shifts and struggles
took place, on the other side of the world, America was rejoicing over the victorious
end of World War II in 1945. Celebrated veterans were receiving higher education in
unprecedented numbers due to the GI Bill, and the Baby Boom marked a time when
happy, growing American families were excited to carry on the proud American
tradition. At this time in history, it would have been laughable to compare the
strength of America, a major superpower and the shining star of the victorious Allied
powers, with that of China, a wounded nation struggling to find identity in the wake
of countless disasters.
During the 50s, the newly fledgling Peoples Republic of China, or PRC,
allied herself with the Soviet Union, a natural relationship based on their geographic
proximity and shared communist ideology. This heightened the tension between the
Soviet Union and the United States in the already-developing Cold War, and when
proxy wars between the allies of these two superpowers began, such as the Korean
War that started in 1950, the PRC and the US were fighting as enemies on opposite
sides. The PRC eventually grew concerned about her growing dependence on the
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Soviet Union, and distanced herself in the 60s, initiating a period of global isolation.
As Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet Union intensified, President
Nixon decided that pragmatic issues of security were more important than
ideological alliances, and he vigorously pursued the opening of a relationship
between the US and the PRC in the early 70s. This relationship continued to grow
well into the 80s, and the two nations became increasingly intertwined
economically, yet the need to balance power against the Soviet Union lessened as
each nation independently developed a better relationship with her as the Cold War
drew to a close. When the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 ended in massacre,
the United States was morally outraged, and the formal end of the Cold War with
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed the strategic security need for
the US/China relationship. These two events combined to sever much of the positive
progress that had been made between the two nations, but at the end of the war,
the PRC stood at a much different place in relationship to the United States than she
had when it began. Throughout relational shifts of the Cold War, as the PRC first
allied herself with the enemies of the US, then withdrew from the national stage,
and eventually emerged with a positive response to US friendship, only to result in a
mutual withdrawal of friendship when ideological differences proved too great, the
balance of power steadily shifted away from the United States and towards the
Peoples Republic of China.
In order to understand the behavior of the PRC, both immediately following
her formation and extending into the following decades, it is essential to know the
situation from which she emerged victorious. Before the beginning of World War II,
China had been in turmoil for over a century, as wars raged internally, and other
nations took the opportunity to exploit their power over China. Although she was
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united in her struggle against the Japanese invasion during the Sino-Japanese War,
the portion of World War II fought in East Asia, the unity China achieved was at best
a splintering relationship between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese
Communist Party (Palmowski). These two groups had been engaged in active civil
war before they were unhappily forced to unite against the Japanese invasion, and
at the end of the war with Japan, they continued fighting. When the Chinese
Communist Party finally triumphed in 1949, the Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek,
were forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan, and Mao Tse-Tung of the Communists
declared the Peoples Republic of China, or PRC. Due to the long and painful
struggles of the previous century, the Chinese people were tired of being abused
and humiliated by various foreign powers, and as they looked with hope towards a
new national identity, they were extremely sensitive to any action that could be
perceived as another nation seeking to assert power over China.
An understanding of Americas behavior at the time of the PRCs formation
must likewise be rooted in the knowledge of both her internal and foreign
development. During this time, American society was under the influence of the
second Red Scare of the 20th century, born out of the advance of communism on
several fronts and encouraged by the dramatic leadership of Senator Joseph
McCarthy. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party did much to advance this
Red Scare in the United States, particularly when Communist China joined the
Soviet Union in aiding North Korea in her fight against the United States ally, South
Korea (Grasso 2356). Not only were the Americans afraid of the advancement of
communism in China and the PRC/Soviet Union connection; now they were actively
at war with Chinese troops to decide the fate of Korea. As long as the PRC allied

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herself with Americas enemy, the Soviet Union, there was no hope for improvement
in the relationship with the United States.
