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“Le ressort de l'amour”


Lorenzo Chiesa a
a
School of European Culture and Languages University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NF, UK

To cite this Article Chiesa, Lorenzo(2006) '“Le ressort de l'amour”', Angelaki, 11: 3, 61 — 81
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09697250601048515
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09697250601048515

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ANGEL AK I
journal of the theoretical humanities
volume 11 number 3 december 2006

I don’t think I’m exaggerating if I say that that


[ . . . ] which we concluded [ . . . ] had thus far
been neglected by all the commentators of
the Symposium and that, for this reason, our
commentary is a date in the continuation of
the history of the development of the
virtualities which are concealed by this
dialogue.
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Lacan, Seminar VIII, lesson of 1 March


1961 lorenzo chiesa

I introduction
The relationship between psychoanalysis and the
classical world’s philosophical and literary pro-
‘‘LE RESSORT DE
duction dates back to Freud who made of the L’AMOUR’’
Oedipus complex one of the conceptual corner-
stones of his revolutionary practice. If, on the one lacan’s theory of love in
hand, Jacques Lacan’s reading of Sophocle’s
Antigone in his Seminar VII (1959–1960) has
his reading of plato’s
been repeatedly investigated by many commen- symposium
tators, on the other, few have ventured to explore
his close and extensive – more than two hundred excellence is the analytic situation.’’5 It is no
pages long – examination of Plato’s Symposium doubt one of the great achievements of psycho-
in Seminar VIII (1960–1961).1 According to analysis to have shown how love could artificially
Lacan, this dialogue depicts an ante-litteram be provoked; according to Lacan, this fact is not
but nevertheless paradigmatic transferential necessarily to the detriment of love itself: love’s
relationship whose protagonists are Socrates artificiality as it emerges in the analytical setting6
(qua proto-analyst) and Alcibiades (qua proto- might suggest that love as such is closely linked
analysand); Seminar VIII is indeed entitled ‘‘Le to some sort of psychical fiction, one which is
transfert.’’2 Lacan also cautiously specifies that however ‘‘essential’’ for the subject.7
his reading of Plato does not primarily focus ‘‘on Given these premises, it is not surprising that,
the question of the nature of love,’’3 on the when approaching Plato, Lacan is mainly inter-
abstract, philosophical notion of love as such ested in articulating a connection between the
which is ‘‘an event, strictly speaking, miraculous Symposium’s philosophical speeches on love – all
in itself’’4 but on the question of love’s relation- revolving around a Socratic ‘‘ti esti?/what is it?’’
ship with the empirical experience of transference – and Alcibiades’ sudden irruption followed by
in psychoanalysis. We could define the latter with his public declaration of love to Socrates: as
Laplanche-Pontalis as ‘‘a process of actualisation Lacan points out, Alcibiades’ vehement and
of unconscious desires [whose] context par profoundly intimate speech in the first person
ISSN 0969-725X print/ISSN1469-2899 online/06/030061^21 ß 2006 Taylor & Francis and the Editors of Angelaki
DOI: 10.1080/09697250601048515

61
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’

‘‘goes beyond the limit of the banquet.’’8 itself as a reading of Lacan’s reading of
Therefore, in commenting on Plato’s dialogue, Plato’s Symposium.
Lacan’s principal assumption is that its final part
is far from constituting an apocryphal and II lacan as a reader of plato
tangential addendum,9 an unimportant divertisse-
ment or a mere apology of Socrates directed at The first speaker of the Symposium is Phaedrus
those who had accused him of being the cause of (178a–180b). He declares that Eros is one of the
most ancient of all gods. Love has donated
Alcibiades’ notorious hybris:10 these have all
the greatest benefits to men as demonstrated by
been popular readings of the Symposium’s
the fact that when the lover (erastes) is in love, he
conclusion throughout the centuries. On the
wants to distinguish himself before his beloved
contrary, for Lacan, there is no reason why we
(eromenos). Love instils courage and the ability
should not believe that ‘‘this bit has an
to sacrifice oneself for one’s beloved, as the
[important] function.’’11
examples of Alcestis and Achilles clearly show.
It is now my intention to proceed as follows:
Thus, love contributes to the well-being of the
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(a) To provide a short summary of the speeches polis.


that precede Alcibiades’ entrance together Lacan’s most important observations regarding
with an account of the most original – and this short speech – which he defines as being
often convoluted – interpretations that ‘‘theological’’13 in principle – could be summar-
Lacan himself formulates of each of them. ized by the two following points:
In Seminar VIII, Lacan surely demonstrates
(a) Phaedrus is incorrect in believing that Eros
himself to be a careful and innovative reader
is a god. Diotima will in fact show Socrates
of Plato: his admittedly retroactive explana-
how Love is instead a daimon, i.e., how he
tion of the ‘‘virtualities’’12 of this dialogue is in an ‘‘intermediate’’ (metaxu) position
is, to say the least, ingenious. between human beings and gods.
(b) To provide a description of the dialogue’s Furthermore, for Lacan, gods ‘‘belong to
final scene involving Alcibiades, Socrates, the Real.’’14 As a consequence, he lets us
and Agathon, and to explain why, according deduce that love does not belong to the Real
to Lacan, it is so determining for both but functions as an intermediary between the
an appropriate understanding of the Real and what in Lacanian theory is opposed
Symposium’s overall economy and, more to it, that is, everyday reality (in its symbolic
importantly, a general grasp of how transfer- and imaginary connotations). Lacan also
ential love functions. concludes that ‘‘gods cannot understand
(c) To provide an introduction to Lacan’s notion anything concerning love.’’15
of love as such as it is expressed at this stage (b) Phaedrus is correct when he suggests that
in the development of his psychoanalytic Love can bring about ‘‘divine effects’’16 in
theory. Despite having often recourse to human beings: when one is in love, one is
mythical imagery, in Seminar VIII, Lacan entheos, i.e., literally possessed by a god.
undoubtedly also sketches an ‘‘epistemic’’ This is clear in the case of Alcestis and
explanation of the ‘‘miracle of love’’: I am Achilles who each sacrificed their lives for
particularly interested in these theoretical their beloved: in so doing, they both
attempts. However, the impossibility of substituted themselves for their beloved.
dealing in this article with subsequent This substitution allows us to affirm that:
developments, the complexity of the con- ‘‘Love is a metaphor, given that we have
cepts involved and the necessity of using an learnt to articulate a metaphor in terms of
intricate ‘‘algebraic’’ jargon to discuss them substitution.’’17 However, the modalities
in an adequate manner prevent me from of Alcestis’ and Achilles’ substitution differ
delivering an exhaustive explanation within from one another: Alcestis is an erastes when
the boundaries of what primarily presents she loves her husband in place of whom she

62
chiesa

decides to die; in her case we can talk of a In Lacan’s opinion, Pausanias’ speech is
substitution and consequently of a metaphor important only insofar as it is ‘‘derisory’’:23
sensu stricto. Achilles’ position is not the Aristophanes has hiccups and is not able to speak
same: as opposed to most commentators,18 when his turn comes since he has been laughing
Lacan takes Phaedrus’s speech at face value throughout its entire duration. Plato is having
and claims that Achilles is an eromenos; and fun as well; he shows it with an interminable
what is more, he sacrifices his life for his series of homophonies which follows Pausanias’
lover in spite of the fact that Patroclus is speech and deals with Aristophanes’ hiccups:
already dead. Strictly speaking, he cannot be ‘‘Having paused Pausanias . . .’’ (‘‘Pausaniou
his substitute. In order to sacrifice himself [. . .] pausamenou . . .’’), etc. (185c).24
for love he needs to become an erastes: According to Lacan, Plato’s message regarding
this becoming erastes of the eromenos, this speech can be said to anticipate the Christian
the fact that the ‘‘beloved behaves like motto according to which the rich person will not
a lover,’’ is defined by Lacan as a ‘‘mir- enter the Kingdom of Heaven (qua Kingdom of
aculous’’ transformation.19 Lacan thus Love, we should emphasize). Why is Pausanias
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underlines Phaedrus’s remark on how this thought to epitomize the position of the rich
change together with the sacrifice it entails man? Why can he not really love? Lacan’s answer
‘‘is what gods deem sublime’’:20 in other is the following: for Pausanias, love is ‘‘all about
words, Achilles’ love is more ‘‘admirable’’ an exchange’’:25 on the one hand, the erastes
than Alcestis’ since, we might add, it ‘‘shows himself able to give a contribution whose
entails a form of disinterestedness that, object is intelligence (phronesis), and the whole
strictly speaking, goes beyond the residual field of merit (areté)’’; on the other hand, the
‘‘pathological’’ utility of sacrifice qua eromenos ‘‘needs to gain something in education
sacrifice-for.21 (paideia) and, generally, in knowledge
The second to speak is Pausanias (180c– (sophia).’’26 The topic of the entire speech is a
185c). According to him, there are two distinct ‘‘quote of values.’’27 The relation of the rich man
kinds of Love: there is a ‘‘celestial’’ Love and a to the other is entirely a matter of value, of the
‘‘vulgar’’ one. Human deeds are never good or ‘‘external signs of value.’’28 Pausanias’ notion of
bad in themselves: actions can be praised only honesty utterly equates to a regulated ‘‘possession
if they are carried out with honest intentions. of the beloved.’’29 Lacan believes that all those
Love is now discredited for the vulgar use that commentators who have overlapped Pausanias’
many people make of it by aiming only at the deceptive ‘‘ethics of pedagogic love’’ – ultimately
body of the beloved. Pausanias then moves on based on an acquisition (ktasthai) – either with
to a description of homosexual relationships and Plato’s own personal beliefs or with so-called
the way in which they are differently considered ‘‘Platonic love,’’ are profoundly mistaken.30
in different parts of Greece. Athenian customs Finally, if Pausanias cannot enter the Kingdom
are ambiguous; the erastes is both encouraged of Love, it is because true love is not measurable
and hindered in his attempts to conquer his and cannot be acquired/possessed. This is some-
eromenos: the latter is blamed if he surrenders thing which Alcestis and, above all, Achilles had
too quickly or for the wrong reasons to the already demonstrated; as a matter of fact, we
erastes. Pausanias thinks that this ambiguity is might add, it is not a mere coincidence if the
due to the necessity of distinguishing between latter’s act was awarded a special compensation
the lover who desires only the body of the by the gods: as Phaedrus reminds us, Achilles
beloved and the lover who, on the contrary, was immediately allowed to enter the Isles of the
aims at improving the knowledge of the Blessed, i.e., the Heaven of the ancient world.
beloved. Homosexuality is permissible only I will omit Eryximachus’s speech, since
when the intention of both the erastes and the Lacan’s comments about it are only indirectly
eromenos is honest.22 related to the question of love.

