Business Horizons (2009) 52, 459467

www.elsevier.com/locate/bushor

Corporate venturing: Insights from actual performance

Donald F. Kuratko a,*, Jeffrey G. Covin a, Robert P. Garrett b
a b

Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, 1309 East 10th Street, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701, U.S.A. College of Business, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331, U.S.A.

KEYWORDS
Corporate venturing; Innovation; Venture managers

Abstract Corporate innovation and the entrepreneurial strategies on which it is based are key challenges at the forefront of executive concerns. In order to establish some factual foundations amid the popular folklore which surrounds corporate innovation today, this study examines the actual factors that inuence internal corporate venturing within the realm of a corporate entrepreneurship strategy. Data were collected from 145 internal corporate ventures (early-stage, middle-stage, and established-stage) operating in 72 rms headquartered in the midwestern United States. The results of this study are summarized herein and offer insights regarding some of the key correlates of corporate venturing performance. # 2009 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. All rights reserved.

1. A strategy for corporate innovation

Innovation is a critical issue for companies in the current world market. As such, corporate innovation and the entrepreneurial activity thats needed from employees is being embraced by executives today as more than simply a component of a companys strategy, but rather as the focus of an organizations success. As Hamel (2000) advised, In these suddenly sober times, the inescapable imperative for every organization must be to make innovation an all-thetime, everywhere capability (p. 115). Firms which are more adaptable, aggressive, and innovative are
* Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: dkuratko@indiana.edu (D.F. Kuratko), covin@indiana.edu (J.G. Covin), robert.garrett@bus.oregonstate.edu (R.P. Garrett).

better positioned not only to adjust to a dynamic, threatening, and complex external environment, but to create change in that environment. They do not take the external environment as a given, but instead dene themselves as agents of change by leading customers instead of following them, creating new markets, and rewriting the rules of the competitive game (Morris, Kuratko, & Covin, 2008). The existence of a corporate innovation strategy implies that a rms strategic intent (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989) is to continuously and deliberately leverage entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) for growth and advantageseeking purposes. Covin and Miles (1999) contended that innovation was the single common theme underlying all forms of corporate entrepreneurship. In that vein, Ireland, Covin, and Kuratko (2009) dene

0007-6813/$ see front matter # 2009 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2009.05.001

460 a corporate entrepreneurial strategy as a visiondirected, organization-wide reliance on entrepreneurial behavior that purposefully and continuously rejuvenates the organization and shapes the scope of its operations through the recognition and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunity (p. 21). Within the context of a corporate entrepreneurship strategy, Covin and Kuratko (2008) delineated corporate venturing and strategic entrepreneurship as distinct strategies pertaining to corporate innovation. In their analysis, corporate venturing entails company involvement in the creation of new businesses, whereas strategic entrepreneurship corresponds to a broader array of entrepreneurial initiatives which do not necessarily involve new businesses being added to the rm. All strategic forms of corporate entrepreneurship have one thing in common: they all involve the exhibition of organizationally consequential innovations that are adopted in the pursuit of competitive advantage. The theoretical and empirical knowledge about the domain of corporate innovation and the entrepreneurial strategies on which it is based are key issues at the forefront of current research and practice (Dess et al., 2003; Kuratko, 2007). Only a few studies have attempted to examine the state of the art in corporate venturing (Birkinshaw, van Basten Batenburg, & Murray, 2002a). It is within that context that this particular study was conducted. In order to establish some factual foundations amid the popular folklore that surrounds corporate innovation today, we sought to examine the actual factors that inuence internal corporate venturing within the realm of a corporate entrepreneurship strategy.

D.F. Kuratko et al.

