Andie Panozzo

Intro to Philosophy
April 2, 2016
1,139 words
Chisholm vs. Frankfurt
Free will is a constant discussion within philosophy. Many philosophers believe in the
idea of determinism, while others take their belief a step further saying that people should still be
held responsible for their actions in some cases. Both Roderick Chisholm and Harry Frankfurt
are philosophers that believe free will is attainable in some instances and therefore people should
be responsible for some of their actions. Although both philosophers are coming from the same
basis of beliefs, one argument goes more in depth in its explanations. In this paper, I will argue
that Frankfurt's theory of freedom of the will and concept of a person is greater than Chisholm's
theory. I will do this by explaining both Chisholms and Frankfurts theories, and then ultimately
comparing the two.
Roderick Chisholm believes that in order for someone to have free will, they must have
had an option to have acted otherwise. He does not follow the deterministic view because of the
lack of moral responsibility associated with it, but also does not follow indeterminism views.
Chisholm differs from indeterminism views because he does not believe that a person can be
responsible for an action that was not caused by anything. Instead, he says that an action may be
caused by the agent, making Chisholm a libertarian. Chisholm calls this immanent action the
state of affairs where an agent causes an event. He believes that in order to be morally free, we
must deny that all events are caused by previous events. However, we cant claim that events

were caused by nothing at all because that would be by random chance and, therefore, does not
leave someone responsible. A person is only free when they caused the event, and therefore are
responsible for whatever was caused. This suggests that when a person acts freely, then they are
an uncaused causer. Chisholm does not deny that events can be caused by other events, but rather
states the difference of events and when someone can be morally responsible. Indeterminists
believe that a person is free when the event was caused by nothing, but Chisholm denies this
statement by saying that those events should not leave someone morally responsible and
therefore suggests the idea of immanent action.
Harry Frankfurt begins to explain his theory by first explaining the importance of
knowing what defines a person. He does this not to distinguish ourselves from species to species,
but rather to understand the essence of a person and what qualifies someone as a person.
Frankfurt does not just limit our vocabulary to wants and desires. He explains the two types of
desires: first-order desires and second-order desires. First-order desires are when one has the
desire to do or not do one thing or another. Second-order desires are the self-evolution or
reflection of ones first-order desires and appears to only belong to man. In order to identify will,
you must identify which desires were the motives for an action. Someone may have a first-order
desire to do something, but their second-order desire could contradict their first. Frankfurt calls
this second-order volition, a particular desire becoming your will, and it is essential to being a
person. All people have a will if they have first-order desires and can reason and deliberate,
however they are not a person unless they have second-order volitions. This distinguishes the
difference between a wonton and a person. A wanton is someone who has first and second order
desires, but they are not a person. For example, a drug addict with first-order desire for taking

drugs can reason that doing drugs is bad, however they will have no other desire to change their
actions. It is necessary that an agent has second-order volitions in order for them to have a will.
From there, a person is free when they could have and wanted to do otherwise, and then should
be held responsible.
When looking at both Chisholm and Frankfurts theories, they are similar in that they
both believe that a person should be morally responsible for their actions when they could have
done otherwise. However, Chisholms theory leaves the reader with questions about who
qualifies as a person that can cause an action. It is difficult to think of ways that an agent is solely
the purpose for an action. One can question what makes a person and how they go completely
uncaused by previous events. Frankfurts argument addresses the question of what qualifies
someone has a person. When a person performs a free action according to Chisholm, it is like a
miracle, an attribute that normally only God has. He even states at the beginning of his argument
in Human Freedom and the Self that we must make somewhat far-reaching assumptions about
about the self or the agent (1). His theory fails to explain the important difference from an
action done by a person compared to an action done by animal. For example, the significance of
when a person does chose something of their own freedom versus when an animal, or even
wanton, does something according to their first-order desires. Without knowing this importance,
we then lose interest in Chisholms theory all together because it does not discuss the will found
in a person and how they can attain or have that will. Chisholm does not address the knowledge
of reasoning to do, or not do, something. As Frankfurt states, a person can reason that they
should not do something, but still feel no urge to not do it. It is second-order volitions that
constitutes someone with a will, the urge to leave their first-order desires unsatisfied. Chisholm

does not give explanations to what defines an agent or if any living species can act freely simply
because they exist. Frankfurt answers those doubts about Chisholms theory and gives us more
knowledge about our own desires.
Frankfurts theory of freedom of the will and concept of the person is a better theory than
Chisholms because of the more in-depth analysis of who qualifies as a person. Chisholms
theory makes it seem impossible to have free will, although he does believe in free will and
moral responsibility. It is hard for the reader to know when they would have free will versus
when they would not. Frankfurt gives the reader the information needed in order to know when
they have free will versus when they dont. His theory helps the reader realize that, when not
choosing freely, they still can reason. Chisholms argument is that a person is morally
responsible when they alone were the ones causing an action, but he does not describe who
qualifies to do that. Frankfurts theory, therefore, is better because of the explanation of who is a
person and when they have free will.