63
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’

The fourth speech is delivered by Aristophanes, our spherical ancestors


Aristophanes. He tells us an imaginative myth ‘‘when it came to running, supported
regarding the birth of man. Initially, human themselves on all eight of their limbs and
beings were spherical; they had four hands, four moved rapidly round and round, just like
legs, and two sets of genitals; and there were three when acrobats perform their circular man-
different sexes (masculine, feminine, and andro- oeuvre and wheel over and over’’ (190a) –
gynous). These beings were ambitious and while, as Lacan points out, Plato’s sphairos
attempted to storm Olympus and attack the actually ‘‘had all that it needed inside
gods. For this reason, Zeus decided to divide each itself.’’34 Second, and most importantly,
of them in two, making them similar to soles. I suggest that Aristophanes’ spheres are,
From that moment, humans began desperately for Lacan, amusing because they cannot love
to search for their ‘‘other half’’: love is nothing one another; spheres are irremediably sepa-
but this search for the whole. rated from each other. We are reminded
Lacan makes a series of important observations that, in the classical world (and in fact until
regarding Aristophanes’ speech which we could Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo), the sphere
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summarize as follows: was considered to be the best form and


its movement the most perfect. A sphere can
(a) Why did Plato decide to make Aristophanes enjoy itself in the perfection of its self-
– a famous comedian and one of Socrates’ containment but it cannot love another
most persistent detractors – speak if he did sphere: consequently, (human, non spheri-
not believe that the question of love should cal) love must be imperfect, it must
be approached in comical terms? (Lacan presuppose some sort of inadequacy. The
states that precisely because Aristophanes is derision of the sphere aims at ridiculing all
a ‘‘clown,’’ he is ‘‘the only one who is worthy notions of love based on an (impossible) idea
enough to speak of love.’’31) Moreover: why of perfect adaequatio. Love is somehow
did Plato, with a further ironical move, related to the search for the whole, but love
decide to make him utter what apparently is itself can never be whole: indeed, gods
the most tragic of the Symposium’s speeches cannot love. But why, in the first place,
if he did not think that, with what concerns would ‘‘self-enjoying’’ spheres need to love
love, comedy and tragedy have something in each other and thus become ridiculous
common? How can we otherwise explain the through their vain attempts to do so?
fact that, immediately after Aristophanes, (c) Aristophanes’ myth is far more subtle than it
Agathon – somebody who has just won a may initially appear.35 Lacan is very careful
prize for his tragic poetry – will utter what in interpreting it: his reading tacitly con-
Lacan deems to be the most openly comic cedes that, for Aristophanes, there is a
speech of the dialogue? transitional state of ‘‘evolution’’ between
(b) Aristophanes’ speech is both seemingly our spherical ancestors and present human
tragic – love consists of an incessant search beings. At a certain point, humans were half
for our lost half: in this sense, scholars tend spheres which could not (sexually) love each
to consider him ‘‘the first one who talks other since their genitals were left on the
about love as we, moderns, do . . .’’32 – and, outside – there where they had been, in sets
less manifestly for us (post-romantic com- of two, before the Spaltung took place –
mentators) but not for the ancients, comic. even though their faces had already been
This speech is comic insofar as here Plato twisted towards the inside. They could not
makes fun of himself: according to Lacan, copulate but desperately – and, above all,
‘‘Aristophanes’ speech is nothing but the comically – tried to do so. It is only when
derision of the Platonic sphairos as it is they started to ‘‘die out’’ that ‘‘Zeus took
articulated in the Timaeus.’’33 Why is a pity on them [. . .] changed the position of
sphere funny? First of all, because, for their genitals round to the front and thus

64
chiesa

introduced intercourse between two human moved: two half-spheres can copulate through
beings’’ (191b). This passage is fundamental their ‘‘internal’’ middle point but could never
for Lacan: it hints at the fact that in order to fuse and become a sphere again, not even for an
have (object) love ‘‘something which relates instant. There is no sexual relationship if we
to an operation on the genitals must intend it in terms of a transitory ‘‘fusion,’’ of a
occur.’’36 In other words, love is inextricable harmonious, pacifying encounter between the two
from symbolic castration and its assump- sexes; but there is a sexual relationship if we
tion, that is, from the mythical renunciation intend it as an asymmetrical ‘‘superimposition’’40
of the spherical/divine genitals and their or intersection which ‘‘makes one’’ thanks to the
absolute enjoyment – note that the latter illusory veil/sublimation of imaginary love. Love
is only supposed/fantasized: Aristophanes thus proposes itself as a fictional, unifying
clearly indicates how, at this stage, spheres palliative that compensates for the absence of
are already reduced to impotent half-spheres. the sexual relationship. This kind of love clearly
Castration is necessary in order to establish differs from that described by Phaedrus.
both a sexual and a love relationship between The fifth speaker is Agathon (194d–197e):
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two human beings. according to him, Love is the most sensitive,


most beautiful, and youngest of all gods. Since
Aristophanes’ myth could help us here to shed the moment he was born, all discord among gods
some light on a basic point of Lacan’s theory of has ceased. Love is rightful, temperate, coura-
sexuation, one which is generally misunderstood. geous, and wise, and he produces in men similar
Commentators usually underline how, according virtues. According to most critics, the main
to Lacan, the symbolic order is responsible for characteristic of Agathon’s speech is its style
the fact that ‘‘there is no sexual relationship’’; as which is marked by an agglutinative language and
Evans succinctly puts it, this means that: ‘‘There seems to follow Gorgias’ rhetoric.
is no reciprocity or symmetry between the male Socrates starts his speech by forcing Agathon
and the female positions because the symbolic to admit that he did not understand anything of
order is fundamentally asymmetrical.’’37 What is, what he has just said. This confutation is carried
on the contrary, almost unanimously overlooked out, according to the Socratic method, in the
is the fact that the assumption of castration, that guise of an ironic elenchos. After that, Socrates
is the subject’s active entrance in the Symbolic, reports what Diotima, a priestess, taught him
constitutes the structural condition of possibility about love (201d–212c). According to her, Love is
for some sort of (reproductive) sexual relation- not beautiful or ugly, good or bad, immortal or
ship to occur.38 The ‘‘natural’’ helplessness of mortal, but he is intermediate (metaxu) between
man qua ‘‘dis-adapted’’ animal is logically prior these two. He is the son of Poverty (Penia) and
to the emergence of the symbolic order. Lacan Resource (Poros), poor but also resourceful.
believes that, already at the imaginary level, Those who love what is beautiful also desire
‘‘there is no sexual relationship’’: propagation of that what is beautiful may belong to them
the species is impossible (as Aristophanes has it, forever. All human beings are prolific, and all
human beings would start to ‘‘die out’’); because seek to reproduce. Beauty stimulates generation,
of prematurity of birth and the ensuing alienating whilst ugliness inhibits it. It is precisely through
identification in the other’s body image, unlike generation that mortals acquire a form of
animal Gestalten, man’s ‘‘disordered imagina- immortality: Love is an aspiration after immor-
tion’’39 is unable to fulfil the basic sexual/ tality and consequently after reproduction.41
reproductive requirements of the species. Generation is not achieved only in the domain
What happens after the subject undergoes of bodies: it also interests souls, where thoughts
castration? Aristophanes’ vivid imagery is extre- and knowledge are continuously renovated.
mely useful to explain this difficult point; we Human beings who are fertile in their body
might suggest that ‘‘current’’ human beings are generate children in the flesh, while those who are
still half-spheres, even after their genitals were fertile in the soul generate knowledge, arts,

65
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’

and laws. Diotima also delineates an ascending philosophical conclusion, but philosophy is
trajectory that the lover should pursue: he is not able to go beyond this point: Socratic
asked to move from the love of the beauty of one episteme qua self-consistent, ‘‘completely
body to the love of the beauty which manifests transparent knowledge’’49 cannot attain
itself in all bodies, and then, progressively, to Eros per se. By making Diotima speak on
that for laws and institutions, science, until he his behalf and by reporting her myth, by
reaches the contemplation of beauty itself, which having to switch from episteme to mythos,
is immutable and imperishable. This speech is Socrates would surreptitiously acknowledge
usually attributed to Plato himself given that that Agathon’s speech has got him into
it seems to presuppose his theory of forms; the trouble.50
ultimate kalon, which is reached by the lover (d) Socrates knows that episteme cannot attain
after a gradual process of abstraction, eludes any Eros. Socrates is generally the one who
concrete determination and overlaps with the knows not to know; however, in this
form of forms: goodness-in-itself. dialogue – as well as in the Lysis – he
Lacan is firmly convinced that Agathon’s and more specifically presents himself as the one
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Socrates’ speeches should be read together. They who does not know anything but ‘‘the ways
are perfectly complementary. Why? of love.’’51 Precisely because he knows what
love is, he also knows that his dialectic
(a) Agathon is not just a cheap sophist; he method cannot fully disclose what it is.
‘‘knows very well what he is doing.’’42 By ‘‘Even if Socrates knows, he cannot speak
analysing the language of his intervention himself about what he knows and has to
and strongly disagreeing with usual transla- make speak somebody else who speaks
tions on different points, Lacan shows us without knowing’’:52 a priestess, somebody
how Plato’s main intention here is to through whom the Other (gods) speaks.
deliberately create contradictions (aporia) With an ingenious but nevertheless rather
such as ‘‘when there is love there is no more precipitous comparison, Lacan associates
love.’’43 Agathon, the tragic poet, is pre- Diotima’s ‘‘non-transparent knowledge’’
sented as the real ironist, if by ‘‘irony’’ we with unconscious knowledge. Therefore,
mean deliberately provoked ‘‘dis-orienta- Socrates’ passage from episteme to mythos
tion.’’ Agathon’s message (probably directed entails the implicit admission of the exis-
against Pausanias, his real-life lover) is clear: tence of the unconscious: Diotima’s mythical
‘‘love is unclassifiable [. . .] it never stays in speech is nothing but the speech of Socrates’
its own place’’;44 love is atopos.45 unconscious.53 The direct consequence of
(b) Agathon is far from being convinced by the dioekisthèmen described by
Socrates’ dialectic confutation: he simply Aristophanes’ myth – that is, of the
admits that they are talking about love at ‘‘Spaltung, the division of the perfectly
two different levels, given that he has spoken round primitive being’’54 – is the formation
in riddles (201c).46 Socrates himself of a kind of knowledge – which first and
acknowledges that Agathon delivered a foremost concerns love – that eludes
‘‘kalon logon’’ (198b), i.e., a fine speech: Socratic episteme and can only be expressed
with a laboured pun, he also admits that he by ‘‘dwelling in the zone of the ‘he didn’t
has been ‘‘gorgonized’’ – that is, turned into know.’ ’’55
stone – (198c) by its ‘‘Gorgianic’’ style. (e) According to Lacan, mythos has to be
(c) Socrates’ confutation qua philosophical interpreted in this context according to its
speech on love hurriedly47 replaces love original signification: ‘‘mythos legein,’’56
with desire as the object of its enquiry and which means ‘‘what we generally say,’’
then reveals the interconnection between what we generally say about truth without
desire and lack: ‘‘one desires what one lacks being able to prove why that is true. In such
in essence’’ (200e).48 This is an important a way, one could argue that Lacan implicitly