It was from this background of Chinas emerging national pride and Americas
growing fear of communism that the interactions between the US and the PRC
sprang. Although fiercely independent, China faced intense struggles as the PRC
attempted to reform the war-torn, suffering nation. Mao attempted to propel China
onto the national stage in the late 50s with his Great Leap Forward, an effort to
rapidly industrialize China that ironically resulted in a terrible economic setback, as
well as a widespread famine that killed between fifteen and thirty million people
(Joseph). It was during this time that China maintained a positive relationship with
the Soviet Union, resulting in a great deal of mentorship and infrastructure support
that helped recovery from the Great Leap Forward (Kaple 4). Although China also
contributed to the relationship through military aid for various uprisings, the
Chinese common people felt an imbalance in cultural sharing and respect between
themselves and the Soviet Union, which was a wound to their fierce nationalist pride
(Kaple 5). Between this culture imbalance, and Maos growing concern over
economic and military dependence, as well as a radicalization of policy by Mao that
was not shared by Soviet leaders, cracks started to appear in this relationship near
the end of the 50s and into the 60s (Kaple 7). The Chinese desire to function as an
independent nation, strongly motivated by the wounded nationalism of the previous
century, acted as the major catalyst for the PRC to pull away from her relationship
with the Soviet Union (Kaple 6-7).
Once the PRC pulled away from their relationship with the Soviet Union, she
was essentially isolated from the major powers of the world. Although this did not
help economic development, it was rooted in a strong desire to be seen as an
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independent nation, so the Chinese people were not necessarily looking to forge
another major alliance right away. At the same time, on the other side of the world,
there were still major complications on the American side that prevented the
building of a positive relationship anyway. During the civil war that resulted in Maos
victory, the United States had provided support for the opposing Republic of
China, led by Chiang Kai-Shek. When Chiang lost, he and his followers retreated to
the island of Taiwan, yet they still claimed the right to rule all of China, and, at least
from an ideological standpoint, entertained plans to try to re-take the mainland
(Tucker 114-115). During the first fifteen years after the PRCs victory, the US
maintained a positive relationship with Taiwan, including financial aid that averaged
$100 million a year (Tucker 114). Support for Taiwan was strong in America,
particularly in the form of the China Lobby, an informal movement of people at all
levels of American society who supported Chiangs government (Tucker 114).
Because Chiang would not give up the idea of the Republic of China ruling all of
China, and Mao was determined to regain control of Taiwan, it was impossible to
forge a positive relationship with both governments; no one was more opposed to
the idea of two Chinas than the two Chinese governments themselves (Tucker
128). Even after the PRC distanced herself from the Soviet Union, the US maintained
a close, supportive relationship with Taiwan well into the 60s, meanwhile holding
onto the futile hope that Red China would eventually collapse on its own (Tucker
113). The United States refused to deal with the PRC as a legitimate political entity,
which solidified the PRCs isolation from world powers in the 60s.
After twenty years of antagonism and isolation, the beginning of Richard
Nixons US Presidency in 1969 sparked a new direction for the relationship between
the United States and the PRC. Although Nixon had initially taken a harsh stance
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against the PRC in his early political career, by the time he became president, his
views had shifted dramatically. Perceiving a decline in the United States worldwide
standing, and recognizing the need to put more pressure on the Soviet Union, Nixon
decided it was time to focus on the pragmatic diplomatic needs of the US, rather
than her ideological commitments (Arnold 152). In the wake of the split between the
Soviet Union and the PRC, which had degenerated to minor armed conflicts along
the border, Nixon saw that forming an alliance with the PRC would put both
geographic and political strategic pressure on the Soviet Union (Tucker 121, Zheng
18). This refocusing of US policy meant a decreased commitment to Chiangs
Republic of China on Taiwan, a move that permanently damaged US credibility in
foreign affairs (Tucker 110).