2. Examining internal corporate venturing

Corporate venturing involves the rm creating an entirely new business (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005). Since there exists no consensus regarding what constitutes a new business within an extant company, we followed one approach toward determining just that; this approach involves the four strategies found in the product/market growth matrix. In Figure 1, the matrix includes intermediate-level variations in market and product novelty. Hence, extensions of current markets and products are considered, so that more degrees of newness are allowed for. A market can be new to the rm or new to the world (market creation), and new products can be introduced to a rms current industry or move the rm into a new industry that is pre-existing or newly created by the rms new product offering. (An industry can be dened as a group of rms that offers identical or highly similar products.) With these elaborations, rms need not move from their current positions on both the market and product dimensions in order to enter new businesses, and some variants of pure market development activity and pure product development activity can be considered new businesses. So, for purposes of this research study, an internal corporate venture was dened as an entrepreneurial initiative that originated within the corporate structure (or within an existing business of the corporation) and was intended from its inception as a new business for the corporation, where a new business is represented by the shaded cells in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Dening what constitutes a new business

Source: Morris, Kuratko, & Covin (2008, p. 83)

Corporate venturing: Insights from actual performance

461 served as the principal contact person on matters pertaining to the overall venturing activity within his or her rm; and 3. The Venture Management Form was used to gather information on matters such as that ventures operations, resources, and relationship with the corporate parent. The venture manager with day-to-day responsibility for the venture in question completed this last survey. Data were collected from 145 internal corporate ventures operating in the 72 rms. Of the 145 ventures, 119 were currently operating while 26 were defunct (i.e., were terminated or otherwise expired). The development stages of these 145 ventures were as follows: 37 early-stage ventures, 52 middlestage ventures, 56 established-stage ventures. These venture development stages were dened carefully in this study: early-stage ventures had received nancial investment from the corporation or their sponsoring division, but were not yet generating any revenue; middle-stage ventures were generating sales revenue, but were not yet protable; and established-stage ventures were generating some prot (i.e., total estimated revenues exceeded total estimated costs). Financial data pertaining to the ventures latest years of operation were collected for the middle- and established-stage ventures. Some of the basic background information is shown in Table 1.

3. Descriptive information of the study

Only midwestern-based U.S. companies with minimum annual sales revenues of $50 million were considered for possible inclusion in the study. The gures break down as such: 496 rms were identied for possible inclusion in the research; 243 were unresponsive to contact; 168 declined participation for various reasons and 58 rms were not involved in corporate venturing. The remaining rms conrmed both their willingness to participate and their involvement in internal corporate venturing. The researchers then attempted to schedule time with the corporate managers in charge of overseeing venturing activities at each rm, and were able to secure appointments with them. Completed research materials were eventually received from 72 (35 public, 37 private) of the 85 rms. Study participants lled out a set of three survey forms: 1. The Parent Corporation Background Information Form solicited background information on the parent corporation from a corporate-level manager; 2. The Venture Description and Performance Form requested basic descriptive information, as well as performance-related information on a venture within the corporation. This survey was completed by the corporate-level manager who

Table 1.

Company demographics Mean USD $5.45B 61.82% Minimum USD $48M 5% Maximum USD $85B 100%

Basic Information Firms annual sales revenue Percentage of rms sales made in its largest single industry (an indicator of the rms level of diversication) Firms number of employees Total number of ventures initiated by rm in last 7 years Number of Early Stage ventures currently being pursued Number of Middle Stage ventures currently being pursued Number of Established Stage ventures currently being pursued Financial Information Venture sales revenue (USD million) Venture return on sales percentage (i.e., gross prot-to-sales ratio)

10,910 9.61 3.42 1.86 2.39 Mean $19.97M 20.37%

80 1 0 0 0 Minimum 0 0

160,000 150 100 25 25 Maximum $401M 70%

462

D.F. Kuratko et al. greatest emphasis: to learn about the process of venturing; to develop new competencies; or to develop managers. In another study of corporate venturing practice this one including rms engaged in both internal and external corporate venturing (where the latter implies the acquisition by a corporation of new ventures founded outside and independent of the corporation)Miles and Covin (2002) reported that the rms pursued venturing for three primary reasons: to build an innovative capability as the basis for making the overall rm more entrepreneurial and accepting of change; to appropriate greater value from current organizational competencies or to expand the rms scope of operations and knowledge into areas of possible strategic importance; and to generate quick nancial returns. In this current study, venture founding motive was assessed from the perspectives of (1) the corporate managers who had detailed knowledge of those ventures and (2) the venture managers who administered those ventures day-to-day operations. The mean scores of these two levels of managers in response to the various venture founding motives are shown in Table 2. It is interesting to note that the highest scores by both sets of managers were given to the variables (1)