66
chiesa

makes mythos and doxa overlap insofar as clearly drunk. After a humorous squabble with
they are both forms of non-ignorance that Socrates and Agathon, he declares he does not
partake of the unconscious function of the want to praise Eros but the person of Socrates.
‘‘he didn’t know.’’ On top of his comments When one meets him for the first time,
concerning Diotima’s capacity to talk about Alcibiades says, he may seem to look like a
love in a mythical way, Lacan in fact also Silenus or a satyr:61 however, his words produce a
argues that ‘‘love belongs to a zone [. . .] prodigious, spell-binding effect. When Alcibiades
which is at the same level and has the same was young, he attempted to seduce Socrates but
qualities of doxa; i.e., [. . .] there are failed: Socrates resisted all his advances, even
discourses, behaviours, opinions [. . .] though he admittedly was in love with him.
which are true even though the subject According to Alcibiades, nobody is like Socrates:
does not know it.’’57 Socrates’ and Agathon’s after having been unable to sleep with Socrates,
speeches on love are thus proved to be very he would have obeyed all his orders without
close to one another: Socrates knows but has hesitation, like a slave (219e).62
to talk without knowing, i.e., in mythical Socrates’ answer to Alcibiades’ eulogy
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terms; Agathon’s doxa does not know but, as (epainos) is unexpected: ‘‘The whole point of
Lacan says, ‘‘n’a pas moins fort bien your speech was [. . .] that I ought to love you and
parlé.’’58 nobody else, and Agathon ought to be loved by
(f) Finally, we might suggest that all this leads you and nobody else’’ (222d). Alcibiades accepts
Lacan to draw two fundamental conclusions Socrates’ interpretation.
from Socrates-Diotima’s words: 1) in Why, according to Lacan, is this epilogue so
philosophical terms, love qua real desire important for the overall economy of the
(‘‘érôs-désir’’) corresponds to the continuous dialogue? First, because Plato portrays here love
postponement of what one’s object of desire ‘‘as we live it,’’63 love in action.64 The main
is – a body, bodies in general, laws, etc. – question now is not ‘‘what is love?’’ but ‘‘how
until desire reaches a ‘‘final identification’’ does it work?’’ Second, and more importantly, as
with kalon in itself; 2) in mythical terms, we shall see later in more detail, because Plato is
love qua love (‘‘érôs-amour’’) is the son of implicitly suggesting that Alcibiades’ final posi-
Poros and Penia. Penia is precisely what tion concretely provides us with a notion of love
Poros is not. Penia is literally A-poria, i.e., which is alternative to Diotima’s ascent to beauty/
that which, by being resource-less, constitu- goodness in itself.
tes an impasse, a contradiction.59 Love is So why is Alcibiades’ final position, after his
thus the product of Poros and Aporia. Love true intentions have been unmasked and – above
is a certain, secondary adaequatio which all – acknowledged by him, so important?
follows a structural inadaequatio – Because after Alcibiades’ eulogy of Socrates –
Agathon’s doxatic speech was therefore at i.e., the confession of his transferential love to
least partially correct. This inadaequatio is ‘‘the tribunal of the Other’’65 – and after
a precondition of love, it factually is his Socrates’ own interpretation of the transference
mother; when Aporia lays with Poros-the- – Lacan notes that ‘‘Socrates’ is, properly speak-
resourceful who does not know he is ing, a [psychoanalytic] interpretation’’66 –
conceiving Love since he is drunk and Alcibiades can finally desire for real. Alcibiades
asleep, Aporia does not have anything to becomes what Socrates already was, ‘‘l’homme du
give him but her very own lack.60 désir,’’ which means he stops fearing castration.67
The end of the dialogue coincides with the end
of Alcibiades’ proto-psychoanalysis. It is for the
III in plato more than himself same reason that this epilogue is so significant
Shortly after the end of Socrates’ speech, for Lacan’s own notion of transferential love.
Alcibiades tumultuously enters the house in In Plato’s dialogue, Alcibiades compares
which the symposium is held. He is Socrates to one ‘‘of those Sileni you find sitting

67
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’

in sculptors’ shops [. . .] which when opened up Socrates: ‘‘Che vuoi?,’’ ‘‘What do you want
are found to contain a precious object (agalma) from me? Why do you seem to want from
inside’’ (215b).68 The metaphor of the Silenus me something which is not in myself?’’
and the term agalma are central for Lacan’s Alcibiades’ desire is thus initially elicited.
reading of this scene; the analysand behaves However, at this stage, his miraculous
exactly like Alcibiades with Socrates: he attri- transformation into an erastes has not
butes a hidden precious object (agalma), i.e., his occurred yet. Unlike Achilles, he is not
object of desire, to the analyst. How is this desire here a pure desirer. His love remains
initiated? How is it transvalued into ‘‘real’’ desire imaginary. He desires Socrates just to
beyond transference? What is the link between make sure that Socrates desires him in
desire and love in this context? In order to return (only him); his desire is aimed at
provide an introductory answer to these funda- confirming his disputed role of beloved.73 In
mental questions, I shall reconstruct the phenom- other words, like Pausanias, Alcibiades is
enology of the transferential relationship between still proposing an exchange of values which
Socrates and Alcibiades in four different stages: does not contemplate any lack or excess.
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Nevertheless, differently from Pausanias,


(a) Socrates desires Alcibiades. Socrates qua he has already sensed the lack which
erastes desires him but he does not desire characterizes Socrates’ desire: he now needs
only him. Indeed, he says ‘‘after I have to identify with it. This is the only way in
fallen in love with him, he does not even let which Alcibiades can emulate Achilles:
me look at other boys’’ (214d). Socrates is indeed, the latter is a pure desirer precisely
already a pure desirer.69 On the contrary, because, besides the fact that he desires
Alcibiades wants to be the exclusive object Patroclus in spite of Patroclus’s lack, he also
of his love: this is to say, he does not realize accepts that he must face his own lack, i.e.,
that Socrates qua pure desirer is looking for his death, by deciding to revenge Patroclus.
the agalma, i.e., the object of desire which (c) Socrates denies that he is the real object of
psychoanalysis names part-object and Lacan Alcibiades’ desire, i.e., he refuses to desire
re-defines as objet petit a,70 something him in return as an eromenos. Socrates
which is not, strictly speaking, in remains a pure erastes. Lacan believes that
Alcibiades (or in anybody else), something he cannot be an eromenos precisely because
which is ‘‘in Alcibiades more than himself.’’ he knows what love is:74 in other words,
Precisely because of his indifference towards Socrates knows that, per se, he is ‘‘void/
the individual specificity of physical beauty, nothing’’ (ouden), that he is only an
Lacan’s real-life Socrates might apparently imaginary substitutive object of Alcibiades’
be associated with Diotima’s abstract teach- (emerging) real desire. Differently put, he
ings: however, I shall later attempt to show knows that agalma is ‘‘in him more than
how this comparison is, for Lacan himself, himself,’’ that love relies on what the other
highly problematic. lacks, and not on what he has. In this sense,
(b) Alcibiades starts desiring Socrates as an one might suggest that Socrates enacts a sort
eromenos. Alcibiades qua eromenos is of practical confutation of Pausanias’ peda-
desired by Socrates. But he is also avoided gogic love insofar as this is based on a
by Socrates. Alcibiades thus starts desiring ‘‘quote of values,’’ on an exchange of what
Socrates precisely when he realizes that the lover and the beloved respectively, have.
Socrates desires him whilst not really As Lacan claims by closely commenting
desiring him (i.e., in Lacanese, after Symposium 218e–219a, Socrates’ reply to
Socrates has frustrated Alcibiades’ uncondi- Alcibiades’ unashamed advances goes as
tional demand to be loved)71. As Lacan follows: ‘‘You want to exchange that
points out, this is an awkward position to be which, from the Socratic perspective of
in for an eromenos.72 Alcibiades thus asks science, is the illusion [. . .] of beauty [i.e.,

