HARNESSING THE SUN: DEVELOPING CAPACITY TO SUSTAIN LOCAL SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS

by

Olufemi Olarewaju

APPROVED BY SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:

___________________________________________ Simon M. Fass, Ph.D., Chair

___________________________________________ Kimberly A. Aaron, Ph.D.

___________________________________________ Donald R. Arbuckle, Ph.D.

____________________________________________ Euel W. Elliott, Ph.D.

Copyright 2011 Olufemi Olarewaju All Rights Reserved

Joshua Adeniran Olarewaju (1929 2004) Father, Friend, and Civil Servant Extraordinaire

HARNESSING THE SUN: DEVELOPING CAPACITY TO SUSTAIN LOCAL SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS

by

OLUFEMI OLAREWAJU, B.Sc., M.S.

DISSERTATION Presented to the Faculty of The University of Texas at Dallas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS December 2011

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS With deepest gratitude, I thank the following: Joshua Adeniran Olarewaju (Deceased), for the memories Edith Taiwo Olarewaju, for the love My committee headed by Dr. Simon Fass, for the direction Dr. Oladapo and Teju Ajayi, for the unflinching support in every way Paul and Kay Amosun, for the love and prayers My siblings: Muyiwa, Toyin, Remi, and Seyi, for the perpetual presence Christopher Ubosi, Supo Sasore, Adeyemi Adewole, Adebola Ayorinde, Tayo Jegede, Tunji Balogun, Goke Osibodu, Yemi Itiola, Wale and Bukky Ajilore, Kunle and Tayo Segun, Tokunbo and Bunmi Adejuyigbe, Dr. Obafemi Hamzat, and others too numerous to mention, for the encouragement and support Olawunmi and BJ, for the presence Beverly Olarewaju, for your love, your prayers, your commitment, your encouragement, your presence, and your patience God, for who you are July, 2011

HARNESSING THE SUN: DEVELOPING CAPACITY TO SUSTAIN LOCAL SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS Publication No. ____________________ Olufemi Olarewaju, Ph.D. The University of Texas at Dallas, 2011

Supervising Professor: Simon Fass

Use of solar photovoltaic (PV) and other renewable sources to meet rising electricity demand by a growing world population has gained traction in many countries in recent years. In rural SubSaharan Africa, where 86 percent of the populace has no access to electricity, solar energy systems represent partial solutions to demand, especially in support of rural development initiatives to supply potable water, health care services and education. Unfortunately, development of human and organizational capacity to maintain solar technology has not kept pace with the rate of installation, causing many to fall into disrepair and disuse. This has stimulated interest in capacity development processes required to make solar systems sustainable. To cast light on the practical meanings and challenges of capacity development for solar energy, this study compares the experiences of two rural projects, one in Lagos State (Nigeria) that disregarded the importance of capacity development, and the other in Texas (United States) that, in contrast, made such development the centerpiece of its operations. Based largely on interviews vi

with 60 key actors, findings underscore the crucial importance of sustained investment in capacity development to assurance of durable power supply from renewable sources.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... v Abstract.. .............................................................................................................................. vi List of Tables. .............................................................................................................. x List of Figures.. ............................................................................................................................ xi INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 1 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY...7 CHAPTER 2 THE LAGOS SOLAR ENERGY PILOT PROJECT (LSEPP).16 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Fieldwork23 Evolution of the Project..25 Stakeholders... 32 Project Process....35 Sustainability..39 Observations...43

CHAPTER 3 THE TEXAS SOLAR FOR SCHOOLS PROJECT (TSSP)..48 3.1 3.2 History and Characteristics.50 Analysis..53

CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION................................................................................. 61 APPENDIX A ....................................................................................................................68 APPENDIX B ....................................................................................................................78

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APPENDIX C ....................................................................................................................81 APPENDIX D ....................................................................................................................83 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................84 Vita

ix

LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1 Three Phases of Capacity Development ......................................................... 12 Table 2.1 Summary of Village and other Stakeholder Visits .......................................... 26 Table 2.2 Solar Power Installation Sites in Six Villages 31 Table 2.3 Summary of Stakeholder Interests, Resource Capability and Attitudes...34 Table 2.4 Extent of Villager Participation in Project Planning and Implementation ...36 Table 2.5 Project Evaluation Categories and Criteria .......................................................44 Table 2.6 Evaluation Categories and Criteria Applied to LSEPP Project ........................45 Table 3.1 TSSP Stakeholder Interests, Resources & Position on Solar Electrification. ...55 Table 3.2 Efforts and Contributions from TSSP Stakeholders ........................................59

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1 Installation of LSEPP at Bishop Kodji Vilage ................................................... 18 Figure 2.2 Stakeholders Associated with the LSEPP24 Figure 2.3 Main Cable Networks for Solar Installation at Bishop Kodji Village.29 Figure 3.1 Completed Solar Panel System at a Texas High School .. ........................... .52

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INTRODUCTION The role of renewable energy sources in a nations energy mix enjoys vigorous debate across the globe, albeit for different reasons. The more developed nations view increased utilization of these sources as a strong tool for environmental degradation abatement. They also view it, as in the United States, as a means to reduce dependence on hydrocarbon energy sources. Developing and less-developed nations increasingly use renewable sources to meet local energy needs, particularly in remote rural communities that electrical grid systems have not yet reached. Such communities have increasingly come to rely on decentralized power i.e., generation of power near demand centers that focus on meeting local needs through utilization of renewable sources (Kaundinya, Balachandra and Ravindranath 2009). One source of such decentralized power, solar photovoltaic electricity, has gained traction in both developed and less developed countries in recent years. Especially in rural SubSaharan Africa, where 86 percent of the populace has no access to electricity (IEA 2009), growing demand for electricity in regions far from national grids has led to hope that renewable systems, such as solar PV, can respond to and serve part of that demand. More than 50 percent of the earths population resides in rural regions (World Bank, 2009). Although nearly all people in more developed countries of Europe and the Americas have access to regular supply of electricity, most rural dwellers in less developed countries, and many urban dwellers, are far less likely to have it. This is especially the case in Sub-Saharan Africa where an estimated 68 percent of people reside in rural areas (World Bank, 2009). Indeed, with

2 rural electrification at levels below 14 percent, Sub-Saharan Africa is the least electrified region of the world (IEA 2009). How then, can reliable modern energy services reach this large segment of Africas population? Challenges to doing this seem daunting. Most rural inhabitants there are poor, earn unstable incomes and live in dispersed areas. Many indicators of well-being, such as poverty, short life expectancy, high infant mortality, difficult access to potable water and illiteracy are worst in these regions (UNDP 2008). There is widespread belief that increasing access to electricity could alleviate many of these problems. However, transmission and distribution via conventional grid electrification remains too costly for most of rural Africa. At the same time, advancements in research and development of renewable energy technologies have led to a continuous decline in system capital requirement. In both developing and developed countries, solar photovoltaic prices have dropped by an average of 4 percent annually over the past 15 years because of progressive increases in conversion efficiencies and economies of scale in manufacturing. Against the backdrop of stubbornly high costs for connection to grids, the falling price for solar technology has drawn increased attention to this decentralized energy source as an appropriate method to serve dispersed rural populations. Given that they are both more cost effective and environmentally friendlier, there is now a perception among many observers that rural Africa presents an ideal venue for deployment of these innovative electrification technologies (Kaundinya, Balachandra and Ravindranath 2009). This may help to explain why almost every country in the region has initiated one or more solar energy projects in recent times (Karekezi and Kithyoma 2002, 1071).

3 However, because relevant data are not forthcoming, there is no telling whether the substantial investment in solar energy has actually increased access to electricity, and/or whether this access has resulted in promised problem alleviation and other benefits. This is unfortunate, among other reasons because rural electrification using solar technology is still expensive relative to individual income and to government budgets. Because this is widely understood, most solar projects in rural areas are undertaken with full knowledge that they will not be financially self-sustaining, and motivations for doing them turn on social, political or educational benefits rather than financial considerations. For this reason, solar projects often elicit questions among analysts of whether these benefits justify the costs. Given that project funds could be spent on other, more pressing needs, are opportunity costs too high? One response has been to shift solar project purposes from providing electricity for its own sake to providing it within the framework of broader programs of rural development as a means to achieve other material objectives, such as supplying potable water that improves health and labor productivity while reducing non-productive medical expenditures (Morgenstern 2002, 46). Seen this way, tangible economic benefits might balance the costs. Another, more common response is that gains exceed costs because the perceived value of the intangible benefit is quite high. Rural residents want access to electricity, period. Therefore, rural electrification projects that influence voting patterns or other expressions of political allegiance remain popular among government officials and politicians. However, installed solar power systems can produce electricity for only a short time without proper support networks of trained people and effective organizations to maintain them. Provision of such networks, typically an afterthought, has not had the same priority as

4 installation of solar panels. Not surprisingly, many systems are not sustainable. They suffer from recurrent failure, or fall into permanent disrepair and disuse. As a result, higher priority is now accorded to developing human and organizational capacities to maintain new technologies in places, such as Africa, where capacities are weak (Charles et al. 2007, 5744). There is expectation that improvement in local capacities, especially if efforts to improve are sustained, will help make the technology durable at the local level and thereby deliver the heralded promises of constant electricity. If financial limitations ease at the same time, through a combination of continuing decline in technology prices and rising income, then one may expect substantial increases in the rate of solar technology adoption in rural areas. However, it is not easy to develop the desired capacities, which Mulugetta (2008, 1441) imagines to be a self-sustaining system based on local technical self-reliance that creates employment opportunities for local entrepreneurs and technicians and allows speedy response to technical problems encountered. Especially in places where modern technologies are almost completely absent, the challenge of equipping rural dwellers and their institutions with understanding, skills, and access to information, knowledge and training necessary to make effective, sustainable use of renewable power sources is formidable (Mog 2004, 2141). It is especially daunting where the very idea of cultivating complementary human and institutional capacity has low priority in renewable energy projects. Still, over time, as causes of project failure become clearer, one may imagine that there will be rising interest in calling upon and equipping rural inhabitants and their institutions to assume responsibility for assuring sustainability of solar projects (Mog 2004, 2141).

5 When that interest becomes manifest, the work will demand attention to several dimensions at once. The self-sustaining process of capacity development involves consideration of individual characteristics and defined competencies that Grejer and Riis (1999, 632) describe as a system of human beings, using hard technology in an organized way and under the influence of a culture to create an output, and interests of decision-making groups responsible for implementation both inside and outside particular localities. Such stakeholder considerations, with wide divergence of interests that Wang and Liu (2010, 366) refer to as a cultural amalgamation, can be very complicated (Poladis and Haralambopouslos 2006, 331). To some extent, the United Nations Development Program clarifies what is needed by imagining simultaneous capacity development efforts at three levels; individual, organizational and enabling environment (UNDP 2008, 5). At the individual level, the need is to vest people with skills, experience and knowledge that they can acquire through formal training as well as through learning and by doing. Organizational level refers to development of internal policies, arrangements, procedures and frameworks that would allow an organization to operate and deliver on its mandate, and that enable the coming together of individual capacities to work together and achieve goals. If these exist and are well resourced and aligned, the capability of an organization to perform well will be greater than that of the sum of its parts. Finally, enabling environment alludes to the broader system within which individuals and organizations function, and that facilitates or hampers their performance. Capacity improvement here involves adjusting public policies, legislation, power relations and social norms, all of which govern mandates, priorities, and modes of operation (2008, 6).

6 This complexity makes it difficult to grasp what capacity development might mean in different situations, especially in Africa where, unlike the United States, there is no long tradition of designing and implementing capacity-building mechanisms alongside design and installation of new technologies. To obtain a better understanding, the research presented in this dissertation reviews the literature on capacity building (Chapter 1), looks at efforts associated with solar energy utilization in a less developed country that does not have the tradition - Nigeria (Chapter 2), and a developed country that does have the tradition - the United States (Chapter 3). It then explores whether and how the experiences of one might inform the other (Chapter 4).

CHAPTER 1 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY There are several approaches to defining the meaning of capacity development, which applies as much to developing as to developed economies (Franks 1999, 57). Horton et al. (2000, 14) sees the term capacity as the ability of individuals and organizations to perform functions effectively, efficiently, and in a sustainable manner. It includes all those attributes, capabilities, and resources that enable an organization to undertake its mission. Hortons perspective allows development of capacity to be seen as a process through which individuals, organizations, and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time (15). The emphasis in this definition of capacity development is on process of transformation from the inside, based on determined priorities, policies, and desired results, and starting from existing capacity assets (UNDP 2008, 4). The UNDP differentiates capacity development from capacity building, referring to the latter as a process that supports only the initial stages of building or creating capacity and alludes to an assumption that there are no existing capacities to start from (6). That is, it involves a process starting with a clean slate and involving a step by step erection of a new structure (6). Capacity building is implied to have relevance in, for example, crisis or post-conflict situations where existing capacity has already been lost due to capacity destruction or capacity flight (6). In other words, capacity development refers to improving what exists, while building refers to creating something that does not yet exist.

