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The cognitive theory described by Beck (16, 34) evolved from his empirical observation of depressed patients descriptions of their thought content through verbalization. Cognitive psychotherapy takes the form of helping patients become aware of their cognitive distortions or cognitive errors and the underlying assumptions of these thoughts. The patient is then encouraged to seek evidence by which to support or refute these cognitive assumptions and to modify assumptions based on a more balanced view of all available information. There is a welloperationalized, manualized treatment procedure designed to replace maladaptive cognitive processes with more adaptive cognitions (18). Cognitive therapy of depression has been widely studied, and meta-analyses of its efficacy have found it to satisfy clearly the criteria for evidence-based treatment (35, 36). Several randomized controlled trials have shown that, when implemented by experienced therapists, it is as effective as pharmacotherapy (37), regardless of the severity of depressive symptoms, and may be even more effective than pharmacotherapy in preventing relapse of depressive episodes (38). The cognitive theory underlying this treatment, however, has been less well studied (39). Although there are many components of cognition that are important to cognitive depression theory, we focus on the 2 cognitive constructs with well-validated measures: cognitive errors and dysfunctional attitudes. Jointly, we label these cognitive distortions. Cognitive Distortions in the Etiology of Depression Cognitive distortions in the absence of a major life stressor are thought to be quiescent. Without specific cognitive intervention, they are also thought to be relatively stable. The conjoint presence of cognitive distortions and a major life stressor, however, is expected to increase the likelihood of a depressive episode. Following from this conceptualization, cognitive distortions should be higher in depressed compared with normal control post-ACS patients, both when a depressive episode is present and when it is absent. This latter point has not yet been established in the literature. For cognitive distortions to be proximal causes for depression, they must precede the depressive episode; otherwise, they would be better conceptualized as epiphenomena. To address this question, Smith et al. (40)conducted a prospective study with a sample of 72 (nondepressed) patients with rheumatoid arthritis followed for 4 years. Cognitive distortions assessed at baseline by the Cognitive Error Questionnaire predicted significant increases in depressive symptoms 4 years later, controlling for baseline depressive symptoms. Moreover, baseline depressive symptoms did not predict changes in cognitive distortions across the study. Interestingly, increased helplessness(41) was also assessed at baseline and did not predict depressive symptom increase across the 4 years, suggesting that helplessness was not a depression proximal cause in this sample. Support for the cognitive theory of depression would also be bolstered if cognitive depression interventions led to less cognitive distortion, such that the level of distortion for successfully treated patients were normalized or closer to the level of nondepressed people. Using the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale, depressed patients have been found to have significantly higher initial levels of dysfunctional attitudes than normal controls, and after cognitive therapy, those whose depression remitted had Dysfunctional Attitude Scale scores close to the levels of normal controls in 1 study (42). In contrast, the National Institute of Mental Health Treatment of Depression Collaborative Research Program did not find that cognitive distortions were lowered most by cognitive (behavioral) therapy (43 45) compared with a drug or interpersonal therapy arm. Beck (46) and Ruehlman et al. (47) have cautioned that the correlates and causes of mildly elevated depressive symptoms or dysphoria cannot be safely assumed to be the same as those for major depression. Specifically, people with subthreshold depression are generally thought to have accurate cognitive perceptions of the stressful life event, resembling adjustment disorder, whereas those with major depression are not (48). Cognitive theory would predict that post-ACS patients with high dysfunctional attitude scores are more likely to have more severe depressive symptoms compared with post-ACS patients with low dysfunctional attitudes. Furthermore, given that cognitive distortions appear relatively stable and increase a persons vulnerability to a major depressive episode when combined with a major life event, depressive symptoms in the presence of cognitive distortions would not be expected to spontaneously remit in this patient population. In summary, there is some evidence from a number of different designs suggesting the possibility that cognitive distortions may be a proximal cause of depression, but there is other evidence such as that from the National Institute of Mental Health trial that is troubling. From the lack of convincing empirical data on the postulates of
cognitive theory, some have expressed more global concerns about the theory; they propose that all diathesis-stress models of depression have formidable conceptual and methodological challenges that have not yet been met (49). These challenges compromise the potential usefulness of these theories to depression treatment. However, the presence of cognitive distortions in post-ACS patients, regardless of current depressive episode status, could be 1 of the markers of excess ACS and depression nonremittance risk, because in theory it should mark previous and future vulnerability to depression. Previous SectionNext Section