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Alcibiades’ beautiful body] for truth [i.e., For the Lacan of Seminar VIII, real love
Socrates’ agalma]’’; on the one hand, that somehow sublimates real desire for death
would not be fair; on the other: ‘‘Be careful, without erasing it: real love has to come to
examine things with more circumspection terms with real lack. In this sense, love is a
(ameinon skopei) so that you won’t make messenger of the Real, a metaxu between the
any mistake; this self is, properly speaking, order of the Real (qua lack) and reality (in
nothing (ouden ôn). [. . .] There where you which the structural lack is necessarily
see something, I am nothing.’’75 veiled).
(d) Helped by Socrates’ interpretation of the (c) Socrates qua analyst has a priori decided not
facts he is now reliving by recounting them to love; he ‘‘does not enter into the game
publicly, Alcibiades retroactively realizes of love’’78 – even though he could. More
that Socrates is/was not the real object of specifically, he refuses to be loved. This does
his desire; his desire is now contingently not prevent him from desiring: there is a
aimed at Agathon. More importantly, he also specific desire of the analyst. ‘‘If the analyst
grasps that his desire actually aims at what realizes the popular image [. . .] of apathy,
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is in Agathon more than himself, i.e., his this is only insofar as he is possessed by a
agalma. According to Lacan, Socrates desire which is more powerful than [. . .]
ironically anticipates this realization when, getting down to facts with his patient.’’79
at the beginning of the Symposium, he (d) The Symposium has an open ending: we
compares Agathon with a ‘‘full cup’’ ignore what happens next. We do not know
(175e).76 This is obviously an antiphrasis: if Alcibiades and Agathon will start a true
like Socrates, Alcibiades is in fact, by now, love relationship (given Agathon’s coquet-
able to concede that Agathon does not own tish and self-complacent final remarks at
any agalma. Alcibiades knows that Agathon 222e, this seems highly improbable).
is only a contingent object of his desire. He What we know for certain is that
has thus assumed the truth of his desire Alcibiades could now love: he only needs
beyond transference. Alcibiades has become to meet another pure desirer who consents
a pure desirer/erastes; at the same time, ‘‘the to be loved.
miracle of love is realized in him.’’77
At this stage, we can finally ask ourselves:
Moving beyond Lacan’s overt reading of the what is real, true love for Lacan (of which
Symposium, we may also draw the following he directly speaks very little in Seminar VIII
general conclusions: and elsewhere)? How does he distinguish it from
(a) In order to really desire, Alcibiades needs false, imaginary love? A distinction between
to assume lack. One does not merely desire ‘‘true’’ and ‘‘false’’ love is, in different ways,
what one lacks: essentially, one desires the tacitly present throughout Lacan’s œuvre.
lack that desire is; real desire is, in the end, Simply put, ‘‘false’’ love is imaginary, i.e.,
an unconscious desire for death. This is to narcissistic in essence.80 It must occur during
say: by desiring agalma, or, in Lacanese, the psychoanalysis in the guise of transferential
objet petit a, one actually desires the love.81 Above all, imaginary love entirely
(lacking) object which causes desire to determines our everyday life: it shapes and
desire all other objects (at the imaginary gives consistency to our own imaginary identity,
level). This is why, for Lacan, the objet petit our ego. The latter is nothing but the product of
a is defined as the ‘‘object-cause of desire.’’ an alienating redoubling of the subject caused
This is also why the objet petit a is, for by his capacity to identify himself with his
Lacan, an ‘‘object-nothing which creates mirror-image (or with the imaginary other
something.’’ understood as mirror-image). Such an identifica-
(b) Precisely because Alcibiades really desires, tion relies on the fact that the subject is
he is also potentially ready to really love. captivated by the image of the human body

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‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’

which functions as a gestalt. The ego thus giving what one does not have.’’86 The first
attempts to realize an impossible coincidence formula refers to the lover, the second to the
with the ideal image reflected in the mirror: beloved. A quotation from Žižek can help us to
given such an impossibility, this relationship explain them:
ends up in a permanent rivalry of the subject
with himself, with the narcissistic image of When in love, I love somebody because of the
objet a in him/her, because of what is ‘‘in him
himself that the lure of the mirror creates. Such
more than himself’’ – in short, the object of
a rivalry is already evident at the level of the
love cannot give me what I demand of him
dialectics between the child’s early perception of since he doesn’t possess it, since it is an excess
his fragmented body and his parallel vision of in its very heart [. . .] the only thing left to the
the completeness of the specular body: it beloved is thus to proceed to a kind of
continues after the constitution of the Ur-Ich exchange of places, to change from the object
and successively consolidates itself in concomi- into the subject of love, in short: to return
tance with the progressive reinforcement of the love. Therein consists, according to Lacan,
ego’s alienating identifications. In other words, love’s most sublime moment: in this inversion
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since the beginning of his psychic life, the when the beloved object endeavours to deliver
subject both eroticizes and vies with his own himself from the impasse of his position [. . .]
by answering the lover’s lack/desire with his
image because this constitutes the ideal perfec-
own lack. Love is based upon the illusion that
tion which the subject does not have. Narcissism this encounter of the two lacks can succeed.87
and aggressivity are thus one and the same
thing; in later years, Lacan indeed creates a In Seminar VIII, Lacan uses a mythical image
neologism in which ‘‘being in love/enamoured’’ to exemplify all this: I want to pluck a ripe fruit.
(enamouré) and ‘‘hate’’ (haine) are fused in a My hand stretches out, it gets closer to the object
single term: he speaks of hainamoration.82 but it still cannot reach it. At that precise
Narcissism can generally be defined as the moment, it is reached by another stretching hand.
(self-loving) relationship between the subject and When the two hands meet, it is as if they were
his own ideal image; aggressivity differs from grabbing the fruit which attracted and still
sheer aggression understood as violent acting attracts them.88 The least we could say is that
(the latter is just one of its possible outcomes): we are here confronted with a notion of love
on the contrary, it is a prerequisite of the which, despite remaining confined to the field
subject’s imaginary dimension and can never be of ‘‘illusion,’’ as Žižek has it, also appears not to
completely eliminated.83 As a consequence, the impede the appearance of (the subject’s) ‘‘pure’’
augmentation of aggressivity will be proportional desire (in the form of the Other’s desire qua
to the narcissistic intensity of the subject’s object a). In other words, in this context, love
relationship with his own ideal image. The bears the sign of a real encounter with lack; it
subject who, when considered qua ego, is bears ‘‘the scar of castration,’’ says Lacan.89
nothing but the consequence of an alienating More specifically, for Lacan, real love is the
identification with the imaginary other, wants to product of a metaphoric substitution in which
be there where the other is: he loves the other ‘‘the function of the erastes, i.e., the lover qua
only insofar as he wants to aggressively be in its subject of lack, comes in the place, substitutes
place. The subject claims the other’s place as the itself for the function of the eromenos, i.e., the
(unattainable) place of his own perfection. It loved [imaginary] object.’’90 The erastes becomes
goes without saying that, for the same reason, eromenos by substituting his narcissistic love
this ambivalent relationship is also self- object with his own lack. The emergence of a
destructive.84 structural inadaequatio91 between real desire and
When it comes to ‘‘real’’ love, Lacan’s its imaginary object together with its assumption
aphoristic definitions are the following: ‘‘What on the side of the subject/lover is a precondition
one loves in a being is beyond what he is, i.e., in of love: this inadaequatio also coincides with the
the end, what he lacks’’85 and, in parallel, ‘‘love is field of tragicomedy.92 Whilst this occurs, the

70
chiesa

eromenos transforms himself into an erastes, that IV in lacan more than himself
is to say, he starts really to desire by offering the
other ‘‘what he does not have’’: this cannot but Does such an account of love actually mark the
be, by definition, the eromenos’ own lack, his own definitive end of its dependence on narcissism?
desire or, which is the same, ‘‘what is in him We should doubt it: for Lacan, the ego will always
more than himself,’’ the agalma/objet petit a that remain a prerequisite of the subject’s own
the lover is looking for. In such a way, an illusory individuation. As he states in one of his early
adaequatio of lacks is achieved. In the end, the essays: The ego is a ‘‘vital dehiscence that is
erastes looks for the desire of the beloved; what constitutive of man’’;97 I take this assumption to
the erastes desires is the Other’s desire. The be valid throughout his entire oeuvre. As a
Other’s desire [le désir de l’Autre] qua agalma is consequence, the neat ‘‘division of two perspec-
the ‘‘spring of love’’ [le ressort de l’amour].93 tives on love’’98 – one which ‘‘derivates, masks,
Returning to the Symposium: the miraculous annuls, sublimates all that is concrete in
character of the eromenos’ transformation is what experience’’ and another which ‘‘revolves
Lacan had emphasised in Phaedrus’s praise of around this privilege, this unique point [. . .]
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Achilles’ sacrifice; the emergence of a structural agalma [. . .] which we only find in a being when
inadaequatio (i.e., an impasse, an aporia) in the we really love’’99 – enacted in certain passages of
erastes from which only an adaequatio can Seminar VIII could rightly be considered as all
successively arise is exactly what the myth of too hurried. Imaginary love and real love cannot
Penia’s conception of Eros with Poros was all easily be separated: if on the one hand, agalma
about. is also constantly operative in narcissistic love
It should be clear by now that both partners despite the fact that we ignore/veil it, on the other
involved in a love relation must be, at the same – as Lacan somehow contradictorily admits in the
time, both erastes and eromenos: this is why the same seminar – every temporary emergence of
relation between Socrates and Alcibiades could agalma in real love must necessarily be ‘‘more or
never be a love relation.94 However, it is less [imaginarily] dissimulated’’; in case this does
important to note how, according to Lacan, not happen, falling in love soon degenerates into
this overlapping of lacks is far from creating any unbearable anxiety.100
sort of symmetry: my hand meets the other’s In a lesson from Seminar IX, Lacan briefly
hand whilst stretching towards a third object; a returns to the interpretation of the conclusion of
real love relationship is a ménage à trois the Symposium he had provided in Seminar VIII
between a couple of lacking subjects and and the reason why the scene between Socrates
agalma/objet petit a.95 On the contrary, two is and Alcibiades should not be understood as an
the number which activates the aggressively example of (the metaphor of) real love. Socrates
narcissistic mirage of completeness. For this qua pure desirer does not accept his being loved
same reason, real love is, as I have already by Alcibiades: therefore, Socrates does not
remarked, less illusory than imaginary love. occupy the place of the beloved, i.e., no
Thanks to the metaphor of love, both partners metaphoric substitution takes place. Lacan main-
somehow realise that what they desire in the tains that he is here specifically focusing on the
other is not a subject but an object which is in ‘‘frontier that separates desire from love’’:101 if
each subject more than the subject himself. there is a substitution, one accesses the realm of
Given that they both take up the position that love; if no substitution occurs, one remains in the
was of the other, what they both desire field of desire. More importantly, in Seminar IX,
through the other is ultimately something Lacan challenges the plausibility of (the metaphor
which is in them more than themselves: an of) real love tout-court: ‘‘It is a matter of
object-nothing which provides the ‘‘extimate’’ establishing whether it is not structurally impos-
kernel of their own being. In this way, they are sible, whether it does not represent an ideal
not apparently desiring in the other their own point.’’102 In other words, all pure desirers – like
ideal image.96 Socrates – would as such, by definition, always