8 I do not differentiate between capacity building and development, and use both terms interchangeably. In any event, both concepts work with three basic elements that are the same. The first is that there exists a need for capacity development. The second is that any project process will rely on capabilities of an organization, that organizations enabling environment, and the organizations human talent, which together make up capacity development resources (UNDP 2008). The final element, combining the first two, recognizes that the measure of capacity development is the efficiency and effectiveness with which resources are deployed to identify and pursue capacity development on a sustainable basis. The emphasis here is on the process of developing or building capacity with the key purpose of exercising functions, identifying and meeting challenges, and doing so in a way that is sustainable over time (7). To assess the extent to which capacity building efforts achieve their sustainability goals, Otoo, Agapitova and Behrens (2009) propose a Capacity Development Results Framework (CDRF) that emphasizes three dimensions: availability of resources (human, financial, technical): these are necessary, but insufficient by themselves to achieve the goals effectiveness and efficiency: how resources are acquired and used depends on specific configurations of sociopolitical, policy-related (institutional), and organizational factors that condition behaviors of political and economic actors sustainable social and economic development: occurs when results and performances of project efforts are locally owned and can be replaced and scaled up by local actors

9 Extending this, the authors posit that capacity development has to do with a process of sociopolitical, policy-related and organizational change driven by changes in how knowledge and information are applied. That is, capacity development emerges from a locally driven process of learning by leaders, coalitions and other agents of change that brings about changes in sociopolitical, policy-related, and organizational factors to enhance local ownership for and the effectiveness and efficiency of efforts to achieve a goal (Otoo et al., 2009, 3) Applied to solar energy, sustainable capacity suggests availability of trained human resources at all levels to help design and implement pertinent policies program and projects. This calls for renewable energy awareness, skills and knowledge. According to Adam and Urquhart (2009, 2): even when all efforts have equal access to technology, the mismatch between skills and knowledge, and the efficient and effective deployment and integration of skills and knowledge with technology, will determine the level of disparity in productivity amongst [different] efforts. At the same time, it is important to recognize that training of personnel for a technology usually does not guarantee improvement in institutional performance (Lamore and Harlin 2002, 542). This is important because individuals, however trained, cannot function effectively without performance incentives, clear definitions of responsibilities, adequate management, sufficient funding, and clear organizational embedding that only institutions are able to supply (2002, 542). As Brown (2004, 2) puts it, local capacity involving effective, efficient, and responsive .governance is dependent on not only having sufficiently developed human resource capacity but also sufficient capacity within organizational and directive context. As a result, he continues, change interventions focused on impacting any single sphere in isolation are insufficient without insightful assessment of existing capacity and respective

10 development needs within the other spheres as part of a broader agenda for continually improving current capacity (3). It follows that a first order of business in planning capacity development is to clarify objectives. The UNDP (UNDP 2008) approaches this by asking three questions: why is there need for capacity development, what capacity is being developed, and for whom is the capacity being developed. Answering these questions typically requires initiation of stakeholder involvement. Among other things, this calls for establishment of a process that involves meetings to distinguish stakeholder needs from stakeholder perspectives, and that delineates the parts of capacity development to focus on, i.e., individuals, organizations and/or enabling environments. Adding detail, Lamoree and Harlin (2002, 545) posit that a successful, sustainable capacity-building project will follow a process approach that focuses on four things:: sustainable human resources: staff are adequately trained and allocated in the organization and that these staff can be retained by the organization or substituted. sustainable information resources: the institution has continuous and timely access to the information it needs in terms of quality and quantity. sustainable technological resources: the right equipment is in place, available to the institution, and maintained and upgraded over time. sustainable financial resources: the institution has continued access to adequate finances to perform its functions. Over all, this is a sustainable, stakeholder-driven institutional development component. Here the capacity-building process tries to promote conditions that encourage stakeholder decision-

11 making through information provision and discussion that raises awareness and eventually commitment to decisions necessary to put institutional changes into effect (2002, 546). From the forgoing, it seems that the literature imagines two distinct but related dimensions to capacity development. First is an endogenous process of organizational learning and adaptation that allows stakeholders to progressively master management of technology and its environment, i.e., learning by doing. In this dimension, learning is more intuitive than planned, and influenced by intangible factors such as culture, values and attitudes. The second dimension, accompanying the first, comprises specific, tangible interventions that formally aim at organizational strengthening and human resources development support. Such interventions, supplied by outsiders are typically technocratic and supply oriented, dealing with structures, systems, technology and training (Land 2004, vi). Sustained, these dimensions allow capacity to grow, and enable the handling of more complexity with more effectiveness over a sustained period of time Baser and Morgan (2008, 34). Baser and Morgans view of growing ability to address complexity is consistent with Lamoree and Harlins (2002) notion of three phases of capacity development, each one serving as the foundation for the next (Table 1.1). The important thing in the case of new programs and projects is that phased capacity development objectives and associated activities be integrated at the project planning stage so that implementation can flow together with learning (Lusthaus, Adrien and Morgan, 2000). Also important, of course, is that planned activities actually take place.

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Table 1.1. Three Phases of Capacity Development

DESCRIPTION

CHARACTERISTICS Identification and establishment of renewable energy project. This stage incorporates efforts and contributions to capacities in individual, organization, and enabling environments. Involves more profound change, and builds upon capacities developed in the first phase. May involve expansion of operations, more intensive hands-on technical assistance, etc. Introduction of more transformative change with a refocusing of the organization towards the project beneficiary. Other elements include modernization of administrative process. Reduction in outside support is expected here.

Phase 1

Pilot project identification and establishment

Phase 2

Expansion and performance improvement

Phase 3

Modernization and transformation

Source: Adapted from Lamoree and Harlin, 2002

The discussion to this point assumes that there is substantial demand for solar energy systems in places like rural Africa, but productive use of the technology, and therefore its widespread adoption, is hindered by insufficient individual and organizational management capacity. Fix the capacity problem in ways suggested above and adoption will follow to some extent. If demand really is strong, then there is much to gain from investing in capacity development. However, if demand is actually weak, then investment is nonproductive, a waste of time and money, producing individuals with high skills but nothing to which to apply them. Indeed, there is evidence that estimates of demand by solar technology optimists may be exaggerated. For India, Reddy and Painuly (2004, 1435) identify taxonomy of barriers that limit demand: awareness and information, financial and economic, market, technical, institutional

13 regulatory, and behavioral. Mirza et al. (2009, 928) point to like constraints, concluding that demand will not rise until solar technology becomes more price competitive. Similarly Rao and Kishore (2010, 1072) do not see a promising future for solar energy until problems of low load factors, small output, high initial costs and unfair advantage (i.e., subsidies for conventional fuels) are resolved. Paradoxically, low demand is clearest in places where capacity to manage solar technologies is strongest, such as the United States where demand lags because the benefit of solar technology is not as evident. The country is awash in grid-delivered electricity service provided at lower cost than alternatives. Whatever interest there is in renewable energy technologies emanates from issues that do not yet concern most people, such as environmental and energy security considerations, and the finite nature of fossil-based energy sources (Rao and Kishore 2010, 1072). Demand is growing, however, propelled by advocacy groups and some elements of government that labor to raise public awareness about the technology and its role as a direct response to the coming challenges of crude oil depletion, price rises and climate change (Agisilaos, 2009; Jennings, 2009; Lund, 2006). One approach that advocates use to increase public awareness is to install subsidized solar power systems in high-visibility locations where they can provide useful services and, at the same time, educate people in surrounding communities about the attributes and advantages of the technology. Regional electricity providers, cooperating with non-profit organizations and state and local governments, are especially active in this domain. The Federal government is involved as well, one example being the U.S. Department of Agricultures Rural Energy for

14 America Program (REAP), which offers grants and loan guarantees of up to $500,000 for solar power installations. Side by side, a solar installation in Africa and another in the United States may look identical, and produce exactly the same quantities of electricity to power similar light bulbs, water pumps and the like. But similarities end there. The objective of the African model is precisely to power bulbs and pumps in order to obtain the sometimes life-extending benefits that flow from light and water. The objective of the American model is to demonstrate that bulbs and pumps can be powered by the sun, in order to obtain the demand benefits that flow from increased familiarity and understanding of the technology by prospective consumers. Another difference, much more important, is that the African installation, for want of capacity to manage it, has a high probability of premature failure. The American installation does not. In this regard, my research is concerned with identifying project components that enhance or undermine sustainable capacity development for solar energy utilization and awareness. The specific inquiry asks whether two projects, viewed as methods or opportunities to promote capacity development, achieved their objectives in the different environments alluded to above, Lagos State in Nigeria and Texas in the United States. Although technological components in the respective places are the same, as noted, the enabling environments are quite different. The purpose of my research, a comparative study of two cases, is to examine this difference, to understand the ways by which it influenced capacity development efforts during implementation of solar projects, and to assess whether lessons drawn from experience in one endeavor are usefully transferrable to the other. I introduce the case studies and my findings in

15 sequence, starting with Lagos in the next Chapter, moving to Texas after it, and then close with my conclusions about capacity development drawn from the two experiences.

CHAPTER 2 THE LAGOS SOLAR ENERGY PILOT PROJECT (LSEPP) That access to electricity is low in the country of Nigeria cannot be attributed to lack of sufficient energy resources to meet its energy consumption requirements. The country has the largest reserve of crude oil in Africa and possesses the worlds sixth largest of same (ICEED 2006). It produces over 2.17 million barrels of oil per day, has proven gas reserves of about 5000 billion cubic meters, an estimated reserve of 2.7 billion tons of coal and lignite, and an additional 31 billion barrels of oil equivalents in tar sands reserves. The energy consumption mix in Nigeria is made up of crude oil (53 percent), natural gas (39 percent), and hydro-electric (7 percent). Coal, though abundant, is currently not part of the countrys energy mix (Gahlawat et al. 2009, 26). Large hydro accounts for 31.3 percent of grid electricity generation while the remaining 68.3 percent comes from natural gas (Ajao et al., 2009). Despite the abundance of generating resources, over 80 million people representing about 60 percent of the countrys population do not have access to electricity. By 2005, the transmission and distribution networks in the country consisted of 6,831 and 42,979 miles of line respectively. The infrastructure has an installed capacity of about 6000 MW, far short of the estimated electrical energy demand of 10,000 MW. The demand figure here is believed to be under estimated due to prevalent self-generation in all sub-sectors (ICEED 2006). Only 37 percent (about 2, 000 MW) of the installed capacity was in operation in 1999 (Adegbulugbe et al. 2009, 2). Frequency of breakdowns of generating plants and equipments due to inadequate

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17 operations and maintenance provisions, and the obsolete transmission and distribution equipments in use are said to be two of the factors responsible for the unreliable electric power supply in the country. Given these challenges, the country recognizes that part of its energy mix has to include generation from renewable sources, more specifically to serve rural habitats that are targeted to achieve rapid and cost-effective access to electricity to aid in their development. These rural areas, representing about 60 percent (World Bank 2009) of the countrys habitations, are typically too far from the grid system making grid extensions cost-prohibitive. Village electrification through harnessing of solar energy received a boost in 2002 when the Nigerian government, with Japanese government assistance, installed power units in 200 rural communities in Imo, Ondo and Jigawa states, and in Abuja, the nation's capital. Drawing inspiration from these experiences, in 2005 the Lagos State Ministry of Science and Technology (LAMOST) launched its own Lagos Solar Energy Pilot Project (LSEPP) at Bishop Kodji, a fishing and boat-making village on an island accessible only by boat. The stated purpose of the project was to promote a low-cost approach to rural electrification. Estimates for connecting a remote village to the national grid pointed to a State government capital cost of about $1.2 million. A solar energy installation in Bishop Kodji might cost about $65,000. Accordingly, if this approach to power supply could prove financially and operationally sustainable, then the State could extend it to other comparable rural areas far from the grid (Olori 2006, 1). The project, completed and commissioned in 2007, equipped the village and its 5000 inhabitants with several things besides the solar installation. These included: solar water pumps for a well (including a standpipe with filtration tank and storage tank), direct circuit color TV and a radio in the community hall, village illumination at strategically-located positions, lighting

18 for the community hall, schools, mosques and churches and, what seemed especially important for a fishing village, a solar collector fish dryer.

Figure 2.1. Installation of LSEPP at Bishop Kodji, 2007 Even before the project was complete, Solomon Hennu, secretary of the Community Development Committee of the Amuwo Odofin Local Government, under which the Bishop Kodji village falls, told a journalist in June 2006 that ''the project has brought great joy and relief to us. It has brought governance closer to us and we now have access to information more than before when we depended on battery-powered radio. We can now watch television and charge our mobile phones.'' Similarly, Ezekiel Huehunmey, in charge of the village primary school, was optimistic about improvements in enrollment and attendance. ''Most of our children travel the high seas to attend schools in distant towns because of inadequate classrooms. With electricity and more classrooms, the risk to our children in the event of canoes capsizing will be reduced.

