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CONTENTS BUSINESS NATION WORLD TECHNOLOGY HEALTH/LIFESTYLE
Fixing the Fix
A credible Random Manual Audit process is crucial
for an automated election system to deliver credible
results in the May 2013 elections
By Zandro G. Rapadas, M.D.C.
STRATEGY POINTS
The May 2010 automated national and local elections were regarded
as a landmark achievement in the countrys history, but while
the results were generally accepted, serious doubts have arisen
regarding the accuracy of the automated election system
Doubts center on the faiIure of the post-eIection audit procedure,
or the Random Manual Audit, to check accurately the results of
automated counting
The direct participation of the Commission on Elections and its
citizens arm in the audit process, combined with the exclusion
of other observers, has cast doubt on the integrity of the entire
automated counting process
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for an aautomated election ssyyyysssstttem to deliver creddiibbllee
results iin tthhee MMaayy 22001133 eelleeeccccttiionns
By By ZZan andro G. Rapadas, M.D.C.
NATION
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:NKcenSEI8KVUXZ - July 23-29, 2012
Fixing the fx
It is the policy of the State to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible,
and informed elections, plebiscites, referenda, recall, and other similar
electoral exercises by improving on the election process and adopting
systems, which shall involve the use of automated election system that will
ensure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and all election, consolidation,
and transmission documents in order that the process shall be transparent
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genuine will of the people.
- DecIuruLIon oI PoIIcy, SecLIon 1, RepubIIc AcL q6q or un AcL umendIng R.A. 8q6
entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to use an Automated
Election System
T
he 2010 automated national and
local elections in the Philippines were
collectively lauded as a landmark achievement
in the nations history of democracy and
suffrage, but continue to be hounded with
unresolved issues and serious doubts on their
accuracy and credibility.
From technology and security concerns
involving the hardware, software, and process of
the automated election system (AES) provided
by vendor SmurLmuLIc-TM Lo LIe nILLy-grILLy
oI ImpIemenLuLIon, udequucy oI resources,
and preparation time for the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) and its partner institutions,
the issues raised by various local election
stakeholders, international observers, and IT
experts left more to be desired from what was
touted as the cure to our manual election woes.
The general acceptability of the results
notwithstanding, the 2010 automated elections
have turned out to fall short of expectations.
Checking automated election results.
JusL us LIere ure sysLem hxes Lo uddress
errors or data corruption in personal computers
-- unLIvIrus, dIsk cIeunup, und deIrugmenLuLIon
progrums -- LIere Is u buIIL-In IeuLure provIded
by law to check on the accuracy and reliability
of automated election results: the random
manual audit (RMA).
SecLIon zq In RepubIIc AcL 8q6 provides for a
posL-eIecLIon uudIL mecIunIsm In LIe AES:
Where the AES is used, there shall be
a random manual audit in one precinct
per congressional district [emphasis
ours] randomly chosen by the
Commission in each province and city.
Any difference between the automated
and manual count will result in the
determination of root cause and
initiate a manual count for those
precincts affected by the computer
or procedural error.
Kathy Dopp, in her 2010 dissertation at the
Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy,
CIeckIng EIecLIon OuLcome Accurucy: PosL-
election Audit Sampling Methods, dehnes
posL-eIecLIon uudIL us u cIeck oI LIe uccurucy
of reported election results done by manually
counLIng uII LIe voLer-verIhubIe puper buIIoLs
associated with randomly sampled reported
initial vote counts, and checking such additional
records as necessary to ensure the integrity of
the electoral process.
Moreover, in its Final Report, the Carter Center
Limited Mission to the May 2010 Elections in
the Philippines noted that in an automated
system such as the Smartmatic AES, the burden
of building public trust in the results rests
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CONTENTS BUSINESS NATION WORLD TECHNOLOGY HEALTH/LIFESTYLE
IurgeIy on LIe uudIL process. PosL-eIecLIon
audits must be both comprehensive and
weII-ImpIemenLed, In order Lo verIIy LIuL
the machines performed as intended and
were not subject to any manipulation or
programing error.
Too much, too late. On April 30, 2010,
just 10 days before the elections, the Comelec
promulgated the General Instructions for the
Conduct of a Random Manual Audit (RMA) for
the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.
Comelec Advisory Council member Henrietta
de Villa, who heads the Parish Pastoral Council
for Responsible Voting (PPCRV), which was the
Comelecs accredited citizens arm in 2010, was
also the chair of the Technical Working Group
on LIe Rundom MunuuI AudIL (TWG-RMA),
with a representative from Comelecs Internal
AudIL OIhce und LIe NuLIonuI SLuLIsLIcs OIhce
(NSO) as members. The NSO slot was originally
for the Commission on Audit (COA), but the
latter withdrew in March 2010, citing possible
conIcL oI InLeresL.
