CHREA vs.

CHR
MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ
CHREA vs.CHR
G.R. No. 155336
November 25, 2004

FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It
provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the
strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading
and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital
Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and
file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSCRegional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution and reversedthe recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and
upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification
that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM
are disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that
shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is
flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans
qualification.
This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution,
application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the
state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances,
and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of
the DBM are unauthorized and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the
compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and
regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597,
the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation
structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board
of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to
ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law,
specifically, that PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under
R.A. No. 6758. )
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first
be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is
consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in
the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the
National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process,
achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations,
administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational
effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and
creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal
justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed
reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As
such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM
is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a
constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CAs Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the
COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal
autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and
fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the
other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police
commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic
and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among
the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated
otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence,
fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is
the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the
wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time. 22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v.
Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag
obtainable by membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of
the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to
formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include
Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the
grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary
Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thusBeing a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised
within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under
RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522
that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits
authorized under compensation standardization laws.26