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G.R. No. 176863 October 30, 2009 GREGORIO DESTREZA, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. MA.

GRACIA RIOZA-PLAZO and MA. FE ALARAS, Respondents.

The notarized deed of sale should be admitted as evidence despite the failure of the Notary Public in submitting his notarial report to the notarial section of the RTC Manila. It is the swearing of a person before the Notary Public and the latters act of signing and affixing his seal on the deed that is material and not the submission of the notarial report. No rule requires a party, who relies on a notarized deed of sale for establishing his ownership, to present further evidence of such deeds genuineness lest the presumption of its due execution be for naught.

G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 August 4, 2009 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and IMELDA R. MARCOS, Respondents.

The propriety of granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the "issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court should take cognizance of the instant case. Since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction relating to four violations of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude. "not every criminal act involves moral turpitude," and that ''as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine." The "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the mere omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual. The filing of a "fraudulent return with intent to evade tax" is a crime involving moral turpitude as it entails willfulness and fraudulent intent on the part of the individual. The same, however, cannot be said for "failure to file a return" where the mere omission already constitutes a violation. Thus, this Court holds that even if the conviction of respondent Marcos II is affirmed, the same not being a crime involving moral turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification.

G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009 P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN DOES, Petitioners,

vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Respondents.

The coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, libertyand security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions. Petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.

G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009 GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-inFact,Respondent.

This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate. The petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. In general, there are three different kinds of "disappearance" cases:

1. those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting agents and are never found again; 2. those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and 3. those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered. As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties. Enforced disappearances have been said to be "a double form of torture," with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner. In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration). Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention). Article 2 of the Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows: For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right is non-derogable. It provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify

enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law. It also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation. Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are established.

The Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold. First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance i.e., the corpus delicti or the victims body is usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have begun. Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred. We cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account. The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test. Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:

1. arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; 2. carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State; 3. followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and 4. placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.

This Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case we believe and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.

G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009 Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner, vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS, secretary DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.

Petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I XIII, Inc. et al.,23 this Court ruled that: This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature

G.R. No. 186640 February 11, 2010 GEN. ALEXANDER B. YANO, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, LT. GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and MAJ. GEN. RALPH A. VILLANUEVA, Commander, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, Petitioners, vs. CLEOFAS SANCHEZ and MARCIANA MEDINA, Respondents.

The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs.

G.R. No. 182498 February 16, 2010 GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, vs.

MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-inFact,Respondent.

Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an interwoven network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and the military.

G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010 LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY a.k.a. DARWIN REYES, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, a certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT. EDGAR B. ROQUERO, ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.

Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged; it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It means such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise.

Separate Opinion CARPIO MORALES

The ponencias ambivalence on the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility overlooks its general acceptance in public international law, which warrants its incorporation into Philippine law via the incorporationclause of the Constitution. Under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Based on the clarification provided by then Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna, now a retired member of this Court, during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the import of this provision is that the incorporated law would have the force of a statute.1 The most authoritative enumeration of the sources of international law, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute),2 does not specifically include "generally accepted principles of international law." To be sure, it is not quite the same as the "general principles of law" recognized under Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. Renowned publicist Ian Brownlie

suggested, however, that "general principles of international law" may refer to rules of customary law, to general principles of law as in Article 38(1)(c), or to logical propositions resulting from judicial reasoning on the basis of existing international law and municipal analogies.3 Indeed, judicial reasoning has been the bedrock of Philippine jurisprudence on the determination of generallyaccepted principles of international law and consequent application of the incorporatio n clause. That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo16 and Razon v. Tagitis17 in proper context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo cases. Neither does Republic Act No. 985119 emasculate the applicability of the command responsibility doctrine to Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity." Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior responsibility as a ground for criminal responsibility for the crimes covered.20 Such limited treatment, however, is merely in keeping with the statutes purpose and not intended to rule out the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to other appropriate cases.

