Professional Documents
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MULTI-SERVICE
TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND
PROCEDURES FOR
CORDON AND
SEARCH
OPERATIONS
FM 3-06.20
MCRP 3-31.4B
NTTP 3-05.8
AFTTP(I) 3-2.62
APRIL 2006
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the
DOD and DOD contractors only to protect technical or
operational information from automatic dissemination under the
international Exchange Program or by other means. This
determination was made on 16 August 2005. Other requests
must be referred to:
HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-RD, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-5000;
HQ MCCDC, ATTN: C427, Quantico, VA 22134-5021;
NWDC, ATTN: N5, Newport, RI 02841-1207;
or HQ AFDC, ATTN: DJ, Maxwell AFB, 36112-6112.
Army
Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command
ATTN: ATFC-RD
Fort Monroe VA 23651-5000
DSN 680-3951 COMM (757) 788-3951; E-mail: doctrine@monroe.army.mil
Marine Corps
Commanding General, US Marine Corps Combat Development Command
ATTN: C427
3300 Russell Road, Suite 318A
Quantico VA 22134-5021
DSN 278-2871/6227 COMM (703) 784-2871/6227; E-mail: deputydirectordoctrine@usmc.mil
Navy
Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
ATTN: N5
686 Cushing Road
Newport RI 02841-1207
DSN 948-1070/4201 COMM (401) 841-1070/4201; E-mail: alsapubs@nwdc.navy.mil
Air Force
Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center
ATTN: DJ
155 North Twining Street
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6112
DSN 493-2640/2256 COMM (334) 953-2640/2256; E-mail: afdc.dj@maxwell.af.mil
ALSA
Director, ALSA Center
114 Andrews Street
Langley AFB VA 23665-2785
DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902; E-mail: alsa.director@langley.af.mil
25 April 2006
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to protect technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the international Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was
made on 16 August 2005. Other requests must be referred to: HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-RD, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-5000;
HQ MCCDC, ATTN: C427, Quantico, VA 22134-5021; NWDC, ATTN: N5, Newport, RI 02841-1207; or HQ AFDC, ATTN: DJ,
Maxwell AFB, 36112-6112
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
FIGURES
Figure I-1. Task Organization ............................................................ I-8
Figure II-1. Urban Terrain ............................................................... II-24
Figure II-2. City Core ...................................................................... II-25
Figure II-3. Core Periphery ............................................................. II-25
Figure II-4. Dense Random Construction ....................................... II-26
Figure II-5. Close Orderly Block Construction ................................ II-26
Figure II-6. Dispersed Residential Area.......................................... II-27
Figure II-7. High-Rise Area ............................................................. II-27
Figure II-8. Industrial-Transportation Area...................................... II-28
Figure II-9. Permanent or Fixed Fortifications ................................ II-28
Figure II-10. Shantytowns............................................................... II-29
Figure II-11. Street Patterns and Effects ........................................ II-30
Figure III-1. Outer Cordon................................................................ III-5
Figure III-2. Inner Cordon ................................................................ III-6
Figure III-3. Search Assault Element ............................................... III-8
Figure III-4. Single Point of Ingress ............................................... III-10
Figure III-5. Multidirectional Ingress............................................... III-11
Figure III-6. Simultaneous Occupation .......................................... III-14
TABLES
Table IV-1. Rotary Wing Aircraft Capabilities .................................. IV-3
Table IV-2. Fixed-wing Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities.............. IV-6
Table B-1. Urban Priority Intelligence Requirements........................ B-1
Table B-2. Urban Intelligence Requirements.................................... B-1
Table B-3. ROE/Escalation Procedures ........................................... B-2
Table B-4. Controlling Civilian Populace .......................................... B-2
Table B-5. Quick Reaction Force (QRF)/Reserve ............................ B-2
Table B-6. Command, Control, Communications (C3) and
Locations .................................................................................... B-2
Table B-7. Direct Fire Planning......................................................... B-3
Table B-8. Air Considerations (Rotary and Fixed-wing) ................... B-4
Table B-9. Consolidation, Reorganization, and Withdrawal ............. B-4
Table B-10. Perception Management (IO and CA Operations) ........ B-5
Table B-11 Media Facilitation and Public Affairs Checklists............. B-5
Table B-12. Sniper Employment....................................................... B-5
Table B-13. Traffic Control Point/Blocking Positions ........................ B-6
Table B-14. Patrol Checklist ............................................................. B-6
Table B-14. Patrol Checklist ............................................................. B-7
Table B-15. Mission Equipment Checklist ........................................ B-7
Table C-1. CAS Terminal Attack Control Attributes..........................C-1
Table C-2. CAS Battle Drill ..............................................................C-1
Table C-3. CAS Briefing (9-Line) ......................................................C-2
Table D-1. Cordon and Search.........................................................D-2
Table D-2. Employment of QRF .......................................................D-3
Overview
Cordon and search operations involve isolating the target area and searching suspected
buildings to capture or destroy possible insurgents and/or contraband. A cordon and search
may also be thought of as a movement to contact, raid, deliberate attack, or area
reconnaissance based on the accuracy of intelligence. While the actual operation may fall
under the category of any of these missions, the cordon and search is typically oriented at
finding insurgents or their caches. This publication:
• Provides MTTP for tactical-level planning and execution of cordon and search
operations.
• Provides reference material to assist supported and supporting personnel and
organizations in planning, coordinating, and executing cordon and search
operations.
• Applies to all elements of the force when planning, executing, and supporting cordon
and search operations. This includes both ground personnel and the supporting
aviation assets in the conduct of operations.
• Is focused on the scope of cordon and search operations.
Planning Considerations
Chapter I provides considerations for staff planning in the conduct of cordon and search
operations. This chapter, in conjunction with appropriate follow on chapters and appendices,
provides the tactical staff planner and the small unit leader a foundation from which to plan,
coordinate, integrate, and execute cordon and search operations. It addresses the capabilities
brought to the fight of land, sea, and air in the conduct of cordon and search operations.
Intelligence and Urban Planning Considerations
Chapter II provides information pertaining to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield
with focus upon the variables inherent in cordon and search operations such as the specific
characteristics of urban terrain, the geography, the impact of structural features, and the impact
of the populous. The information provided also addresses the applicability and appropriateness
of available capabilities. These include, but are not limited to, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), using both traditional and non-traditional ISR.
Execution Procedures
Chapter III provides TTP derived from historical sources with emphasis on recent operations
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The lessons
learned, in conjunction with available resources, provide the backdrop for more detailed
discussion of the ground elements and their role(s). Specific areas discussed include the
conduct of, and responsibilities within, the elements of the cordon and search force; the
command element security element, search/assault element, and the support element. This
• Lessons learned
• Planning checklists
• Smart cards
• Rehearsals
• Information operations (IO)
• Civil-military operations (CMO) and civil affairs (CA)
• Communications
• Interpreter considerations
• Urban reference systems
Joint
US Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL
Commander Naval Special Warfare Command, NAB, Coronado, CA
JFK Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC
Army
US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA
US Army Infantry Center, CATD, Fort Benning, GA
US Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO
Combat Doctrine Development, Army Medical Dept Center and School,
Fort Sam Houston, TX
Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA
3-16 Cavalry, US Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY
1-360th Infantry Battalion, 2nd-91st Brigade, Fort Carson, CO
Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS
DOTD, Fort Rucker, AL
C Company 7th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, NC
Marine Corps
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA
Marine Special Operations Command Detachment 1, Camp Pendleton, CA
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1, Yuma, AZ
2nd Battalion 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division, I MEF, Camp Pendleton, CA
3rd Battalion 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division, I MEF, Camp Pendleton, CA
1st Battalion 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, I MEF, 29 Palms, CA
1st Battalion 8th Marines, 2nd Marine Division, II MEF, Camp LeJeune, NC
Provost Marshal Office, MCAS Miramar, CA
Infantry Officer Course, The Basic School, MCCDC, Quantico, VA
Marine Air Control Squadron 23, Marine Forces Reserve, Buckley AFB, CO
Navy
Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport RI
Air Force
Air Combat Command/DOTW, Langley AFB, VA
Air Combat Command/Joint Air Ground Office, Langley AFB, VA
Air Combat Command/DOYC JTAC/Air-Ground Office, Langley AFB, VA
Air Combat Command, Security Forces A-3/SFO Moody AFB, GA
Air Force Special Operations Command, Weapons and Tactics Division, Hurlburt Field, FL
1. Planning Considerations
a. Planning Overview. Commanders must consider numerous factors when planning and
preparing for a cordon and search operation. Commanders and their staffs apply the same
steps used in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). When the objective of the cordon
and search operation is a high payoff target (HPT), the planning time can be extremely limited
between when a battalion first receives the mission from "higher" and when it is actually
executed. Given the complexity of the mission and the many assets task organized to support
the operation, planning time may require immediate collaborative planning by key leaders of all
the elements and a very accelerated MDMP. As in all cases the quality of the information
associated with mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time, troops available and civilian (METT-
TC) becomes critical. Commanders should ask, “What is the focus of our planning?” In
particular the “civilian” part of the factors of METT-TC should be specifically considered.
(1) Terms. The following four terms are used when discussing cordon and search
operations throughout this publication:
(a) Objective Area—The area where the cordon and search takes place.
(b) Target Area—The area immediately surrounding the target, which may be a
house, a series of houses, etc.
(c) Target—The location of the HPT, weapons cache, etc.
(d) Objective—The goal of the operation.
(2) Population. The basic principle when conducting any search of a village or built up
area is to complete the cordon and search mission with the least amount of disruption to the
local population as possible. The populace may be inconvenienced to the point where they may
discourage guerrillas and insurgent sympathizers from remaining, but not to the point that the
search drives them into sympathy with the movement. Respect for the inhabitants, their homes,
property, customs, traditions, and religion is of paramount concern. Rough handling and abuse
will alienate the populace, close the lines of communication, and drive the critical focus of the
insurgent’s efforts into the arms of the movement. Ideally a search within the area is conducted
by local forces with some US advisors, counterintelligence personnel, etc., as required.
Moreover, civilian populations in occupied areas are entitled to specific protections under the
law of war, including Geneva Convention (IV) and customary international law.
(3) Civil-Military Operations (CMO). If possible the cordon and search should be
executed as a combined civil and military operation. The presence of regional officials and local
police should not be automatic; their effectiveness will depend on how the population being
cordoned and searched views these officials: i.e., if as a friend—bring them; if as an enemy—
leave them behind. The operation can be enhanced if the host nation (HN) government has
intelligence roots in the area and the people are pro-government or neutral. The use of HN
forces can increase legitimacy of CMO.
(4) Goals for the Operation. These include the following:
(a) Psychological: a positive political message.
(b) Presence: show of force.
Note: The USMC employs only cordon and knock, not cordon and ask.
Note: If intelligence indicates several armed insurgents are at the target, the commander
might plan a support by fire (SBF) position with a crew-served weapon capable of
penetrating the building's walls to facilitate the assault force's entry, as well as
facilitating the tempo and aggressiveness of the assault team's clearance of the
building. If intelligence indicates a more passive target, the commander might elect
to knock on the door and allow the occupants to come to the consolidation point
before the assault force enters the room.
(3) TERRAIN—Terrain considerations for a cordon and search are similar to those for
most other operations in urban terrain. As with any military operation, commanders must
consider obstacles, avenues of approach (to include enemy avenues of withdrawal), key terrain,
observation/fields of fire, and cover and concealment when evaluating the terrain.