The general instructions for RMA also
increased the number of clustered polling
precincts to be audited from 1 per legislative
dIsLrIcL (us provIded Ior In R.A. q6q) Lo hve,
Ior u LoLuI oI 1,1q (Irom LIe orIgInuI zzq). AIso,
the elective positions to be audited included
onIy LIose Ior PresIdenL und VIce-PresIdenL on
the national level, and Governor, Congressman,
and Mayor on the local level.
The Provincial Election Supervisors (PES)
implemented the RMA in the legislative
districts, including designating members of the
audit team. The auditors were members of the
Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) from the
clustered polling precinct that was immediately
after the randomly selected precinct or before
it, should the latter be the last precinct in the
voting center, or from the next barangay should
the randomly selected precinct be the lone
precinct in the voting center.
AccordIng Lo TWG-RMA, seIecLIng unoLIer
set of BEI to do the manual audit in the
randomly selected precincts ensures a blind
audit, given that it precludes the possibility
of any attempt to reconcile the manual
count with the AES count, as noted in their
terminal report submitted to the Comelec on
July 20, 2010, a copy of which was obtained by
The CenSEI Report.
Prolonged selection process leads to
delays, errors, confusion. The selection of
LIe 1,1q poIIIng precIncLs wus done munuuIIy
by druwIng pIng-pong buIIs Irom u tambiolo (a
roLuLIng recepLucIe used In ruIe druws), wILI
one ball assigned to a clustered polling
precinct per legislative district, as witnessed
by representatives of various election
stakeholders. The draw was done from
10:30 a.m. to 7 p.m. on May 10 at the
Philippine International Convention Center
in Pasay City (where Comelec set up its
national canvassing). However, the
prolonged process delayed the transmission
of the selection results and instructions to
the audit teams, and there was confusion
us weII us severuI gIILcIes, us reecLed In
reports from Davao City and Quezon City,
the former being the largest city in the
country geographically, and the latter in
terms of voting population.

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:NKcenSEI8KVUXZ - July 23-29, 2012
The random manual audit, just
like the AES, suffered from a very
tight timetable for its preparations.
Adversely affected was the selection
of the Random Manual Audit Team
(RMAT) composed of teachers
totaling 3,435 (each RMAT was
composed of three members) that
were only given one-day session
of training a week prior to elections.
Some of those who were not
reached by such session had to rely
on a training CD. This lack of
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improvisations committed during
the implementation of the RMA.

~ Excerpt from the Executive Summary
oI LIe ReporL oI TWG-RMA Lo ComeIec,
July 20, 2010
This second part of our AES review focuses
on its audit mechanism, the RMA, and
reports on the audit results in 2010, as
weII us LIe Issues ruIsed ubouL ILs uws
and action points to consider in 2013.
The details of the RMA process, culled
Irom LIe TWG-RMA TermInuI ReporL, wIII
be posted on The CenSEI Reports blog at
http://censei.wordpress.com.
Actual audit results in 2010. Only
1,oq6 oI LIe LoLuI 1,1q sumpIed cIusLered
precIncLs (q1.%) Lurned In compIeLe
uudIL reporLs Lo TWG-RMA by JuIy ;, zo1o.
A report was deemed complete if it provided
the number of votes per AES and per RMA.
From this number of precincts covered, a
LoLuI oI qo,qqz persons voLed usIng LIe AES.
TIe TWG-RMA reporLed LIuL uudIL compured
the results of the AES count to the
results of the manual count. Ideally, the
number of votes counted from the AES
should be the same as the number of votes
counted manually.
Acceptable margin of variance
adopted by TWG-RMA. Based on the
nIneLy-nIne percenL (qq%) uccurucy ruLe
udopLed by LIe TWG-RMA, LIe uccepLubIe
margin of variance was one percent or 10
votes difference in absolute value for every
1,000 valid ballots cast. Variance was
dehned us LIe ubsoIuLe dIIIerence beLween
the number of votes per AES and per RMA.
TIus, Irom LIe gIven sumpIe oI 1,oq6
cIusLered precIncLs wILI qo,qqz vuIId
ballots cast through AES, the allowable
total cumulative discrepancy based from
LIe sumpIe sIouId be Iess LIun ,qoq voLes.
At the clustered precinct level, a candidate
that was found to have a variance of 10 or
more votes underwent further validation
by the audit process.