19 We can now enroll more pupils in the school and run two shifts, day and evening,'' he said (Olori 2006, 1). The apparently high level of initial enthusiasm and success at Bishop Kodji prompted the state government to accelerate authorization of installations for ten additional villages in four Local Government Areas within the state. Extending and replicating the Bishop Kodji experience, all the villages would have solar lighting along footpaths and the village square, and in churches, Mosques, other religious facilities and schools (as appropriate). Also included were a solar powered pump with water tanks to lift and store potable water from a deep well, a television for the Community Hall, a CD player and electrical outlets where people could recharge their telephones. The expectation was that electrification would spur local development through provision, among other things, of better knowledge of and communication with the world outside (e.g., daily fresh and preserved fish prices), easier access to potable water, and improved academic outcomes for students now unable to study during evenings (or at all). Unfortunately, as seems too often the case with promising projects in Africa, especially those that experiment with new technology, informal reports filtering out of the villages suggested that the challenges of sustainability were proving more daunting than project planners may have anticipated. For example, Bishop Kodji residents periodically overloaded system circuits, causing it to shut down for several days or weeks or months until state contractors came from Lagos city to conduct repairs. The need for external help to resolve minor technical issues seems surprising, given a stated intent to promote system sustainability. Why was there limited or no village-level capacity to manage and repair the solar installations? Speculating, one possible factor might be that the

20 LAMOST really did not have a mandate to provide or administer public services such as electricity. Its mission, which justifies projects such as the LSEPP, includes using science and technology to improve welfare of citizens. Since it is not equipped to be an electricity supplier or manager, it relies on contractors to do all installation and maintenance work. There may have been an expectation at the beginning that other, more durable administrative arrangements through another unit of government would take over once projects were up and running. But this did not happen. Another possibility, implicit in the first, may be a top-down or statist approach to project planning, implementation and management. The State government paid for the village systems and thereby owns and is responsible for them. That is, the project may not have been designed to be a turnkey operation in which villagers could learn to manage the system and in the process learn to take gradual ownership of it through their local institutions. Certainly, the project design did not seem consistent with the idea of helping villages to set up their own solar power systems, i.e. helping people to help themselves. A third factor may be operating cost. Although a solar system requires much less capital compared to connecting to a national grid, panels when they breakdown are expensive to maintain, depending on the type of maintenance required. But panels rarely break. System shutdowns have stemmed mainly from failures of other bits and pieces of wiring, batteries, regulators and the like. Costs of such replacement parts are not encumbering to the State, and not exorbitant even to the poor villagers who, in any event, pay for electrical services that they do get, such as charging cell phones at local kiosks powered by small generators.

21 These factors, however, are speculations based on journalist reports and hearsay in 2009 and early 2010. They may be among the actual reasons for lack of project sustainability, or not. To find out, I travelled to Nigeria during October-December 2010 to interview senior staff of the LAMOST associated with the solar power project, technical contractors responsible for installing and afterward repairing the systems, and community leaders and ordinary residents in a sample of six of the eleven villages. The purpose of this fieldwork was to unravel the solar project story by searching for answers to three sets of questions: Evolution: Which stakeholders were involved at different stages of the project at the village, local government and State level? What were the stakeholders expectations for the project and their involvement at each stage of the project? What rationales did stakeholders use to guide their involvement? System Status: How well have the village systems functioned since they became operational? Have they met original expectations? What are the main achievements of the project? What are the main difficulties that have and/or have not been resolved over the life of the village system? What are the causes of these difficulties? How might different arrangements address these difficulties? Sustainability: In stakeholder eyes, is the system financially, technically and managerially self-sustaining under present administrative arrangements? Was the project designed to be sustainable? If no, what other institutional or organizational arrangements show promise as means to assure greater financial and administrative sustainability?

22 Drawing from the research literature on lessons learned about sustainability in general (e.g., Agisilaos, 2010; Brown, 2004; Mog, 2004; Mulugetta et al., 2005), I developed an interview script adaptable to different interviewees, that focused on producing answers that directly or indirectly touched on the following dimensions: Stakeholders: These comprise the network of administrators, technical professionals, local leaders and intended beneficiaries required for project implementation and utilization. Who are they? What are their perspectives? Identifying perspectives of stakeholders and their capacities to shape project characteristics may cast light on why the project has evolved as it has. Acquisition of knowledge: To what extent did different stakeholders acquire new knowledge pertinent to the project? Did the new knowledge contribute to effective utilization of other resources? Was there an enabling environment to encourage acquisition of new knowledge by relevant stakeholders? Application of knowledge to develop capabilities contributing to sustainability: To what extent did different stakeholders transfer knowledge among themselves? Were people at the local project level able to use new knowledge? Did the combination of acquired knowledge and enabling environment, if any, produce local project ownership to help assure sustainability? The learning that I accumulated through the various interviews, always interesting, was at once highly revealing and not very encouraging. The literature that I reviewed as part of my research, in retrospect, seemed much too technocratic and perhaps overly naive in its understanding of and approach to sustainability. Whether deliberate or inadvertent, the LSEPPs

23 implementation process was inconsistent with what will promote project sustainability. The implementation process actually revealed omissions of elements that are critical for a successful development of sustainable renewable energy systems in Africa, or anywhere else. In what follows I explain my fieldwork, describe the evolution of the project, and then present my findings concerning interactions of stakeholders, the project process and sustainability. I end the chapter with my observations about the LSEPP experience and what it implies about prospects for capacity development needed for sustainability.

2.1

Fieldwork Data collection involved site visits and a sequence of face-to-face interviews with a

small sample of individuals who engaged in and/or who were supposed to benefit from the solar project, spread across three groups of stakeholders: outsiders, i.e., non-local project initiators and contributors, village headmen and others in positions of local leadership, and ordinary villagers. The purpose of the visits was to see sites firsthand, to meet with people to explore their views on the project, and to get answers to the questions indicated above. The meetings were organized as formal, semi-formal and informal interviews, with most village sessions done as group meetings and recorded for later transcription. Selection of representative samples among these three main groups was straightforward, in part because stakeholders comprised a small universe, as shown in Figure 2.2. Also, although villages have some unique geographical characteristics, they are similar in all other important respects. Likewise, there was little variation in technical characteristics of the project because the LAMOST provided almost identical solar installations at all 11 sites. Accordingly, I believe that

24 my sample of 6 sites provides representative information for the 11 project villages. Appendix A (Tables A1-A7) presents the general responses to questions I asked respondents in an effort to have a better understating, as a beneficiary group, of the roles that villagers played, their expectations, and their relationships with outsiders (i.e., LAMOST and its technical partners) during the life of the project.

Figure 2.2. Stakeholders Associated with the LSEPP. To assure consistency in coverage of issues, the interviews relied on informal scripts, shown in Appendix B, which I adapted to each meeting. Pre-set questions proved useful when talking in English with outsiders such as government officials and technology installers. They were less useful than directed conversations in the case of villagers, during which conversations

25 could readily slide between English, Yoruba and Egun, for which I relied on translators that spoke Egun and a local broken English dialect. Language was not a barrier to communication, however. Main challenges at the village level were difficulty in sticking to the subject because responses to queries tended to be longwinded and scattered, and because most ordinary villagers, with no knowledge of anything that went into the LSEPP project, had little or nothing to say. Gathering project-specific information had therefore to rely mostly on informal communication made possible by my personal connections to government people and consultants, such as Mr. Tayo Jegede, a technician with Impasse Technology. He traveled with me to all the villages and shared his knowledge, gained from being an integral part of the entire solar project process. Mr. Jegede became one of the most valuable contributors to my information collection effort. Table 2.1, summarizes the schedule of my government office and site visits.

2.2

Evolution of the Project In 2005, the Lagos State Ministry of Science and Technology (LAMOST), the

supervising body acting on behalf of the Lagos State Government, directed its Department of Science, Policy, Programs and Promotions (DSPPP), at the time headed by Dr. Adenike Boyo (Orowariye 2010), to spearhead efforts to provide solar PV power to the states rural areas. Zones of particular concern were coastal villages that did not have access to the national electricity grid. According to Mr. Johnson Adeniji, the states DSPPP director (replacing Dr. Boyo in the year 2008), the government saw provision of electric power to rural dwellers as part of its social responsibility (Adeniji 2010).

26 Table 2.1. Summary of Village and other Stakeholder Visits

Date Activity
Meeting with Dr. Obafemi Hamzat, Commissioner, Lagos State Ministry of Science and Technology Meeting with Mr. Adeniji, Head Lagos DSPPP Meeting with Mr. Adeyiga, MD Empirical Networks Meeting with Mr. Wanike Oruwariye, MD, Impasse Technologies Village visit. Bishop Kodji

Interviewee
Dr. Hamzat

Comments
Introduced to Mr. Adeniji, Head, DSPPP

10/5/2010 10/5/2010 10/7/2010 10/12/2010

Mr. Adeniji, Mr. Adeyiga Mr. Oruwariye

Introduced to technical partners Empirical Networks is one of two PV technology installers Impasse Technologies carried out pilot installation at Bishop Kodji 6 others in attendance, including assistant secretary Mr Lawrence, the Balogun Mr Peter Danzu In attendance also is Mr. Fidelis, Chairman of the Boat Association. In attendance were two teachers.

10/19/2010

Baale Felix Sewanu

10/19/2010 10/25/2010

Village visit. Sagbo Kodji Village visit. Sagbo Kodji

10/25/2010

Village visit. Sagbo Kodji

Mr. Noel, General Secretary of village Mr. Adekoya, Headmaster Sagbo Kodji Ele school Chief Anthony Avime, Baale Sagbo Kodji Mr Solomom Henny, Community Development Committee (CDC) secretary Group interview with ordinary villagers Group interview with villagers Chief Azeez Oloto, Baale Obada Chief Agbomenu Siwakunnu Group interview with villagers Chief Jamiu Lawan, Baale Group interview with villagers Chief Salia Adelaja, Baale

10/25/2010

Visit to the Amuwo Odofin local government headquarters

6 others in attendance, including secretary general Mr Noel, and boat association chairman Mr Fidelis Both Bishop Kodji and Sagbo Kodli villages fall under jurisdiction of Amuwo Odofin Local Government.

11/18/2010 11/18/2010

Village Visit. Bishop Kodji Village Visit. Sagbo Kodji

11/19/2010 11/24/2010 11/25/2010 12/4/2010 12/4/2010 12/8/2010

Village visit. Obada Village Visit. Agbojedo Village Visit. Agbojedo Village visit. Mosorigogo Village visit. Mosorigogo Village visit. Ijih

7 villagers in attendance, including Mr. Segun Benjamin, the General Secretary of Bishop Kodji 6 villagers in attendance.. Also in attendance was the general secretary and the boat association chairman 9 others in attendance, including the village secretary Mr. Raji and other village elders Also in attendance was Mr. Isiah Afose, a village elder 6 villagers in attendance, including the Baale, and the first female in the entire experience Present was Mr Kasim Adesanya, supposedly allowed to witness some of the installations 6 other villagers present, including women, and a high-ranking Chief, Talib Idowu Present with the Baale are two of his assistants, the pastor of the only church in the village and four other villagers

27 The high cost of extending the grid to remote locations drove heavy reliance on small diesel generators as local power sources. At the same time, the operating cost for generators was high after factoring in fuel transport costs. Mr. Adeniji noted that, these people are tax payersthey are entitled to benefit from governance and they are entitled to power and to be informed as information is crucial to the peoples lives. Accordingly, there seemed to be compelling need for this kind of project, the main goals of which were to: Provide power to illuminate general roads and pathways in villages. This would increase nighttime activities, and so also security and commercial activities. Provide solar-powered pumps to lift potable water from deep boreholes. Deep wells are essential because water nearer the surface in villages close to the ocean is brackish. Equip community centers with solar-powered television and radio sets. This would encourage rural dwellers to congregate at the end of the day, listen to the news on radio, watch television and through these things obtain information that could help improve overall awareness and welfare of rural inhabitants. In addition, there was an early effort to connect the project to rural livelihood by providing fishermen, the main occupation, with solar dryers as a means of preserving their catches. However, this element failed from the outset because, according Mr. Adeniji, villagers were caught up in a consumption culture. That is, villagers were accustomed to the taste and color that came from using wood fires to dry fish, characteristics that solar dryers were not able to duplicate. As a result, after early rejection by villagers, the dryer component was dropped from the subsequent phases of the project.

28 To reach the goals mentioned above, the LAMOST instructed the DSPPP to carry out a pilot project in the village of Bishop Kodji, located on an island across the lagoon from the city of Lagos, in the Amuwo Odofin Local Government Area of Lagos State. With an average elevation of about 1-2 meters above sea level, Bishop Kodji is approximately 20 minutes by boat from the Lagos Isalnd. It is home to about 5,000 inhabitants. Before and after the solar project, the most common use of electricity among residents of Bishop Kodji and other villages was charging of GSM cellular phones. In Bishop Kodji, almost all households own cellular phones, and most have at least two. Popularity of cellular phones makes the need to charge phones important. Also, for this and other purposes more than half of households own small diesel generators with average capacities of 800-850 Watts (Benjamin 2010). On average, these cost $2.00 to $3.30 per day to operate (excluding depreciation and maintenance) if they power a fan, light bulb and television for extended hours. This cost is high, and implies that most families cannot afford to use them extensively for non-essentials. Those without generators rely on friends that own one, or pay about $0.33 per charge to a GSMcharging service at a village kiosk. Other businesses utilize bigger generators (1.2KVa), such as a TV center where people converge to watch British League soccer, a popular sport in this part of the world. The Center charges 33 cents per person. There is also a Movie center that charges 20 cents per adult and 13 cents per child. Introduction of a source of public electricity that might lower costs of charging phones or watching TV and movies at a community center would seem to make economic sense from a consumers perspective. Against this backdrop, the LAMOST contracted with Impasse Technologies Limited, a local engineering company specializing in design, building and maintenance of electrical power

29 systems, to design a solar PV power system for Bishop Kodji, under an arrangement called a Bill of Engineering Management and Evaluation, BEME, (Adeyiga 2010). This was a pilot project from which lessons extracted would apply to the next 10 villages. Impasse installed a PV farm in a communal area of the village and, from this location, installed hardwood pylons to support connecting cables to the various communal facilities and, along the way, public illumination devices (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3. Main Cable Network for Solar Installation at Bishop Kodji Source: Wanike Orowariye (2010)

30

The solar farm at the center of the installation consists of a top-of-poles mounted PV array equipped with thirty 12 volt DC, 75W mono-crystalline solar panels, with a combined output of 2250 W. The array output feeds through three charge controllers (or battery regulators) that regulate, monitor, report the charge condition, residual charge state and voltage of a 12-unit accumulator (battery) bank of deep-cycle valve regulated lead-acid (VRLA) batteries. There is a distribution board equipped with circuit breakers individually connected to the outgoing utility/service wires that span the local grid to deliver electricity to the various recipients shown in Figure 2.3. The Bishop Kodji installation took about 80 days to complete, from site identification to project testing, commissioning and handover to the village, at a total cost of about $ 63,400. The communal facilities supplied by the new system included, among other things, public entertainment (colored television and radio cassette/compact disc player), a water storage tank with a capacity of 4000 liters, and a pumping system to take water from a deep well to the tank. Closely following the Bishop Kodjie model, the project then expanded to cover 10 additional villages at Sagbo Kodji, Obada, Agbojedo, Mosorigogo and Ijih (which I visited) and Oriba, Okogbo, Daddo Kesse and Ojodun (which I did not visit). The fuller set of community facilities serviced by solar power in Bishop Kodji and the villages I visited are shown in Table 2.2. Immediately after the solar installations were complete and commissioned, they all functioned well. They seemed to demonstrate clearly the positive effects of the public power supply that included improved security, heightened level of local commerce, and a general sense that the government, at last, was paying attention to the needs of rural inhabitants, as I noted at

31 the outset of this chapter. There were few other benefits, however because the project provided only communal service. That is, apart from provision of two communal GSM phone charge points, households have no private access to public power. The systems do not bring significant private material benefit in the form of lowered energy costs to residents.