While continuing to give positive yet vague promises to the Republic of China
situated in Taiwan, Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, worked
behind the scenes to engineer the beginning of a positive relationship with the PRC
(Tucker 117). In 1971, Kissinger made his first official diplomatic visit to the PRC,
which included negotiations with Maos government. In his eagerness to quickly
establish positive relations, Kissinger was willing to concede several important
points of support for the Republic of China in Taiwan, although these details were
obscured from the public eye, and particularly from the Republic of China itself, at
the time (Tucker 123). Although this move specifically resulted in a loss of power for
Taiwan, more broadly, it represents a change in US policy based on shifting power
(Tucker 110). Up to this point, America had resisted connection with communist
powers, not only on grounds of safety, but on moral and ideological grounds as well.
The American public was still highly concerned about human rights abuses of the
PRC, but this concern was no longer valued as highly as a more strategic
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relationship toward the Soviet Union (Tucker 113). Not only had the US reached out
to the PRC in spite of her allies; she reached out in spite of her guiding principles as
well.
Although the US instigation of an improved relationship with the PRC was
primarily motivated by security and political concerns, there were economic
repercussions as well. Nixon removed many legal barriers to commerce and trade
between the two nations, opening the door for rapid economic growth in China, a
nation that was marginal to world trade in 1971 (Wang). Although trade in 1972
was a paltry US $4.7 million, this represented a huge step forward for China, and
was indicative of great things to come (Wang).
Although this fledgling alliance continued to grow throughout the 70s, both
America and China experienced internal political crisis that temporarily shifted their
focus away from international concerns. News of the Watergate scandal broke in
June of 1972, signaling the end of Nixons progress on the American side. In China,
Maos death in 1976 led to a brief but tumultuous power struggle between factions
of Communist leaders, some of whom were more liberal than Mao and some of
whom were more conservative. Slowly, the situation stabilized as a new figurehead
in the form of Deng Xiaoping rose to power, solidifying his position by 1980. The
American Watergate crisis was a very public black mark on Nixons record, sending
repercussions throughout every level of US government, but on the other side of the
world, the rise of Deng to power in China was an even greater change, and this one
ultimately proved to be for the better, in terms of Chinas international influence.
Although Deng was committed to Communist political ideology, he was also a
proponent of the socialist market economy, saying, Planning and market forces are

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not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism (Hou 1). This shift in
ideology, or rather, shift from pure ideology to some pragmatic consideration,
proved to be the spark that propelled China onto the world stage, as Deng instituted
an open door policy that allowed not only trade and communication with the
outside world, but also the sharing of culture (Wang). By 1984, the United States
had become Chinas third-largest trading partner, and therefore had a huge impact
in her economy (Wang). Even though the United States initiation of the relationship
was motivated primarily by security concerns, it provided crucial stimulation of the
Chinese economy. On the other hand, due to the USs vastly superior economy at
that time, this growing trading relationship still only accounted for 1.4% of United
States foreign trade in 1988 (Wang). China was making progress at break-neck
speed, but she still had a long way to go.
The positive ties between the US and the PRC continued to strengthen
throughout the 80s, and extended further into areas such as technology and culture
exchange, but the catalyst for forming this relationship, namely as a power balance
against the Soviet Union, became less and less important. Both relationships
between the Soviet Union and the US, and between the Soviet Union and the PRC,
were steadily improving, and the power of the Soviet Union was waning, which
made the situation less tense all around. In May of 1989, the Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev visited Beijing to formally reinstate the relationship between these two
major communist powers (Suettinger 41). Ironically, it was not the visit itself, but an
event that was triggered by it, that caused the next major change in the US/China
relationship, this one for the worse: the Tiananmen Square massacre.
Leading up to Gorbachevs intended visit, a growing body of university
students in Beijing were becoming more and more aggressive in their calls for
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greater freedom, eventually staging a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square in early
May (Suettinger 42). The strike snowballed into a protest that, at one point, drew at
least one million people to Tiananmen Square, and the relaxed controls on Chinese
media, intended to make the historic meeting with Gorbachev more visible to the
world, instead served to make the PRCs splinted response to the protests visible
throughout China and the rest of the world (Suettinger 47, 43). The protest ended
with the PRC, led by Deng, calling for martial law in Beijing, which led to rampant
bloodshed. Although the details and casualties remain obscured to this day, it was a
violent tragedy that killed somewhere between the PRCs estimated two hundred
people and the Western medias estimated tens of thousands, and brought the
PRCs ideological differences to the forefront of American attention (Suettinger 61).