Interpersonal psychotherapy explicitly focuses on the here and now of these interpersonal problems, and thus appears applicable to a wide range of patient populations with interpersonal problems. However, little research is available demonstrating that the tenets and postulates of interpersonal theory are supported. For example, it is not yet clear that the reduction or prevention of depressive symptoms is mediated through changes in 1 of the 4 interpersonal problem areas, such as relational functioning. Finally, the efficacy of this therapy in medically ill, mildly depressed patients has yet to be clearly established. To conclude, the interpersonal theory has not been extensively tested for either increased presence of interpersonal problems before the depressive symptoms or for evidence that interpersonal psychotherapy reduces the identified interpersonal problem. The beneficial effect of interpersonal psychotherapy on depressive symptomatology is well established. Based on this theory, post-ACS patients with the presence of a role transition, or loss, or interpersonal deficits will be more likely to show elevated depressive symptoms. A second group at risk may be patients for whom the cardiac event itself represents a major loss or role transition. Patients with this depressogenic vulnerability may not be as severely depressed as those with cognitive distortions, but their depressive symptoms are also unlikely to remit spontaneously without intervention, because the defined interpersonal problems and interpersonal functioning deficits are considered relatively stable. Previous SectionNext Section
negative events (assessed with the Pleasant Events Schedule and the Unpleasant Events Schedule) in a clinical sample of 60 people diagnosed with any DSM-III depressive disorder (major affective disorder, dysthymic depression, or atypical depression), and in a nonclinical sample of 143 undergraduate students. They found that in both samples, depression scores on the BDI were negatively related to the frequency and pleasantness of pleasant events and were positively related to the frequency of unpleasant events. Importantly, Grosscup and Lewinsohn (60) demonstrated in depressed patients that scores on daily ratings of the Unpleasant Events Schedule and Pleasant Events Schedule were associated with daily fluctuations in mood level. Moreover, during the course of a specific treatment targeted at increasing pleasant activities, a decrease in the subjective aversiveness of events was associated with clinical improvement in depression symptoms. In summary, the behavioral theory of depression postulates that low rates of positive events and therefore the absence of positive reinforcement are central to the induction and maintenance of depressive symptoms. Depressed people compared with nondepressed people have fewer pleasant events, and behavioral treatment aimed at increasing pleasant events successfully decreases depression. It is less clear whether the behavioral theory has a prediction about the course of depression in patients with ACS. One possibility is that as the time from the ACS event lengthens, the frequency of pleasant events occurrence and behavior reinforcement will naturalistically increase, and depressive symptoms will decrease. As a consequence, post-ACS patients with a behavioral reinforcement disruption as the proximal cause for their depressive symptoms will be more likely to remit spontaneously than those with the other 2 depression proximal causes. Previous SectionNext Section
Aaron Beck's Cognitive Theory of Depression Different cognitive behavioral theorists have developed their own unique twist on the Cognitive way of thinking. According to Dr. Aaron Beck, negative thoughts, generated by dysfunctional beliefs are typically the primary cause of depressive symptoms. A direct relationship occurs between the amount and severity of someone's negative thoughts and the severity of their depressive symptoms. In other words, the more negative thoughts you experience, the more depressed you will become. Beck also asserts that there are three main dysfunctional belief themes (or "schemas") that dominate depressed people's thinking: 1) I am defective or inadequate, 2) All of my experiences result in defeats or failures, and 3) The future is hopeless. Together, these three themes are described as the Negative Cognitive Triad. When these beliefs are present in someone's cognition, depression is very likely to occur (if it has not already occurred). An example of the negative cognitive triad themes will help illustrate how the process of becoming depressed works. Imagine that you have just been laid off from your work. If you are not in the grip of the negative cognitive triad, you might think that this event,
while unfortunate, has more to do with the economic position of your employer than your own work performance. It might not occur to you at all to doubt yourself, or to think that this event means that you are washed up and might as well throw yourself down a well. If your thinking process was dominated by the negative cognitive triad, however, you would very likely conclude that your layoff was due to a personal failure; that you will always lose any job you might manage to get; and that your situation is hopeless. On the basis of these judgments, you will begin to feel depressed. In contrast, if you were not influenced by negative triad beliefs, you would not question your self-worth too much, and might respond to the lay off by dusting off your resume and initiating a job search. Beyond the negative content of dysfunctional thoughts, these beliefs can also warp and shape what someone pays attention to. Beck asserted that depressed people pay selective attention to aspects of their environments that confirm what they already know and do so even when evidence to the contrary is right in front of their noses. This failure to pay attention properly is known as faulty information processing. Particular failures of information processing are very characteristic of the depressed mind. For example, depressed people will tend to demonstrate selective attention to information, which matches their negative expectations, and selective inattention to information that contradicts those expectations. Faced with a mostly positive performance review, depressed people will manage to find and focus in on the one negative comment that keeps the review from being perfect. They tend to magnify the importance and meaning placed on negative events, and minimize the importance and meaning of positive events. All of these maneuvers, which happen quite unconsciously, function to help maintain a depressed person's core negative schemas in the face of contradictory evidence, and allow them to remain feeling hopeless about the future even when the evidence suggests that things will get better