Table 2.2. Solar Power Installation Sites in Six Villages

Village Electricity Recipients Anglican Church Catholic Church Mosque French School Elementary School Baale Community Hall with equipment Community Hall with equipment Community Center Water storage tank with pump Illumination points on village pathways Boat landing jetty GSM recharging power module Bishop Kodji Sagbo Kodji Obada Agbojedo Mosorigogo Ijih

The need to fuel, maintain and repair diesel generators remains, as does the need to pay for charging because 2 charge points are not enough for a community of several thousand cell phone users (Chidiezie and Igwiro, 2008). This begs questions such as: what private benefits

can individuals derive from a solar project with the kind of design advanced by the LAMOST? Are public benefits sufficient to warrant interest and support by villages? Answers to these questions seem important in relation to system sustainability. However, in the specific

32 circumstances of the LSEPP, they are not immediately relevant because the common challenge in all villages I visited was recurrent breakdown of crucial system components and the long times required for repairs. Why this is so, and what lessons the experience provides to guide future efforts, is what I focus on in the balance of this chapter, starting with a closer look at the projects principal stakeholders.

2.3

Stakeholders The project combined the interests of four stakeholder groups: the Lagos State Ministry

of Science and Technology (LAMOST), the solar energy installers contracted by LAMOST to execute the technical aspects of the project, Local Government Community Development Committees (CDCs) that covered the 11 project villages, and the villagers. Such stakeholders, as defined by Morgan and Taschereau (1996), are the persons and groups with a stake in the undertaking who would be affected by the project, whose support was needed to make the project function, and/or who might oppose the project if it countered their interests. Although four groups were involved, the project was not at all participatory. The LAMOST adopted a top-down approach, making the state government initiator, leader and sole owner of the project in all villages. As noted in Table 2.3, which summarizes stakeholder interests and expectations, resources availability, resource mobilization capacity and attitude toward solar power, the LAMOST wielded ultimate power. This arrangement of stakeholder influence is typical in West Africa. Government believes that it is its responsibility to provide electricity for rural inhabitants, and inhabitants are in full support of the governments belief.

33 This means that the only available method of implementation, in the eyes of most people, is the top-down approach where government dictates every aspect of the project. It is important to appreciate, as I mentioned earlier, that the LAMOST initiated the project knowing that it was not going to be financially self-sustaining. It undertook the project mainly for its social and political, not economic benefits. Such projects are popular among politicians as a way to show rural voters that they care about them. Clearest evidence of this political motivation is the fact that timing of most project efforts coincided with periods of political electioneering in Lagos State (e.g., 2006-2007 local government and governorship campaigns). This may explain why the LAMOST favors the solar projects they are relatively easy to implement - and why it has a high resources mobilization capacity - political gain makes the investment worthwhile. The LAMOST is the only stakeholder that has high resource mobilization capacity because it controls every aspect of the project. This is not the case with local government and the villagers. While they also favor the project because of perceived public benefits, they are poor and lack resources, other than making available the land needed to site the solar farms. Ordinary people and local government leaders, for the most part semi-literate, seem satisfied that government is giving them electricity. Making land available is the least they can do to help. The upshot of this perspective is that villagers and their leaders do not take initiative to decide what they want from the project, express a desire to play more active roles in the project process, or to demand changes that could influence outcomes. The last stakeholder group comprises the solar energy installers and engineers. They obviously favor the project as they stand to gain financially. Because they supply engineering expertise as their main resource, knowledge that

34 LAMOST does not possess, installers are able to wield a limited amount of influence. It is limited because at the end of the day they expect LAMOST to pay them. That is, their ability to influence is limited because the LAMOST holds a monopoly on project finances. This distribution of interests and willingness and power to influence shaped the project process as it proceeded from inception through installation to completion and beyond.

Table 2.3. Summary of Stakeholder Interests, Resource Capability and Attitudes

STAKEHOLDERS

Lagos State Ministry of Science and Technology (LAMOST)

Local Government Community Development Committee (CDC)

INTERESTS AND EXPECTATIONS IN SOLAR ELECTRIFICATION Illuminate the general roads and pathways, provide drinkable water, provide community hall with communications equipment, and gain local political support Ensure that rural people benefit from governance through electrification of villages

RESOURCES AVAILABLE

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION CAPACITY Very High. Project owner.

ATTITUDE TOWARD SOLAR ELECTRIFICATION Favorable. Viewed as only cost-effective way to provide electrification for villages. Is also politically expedient for government. Favorable. Aligns with the mandate of the CDC

Policy coordination and financial resources

Solar Energy Technology Installers

To be the technical partner of choice for LAMOST

Development advocacy capability and better understanding of village circumstances Engineering knowledge

Low. The LAMOST has full ownership of the project

Villagers

To improve security at night, energize commerce, and generally have a personal satisfaction of a government that cares for local needs.

Land for solar farm, ability to mobilize village residents to support project initiatives if asked to do so

Medium-High. LAMOST lacks expertise. Completely relies on engineering consultant partners for all technical aspects of project Very Low. Topdown approach to implementation excludes recipients from decision making.

Favorable. Financially motivated. Also want to be a leading PV installer in the state, a technology viewed as in its infancy

Favorable. Key desire is to feel that rural dwellers benefit from governance, i.e., money spent on making life easier for citizens

35 2.4 Project Process After deciding that the State Government was going to provide solar electricity to coastal areas of the state, the LAMOST identified Bishop Kodji as the pilot project site. According to respondents in Bishop Kodji, representatives from the LAMOST approached the village leadership and informed them of the decision to provide solar power. Village leaders received this news with great fanfare, perhaps expecting that the entire village would be electrified. LAMOST representatives visited two more times to identify the specific site within the village for the solar farm. Installation took place right after this. The majority of villagers first learned of the project at this moment, i.e., when the equipment arrived and installation began. That is, as detailed in interview responses presented in Appendix A, Tables A1-A7, there were no broad-based efforts at promoting community awareness before starting the project. There were no community meetings where the project was discussed during implementation. The LAMOST and its partners were therefore unaware of local priorities and needs, and the absence of meetings provided no opportunity for these to come forward. So there was little sense among main deciders of whether the project would be relevant or useful for the intended beneficiaries as they imagined. At the same time, as underscored by Table 2.4, absence of participation precluded the concomitant pre-assessment, partnership development and community relations activities that the research literature deems essential for capacity development and project sustainability. This lack of beneficiary involvement, laid the foundation for all the challenges that the project would later encounter.

36 Table 2.4. Extent of Participation in Project Planning and Implementation

Type of Participation Bishop Kodji yes no no no no no no Sagbo Kodji yes no no no no no no

Village Obada Agbojedo yes no no no no no no yes no no no no no no

Mosorigogo yes no no no no no no

Ijih yes no no no no no no

Selection of project site (village leadership) Selection of project type Community mobilization and awareness building Developing possible solutions to challenges during installation Construction / Installation Monitoring and Evaluation Operation and Maintenance

To appreciate the importance of participation by intended beneficiaries, one has to view solar power in rural areas as an imported technology. The question that arises in this regard is: how do we create institutional frameworks that have the capacity to absorb, adapt and ultimately improve an imported technology such as solar power? One answer is that social appropriateness of the technology has to be taken very seriously. Green (1999, 1136), for instance, sees socially appropriate technology as that which enhances the quality of life- rather than merely increasing the consumption of goods; it receives cultural acceptance of the community as the technology is assimilated, and specifically in the case of energy projects, fulfills the basic needs of the end users. Part of community relationship development is to give outsiders the chance to get to know beneficiary communities well, specifically to know their priorities and needs. Clearly, the LAMOST project designers did not succeed in this regard (not that they tried).

37 I asked village leaders and others if anybody from government ever came to ask about their specific needs, whether related to the project or not. The answer was a strong no in every case. I then asked respondents to list three main problems faced by villagers. As detailed in Appendix A, Table A3, responses were varied. But in every village the same three issues came to the fore: schooling, a medical facility and potable water. Every one of the people I talked with mentioned these three items. As Green (1999, 1136) notes, part of the social acceptability of a new technology lies in the technologys ability to fulfill the needs of the end users. In the case of the solar project, one has to wonder how needs of end users can be addressed if the question is never asked. That the technology did not help with priority needs finds substantiation in the answers to a question (Appendix A, Table A4) that asked whether the project had helped solve any village problems. In their responses, villagers stated that the project had not contributed any relief. Their expressed reasons included insufficient light points in the village, unreliability of the technology (always breaking down) and, except for water, irrelevance to what they truly needed schools and medical facility. While villagers recognized that technology could make a big difference, as in the case of potable water when the system functioned, such benefits can only be sustained if local people are prepared to deal with inevitable equipment breakdowns (Mulugetta 2007, 1442). The approach used by project planners missed this point. The LAMOST believed that it was its responsibility to provide electricity, a belief shared by the villagers as well (see Appendix A, Table A4). This belief, reaffirmed by Mr. Adeniji, project head for the LAMOST, precluded opportunities for promoting project ownership by beneficiaries. Everything that had to do with the project, from planning to maintenance and repairs, were all responsibility of the LAMOST.

38 And it is difficult to fault local people for leaving responsibility with the LAMOST because they see things the same way. With the villagers believing that all responsibility for supplying electricity belongs to government, it begs the question of whether villagers are just free riders or are willing to pay for services if asked to do so. I explored this matter by asking (Appendix A, Question A4.7) whether people would be willing to pay for power if service was more reliable and extended to reach more areas that request them. Every villager gave a positive response to this question. In most cases they went further, by reminding me that they already spend a lot of money on diesel fuel to power their generators and charge their phones. Provided the service allows them to reduce how much they spend on fuel, paying for the service would not be a problem, they said. This response was not surprising because until arrival of the project, as noted, villagers were accustomed to paying for their energy needs in the form of diesel fuel, kerosene and other sources, such as paying to charge cell phones at kiosks powered by small generators. Experience in other places, as highlighted by Alzola et al. (2009, 2152) and Ellegard, et al. (2004, 1252), suggests that there is willingness to pay for solar power, and that by financing repairs and maintenance, this can extend the useful life of small solar power systems. It seems clear that the project process is a story of missed opportunities to provide enduring benefit to rural inhabitants. First, project planners failed to recognize the key role to be played by villagers if the project was to be sustainable. Second, by not including villagers in all planning aspects of the project, planners failed to identify core needs of the localities. This may explain why, despite the large sums spent on the project, villagers insist that it has not contributed to alleviation of their problems. Finally, planners did not seem to have a proper grasp

39 of the challenges associated with remotely maintaining a technology system like the solar installation (i.e., depending on technicians to come out from Lagos to conduct repairs). This is clear in the contract between the LAMOST and its technical partners, which did not include training for any local people, nor a continuing service contract for operations and maintenance. Beyond the matter of its general perspective on the role of government as supplier of services, there are several plausible explanations for the LAMOSTs approach to the project. One could be that as an entity of the Lagos State government, the LAMOST is not equipped with personnel and other components to administer projects of this type. An electricity supplier might be more attuned to solar power needs than a science and technology organization. Another factor may be that the LAMOSTs technical partners, qualified engineers with adequate skills to handle technology aspects of the project, were not equipped with skills or knowledge about the importance of local capacity building in such projects. Once the solar installations were installed and running, everyone thought the job was done. Of course, the job was complete from an installation perspective. But from a capacity building and sustainability perspective, the job had not yet started. Indeed, missteps in planning and implementation became root causes of ongoing difficulties in system operation.

2.5

Sustainability As noted, the solar installations have not functioned well since they started, and they have

not met original expectations, at least not those of villagers at the sites. Certainly, it was easy for me to see the state of the systems during my visits. In only one of the six villages visited, Mosorigogo, was the system functioning. To have a better sense of whether this was a one-off

40 situation or a more systemic issue, I asked villagers (see Appendix A, Question A5.1) about the frequency and duration of breakdowns. Most respondents reported that their systems broke down often, and that it normally took at least 2 months to get technicians to come and repair them. The situation I found when I visited the villages, in other words, was typical. I then inquired about whether villagers and leaders understood the steps they needed to take to have the solar systems repaired in case of breakdown. Earlier conversations with the LAMOST project director and project installer, Mr. Adeniji and Mr. Oruwariye respectively, had revealed the maintenance procedures and agreements between these two parties. In the event of breakdown, villagers were supposed to contact a LAMOST representative to report the matter. In turn, the LAMOST representatives were supposed to contact the technical installers, who would then go to the village to fix the problem. Villagers confirmed that they understood and followed this procedure (see Appendix A, Question A5.1). Wanting to understand why villagers could not contact the installers directly, I asked Mr. Adeniji why there was no permanent maintenance contract in place with the installers to supply repair services as needed. Mr. Adeniji explained that there is lack of trust between his office (LAMOST) and the installers. He noted that it is common for contractors to bill the government for repairs that they fabricate or that they never carry out. For this reason, he continued, the government decided to empower villagers with the responsibility for initiating maintenance or repair requests. He did acknowledge that this arrangement might not be the most effective approach, for two reasons. One is that the LAMOST does not have capability to carry out repairs and is therefore dependent on technical partners. The other reason is that technical partners will travel to villages only at their convenience, which may explain the long response time.