(4) TIME—The time available before mission execution determines whether the unit will
execute a hasty or deliberate cordon and search. Commanders must also consider the time of
day they are conducting these operations, whether they want to conduct them in the early
morning hours before people arise and go to work or if in warmer climates they want to conduct
"We conducted these operations in both day and night, depending on the
time sensitivity of the target, minimizing potential for collateral damage (i.e.,
most folks are off the streets in late night), the availability of resources to the
battalion, and the ability to achieve surprise. In some cases, the timing of the
operation is based on when the targeted activity occurs (i.e., blackmarketing)
or patterns detected for such activity. When conducting the operation at night
in the urban environment, vehicles should approach the objective area with no
lights and under NVGs if the illumination is poor and the sector of the city has
poor night lighting. In some cases of objectives in smaller villages and towns
where the entire village is the objective, the operation should often commence
just at Before Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT) so that the movement to the
objective area is under cover of darkness and yet the actual search can be
conducted in partial daylight. Working around the BMNT timing also
minimizes the COB interference on the operation.”
LTC Stephen Bruch
Battalion Commander
2-502nd 101st Air Assault Division
OIF 2003
f. Host-Nation Security Forces (HNSF) (Police and Military). It is critical that these forces
are integrated in the operation because it adds legitimacy to the HN government and ultimately
allows US forces to transition operational responsibilities to the host nation.
(1) HNSF have different levels of proficiency and capabilities. If not properly evaluated
HNSF can become a liability rather than an asset.
(2) Training should be conducted with these forces when possible to improve
capabilities, relationships, and confidence.
(3) Rehearsals are critical with these forces.
(4) Operational security may also be a concern when working with these forces. It is best
if they are only provided with generalities regarding execution time and location until they are
completely embedded and under the control of the mission commander.
(5) It may be necessary to assign a liaison officer (LNO) or specific individual(s) to
coordinate and control the actions of these security forces. The LNO should not take direct
control of this element but should communicate instructions directly to the HNSF element leader
and monitor for compliance.
(6) See chapter VI for HNSF logistical considerations.
2. Task Organization
a. Elements within the Cordon and Search Force. Organization of the force is similar to the
method used in task organizing a patrol or raid force, in that a general organization to conduct
major tasks is established. This breaks the unit into subelements. Subelements can be further
broken down into teams to conduct special tasks based on mission requirements. The below
figure depicts the task organization of a cordon and search force.
3. Snipers/Recon Infiltration
Snipers and/or small recon units can be used in order to secure routes into the objective
area as well as provide timely information concerning road conditions and civilian activity.
4. Search Considerations
a. Units conducting operations in Southwest Asia have found that search considerations
vary among provinces, cities, and neighborhoods. This will most likely be the case in future
theaters.
b. For each search, commanders must plan for a point to consolidate the occupants of a
building or set of buildings.
c. There are different types of searches, as follows:
(1) US-only Search. This search is conducted by the designated search team without an
informant or a member of the family or a worker from that building being present. This search
technique allows for a very rapid search and minimizes the number of personnel dedicated to
securing the building’s occupants. The disadvantage to this type of search comes from the fact
that US personnel may not know all the hiding spots in the building, may not have keys to all the
rooms or outer buildings, and it may place the search element in a position where they are
implicated in theft allegations. The US-only search is best used when time in the target location
must be minimized or troops are not available to escort occupants around a building.
(2) Occupant-assisted Search. This search is conducted with a selected occupant of the
household moving with the search element. This search technique allows the head person of
the building to observe the search and confirm that none of his property was stolen and
provides the US personnel with an indigenous person to open locked or possibly booby trapped
rooms or storage areas. The disadvantage to this search technique comes from the
requirement to devote extra personnel to secure the head person of the building during the
search. The occupant-assisted search is best used when time in the target building(s) is not
critical and when the intelligence on the target building is not very firm.
(3) Informant-assisted Search. This search is conducted with the informant assisting the
search team in their search. This search technique provides the search element with the actual
informant who provided the intelligence on the target building. The disadvantage to this
technique comes from the possibility of compromising the identity of your informant. Units must
provide an adequate disguise for their informant during this type of search. The informant-
assisted-search is best used when intelligence on the target building(s) is believed to be very
accurate.
Note: The identity of the informant may be compromised if taken into the target building as
part of an occupant-assisted search. The search element must search the entire
building and adjacent property in addition to the informant-identified areas.
6. Aviation Integration
a. Aviation should be a part of the planning process to include rehearsals. Aviators must
completely understand the ground maneuver plan, commander’s intent, and their task and
purpose for each phase of the operation. Air assets require the same mission planning
products as any ground unit: maneuver graphics, objective sketches, imagery, target-list
worksheet, air-ground integration smart card, and the communication plan. Additionally, friendly
marking techniques, clearance of fires, type of control (eyes on target; eyes on area); 9-line
close air support check-in briefing; aviation ROE, route clearance, and downed aviator/aircraft
issues create additional situations that must be covered during planning and rehearsals,
preferably with the aviators present.
b. While attack and reconnaissance helicopters are the primary air asset used during
cordon and search operations, fixed-wing aircraft and utility helicopters may also be employed.
The first step in successful integration of fixed-wing aircraft begins with the ground maneuver
unit’s air liaison officer/JTAC. For fixed-wing assets to be available, they must be requested,
allocated, and published on an air tasking order. Procedures to request immediate air support
are located in Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close
Air Support (CAS), and in the Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower
[FM 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP (I) 3-2.6].
c. Weapons effects and employment are also important planning factors in cordon and
search operations. Refer to Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation
Urban Operations [FM 3-06.1/ MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP 3-01.09/AFTTP (I) 3-2.29] for more specific
information.
Commanders must plan for media being present throughout their operational area and
possibly embedded with the unit during cordon and search operations. News reporting provides
11. Communications
a. Well organized and understood communication lines tie the various elements of a
cordon and search mission together. Communication planning must not only define the
methods to communicate between elements but also the form of that communication. Visual
means such as hand and arms signals, laser pointers and/or designators, infra-red spotlights,
chemical lights, and wolf-tails must be understood by all elements as to their purpose and
meaning. Planning for voice communication must identify the designated radio frequencies for
the various elements (i.e., medical evacuation [MEDVAC]/casualty evacuation [CASEVAC],
indirect fire, close air support [CAS]) and to use brevity codes, key phrases, and report formats.
b. As most cordon and search missions will occur in urban or built up areas, particular
attention must be given to those conditions that will inhibit or prevent communication. The
presence of high power lines, generators, structures, and battlefield haze or smoke are
considerations when identifying the means of communication between the elements of the
mission. Backup and redundant communication means are necessary to ensure reliable C2 of
the mission. In some cases it may be necessary to have designated runner/courier teams to
carry messages between elements.
c. When HNSF are integrated into the cordon and search mission it will be necessary to
integrate their communication means. The designation of interpreters and their training to
operate radios or other equipment will be essential if the HNSF are operating as a separate
element. In some cases this may involve using commercial cell phones or nonsecure radios
which will make it necessary to develop code word and brevity phrases that will transmit
command and control instructions with some degree of security.
1. General
a. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) includes information about terrain and
weather and civil considerations as well as the enemy. (The six factors of METT-TC—mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations—make up the major subject categories relevant information is grouped for
military operations.) In cordon and search operations, civilian considerations are prominent in
IPB analysis.
b. The successful conduct of cordon and search operations relies on the willing support
and cooperation of the populations directly involved. Cultural awareness is needed to
understand the motivations of the parties involved in the conflict and the population as a whole.
This requires a detailed understanding of the civil considerations of the area in which US forces
operate and thereby places a heavy reliance on the use of HUMINT.
c. The objective area in cordon and search operations includes three primary components:
the physical, military, and civilian considerations of the area. These components provide a
structure for intelligence personnel to focus and organize to provide support to cordon and
search operations. These entities are interdependent, not separate, and enable the
commanders to gain an in-depth understanding of their objective area during cordon and search
operations and to provide a focus for the intelligence analyst.
d. Expect terrain in cordon and search operations to be complex. Some of the factors that
ought to be considered are the density of construction and population within the objective area,
the street patterns within the urban areas, and compartmentalization of areas within the
objective area (such as areas separated by waterways or highways). Also functional zones
should be considered (for example, the functions different areas serve within the objective area,
such as residential, commercial, and government areas) as well as the potential for significant
differences in receptiveness/cooperative nature of the populace within subsections of the
objective area and areas surrounding the objective area to cordon forces.
2. Civilian Considerations
a. Civilian considerations comprise the manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and
attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an objective
area that influence the conduct of military operations. Factors of interest include the gender and
mix of the populace; the cultural, religious, and socio-economic beliefs and thinking; and the
beliefs, attitudes, and actions of groups and individuals.
b. US leaders should identify and meet with key local leaders early in the operation. These
key personnel can provide valuable information needed for successful completion of the
operations, to include local infrastructure, a common picture of cultural norms, suspected enemy
strengths, and probable means of support and locations for enemy forces. Support from local
leaders usually means support from the populace. US leaders can assess the support of the
populace by actions of the local leaders to them during meetings.
c. Commanders must realize that the local populace will behave in their perceived self-
interest. They are keenly aware of five sets of interests at work: those of the US forces, the
insurgent/hostile elements, the local opportunists, the legitimate government, and the general
In Chechnya, Chechen rebels and Hezbollah terrorists effectively used the cover of
refugees to attack occupying forces. The Chechens counted on the ferocious nature of
the Russian counterattack to cause heavy civilian casualties in order to gain support from
the indigenous population for the Chechen separatist cause.
In Fallujah, Iraqi enemy forces pretended to surrender in order to maneuver into
positions of advantage.
e. Defining the structure of the social hierarchy is often key to understanding the
population. Identifying local personnel in positions of authority is important. These local officials,
tribal leaders, or village elders are often the critical nodes of the society and influence the
actions of the population at large. In many societies nominal titles do not equal power, influence
does. Many “leaders” are mere figureheads, and the true authority lies elsewhere.
f. The ability of a mission planner and an intelligence analyst to identify and understand
trends and patterns of activity is essential in providing commanders with information they need.
Every local area has discrete and discernible patterns of daily activity. The time of heaviest
activity along a line of communication is one case in point. Trade and business transactions,
market sales, religious practices, governmental functions, and criminal activity are other
examples of daily behavior that can be analyzed for consistencies. Disruptions or irregularities
in these patterns serve as a warning of insurgent activity or potential attack on US forces.
g. It is important to remember that while certain general patterns do exist, most areas are
normally composed of a multitude of different peoples, each with their own standards of
conduct. Treating the local population as a homogenous entity can lead to false assumptions,
cultural misunderstandings, and a poor understanding of the current situation. Individuals
normally act independently and in their own best interest. Their behavior will not always
coincide with friendly courses of action. Do not ignore the presence or actions of the different
population components within an objective area when developing assessments.
Note: Imagery can assist in planning and execution with HN forces who may not be familiar
with reading maps.
f. Urban areas will contain varying degrees of physical infrastructure. This infrastructure
will at a minimum include a transportation network, utilities, government buildings, hospitals,
schools, food processing and distribution centers, and communications facilities. The
infrastructure may be relatively simple or it may be highly complex and sophisticated. For
example, transportation infrastructure in one city may be a simple network of streets; in another
city it may consist of sophisticated port facilities, rail networks, airports, large highways,
subways, and other modes of public transportation. In the latter case, such a city would be the
transportation hub for the region in which it is located.
g. In addition to the physical infrastructure of power plants, transportation networks, and
the like, cities also have a service infrastructure: police, fire, and other government services;
food and water availability and distribution; medical services; fuel and electricity; the news
media and information flow; and others. This sort of infrastructure may be quite sophisticated
and an integral part of the city’s life, it may be virtually nonexistent, or it may exist in a state of
ineffectiveness.
h. Within urban areas and urban zones.
