Celina May R. Tang Student No.

38569

Mercado v. People G.R. No. 149375 November 26, 2002 Facts: Marvin Mercado, the petitioner, was charged with and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Petitioner argued that CA who increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certified the case to this Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124,2 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petition, however, was denied because the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon by petitioner, was applicable only when the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty. Hence, the penalty imposed by the appellate court on the accused was clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538,3 which is not considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.

Issue: Is the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the instant case considering that the penalty imposed was seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years? Ruling: The crime committed by petitioner is one penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under The Revised Penal Code. Unless otherwise specified, if the special penal law imposes such penalty, it is error to designate it with terms provided for in The Revised Penal Code since those terms apply only to the penalties imposed by the Penal Code, and not to the penalty in special penal laws. Special laws provide their own specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties are not taken from nor refer to those in The Revised Penal Code. The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months under RA 6538 is essentially within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal. However, such technical term under The Revised Penal Code is not similarly used or applied to the penalty for carnapping. Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstance of violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things does not correspond to that in The Revised Penal Code. There is no basis for the trial court to set the minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day since RA 6538 sets the minimum penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of 12 years and 1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum. People v. Guillermo G.R. No. L-4316 May 28, 1952

Facts: The 7th Guerilla Amnesty Commission, composed of Honorables Higinio Macadaeg, Potenciano Pecson, and Ramon R. San Jose, Judges of the Court of First Instance of Manila are restrained and prevented from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition for amnesty filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver, who was convicted and sentenced by this Court on May 19, 1950, for murder. The grounds upon which the petition are based are (1) that this Court has already expressly ruled in its judgment of conviction of said case that said Antonio Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because the murders of which he was convicted
1

Celina May R. Tang Student No. 38569

were committed "not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two rival guerilla units," and (2) that the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court on October 2, 1946 (date of Administrative Order No. 1 of the President), at that time. Respondents opposed the petition, alleging (1) that the decision of this Court does not prevent the respondent Antonio Guillermo from invoking his right to the provisions of the amnesty, because said right was not an issue at the trial on the case against him, and the pronouncement of this Court thereon is not final and conclusive and is merely an obiter dictum, and (2) that under a liberal interpretation of the administrative orders implementing the President's Amnesty Proclamation, the respondent Commission has jurisdiction of said petition.

Issue: Is the finding of the Court that Guillermo entitled to the benefits of amnesty, an obiter dictum? Ruling: No. An obiter dictum is an opinion "uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects", or the opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is not required to decide, or an opinion of the court which does not embody its determination and is made without argument or full consideration of the point, and is not professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself.

T he ruling of the Court that the said respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty is not an obiter dictum, but is a ruling of the Court on an issue expressly raised by the party appellant on facts or evidence adduced in the course of the trial of his case. It is not an opinion uttered by the way; it is a direct ruling on an issue expressly raised by a party. It was not unnecessary to make that ruling; the ruling was absolutely essential to a determination of a question of fact and of law directly in issue. It was not made without argument or full consideration of the point; it was deliberately entered by the Court after arguments on both sides had been heard. This Could not have avoided determining the issue without the peril of rendering an incomplete decision. Recuerdo v. People G.R. No. 133036 January 22, 2003 Facts: Joy Lee Recuerdo, the petitioner, was found guilty of violating BP 22 or the The Bouncing Check Law. Out of the 9 checks she issued as payment to Yolanda Flora, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to the petitioner, and upon failure to pay, a complaint was filed where she was found guilty. On the petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that BP 22 is unconstitutional since banks are not damaged by the presentment of dishonored checks as they impose a penalty for each, only creditors/payees are unduly favored by the law.

Issue: Is BP 22 unconstitutional? Ruling: In the Lorenzo v. Martinez case, it states that where it was held that BP 22 punishes the act of making and issuing worthless checks. It is not the non-payment of debt or obligation which the law punishes and the law does not coerce the debtor to pay debt but the main objective of the law is the prohibition and penalizing the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Such act is against public order. Thus, the BP 22 is constitutional.
2

Celina May R. Tang Student No. 38569

Relampagos v. Cumba G.R. No. 11886 April 27, 1995 Facts: During the elections of May 11, 1992, Relampangos, the petitioner, and Cumba, the private respondent, were candidates for the position of Mayor in Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. Private respondent won in the election. Petitioner filed an election protest, and later found out that he won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent. Private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC which was later given a due course by the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal, and it was granted despite the opposition of the private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition for Certiorari to annul the the motion for execution pending appeal, and the COMELEC granted it, restoring private respondent as the municipal mayor. The COMELEC upheld its exclusive authority to decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus where it maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction Section 50 of BP 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction? Ruling: Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Serano v. NLRC G.R. No. 117040 January 27, 2000 Facts: Ruben Serano, the petitioner, was hired by Isetann Department Store, the private respondent, as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters. However, due to cost-cutting, the petitioner was terminated so he prompted a complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC ordered the petitioner to be given his separation pay, holding that his dismissal was a legitimate business decision. However, petitioner was the denied the right to be given written notice before the termination of his employment as stated in Art. 283 of the Labor Code.

Issue: Is the dismissal of the petitioner illegal? Ruling: The case Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC stated that it was unjust to require an employer to reinstate an employee if, although termination is made with cause, if due process was not satisfied. This rule reversed a long standing policy where the dismissal of one employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process.