41 So, apparent administrative inefficiency is powered in this case by mistrust between two key stakeholders, one with the power of the purse and the other with the power of technical knowhow. Given that villagers were not involved in tangible ways in any key aspects of the project, they are caught between two actors and have no option but to wait for repairs. In Ijih, for instance, villagers report that the system functioned for 6 months in 2008, but not since. Reflecting on the acceptability of renewable energy technologies in less developed parts of the world, Mulugetta (2008, 1441) suggests that a sustainable project must focus on four vital elements: creating local acceptance of new technology, creating sustainability through technical self-reliance at the local level, creation of employment opportunities, and speedy response to technical problems. To have such foci, however, project planners would have to recognize the importance of the beneficiary in assuring sustainability and then build the elements into the undertaking at a projects initial stages. This did not happen in the solar project. Villagers were not involved in any key decisions including, most importantly, determining how the project would help them with the challenges they face. More tangibly, one could suggest that villagers were not incorporated into decision making because there was no adequate effort at building community awareness and acceptance, no adequate effort at local technical capacity development, no local training, and finally no operations and maintenance agreement among stakeholders to assure functioning of the systems. In other words, though the State Government announced such at the start of the project, no one wanted or asked for broad-based participation. From a financial sustainability perspective, recall that the LSEPP was not implemented with financial or economic return in mind. The political deciders in place at the time deemed it a

42 social responsibility to provide electrical power. Given the exorbitant cost of extending the grid to the villages, they accepted solar generation as a viable alternative. In these circumstances, and given that both government and villagers assume that it is the responsibility of government to provide electricity, it is not evident that the LSEPP can be financially sustainable. There is no formal operations and maintenance agreement in place, hence no budget set aside for such. Further, the project depends on the goodwill of the incumbent political class, meaning that when State political power passes to others, there is risk that new deciders will not be as interested in continuing to finance a dysfunctional project inherited from predecessors. And there is no tangible benefit. There would be if continuous power allowed pumps to deliver potable water from deep wells, but there is no power for the pumps when the LSEPP is down for want of repair. It seems reasonable to suggest here that the LAMOST project designers did not have capacity for project sustainability in mind when they designed and implemented the LSEPP. As mentioned earlier, several reasons could be responsible for this, a key one being that LAMOST was not equipped, from capacity development perspectives, to handle such projects. Coupled with the top-down approach of project efforts, the technical partners, also not equipped with capacity development awareness, had no choice but to follow LAMOST as to how the project was to be implemented. Villagers were just happy that government was gifting with an advanced system that promised to make life a bit easier - something that government was supposed to do anyway. Like similar projects elsewhere, the LSEPP is now just a remnant of what was once a proud symbol of rural development powered by the sun.

43 2.6 Observations The project fully succeeded in achieving the explicit goals set for it by the Lagos State government, for a time. Among other things, it provided solar power to illuminate roads and pathways in the villages. It provided village community halls with solar-powered televisions and radio sets. It provided solar-powered pumps to deliver potable drinkable water. Although not consulted on whether these things reflected their priority needs, villagers welcomed the improvements, especially the water. At least for the durations that the systems were in operation, the government also derived political benefits of seeming to at long last do something for rural people, which interviewees confirmed was something, perhaps because of its rarity, that they truly appreciated. Government did indeed have peoples interests in mind, from time to time. But are these accomplishments the measure of project success? Joy Morgenstern (2002, 130), does not think so. In her work on evaluation of renewable energy projects, she argues that social benefits, those that cannot be readily or fully expressed in financial terms, are central to judgment. Thus, making potable water available to reduce water borne illness and subsequent health expenditures is an especially important gain in rural settings. However, such gains have to be durable to count as meaningful social benefit. More formally, Morgenstern (2002) defines success of rural electrification efforts as a project that not only achieved the intended objectives but also will be able to provide that which is intended for a prolonged period of time. Success, in other words, requires that project benefits endure, and therefore that a project be sustained. And to be sustainable, a project must develop local capacity to maintain itself. In that vein, Morgenstern (2002) identifies three measurement categories by which to assess projects status in relation to its intended goals; technical, financial and economic, and socio-cultural (Table 2.5).

44 Table 2.5. Project Evaluation Categories and Criteria (adapted from Morgenstern, 2002)

Measurement Category Technical Financial and Economic Socio-cultural

Success Criteria

The system must work properly it must provide the designed level of services and the generating unit must operate at the designed capacity. The equipment must not experience recurring breakdowns. The project must be designed to provide sufficient, ongoing operations and maintenance provisions The project must be financially sound; it must show evidence that there is and will continue to be sufficient income to cover its ongoing cost. The project must not depend on unreasonable subsidies; in particular it should not depend on ongoing subsidies unless there is sound reason to believe they will continue in the future. The project should result in tangible (though not necessarily quantifiable) net economic benefit. The project should meet the needs of the community. The project should have an equitable impact within the community The project should not conflict with the communitys values of beliefs.

With regard to the solar project, the technical category asks: Is the solar equipment functioning properly? To be seen as functioning properly, it should satisfy the three criteria shown in Table 2.5, i.e., must work as designed, not have recurring technical problems, and have sufficient operations and maintenance provisions to assure timely repair and replacement. Set against these criteria, as I highlight in Table 2.6, the technical component of the solar project clearly is not working properly. It has recurring problems with Inverters, a vital piece of equipment, and does not have operations and maintenance provisions. One important reason that inverter and other pieces fail is likely the absence of operations and maintenance provisions.

45 Failures are interdependent. Success in one dimension of the project depends on success in others. Table 2.6. Evaluation Categories and Criteria Applied to the LAMOST project

Villages PROJECT CATEGORY Bishop Kodji no no Sagbo Kodji no no Obada no no Agbojedo no no Mosorigogo yes yes Ijih no no

Technical

Financial/Economic

Socio-Cultural

Working as designed No recurring technical problems Sufficient operations and maintenance Financially sound No unreasonabl e subsidies Shows evidence of economic benefit Meets the needs of the community Equitable impact within the community No conflicts with local values or beliefs

no

no

no

no

no

no

no no

no no

no no

no no

no no

no no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

The financial/economic category asks whether arrangements are in place to assure continuous financing of critical project elements, such as operations and maintenance. Criteria here hinges on whether a project is financially sound (must show evidence that there is and will

46 continue to be sufficient income to cover ongoing costs), does not depend on unreasonable subsidies, and produces tangible (though not necessarily quantifiable) net economic benefit. Concerning the LSEPP, the State government did provide adequately for capital costs, $63,300 per village. Unclear is whether this financial commitment will continue. Because there are no formal operations and maintenance provisions or associated budgets at the State level, it is difficult to see where regular maintenance and repairs can come from (i.e., rather than ad hoc crisis responses). There is no local financing mechanism in place either. There is no pool of resources at any level available to pay the installers to come out immediately when needed. This arrangement is not consistent with sustainability needs. On the matter of tangible economic benefit, success is measured by whether there are benefits from using project services, in this case electricity. Clearly, there are number of private (e.g. charging stations) and public (e.g., potable water, entertainment) benefits when the project functions, so success here is a function of technical success, which is in turn a function of financial success. And since the latter two categories are not successful, the same goes for economic benefit. There is finally the socio-cultural category, which may be the most important justification for the project because the LAMOST initiated it to improve social welfare. Here success criteria are measured by the extent to which the project meets priority needs of the community, whether its impact is equitable, and whether it conflicts with community values and beliefs. Unfortunately, it is difficult to judge the project on this category. Leaving aside the issue of non-functioning systems, the problem here is that there was no effort made at any time by anybody to ask villagers and leaders to identify priority needs, concepts of fairness or sensitive

47 values and beliefs. If project planners had made such inquiries, then maybe they would have determined the extent to which the villagers believed that they needed electricity. This seems important. As I note in Appendix A Question 4.1, across all visited sites electricity came after potable water, schools and medical facilities in the rankings of village priorities. This should not surprise. In Sagbo Kodji, for example, more than 85 percent of residents own diesel generators. For them, the addition of public power for public use may be nice for the community as whole, but it provides little private gain. A robust, solar-powered pump and pipes to convey stored well water to community standpipes, by contrast, would likely have registered as an important benefit for everybody, and perhaps one worth fighting to sustain. I ask myself many questions in response to what I saw and heard during my visits to LAMOST, the installer firms and the villages. They all turn on wondering how things could have been arranged differently at the start so that the project would by now be demonstrating a capacity to sustain itself technically and financially, and be using solar power to address high priority village needs. On this, the research literature provides no shortage of suggestions, many of which I review in Chapter 1. Beyond printed words, however, I wondered what a project able to sustain itself might look like in real life if it traced a capacity development process similar to what the literature points to. In the event, I discovered one nearby; the Texas Solar for Schools Program (TSSP). It has a lot to tell and to teach about how to establish durable solar energy installations. I detail these things in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3 THE TEXAS SOLAR FOR SCHOOLS PROGRAM (TSSP) The State of Texas, with a population of about 25 million people in 2010 (US Census 2010), is a leader in production and consumption of energy. The State currently consumes about 12 percent of all energy used in the United States (TRERA 2008), and forecasts suggest that energy demand will grow from 11.6 quadrillion Btus/yr today to 15.2 quadrillion Btus/yr (31 percent increase) by 2025 (TEPC 2005). Demand for electricity by industrial, transportation, residential and commercial users, which accounted for more than 30 percent of total energy use in 2005, is growing faster than all other types of energy service. Texas produces more oil and natural gas than any other state, supplying more than 25 percent of U.S. natural gas demand, almost 20 percent of oil production, and 31 percent of all refined products. At the same time, Texas holds a very large share of the nations renewable energy resources. Some even claim that among the 48 contiguous states, Texas has the highest potential for generating energy from its solar, wind, biomass and geothermal resources (TRERA, 2008). Despite the abundance of petroleum resources, policy makers in the state appear to have recognized that oil and gas alone cannot supply energy requirements indefinitely. At the same time, rising national concerns about overreliance on fossil energy, foreign sources, future cost and availability, and environmental impacts such as climate change, have nudged the state away from fossil fuels to raise interest in and develop its renewable energy resources. An early step in

48

49 this direction was establishment of the State Energy Conservation Office (SECO) in 1987. Another was SECOs launching, in 1997, of the Infinite Power of Texas Renewable Energy Educational Campaign, designed to accelerate acceptance of renewable energy resources in Texas. The campaign promotes use of renewable energy and sustainable building practices through demonstration, instruction and general education on the benefits of renewable energy. The need for such a campaign, as detailed in TRERA (2008), stemmed from SECOs identification of several barriers to development of renewable sources. These include weak information dissemination and low consumer awareness, inadequate workforce skills and training to support new technology, poor public image of renewable energy aesthetics (i.e., of solar panels, windmills, etc.) and absence of community participation and committed stakeholders in the making of energy choices and participating in renewable energy projects. Among other initiatives to overcome some of these constraints on development of renewable energy sources, SECO collaborated with the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA), a conservation and reclamation district that provides electricity and other services in Central Texas, to initiate the Texas Solar for Schools Program (TSSP) in 2001. TSSPs purpose was to raise public awareness through demonstration, skill training and general education about installation and utilization of photovoltaic sources of electric power generation. I describe the history and characteristics of the TSSP in what follows, and then present an analysis of how the project process complemented its road to sustainability.

50 3.1 History and Characteristics The TSSPs approach to raising public awareness was to some extent shaped by a parallel 10-year effort that started two years earlier: the Watts on Schools (WOS) program funded by American Electric Power (AEP), a large electricity generator. AEP launched the WOS program in partnership with 16 Texas and 3 Louisiana and Arkansas schools in 1999. Through a contractor, Conservation Services Group (CSG), it financed, designed, owned and operated the school solar systems for a decade. Objectives of the program were to provide solar educational tools for students in grades K-12, monitor performance of the solar electric systems, and present performance data on an interactive website (Hoffner et al. 2010). That is, the purpose, more or less the same as that of the TSSP, was to increase public awareness of solar energy utilization through education. At the end of the lease term, in 2009, CSG offered each school a choice of keeping the system, with ownership transferred to the school district, or having the system removed. Eight elected to keep their systems. Among the lessons learned over the WOS decade, one was that flawless system operation is hard to achieve. Most systems encounter multiple failures, some due to human error and others due to part failures. More local training and responsibility could prevent some of these, as schools were not required to maintain the systems (Hoffner et al. 2002). Another lesson was that solar installations have little public education value when not visible (e.g., on rooftops). They should be in prominent, visible locations. In addition, education programs need to be sustainable and self-supporting, suggesting need for coordination with local educational non-profits to provide continuous flows of updated information. And it is better to develop educational tools in

51 coordination with school districts, rather than independently, to assure ready incorporation into the classroom. The TSSP took these lessons to heart while the WOS program evolved. It made schools the owners of their systems at the outset and the prime purveyors of educational content. It contracted with technical partners, such as Meridian Energy Systems, to not only design and install the systems in highly visible locations, but also to train local maintenance staff on routine operations and maintenance. And it launched the program in phases, rather than all at once, so that accumulating experience could inform subsequent phases. In action, the TSSP built small solar energy systems, such as illustrated in Figure 3.1, and provided associated educational tools to school districts in fourteen rural communities. Implemented in phases, each school received a 1 kW to 3 kW solar panel system, a web-based monitoring system, and other hands-on learning materials. To broaden the projects base, SECO solicited support of local utility companies, and secured buy-ins from students and teachers. For example, students were encouraged to participate during system installation, and monitoring systems, as in the WOS, allow teachers and students to compare their solar energy production with that of other schools. Main stakeholders in the TSSP are SECO, LCRA, schools, districts and the communities they serve, local PV technology suppliers, and local utility providers. According to Pam Groce of SECO, the TSSP went on concurrent to other projects that enhanced their ability to provide the educational component (Groce 2010) That is, SECO understood that it needed to develop human capacity at the local level to manage the installations, and, recognized at the outset that

52 developing an educational component for the project was critical to project success and sustainability.