Variance was computed at the sample clustered
precinct level. The sum of variance at the
legislative district level was computed by adding
all the variances of the sampled clustered
precincts within the district, while the regional
vurIunce wus equuI Lo LIe sum oI LIe vurIunces
of the legislative districts within the region.
Finally, the national total variance was the sum

High school teacher Janet Layosa-Arbon, who heads the


Random Manual Audit Team assigned in Krus na Ligas
Elementary School in Quezon City, reads out the votes from
over 700 ballots to be manually tallied by two other team
members. This is to check whether the results recorded by
the counting machine tallies with the results obtained through
manual counting Jerrie Abella/GMA News
Fixing the fx
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of the variances of all the regions.
Large variances were subjected to further
validation. A variance was considered large if
it was double digit and exceeded the allowable
murgIn oI vurIunce. VuIIduLIon requIred
identifying the root cause of discrepancies, and
variances attributable to clerical or computing
errors were ImmedIuLeIy correcLed und reecLed
in the variance summary results. However,
errors other than clerical or mathematical errors
were reIerred Lo LIe TWG-RMA.
Accuracy rate. The accuracy rate was
computed as the complement of percentage
vurIunce. TIus, u o.qq percenLuge vurIunce Ius
un uccurucy ruLe oI qq.1%. TIe zo1o uudIL
outcome revealed that on the average, accuracy
rate at the national level for all positions was at
qq.6%. TIe IIgIesL uccurucy ruLe wus recorded
In RegIon 11 Ior PresIdenL (qq.6%) und CAR Ior
VIce PresIdenL (qq.;q%). or LIe IocuI posILIons,
the highest rate was recorded in Region 2 for
Congressmun (qq.8;%), CAR Ior Muyor (qq.;%),
und RegIon 11 Ior Governor (qq.;q%).
Flaws in the audit system. UnIversILy oI LIe
Philippines economics professor Solita Monsod,
In Ier Muy z8, zo1o Philippine Daily Inquirer
column, crILIcIzed LIe IusL-mInuLe IncIusIon
oI un NuLIonuI SLuLIsLIcs OIhce represenLuLIve
In LIe TWG-RMA, noLIng LIuL LIe NSO wus
InvoIved onIy hve duys beIore LIe eIecLIons, und
that NSO head Carmencita Erictas expertise
in choosing the most appropriate sampling
design and analyzing the results of the audit
was not utilized. If one of the three members
oI LIe TWG-RMA wus noL In LIe Ioop, one cun
only imagine how important technical decisions
were made. I am not sure where De Villas or
Carreons technical expertise lies, but I am sure
where Erictas expertise lies. And she was not
used, Monsod stated.
Meanwhile, u Muy zo, zo1o ABS-CBN reporL
on the RMA drew a response from a reader
(edwurdqzq;q), wIo commenLed LIuL LIe uudIL
lacked credibility, obviously referring to the
involvement of Comelec personnel in the audit.
How can you expect a credible random
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED CLUSTER
NCR 13%
Region 4A
10%
Region 3
9%
Region 6
8%
Region 7
7%
Region 5
7%
Region 10
6%
ARMM 2%
CAR 3%
Region 4B
3%
Region12
3%
Region 9
4%
Caraga 4%
Region 2
5%
Region 11
5%
Region 8
5%
Region 1
6%
Chart from Executive Summary of the Report of the Technical Working Group on Random Manual Audit
to the Commission on Elections, July 20, 2010, unpublished document obtained by TCR
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:NKcenSEI8KVUXZ - July 23-29, 2012
manual audit if Comelec personnel are
uIso InvoIved In LIe so-cuIIed cIeckIng? OI
course, they will refrain from divulging BIG
discrepancies because that will invalidate the
Commissions claim that the
electronic election is reliable
and accurate. This is a very
basic audit principle, he said.
(The reader, who signed
his posts Eduardo from
DubuI, IdenLIhed IImseII
as having worked in
PricewaterhouseCoopers
and KPMG in Manila, and
as currently employed as an
internal auditor in Dubai.)
For local election watchdog
Halalang Marangal, the
conducL oI uudIL In onIy 1,1q
ouL oI ;6,q; precIncLs, wus u poor subsLILuLe
for public counting. They also noted several
uws In LIe uudIL, including:
DeIuy oI severuI duys uILer LIe eIecLIons
in conducting the audit, instead of
immediately after election returns were
transmitted from the precinct level
Some InsLunces wIen LIe uudIL wus
done without political party watchers and
election watchdogs, who were essential to
the integrity of the process
DeIuy In LIe unnouncemenL oI resuILs
immediately after the conduct of the
audit, with results going through further
processing, raising concerns that the
results were sanitized.
