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Contact Dr. Edward W. Rogers Chief Knowledge Officer Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer Goddard Space Flight Center NASA
Version 1.8 Publication Date: September 2011 Disclaimer: This document links to many Web sites created and maintained by public and/or private organizations other than NASA. NASA provides links to these sites as a service to our readers. The presence of a link is not a NASA endorsement of the site. When users follow a link to an outside Web site, they are leaving NASA and are subject to the privacy and security policies of the owners/sponsors of the outside Web site(s). NASA is not responsible for the information collection practices of non-NASA sites.
Cover Image: The TacSat-2 launches from Wallops Flight Facility. Credit: NASA
ALPHABETICAL INDEX
Case Title ABCs of OCI: Know You Dont AGATE: The Turning Point for General Aviation Atlas Centaur-67: Go or No Go for Launch? Building the Team: The Ares I-X Upper Stage Simulator Collaborative Problem-Solving: The STS-119 Flow Control Valve Issue Columbia's Final Mission Columbias Final Mission (Multimedia Case) Communication Aberration Cover Blown - The WIRE Spacecraft Mishap Earth Observing System Data Information System (EOSDIS) Fender Bender - DART's Automated Collision Final Voyage of the Challenger Fire in the Cockpit - The Apollo 1 Tragedy Goddard Space Flight Center: Building A Learning Organization GOES-N: Long and Winding Road to Launch Gravity Probe B Hit the Bricks HMS Thetis and Apollo XIII Hubble Space Telescope: Systems Engineering Case Study IBEX: Managing Logistical Exigencies Length 4 35 3 10 13 33 Subject Focus Contract management; Decision making Project management; Revitalizing industry Launch decision Expertise; Facilities renovation; Large scale fabrication; Staffing; Retraining Problem-solving; Collaboration Shuttle accident; Decision making; Communication; Crisis management; Beliefs; Crisis communication; Crisis prevention; Group behavior; Group dynamics; Managerial skills Hubble; Communication; Risk management On-orbit failure; Test-as-you-fly; Peer reviews R&D environment vs. operational environment; Developers vs. users; Instability of requirements; Acquisition strategy Navigational system error; On-orbit failure Shuttle accident; Decision making; Risk management Design and material issues; Quality control; Emergency preparedness; Budget and schedule pressures; Complacency Organizational learning Managing fixed-price contract; Technical role in launch decision; Managing exigencies Schedule pressures; Launch decisions; Risk management; Risk mitigation Launch facilities; Safety; KSC; Space Shuttle Disaster management Systems engineering Logistics; Communication Page 1 2 3 4 5 6
n/a 4 4
7 8 9
35
10
4 35
11 12
4 20+ 12 8 11 4 21 69 1
13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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Case Title IMAGE International Project Management: The Cassini-Huygens Mission International Space Station: Systems Engineering Case Study Launching New Horizons: The RP-1 Tank Decision Launching the Vasa
Subject Focus Budget; Schedule; Science; Team; Project management On-orbit failure; Telemetry; International collaboration; ITAR Systems engineering; Partnerships Governance model; Independent technical authority; Transparent decision making Risk management; Communication, Organizational culture; Technologies, Requirements, Schedules, Budgeting; Accidents Launch decision; Safety, Organizational culture; Risk management; decision making; engineering design Faster, better, cheaper (FBC); On-orbit failure Risk management; Communication; Organizational culture; Contract management Spacecraft trajectory; Ground software Engineering problem solving; Faster, better, cheaper (FBC) Risk management; Communication, Project management Knowledge management; Organizational learning
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Lessons from the Challenger Launch Decision Lewis Spins out of Control Lifting NOAA-N Prime Lost in Translation - The Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Lost in Space: A Case Study in Engineering Problem Solving Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) Managing Knowledge and Learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Mechanical Systems Engineering Support Contract Re-Compete Mission to Mars M.S.T.I.: Optimizing the Whole System NASA After Challenger: Restoring an Image NEAR (Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous) NOAA-N Prime Case Study Pegasus XL-HESSI: Last-Minute Decisions in Flight-Based Launch Redesigning the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE)
13 4 4 4 8 8
26 27 28 29 30 31
30 Organizational culture; Communication; Contract management Failure; Investigation; Contract management; Risk management Systems engineering across a project Disaster management; Media relations; Management communication Redesign; Managing change Safety; Risk management; Accidents Decision making; Communication; Risk Management Launch vehicle; Redesign; Matrix management; Mass; Co-location; Test-as-you-fly
32
4 4 27 18 n/a 38 8 10
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
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Case Title Searching for Life on Mars: The Development of the Viking Gas Chronomatograph Mass Spectrometer Shuttle Software Anomaly Sitting on the Fence: Launching a Balloon in the Outback Skin in the Game: Questioning Organizational Conflict of Interest Space Shuttle Space-to-Space communications System Spektr of Failure
Length
Page
41
4 10 4