Figure 3.1. Completed Solar Panel System at a Texas High School

That understanding underwrote the TSSPs now well-documented success, and the delivery methods adopted by the LCRA earned it the prestigious 2007 Innovation Award given by the Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC), a non-profit organization that attempts to create renewable energy programs and policies targeted at the adoption of uniform guidelines, standards and quality assessment. As noted, the project was implemented in several phases (see Appendix D for list of schools in each phase). Phases 1 and 2 required participating schools to provide cost share for the installation of technological components of the system. In an attempt to improve community

53 participation and awareness, which were quite low in the initial phases, SECO introduced changes for Phase 3. It now provided cost share funds, and LCRA worked with its wholesale electricity customers to guarantee community participation and support for each school. Phase 4 saw more effort on the part of SECO and LCRA to increase public awareness. For example, in collaboration with Austin Energy (AE), a community-owned electric utility that serves the City of Austin, Travis County and a portion of Williamson County, the project installed 10 systems in schools within AEs service area. Key changes in this phase included a requirement for participating schools, before receiving systems from AE, to submit applications describing their commitment to solar technology. Clearly, through its various phases the project was a learning exercise, allowing shortcomings that appeared at each stage to inform design of the next, most notably with regard to knowledge acquisition by all concerned of what needed learning in order to make the solar systems sustainable. Every installation now includes data collection capabilities and fully integrates solar photovoltaic education elements into student lesson plans. Although intended for very different purposes than the project in Lagos (but not that different from the SELF undertaking in South Africa), the apparent success of the TSSP makes it a suitable contrast to help understand what should and should not have happened in Nigeria, as well as what could and could not happen, to make the LSEPP sustainable.

3.2

Analysis A fundamental thing that distinguishes the LSEPP and TSSP projects is that the first has

tried to deliver solar electricity, while the second has tried to deliver knowledge about solar

54 electricity. Although these purposes seem different, they really represent two ways of trying to reach the same goal. The difference is that the LSEPP plunged to production without preparation. The TSSP, seeing preparation as a means of one day getting to sustainable production, has focused on that. It is a reasonable focus because there are many obstacles to overcome, including limited information dissemination and consumer awareness, inadequate workforce skills and training to support the technology, low regard by the public for renewable energy system aesthetics, and lack of stakeholder/community participation in energy choices. Overshadowing everything, of course, is price competition with conventional and better-understood energy technologies that benefit from economies of scale. Accordingly, the TSSP approach has been to build learning and training environment around the technology, assure that the technology is robust, and buttress the technology with clear operations and maintenance provisions. Unlike the LSEPP case where it has to do with maintaining solar power supply, sustainability for TSSP has to do with maintaining flows of knowledge about solar power. The apparent wisdom here is that in order for instruction to be continuous, the object of instruction, the solar electricity system, must also be continuous. This interdependency does not assure sustainability, but it may make achievement of objectives more manageable. Playing different roles in helping (or hindering) goal achievement, the TSSP has five major stakeholder groups: SECO, LCRA, technology installers, wholesale electricity customers and newspapers, and the solar technology recipients, schools. Table 3.1 summarizes their respective interests and expectations, resources available to them, their capability to mobilize resources, and their position with regard to solar electrification.

55

Table 3.1. TSSP Stakeholder Interests, Resources and Position on Solar Electrification

GROUP

INTEREST / EXPECTATIONS IN SOLAR ELECTRIFICATION

RESOURCES

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION CAPACITY

POSITION ON SOLAR PV ELECTRIFICATION

The State Energy To raise awareness about Conservation Office renewable energy in Texas, (SECO) collaborates with LCRA to operationalize the TSSP and deliver on its core objectives

Skills and experience Very high in promoting and Project planners and operationalizing overall supervisors. environment-friendly energy technologies. Promoting renewable sources of energy is a strategic objective of SECO Very high. Project owners and initiators

Favor Viewed as a technology that is growing but yet to compete with conventional sources

The Lower Colorado To raise awareness about Policy and financial River Authority renewable energy in Central instruments (LCRA) Texas

Favor Viewed as a technology that is growing but yet to compete with conventional sources. Favor Financially motivated. Positioning of the company for future contracts Slightly Favor

Meridian Energy Systems (and other installers)

Technical partners and Engineering project installers. Deliver on knowledge required system design in a timely manner To support the objective of promoting the use of renewable energy as part of total energy mix Knowledge of , and access to customers in the communities, thus the capability to promote solar PV use; Financial support

High For profit organization

Local wholesale electricity customers and newspapers (sponsors)

Medium-High

While PV is not yet a The approach is still of waitviable replacement for and-see. PV technology is conventional sources for yet to be cost-effective electricity generation, enough to replace or display local wholesalers continue existing technology to contribute to its promotion as the technology gains grounds.

PV Technology Enlighten students on use of Location for PV High Indifferent Recipients (schools) solar-PV technology and equipments; Students develop instruction curricula and teachers (agents of The schools were willing Strictly a learning and participants. awareness-raising effort at for classroom use change) this time

Unlike the LSEPP, where the Lagos State government commanded ultimate power and influence, stakeholders that make up the TSSP all have important contributions and wield balanced influence on the effort. The SECO and LCRA, project initiators, had a clear idea of

56 what they wanted to achieve with the TSSP and, borrowing from WOS and other experiences, seemed to understand how to go about reaching those objectives. From the onset, TSSP planners recognized that it was important to identify and solicit support of all stakeholders. They did this by identifying desired contributions from each stakeholder group and then geared efforts to assure that the promised contributions were made. They solicited support of local utility companies and secured buy-ins from students and teachers. Such buy-ins were achieved, for example, by encouraging students and teachers to participate in system installation. Not only did students participate during system installation, planners also made monitoring systems available to allow teachers and students to compare their solar energy production with other schools. By doing this early on (together with other, concurrent activities), the TSSP has been able to elicit abiding interest and sustainability after installation. SECO also recognized that developing an educational component was essential to developing human capacity to sustain the technology. One of the first things it did in this regard was to elicit active involvement of more than 200 teachers. A first step in doing this was to train them. During pre-installation, for instance, the TSSP arranged an assessment of solar technology awareness among prospective teachers. This effort included distribution of a 20-question survey instrument to math and science teachers in the participating schools (Mougne 2010). According to Ti Mougne (2010) of the LCRA, the survey was intended to give planners a better idea of what the teachers already know about solar energy prior to implementation of the TSSP. The survey was an important exercise because, by immediately bringing teachers on board the project and testing their understanding, planners could design appropriate teacher learning programs. They recognized that teachers were critical to achieving project objectives.

57 After testing knowledge among teachers the project ran workshops - concurrent with system installation so that teachers could observe firsthand what was discussed about in the classroom on solar energy and systems and on how to incorporate solar knowledge and use within existing curricula. Then there was a post-installation survey. It gave planners a sense of what teachers knew about solar energy. The before-after comparison of answers showed an overall increase in basic technological knowledge of renewable systems and their applications. To sense how the TSSP functioned at the local level, I used the script shown in Appendix C to interview two teachers from Brenham Middle School and La Grange Intermediate School, and an official from the Utopia School ISD. Among the interesting details that they mentioned, not available in project documents, is that there were extra rewards for exceptional levels of local involvement. Brenham Middle School, for example, received a second solar installation from the LCRA because of its efforts in system maintenance. The school utilized its own maintenance staff for continuous maintenance of the solar farm, at a level far above what its operations and maintenance agreement with the LCRA provided for. Also of interest at Brenham Middle School was the way in which the TSSP project could tap into pre-existing educational interest. The schools curriculum included coverage of the usefulness and utilization of energy from renewable sources long before the project. Arrival of the TSSP allowed students to at last observe a real system and helped them to make better sense of what they were already learning in the classroom (Oerli 2011). And there was the matter of system status. None of the systems at the three schools had ever suffered a major breakdown, though on-line monitoring systems did fail briefly in two schools. Interviewees supposed that one reason for this durability reflected the experience and

58 sophistication of project planners and installers. Another factor was the existence of operations and maintenance provisions ensuring that technical glitches, when they arose, were addressed quickly. A third factor was the ability of school personnel, after training, to perform regular maintenance that helped to prevent big breakdowns from happening. So, from the perspective of at least three local stakeholders, the TSSP has been exceptionally useful, successful and, to date, sustainable. Standing back, it may be useful here to look at the stakeholder landscape of the TSSP, comprising the three main groups associated with targeted capacity development: individual, organizational, and the overarching environment (Table 3.2), and examine their interactions in relation to capacity development and sustainability. The individual level in the TSSP comprises students, teachers, and local communities. At first glance, it seems obvious that the main target for capacity development efforts should be at this level. This is probably correct if one considers that most workshops and trainings during the TSSP process were targeted at groups at this level. But the larger picture is that learning curves in new technologies, such as solar electricity, imply that every element at each of the three levels depicted in Table 3.2, are change agents. To overcome barriers to sustainable adoption and use of solar technology, which is the basic purpose of the TSSP, all agents, be it individuals or organizations, must engage a mix of learning activities so that trained human resources are available at all levels to help design and implement renewable energy actions. This seems crucial to project sustainability because, as Adam and Urquhart (2009, 2) note: even when all efforts have equal access to technology, the mismatch between skills and knowledge, and the efficient and effective deployment and integration of

59 skills and knowledge with technology, will determine productivity in the development efforts. Table 3.2. Efforts and Contributions from TSSP Stakeholders at Different Capacity Development Levels

Target for Capacity Development

Stakeholders Involved

Process Examples

Students participated during the installation phase Individual Level Students, teachers, and the local community Teachers and students are involved with power-generation monitoring The local community involvement encouraged by the students, teachers, and LCRA (by tapping into the pool local utility consumers The project and the process approach utilized by SECO allowed for organizational capacity development as innovations and amendments were always needed to fulfill contract obligations Local utility providers and equipment manufacturers learn firsthand the processes involved in project delivery for renewable energy technologies This is the broader system within which individuals and organizations function, and one that facilitates or hampers their performance. SECO and LCRA are able to put policies and legislation in place They are able to navigate the necessary power relations with other stakeholders. These power relations govern the mandates, priorities, and modes of operation

Organization Level

SECO, Schools, LCRA, Local Utility Providers, Equipment manufacturers

Enabling Environment

Local community, State organizations (SECO, LCRA)

Inclusion of pre-installation assessment, and allowing training workshops and installations to run concurrently so that targeted recipients could see firsthand what was being learned suggests that TSSP planners recognized this requirement. At the organizational level, the TSSP is made up mostly of government entities (SECO, school districts, LCRA), local utility providers, and the technology installers. The SECO and

60 LCRA, unlike the LAMOST, have mandates for resource conservation and all things attendant to that. So promoting projects that reduce reliance on hydrocarbon energy sources and that contribute to reduction of pollutants is part of their strategic objectives. Their motivations to have the TSSP succeed are therefore quite high. That SECO and LCRA can mobilize substantial financial and human resources to reach their objectives is a very important plus. This made it relatively easy for the LCRA to contract with technology partners to do the installations, such as Meridian Energy Systems, which designed and installed all systems during Phase 2. That contract, according to LCRAs Ti Mougne, was awarded to Meridian Energy because of its quality and approach of system design to meet technical specifications requirements. The emphasis on technological knowhow was important because, even though the TSSP seeks to raise awareness about solar electricity, sustainable realization of this objective depends on reliability of the subject technology. For this kind of project to succeed, the technology partner must be good at what it does. Then there is the enabling environment comprising the government entities (SECO and LCRA), local communities and the political culture in which they both function. In that culture, SECO and LCRA have been able to press for supportive policies and legislation, and to navigate power relations with other stakeholders that govern the mandates, priorities and modes of operation of all entities involved in the TSSP. Of course, projects do not design their own enabling environments. In this sense, the environment matters to the extent that it has allowed the TSSP to do what it has done over the years. It will be a while yet before political culture produces a comparable environment in Nigeria.

CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION The literature suggests that successful projects are those that undertake several fundamental activities. These include pre-assessment, partnership development and community relations. Projects that incorporate pre-installation actions can help assure that communities and civic leaders are involved in decisions that contribute to development of local capacities necessary for sustainability. In retrospect, I imagine that such capacity building in LSEPP might have included: Selection of a local project committee tasked with bridging the gap between villagers and outsiders (e.g., LAMOST representatives and technology installers). The committee then guides and advises on actions needed to encourage broad participation of village residents, which then builds ownership pride, a key ingredient to capacity building and project sustainability. Organization of community meetings to establish partnerships and develop sound community relations. These meetings would allow outsiders to gain better understanding of priority needs of intended beneficiaries and then focus the project to address these needs. Inclusion of villagers at this point might encourage their full support, further increasing their sense of project ownership. Selection of project sites that emerge from community relations efforts and, more important, design of project types based on local knowledge of local needs.

