Buea STRATEGIC FORUM SELB to om Oey io About the Author DR TEX. Hammes, a Fellow in the Center red U.S. Marine nior Research For Stratagic 5 officer. isa Research, Institute for National i Studies, at the National iy. Comments and {questions may be directed to thomas, Key Points ° ‘The United States hes hited record numbers of contractors to serve in the conflict zones of iraq and Afghanistan but has net seriously ‘examined their strategic impact. Thera are clearly advantages to using contractors in conflict zones, but they have three inherent characteristics that have serious regative effects during counterin: surgency operations. We cannot effectively control the qualty of w contractors or contval thei tions, but the population holds us rasponsible for everything the contractors do, of fail todo, Contractors compete with the personnel and tdramatically change local Contractors reduce the polit cal capital necessary to commit U.S. forces to war, impact the legitimacy of a counterinsurgency effort, and reduce its the peresive morality, These factors attack our nation’s crteal vainerabilty in an irregular war—the political will of the American people. wnnduedu/iess Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact by TX. Hammes a he United States has hired record numbers of contractors to secve in the conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan, However, the government AL has not seriously exemined the strategic impact of contractors on cur- rent and future conflicts There ae clearly advantages to using contractors in combat zones. Of par~ ‘icular value isthe fact that they replace troops and bring capabilities that the USS. Government may lack ‘There are three inherent characteristics of contractors that have seri= fous negative effects during counterinsurgency operations effectively control the quality of the contractors. Second, the United States cannot control their actions but authorizes their use of deadly force. Third, the population holds the United States responsible for everything the con- tractors do oF fail to do. This elevates the first two problems to the strategic level by severely undercutting the government's legitimacy in the eyes of its ‘own population, Contractors also compete with the host g eenment fora limited pool of ‘qualified personnel. They dramatically change local power strictures. They fag- ‘ment the chain of command and can be very difficult to get fred, There has been very litte investigation by the U.S, Government into the strategic impact of contractors. Yet contractors reduce the political ‘capital necessary to commit U.S. forces to was, impact the legitimacy of a counterinsurgency effort, and reduce ies perceived morality. These factors attack the Nation's critical vulnerability in an irregular war—the political 0.260 1will of the American people. At a minimum, the Department of Defense (DOD) should institute the following guidance: ‘© The default position should be no U.S. Govern- ment contractors employed outside secure facilities ina conflict zone. 2 IFUS. Government capacity is exceeded, use host nation government organizations first and host nation contractors next with U.S. or foreign con- tractors being a choice of ast resort © If used, contractors must be under the dizect pervision of a US. Government employee, ‘To reduce military personnel tempo, DOD should hire contractors or US, Goverament civilians for deployed billets ouside the conflict zone, ‘Use civilian employees or contractors to fil nonde~ ploying military billets, Despite the recent mastive increase in the use of surmed and unarmed contractors in confict zones, there has not been an increase in the ability of the international community to regulate the use of srmed contractors. The United States must work with international organizations to develop poli- cies, procedures, and institutions to deal with the presence of armed contractors in conflict zones Eee eee eee] there has been very little investiga- tion by the U.S. Government into the strategic impact of contractors in conflict zones In Imag and Afghanistan, the use of contractors reached « level unprecedented in US. military opera- tions. As of March 31,2010, the United States deployed 175,000 toops and 207,000 contractors in the war zones. Contractors represented 50 percent of the De~ partment of Defense (DOD) workforce in Iraq and 59 2 sFNo.260 percent in Afghanistan ‘These numbers include both, armed and unarmed contractors. For the purposes ofthis per, the term contractor includes both armed and un~ acmed petsonnel unless otherwite specified. The presence of contractors on the battlefield is ebviously not a new phenomenon but has dramatically increased from the ra~ tio of 1 contractor to 55 military personnel in Vietnam to 1: in the rag! and 1:1.42 in Afghanistan? “This increase is the logicel outcome of a series of decisions going back decades. Force structure reductions ‘ranging fiom the post-Vietnam decisions that moved most Army logistics support elements to the Array Re~ serve and Guard! to the post-Cold War reduction that ct the Army fiom 18 to 10 divisions with correspond ing cuts in support forces greatly reduced the Services’ ability to support long-term operations. Next, a series of| decisions in the 19908 led to the employment of con tractors in the