Software anomaly; "Test as you fly"; Anomaly documentation Launch vehicle; Decision making; Safety; Failure; Accidents Contract management; Decision making Behavior; Human resources management; Organizational behavior; Organizational structure; Quantitative analysis Schedule pressures; Testing; Space communications; In-house development Hubble; Communication; Risk management Communication Organizational culture; Communication; Tests; Schedules; Budgeting Shuttle launch; Decision-making Risk management; Risk mitigation: Risk assessment Contract management; Organizational culture; Schedules; Budgeting Contract management; Requirements Interagency communication; Roles; Relationships; ITAR and international partnerships Contract management; Requirements; Engineering; Schedule; Review; Learning Communication; Contract management; Engineering; Instruments; ITAR; Launch vehicles; Politics; Project management; Roles; Technologies; Tests In space recovery; Extending the mission; Ground operations Choosing your biggest worry; Launch decision making
42 43 44
45
6 4 4 5 n/a
46 47 48 49 50
ST5 - Miniaturized Space Technology STEREO: Organizational Cultures in Conflict Stormy Weather: Lightning Strike on the Launch Pad Super Lightweight Tank: A Risk Management Case Study in Mass Reduction TDRSS: Fixed-Cost versus Cost-Plus Contracting TDRSS K, L: Working with a Fixed Price Contract The CALIPSO Mission: Project Management in the "PI Mode": Who's in Charge? The CEV Seat: Seeking a SemiCustom Fit in an Off-the-Rack World The Dart Mission: Changing Environment, Shifting Priorities, Hard Decisions The Million Mile Rescue - SOHO Lost in Space The NFIRE Launch: Beating the Sophomore Slump at the Wallops Range
44
51
7 6
52 53
54
55
56
57
58
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Case Title The Pursuit of Images of Columbia The Tour Not Taken - NASA's Comet Nucleus Tour (CONTOUR) Thermosphere Ionosphere Mesosphere Energetics and Dynamics Project (TIMED) Case Study Vegetation Canopy Lidar Wait, Wait, Dont Launch Wide-Field Infrared Explorer (WIRE)
Length 6 4
Subject Focus Communication; Organizational silence; Accidents; Hierarchical barriers; Safety On-orbit failure; Team integration; Faulty design Programmatic challenges; Mission requirements; Center buy-in; Managing expectations; Lines of authority; Rules of engagement; Complex relationships; Personality conflicts Weak project management; Institutional oversight; Contract management; Risk management; Decision making "Faster, better, cheaper" mandate; Geographically dispersed teams; Communications;
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21
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12 4 16
62 63 64
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9 11 13
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27 28 29 33
34
42 44
47
48 57 60 63 49 59 46 56 45 25 53 58
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Case Title TDRSS: Fixed-Cost versus Cost-Plus Contracting The CEV Seat: Seeking a Semi-Custom Fit in an Off-the-Rack World GOES-N: Long and Winding Road to Launch Pegasus XL-HESSI: Last-Minute Decisions in Flight-Based Launch Searching for Life on Mars: The Development of the Viking Gas Chronomatograph Mass Spectr. Lost in Space: A Case Study in Engineering Problem-Solving Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) The CALIPSO Mission: Project Management in the "PI Mode": Who's in Charge? Building the Team: The Ares I-X Upper Stage Simulator Sitting on the Fence: Launching a Balloon in the Outback Redesigning the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE) Gravity Probe B Vegetation Canopy Lidar Collaborative Problem-Solving: The STS-119 Flow Control Valve Issue Lessons from the Challenger Launch Decision International Project Management: The Cassini-Huygens Mission Launching New Horizons: The RP-1 Tank Decision Wide-Field Infrared Explorer (WIRE) NASA After Challenger: Restoring an Image Thermosphere Ionosphere Mesosphere Energetics and Dynamics Project (TIMED) Case Study HMS Thetis and Apollo 13 Goddard Space Flight Center: Building A Learning Organization M.S.T.I.: Optimizing the Whole system Managing Knowledge and Learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Columbia's Final Mission AGATE: The Turning Point for General Aviation Earth Observing System Data Information System (EOSDIS) Final Voyage of the Challenger NOAA-N Prime Case Study Super Lightweight Tank: A Risk Management Case Study in Mass Reduction Hubble Space Telescope: Systems Engineering Case Study International Space Station: Engineering Case Study
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40 16 62 5 26 22 24 64 36 61 18 14 35 32 6 2 10 12 38 51 19 23
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INDEX BY SOURCE
Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer (OCKO), NASA/GSFC
Case Title ABCs of OCI: Know You Dont Atlas Centaur-67: Go or No Go for Launch? GOES-N: Long and Winding Road to Launch IBEX: Managing Logistical Exigencies Launching the Vasa Lessons from the Challenger Launch Decision Lifting NOAA-N Prime Mechanical Systems Engineering Support Contract Re-Compete Pegasus XL-HESSI: Last-Minute Decisions in Flight-Based Launch Sitting on the Fence: Launching a Balloon in the Outback Skin in the Game: Questioning Organizational Conflict of Interest ST5 - Miniaturized Space Technology STEREO: Organizational Cultures in Conflict TDRSS: Fixed-Cost versus Cost-Plus Contracting TDRSS K, L: Working with a Fixed Price Contract The CALIPSO Mission: Project Management in the "PI Mode": Who's in Charge? The CEV Seat: Seeking a Semi-Custom Fit in an Off-the-Rack World The Dart Mission: Changing Environment, Shifting Priorities, Hard Decisions The NFIRE Launch: Beating the Sophomore Slump at the Wallops Range The Pursuit of Images of Columbia Wait, Wait, Dont Launch Length 4 3 8 1 8 13 4 4 8 10 4 4 5 7 6 9 7 6 7 6 4 Page 1 3 15 20 25 26 28 33 39 43 44 48 49 52 53 54 55 56 58 59 63