61

62

The fact that the LAMOST did none of these things does not reflect ignorance or disinterest by state government deciders in what the literature has to offer. They are, by my reckoning, quite familiar with what needs doing to encourage participation in the project process. It is not a matter of lack of pertinent administrative ideas. The constraint lies in the political culture of Nigeria, where a statist understanding of and approach to modern governance inherited from colonial administration and refined over decades by military-authoritarian rule has anchored itself deeply in the minds of both governors and the governed. In this culture, participation is not valued for its utility in helping to make projects sustainable, let alone for its own sake, because that is the states job. This culture is hard to change in the short run. By extension, the goal of establishing sustainable solar or other renewable energy projects will also take time to achieve. Nigerias newfound embrace of participatory democracy and attendant politics may help. Until then, one can continue to look at models of what actual sustainable solar projects look like, and from them perhaps draw lessons that, applied to places like Nigeria, can one day make a difference. The model I chose to look at for the present research is the TSSP. Otoo, Agapitova and Behrens (2009, 3) have useful things to say with regard to projects like it. They see human capacity development as part of a locally driven process of learning by leaders, coalitions and other agents of change that brings about changes in sociopolitical, policy-related, and organizational factors to enhance local ownership for and the effectiveness and efficiency of efforts to achieve a goal. They underscore that the capacity development process is driven primarily by changes in how knowledge and information are applied at various levels of a

63 society that is, by learning (15). If one views human capacity development and learning in these ways, as I do, then it is clear that individuals and organizations involved with the TSSP have engaged the process described. In so doing, they have demonstrated the tangible worth of both its approach and the soundness of Otoo, Agapitova and Behrens observations. Things seemed to work in the TSSP because it engaged in what is supposed to work. That is perhaps why, as testimony to its effective and efficient use of resources, the TSSP earned the prestigious 2007 Innovation Award given by the Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC 2007). Likewise, in their investigation of capacity building projects, Lamoree and Harlin (2002, 545) posit that successful capacity building follows a process approach with three distinguishable components: human talent development, organization and resources, and institutional development. The human talent development component calls for a process approach to training that starts from the person that needs to be trained to be able to perform his or her duties in the institution, and is contextual and individually tailored. An example in the TSSP was the pre-installation survey of the teachers to measure their knowledge of solar technology. With this information, project planners were able to design training workshops that focused on teacher knowledge gains necessary for the project to succeed. Training was not a workshop. It was a process of learning. On the organization and resources component, Lamoree and Harlin (2002) contend that this is the level at which sustainability is addressed, forming the enabling environment for project performance. Sustainability elements at this level include: sustainable human resources: staff are adequately trained and allocated and can be retained or substituted.

64 sustainable information resources: there is continuous and timely access to information it needed in terms of quality and quantity. sustainable technological resources: the right equipment is in place, available, and maintained and upgraded over time. sustainable financial resources: the project has continued access to adequate finances to perform its functions. The foregoing seemed to be present in every aspect of the TSSP effort. One reason, obviously, is that state institutions have had more time to evolve in the United States than in places such as Nigeria, function more efficiently as a result, and benefit from organized and time-tested approaches to project design and implementation. In addition, stakeholders in projects such as the TSSP have precedent examples to learn from, such as the WOS project, and better access to qualified technological partners, such as Meridian Energy. All these factors combine to make projects like the TSSP a seamless stream of complementary actions. Then there is the institutional component. Here Lamoree and Harlin (2002) posit that application of a process approach to development must originate from recognition that institutional development processes are essentially stakeholder driven, involving decisionmaking processes by the stakeholders (256). This means that a process approach encourages stakeholder decision-making. That is, the process of information provision, discussion, and involvement of stakeholders to create awareness eventually yields commitments for decisions that need making in order to procreate institutional changes. All these characteristics were in evidence in the TSSP effort. Thus the research literature, if one chooses to view the TSSP as an empirical basis to test hypotheses, does a decent job of capturing what ought to be done. That

65 same literature also underscores that what ought to be done may take a long time to spread across places such as Nigeria. But maybe not that long. Africa is a heterogeneous space that contains, in addition to less favorable examples such as the LSEPP, a non-negligible number of positive examples. One such comprises projects implemented by the Solar Electric Light Fund (SELF), a non-profit organization based in the United States that develops and facilitates solar electrification and energy self-sufficiency in African and other countries, often with financial support of international aid organizations. In South Africa, its Solar Rural Schools Project aims at improving educational quality at a cluster of participating schools, thereby broadening the perspectives of the students and the community (SELF 2009). Although there are other objectives, education is the main one in the South Africa project. Unlike the LSEPP, the project did not focus on installing solar technology just to generate electricity. Rather, SELF project planners had well-defined objectives that electricity generated from solar panels were supposed to facilitate. Accordingly, they first identified priority needs in planned project areas consistent with an objective that was to bring the rural communities into contact with the rest of the world and the surrounding communities (SELF 2009, 3). From initial needs assessment, project planners learned that half the schools in South Africa cannot use information and communications technology. Even when such equipment is available, they are useless without constant supply of electricity. Understanding of interdependence, lacking in LSEPP effort, was clearly in evidence here. The purpose of bringing solar energy to schools was to make information and communications technology useable so that broadening perspectives of students and community

66 might occur. For these things to take place in a meaningful way, solar power had to be sustainable from the outset. Narrowing a bit, SELF designated a particular focus of its communications technology effort to be establishment of a substantial computer lab connected to the Internet that would be integrated at additional schools with mobile, Internet-enabled computing facilities for use in regular classes (SELF 2009, 4). For this, project designers drew from lessons learned in previous school electrification efforts in rural areas elsewhere in southern Africa where inhabitants lacked food and water, medical care, and education. Designers knew that they had to divide project activities into two key phases. The first comprised needs assessment, partnership development, community relations, installation design, training, project infrastructure development and construction, and the second comprised project monitoring, maintenance, training, research and innovation. The first phase seemed critical because all activities were directly pertinent to sustainability. They speak directly to involvement of project beneficiaries and to the importance of their buy-in and contribution to a sustainable project. SELF planners call these people primary elements of a successful project (SELF 2009). It was crucial to engage local partners and to develop strong community networks. Engagement was not easy. For example, in a project at Zwelenqaba Senior Secondary School in the Cape Province, South Africa, it took the SELF planners one year to become sufficiently networked in the local community and with local providers, and several more months to establish enough trust and contacts in the community before being in position to explain the project (SELF 2009, 16). After that, actual implementation took less than 90 days about the

67 same amount of time that the LSEPP consumed from start to finish. Today, SELFs main challenge is not technical sustainability. Rather, it is to find ways to reduce the time required to develop community networks so that tangible project components can start sooner in the implementation process. What I write about SELF, extracted from its own progress reports that may be selfserving, is a story about an experienced organization from the United States (i.e., benefitting from the same advantages as the TSSP) that installs solar energy projects for purposes other than simply providing electricity. The important aspect, I believe, is that similar projects as the SELF project dot the African landscape. They provide useful examples for others to emulate if they choose to do so. The presence of positive examples like SELF guarantees nothing, of course. The organization has been active in Jigawa State, in Northern Nigeria, since 2001, doing things similar to what I describe here (SELF 2001). Those projects do not seem to have influenced the

LSEPP. Also, there are no data available to indicate whether SELF projects sustained themselves after its personnel left. Still, they exist and can present valuable lessons to aid better approaches to future rural energy development projects, and with them, the what ought to be done that I mentioned in previous paragraphs may take a bit less time to come to spread across rural areas of places such as Nigeria.

APPENDIX A SURVEY PROCEDURE RESULTS Interviews covered a total of 56 individuals in the six villages, or an average of 9 people per site. I spoke with 16 people in Sagbo Kodji, representing the high end, and with 6 people in Agbojedo, representing the low end. Several factors affected the number of people available in each village. One is population. Bishop Kodji and Sagbo Kodji are the most populous of the villages, and the closest to large urban settlements. Mosorigogo and Obada, on the other hand, are farthest away, requiring a travel time of 4 to5 hours each way, on average. Secondly, Bishop Kodji was the pilot village, which is why it was the first village I visited. Sagbo Kodji is right next to Bishop Kodji, meaning that each time I visited Bishop I was able to visit Sagbo. I visited these two villages four times. I was able to visit Mosorigogo, Agbojedo, and Ijih during the latter period of fieldwork, by which time a clear trend with regards to the characteristics of the project, and the village recipients had been established. 1. Conversations in regard to anything that affects a village in general always began with the traditional leader, called the Baale. 2. On all occasions, the Baale will call others to join him and those called usually included the village secretary. 3. The affairs of the villages, at least with regard to the SEP, are run with a top-down approach. Whatever the Baale and the group of elders or leaders feel is good for the village is what obtains. The opinion of the general populace rarely matters.

68

69 4. The Baale in all the villages were informed about the SEP, but only to the extent of asking for where they wanted the solar farm located. 5. The general populace (except by coincidence), in all cases never knew anything about the SEP until equipment arrived. 6. A post survey of earlier installations never took place, meaning that whatever approach was employed in the earlier projects were repeated in all other projects without substantial adjustment. It is important to note the foregoing points because they played important roles in determining the efforts and approach put into the fieldwork. Knowing full well that all information with regard to the SEP is mostly obtained through the Baale and the leadership did not preclude speaking with ordinary villagers, though it did control the number of people available to talk to. Most of my conversations with village people are therefore informal conversations (as distinct from more formal, documented conversations with leadership) and answers were always the same: we did not know anything about the SEP until people came and started installing equipment. The common approach in all cases was to arrive at the village and request to speak with the Baale. Usually the individual one speaks with first takes one to the village community hall and then sends for the Baale, who on arrival sends for others that will be part of the meeting. I never met the Baale by himself in any of the villages. The prepared set of questions (Appendix B) was selected such that they address three major aspects with regards to the project: history, systems status, and sustainability. While I was able to use the questionnaire as a guide, the ultimate interview approach was informal, more like having a conversation. This unstructured approach, I

70 discovered, was what was comfortable for the respondents. Tables A1 and A2 below summarizes the characteristics of the people I spoke with in each village, along with their occupations, age and gender. Of the 56 people interviewed, only six were female (5%). It is followed by several tables that, in sequence, summarize my survey findings with regard to history of the project, priority village problems reported by villagers and leaders, and their opinions on the status of their solar electric systems. Table A1. Occupations of respondents in the six villages visited.

Villages Occupations of Village respondents Fishermen Farmers /Rice field owner Farmers (banana, produce) Boat Driver Carpenter School Headmaster Teacher Small scale business owner Local Government representative Clergy Man TOTAL Total Bishop Kodji 9 Sagbo Kodji 4 Obada 3 4 5 6 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 Agbojedo Mosorigogo 5 7 Ijih 21 4 7 8 2 1 2 6 4 1 56 % of Total 37.5 7.1 12.5 14.3 3.6 1.8 3.6 10.7 7.1 1.8 100

2 1

2 1 1 8

13

16

10

Table A2. Respondents Ages and Sexes.

Sex Respondent Ages 20 29 30 39 40 49 50 59 60 69 70 - 79 Total % OF TOTAL Male 12 9 20 7 3 2 53 95 Female 2 1 % of Total 21.4 19.7 37.5 12.5 5.4 3.5 56 100

3 5

71

Table A3. Responses to Questions Geared At Establishing the History of the LSEPP
Village Obada

Question
A3.1. Did you know about the solar electricity project before work on it started in the village? (Leadership)

Bishop Kodji

Sagbo Kodji

CDC Secretary

Agbojedo

Mosorigogo

Ijih

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

A3.1 Comment: Village leadership learned about the SEP project when LAMOST representatives approached them to request location options for the solar farms. A3.2. Did you know about the solar electricity project before work on it started in the village? (Ordinary Villagers)

no

no

no

no

no

no

A3.2. Comment: Although village leaders knew something about the project, ordinary villagers learned of it only when consultants appeared to install it. A3.3. To the best of your recollection was there a community meeting or meetings that took place where the SEP was discussed before installation began? (Leadership and Ordinary Villagers)

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

A3.3. Comment: Similar to previous questions, asking in a slightly different way makes clear that there was no effort to make communities aware of project A3.4. Did you or anyone you know in village make a contribution (e.g. suggestion as to how best the SEP can benefit the village) from planning to implementation? (Leadership)

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

A3.4. Comment: Although leadership acknowledged that they were aware of the SEP before installation began, they confirm that their involvement was limited to showing state representatives available land to situate the PV farm. Answers confirm that they were not a part of project planning.