(1) City Core. The city core is the heart of the urban area—the downtown or central
business district. It is relatively small and compact, but contains a larger percentage of the
(2) Core Periphery. The core periphery is located at the edges of the city core. The core
periphery consists of streets 12 to 20 meters wide with continuous fronts of brick or concrete
buildings. The building heights are fairly uniform—two or three stories in small towns, five to ten
stories in large cities. Dense random and close orderly block are two common construction
patterns that can be found within the city core and core periphery zones.
(4) Close Orderly Block Construction. Wider streets generally form rectangular patterns
in this area. Buildings frequently form a continuous front along the blocks. Inner-block
courtyards are common.
(5) Dispersed Residential Area. This type of area is similar to close-orderly block areas
in Europe. The pattern consists of row houses or single-family dwellings with yards, gardens,
trees, and walls. Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving.
(6) High-Rise Area. Typical of modern construction in larger cities and towns, this area
consists of multistoried apartments, separated open areas, and single-story buildings. Wide
streets are laid out in rectangular patterns. These areas are often contiguous to industrial or
transportation areas or interspersed with close-orderly block areas.
(8) Permanent or Fixed Fortifications. These include any of several different types and
may be considered isolated forts, such as the Hue Citadel in Vietnam and the German
fortifications that surrounded Metz, or as part of a fortified line (Siegfried and Maginot Lines).
While most of these fortifications are found in Western Europe, many can be found in the
Balkans, Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America. Those in the United States are mostly of
the coastal defense type. Permanent fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick,
concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or any combination of the above. Some of the latest
variants are built underground and employ heavy tank or warship armor, major caliber and other
weapons, internal communications, service facilities, and chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) overpressure systems.
(10) Street Patterns and Effects. Knowledge of street patterns and widths gives
commanders and leaders a good idea of whether or not mobility corridors in different zones can
permit wheeled or tracked vehicles and facilitate command and control. For example, a
rectangular, radial, radial ring, or combined pattern facilitates movement and control better than
irregular patterns. See figure II-10 for a description of common street patterns within the AI and
AO.
2. Command Element
a. The command element is the headquarters that provides C2 for the cordon and search
mission and may have several combat multipliers attached. Frequently, a commander is given
a variety of assets to assist him in accomplishing his mission. Ideally, the commander will task
organize his assets in order to maintain control of no more than three to five elements.
b. The location of the command element must provide the ability to control the subordinate
teams and supporting assets of the cordon and search mission. The ability to observe the
search/assault element will generally cause the command element to collocate with the inner
cordon. Visibility and communication capability will be deciding factors in identifying the best
location for the command element during the actual mission.
c. The composition of the command element may be as small as the commander and a
radio operator or may include security vehicles, interpreters, HN officials and/or local authorities.
The command element must remain mobile and able to move to any point within the cordon and
search operation to ensure coordination of all elements and supporting assets. When HN
forces or authorities are involved in the operation, the command element coordinates with them
and integrates them as identified during the planning phase of the operation. Operation and
communication security must be guiding principles when conducting integrated operations with
HN forces.
d. The command element is the single point of coordination for supporting assets and for
status reporting to higher headquarters. As a critical component of the cordon and search
3. Security Element
a. Primary Task. Total isolation of the target area is the objective of the security element.
The security element limits enemy or civilian influence in the objective area and prevents targets
from escaping the cordon. They may have to use multiple avenues of approach and operate
decentralized to accomplish their mission. They may have to establish multiple blocking
positions and observation posts (OPs) and conduct patrols in order to isolate the target area.
The security element may include:
(1) Vehicle-mounted sections or platoons
(2) Interpreter(s)
(3) Detainee teams
(4) Crowd control teams
(5) OPs
(6) TCPs or blocking positions
(7) HNSF (military or police)
(8) Integrated aviation assets
(9) Dismounted squads or platoons
(10) Female search teams
b. The Outer Cordon. The conduct of the outer cordon is an integral part of the security
element in any cordon and search operation. The outer cordon isolates the objective area and
prevents enemy or civilian influence. As such it requires detailed planning, effective
coordination, and meticulous integration and synchronization to achieve the combined arms
effects, lethal and nonlethal, required for mission execution.
(1) Some considerations for the outer cordon include:
(a) Vehicles for TCPs and/or blocking positions
(b) Battlespace geometry—fire planning and coordination
(c) Overwatch positions
(d) Aviation assets to observe target area and inform outer cordon if vehicles or
persons leave the target area. Constant communication between the aviation element and the
outer cordon will better facilitate the isolation of the target area.
(e) An initial detainee collection point for the receipt and temporary holding of
detainees.
(f) An initial material collection point for consolidation of captured material.
(2) Each subordinate outer cordon element (TCP, blocking position) must have a
designated leader and a clear task and purpose. Weapon systems to consider for outer cordon
positions are tracked and wheeled vehicles with weapons systems, crew-served weapons,
javelin with the command launch unit (CLU), and snipers or designated marksman.
(3) The leader of the outer cordon element must develop and maintain situational
awareness (SA) of his area of responsibility as well as the areas of the inner cordon and the
search elements. This will enable him to anticipate threat activity, control direct and indirect
fires, and facilitate the achievement of the outer cordon’s task and purpose. Aviation assets,
communications systems, and reporting procedures must be implemented to facilitate SA for the
entire element.
4. Search/Assault Element
a. The search/assault element’s mission is to assault, clear, and search the target to
capture kill or destroy the targeted individuals and/or materials. The search/assault element
initiates action once the outer and inner cordons are in place. The element accomplishes its
mission by gaining a foothold on or in the target to clear all enemy and noncombatant
8. Deception Techniques
Deception can be an effective tool to avoid mission compromise when approaching a target.
Any technique that makes the cordon and search force appear to have a different mission or
objective will aid in success. Several techniques that have been tried successfully include:
9. Driving Considerations
a. Night Driving. Ambient light from urban areas and civilian traffic severely affects night
optics; which in turn affects visibility and the driver’s ability to react as well as see long
distances. For night driving it is essential that all drivers have and are experienced with the use
of night vision goggles (NVGs)/night optical devices (NODs). While night optics increase
capability at night, they are not fool proof. Visibility can be enhanced by placing IR
chemlights/IR beacons on the antennas, front, and rear of vehicles, allowing safe travel and
dispersion between vehicles. IR headlights are an essential element for successful tactical
driving at night.
b. Day Driving. Daily traffic patterns will impact the ingress and egress from an objective
area. Commanders must expect and address civilian traffic jams that will inevitably be caused
by roadblocks; planned alternate routes of ingress and egress are essential. Attempts should
be made to take advantage of cultural traffic patterns that lessen the amount of traffic on the
roads. Times of religious observance, nonworkdays, night time, and time periods of extreme
heat (siesta) or foul weather are ideal times for conducting cordon and search operations from a
traffic perspective.
c. Terrain and Weather Considerations. Terrain conditions on roads must be addressed
prior to commencing any operation. Dust from poorly repaired or country roads can slow the
cordon forces approach to the target. Moreover, poor road conditions can hinder movement
into/off the target. Weather considerations must also be used for planning. Extreme wind, heat,
and storms can hinder approach and C2. However, extreme weather conditions can mask the
noise/visual signature of approaching units as well as reduce local traffic. Cordon and search
elements must also be aware of driving hazards and terrain features such as canals, ditches, or
pipelines that significantly restrict movement.
(3) Some disadvantages of this technique are that it requires multiple routes, control
measures/battle tracking (i.e., phase lines or check points to ensure that the positions are
emplaced simultaneously), makes control a little more difficult for the commander, potentially
makes CASEVAC more difficult, and spreads out the elements' combat power. It may also
increase the probability of the outer cordon elements coming into contact with IEDs or direct fire
engagements. Vehicles and the HN populace may get trapped between the inner and outer
cordon and cause unnecessary panic and control issues. In summary, disadvantages include:
c. Sequential Occupation. This occurs when the elements occupy multiple positions in
sequence. (See figures III-7, III-8, and III-9.)
(1) The outer cordon is established first to isolate the objective.
(2) The inner cordon is the next step to further isolate specific target areas and entry
points.
(3) The support element should be positioned where it can best support the other
elements based upon established planning priorities.
(4) The search/assault element should move in and begin executing when conditions
have been set by the other elements.
(5) Advantages
(a) Ease of control.
(b) Simplicity for planning and execution.
(6) Disadvantages
(a) Less effective at timely isolation of the objective area and the target.
(b) Allows the enemy initial freedom to reposition or hide personnel and materials.
d. Sequential emplacement of the outer cordon elements, or using one route in, and having
outer cordon elements pass through the objective area is another technique. This technique
facilitates C2, keeps combat power massed, facilitates CASEVAC, requires less planning, and
the need for additional control measures and battle tracking to ensure synchronization.
However, the elements approaching the objective from one side may be observed by the enemy
and the targeted individual(s) may be able to escape, hide, prepare a counter attack, or
emplace an IED.
(a) Advantages
• Flexibility
• Security
• Speed
Note: Doors should be checked before they are breached. They may be unlocked.
Note: Understand the limitations of using a shotgun for room clearing because of its limited
magazine capacity and the difficulty of reloading the weapon. Various shotgun
rounds can be used for ballistic breaching. The assault teams need to be familiar
with the advantages as well as the disadvantages of each type of round. Leaders
must take in consideration over penetration through walls and floors.
b. Explosive (Demolition) Breach. The order of movement for an explosive breach without
engineer support is:
(1) No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, and then No. 4. The No. 1 man provides security at the doorway.
(2) The No. 2 man carries the demolition charge and places it.
(3) The No. 3 man provides security overhead, and the No. 4 man provides rear security.
(4) After the demolition charge is placed, the team moves to covered positions and
prepares to enter in the standard 1, 2, 3, 4 order. Refer to FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms
Operations in Urban Terrain, chapter 8, sections 9 to 11, for breaching reinforced and non-
reinforced exterior walls, interior walls and partitions, and door-breaching charges. The Marine
Corps also has published MCIP 3-35.01, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reduction of
Urban Area Strongpoints. It contains valuable information about breaching techniques.
c. Mechanical Breach. A suggested order of movement for a mechanical breach is the
initial assault team in order, followed by the breach man or element. At the breach point, the
assault team leader brings the breach team forward while the assault team provides local
security. After the breach is conducted, the breach team moves aside and provides local
security as the assault team enters the breach.
g. Controlling the Situation. By dominating the room and eliminating any threat, the assault
team seizes control of the room and the initiative from the enemy. Inaction or slow execution
gives the initiative back to any hostile element in the room. Live noncombatants or friendly
personnel not engaged must also be controlled. The control measures used can be both verbal
and physical. The team leader or a designated team member must immediately begin speaking
to any people in the room in a loud, commanding voice. He must take charge. Verbal control
may be difficult because of the loss of hearing resulting from explosives and firearms use.
Verbiage should be short and to the point, and it should be loud enough to be heard by those
whose hearing may have been damaged by the sound of gunfire and explosives. Physical
control must be firm, but not overly harsh.