71
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’

persist in their refusal to take up the position of association is openly resumed under the motto of
the beloved: being aware of the fact that there is ‘‘noli me amare.’’ At this stage, we should
nothing in them which is lovable, or, better, that naively ask the following basic question: what
they are desired for the ‘‘void,’’ for the ouden, does Diotima’s ascent and ‘‘final identification’’
which is in them more than themselves, pure concretely share with the troubadours and
desirers could not but subscribe to a program- Minnesänger’s love for an inaccessible Lady?
matic ‘‘noli me amare.’’ If according to Seminar Žižek seems to propose that their common
VIII, as we have seen, the signification of real denominator should be identified in tragedy;
love surfaces when ‘‘the function of the erastes, both Platonic and courtly love culminate ‘‘in
i.e., the lover qua subject of lack comes in the Liebestod, in a climactic self-obliteration in which
place of [. . .] the function of the eromenos,’’103 in all distinctions disappear’’:108 both should there-
Seminar IX, Lacan realizes that the lover either fore be condemned as two fundamentally false
fully recognizes himself as a subject of lack (i.e., visions of love. I completely agree with these
as a pure desirer) or accepts his being loved conclusions, but I believe some further elucida-
for something he does not have. tions are necessary.
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What is it then that radically changed in the In Seminar VIII, Lacan explicitly claims that
course of just one year? In Seminar VIII, real/ the notion of tragic (and not tragicomic) love was
non-narcissistic love relied on one main (incon- alien to the classical world,109 and proposes that
sistent) assumption: its compatibility with pure Plato’s fundamental fantasy (in the Symposium
desire. Now, Lacan thinks that such a ‘‘con- and beyond) ‘‘consists in having projected the
junction,’’ as he names it, between pure desire idea of Supreme Good on [. . .] the impenetrable
and the (more or less illusory) ‘‘function of the void.’’110 Platonic love, like courtly love, leads
One’’ which love necessarily supports is simply to the void: in this sense, what they both equally
impossible. Desire and love are structurally share with tragedy is, on one level, an undeniable
incompatible. Desire is the desire of lack, or, Schwärmerei, an ‘‘exaltation.’’ However, not only
more precisely: ‘‘That which desire looks for in do they ‘‘do without satisfactions’’ but, above all,
the Other is less that which is desirable [le unlike tragedy, they point towards ‘‘the institu-
désirable] than that which desires [le désirant], tion of lack.’’111 We could thus affirm that, for
i.e., that which the Other lacks.’’104 Differently Lacan, Platonic (and courtly) love:
put, the pure desirer desires the desire of the
Other, to be understood as that which in (a) Elides the Other. By reducing the beloved to
the Other desires [le désirant dans l’Autre], the void, it mortifies the Other. ‘‘In Platonic
i.e., the Other’s lack. As Lacan notices, for this Eros, the lover, love, only aims at his own
very reason, as a pure desirer, I cannot desire perfection.’’112
the Other desiring me, I cannot desire to be (b) Converts, at last, the quest for the void –
loved: if this happens, I ‘‘abandon desire.’’ To which, meanwhile, has enhanced desire –
express this with Lacan’s own convoluted words: into an absolute, ‘‘final identification with
‘‘It’s me who desires and, given that I desire that which is supremely lovable,’’113 beauty
[the Other’s] desire, this desire could only be in itself, i.e., the Supreme Good qua
desire for myself [désir de moi] if [. . .] I love capitalized Void. In the ‘‘higher mysteries
myself in the other, that is if it is me that I of love’’ described by Diotima, Lack is thus
love.’’105 positively instituted as the ultimate ktema
In Seminar IV, Lacan had already come to the (which Lacan adequately renders as ‘‘but de
conclusion that ‘‘the biggest desire is lack,’’106 possession,’’ ‘‘aim of possession’’114).
and that, consequently, what one loves in a being Psychoanalysis can only define this transva-
is what the beloved lacks. He had also underlined luation – which indeed perfectly corresponds
how this is particularly evident in two specific with the utter obliteration of the Other – as
forms of love: Platonic and courtly love.107 In superlatively narcissistic.115 If, for Lacan,
Seminar IX, the same trans-historical/cultural three is the ‘‘minimum’’ number of love,116

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chiesa

Diotima remains on the contrary at the level that Alcibiades is literally ‘‘spellbound’’ by
of a ‘‘dual relation.’’117 Socrates’s agalma, beyond good an evil:
(c) Ultimately differs from tragedy insofar as Alcibiades ‘‘is saying ‘I want it because I want
the latter does not operate this final reversal: it, be it my good or my evil.’ ’’125 But, at the same
in tragedy, pure desire embraces the void time, Lacan also puzzlingly affirms that:
without paradoxically elevating it to the ‘‘Without knowing it, Alcibiades provides the
dignity of the Supreme Good. Moreover, true representation of what the Socratic ascent
radical/tragic desire also goes beyond ‘‘the implies.’’126 Are we facing an insurmountable
experience of beauty.’’ As Lacan writes in contradiction in the psychoanalyst’s impromptu
Seminar VII: ‘‘On the scale that separates us statements? A possible way out of this deadlock
from the central field of desire, if the good would consist in referring Alcibiades’ ‘‘true
constitutes the first stopping place, the representation’’ of Diotima’s ascent to a notion
beautiful forms the second and gets of tragic desire which profoundly interests Lacan
closer.’’118 and which, in this period of his production, he
deems compatible with nothing less than the
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We have thus far tacitly associated Platonic ethics of psychoanalysis. If this hypothesis is
love with Diotima’s ascent.119 Does Lacan, in correct, the ‘‘truth’’ of Alcibiades’ desire should
Seminar VIII, actually think that Plato’s own precisely be equated with the fact that its quest
notion of love in the Symposium is unreservedly for agalma (qua void) was never reversed into the
expressed by the priestess? There are at least appropriation of a Supreme Good. Undoubtedly,
three instances in which he overtly denies this.120 Alcibiades is one of the most tragic figures of
If, on the one hand, ‘‘in presenting that which Ancient Greek history: he was rapidly down-
one may call his thought [on love], Plato graded from the status of political leader and
deliberately reserved for himself the place of military hero to that of enemy of the state par
enigma,’’121 on the other, Lacan believes that we excellence (and possibly, as Lacan remarks, of
should definitely be looking for ‘‘the last word of scapegoat); however, even when he was obliged to
what Plato wants to tell us about the nature of flee Athens, he did not cede on his desire (for
love’’122 in the scene between Socrates and instance, to assure a throne to his descendants)
Alcibiades. Lacan’s reading of the Symposium and he ‘‘found nothing better to do [. . .] than
remains as open as Plato’s own ending of the conceiving a child with the queen [of Sparta] in
dialogue: however, a close cross-scrutiny of the open’’;127 he died a violent death. (In order to
lessons X, XI and XII of Seminar VIII enables have an updated idea of the sort of man he was,
us to draw some provisional conclusions. Lacan suggests, one should imagine a ‘‘Kennedy
Concerning Alcibiades, one can infer that who would have been at the same time James
Lacan thinks that, after he has been ‘‘analysed’’ Dean’’!)128 Furthermore, the similarities between
by Socrates, his desire is both irreducible to Alcibiades’ existence and that of the fictional
Diotima’s ascent to beauty in itself/the Supreme character of Oedipus (e.g., profanation of the
Good and strangely contiguous to it. Indeed, Gods; subversion of the laws of the polis;
Lacan states that ‘‘it is not beauty, nor the ascent, imposed exile; conceiving a child with a foreign
nor an identification with God that Alcibiades queen, etc.) are dazzling; Lacan repeatedly
desires, but this unique object, this something he analysed the figure of Oedipus throughout his
has seen in Socrates’’;123 he is able to support this seminars: one may suppose that he did not fail
view by showing how, through the simile of the to notice them.
ugly Silenus and of agalma as something This reference to the real-life Alcibiades leads
precious which is hidden inside, Plato makes us to our second concluding point concerning
Alcibiades ‘‘eradicate us from the dialectic of the the notion of transferential love that, according
beautiful which had thus far been [. . .] the guide to Lacan, Plato would make him impersonate in
[. . .] on the road to what is desirable.’’124 the Symposium. Lacan insinuates that (Plato is
Moreover, Lacan reminds us how Plato writes well aware of the fact that) Socrates does not