The Carter Center, an international human
rights organization based in Atlanta, Georgia,
shared the same observation and noted in its
mission report that while there were very few
variances between the AES and RMA results
as reported by Comelec and PPCRV, the utility
of this audit was severely curtailed by a lack of
transparency and ineffective administration.
The Carter Center also noted because the
national results of the election so closely
mIrrored LIe pre-eIecLIon poIIs, LIe uudIL`s
role as a check on the accuracy of the system
received minimal attention in
LIe posL-eIecLIon perIod und
was not subject to scrutiny by
watchers or political parties.
Meanwhile, the Center for
Public Empowerment and
Governance (CenPEG)
quesLIoned LIe excIusIon oI
purLy-IIsL represenLuLIves
and senators, as well as the
posILIons Ior vIce-governor
und vIce-muyor Irom LIe
audit. In its analysis of
the random manual audit,
CenPEG cited Comelec
ResoIuLIon 88q, which
maintained that the audit aims to discover if
the cause of errors is attributable to the PCOS,
and thereafter seeks to determine if, with errors
accounted for, the PCOS is still reliable. If the
RMA was conducted to determine whether the
PCOS count is reliable, then the RMA should
examine all the positions in the last election,
CenPEG said.
urLIermore, CenPEG noLed LIuL LIe TWG-
RMA arbitrarily imposed an allowable margin
of variance of one percent, which they say was
not supported by any Comelec document. In
IucL, u provIsIon In LIe RequesL Ior ProposuI oI
the Comelec for the Automation of the 2010
eIecLIon (duLed MurcI 11, zooq) noLed LIuL LIe
system shall count the voters vote as marked on
LIe buIIoL wILI un uccurucy ruLIng oI qq.qq% or
un error ruLe oI o.oo%.
Hence, the allowable margin of variance is
o.oo%. TIIs Is 1 error ouL oI zo,ooo LrIuIs.
However, 1% Is zoo errors ouL oI zo,ooo LrIuIs,
CenPEG explained. It further noted that if there
were qo,qqz voLes cusL LIrougI LIe AES LIuL
continued on page 22
The utility
of this audit
was severely
curtailed
by a lack of
transparency
and ineffective
administration
-The Carter Center
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Report of the TWG-RMA on the eIective
positions audited
The cumulative variance for President was tallied at 2,653 votes, which was almost half of the
allowable variance of 5,409 votes. The computed variance was 0.49%, which meant a 99.51%
accuracy rate. Percentage variance is the ratio between total variance and the number of persons who
actually voted. For the VP position, the total variance was 2,180 votes or 0.40 percent, which was
almost 0.1% lower than the percentage variance for President.
Meanwhile, the total variance recorded for Congressman was 1,947 votes, or 0.36% variance.
The mayoralty position had a total cumulative variance of 2,182 votes, or 0.4% variance, while the
gubernatorial post had a total variance of 1,910 votes, or 0.35%. Please see the following table for the
percentage share by regions for the fve elective posts audited:
VARIANCE SUMMARY RESULTS FOR NATIONAL AND
LOCAL ELECTIONS: PHILIPPINES 2010
Table from Executive Summary of the Report of the Technical Working
Group on Random Manual Audit to the Commission on Elections, July 20,
2010, unpublished document obtained by TCR
Position
Before Validation of
Large Variances
After Initial Validation of
Large Variances
After Final Validation of
Large Variances
June 4 June 17 July 7
Total
Variance
Percentage
Variance
Total
Variance
Percentage
Variance
Total
Variance
Percentage
Variance
President
3,787 0.70 3,528 0.65 2,653 0.49
Vice President
2,835 0.52 2,529 0.47 2,180 0.40
Total (National)
6,622 0.61 6,057 0.56 4,833 0.45
Mayor
3,042 0.56 2,808 0.52 2,182 0.40
Member,
House of
Representatives
2,605 0.48 2,642 0.49 1,947 0.36
Governor
2,766 0.51 2,467 0.46 1,910 0.35
Total (Locals)
8,413 0.52 7,917 0.49 6,039 0.37
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:NKcenSEI8KVUXZ - July 23-29, 2012
There were three (3) cases that the TWG-RMA deemed as beyond their mandate, and as such were
submitted to the attention and action of Comelec.
1. The frst case involved legislative districts that were found to have large discrepancies in
number of ballots, whereby the AES count was more than the physical count. These included
the Municipality of Pambujan in Northern Samar (difference of 24 ballots), Municipality of
Tuburan in Basilan (diff: 13), Municipality of Gerona in Tarlac (diff: 14), and Tarlac City (diff: 18).