72 Table A4. Responses to Questions Geared At Establishing the Local Challenges to which the LSEPP may contribute a solution
A4.1: What are three biggest problems that this village faces (Leadership) Electricity Schools Roads Farming Assistance Public Security Potable water Toilets Medical facility New Industry Repair Embankment Build Canal Village Bishop Kodji Sagbo Kodji CDC Secretary* Obada Agbojedo ** Mosorigogo Ijih

A4.1. Comment: Questions here suggest what might have been asked of local leaders if their involvement was favored in the SEP process. The responses identify three key challenges common to all villages: schools, potable water and medical facility. Designing solar projects to address these challenges in some way, if possible, would be a key to promoting sustainability. * Amuwo Odofin L.G. ** wanted grid electrification

73 Table A4 continued
Village Bishop Kodji Sagbo Kodji Obada Agbojedo ** (2ndary) 2ndary) Mosorigogo Ijih

A4.2. What are three biggest problems that this village faces (ordinary villagers) Electricity Schools Road Farming Assistance Public Security Potable water Toilets

Medical facility A4.2. Comment: The same question as in A5 asked of ordinary villagers produced the same result as answers by leaders. However, discussion with villagers revealed that easier access to potable water was something they urgently needed, more important than other things. ** high tension

Table A4 Continued Question

A4.3.Do you think the SEP has helped with any of the problems? (leadership and ordinary villagers) Bishop Kodji Sagbo Kodji CDC Secretary* Village Obada Agbojedo Mosorigogo Ijih

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

A4.3. Comment: All respondents feel that the SEP has not helped with any of their problems. A4.4. Why in your opinion has the SEP not helped to solve problems identified? Not connected to enough parts of the village System always breaking down Lack of needed infrastructure, such as borehole for drinkable water Need high-tension (grid-quality) connectivity

74

A4.4. Comment: The project was designed to serve only common areas, not individual homes. This explains why the villagers think the electricity points were too few. Also, the power was meant to run the borehole pump to lift potable water. In the event, the borehole was too shallow and the power supply stopped working. Accordingly, villagers and leaders see no value in the project as delivered. A4.5. Who has the responsibility of providing the village with electricity? Government Individuals Government and Individuals

A4.5. Comment: Respondents believe that it is the responsibility of government to provide them with electricity. Government officials believe the same thing. A4.6. In general, who should pay for the electricity? Government Individuals Government and Individuals A4.6. Comment: The question is similar to A9. It clarifies what respondents mean by responsibility. It shows that villagers expect the government to pay for the electricity as well as supply it.

A4.7. If the electricity can be made to work more consistently and reach more areas in the village, i.e., reach residents that request them, would you be willing to pay a little?

no yes

no yes

no yes

no yes

no yes

no yes

A4.7 Comment: This question was asked mostly of the leadership. They believe that if they can see the consistent benefit of the SEP they would be more than glad to assist the government if asked.

75 Table A5. Responses to Questions Geared at establishing the system status of the LSEPP installation
Village Agbojed o yes

Question
A5.1. Does the SEP ever break down so that there is no electricity for a while? A5.1b. What is the typical duration of breakdown before it is fixed? Less than 1 week 1 4 weeks

Bishop Kodji yes

Sagbo Kodji yes

Obada yes

Mosorigogo yes

Ijih yes

PV Farm Installation Dates 08/2007 02/2008 06/2009 09/2009 06/2010 03/2010

%
0

has worked consistently for 9 months as at 12/4/10 (has not worked since 04/10 (has not worked since 01/10 (has not worked since 05/10 (has not worked since 06/10 Worked for 6 months in 2008. Has not worked since

17

4 8 weeks 8- 16 weeks

0 16

Greater than 4 months

66

A5.1. Comment: The SE has failed to work for more than 4 months 66% of the time. As at the time of the visit the SEP was functioning in only one of the villages visited. When the electricity is not available, it makes it impossible to utilize the power to pump potable water from the provided boreholes.

76
A5.2. When the PV equipments break down how are repairs carried out? Call a local person trained to fix the PV system Call the technicians that installed the PV system Call LAMOST

100

A5.2. Comment: This response was also confirmed by LAMOST representatives and their technical partners. The villagers call LAMOST and wait for someone to come and address the challenge, no matter how little. This takes a while because LAMOST will have to call the technical partners. LAMSOT is not equipped to handle any of the technology elements of the SEP.

Table A6. Responses to Questions Geared at establishing the sustainability elements within the LSEPP
Village Agboje do

Question

Bishop Kodji

Sagbo Kodji

Obada

Mosorigo go

Ijih

A6.1: Separate from the times the SEP equipments breakdown, how often does the technicians/government officials pay visits to the village to check how well the equipments are functioning? Often Rarely Never 100

A6.1 Comment: This is to inform on whether there is an Operations and Maintenance (O&M) agreement in place. That there is no such is confirmed by LAMOSTs technical partners. A6.2: Is there any designated individual or group in the village tasked with the responsibility of providing ongoing support (technical or otherwise) for the SEP equipments? Yes No 0 100

A6.2 Comment: This is also to inform on whether there is an Operations and Maintenance (O&M) agreement in place. For an O & M to be in place, at least an individual in the village will be recognized as the person to approach locally, who in turn may pass requests on to the technicians. No such individual existed in any of the villages.

77 Table A7. Responses to Questions Geared At Establishing the fact that no Operations & Maintenance provision existed within the LSEPP
Project planners and technology installers

Question

Mr Adeniji, Director LAMOST (Project owners and initiator)

Mr. Wanike Oruwariye, MD, Impasse Technologies (Tech. Partner 1)

Mr. Adeyiga, MD Empirical Networks (Tech. Partner 2)

A7.1. Is there any operations and maintenance (O & M) agreement in place between the technical partners (SEP installers) and the government (project owners)? Yes

No

A16. Comment: Both the LAMOST project head and the technical partners were asked this question. They both confirmed that no such agreement existed.

APPENDIX B SAMPLE PRE-PREPARED QUESTIONS USED AS A GUIDE DURING THE LSEPP FIELD SURVEY Awareness Did you know about the solar electricity project (SEP) before work on it started in the village? Y/N What are three biggest problems that people in this village face today? Do you think the SEP has helped with any of the problems you mention?" Y/N if yes: Please tell me how the SEP has helped with the problem(s) Separate from problems, have there been any benefits of the SEP to the village as a whole? Y/N Separate from the village, have there been any benefits of the SEP to you or your family? Y/N Reliability Does the SEP ever break down, so that there is no electricity for a while? Y/N if yes: Please describe the frequency of the breakdowns (per week/month/year) and the usual duration of each one breakdown (hours/days/weeks/months). Do you know what is done to repair the SEP when it breaks down? Y/N if yes: Please describe what is done to fix the system. Do you know who actually repairs the SEP when it breaks down? Y/N if yes: Please describe who does what to fix the system. Do you know how much time usually passes between the moment that the SEP breaks down and the moment that electricity is restored? Y/N if yes: Please tell me the approximate amount of time involved. Responsibility/Ownership Who has the most responsibility for providing a village with electricity through projects like the SEP? Who should have responsibility for providing a village with electricity through projects like the SEP?

78

79

Who has the most responsibility for maintaining proper operation of a system like the SEP? Who should have the most responsibility for maintaining proper operation of a system like the SEP? Should the entity who should have the most responsibility be the owner of the SEP? Y/N if no: Please explain why the owner should not be responsible. Is there anything that you yourself can do to maintain proper operation of the SEP? Involvement Did you have any involvement with the SEP before it was installed and completed? Y/N if yes: Please tell me about your involvement (i.e., how it came about, what you did and why, when these things happened, etc.) Have you had any involvement with the SEP since it was completed? Y/N if yes: Please tell me about your involvement (i.e., how it came about, what you have done and why, when you did them, etc.) Do you know why the SEP has come to the village? Y/N if yes: Please tell me your understanding Training Have you received any training on how to use/manage the electricity provided by the SEP? Y/N if yes: Please tell me about your training. Have you received any training on how to use/manage the electricity provided by the SEP? Y/N if yes: Please tell me about your training. Have you or anyone else in the village received any training on how to maintain or repair the SEP? Y/N if yes: Please tell me about your and/or others training. Regarding other villages where SEP systems may be installed in the future, do you think that all or most people should receive training on how to use/manage the electricity provided by the SEP? Y/N if yes or no: Please tell me why they should or should not receive such training. Regarding other villages where SEP systems may be installed in the future, do you think that all or most people should receive training on how to manage or repair the SEP? Y/N if yes or no: Please tell me why they should or should not receive such training.

80 Finance Do you pay anything for electricity provided by the SEP? Y/N if yes: How much do you pay each month/year? Do you pay anything towards the cost of operating and repairing the SEP? Y/N if yes: How much do you pay each month/year? In general, who should pay for village electricity provided by a SEP? Fairness In your opinion, is the way that electricity used/distributed in the village fair? Y/N if no: Please explain why you think that use/distribution is unfair. Transparency Do you know/understand how the SEP is managed? Y/N if no: Do you want to know how it is managed? Y/N either way: Why do want/not want to know? Have you ever made a suggestion concerning the SEP? Y/N if yes: Please describe what happened after you made the suggestion Satisfaction Are you completely satisfied by the electricity service that the SEP provides Y/N if no: What the 3 main areas of dissatisfaction? If there are three things that you could propose to improve the SEP, what would these things be? Background To help me compare responses from people in different villages, I would like to ask a few questions that are more personal. You do not have to answer any of them if they make you uncomfortable. 1. What is your age (approximately)? 2a. How many young (school-age) children live with you? 2b. Of these children, how many go to school? 3. How many older children and adults live with you? 4. What is/are your main occupation(s)? 5. What is your name?

Are there important things about the SEP that concern you and that I have not asked about? Y/N if yes: Please tell me about these things

APPENDIX C SAMPLE QUESTIONS USED AS A GUIDE DURING THE TSSP PHONE INTERVIEWS

I just got back from Nigeria to study a similar project where unfortunately there was not much success to report. This brings me to the reason why I asked for this interview. I seek your help in allowing me to learn more about the knowledge acquisition component of the TSSP, both in terms of general understanding of the efforts that went into the project and, more particularly, your perspectives on its strength and weaknesses and ways to improve in the future. Do you have any questions or require clarifications comments before we start? Preamble 1. If you could recall the efforts that went with the TSSP, when and how did your involvement began? Follow up questions depending on what comes up 2. Before your involvement then how would you rate your knowledge of the solar PV technology? Follow up questions like what he thinks is knowledge is now 3. Has your attitude about solar PV technology changed? If yes how would then rate the TSSPs contribution to the change in attitude? Maintenance 4. How reliable is the system? Does it breakdown such that it does not function for while? Usually for how long, on the average? Who pays for the upkeep?

81

82

Sustainability

5. In your opinion, is the TSSP sustainable (Financial, Technical, Organizational)? 6. There must have been some problems during the TSSP implementation processwhat are some of the major huddles encountered and how ere they dealt with? 7. If you had to name the three best characteristics of the TSSP what would they be? Contribution to students? Contributions to community? 8. Are there other aspects of the TSSP that I have not inquired about that you think are important for me to know? Especially with regard to sustainability? 9. You may know or not know about Africa but if you can contribute suggestions to what they need to do back there, based on your experience with the TSSP, what would those suggestions be? Thank you very much for your time.

APPENDIX D TEXAS SOLAR FOR SCHOOLS PROJECT, PHASES AND PARTICIPATING SCHOOLS

Phase 1 Blue Ridge High School Brookesmith ISD Eagle Pass High School - CC Winn Campus Hamlin Middle School Holliday High School

Phase 2 Alvin High School Bryker Woods Elementary (Austin ISD) Cordova Middle School (El Paso ISD) Canyon Lake High School (Comal ISD) Dallas ISD

Phase 3 Breham Middle School Cuero Jr. High School Giddings Middle School La Grange Intermediate School Bluebonnet Elementary School (Lockhart ISD) Marion Middle School Schulenburg Elementary School Smithville Jr. High School

Phase 4 Bedichek Middle School Blanton Elementary School Cunningham Elementary School Gonzalo Garza HS

Phase 5 Bastrop Inter./BBEC Boerne/Kendall Elem Brenham Jr. High School Flatonia ISD

Martin Middle School

Harper Campus

Murchison Middle School O'Henry Middle School Will Davis Elementary

Hempstead Middle School Lampasas Middle School Llano Junior High School

Ira High School

Environmental Education Center East Central High School (East Central ISD - San Antonio) Junction High School Kealing Junior High (Austin ISD)

Maplewood Elementary (Austin ISD) Monahans High School John Jay High School -(Northside ISD - San Antonio)

Utopia ISD Weimar High School

Zilker Elementary Round Rock ISD

Luling-Leonard Shanklin Elementary San Saba Middle School

James Madison High School - San Antonio ISD River Road High School

Roosevelt High School (Northeast ISD San Antonio) Seabrook Intermediate School -Science Magnet Program (Clear Creek ISD)

Waelder ISD

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VITA

Olufemi Olarewaju was born January 18, 1965 to Edith Taiwo Olarewaju and Joshua Adeniran Olarewaju of Oke-Iyin, Ilesa in Osun State of Nigeria. Olufemi attended the prestigious Government College Ibadan for his secondary education. In 1989, he graduated with a Bachelor of Science Honors degree in Applied Geophysics from the Obafemi Awolowo University, IleIfe, Nigeria. After several years of employment as an Oil Seismologist working in both the Niger Delta and the Chad Basin of Nigeria, Olufemi immigrated to the United States of America and lived in the great State of California. Getting to California, Olufemi worked in several capacities including as a Borehole Investigations Specialist. In 2003, he obtained his Master of Science degree in Business Administration from the California Polytechnic University, Pomona, California. This marked his move from the private sector to public service. Shortly after, he relocated to the State of Texas. After services with the City of Garland as an Internal Auditor, Olufemi enrolled at The University of Texas at Dallas for his doctoral degree in Public Affairs. He has since worked as a Policy Fellow in the city of Dallas with the National center for Policy Analysis, a Think Tank. Olufemi enjoys spending time with family and is an active member of the church choir. He is happily married to his wife of twenty years, Beverly, and along with their wonderful daughter Olawunmi, reside in the City of Plano, Texas.