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Space-to-Space communications System Stormy Weather: Lightning Strike on the Launch Pad Thermosphere Ionosphere Mesosphere Energetics and Dynamics Project (TIMED) Case Study Vegetation Canopy Lidar Wide-Field Infrared Explorer (WIRE)
6 n/a 21 12 16
46 50 61 62 64
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ABCs of OCI: Know You Dont n/a Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer (OCKO), NASA/GSFC http://gsfcir.gsfc.nasa.gov/casestudies/305/ 4 This case study focuses on an Organizational Conflict of Interest (COI) issue within NASA contracting based on a contractor's ongoing work within one contract which could potentially conflict with a new contract the contractor is now preparing to bid for. Contract management; Decision making
Understand how NASA's contracting workforce needs to be pro-active in identifying potential conflict of interest issues across contracts and across activities undertaken in different centers and at headquarters as well as in taking decisive action early in the process.
Other Resources
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AGATE: The Turning Point for General Aviation AGATE Virginia Polytechnic Institute http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/293210main_58527main_agate_casestudy_042604 .pdf 35 This is a full length historical case of how NASA became involved in a project to revitalize the General Aviation industry in America which had been declining for 15 years. Set in the early 1990s it documents the steps and involvement of the government through AGATE to address this decline. AGATE is the Advanced General Aviation Transportation Experiments. project management; revitalizing industry
# of Pages Abstract
Industrial decline and revitalization. Government intervention. National technology capability. AGATE factsheet: http://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/news/factsheets/AGATE.html
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Associated Documents
Other Resources
Christian, H. J., V. Mazur, B. D. Flsher, L. H. Ruhnke, K. Crouch, and R. P. Perala (1989), The Atlas/Centaur Lightning Strike Incident, J. Geophys. Res., 94(D11), 13,16913,177.
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Case Title
Project Name Source URL # of Pages Abstract
problem-solving; collaboration What is the role of cognitive diversity in resolution of technical problems? How do different individuals exercise leadership at different points in time? How does communication among stakeholders help shape outcomes? STS-119 http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/sts119/main /index.html STS-126 http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/sts126/main /index.html
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beliefs, crisis communication, crisis prevention, group behavior, group dynamics, managerial skills To enhance understanding of organizational decision making and learning as well as catastrophic failures; to help students understand how failures can evolve; to think about how to prevent failures in an organization; and to examine how to manage crises effectively. Also, to learn leadership behavior and how to build an organization that is less susceptible to significant preventable failures. Michael A. Roberto, Richard Bohmer, Amy C. Edmondson, Facing Ambiguous Threats, R0611F-PDF-ENG.
Learning Points
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Case Title
Project Name Source URL # of Pages Abstract
Communication Aberration
n/a
NASA Safety Center http://nsc.nasa.gov/SFCS/SystemFailureCaseStudyFile/Download/190/ 4 When NASA launched the Hubble Space Telescope in 1990, astronomers boasted that Hubble would probe the universe to a degree unparalleled by earthbound observatories, and the images it would capture would be of unrivaled quality. Hubble has fulfilled these claims, and the telescope is presently credited with providing data for more than 6,000 published scholarly articles. Fortunately, Hubbles past and current successes now overshadow the debacle in which it was mired during its early years. After Hubbles Wide Field Planetary Camera recorded its first photograph, a voracious press clamored for weeks to see the result. They were met with disappointment. The picture - a severely blurred image of a star cluster in the Carina constellation - fell far short of the crystal representation everyone expected, and a difficult truth became strikingly evident: the telescope was flawed. Hubble; Communication; Risk management
In an industry dominated by engineering and in an Agency endeavoring to expand technology's limits, scientific emphasis can sometimes overrule social contexts. NASA's leaders must possess "soft skills" to enhance team-building and better identify managerial shortcomings before they result in broken team interfaces and technical mistakes, as they did during the HST project. NASA's official Optical Systems Failure Report lists key lessons to take away from the HST mishap. NASA Website: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/hubble/main/index.html
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on-orbit failure; test-as-you-fly; peer reviews Underlying issues identified by the Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) included the following: 1) Failure to consider off-nominal conditions; 2) Lack of peer reviews; 3) Incomplete test procedures and analysis. Listed at the end of the case study document
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navigational system error; on-orbit failure Underlying issues included 1) Flawed software requirements and validation approach; 2) Ineffective design choices, and; 3) Lack of training, experience and oversight. The mission illustrated the importance of independent assessments, audits, and peer reviews throughout the various stages of a mission.