73
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’

really know what he is doing when he interprets The diffuse ambiguity that permeates the
Alcibiades’ desire.129 He thinks he has displaced finale of the dialogue equally prevents us from
agalma from him to Agathon: as we have just establishing what Socrates’ role is with regard to
seen, what history actually teaches us is that the enunciation of a true notion of love, both for
Socrates has – allow me the expression – Plato and, more importantly, for Lacan. To what
‘‘uncorked’’ Alcibiades’ devastating hybris. On extent is Socrates (and not Plato) a faithful pupil
an initial level – Lacan seems to suggest – Plato of Diotima who, in his turn, converts new adepts
shows us how, by wanting to praise Agathon, to the cause of the Void qua Supreme Good?
Socrates is actually ‘‘indicating to Alcibiades Undoubtedly, the more he is, the less he can
where his desire lies’’130 – given that Alcibiades’ convincingly be presented as a proto-analyst
desire equates with the Other’s/Socrates’ (con- given that Lacan unequivocally distances his
tingent object of) desire. In this sense, it would notion of true love from the ascent to beauty in
appear that Socrates’ interpretation achieves a itself condemning the latter as a radical form
narcissistic ‘‘re-corking’’ of Alcibiades’ desire of narcissism. But even if one unconditionally
through Agathon after having awakened it. But, assumes that there is no connection whatsoever
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on a second level, Alcibiades’ real/tragic desire between Diotima’s theory of love and Socratic
is not ‘‘re-corked’’ by Socrates’ retroactive Eros135 – this is what Lacan seems to imply when
interpretation (‘‘You do not love me, you love he insists on the passage (217e) in which Plato
him!’’). As Lacan himself specifies: ‘‘Alcibiades makes Alcibiades speak of Socrates’ indifference
keeps on desiring the same thing. That which he before beauty and the Good as such136 – many
looks for in Agathon – do not doubt it – is this problems still remain unsolved. First and fore-
same supreme point where the subject abolishes most: Lacan admits that Socrates was driven by a
himself in his fantasy, i.e., his agalmata.’’131 ‘‘desire for death’’; if, on the one hand, reading
This is probably the reason why, in an early the Apology – he says – ‘‘it is difficult to believe,
passage of Seminar VIII, Lacan also notes that hearing [Socrates’] defence, that he didn’t want to
Socrates had been a master of love against die,’’ on the other hand, this desire is itself
everybody’s good and that, consequently, he was contradictory (it is not just a matter of commit-
(rightly) put to death for everybody’s good;132 ting suicide) given that ‘‘it took him seventy
against any superficial apologetic reading of the years’’ to satisfy it.137 This complex proximity
overall economy of the dialogue – such as between the desire of the (proto)analyst and the
‘‘Socrates is not guilty for Alcibiades’ hybris, he desire for death directly introduces us again to
even refused to sleep with him’’ – Plato would the delicate issue of psychoanalysis’ overlapping
instead be the first to admit his teacher’s with tragedy. Justifying or criticizing the reasons
responsibility. and the consistency of Lacan’s temporary super-
I believe that, for Lacan, these two imposition of the aim of psychoanalysis – and
interpretations are equally valid and, what is therefore of the formation of the analyst – with
more – attaching importance to the mythical real desire qua tragic desire lies beyond the scope
stratifications of the Symposium as a whole – of this article. Let us only recall that, some years
should not be held as mutually exclusive. As he later, in Seminar XI, ‘‘the analyst’s desire is not
remarks, the conclusion of the conversation [any longer seen as] a pure desire.’’138 As for
between Alcibiades and Socrates is ‘‘enig- Seminar VIII, what noticeably emerges from one
matic’’:133 Plato purposely disrupts the banquet of its opening lessons – and is later explored by
with the arrival of a new group of drunken Lacan’s dissection of the scene between Socrates
fêtards. I suggest that this second interruption and Alcibiades – is that the psychoanalyst should
should be read together with the abrupt ‘‘Good be somebody who: a) ‘‘is not there for [the
night!’’ with which Socrates answers to analysand’s] good but so that he may love’’; b)
Alcibiades’ advances and which Lacan seems to makes the analysand love ‘‘that which he lacks
associate with his notorious ‘‘interruption de la [i.e., the analysand’s real desire] through the
séance.’’134 medium of the transference.’’139

74
chiesa

V conclusion prevent the inflicted wound being lethal, how


analysis manages to re-cicatrize an old wound
Lacan is well aware of the fact that the final scene after having turned the knife in it.
of the Symposium does not provide him with Such an antinomy is not without consequences
an exemplification of what, in Seminar VIII, he for the extremely variable status of ‘‘real’’ love in
understands as (the metaphor of) real love. these years. On this regard, one might well argue
Alcibiades is, at best, initiated by Socrates into that, if Seminar VIII is overoptimistic, Seminar
the tragic mysteries of pure desire. No hand IX is, almost by way of compensation, over-
stretches back to meet his hand: not Socrates’, pessimistic. For this reason, both fail to consider
who refuses to be loved; not even Agathon’s, for (the metaphor of) real love as something
the simple reason that he is not a pure desirer. momentarily possible: real love emerges for an
However, Lacan supposes that Alcibiades qua instant when, having pursued agalma, the
pure desirer could have established a real love subject of pure desire abandons his (ultimately
relationship if only, in his quest for the void, the nihilistic) search for purification and, by answer-
Other would have ‘‘answered’’ him as a – to use ing to the Other’s answer qua last presence,
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one of the most effective definitions of real love substitutes himself for the beloved. He will not
from Seminar VIII – ‘‘last presence.’’140 (And, in take the place of the latter qua pure subject of
case such an answer ever occurred, if he himself lack – as Lacan contradictorily suggests in
consented to answer to it.) Seminar VIII – but as somebody who, despite
As we have seen, for the Lacan who inge- his progress towards the void, finally opts to be
niously re-reads the Symposium through the filter loved regardless of his residual ‘‘impurity.’’ In
of the psychoanalytic setting, pure desire and real other words, the subject of pure desire who has
love are deemed compatible: the emergence of experienced lack finds himself in a position where
pure desire is a conditio sine qua non of real love he can decide either to enact the metaphor of
(contrary to all Lacanian doxa, this is, for love, thus necessarily falling back into narcissism
example, clearly implied by Lacan when he qua structural ‘‘vital dehiscence,’’ or to consume
states that Penia qua erastes – ‘‘original desirer’’ himself in tragedy by refusing to be loved.
– represents ‘‘the logical time that precedes the In Seminar I, Lacan had already pointed out
birth of Love’’)141; conversely, unlike narcissistic how love, by provoking a perturbation of the
love, which, all things considered, also includes symbolic order,143 entails the exposure of one’s
courtly and ‘‘Platonic’’ love, real love does not own narcissism to the influence of the beloved:
hinder pure desire. The problem is that this however, at this level, we are still passive
compatibility remains largely unexplained and, in ‘‘victims’’ of love. The space of discussion
the end, inconsistent with regard to Lacan’s own opened by Seminars VIII and IX invites us to
general theory of desire. Lacan acknowledges think a way in which we could also actively
this in Seminar IX, where the ‘‘subject of desire’’ decide to be loved after having undone our
is neatly distinguished from the ‘‘subject of stagnant narcissistic identifications by tempora-
love.’’142 The latter is now regarded exclusively as rily following our pure/real desire (for the void).
a narcissistic subject. Despite the fact that pure Strange as it may sound, I firmly believe that
desire is apparently the only option one might such a ‘‘decisionism’’ should be thought in
choose that would not amount to narcissism, we accordance with – and not to detriment of – the
should stress one last time that this same logical mode of contingency that undoubtedly
admission is precisely what marks Lacanian permeates Lacan’s later speculation on love.
theory in the early 1960s with the antinomy of Being unable to develop this argument any
tragedy: if on the one hand, the shattering further in this article, I limit myself to pointing
manifestation of ‘‘pure’’ desire is rightly invoked in the direction of the element of ‘‘courage’’ in
to re-engrave on the subject the ‘‘scar of love, as obliquely treated by Lacan in Seminar
castration,’’ on the other hand, Lacan is not yet XX:144 we could suggest that, after subtraction,
able to explain in a convincing way how we in order to love, one must have the courage – and

75
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’

thus somehow ‘‘decide’’ – to be faithful to the detailed analysis of the first part of Seminar VIII
event of love, despite obligatory ‘‘re-narcissisisa- has thus far been produced.
tion.’’ As for this imaginary re-inscription, it is 2 Such a relationship is not a ‘‘presentiment of
imperative to make a distinction between new sychanalisse,’’ Lacan admits, but ‘‘an encounter,
imaginary identifications that are the conse- the apparition of certain traits which are, for us,
quence of mere frustration – in everyday life revelatory’’ ( J. Lacan, Le se¤minaire, livre VIII. Le
‘‘there are as many [narcissistic] masks as there transfert, 1960^1961 (Paris: Seuil, 2001) 85^ 86; for
are forms of insatisfaction,’’ Lacan says –145 and an alternative critical edition of Seminar VIII,
those which follow the (reciprocal) experience of see also www.ecole-lacanienne.net/documents/
transfert.doc). (All translations from French
‘‘falling in love,’’ the fleeting moment in which
source materials for which no English translation
the Real qua void pierces the imaginary-symbolic is currently available are mine.)
veil of reality and appears in self-consciousness.
Ultimately, this is precisely the difference 3 Ibid. 37.
between relating to the Other’s demand, demand- 4 Ibid. 71; my emphasis.For a Lacan-inspired treat-
ing something of him, being ment of love qua event and the importance of
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frustrated in our demand and (Lacanian) psychoanalysis in relation to it one


consequently identifying with should refer to Alain Badiou’s work (see especially,
him, and temporarily relating A. Badiou,‘‘La sce'ne du Deux,’’ in De l’amour (Paris:
to the pure desire of the Other Flammarion, 1999) 177^90; A. Badiou, ‘‘What is
love?’’ in Jacques Lacan, Critical Evaluations in
– and thus purely desiring.
Cultural Theory: Volume IV, ed. S. Z›iz› ek (London:
Routledge, 2003) 51^ 67; A. Badiou, On Beckett,
notes eds. N. Power and A. Toscano (Manchester:
Clinamen, 2003) 22^36, 64 ^ 67. See also P.
A first draft of this paper was originally presented Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minneapolis:
at the ‘‘Ancient and Continental’’ workshop orga- Minnesota UP, 2003) 185^91).
nized by John Sellars (University of Warwick, 27
February 2003). A second, enlarged draft was 5 J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of
delivered as a lecture at the Jan van Eyck Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac,1988) 455 (transla-
Academie (31 March 2004) on invitation by Marc tion slightly modified).
De Kesel and Dominiek Hoens. I want to thank 6 Lacan reminds us how psychoanalysis itself is
Myriam Be¤rube¤ and Mike Lewis for their linguistic a ‘‘fausse situation’’ (Le se¤minaire, livre VIII, cit.11).
advice. I have followed R. Waterfield’s English
translation of the Symposium (Oxford: Oxford UP, 7 Ibid. 46.
1994) except in the places where Lacan proposes 8 Ibid. 31.
an interpretation that is incompatible with it.
9 Lacan reminds us that the Symposium’s first
1 The third part of Seminar VIII, centred on a com- translator into French, the sixteenth-century
mentary of Claudel’s Cou“fontaine trilogy, met humanist Louis Le Roy (Ludovicus Rejus), consid-
with a far wider and more committed reception, ered the last part of the dialogue apocryphal
especially in English (see e.g., Chapter 2 of S. and did not translate it.
Z›iz›ek, The Indivisible Remainder. An Essay on
10 As claimed amongst others by the respected
Schelling and Related Matters (London: Verso, 1996);
twentieth-century classicist (and himself a transla-
A. Zupanc›ic›, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan
tor of the Symposium into French) Le¤on Robin. For
(London: Verso, 2000) 211^33). In France, some
Lacan’s bitter attack against Robin’s interpretation
authors have ^ from opposite standpoints ^
of the final scene of the Symposium, see Le se¤mi-
explicitly relied on Lacan’s general interpretation
naire, livre VIII 36 ^37.
of the Symposium for their own reading of this
dialogue (see esp. C. Dumoulie¤, Le de¤sir (Paris: 11 Ibid. 37. As Gagarin observes (in 1977),‘‘there is
Armand Colin/HER E¤diteur, 1999) and J. Le Brun, now general agreement that Alcibiades’ speech
Le Pur Amour de Platon a' Lacan (Paris: Seuil, 2002)). is a vital element of the Symposium’’ (M. Gagarin,
However, to the best of my knowledge, no ‘‘Socrates’ hybris and Alcibiades’ failure,’’ in Phoenix