17. Searches
a. A search can orient on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain. It usually involves both
local police and Service members. The commander must decide whether the unit will conduct a
detailed search or a hasty search depending on the intelligence available. Escort parties and
transportation must be arranged before the search of a house. The object of a house search is
to screen residents to determine if there are any targeted individuals and groups, and to look for
The following TTP and lessons learned are important factors for commanders to consider
when planning and executing aviation operations in support of cordon and search operations.
Some of the TTPs in this chapter have been taken from the Center for Army Lessons Learned
(CALL) database on recent operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and from lessons
learned from our allies. Aviation support in the cordon and search operation provides the
ground commander increased SA, reconnaissance, security, flexibility, fires, and C2. In order to
successfully employ airpower, there must be close integration with the aviation assets from the
beginning planning stages, through execution, and after-action reporting. Many of the planning
and execution factors can be found in Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Aviation Urban Operations [FM 3-06.1/MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP 3-01.04/AFTTP(I)3-2.29].
2. Air-Ground Coordination
a. General Considerations.
(1) Effective integration of air and ground assets begins with detailed mission planning.
(2) The aviation LNO or air officer also plays a critical role in keeping the aviation assets
abreast of current operations. It is also critical that the aviation LNO is an integral part of the
COA development process in order to ensure integration of aviation assets.
(3) Due to the nature of most cordon and search operations, the urban environment
presents unique requirements, threats, and limitations for air-to-ground operations.
(4) Airspace C2 ensures deconfliction of the battlespace.
b. Planning Considerations.
(1) Minimal planning time.
(2) Threats/enemy forces.
(3) Weather.
(4) Ground Commander Scheme of Maneuver and Intent. It is imperative that all
aircrews have a clear understanding of the task and purpose of the mission. Commanders
should also decide when and where to first integrate aviation assets (security versus surprise).
(5) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Requirements. Traditional ISR
platforms (satellite, JSTARS, dedicated UAS, etc.) generally require long lead times for tasking
and analysis. However, many theater airborne platforms can be dynamically tasked/re-roled to
support time-critical/dominant operations. Nontraditional ISR platforms (AC-130, fighters with
targeting pods, rotary wing, FLIR, etc.) can respond faster and provide real-time reconnaissance
of the target.
(6) Asset Availability. Due to limited resources and high demand, aviation assets may
not be available. Planners must know what is available and integrate assets accordingly.
(7) Command, Control, and Communications (C3). A simple communications plan is
essential for effective C2.
b. Utility Rotary Wing Aviation Assets in the Cordon and Search. Utility aircraft can provide
reconnaissance, air assault/movement of fighting forces and supplies, airborne C2 as well as
limited enemy suppression.
c. General Rotary Wing Capabilities in the Cordon and Search.
(1) Command and Control. Rotary wing assets provide excellent C2 platforms due to
their ability to fly at slower speeds and see the battlespace as a whole. Utility aircraft are best
utilized for this purpose, however, attack and reconnaissance aircraft can provide limited C2 ISR
functions by providing situational awareness.
(2) Security and Reconnaissance.
(3) Aircraft can provide security and reconnaissance over specified areas, zones, routes,
and rooftops.
(4) Close Combat Attacks (CCA)(USA) Rotary Wing CAS (USMC). Rotary wing aircraft
can be used to conduct attacks with a wide variety of weapons systems and ordnance. Due to
Note: The USMC does not own any organic UAS that have the ability to perform radio relay
or auto-retransmit.
(2) ISR. UAS like Global Hawk and Predator were designed as ISR assets. They
possess data collection capabilities, including EO and IR cameras, synthetic aperture radar
(SAR), and other specialized sensors. Data obtained is normally routed to distributed common
ground station locations for processing, analysis, and exploitation and can be transmitted
directly to the tactical user when required. ROVER video links may increase SA when equipped
ground forces are escorted by the UAS in a direct support role.
(3) Support for CAS Operations. Some UAS are equipped with both laser target
designator and NVG-compatible laser illuminator designator, enabling laser operations and
close coordination with other tactical assets. Long loiter and slow speeds permit methodical
sensor scans of urban canyons. The Predator’s ROVER capability to transmit sensor video
directly to ground parties, including JTACs, has proven effective during combat operations.
Predator employs the AGM-114 Hellfire in three variations: shaped charge (AGM-114K), blast-
fragmentation (AGM-114M, modified AGM-114K), and inert kinetic round. The Army Hunter
UAS has also been equipped to carry the Viper Strike (modified brilliant antitank) round, a
precision low channel designator (CD) weapon.
1. SOF Overview
a. More missions are now being conducted by combined SOF and conventional forces
(CF), either in supporting roles or as fully integrated forces. This chapter discusses the basic
principles for effectively integrating and employing forces as a multi-Service warfighting team to
maximize the overall capabilities of the unit at the tactical level during cordon and search
operations. Operations employing SOF and CF, which rely heavily on increased cooperation
and mutual support, make it necessary that United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM),
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the Services change their
current planning and training frameworks to better reflect present and future operational
employment scenarios. Previously, joint SOF and CF planners focused on deconfliction of
operations when needed, but combat operations in OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) demonstrated that a degree of SOF/CF integration at all levels are important to mission
success.
b. The capstone manual for employment of SOF is JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special
Operations. It serves as the overarching reference for application of SOF capabilities and
provides detailed information on SOF C2, employment, and support at the operational level. As
such, Service and subordinate manuals refer to JP 3-05 when developing added guidance for
SOF employment It is also the reference for theater and joint task force (JTF) commanders and
below for SOF implementation.
SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish nine core tasks: direct
action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare,
counterterrorism, PSYOP, civil affairs operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and information operations.
4. Integrated Operations
a. Our national military strategy recognizes today’s uncertain world requires flexible and
interoperable forces that can respond quickly to the multitude of potential crises that may
threaten US vital national interests. To respond to these crises, the nation’s evolving force
structure must be both capable and responsive to implement and enforce the strategy that will
protect our national interests. The exact composition of a given force depends on the nature of
the crisis and the prevailing strategic politico-military environment. Such “adaptive force
packaging” seeks to maximize the capabilities of operational execution. This section focuses on
5. Planning Considerations
a. The CF maneuver commander and the SOF unit commander must clearly delineate who
will conduct which portion of the cordon and search operation, ensuring that the capabilities of
each unit are maximized. Depending upon the size and scope of the operation, Joint S-2/S-3
planning cells should be implemented to integrate SOF and conventional units for the conduct of
a cordon and search operation. The staff involved in planning an operation may vary between a
joint level staff to a JTF commander and operational detachment-Alpha (ODA) team leader.
b. The CF commander must consider that since SOF normally operate in small elements;
they do not possess sufficient combat power to confront enemy forces for a sustained period.
However, properly used, SOF offer specialized, yet complementary capabilities to the CF
commander.
c. Commanders should not use SOF as a substitute for other forces. Key items for
consideration during planning include:
(1) Conduct a mission analysis to determine if the tasking is appropriate for use of SOF.
(a) The best use of SOF is against key strategic or operational targets that require
SOF-unique skills and capabilities. If the targets are tactical, the use of SOF is not appropriate.
(b) The mission should support the theater geographic combatant commander’s
campaign plan. If the mission does not support the JFC’s campaign plan, more appropriate
missions are probably available for SOF.
(c) The mission should be operationally feasible. During COA analysis, the SOF
commander must realistically evaluate his force. Planners must understand that SOF are not
structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare. They should not assign missions that are
beyond SOF capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.
(2) Ensure SOF input on how the CF commander’s intent and operational plan can be
supported.
(3) Bring SOF fully and early into the planning and coordination process.
(4) Recognize the characteristics and capabilities/limitations of each other’s forces.
(5) Make force protection arrangements for SOF.
(6) Provide SOF with any non-SOF resources required to successfully execute the
mission.
3. Detainee Operations
a. International law, military training, ROE, and ethical principles demand that EPWs,
detainees, and civilians be accorded the utmost humane treatment:
(1) Ensure procedures of 5-S’s and T (search, silence, segregate, safety, speed, and
tag) are followed.
(2) Use blindfolds for detainees (IAW ROE). Have available sand/dust goggles, duct
tape, neck gaiters, pressure dressings. Standardize EPW kits.
(3) Gather detainee packets with vehicles or at a collection point.
4. Medical
a. Medical providers provide prompt medical treatment consisting of those measures
necessary to locate, recover, resuscitate, stabilize, and prepare patients for evacuation to the
next level of care or to return to duty. To facilitate effective medical support, the medical
provider must coordinate communications, security, and other support requirements with
appropriate local units prior to commencing operations.
(1) Ensure one or two medical providers are located at the CCP and one medical
provider is located with the assault/search element.
(2) Ensure medical providers are equipped to support the type of casualties likely to
occur in an urban environment—blast effects, broken bones, higher number of head wounds
etc. Ensure they are prepared to triage on site.
(3) Establish a CCP and coordinate evacuation plans with local/theater casualty/medical
evacuation assets.
(4) Ensure planning considers that evacuation times in urban operations may be much
longer than normal.
(5) Employ standardized air and ground medical evacuation resources. Use the most
expeditious means possible to evacuate a casualty. Consider the use of air ambulances as the
means of medical evacuation according to METT-TC and the condition of the casualty. Urban
terrain may make this difficult and needs to be planned in advance.
(6) Ensure the required coordinated plan establishing guidance for pre-positioned
ambulance utilization/dispatch is prepared.
(7) Appoint/identify a primary and alternate medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) coordinator.
The MEDEVAC coordinator should not be the unit leader or the aid provider. Ensure both
primary and alternate MEDEVAC coordinators are trained/competent regarding current
MEDEVAC procedures.
Note: Disposal/release of such equipment should be IAW the affected unit’s standard
operating procedures (SOP).
(9) Coordinate with the next level of care to ensure advance preparation to receive
casualties.
(10) Ensure all casualties have a medical information card per the unit SOP (one carried
on gear and one carried on their person) filled out before the operation begins.
(11) Provide armored evacuation and security platforms if possible.
(12) Develop a mass casualty plan.
(13) Ensure, when possible, casualties are not evacuated with deceased military
personnel or with detainees.
(14) Ensure medics organize and control activities within a casualty collection point.
They should be assisted by additional medics or other available personnel. Casualties must be
triaged and segregated based on triage assessment in order to expedite treatment and
evacuation. Security must be maintained at all times at this location.
(15) Use a lightweight casualty evacuation cart. It can greatly assist in moving
casualties away from contact and to a treatment location.
b. To establish a CCP, use the following techniques:
(1) CCP inside of a building/courtyard. Mark each corner with a distinctive color or other
marker.
(a) Use the closest corner to place urgent casualties.
(b) Use the next closest corner to place priority casualties.
(c) Use one of the far corners to place routine casualties.
(d) Use the remaining corner or preferably a separate room for friendly dead.
(e) Use an adjacent room for enemy wounded.
(2) CCP in an open area.
(a) Establish a triangle. Mark each apex with a distinctive color or other marker.
(b) From six o’clock to ten o’clock place urgent casualties.
(c) From ten o’clock to two o’clock place routine casualties.
(d) From two o’clock to six o’clock place priority casualties.
(e) Place friendly dead out of sight and beyond the routine casualties.
(f) Place enemy casualties with security beyond the urgent casualties.
c. Triage is critical and must be conducted early so that medical personnel can properly
treat the most urgent casualties. Ideally for casualty survival arterial bleeding needs to be
stopped within 5 minutes, within 10 minutes patient should be packaged for evacuation, within
30 minutes casualties should be further assessed by a physicians assistant or a medical doctor,
and within 1 hour the casualty should be under a surgeon's care.