BRION

With RA 9851, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an "enforced or involuntary disappearance" is. Two aspects relevant to the present case have been touched upon by this law, namely, the definition of enforced or involuntary disappearance, and liability under the doctrine of command responsibility. Under Section 3(g) of the law, "enforced or involuntary disappearance" is now defined as follows: (g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. The doctrine of command responsibility is a substantive rule that establishes criminal or administrative liability that is different from the purpose and approach of the Amparo Rule. As we have painstakingly explained in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo4 and Razon v. Tagitis,5 the Amparo Rule merely provides for a procedural protective remedy against violations or threats of violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. It does not address criminal, civil or administrative liability as these are matters determined from the application of substantive law. As heretofore mentioned, a new law RA 9851 has recently been passed relating to enforced disappearance and command responsibility. Section 10 of this law explicitly makes superiors criminally liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, as follows:6 Section 10. Responsibility of Superiors. In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility for crimes defined and penalized under this Act, a superior shall be criminally responsible as a principal for such crimes committed by subordinates under his/her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his/her failure to properly exercise control over such subordinates, where: o That superior either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes; o That superior, failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his/her power to prevent or repress their commissio0n or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

Thus, liability under the doctrine of command responsibility is no longer simply administrative (based on neglect of duty),7 but is now criminal. This new development all the more stresses that the doctrine of command responsibility has limited application to the Rule on the Writ of Amparo whose concern is the protection of constitutional rights through procedural remedies.

G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010 IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants. But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.

G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010 MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.

In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her husbands surname in her old passport, requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband's surname.16 In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.17 However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden

name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

G.R. No. 183713 EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, vs. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; Chief of the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents.
We conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires.

G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.
The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which

case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners, vs. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
An employees plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. In general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. The writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 169482 January 29, 2008 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner, vs. LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.
In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.

G.R. No. 166676. September 12,2008 Republic of the Philippines , vs., Jennifer B. Cagandahan.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. CAH is one of many conditionsthat involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes." We are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. TThe Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male. As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons

adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

G.R. No. 170243 April 16, 2008 NANCY H. ZAYCO and REMO HINLO in their capacity as judicial coadministrators of the Estate of Enrique Hinlo, petitioners, vs. ATTY. JESUS V. HINLO, JR., respondent.
An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent's estate. It is a final order and, hence, appealable.

G.R. No. 174680 March 24, 2008 VICTORIA C. TAYAG, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR, Respondent.
A petition for the issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an interested person. an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no further court action and is, therefore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be brought during the lifetime of the putative parent. Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents. Since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e.,open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the alleged father.

G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008 DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON,respondents.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy

supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact. Clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. Clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties.

[G.R. No. 164479, February 13, 2008] ROMBE EXIMTRADE (PHILS.), INC. and SPOUSES ROMEO PERALTA and MARRIONETTE PERALTA, Petitioners, vs. ASIATRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.
A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Strictly speaking, it is only in civil actions that one speaks of a cause of action. A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. Thus, in the annulment of foreclosure case, the cause of action of Rombe is the act of Asiatrust in foreclosing the mortgage on Rombes properties by which the latters right to the properties was allegedly violated. On the other hand, the rehabilitation case is treated as a special proceeding. Initially, there was a difference in opinion as to what is the nature of a petition for rehabilitation. The Court, on September 4, 2001, issued a Resolution in A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC to clarify the ambiguity, thus: On the other hand, a petition for rehabilitation, the procedure for which is provided in the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, should be considered as a special proceeding. It is one that seeks to establish the status of a party or a particular fact. As provided in section 1, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Recovery, the status or fact sought to be established is the inability of the corporate debtor to pay its debts when they fall due so that a rehabilitation plan, containing the formula for the successful recovery of the corporation, may be approved in the end. It does not seek a relief from an injury caused by another party. Thus, a petition for rehabilitation need not state a cause of action and, hence, Rombes contention that the two cases have distinct causes of action is incorrect. The rehabilitation case is a special proceeding which is summary and non-adversarial in nature. The annulment of foreclosure case is an ordinary civil action governed by the regular rules of procedure under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

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