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# of Pages Abstract
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Case Title
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Subject Focus
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Learning Points
The role of the Systems Engineer to marshal the project towards launch. How engineering (technical) issues spill over into procurement (contract) issues. Implications of a fixed price delivery contract for space missions and launch services. Making judgment calls on equipment readiness. GOES-N Web page: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/goes-n/main/
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Gravity Probe B
GP-B Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership (APPEL), NASA http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/384132main_Gravity_Probe_B_case_study.pdf 11 In the summer of 2003, NASA Program Manager Rex Geveden was eager to ship the Gravity Probe B (GP-B) spacecraft to Vandenberg Air Force Base for integration and testing and then launch. In April the program had undergone a termination review, which in Gevedens estimation, had been a close call. Getting the spacecraft to the launch pad would remove the threat of imminent cancellation. After the spacecraft arrives at Vandenberg, problems with the Experimental Control Unit (ECU) are identified. Will these problems require the launch to be postponed until the issues are satisfactorily addressed? schedule pressures; launch decisions; risk management; risk mitigation Different types of pressures can affect the behavior of key stakeholders. Different stakeholders can characterize anomalies differently in risk management terms. Various organizational and managerial factors can complicate the decision-making process for the program manager. Gravity Probe B website at Stanford University: http://einstein.stanford.edu/; NASA Mission Page: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/gpb/index.html
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Case Title
Project Name Source URL # of Pages Abstract
The failure in the flame trench was a result of several factors, but the sweeping transition from Apollo to the Space Shuttle Program play a most significant role. Flame trench upkeep was driven by assumptions based on an apparent reliable history. Signs of a deteriorating infrastructure were not recognized.
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# of Pages Abstract
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IMAGE
IMAGE Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership (APPEL), NASA http://www.nasa.gov/flash/293122main_image_study.swf n/a self-learning multimedia presentation In this interactive case study you will be presented with a real management situation faced by the NASA-contracted Southwest Research Institute team during the groundwork of the Imager for Magnetopause-to-Aurora Global Exploration (IMAGE) mission. As the Project Manager you will need to respond in the most effective and timely manner possible. Your decision will directly affect the outcome of the entire mission. When faced with the following problems, you will want to respond as a Project Manager and to think about ways that you can encourage your team to do the same. budget; schedule; science; team; project management
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Case Title
This NASA mini-Case Study looks at the programmatic and technical complexities of an international deep-space mission in which there is zero room for error. It elucidates some of the mission's primary challenges and their solutions. Cassini Equinox Mission (JPL website): http://saturn.jpl.nasa.gov/ Cassini-Huygens (ESA website): http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/CassiniHuygens/index.html
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# of Pages Abstract
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Subject Focus
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There is also a Harvard Vasa case study. VASA Museum website: http://www.vasamuseet.se/en/ Famous Failures: The VASA (PPT): www.cs.huji.ac.il/course/2003/postPC/docs/Famous_Failures_Vasa.ppt Additional resources are listed in the Teaching Note.
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Lessons from the Challenger Launch Decision STS-51L Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer (OCKO), NASA/GSFC http://gsfcir.gsfc.nasa.gov/casestudies/285 13 On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts abroad the Space Shuttle Challenger lost their lives as the orbiter exploded 73 seconds after launch. The investigation that followed uncovered both the technical causes of the accident and some underlying, contributing causes. This case, primarily based on the findings of the investigation as detailed in the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, is meant to highlight key aspects of technical communication challenges and decision-making. Launch decision; Safety; Organizational culture; Risk management; Decision making; Engineering design Look beyond simplistic explanations Ask the right questions Take corrective action The Teaching Note provides suggestions for guiding classroom discussions of the case as well as additional resources for background information. For access to the Teaching Note, contact the Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer /Goddard Space Flight Center.
Subject Focus
Learning Points
Associated Documents
Other Resources
Final Voyage of the Challenger Harvard Case Study (see page 10)
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Subject Focus
Learning Points
Associated Documents
The Teaching Note provides guidance regarding key issues and questions to guide discussions as well as related resources. For access to the Teaching Note, contact the Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer /Goddard Space Flight Center.