76
chiesa
31 (1977) 22). However, this was not definitely yet Seminar VIII). Simply put, at best, Achilles’ sacrifice
a reputable belief amongst scholars when Lacan is beyond all ‘‘pathological’’ sacrifice but, as it were,
delivered his commentary in the early 1960s. does not sacrifice the non-pathological sacrifice
itself ^ which should therefore be considered as a
12 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 204.
final pathological remainder. On the contrary,
13 Ibid. 59. Sygne sacrifices sacrifice, says ‘‘No!’’ to it.
(However, I fully agree with Zupanc› ic› when she
14 Ibid. 58.
claims that sacrifice is the precondition of Sygne’s
15 Ibid. 95 (see also 40 and 71). What about (the final ‘‘No!’’)
Christian) God’s love for us? We can believe that
22 Why is the idealized erastes/eromenos relation-
God qua supreme Being loves us only insofar as
ship in ancient Greece generally homosexual?
we ultimately doubt about his existence. As is
Putting together different suggestions made by
well known, Lacan was a fervent admirer of
Lacan in Seminar VIII, we might be able to sketch
Spinoza: ‘‘Beneath all belief in a god that would be
an answer: a) The real object of love is always
perfectly and totally generous, there is the idea of
neuter (in general, not only in ancient Greece)
a certain je ne sais quoi that he anyway lacks and
(ibid. 64); b) As the scene between Socrates and
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that makes it always possible to suppose that he


does not exist’’ ( J. Lacan, Le se¤minaire, livre IV. La Alcibiades will show, the neuter object of love
relation d’objet, 1956^1957 (Paris: Seuil, 1994) 140). emerges only when demand is frustrated; c) In
Indeed, it is precisely because, for Spinoza, God’s Greece,‘‘woman demanded what was due to her,
essence and existence are ‘‘one and the same’’ that she attacked man,’’ i.e., simply put, she used to
he famously ‘‘loves no one’’ (see the fundamental take the initiative (ibid. 44; on this point, see also
corollary to Ethics, V, Prop. 17). Miller provides a J.Lacan, Le se¤minaire, livreV.Les formations del’incons-
succinct Lacanian explanation of Spinoza’s God cient (Paris: Seuil, 1998) 135); d) Consequently, the
incapacity to love: ‘‘Spinoza [. . .] cannot imagine neuter object could not generally emerge in het-
that God loves us since he cannot imagine a God erosexual relations. On the contrary, homosexual
as Barred Other’’ ( J.-A. Miller, Logiche della vita courting was socially coded in a way that allowed
amorosa (Rome: Astrolabio, 1997) 19). For a well- the neuter object to emerge (i.e., recalling
informed comparative discussion of Lacan and Pausanias’ speech, the erastes was both encour-
Spinoza, see C. Guarino, A. Labate and G. aged and hindered; the eromenos could not
Galvano, ‘‘Il desiderio di fronte alla causa,’’ in La surrender too quickly, etc.).
Psicoanalisi 24 (1998): 257^ 64. 23 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 81.
16 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 60. 24 ‘‘We find seven repetitions of ‘paus’ in [sixteen]
17 Ibid. 53. lines’’ (ibid. 80).

18 Noticeably, M. Meunier (see ibid. 62, 71). 25 Ibid. 73.

19 Ibid. 63, 71. 26 Ibid. 73.

20 Ibid. 63 (see Symposium 180a ^ b). 27 Ibid. 73.

21 Interestingly enough, Diotima will denounce 28 Ibid. 77.


Achilles’ act as ultimately self-interested (208d). 29 Ibid. 74, 77.
Diotima in fact claims that ‘‘those who are ‘dead-
for[-somebody],’ or have followed another in 30 Ibid. 77. As we shall later see in this article,
death [uper [. . .] apothanein, epapothanein, proa- according to Lacan, ‘‘Platonic love’’ (the love of
pothanein [. . .] uper] only thought about assuring beauty-in-itself qua Supreme Good) should in its
for themselves an immortal memory: men do turn be distinguished from Plato’s own beliefs
everything in order to achieve the immortality of concerning love.
glory’’ (see J. Le Brun, Le Pur Amour de Platon
31 Ibid.108,116 ^17.
a' Lacan 35). Even if Diotima’s allegations would
prove wrong, what is certain is that Achilles’ act 32 Ibid.109.
does not reach the level of Sygne de
33 Ibid.117.
Cou“fontaine’s act (also analysed by Lacan in

77
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
34 Ibid.116. exact opposite, i.e., the mythical achievement of
symbolic death through tragic desire, ultimately
35 A general lack of sufficient attention on the
coincide.
side of commentators may be indeed inferred
from the fact that we still call it the ‘‘myth of the 42 Ibid.132.
androgynous,’’ whereas the androgynous is just
43 Ibid. 132. The list of qualities attributed by
one of the three original spherical species.
Agathon to Eros is considered by Lacan to be far
36 Ibid.118. more ambiguous than translators generally con-
sider it to be. Most of the terms used by the poet
37 D. Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian would have a double, pejorative meaning: for
Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1996) 181. example, Lacan claims that it is too simplistic to
Briefly put, this lack of symmetry is due to the translate truphe as ‘‘well-being’’ given that it also
fact that the phallus is the only signifier which gov- presupposes a certain hybris qua pretentiousness
erns the relations between the sexes: woman has (ibid. 134). Waterfield also notes that there are
‘‘to take the image of the other sex as the basis some ‘‘obvious absurdities’’ in Agathon’s speech,
of her [symbolic] identification’’ ( J. Lacan, The such as ‘‘love is self-controlled,’’ but he does not
Psychoses 1955^1956 ^ Book III (London: Routledge,
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make much out of it (see, Plato, Symposium 84).


1993) 176). If, on the one hand, most commentators find
38 Lacan is particularly explicit on this point:‘‘The Agathon’s contribution a sophistic ‘‘nullity’’ (see
symbolic order has to be conceived as something Lacan on Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, ibid. 138 ^39),
superimposed, without which no animal life [. . . on the other hand, some take it very seriously
nor] the most natural of relations, that between indeed: for instance, according to Hamilton,
male and female [. . .] would be possible for [. . .] Agathon’s words would anticipate Paul’s praise of
man’’ (Ibid. 96). love in the First Letter to the Corinthians (see
Plato, The Collected Dialogues (Princeton: Princeton
39 J. Lacan, Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953^1954: UP, 1961) 526). Lacan does not subscribe to either
Book I (New York: Norton, 1988) 138. On the of these readings: he believes this speech should
incompatibility between ‘‘nature’’ in general and be taken seriously precisely because it is a
the spherical perfection of harmonious copulation, ‘‘macaronic discourse’’ (Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 134).
see J. Lacan, Le se¤minaire, livre XVII. L’envers de la
44 Ibid.134.
psychanalyse, 1969^1970 (Paris: Seuil,1991) 36.
45 Ibid.134.
40 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 118.
46 Ibid.139^ 40.
41 Lacan seems to contradict Diotima’s assump-
tion that all those who sacrifice themselves for 47 Ibid.143.
love do so in order to become immortal, or,
48 Ibid.141^ 42.
better, he renders it much more complex (see
above n. 21). Indeed, on the one hand, he claims 49 Ibid. 145. Lacan believes that the purpose of
that ^ like Antigone ^ both Alcestis and Achilles Socratic episteme is to ‘‘warrant knowledge,’’ to
have entered the tragic space ‘‘in between two bring truth back to discourse: this attempt to
deaths,’’ i.e., the space of symbolic death (ibid. 61). ‘‘assure truth’’ through a ‘‘certainty that is internal
On the other hand, he maintains that Socrates to discourse’’ makes him a ‘‘super-sophist’’ (ibid.
himself was led by a peculiar desire for death (suf- 102).
fice it to read the Apology) whilst he also clearly
50 Ibid.143.
aspired after some sort of immortality: Lacan
names the latter ‘‘the desire of infinite discourse’’ 51 See, for example, 177d: ‘‘The ways of love are
and rather surprisingly locates it again in the all I understand.’’
space in between two deaths (ibid. 126 ^29). Here,
52 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 159.
it is clearly impossible to fully unfold the multiple
resonance of these observations. I limit myself to 53 Ibid.145^ 47.
underlining how the space in between two deaths
54 Ibid.146.
is intended in Seminar VIII as the limit where full
symbolisation (Socrates’ infinite discourse) and its 55 Ibid.159.