Note: Additional Class I stores may be required if detainees are anticipated. Planning
should address this possibility.
(2) Class II—Planning considerations must be given to what supplies are needed such
as engineer tape, chemlights, 550 cord, duct tape, batteries (at least enough for all equipment to
be powered for 48 hours), and other items that will be required for the mission.
(3) Class III—Fuel, oil, and other petroleum products must be brought in sufficient
quantity to support the operation. Additionally, propane or commercial vehicle fuel may be
brought in or controlled as part of action mitigation following the operation.
(4) Class IV—Barrier materials may be needed for TCPs/blocking positions or detainee
collection points. Consider including traffic cones, spike strips, concertina wire, and signs, if
available.
(5) Class V—Sufficient ammunition must be on hand and available for any anticipated
engagement. One technique is to have ammunition prepositioned forward so that ammunition
can be quickly resupplied in the event of a prolonged engagement. Include ammunition
requirements for HNSF.
(6) Class VI—Sundry packs may be obtained to distribute following the mission as part of
perception management.
(7) Class VIII—Stretchers (preferably one for every two vehicles), a lightweight casualty
evacuation cart, medical bags, and other items must be restocked and positioned where they
can support any friendly, enemy, or civilian casualties.
(8) Class IX—Spare tires, fan belts, and a small parts package may be brought for minor
repairs.
Overview
This appendix contains an overview of lessons learned concerning cordon and search
operations during recent combat operations and includes historical examples in order to
document effective and ineffective TTP across a broad spectrum of environments:
(1) MCIP 3-35.01, TTP for Reduction of Urban Area Strongpoints (USMC OIF Lessons
Learned)
(2) Air-Ground Integration (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL] Handbook Cordon
and Search, chapter 11)
Although these groups tended to congregate in houses close to one another, they have
fought as individual groups rather than establishing a mutually supporting series of positions.
Although Marines have taken some casualties from rooftop shootings, most of them were
incurred inside buildings where the enemy waited for Marines to come to him. This is contrary
to current doctrine that identifies the streets as “fatal funnels of fire” and warns Marines to enter
buildings rapidly and not stack in the street.
These latest tactics are probably a result of the Marines’ ability to dominate by fire the
streets and rooftops. The Marine Corps center for lessons learned (MCCLL) indicates most
engagements were initiated by the enemy opening fire on Marines as the latter were entering a
house or ascending the stairwell. The insurgents often used PKMs (7.62 machine gun) and
grenades to initiate the engagements and would usually continue to fight until killed. This does
not mean, however, that Marines were fighting an enemy that was universally suicidal. In many
instances, insurgents attempted to escape by throwing down their weapons and either tried to
evade Marine units or approached them pretending to be civilians. However, by all accounts,
the enemy encountered in Fallujah was far more willing to stand and fight to the death than
experiences elsewhere in Anbar province suggested. Lastly, the enemy generally did not
choose to conduct offensive operations at night.
Conduct a Penetration
Some battalions either chose or were compelled by the wording of their original tasking to
push as rapidly as possible to a designated objective. In doing so they accepted risk on their
flanks and to the rear of their forward units, a vulnerability that was frequently TTP for reduction
of urban area strongpoints exploited by the enemy. The lesson is not a new one in urban
warfare: Unless physically occupied by friendly forces, no area of a city is really secure. As an
example, one unit pushed through to seize its objectives ahead of schedule. However, it then
became necessary for the adjacent unit to move into the same area in order to clear it of
insurgents, incurring casualties in the process. This pattern was repeated several times and
nine weeks after the initial attack, units were losing Marines in areas that had been cleared and
then vacated. This problem would have been prevented if units conducting a penetration had
designated the bulk of their force to conduct detailed clearing behind the lead elements. All
battalions reported that they incurred more casualties during back clearing than during the
assault phase.
The dangers attendant in focusing on conducting an urban penetration without a plan for
detailed back clearing must be balanced against mission requirements and deferring the
clearing battles until a major objective is seized.
During the assault on Fallujah during November 2004, all but one of the infantry battalions
had tanks attached. These tank units were attached a few weeks prior to the operation and the
TTP continued to be refined throughout the operation. A tank section would typically be placed
in direct support of a company and would lead the way down streets with infantry clearing
adjacent buildings. The infantry companies dedicated dismounted squads to provide security to
each tank section since the tanks were "buttoned up” and had no other means to cover their
dead space.
Tankers preferred to keep their sections together. Tanks would fire into confirmed or
suspected enemy positions, typically using the 120mm high explosive antitank (HEAT) round
which limited collateral damage, while the tanks provided overwatch. The infantry would use
the “grunt phone” attached to the hull of the tank to communicate with the tank commander and
M203 smoke and smoke grenades to designate targets. Commanders and small unit leaders
paid great attention to geometry of fires since six battalions were operating in a relatively small
area. When using grids to designate targets, only 10 digit grids were used. One battalion used
a grid system of numbers and letters that worked well as a reference but was not exact enough
for targeting since a designator such as AB5 would refer to a block of 20 to 25 buildings. In
most cases, this was the first time that these infantry companies had worked with tanks and
most of these TTP were developed in the assembly area and refined during the actual
operation.
After action reports (AARs) from this operation noted that it would be prudent for all units
deploying to Iraq to train in CONUS with tanks and engineers in order to practice TTP such as
those developed in combat. This training should focus on breaching techniques, movement and
overwatch, tank/infantry communications, and relative positioning.
In order to provide background information on the nature of house clearing operations, the
following methods and recommendations on house clearing techniques were drawn primarily
from an AAR produced by K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which was heavily involved in
Operation Al-Fajr.
An infantry squad can assault structures using two different methods, each with
advantages and disadvantages. Doctrinally, the top down assault is taught as being the most
ideal method for clearing a structure. Surprising the enemy by moving from the top down may
Realistically, however, assaulting from the top down may not be the best option for the
infantry squad in every situation. When clearing from the top, once the squad makes entry and
contact is made, pulling out of the structure is extremely difficult. This limits the options for the
squad leader on how to engage the enemy. The structure must be flooded and Marines have to
go overtop of casualties in order to kill the enemy. Additionally, top down is unrealistic unless
an adjacent house is first cleared from bottom up, resulting in a force that can be stretched too
thin by simply providing security for itself.
If the squad decides to break contact they are moving opposite of their momentum and
more casualties will result. Momentum must not be lost. Marine squads may not have enough
Marines to effectively flood the structure. If casualties are taken they are nearly impossible to
pull up the ladder well with all their gear. This is another reason why the structure must be
flooded. The casualties will not receive immediate first aid because the entire squad must be
committed to neutralization of the threat. The swiftness of medical attention may mean the
difference between life and death.
Bottom Up Clearing
On the other hand “bottom up” clearing offers advantages. The squad leader has more
options when contact is made. The structure does not have to be flooded. Momentum can be
maintained in assaulting or breaking contact and the squad leader can switch rapidly from one
to the other relatively quickly. The structure can be cleared with fewer Marines because the
clearing is more controlled and smooth whereas top down is always in high gear. Casualties
can be pulled out faster and easier simply because gravity is working for the squad. But the
squad is moving into the enemy’s defenses. It is easy for the enemy to hold the second deck
and ladder well. The squad is slow moving up the ladder well, which makes it harder to
maintain momentum. The enemy has the ability to escape by using its preplanned routes.
Footholds
Footholds are extremely important. By establishing footholds the squad establishes strong
points during the assault that can be used for consolidation, coordination, base of fire positions,
rally points, and casualty collection points. The squad must move from one foothold to another
without stopping until each foothold is attained. The succession of footholds that the squad
establishes will be different when assaulting from either the top down or the bottom up.
• All rooftops.
• Inside top deck.
• Each individual lower level to the bottom deck.
• Courtyard (including external outhouses, workshops, and tool sheds).
Bottom Up Assault
• Front courtyard.
• First two seating rooms.
• Central hallway.
• Each successive upper deck with its respective rooftop.
• Uppermost rooftop.
At each individual foothold, the squad can consolidate and coordinate its further clearing of
the structure. If contact is made, the footholds can be used to establish a base of fire in order to
assault or break contact. When breaking contact, they are used as rally points in order for the
squad and fire team leaders to get accountability of all their Marines. The squad will bound
back through each foothold. A foothold can also be used as a casualty collection point.
During the assault on Fallujah, the use of sledgehammers in the assault breacher’s kit and
shot gun slugs played an important role in giving the assault elements the tools necessary to
decrease collateral damage. Sledgehammers were also useful in the construction of firing ports
inside houses when going firm or for sniper emplacement. Predeployment training, however,
must include instruction on shotgun employment. A leader must not have to stop advancing
during clearing of a house in order to give instruction on the proper procedures for safe and
effective shotgun gunnery. Stun or flash-bang grenades were also particularly useful for
extracting friendly casualties from inside enemy-dominated kill-zones. Flash-bangs would
suppress the enemy without injuring friendly forces, but were in short supply.
These options allowed the units to make dynamic entry without reverting to an explosive
breach. The units that had stun grenades were able to use these in situations to diminish
casualties to friendly personnel and noncombatants.
The hooligan tools in the breaching kits have tips that are typically too wide for the door
jambs in Iraq. In a high threat situation, explosive breaches become the best course of action.
However, few Marines are trained in how to set a breaching charge, even one as simple as the
use of detonation cord around a doorknob. An assault breacher’s course, of the type formerly
conducted by the special operations training groups, should be mandatory training for all military
occupational specialty 0351s although it would not be practical to add this training to the
curriculum at March Air Reserve Base. As a side note, the outside gates are almost always
constructed of metal and have no outside latch or doorknob. The best means of breaching
these is to ram them with a HMMWV. The amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), when available,
breaks down perimeter walls with ease.
Shotguns have proven to be an invaluable breaching tool for internal doors. However, the
need to be flexible must be emphasized because tactics will be different for every building,
whether it is a mosque, storefront, factory, or house.
Grenades
Grenades by themselves are not always effective in ensuring that the occupants of a
building are disabled prior to entry. In urban fighting in Iraq, it sometimes became necessary to
use grenades as a back up after using some other casualty producing munitions, such as
rockets fired into the building. Additionally, a unit AAR cited the use of M67 fragmentation
grenades during a fire fight in urban terrain to defeat the enemy. A depleted enemy squad was
protected by a series of unfinished concrete cubicles that stopped 5.56 millimeter and 7.62
millimeter rounds. To destroy this enemy, one squad had to close to within 10 meters and
employ hand grenades. The first two grenades thrown were not held for 2 or 3 seconds and
had no effects because the enemy had sufficient time to take cover. The following three
grenades were properly employed with devastating effects. Of a total seven enemy dead, only
two were confirmed as shot by 5.56-millimeter rounds. The platoon commander noted that,
while the Marines were almost completely unafraid of enemy fire, they were timid when it came
to using grenades.
Experience showed that significant improvements could be made in the ways in which
Marines are trained to use fragmentation grenades. The “prepare to throw” position is a
peacetime safety measure that results in negative learning. The position was never used in any
combat engagement. Additionally Marines are trained to hold the grenade in such a manner
that prevents the release of the spoon prior to throwing. This is another safety measure
designed to ensure that the full 5 seconds are available in training to take cover from a
mishandled grenade. One of the major lessons learned during combat was to release the
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spoon and wait 2 to 3 seconds before throwing to deny the enemy sufficient time to take cover.