Other Resources
Mishap Investigation Board Report: URL: http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/65776main_noaa_np_mishap.pdf NOAA-N PRIME website: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/NOAA-NPrime/main/index.html
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Case Title
Project Name Source URL # of Pages Abstract
Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership (APPEL), NASA http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/474589main_LCROSS_case_study_09_23_10.pdf 8 When NASA announced that the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) would upgrade from a Delta II to a larger Atlas V launch vehicle, a window of opportunity opened for an additional mission to go to the moon. The Atlas V offered more capacity than LRO needed, creating space for a secondary payload. The Exploration Sciences Mission Directorate (ESMD) posed a challenge to interested secondary payload teams: The chosen mission could not interfere with LRO, it could not exceed a mass of 1000 kilograms (kg), it could not go over a $79 million cost cap, and it had to be ready to fly on LRO's schedule. Of the 19 proposals submitted, ESMD chose the Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS)a mission that sought to search for water on the moon by firing a rocket into the lunar surface and studying the debris resulting from the impact.
How did the constraints of the mission shape the project management challenge? What role did communication play in building a team that could work within the mission constraints? How did the project manage its approach to risk? NASA LCROSS website: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/LCROSS/main/index.html
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Case Title
Managing Knowledge and Learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
n/a Harvard Business School Publishing http://hbr.org/product/managing-knowledge-and-learning-at-nasa-andthe-je/an/604S24-PDF-SPA 30 Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) faces a serious loss of knowledge--both because of the "faster, better, cheaper" mandate for Mars missions and from the retirement of key personnel. An extensive knowledge management system for NASA/JPL includes formal knowledge-capture mechanisms such as Web pages and digitized manuals and such informal ones as storytelling. The former are much easier to get funded and to implement than the latter, but chief knowledge architect Jeanne Holm is concerned that technology cannot solve some of the most difficult issues she faces. This case focuses more on managing the tacit knowledge held in the heads of scientists and experienced project managers than on the information technology that Holm has put in place. The switch from expensive but infrequent Mars missions to 2 missions every 26 months propelled a number of junior managers into positions of responsibility and decision making for which they had inadequate experience. In the face of increasingly tight budgets, Holm must decide what kinds of knowledge management initiatives to back--and how to encourage the cultural change that is needed in the organization.
# of Pages Abstract
knowledge management; organizational learning To highlight the challenges in managing the transfer of knowledge, both between experts and between projects.
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Case Title
Associated Documents
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Case Title
Project Name Source URL # of Pages Abstract
Mission to Mars
Mars Observer NASA Safety Center (NSC) http://nsc.nasa.gov/SFCS/SystemFailureCaseStudyFile/Download/147/ 4 After eleven months in transit, and only three days away from entering the red planets orbit, Mars Observer dropped from contact with its Earthbound NASA controllers. The project team could not restore communication with the spacecraft; no signals were detected from it in the following months, and NASA was forced to declare Mars Observer permanently lost. NASA Administrator Dan Goldin asked the Naval Research Laboratory to form an investigation board. Failure; Investigation; Contract management; Risk management The Mars Observer example shows us that unexpected consequences can follow from each design and risk management decision. A thorough, well-conceived and executed testing plan that meets or exceeds all mission demands is the best defense. When assessing commercial capability to deliver spacecraft with unique and complex missions, caution should be exercised and sufficient budget "margin" built in to take advantage of the best experience and oversight available. NASA Website: http://heasarc.nasa.gov/docs/heasarc/missions/marsobs.html
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Case Title
Project Name Source URL
# of Pages Abstract
Other Resources
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# of Pages Abstract
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NOAA-N Prime Case Study NOAA-N Prime NASA Safety Center http://nsc.nasa.gov/Home/ (NASA Only) 38 (PowerPoint slides with space for notes) This case study is delivered within the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance Technical Excellence Program (STEP). The case provides a brief overview of the NOAA-N Prime mishap which occurred in 2003. The mishap involved damage to the satellite during pre-flight ground processing. Covered in this brief case study is a summary of events leading up to the accident, a discussion of approximate and root causes, and the role of SMA in the accident. Safety; Risk Management; Accidents Describe the NOAA-N Prime mishap Identify the mishap proximate cause Identify a subset of the mishap root causes Identify Safety and Mission Assurance Lessons from the NOAA-N Prime mishap. Lifting NOAA-N Prime (NASA/GSFC/OCKO case study) Mishap Investigation Board Report: URL: http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/65776main_noaa_np_mishap.pdf NOAA-N PRIME website: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/NOAAN-Prime/main/index.html