Newly-elected President Bush immediately responded by saying that he deeply
deplore[d] the decision to use violence, and within two days announced that the
US was cutting $600 million worth of military and technology ties, allowing Chinese
students in the US to stay past their permitted time, offering humanitarian aid to
the Tiananmen Square victims, and promising to review all aspects of the US/China
relationship (Suettinger 66, 67). Congress and the American public were far more
ardent in their expressions of outrage, including a statement by Representative
Mickey Edwards that referenced Bushs initial response, saying, Diplomatic
messages of disapproval are a pretty puny reaction to the murdering of innocent
civilians whose only crime is to want the same freedoms we in the West take for
granted (Suettinger 66). In the wake of such a public disaster, the United States
would not ignore the PRCs blatant abuse of human rights.
At the same time, the PRC reacted with much anger towards the United
States condemnation. The fierce spirit of Chinese nationalism born out of pre-PRC
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struggles, both within the leadership and within the Chinese people, perceived the
United States political pressure that resulted from the Tiananmen incident as an
infringement on their own rights and a threat to their autonomy. Additionally, even
before Tiananmen, one contemporary American writer observed that The Chinese,
like most other Asians, speak with increasing frankness of their perception that the
economic power and influence of the United States is in decline (Kreisberg 60). Not
only had China been deeply offended by US political moves; she also had less
reason than before to care about expressing this offense. When the Soviet Union
officially fell in December 1991, both China and the US had even less strategic need
to lean upon each other. Simply put, The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end
of the Cold War destroyed the strategic framework for the Sino-American
cooperation initiated by U.S. President Richard Nixon and Chinese Chairman Mao
Zedong (Sutter 359). Rather than pursuing a closer bond of friendship based on the
need to achieve balance with other nations, both the PRC and the US looked to
strengthen strategic relationships with other nations around the world, particularly
other nations in Asia.
Although this sharp divide in political and military relations may sound like a
near-complete cutoff in the US/China relationship, in reality it was only partial. The
economic relationship that had started in the 1970s had steadily continued to grow,
and was of increasing importance on both sides. In the wake of sharp political
divides over Tiananmen Square, China and the United States drifted into an uneasy
relationship in which their expanded economic ties belied the uncertainty of
geopolitics, maintaining a trading partnership yet breaking into squabbles over it
and using various economic maneuvers to apply pressure for political change
(Wang). Even though the US particularly applied pressure over human rights issues,
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and the PRC responded negatively, the US was still willing to push for an increase in
the economic relationship, and even removed legal barriers that were based on
human rights concerns (Wang). Far from the time when the US refused to recognize
the PRC because of an ideological alliance with Taiwan, the US was now willing to
make concessions due to Chinas economic power.
From enemy to ally to competitor, the PRCs relationship with the United
States underwent dramatic changes over the course of the Cold War. Although the
PRC initially struggled to care for even her own people, by the end of the war, her
influence was felt around the world, and the United States could not ignore it,
despite significant disagreements in the areas of policy and ideology. As the PRC
matured, her power in both political and economic areas steadily increased,
particularly after her positive response to Nixons outreach and the implementation
of Dengs economic reforms. During this time of Chinas rapid growth, the United
States international power generally declined, resulting in a significant power shift
towards China and away from the United States by the conclusion of the Cold War in
1991. Although this shift was still emerging at that time, the decades in between
have only accelerated the process, resulting in a Chinese economy that is second
overall only to the United States, and that passed the US as the largest trading
nation in 2012 (Wang). Today, as in past years, Chinas relationship with the United
States is as necessary as it is uncomfortable and riddled with mistrust on both
sides. As each nation looks forward, the trajectory of their past relationship will form
the foundation of their future development.

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