The risks involved in the use of this TTP must be considered prior to its use.
Demolitions
When clearing a multistory building, task organize the assault platoons with engineers and
prefabricate breaching charges prior to the TTP for reduction of urban area strongpoints assault.
A good planning figure is 30 rooms per floor for a 200-meter by 200-meter square building. The
judicious use of demolitions will save the Marines’ energy for the tiring process of room clearing.
If contact is imminent, precede room entry with closed doors with a burst from the SAW or M-16.
The floors should be cleared with a reinforced rifle squad while the remainder of the platoon
remains in an assault position in the stairwell either above or below the floor being cleared. This
will reduce the fratricide risk and isolate the floor. A safe assumption is that each building will
have at least two stairwells. These must be secured as maneuver elements assault each floor.
When clearing at the ground level, the exact number and location of stairwells should be
determined. Note that other stairs may be located further into the building. Many multistory
buildings will have extensive subterranean areas. Always have a plan to attack downward into
the basement or utility floors.
While K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was fighting the battle and clearing their
sector of the AO, the exposure to enemy fire while attempting to breach the outer perimeter of
the houses in their sector proved to be too risky using their current methods. The outer metal
doors surrounding many of the homes had flat locks and bolt cutters could not be used nor
could detonation cords. A burst of 40-millimeter ammunition could be used but the decision not
to waste the ammunition was made. Using the attached AAVs, tanks, or a HMMWV to push
open the doors or knock a section of the wall down proved to be very quick and allowed for a
larger number of Marines to storm the building. The breaching of the metal roll down storage
units was challenging as well. Some of the locks were just too thick for the small bolt cutters to
accommodate. A HMMWV with an attached chain was used to rip open the door and this again
saved the unit time, ammunition, and energy. This method also proved useful for evacuating
injured Marines from rooms with barred/gated windows.
Training
There will be circumstances where detailed clearing of houses will be required. Training in
these techniques must be continued and reinforced. However, deficiencies in current training
K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines conducted extensive training at Stu Segall Studios,
MOUT (Urban Operations) town (Range 131, Camp Pendleton) and at March Air Reserve Base
(Division Stability and Support Operations Exercise) prior to deploying. Many of the TTP that
were employed during operations were not learned and rehearsed prior to deployment due to
range and training limitations. The limitations of size, building layout, building construction, and
range regulations at both Range 131 and March Air Reserve Base precluded training to the
standards that were required for operations. The training areas were not large enough in size to
facilitate a company’s maneuver with tracked and wheeled assets. Range regulations largely
prohibited the use of explosive breaching. Building construction and a lack of furnishings
(including doors with locking mechanisms and windows) prevented the ability to realistically
prepare for urban operations.
Specifically, units need to have the facilities support to conduct the following additional
platoon-sized urban operations training:
• Wheeled and mechanized asset integration require at least three streets amidst five
building lanes. Walls and buildings need to be constructed for tanks, AAVs, and
HMMWVs to be able to simulate making breaches. Streets should vary in width in
order to provide better training for the wheeled/tracked vehicles to maneuver within
tightly confined spaces. There is a need to “dirty up” urban operations facilities. Add
furniture, curtains, vehicles, and trash. This lets individuals hide and causes
significant problems searching and clearing rooms. Train to identify and to forward
items of intelligence value. Facilities need to have doors and windows with bars
added and Marines should be able to do both mechanical and explosive breaching
against real doors, both wood and reinforced metal doors with deadbolts. Put
furniture in all facilities. Blockade entrances to houses with furniture, forcing the
attacking unit to enter into the defender’s preplanned kill zone or be slowed by the
blockade.
• Marines need to be trained to remove doorknobs, hinges, and locking mechanisms
through explosive means (to include the shotgun). They also need to be trained to
make mouse holes through walls inside and outside of structures. The Fort Knox
urban operations facility provides an excellent facility for this training. Recommend
using this facility as a model for range regulations and for an inexpensive method to
explosively breach mouse holes, walls, loopholes, doors, etc.
• Facility needs to include current open construction at Range 131 (buildings built with
space between each structure), as well as tight construction where there is little to no
gap between buildings. Building type and construction also needs to vary. Again,
platoon-size is needed for both types of construction.
• Buildings need to be fully furnished. Recognize that the furniture will be destroyed.
It should not be set up in a neat and orderly manner.
• A good representation of a day’s work for a platoon tasked to clear in zone is an area
150 meters by 400 meters with three streets and multiple alleys running in a variety
of directions.
• An “urban grenade employment course” should be added to urban operations
training. The course could provide practical application instruction with blue bodies
through windows and doors, rooftops, and inside houses.
The 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm rounds did not penetrate the concrete and brick walls that
composed most of the city’s buildings. The .50 caliber round, however, proved to be very
effective in penetrating the walls.
The M-4 is more manageable inside tight spaces. Fully automatic AK-47s can quickly gain
fire superiority over single-shot M-16s, and Marines are primarily trained to fire the M-16 in the
single shot vice burst mode. Unit live fire training should address firing in the burst mode for
clearing rooms during pre-employment training. Reportedly, the determined and possibly
drugged enemy, with or without body armor, has sustained up to five shots to the body with 5.56
mm rounds and continued to fight.
Explosives
Most battalions made heavy use of their engineer squads that were attached to infantry
platoons, by employing multiple satchel charges and Bangalore Torpedoes to breach buildings
and kill the occupants. These charges were prepared in great quantities prior to the operation.
It proved to be a critical requirement to have breaching expertise at platoon level and below.
This weapon received very favorable reviews since it facilitated the weapon’s use inside
buildings.
Shotguns
Shotguns were used extensively for breaching and room clearing. Each battalion had on
average 20 to 25 of these. By all accounts, one to two per squad, for a total of 70 to 80 per
battalion would have been an allocation better suited to the demand.
Mortars
Both the 81 mm and the 60 mm rounds are perceived at the platoon level to be the most
responsive supporting arm. Mortars were used freely against enemy strongpoints, generating a
high demand for resupply. Unlike artillery that was fired in general support across the
battlespace, mortar fire was confined to directly supporting a battalion sector. Because of this,
demand for mortar rounds varied widely from sector to sector. Since there was no effective way
to redistribute mortar rounds from a less engaged battalion to a more heavily engaged unit,
additional rounds were pushed out. The result was a large turn-in by one unit and a perceived
shortage by another.
Rockets
Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided Missile II
This proved effective as a point destruction tool against enemy forces defending from
buildings. On one occasion, two tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW) missiles
Similar effects were achieved with the Javelin fired in the top attack mode on rooftop fighting
positions and “ladder-well pillboxes” standard to most Iraqi houses.
Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon
The shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW) high explosive (HE) and
antitank (HEAT) round was used for breaching and as a means of destroying the enemy inside
buildings. The shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon-novel explosive (SMAW-NE)
(thermobaric) round proved to be especially effective for the latter purpose. The only limitation
was the number of rounds that could be carried. SMAWs were used with such frequency that in
most cases resupply could not keep pace with expenditure. For instance, one company fired
250 SMAW rounds.
SMAW-NE rounds were highly effective only when shot into enclosed spaces (such as a
room) through a window. If the round impacted short or on an external surface and did not
enter a closed space, then the effects were minimal to ineffective. The SMAW is an outstanding
counter weapon to the RPG; however the RPG can be fired from many more positions due to its
significantly smaller back blast.
The M-203 Grenade Launcher was used with good effect but with the same limitation with
regard to the number of rounds that could be carried.
Combat Support
Engineers
D-9 bulldozers received highly favorable reviews. A D-9 cleared a row of buildings
effectively within an extremely short period of time. The infantry company commander seemed
to prefer this asset to others (D-7, armored combat earthmover) as it could reduce the largest
structures and survive most small arms fire engagements. The D-9 proved to be an extremely
capable asset in house clearing. It was instrumental to coining the tactical task of “Recon by
Destruction” wherein the enemy’s location is identified by the destructive removal of his hidden
strongpoints. Many enemy bodies surrounded by weapons were found in rubble left behind by
the D-9.
Communication with the D-7/D-9 was difficult and often required the rifle platoon to sacrifice
one of its personal role radios for responsive and timely communications. When engineers are
attached to rifle platoons, key leaders need to ensure that the engineer is familiar with
established platoon SOPs and his role when in contact.
Due to the unstable nature of the city terrain, the D-9 often became stuck during building
reduction operations and organic assets (another D-9, tank, AAV, AAV-R7, etc.) were not
capable of recovering the D-9. Eventually, the combat service support battalion (CSSB)
dispatched its M-88 to support some D-9 recoveries.
The AAV up-gunned weapons system provided accurate, high volume fire in support of
building entry. Armor piercing .50 caliber fires from the AAVs were invaluable when providing
suppression through brick and concrete buildings. The AAV was successfully used to
mechanically breech and push down structures such as reinforced doors, brick fences, walls,
etc., thus creating entry points for the infantry. The front left and right corners of the AAV were
used to make physical contact with building structures. It is not recommended that the rear of
the vehicle be used since it may damage the ramp in the closed position or damage the prop
buckets. On almost every occasion, the bow plane made contact with the structures during
breaching attempts. The force caused cracking in the area where the bow plane connects to
the bow plane cylinder. If operating in an urban operations environment and away from
waterborne operations for an extended period of time, it may be beneficial to remove the bow
plane and cylinder to avoid damage. Tracks are an uncomfortable fit in tight urban spaces and
are vulnerable and attractive to RPG attack. Downed power lines proved difficult in urban
maneuvers close to residences with tracks. Additionally, concrete rubble and metal “rebar” was
prevalent in many streets and was a potential hazard for the suspension system of the AAV.
Tanks
The M1A1 tank was used very effectively to create breaching points into buildings by
physically pushing down structures. Marine tankers would traverse the main gun to the side
and utilize TTP for the reduction of urban area strongpoints with the tank hull to create breach
points. Care must be taken to prevent gun tube damage and minimize rubble from covering the
driver’s vision blocks. Use of the rear of the tank to create breach points is not recommended
as it causes damage to the grille doors and tank/infantry phone. Tanks in mechanical breaching
must also exercise caution to ensure the front of the hull is used at a 90-degree angle or else
risk damaging the fenders.
Tankers utilized the front slope and rear hull of the M-1A1 tank to knock down buildings and
walls. These techniques caused significant damage to the front headlights, fenders, rear grille
doors, tank/infantry phone, and number 7 skirts. As a result, a Marine welder designed, welded,
and mounted an M-1A1 tank-breaching beam that mounts to the front of the tank. No
modifications to the tank were required to mount this system. The breaching beam was tested
on a building with outstanding results. No damage was sustained to the tank and it successfully
destroyed the building. Additionally, the tank driver reported no obscuration of his view from the
driver’s hole. All material was taken from destroyed Iraqi infrastructure in Fallujah.
Mine plows were a nonfactor, as only one was available at the start of the offensive (two
more arrived later but were designed for the M-1A2). The tank that had the mine plow mounted
ended up setting the plow down after the second day of operation as it severely restricted
maneuver in an already restricted environment. The tank company commander stated that
Pearson Blades would have been useful, as tanks were asked to knock down walls many times,
especially when the D-9 was down or not available.