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Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership (APPEL), NASA http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/384131main_COBE_case_study.pdf 10 COBE was slated to launch on the Shuttle in 1989 from Vandenberg Air Force Base. The Shuttle would place the satellite at an altitude of 300 kilometers, and an on-board propulsion system would then raise it to a circular 900 kilometer sun-synchronous orbit. The loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger 73 seconds after liftoff on January 28, 1986, changed everything. The Shuttle programs future was now uncertain and this had dramatic consequences across NASA, not only for the human space flight program. The COBE team was forced back to the drawing board. launch vehicle; redesign; matrix management; mass; co-location; testas-you-fly Since spacecrafts are designed based on pre-identified launch vehicles, a change in launch vehicles will likely result in a significant redesign, added costs and schedule slips. With the appropriate support at the Center level and from headquarters, financial and human resources can be applied to get things done and organizational structures can be realigned to fit the needs of a project. "Test as you fly" in order to catch problems before launch. Cobe Satellite Marks 20th Anniversary http://www.nasa.gov/topics/universe/features/cobe_20th.html
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Case Title
Searching for Life on Mars: The Development of the Viking Gas Chronomatograph Mass Spectrometer
Viking Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership (APPEL), NASA http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/384151main_Viking_GCMS_case_study.pdf 8 The Viking mission was set to be the first mission to attempt as soft landing on Mars. The opportunity to conduct experiments on the planet's surface led to an extremely ambitious scientific agenda featuring thirteen scientific instruments. The primary objective of the Viking mission was to determine if there was evidence of life on Mars. In 1971, the project manager added the Gas Chromatograph-Mass Spectrometer (GCMS) to his "Top Ten Problems" list. While the project was managed from the Langley Research Center, the GCMS was the responsibility of the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL). This arrangement failed to provide the desired results. instrument development; project management
Get the right technical expertise to solve technical problems; reach out to other industries and the private sector to identify solutions (even when they are proprietary); consider using a "Top Ten Problems" list to give visibility to challenges that could threaten the viability of the mission. NASA's Viking webpage: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/viking/
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The STS-126 illustrates the need to ensure critical elements are embedded in design and procedures, provide sufficient training, complete rigorous end-to-end testing and verification, follow the oftquoted mantra, "Test as you fly," and find the real causes of all anomalies. Flight Software Readiness. STS-119 Joint Shuttle/Station Flight Readiness Review. United Space Alliance Presentation, 02/03/09. Space Shuttle Orbiter Systems. HSF-The Shuttle. http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/reference/shutref/orbiter/ Fishman, Charles. They Write the Right Stuff. FastCompany.com. 1996. http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/06/
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Sitting on the Fence: Launching a Balloon in the Outback n/a Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer (OCKO), NASA/GSFC http://gsfcir.gsfc.nasa.gov/casestudies/309/ 4 On April 29, 2010, a NASA High Visibility, Type B Mishap occurred at the Alice Springs International Airport in Alice Springs, Northern Territory, Australia. During the launch attempt of the Nuclear Compton Telescope (NCT) scientific balloon payload, the payload inadvertently broke free of the launch vehicle and was dragged by the wind-driven balloon through the airport fence and into the privately owned vehicle of a spectator. While no injuries occurred, the payload suffered extensive damage and several spectators were nearly struck. NASA convened a Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) to investigate this event. The MIB collected data and evidence and, using NASAs Root cause Analysis methodology, was able to determine to proximate, intermediate, and root causes. The Boards investigation, findings and recommendations are discussed in this case study. Launch vehicle; Decision making; Safety; Failure; Accidents
Understand the role of Balloon missions within NASA and how they are conducted. Understand the process involved in launching a balloon and how such an accident could happen. Nuclear Compton Telescope Balloon Launch in Alice Springs, Northern Territory, Australia High Visibility Type B Mishap http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/pdf/491345main_Master%20Repo rt%20Vol%20I%20-Final.pdf
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Skin in the Game: Questioning Organizational Conflict of Interest n/a Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer (OCKO), NASA/GSFC http://gsfcir.gsfc.nasa.gov/casestudies/307/ 4 This case study focuses on a procurement protest. In this instance, the incumbent contractor was protesting after losing a follow-on contract to another company and the protest was based on (among other things) a claim of Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI) which also resulted in a formal investigation by the Office of Inspector General (OGI). How much would all this cost Goddard (both financially and in terms of time lost and stress? Contract management; Decision making
Understand the amount of work involved in procurement protests and the level of care that needs to be taken in handling procurement processes, including potential claims of conflict of interest.
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Space Shuttle
n/a Harvard Business School Publishing http://hbr.org/product/space-shuttle/an/909E09-PDFENG?Ntt=space%2520shuttle 6 After the successful Apollo series NASA formulated a new vision for the space program, incorporating a space station and guaranteeing routine access to space via a reusable space shuttle. In 1986, the space shuttle design included two solid-rocket launchers which required the use of Orings to seal the joints. After each launch the launchers were retrieved, inspected and possibly reused is they did not display evidence of O-ring distress. The space shuttle Challenger had flown 9 successful missions into space and was gearing up for its tenth with great fanfare due to NASA's successful public relations program, "The Teacher in Space Program". The evening prior to the January 28, 1986 launch saw representatives from the Kennedy Space Centre, the Marshall Space Flight Centre and contractor Morton Thiokol participate in a 3-hour teleconference to discuss if the predicted low temperatures would have any effect on the expected performance of the O-rings. In addition to the statistical analysis of the historical O-ring failure, the stakeholders needed to communicate their results in the appropriate flow of information.