78
chiesa
56 Ibid.147,153. desires the child for what literally is in him more
than himself: the phallic gestalt (see, for example,
57 Ibid.150.
Le se¤minaire, livre IV 70 ^71).
58 Ibid.163.
72 See M. Nussbaum on this issue (‘‘The speech of
59 Ibid. 149; see Symposium 203b where Penia is Alcibiades: a reading of the Symposium,’’ in The
in fact described as aporia. Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy
and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986)
60 Lacan says he derived this expression
188 ^ 89).
from Symposium 202a (ibid.150).
73 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 187, 213.
61 Indeed, Socrates was snub-nosed and had
protuberant eyes. 74 Ibid.188.
62 Ibid.171. 75 Ibid.189. Elsewhere in Seminar VIII, Lacan reads
Socrates’ ouden in topological term: his being is
63 Ibid.162.
‘‘nulle part,’’ he is atopos. Equally, the analyst should
64 Ibid.168. be atopos. (ibid.103).
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65 Ibid. 213. See also Symposium 219c; Alcibiades 76 Ibid.189.


states: ‘‘I might as well call you ‘gentlemen of the
77 Ibid.192.
jury,’ because you’re listening to evidence of
Socrates’ high-handed treatment of me.’’ 78 Ibid.188.
66 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 183,193. 79 Ibid. 225.
67 Ibid.192. 80 According to Lacan, imaginary love is exempli-
fied in Phaedrus’s speech by the figure of
68 As for the question of how to translate
Orpheus: given that Orpheus ‘‘hadn’t been
agalma, Lacan provides a detailed explanation
brave enough to die for his love,’’ the gods
of its signification which analyses many examples
‘‘showed him only a phantom of his wife’’
of its use in various classical texts and which we
(Symposium 179d).
could summarize with the following points: a) it
is something precious; b) the ‘‘topological indica- 81 In Seminar VIII, Lacan notices that the transfer-
tion,’’ the fact that it is ‘‘inside,’’ is very impor- ence is ‘‘something which is similar to love’’ (cit. 84;
tant (ibid. 170); c) it can be considered both as my emphasis). However, the narcissistic love rela-
a ‘‘special image’’ and as an ‘‘unusual object’’ tion established during the transference is meant
(ibid. 174 ^75); d) unlike most translators who to undo narcissistic identifications: in this sense,
refer to agalma as hidden statues of gods, as Safouan clearly points out with reference to
Lacan invites us to think of it as a ‘‘trap for Alcibiades’ confession, ‘‘the transference
gods’’ (a ‘‘pie'ge a' dieux,’’ ibid. 175): once again, becomes related to a search for truth’’
one should be reminded here of the metaxu (M. Safouan, Lacaniana: Les se¤minaires de Jacques
role of love, i.e., its location in between gods Lacan,1953^1963 (Paris: Fayard, 2001) 164).
and humans.
82 See, for example, J. Lacan,On Feminine Sexuality,
69 The expression ‘‘pur de¤sirant’’ is used by Lacan The Limits of Love and Knowledge: Book XX, trans.
himself with reference to Socrates and the desire with notes by B. Fink (New York: Norton, 1998)
of the analyst in Seminar VIII (ibid. 433). 90. In his index, Fink proposes to translate
‘‘hainamoration’’ with hateloving.
70 Lacan explicitly equates agalma, part-
object, object of desire and objet petit a (see 83 J. Lacan, ‘‘Aggressivity in psychoanalysis,’’
ibid.179,181). E¤crits: A Selection (London: Tavistock,1977) 24.
71 There is here a parallelism with what happens 84 For an in-depth analysis of these issues,
in the so-called dialectic of frustration between see L. Chiesa, ‘‘The Subject of the Imaginary
the child and the mother: the demand of the sub- Other,’’ Journal for Lacanian Studies 3.1 (2005): 1^34.
ject is initiated by primordial frustration and suc-
85 Le se¤minaire, livre IV 142.
cessively sustained by the fact that the mother

79
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
86 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 46. In Seminar IV, Lacan object is worth the other, for a subject things get
similarly states that ‘‘there is no bigger sign of even worse. Indeed, a subject is not actually worth
love than donating what one does not have’’ (Le an other subject: in this case, one subject is the
se¤minaire, livre IV 140). other subject’’ (ibid.178 ^79; my emphasis).
87 S. Z›iz›ek, Enjoy your Symptom! Jacques Lacan in 97 J. Lacan,‘‘Aggressivity in psychoanalysis’’ 21; my
Hollywood and out, revised edition (London: emphasis.
Routledge, 2001) 57^58. One should specify
98 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 181.
though, that, in real love, the beloved returns love
qua erastes, i.e., qua pure desirer. 99 Ibid. 181^ 82; my emphasis. The same dichot-
omy is also expressed in Seminar VIII by the
88 See Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 69; see also 216.
distinction between ‘‘phantasmatic’’ love and
89 Ibid.130. Lacan could have found further corro- the love which aims at ‘‘the being of the Other’’
boration for this expression in the fact that, in his (ibid. 61).
speech, Aristophanes claims that the navel should
be regarded as a ‘‘reminder’’ of the cut inflicted 100 Ibid. 214.
by Zeus (see Symposium 190e ^191a)! 101 Seminar IX (unpublished), lesson of 21
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90 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 53. February 1962.

91 In Seminar VIII, Lacan writes that ‘‘this significa- 102 Ibid.


tion called love must raise from the conjunction 103 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 53; my emphasis.
of desire with its object insofar as the latter is
inadequate’’ (ibid. 47; my emphasis). 104 Seminar IX (unpublished), lesson of 21
February 1962.
92 This would explain the conclusion of the
Symposium which continues to puzzle commenta- 105 Ibid.
tors: in the early hours of the morning only 106 Le se¤minaire, livre IV 190.
‘‘Agathon [the tragic poet], Aristophanes [the
comedian], and Socrates were still awake’’ (223c); 107 Ibid.109^10.
‘‘Socrates was trying to get them to agree that 108 S. Z›iz›ek, ‘‘Prefazione all’edizione italiana,’’ Il
knowing how to compose comedies and knowing soggetto scabroso: Trattato di ontologia politica, trans.
how to compose tragedies must combine in a and introduced by D. Cantone and L. Chiesa
single person’’ (223d). (Milan: Cortina, 2003) xvii.
93 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 204, 216. 109 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 135.
94 The fact that love necessarily entails a (meta- 110 Ibid.13.
phoric) becoming eromenos of the erastes is clearly
stated by Lacan in Seminar VIII with reference 111 Le se¤minaire, livre IV 109; my emphasis.
to Socrates’ refusal to become eromenos (‘‘This 112 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 158.
would be the metaphor of love insofar as
Socrates would acknowledge himself as a beloved,’’ 113 Ibid.158.
ibid.189).
114 Ibid.158.
95 On the lack of symmetry in love, see ibid. 53,
115 In Seminar IV, talking indiscriminately about
70. On the number 3 qua number of love, see
courtly and Platonic love, Lacan states that:
ibid.162,168,182.
‘‘At the height of love, in the most idealised form
96 ‘‘Objectifying’’ the Other (whose being is an of love, what is looked for in woman is what
object; see ibid. 68) is thus the best one can do in she lacks: the phallus’’ (Le se¤minaire, livre IV 110).
order to distance oneself from sheer narcissism. Even in this case, one should not overlook the
As Lacan writes in Seminar VIII: ‘‘I don’t know if, fact that such a love of what woman as such
after having given such a pejorative connotation lacks paradoxically coincides in the end with the
to the fact of considering the other as an object, most radical quest for the whole. Woman’s
anybody has ever remarked how considering him missing phallus is the pendent of man’s ‘‘plus’’
as a subject is not better. [. . .] If it is true that an qua castrated being: man is castrated, since he

80
chiesa
symbolically lacks the ‘‘minus’’ (qua imaginary 133 Ibid. 215.
object).
134 Ibid.191.
116 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 168.
135 From a different standpoint, Neumann simi-
117 Ibid.168. larly concludes that: ‘‘It is [. . .] wrong to ascribe
to him [Socrates] the role of Diotima’s educator
118 J. Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959^1960:
intending to father spiritual children in others’’
Book VII (London: Routledge, 1992) 217. The fact (‘‘Diotima’s Concept of Love’’ 57).
that, for Lacan, the aim of psychoanalysis is, in
these years, close to such a tragic notion of desire 136 Lacan comes to this conclusion by strongly
is clearly reinstated in Seminar VIII. Through psy- disagreeing with usual translations of Symposium
choanalysis, we ‘‘find’’ our desire qua lack: the 216e: see Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 170.
latter is incompatible with any good and any pos- 137 Ibid.104.
session of an object (Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 84 ^ 85).
138 J. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of
119 Which is what Lacan implicitly does in Psychoanalysis (London: Vintage, 1998) 276; my
Seminar IV. emphasis.
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120 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 158, 204, 215^16. 139 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 25.
121 Ibid. 204. For a similar sceptical approach to 140
Plato’s own ideas on love, see H. Neumann,
‘‘Diotima’s Concept of Love,’’ American Journal of Love as such is related to the question one
Philology 86 (1965): 33^59 (esp. 34 ^37). Neumann poses to the Other concerning what he can
give us and what he can answer us. It’s not
convincingly disputes the fact that ‘‘Socrates’
that love is identical to all demands with
speech in the Symposium holds the key to the
which we assail the Other; it situates itself
Platonic evaluation of the other speeches’’ (ibid.
in the beyond of this demand, insofar as the
33). However, such a conclusion is drawn after an
Other can answer us or fail to answer us as a
analysis of Diotima’s teachings which differs last presence. (ibid. 207)
profoundly from Lacan’s.
141 Ibid. 160. One should, however, specify that
122 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 204. pure desire is, as such, an ideal asymptotic point.
123 Ibid.194. Pure desire designates here the commencement
of a process of ‘‘purification’’ of desire, the fact
124 Ibid.170. that, as is clear from Lacan’s mythical example,
125 Ibid.191. before meeting the hand of the Other, my hand
has already reduced its distance from the fruit.
126 Ibid.197.
142 Seminar IX (unpublished), lesson of 21
127 Ibid. 33. Lacan mentions again the same February 1962.
anecdote (taken from Plutarch) in Seminar IX
(lesson of 21 February 1962). 143 Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953^1954: Book I
142.
128 Ibid. 35. Interestingly enough, Nussbaum
herself, who never mentions Lacan in her 144 SeeThe Seminar. Book XX 144.
seminal 1979 article on Alcibiades’ speech, 145 Le se¤minaire, livre V 333.
compares Alcibiades to Kennedy (see ‘‘The
Speech of Alcibiades: A Reading of Plato’s
Symposium’’ 169)!
Lorenzo Chiesa
129 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 215. School of European Culture and Languages
130 Ibid. 215. University of Kent
Canterbury CT2 7NF
131 Ibid.194.
UK
132 Ibid.16 ^19. E-mail: l.chiesa@kent.ac.uk

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