Marine infantrymen working with tank sections utilized various methods to talk tankers onto
enemy targets inside buildings. Infantrymen utilized organic weapons systems to shoot at
positions they wanted destroyed with the tank main gun. This required the tankers to observe
the impacts, which at times was difficult when fully buttoned-up in the tank. The most common
method was for tankers to engage a building with a coaxially mounted M-240G and have the
infantrymen call for adjustments from the impacts. Once targets were identified with the
Tank-infantry phones were often destroyed or inoperable, making communications with the
tank Marines inside very difficult and communications were centralized to the platoon
commander only.
Marine tankers developed techniques to maximize the effects of the tank’s organic
weapons. When engaging fortified enemy positions less than 1 kilometer away, tankers would
initially engage with tank main gun and then immediately suppress the target with machine
guns. The machine gun suppression ensured that the enemy could not attempt to leave a
building or an area once a main gun round was fired. If a main gun round was fired at the first
floor the suppression was shifted to the second floor to engage insurgents.
In addition, infantry units utilized their attached tank assets to clear buildings of IEDs and
snipers. M-1A1 tank main gun rounds were effective at detonating buildings booby trapped and
rigged with TTP for reduction of urban area strongpoints
The high explosive power and over pressurization created by the tank main gun destroyed
IEDs or caused secondary detonations. During Operation Al-Fajr, enemy insurgents utilized
mosques and minaret towers to engage assaulting US forces. The ability of Marine tank crews
to acquire and accurately engage snipers holed-up in minarets and multi-level buildings
neutralized this threat on numerous occasions. Frequently minarets required multiple tank main
gun impacts to achieve desired results. The materials and masonry utilized in the construction
of mosques and minarets was far superior to that of the civilian building infrastructure. As such,
tank crews utilized as many as 10 or more tank main gun rounds to achieve desired effects on
the mosques and minarets.
Note: The efficient employment of the M-1A1 main gun in urban terrain can be both
devastating and problematic. It is important for both tank and infantry commanders
to understand the effects generated by various M-1A1 main gun employment
techniques and ammunition types. Often, what is an appropriate M1A1 main gun
employment technique or ammunition type for one situation may not be as
successful in a different situation.
For 120-millimeter tank main gun ammunition, the overall assessment from the majority of
the tank commanders was that the HEAT round was the most potent and versatile round for the
urban environment. High explosive obstacle reduction (HE-OR) by design is an obstacle-
reducing round made specifically for the urban environment. However, in terms of breaching
power, HEAT was by far the round of choice compared to the others. Because most of Fallujah
is constructed from cement, the shaped charge of the HEAT round provided more explosive
punch and overpressure than the steel-nosed HE-OR. HEAT also had better effects on
reducing obstacles such as concrete barriers. In view of the minimum arming distance of the
HEAT round and the nature of the close engagements (due to terrain, most tank engagements
were closer than that minimum arming distance), the canister round would have been even
more useful in engaging enemy hunkered inside buildings. This round has over 1,000 tungsten
steel balls and is designed to take out entire squads of enemy formations with one round.
A-12 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006
Compared to the other 120-millimeter rounds (multipurpose antitank [MPAT], high explosive
obstacle reduction with tracer [HE-OR-T], and HEAT), this round is armed as soon as it leaves
the gun tube. It is essentially a 120-millimeter shotgun shell. MPAT rounds provided effective
results for breaching if it was employed utilizing certain techniques. Based on ammunition
availability, tankers utilized the MPAT round during urban combat operations in Fallujah. Tank
crews quickly identified that due to the smaller high velocity warhead of the MPAT, when
compared to the HEAT, it was passing through multiple structures creating limited fragmentation
effect and breach holes only 12 inches in diameter. Crews experimented with different
techniques and found that when the MPAT was fired in ground mode at infrastructure less than
the minimum required arming distance, it created larger breach holes capable of allowing
infantrymen to enter. Additionally, when the MPAT was fired at a building in the air mode at less
than the required arming distance, it achieved similar results.
Tanks fired approximately 3,000 main gun rounds, over 150,000 7.62 mm, and over 77,000
.50 caliber rounds. Marine tankers discovered that the effects of 120-millimeter tank main gun
ammunition were greater when it was shot at the sides of windows in buildings containing
insurgents. The detonation of tank rounds on the “window frames” provided an additional brick
and mortar fragmentation into the room increasing the effects of the round. Tank rounds that
were fired directly through windows often passed through the rear walls limiting the effects of
fragmentation. When shooting the corners of buildings in order to engage insurgents seeking
cover in these vicinities, similar success at creating effects with secondary fragmentation was
discovered. Insurgents adjusted their tactics against Marine tank crews by taking positions in
fortified buildings and infrastructure.
Insurgents discovered that M-1A1 tank ammunition easily penetrated buildings made of
brick. Buildings constructed of concrete masonry, provided greater protection so insurgents
quickly utilized this infrastructure to establish strongpoints. Insurgents adjusted tactics by
engaging Marine tanks and then retreating into the inner rooms of buildings to avoid the effects
of main gun over pressurization and fragmentation. Tank ammunition effects were minimized
by the initial impact on the buildings’ outside walls. Tankers countered this tactic by firing the
main gun directly into door openings and windows to maximize ammunition penetration into the
inner rooms and causeways of infrastructure. Occasionally tank crews found it difficult to
penetrate deep into some buildings without expending significant quantities of 120-millimeter
tank main gun ammunition. Tankers discovered that creating fires inside hardened buildings by
using coaxially mounted M-240 and .50 caliber weapons systems smoked out the enemy or
suffocated them in place. The tank .50 caliber needs a thermal sight; this weapon is very
accurate out to 1,800 meters but, due to a lack of a night sight, it is difficult to employ at night.
Marine tank commanders report the importance of utilizing open terrain in the urban
operations environment because it allowed tank platoons and sections to maximize firepower on
enemy strongpoints. During Operation Al-Fajr certain districts within the city had open terrain to
support this TTP. This included parks, industrial areas, riverside property, and traffic circles.
Marine tankers report that platoon and section volleys with tank main gun produces the most
effective results on enemy positions and strongpoints in urban combat. Additionally, platoon
and section volleys ensured that obscuration time did not affect other tank crews trying to
engage targets since all tanks simultaneously fired. Massed fires provided highly successful
killing effects due to increased explosive energy, over pressure, fragmentation, and shock
power.
Many expressed surprise that artillery proved useful in an urban environment. Artillery was
responsive, routinely answering adjust fire missions in less than 5 minutes. Danger close
missions were conducted in an urban setting several times with no trepidation of the maneuver
commander. On several occasions, a forward observer (FO) called for fire on a single building,
quickly received those fires, and had effects on that building with minimal collateral damage.
During a preparation in the attack on Salman Pak, the battalion fire support coordinator fired
unobserved fires on enemy buildings, deriving the target information from maps and satellite
imagery. Upon survey of the effects after the battle, the fire support coordinator noted damaged
and destroyed buildings at the desired locations. The only collateral damage were shrapnel
effects on buildings 370 meters away. Confidence in the artillery in support of infantry
maneuver was bolstered significantly.
During Operation Al-Fajr, the companies needed the ability to engage specific buildings in
close proximity to friendly positions. Air was the preferred method as they could use laser-
guided weapons, however, it could take up to 45 minutes to have air on station engaging
targets. Because artillery was readily available, the company fire support teams began adapting
their artillery calls for fire. Generally the FOs were able to get their adjusting rounds to hit the
target building after two or three adjustments. They found that after one 155-millimeter round
fuzed on delay hit the building, the enemy inside either withdrew or was incapacitated to the
point that the company could then attack the building.
When engaged by riflemen in numerous buildings, the FOs found that they could get
adjusting rounds on their target building and then, using additional adjusting rounds, destroy
specific buildings. The FOs would not begin another mission, but would walk their adjustments
from building to building. At times the battery would interpret these as random corrections on
the same mission. Once the fire support coordination center explained how the FOs were
working, the battery began to dedicate one tube to that company, freeing the rest of the battery
to fire other missions. If the FO called a “fire for effect,” they would still use just one tube to fire
(generally four rounds) in order to minimize the error of the rounds. This allowed the FOs to
engage point targets with artillery in close proximity to friendlies without the time associated with
directing close air support (CAS) on target.
Marine Corps Order 8010, Class V(W) Planning Factors for Fleet. Marine Corps Combat
Operations, does not address the expenditure of ammunition in urban operations. The division
used the recent battle in Najaf as a starting point and estimated firing a maximum of 1,500 HE
rounds. The actual expenditure was over 6,000 HE rounds.
Prior to the operation, a building numbering system was created, with a phase-line network,
and target reference points throughout the city. All elements of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines and its
attachments from other Services were given these references to use during the operation. All
squadrons were given the references, and 10 digit grids for them. An aircraft could check in,
receive a modified nine-line brief in which the target description was “Building 615E” and he
Effects of air were tremendous, often causing catastrophic destruction to target buildings,
but occasionally CAS was slow. In an urban environment it could take 15 to 30 minutes to talk
CAS onto the target, and then an additional 15 to 30 minutes to receive clearance due to
geometry issues with adjacent units. Despite the time requirement, air is a tremendous asset
and should be utilized at all opportunities. It may take an hour to get a bomb on target, but it
would often reduce the target, whereas an infantry assault would have taken several hours to
accomplish the same goal and would have sustained casualties. It is often the better policy to
pull back troops, isolate, and drop bombs than to charge into enemy strongpoints.
During Operation Al-Fajr a need was identified for a helicopter precision-guided munition
that could destroy a target in a building without destroying the entire structure. The AGM-114
Hellfire is the weapon of choice in this endeavor. There are currently three warhead options
available to the Hellfire: shaped charge, blast fragment, and metal augmented charge. During
Operation Al-Fajr, Hellfires were employed on many instances against specific portions of
buildings (i.e., upper left window) to destroy a suspected enemy position in a particular room of
a building. Rather than sending a GBU-12 or GBU- 38 against the building, the ground combat
element elected to utilize a lower collateral damage Hellfire missile with precise and destructive
effects. Targets that were engaged were either buildings themselves or the enemy hiding in
buildings. Buildings were generally concrete/masonry with mild reinforcement and were
extremely sturdy by Western standards. To completely destroy a normal-sized residential target
building and everyone/everything inside it, at least a 500-pound bomb with a delay fuze was
required. Anything smaller than that would only damage the structure; and while it might have
effects on the enemy hiding inside, it would by no means guarantee destruction. However,
when GBU-12s and GBU-38s were used to engage such targets (even two and three story
buildings), success rate for destroying the structures and everything inside was nearly 100
percent when they had accurate hits. Proper fuzing is critical. Instantaneously fuzed weapons
on structures caused far less damage to the structure itself, and the explosion would also send
much more shrapnel and debris flying much further out (increasing the potential for fratricide for
close strikes). Marines under cover (inside fortified concrete buildings) were safe during CAS
strikes from 125 to 250 meters from the target—a technique, but not the preferred method.
However, when the same type building was engaged with a 500-pound delay fuzed weapon, the
bulk of the explosion was concentrated inside the building and the destructive force was
maximized within the structure. Occasionally this effect occurred to such a degree that a FAC
thought the weapons had actually failed (heard the bombs whistle in to the target and impact but
no audible explosion was detected). After closer inspection, the FAC realized that the lack of
the usual “explosion” sound and flying debris was due to the fact that the bomb focused all its
destructive power within the structure itself, and the effects were dramatic. If a GBU-12 hit its
precise target, collateral damage to surrounding structures was minimal. Some missions
required larger bombs (i.e., 2,000 pounds), but the ordnance was not available or not approved
for the drop.