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Behavior; human resources management; organizational behavior; organizational structure; quantitative analysis
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Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership (APPEL), NASA http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/384149main_SSCS_case_study.pdf 6 (+appendices) The Space-to-Space Communications System (SSCS) is a sophisticated two-way data communication system designed to provide voice and telemetry among three on-orbit systems: the Space Shuttle orbiter, the International Space Station; and the Extra Vehicular Activity Mobility Unit (EMU) (aka, the spacesuit). NASA decided to treat SSCS as an in-house development at the Johnson Space Center (JSC). Numerous organizational and technical challenges emerged over time while the project was under pressure to deliver the system for use on the Space Station. After encountering multiple failures on-orbit, the team was told to "fix it" and eventually had the time and resources to do it right. schedule pressures; testing; space communications; in-house development Do it right the first time or you'll have to start over. Schedule pressures and organizational challenges can lead to band-aid fixes and equipment that isn't truly ready for flight. http://www.nasa.gov/offices/oce/appel/knowledge/publications/SSCS.html
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NASA Safety Center (NSC) http://nsc.nasa.gov/SFCS/SystemFailureCaseStudyFile/Download/168/ 4 On June 25, 1997, a manually controlled rendezvous and docking test between a Progress automated supply vehicle and Space Station Mir became a threat to crew survival. The Mir crew controlled the Progress remotely, but loss of telemetry data crippled their efforts to steer a spacecraft they could not see. By the time the Progress spacecraft entered their line of sight, it was moving too fast to control. Progress slammed into a solar array and ricocheted into the Spektr module, sending the station into a slow tumble. The impact punctured Mir's hull and resulted in the first decompression on board an orbiting spacecraft. Flawed testing; Economic pressure; Insufficient test knowledge
One of the key achievements of international spaceflight partnership since the Mir project has been agreement to share that information mutually identified as essential to mission success and safety of flight. As commercial companies compete for government-sponsored spaceflight work, it would be dangerous (a failure of nerve) to ignore the risks posed by information considered proprietary and essential to flight safety. Technology and research that increases safety margins merits the ultimate accolade of becoming open source. To proceed otherwise will incur costs far beyond those required to repair Mir as a result of this incident.
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Understand contract consequences; when the government doesn't own the asset, it doesnt control its use. Commercial priorities will take precedence over science. Contracting choices will affect project for many years so be wary of short-term contracting solutions that have lasting effects on program viability. The Teaching Note provides suggestions for guiding classroom discussions of the case as well as additional resources for background information. For access to the Teaching Note, contact the Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer / Goddard Space Flight Center. See also the companion case: TDRSS K, L: Working with a Fixed Price Contract.
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After nearly 40 years of building TDRSS with four different types of contracts, what has NASA learned about structuring procurements to enable successful and viable space missions? A Teaching Note provides suggestions for guiding classroom discussions of the case as well as additional resources for background information. For access to the Teaching Notes, contact the Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer / Goddard Space Flight Center. See also the companion case: TDRSS: Fixed-Cost versus Cost-Plus Contracting.
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Case Title
The CALIPSO Mission: Project Management in the "PI Mode": Who's in Charge?
CALIPSO Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer (OCKO), NASA/GSFC http://gsfcir.gsfc.nasa.gov/casestudies/3 9 CALIPSO (Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observations), a joint mission between NASA and the French space agency CNES, was designed as a pioneering tool for observing Earths atmosphere. Project development has been hampered for years by a complex organizational structure, management conflicts between NASA centers, international-partnership issues, and instrument and spacecraft problemsissues that appear to require a project replan. interagency communication, roles, relationships; ITAR and international partnerships The Teaching Note provides suggestions for guiding classroom discussions of the case, a short supplement case addressing the CALIPSO Propulsion Safety Launch Decision, and a 2-page optional epilogue handout. For access to the Teaching Note contact the Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer /Goddard Space Flight Center.
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Define roles and responsibilities. Multiple centers, international partners, fixed price and cost-plus bring complexity to a project that needs addressing. Complex project structures have difficulty solving problems efficiently. Know when to push on HQ for definition and direction. Managing across borders and across contractors. NASA CALIPSO website: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/calipso/main/index.html
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The innovation process of go wide in thinking, go practical in prototype and go thorough in testing. Using seemingly dissimilar fields (NASCAR) to improve NASA thinking. Challenges of parallel development when requirements are being specified on the fly in parallel iterations. CEV Seat Attenuation System. URL: http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20070010702_2007 005306.pdf
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The NFIRE Launch: Beating the Sophomore Slump at the Wallops Range NFIRE Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer (OCKO), NASA/GSFC http://gsfcir.gsfc.nasa.gov/casestudies/6 7 NFIRE (Near-Field Infrared Experiment) is scheduled as the second orbital launch from the Wallops Flight Facility within five months, coming on the heels of TacSat-2. Two such launches in this timeframe from the small range on Virginias Eastern Shore is ambitious. NFIRE is benefiting from lessons from TacSat-2, but problematic systems and other issues threaten the NFIRE launch, and could lead to destacking and launch delay. With the Range Readiness Review the next day, and launch two weeks away, the Range chief is prioritizing the issues in preparation for making a ready or not ready decision. choosing your biggest worry; launch decision making Apply lessons learned on a quick turnaround. Fast pace (sounding rocket program) requires rapid learning and application of lessons learned. Deciding which problems are show-stoppers and which are not. Listening to the customer and being on the same risk-page. Who is taking the risk for certain decisions? The Teaching Note provides suggestions for guiding classroom discussions of the case as well as additional resources for background information. For access to the Teaching Note, contact the Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer / Goddard Space Flight Center.
