Tracey Thurman, et al. vs. City of Torrington, et al.

Facts: Between Oct 1982 and June 10, 1983, Tracey (a resident of Torrington) and others on her behalf, notified the City through the defendant police officers of the repeated threats upon her life and the life of her child Charles Jr. made by her estranged husband Charles (Torrington resident and short order cook at Skies Diner where he served many members of the Torrington Police). Attempts to file complaints against Charles were ignored or rejected by the police and the City. In October 1982, Charles attacked Tracey at the home of the Bentley and St. Hilaire in the city of Torrington. St. Hilaire made a formal complaint to one of the police officers and requested efforts to keep Charles off their property. In Nov 5, Charles returned and using physical force, took Charles Jr. The police officers refused to accept a complaint even as to trespassing. In Nov 9, Charles screamed threats at Tracey while she was sitting in her car. One of the defendant police officers just stood and watched until Charles broke the windshield of Traceys car. Charles was arrested and on the next day he was convicted of breach of peace. He received a suspended sentence of 6 months and a two-year conditional discharge during which he was ordered to stay away from Tracey and the Bentley residence. In Dec 31, he returned to said residence and threatened Tracey. She called the police. The police, although informed of the violation of the discharge, made no attempt to ascertain Charles whereabouts/arrest him. Between Jan 1 May 4, 1983, repeated threats of violence were reported and his arrest requested. May 4 and 5, Tracey reported to the police that Charles threatened to shoot the plaintiffs. One of the defendants refused to take the complaint. May 6, Tracey filed an application for a restraining order against Charles. That day, the court issued the order and the City was informed of the restraining order. May 31, Tracey went again to the police to pursue the warrant request but no arrest took place. June 10, Charles went again to the Bentley residence and demanded to speak to Tracey. Tracey called the police; she then went outside to persuade him not to take or hurt Charles Jr. But Charles began to stab her repeatedly in the chest, neck and throat. 25 minutes after the call, a single police officer arrived; during his arrival, Charles was holding a bloody knife. Charles dropped the knife and kicked Tracey in the head, went inside the house and returned from within, holding Charles Jr., and dropped the child on his wounded mother, then kicked Tracey again. Soon thereafter, three of the defendants arrived but still permitted Charles to wander about the crowd and to continue to threaten Tracey. Plaintiffs Tracey and Charles Jr., mother and son, filed an action against the police officers of Torrington and the City of Torrington for deprivation of her right to equal protection. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants used an administrative classification that manifests itself in discriminatory treatment. Police protection in the city is fully provided to someone with whom the victim has no domestic relationship, but lesser protection when the victim is 1) a woman assaulted by a spouse/boyfriend, 2) a child abused by a father or stepfather. Plaintiffs also alleged that although there is no

law in the city which discriminates against a victim abused by someone with whom she has a domestic relationship, there is an administrative classification. The failure to act by the police was due to the practice of affording inadequate protection to women who have complained of having been abused by their husbands. The City filed a motion to dismiss the claims for failure to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right. The City contends that the equal protection clause does not guarantee equal application of social services; the clause only prohibits intentional discrimination that is racially motivated. Issue: Whether or not the City may be held liable for the acts of its police officers Held: YES. The motion of the City to dismiss the claims of Tracey is denied, while its motion to dismiss claims of Charles Jr. is granted. Failure of city officials and police officers to perform their duty of taking reasonable measures to protect personal safety of persons whom they know may be attacked is a denial of equal protection and is actionable. Although in this case there is no law discriminating against victims abused by their relatives, the acts of the officers constitute an administrative classification. Equal protection clause is applicable not only to discriminatory legislative action, but also to discriminatory governmental action in administration and enforcement of law. While a municipality is not liable for the constitutional torts of its employees on a respondeat superior theory, a municipality may be sued for damages [under section 19831] when "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body's officers" or is "visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services Some degree of specificity is required in the pleading of a custom or policy on the part of a municipality. Mere conclusory allegations devoid of factual content will not suffice. In this case, Tracey has specifically alleged a series of acts and omissions. From
1

42 U.S.C. 1983, commonly referred to as "section 1983" provides:

Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

this pattern raises an inference of custom or policy on the part of the municipality. Furthermore, this pattern of inaction climaxed on June 10, 1983 in an incident so brutal that under the law of the Second Circuit that,"single brutal incident may be sufficient to suggest a link between a violation of constitutional rights and a pattern of police misconduct." Owens v. Haas As to Charles Jr., his claim is dismissed because he did not suffer from a continuous failure of the police to provide him protection. The isolated failure in the June 10 assault on him does not violate any constitutional right.