The TWG-RMA suggested that the RMAT and the BEI of these precincts be made to explain the
reason for the discrepancies with the number of ballots per AES and per manual count.
2. The second case involved the Municipality of Lutayan in Sultan Kudarat, which had 99
"rejected" ballots, which required further analysis, while the Municipality of Maluso in Basilan,
which posted large variances, thus requiring the retrieval and opening of the ballot box of the
polling precinct. The audit team found no variance but noted a very low number of valid votes at
99, as compared to 171 voters who voted and 980 registered voters.
3. The last case involved the cumulative variances for the Third District of Manila, which posted
unexplainable large variances, even after physical count of the ballots and ruling out "over
votes." The memory cards of the PCOS machines involved were then retrieved and the scanned
images of the ballots analyzed. The TWG-RMA reported that a vertical line was discovered to
have run through a portion of the ballot where the local positions were found, which could not
be seen in the actual ballots. "As explained by Smartmatic-TIM, this must have been caused by
a foreign object that got unintentionally lodged in the scanner of the PCSOS during the voting
and scanning process. It might be interesting to note that when the particular PCOS machine
was inspected in the presence of several watchers, indeed a fber-like substance was found
inside the machine. This case appears to be machine and not procedural error," the report said.
The TWG-RMA ended its report to Comelec by noting that the "root cause analysis of the variances
in a majority of the sampled clustered precincts manifested the diffculty of conducting parallel manual
and machine counts," adding that the manual count is prone to the subjective appreciation by the
auditor of the voters intent, whereas the machine will only count in the way it was programmed to do.
They also distinguished between margin of variance, which is a computation of the difference between
the manual count and the machine count, and the tolerance level set for the accuracy of the machines.
At this point, we wonder whether there was an audit on the accuracy of PCOS machines (based on
the tolerance level) for sampled precincts that posted large variances.
"The margin of variance indicated by the NSO as equivalent to 1% based on the accuracy rate of 99%
(the allowable rate used in statistical analysis) cannot thus be used as the basis of comparison with
the 99.995% accuracy rate of the PCOS machine set as a requirement for the bidding process of the
AES technology. As indicated in the NSO cumulative variances for the fve positions audited, none
failed the accuracy rate of 99%," the report maintained.
Fixing the fx
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uIIowubIe murgIn oI vurIunce uL o.oo% sIouId
LIen be equuI Lo z; voLes. TIereIore, LIe ucLuuI
vurIunce z,6 In LIe presIdenLIuI IeveI Is over
z,6Jz; or over q8 LImes LIun LIe uIIowubIe
limit, it maintained.

Recommendations for conduct of future
RMAs. TIe TWG-RMA proposed severuI
improvements on the RMA system, which
include, among others:
SeLLIng u sLundurd number oI precIncLs
to be audited
ncIudIng LIe RMA In LIe generuI
appropriations act of the Commission
eurnIng Irom oLIer posL-eIecLIon uudIL
methodologies from other countries or
from research
mprovIng LecInIcuI IeuLures oI voLIng
machines to become more
uudIL-ubIe und uccounLubIe
ncIusIon oI uudILors In LIe reguIur
training of BEI before elections.
In an interview with The CenSEI Report,
TWG-RMA cIuIr HenrIeLLu de VIIIu noLed
that she would recommend to the Comelec
en banc to revert to 1 precinct per
legislative district to be audited, and when
asked why the audit task was not given to
volunteers from the Parish Pastoral Council
for Responsible Voting (PPCRV), considering
that they are as capable as the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI), De Villa said it
could be explored.
As noted earlier in this report, another set of BEI
composed the audit team, but ABS-CBN reporLed
that PPCRV dismissed a petition by the coalition
of the National Citizens Movement for Free
Elections and the Catholic Bishops Conference
of the Philippines National Secretariat for Social
Action to observe and assist in the random
manual audit, arguing that such duty is also
PPCRV`s IuncLIon. Hence, co-peLILIoners ure
asking for a duplication of the task that has
already been awarded to PPCRV, it said. Could
it be that PPCRVs own parallel count prevented
them from doing the random manual audit,
which they say was part of their mandate?
This and many other stones need to be turned
in order to understand why the RMA in 2010
failed, and, more importantly, how to prevent a
recurrence in 2013.
About the author: Zandro Rapadas was a Namfrel
volunteer since 2001, starting out as a voting
center manager, and later on becoming chairman
of Namfrel Quezon City in 2007. He was part of
the international observation mission of the Asian
Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) for the
presidential elections and referenda in Taiwan in
2008. His article is the second installment of The
CenSEI Report assessment and recommendations
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Vol. 2, No. 26 issue dated July 2-8, 2012
Fixing the fx
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