Balkans for tases from traditional camp- building to the new concept of force development” that saw MPRI training the Croatian army. Finally the deci sion to invade Iraq with minimum forces left the United States with to0 few troops in-theater to deal with the dlsorder that resulted from the removal of Sddam. Thus, it is understandable that the immediate, unanticipated ‘need for large numbers of logistics and security person- nel, shortage of such toope on Active duty, and prec cedent for using contractors in the Balkans caused the Pentagon to turn to contractors to fill the immediate ‘operational needs. However, the subsequent failure to conduct « careful analysis of the svisdom of using con- tractors is less understandable. The executive branch has conducted aumerous investigations into fraud, waste, snd comruption in the contracting process. Congress has hheld hearings and established the Commission on War- ‘ime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Yer the U.S. Government has not systematically explored the essen~ tial question: Does using contractors in a conflict zone snake srg sense? ‘This paper explores that question. Ie examines the _good, the bad, andthe strategic impact of using contrac- tors in confict zones. It concludes with policy recom= winwndaedu/inss‘mendations for the furure employment of contractors and outlines additional actions needed to understand tnd cope with the rapidly expanding use of armed con- tractors worldwide. The Good Contractors provide a number of advantages over military personnel or civil servants—speed of deploy- ‘ment, continuity, reduction of troop requirements, re- duction of military casualties, economic inputs to local ‘economies, and, in some cases, executing tasks the mil- tary and civilian workforce simply cannot. This section ‘amines each ofthese advantages in turn, Speed of deployment—the ability to quickly mobi- lize and deploy large numbers of personnel—is particu~ larly important when a plan file to anticipate problems, Since the Pentagon had not planned to keep large mum= bers of troops in Afghanistan or Iraq for any period of ‘ime, it had not planned for the required logistics support ‘The Pentagon also fled to anticipate the requisement for lange numbers of security personnel to protect all US. ac~ ‘ites (including political and reconstruction activities) ‘once the Afghan and Iraqi governments were toppled. By tapping into databases, running jab fairs in the United States, and contracting for labor from Thicd ‘World companies, contractors were able to quickly re mui, process, and chip personnel to run base camps, drive truce, and perform the hundreds of housekeeping chores required to maintain both combat forces and civil administrators spread across Irq and Afghanistan, More challenging was finding qualified personnel to provide security for the rapidly growing ULS, presence in both nations. Private companies managed to find people, hice them, and move them into country-all without the po- liscal problems inherent in mobilizing additional US. siltary forces to execute the same tasks, The combin ‘ion of speed and alow politcal profile made contractors fan attractive choice to provide the resources for which ‘he administration had fled to plan. In addition, the use of eontractors aligned with previous decisions and the ‘dministrations faith in che efficiency and effectiveness rnenducedu/inss of private business compared to governmental organiza tion. Both inside and outside Iraq and A ghnistan, con~ ‘uactors replaced tens of thousands of soldiers normally ‘equired to move, stage, marshal, and transport personnel and supplies into confictzones.? Continuity is a second major advantage of contrac- ‘ors, While the U.S miliary has a policy that ensures che vast majority of personnel rotae every 6 to 12 months, contractors ere often willing to stay far longer periods. For key billets, companies can offer significant bonuses ‘to personnel who stay. The companies know that they will reap commensurate savings due to the personnel conti- nity, and employees see an opportunity for significantly increased pay. Sometimes, moreaves, longevity leads to ‘eater understanding of the situation. This can lead to ‘more effective decisionmaking to include an understand ng ofthe politcal impact of che contractor's decisions. SEN the use of contractors aligned with previous decisions and the administration’s faith in the efficiency and effectiveness of private business compared to governmental organization — ‘The most highly prized attribute of private contrac tors is that they reduce troop requicements by replac- {ing military personnel. This reduces the military and Political resources that must be dedicated to the war, At the height of the surge in April 2008, the Depart ‘ment of Defense (DOD) stated it had 163,900 eontrac~ ‘ors supporting 160,000 troops in Iraq! Without the presence of contractors, the United States would have had to provide literally twice as many troops. The US, Armed Forces struggled to maintain 160,000 tzoops in Trag; i is doubtful that they could have supported the 320,000 needed if contractors were not employed. While the vast majority of contractor personnel were involved in noncombatant logistics tasks, DOD et ‘mated there were over 20,000 armed contractors in [ra SFNo.260 3