Army aviation provides a critical element that is integral to the success of combined arms
operations. Attack and cavalry helicopters, the AH-64 Apache and the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior,
are vital to any ground maneuver commander involved in cordon and search operations. Their
capabilities, when fully integrated within the planning process, enhance the ground
commander’s ability to succeed.
The following observations highlight several of the trends observed during these recent
situational training exercise (STX) lanes. The comments focus specifically on air-ground
integration to assist ground maneuver commanders in preparation for cordon and search
operations or any mission in which air-ground integration is critical.
Maneuver Element
The first step in any air-ground integration is to recognize that cavalry and attack helicopter
elements primarily serve as an additional maneuver element rather than just a fires platform.
This recognition dictates additional, integrated planning requirements, as well as the
establishment of a command and control (C2) structure capable of handling both air and ground
assets. Additionally, aviation is adaptable and capable of changing “on the fly” as the mission
responds to enemy actions.
As applied to the cordon and search mission in the STX lanes, cavalry and attack
helicopters provide the ground commander essential capabilities for the conduct of this
operation. The aircraft normally conduct route reconnaissance in support of ground movement
to the objective with an initial observation and assessment of the situation within each objective.
The best results occur when ground commanders focus initial observations according to specific
intelligence requirements. These observations might be the situation around the target building,
the location of a specific vehicle, or detection of anything attempting to exit the objective prior to
the establishment of the outer cordon. Cavalry and attack helicopters utilize sensors/video
capabilities to gather requested information without alerting or heightening tensions of the
people within the village. Once the cordon is set, the initial plans call for aviation to provide area
security outside the inner cordon and mostly beyond the outer cordon. This task keeps the
aviation element focused “out,” away from the objective searching for elements attempting to
influence the ground commander’s mission (focus out). The typical scenario uses an opposing
forces (OPFOR) technical vehicle and mortar team forcing a CCA opportunity during execution.
Finally, aviation assets accomplish an egress route recon once the ground element completes
its mission within the objective or the helicopter’s fuel situation dictates an early departure.
The communications plan serves as a vital item within the planning process; the
communications plan either enhanced or drastically hindered the overall mission. Items such as
crypto net variables and time-of-day as well as competing terminology, such as “unsecure” and
“plain text”, affected actual execution. Those spending adequate time during planning to
establish primary and contingency frequencies and to ensure all personnel were trained on
radio operations saw the benefits in the actual lane execution. Often, aviators provided the
ground personnel a single-channel unsecure (plain text) frequency as an initial communications
“link-up” net and a worse case contingency for communication.
The STX lanes reinforce this process as units ready to receive air assets proved ready to
adapt to the cordon and search environment. The air tasks prior to the establishment of the
outer cordon never changed, though some refined the observation tasks seeking more specific
information. Within the objective, several ground units altered the air tasks based on enemy
actions inside the towns. Making use of the air’s observation capabilities, some ground
maneuver commanders accepted risk beyond the outer cordon refocusing air in search of
snipers or other observation tasks inside the town (focus in). Once each situation reached
resolution, the ground commanders returned air assets to the initial area security mission (focus
out). This quick shift between "focus out" versus "focus in" only worked for those companies
who tracked aviation much like one of their own maneuver platoons. Those companies capable
of developing and refining both the ground and air tasks during the cordon and search proved
most successful on the STX lanes.
Lastly, nearly every ground maneuver element found it relatively easy to communicate with
air assets. Those who prepared the most during the planning process used products such as
town sketches to vector air throughout the operation. Their terminology appeared the same as
with any maneuver platoon element.
Information operations battle drills are designed to serve as the basis for planning during
activation of the crisis action team. The drills are only a planning aid. The information
contained in the drills must not be taken as a final and complete plan. The battle drills contain
only generic tasks and purposes that must be refined to develop an IO concept that best
addresses the situation at hand.
3. CA During Planning
Civil affairs forces can be utilized during all phases of cordon and search operations. Civil
affairs planning teams (CAPTs) augment staffs and assist commanders at brigade and higher
level with CMO planning. CA teams in direct support of maneuver battalion commanders are
also capable of conducting CMO planning. Civil affairs planners and operators at all levels are
the direct link between ground forces and local authorities, to include nongovernmental and
governmental organizations and agencies. In many cases, maneuver units may fall in on and
receive attachment of CA forces that are already operating in the AO. CA forces may have
already established productive relationships with local authorities and tribal leaders and can
advise the commander on the atmospherics of the area to include cultural nuances,
identification of key leaders, personalities, and tribal alliances. CA forces routinely conduct
village and urban infrastructure assessments and may already have detailed databases
developed to support planning and execution of operations from combat to stability and
reconstruction.
6. Post Operation
One of the keys to successful CMO is the prevention or mitigation of negative activities on
the part of friendly forces. Destruction of property is probably the most prevalent negative result
of cordon and search operations but it is usually the easiest to remedy. Damage cannot be
avoided during dynamic entries. Civil affairs teams can assist in identifying and documenting
damaged items, assist in the claims process, and direct complainants to the proper authorities
by coordinating with the local staff judge advocate (SJA). Civil affairs teams are also familiar
with the funding sources used to compensate victims. One of these sources is the
Commander’s Emergency Response Program or CERP fund. It is imperative that CA operators
have access to these funds to help in mitigating property damage and to fund immediate impact
projects such as wells. One technique is to develop pre-packages of humanitarian assistance
(HA) supplies that can be distributed after the cordon and search operations. CA teams can
coordinate the distribution of these supplies based on previous needs assessments. HA
supplies may include rations (wheat, rice, etc.), building materials and tools, or clothing items.
Along with remedying property damage and distributing HA supplies, CA forces may be involved
in claims procedures for non-combatant loss of life. Civil affairs forces may disburse payments
through a civil-military operations center (CMOC) or may use local nationals to disperse
payments through a civilian coordination center. The key to the remedy process is to never
promise anything you can’t deliver.
1. Rehearsal Overview
Rehearsals are used to prepare for upcoming missions. Generic rehearsals are worthwhile,
but rehearsals should include mission-specific rehearsals. They are not a discussion of what is
supposed to happen. They should test subordinates understanding of the plan. Rehearsals
should also include vignette training to reinforce understanding of ROE when practical. The
commander uses well planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following:
(1) Reinforce training and increase proficiency on critical tasks.
(2) Reveal weakness or problems in the plan, leading to further refinement of the plan or
development of additional branch plans.
(3) Integrate the actions of subordinate elements.
(4) Confirm coordination requirements between the company team and adjacent units.
(5) Improve each Service member's understanding of the concept of the operation, the
direct fire plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various
situations that may arise during the operation.
(6) Ensure that seconds-in-command are prepared to execute in their leaders absence.
2. Rehearsal Principals
a. Determine attendees, location, and uniform.
b. Prioritize events to rehearse.
c. Start with generic rehearsals, then conduct mission-specific rehearsals after the
operation order (OPORD) is given.
d. Attempt to rehearse as many phases of the mission as possible using different rehearsal
techniques.
e. Rehearse on terrain/under conditions similar to execution.
f. Rehearse the plan initially, then continue to rehearse contingencies based on the seven
forms of contact.
3. Rehearsal Types
a. Confirmation Brief: involves entire unit.
(1) Confirms that everyone understands the plan.
(2) Conducted immediately prior to departure from friendly lines.
b. Reduced Force: involves only selected leaders.
c. Full Force: involves entire unit.
4. Rehearsal Techniques
a. Talk through:
(1) Oral: cover SOPs and mission expectations.
(2) Map: use a map/overlay to brief the plan.
(3) Radio: review sequence of events using FM radio net.
(4) Terrain model: graphically depict terrain/control measures.
b. Walk through:
(1) Rock Drill: subordinates move rock to simulate actions.
(2) Key Leader: use key leaders to physically rehearse.
(3) Full Dress: entire unit, similar conditions as execution.
d. Pre-mission Guides. The interpreter's introduction to both the unit commander and the
first line leader should include:
(1) Who they are and their role in the communication.
(2) What hand signals they may use if needing to interrupt.
(3) Assures they interpret the exact words and will not change the meaning or intent.
(4) Assures that the military personnel have received the same instructions regarding the
interpreted session.
e. Positioning. The interpreter is most aware of what is actually occurring during the
interpreted session and is responsible for facilitating the best possible communication.
(1) Triangulation, the first line leader and HUMINT source are facing each other with the
interpreter seated or standing equal distance from each party. The interpreter remains out of
reach of the HUMINT source unless culture dictates other positioning.
(2) The first line leader should speak directly to the HUMINT source in first person, not to
the interpreter.
(3) The first line leader should continue to look directly at the HUMINT source as the
interpreter translates the first line leader's comments.
(4) The interpreter should not engage in private conversation with indigenous personnel
in front of the first line leader.
f. Conduct and Ethics.
(1) Will remain impartial.
(2) Will excuse themselves if they have a conflict of interest.
(3) Will not disclose confidential information acquired in the course of official duty.
(4) Will not use their position to secure unwarranted privileges or exemptions for
themselves or others.
It is essential for all forces to use the same reference system. Ground maneuver elements
generally use a terrain-based reference system during urban operations. Main urban areas can
be overlaid with a simple grid reference. Scale of the grid should relate to distance common to
urban engagements while still making it usable as a quick reference for approximate initial
location of interest. Using the convention of basic alpha/numerical sector techniques becomes
almost second nature so that when a network broadcast such as “Hardrock is taking fire from
building 12” is heard, it cages every air assets eyes in the general vicinity of the activity. After
the grid overlay is laid, make analysis of the major routes through the urban area and label them
with code names (route iron, gold, lead, Detroit, Michigan, Boston, et al.) and use as common
references with air and ground forces (i.e., everyone from the convoy truck drivers to tactical
aircraft). Finally as time and mission objectives allow, add basic named areas of interest (such
as cloverleaves, bridges and other choke points) to the template. Military joint planners can
produce the required detail overlay for an entire area of responsibility (AOR) very quickly prior to
commencement of hostilities (they can easily be conceived as parts of operation plans
[OPLANs] as well). Reference grids allow quick correlation between air assets and ground
assets. Regardless of the system used, an established call for fire procedures must be used.
Aircrew should be prepared to transition to the system in use by the ground element upon
arrival in the objective area. For example, following the initial call for fire format, references to
the objective or target may include local landmarks such as, “The third floor of building 5d.” This
transition should be facilitated by using a “big to small” acquisition technique. Detail can be
added as the situation dictates, up to and including numbering and identification of all structures
within each grid.
b. If the area is large, the numbers should be subdivided by objectives or other means—
figure I-2.
Multi-Service
Army
Marine Corps
battle damage assessment—The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the
application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a
predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to
the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and
special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military
operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence
responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators.
Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage
assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system
assessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02)
casualty evacuation—The movement of casualties. It includes movement both to and
between medical treatment facilities. Any vehicle may be used to
evacuate casualties. Also called CASEVAC. (JP 1-02)
civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained,
and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support
civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)
civil disturbance—Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order. (JP
1-02.)
civil-military operations—The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or
exploit relations between military forces, governmental and
nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian
populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to
facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US
objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military
forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local,
regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to,
during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if
directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military
operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military
forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called
CMO. (JP 1-02)
civil-military operations center—An ad hoc organization, normally established by the
geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander,
25 April 2006
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JOYCE MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0613103
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: Distribute in accordance
with the initial distribution number (IDN) 115956, requirements for FM 3-06.20.
BENTLEY B. RAYBURN
Major General, USAF
Commander
Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center