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Harvard Case: "Columbia's Final Mission" (Multimedia Case) http://hbr.org/product/columbia-s-final-mission-multimediacase/an/305032-MMC-ENG Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report: URL: http://caib.nasa.gov
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Thermosphere Ionosphere Mesosphere Energetics and Dynamics Project (TIMED) Case Study
TIMED Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership (APPEL), NASA http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/384153main_TIMED_case_study.pdf 21 The TIMED mission was conceived around 1990 as a very ambitious multi-spacecraft mission. It was eventually launched on December 7, 2001 as a more modest mission with a single spacecraft. The program was caught in all the dramatic changes that NASA went through in this time period. At one point it came close to termination. The case study is presented in three distinct phases that characterize the development of the program. programmatic challenges; mission requirements; center buy-in; managing expectations; lines of authority; rules of engagement; complex relationships; personality conflicts Phase One Lessons Learned: 1) It is necessary to recognize and respond to ground rule changes in a timely manner; 2) Control expectations; 3) Center buy-in and cooperation is necessary; 4) Basic mission requirements must be set early, prioritized, and maintained. Phase Two Lessons Learned: 1) Building and employing an ETU for a new hardware development is still a good idea. Phase Three Lessons Learned: 1) Clear lines of authority and reporting are necessary and must be followed; 2) The rules of engagement must be agreed to and put into writing; 3) A clear decision on the method of implementation of a project must be made and the relationship of the program and project defined for that method; 4) The Center must take ownership of any project for which it has responsibility and staff it accordingly; 5) Management processes appropriate for NASA funded projects need to be in place, verified and used no matter where the project is developed; 6) It is necessary to adhere to the processes developed for integrating and testing a spacecraft; 7) Co-manifesting multiple missions on the same launch vehicle is still an appropriate cost-saving technique but it should be employed within one Enterprise only; 8) Personality conflicts can be real and should be addressed and resolved to assure efficient functioning of the project team. TIMED Mission website: http://www.timed.jhuapl.edu/WWW/index.php
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Academy of Program/Project & Engineering Leadership (APPEL), NASA http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/384157main_VCL_case_study.pdf 12 The Vegetation Canopy Lidar (VCL) was selected in March 1997 as the First Earth System Science Pathfinder (ESSP) spaceflight mission. It was scheduled for launch in January 2000. Technology challenges (specifically with the Multi-Beam Laser Altimeter or MBLA) and project management challenges under the "PI-Mode" of mission management led to the mission being postponed indefinitely. weak project management & institutional oversight
1) A formal process utilizing a team of independent recognized experts for reviewing and approving project proposals is crucial to assure that only viable proposals are submitted; 2) The project selection process must not stop at the desirability of the science being proposed. It must include the viability of the mission implementation plan as well; 3) Managers leading a proposal effort must address the above considerations as part of their proposal preparation process; 4) The project management of a fast-paced low-cost mission requires a strong, yet streamlined, central management structure with short communication paths; 5) The management of a fastpaced, low-cost project still requires the project discipline necessary to assure that the project meets its technical and programmatic objectives; 6) The above two lessons learned imply that an experienced project manager is highly desirable for any fast-paced low-cost project; 7) Projects involving a U.S. government entity, such as a NASA Center, as a subcontractor to an outside PI must formally document their subcontracting relatinoship; 8) Independent cost estimates or assessments must be done in conjunction with independent technical and managerial reviews. VCL website: http://ilrs.gsfc.nasa.gov/satellite_missions/list_of_satellites/vcl__general.html
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Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer (OCKO), NASA/GSFC http://gsfcir.gsfc.nasa.gov/casestudies/303/ 4 This case study looks at the impact of a fixed-price contract and on-orbit delivery on a launch decision when the contractor responsible for launch and NASA are having differences of opinion over launch commit criteria. Contract management; Risk management; Decision making
Contract types can have a critical impact on ownership of risks and decision-making responsibility for both NASA and the contractors involved. A firm-fixed-price contract for on-orbit delivery can significantly limit NASA's ability to intervene in a process under the responsibility of the contractor. While fixed-price contracts can bring good value to NASA, differences of opinion can become costly under such contracts.
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 8800 Greenbelt Road Greenbelt, MD 20771 http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard
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