4. Motives for corporate venturing

Corporations create new businesses for multiple reasons. This being the case, it is impossible to evaluate the success or failure of corporate venturing initiatives unless it is clear what managements goals were in the rst place. Companies must create venture evaluation and control systems that assess venture performance on criteria which follow from the ventures founding motive. Based on their study of 60 internal corporate ventures founded in 15 UK-based rms, Tidd and Taurins (1999) concluded there are two sets of motives that drive the practice of internal corporate venturing: leveraging (to exploit existing corporate competencies in new product or market arenas) and learning (to acquire new knowledge and skills that may be useful in existing product or market arenas). When the overall motive is leveraging, some of the specic reasons that rms engage in corporate venturing include: to exploit under-utilized resources; to extract further value from existing resources; to introduce competitive pressure onto internal suppliers; to spread the risk and cost of product development; and to divest non-core activities. When the overall motive is learning, three major types of organizational learning tend to receive the

Table 2.

Motives for founding the venture Mean Score as reported by Corporate Manager 5.88 Mean Score as reported by Venture Manager 5.72

Possible Venture Founding Motive

To realize greater value from the corporations pre-existing resources (e.g., knowledge, technologies, competencies) through leveraging these in the ventures business. To enable the corporate parent to learn about new products or technologies. To enable the corporate parent to learn about new markets. To develop new capabilities within the corporation. To enable the corporate parent to move quickly into a new business arena when and if such movement is desired. To generate quick and predictable nancial returns for the corporate parent. To create a business that would be spun off from the corporation. To provide insurance for the corporate parent in the event that its core businesses fail to yield desired results. To diversify the corporate parent for overall risk management purposes.

4.37 4.46 5.24 4.13 4.59 2.06 3.25 4.34

4.10 4.29 5.10 4.27 4.64 2.25 3.35 4.12

Key: Graduated scale whereby 1 = Not at all a founding motive of the venture; 4 = A moderately strong founding motive of the venture; and 7 = A very strong founding motive of the venture.

Corporate venturing: Insights from actual performance To realize greater value from the corporations preexisting resources (e.g., knowledge, technologies, competencies) through leveraging these in the ventures business, and (2) To develop new capabilities within the corporation. The third-highest response was To generate quick and predictable nancial returns for the corporate parent. These responses indicate agreement with the previously mentioned studies concerning leveraging, learning, and nancial returns as the key motives for corporations to engage in internal corporate venturing (Schilit, Maula, & Keil, 2005). The literature has historically stated that the extent to which a corporation engages in internal corporate venturing is driven by the availability of uncommitted nancial resources, or nancial slack, while attractive prospects in the rms existing core businesses are said to decrease the likelihood of the company pursuing corporate venturing. In this study, the availability of uncommitted nancial resources and the attractiveness of the parent corporations prospects in its core businesses were assessed to determine whether these assumptions are supported. Neither of those factors was found to be signicantly associated with the total number of ventures initiated by the sampled rms over the past 7 years. This indicates that the importance of these two elements as drivers of corporate venturing is likely overstated in the popular press. Firms are more motivated by the previously stated reasons of leveraging, learning, and nancial returns.

463 areas of perceived venture success, venturing experience, resources and core business, market/product similarity, planned vs. opportunistic ventures, management support, venture goal clarity, venture operations, strategic assets, venture management knowledge, and external environment. These are explored next.

5.1. Perceived venture success

In this study, corporate managers were asked to gauge the state of their current internal corporate venturing initiatives by using four rankings: successful, marginal, unsuccessful, and impossible to condently evaluate venture success level (e.g., conicting data; too soon to judge). The following mean scores were computed from the results: 36.62% (successful), 18.17% (marginal), 16.13% (unsuccessful), and 29.43% (impossible to evaluate). These gures can be used as an informative benchmark against which individual corporations venturing success rates might be compared. As a point of reference, research in the area of new product development has shown that new products typically experience success rates of approximately 60%. However, most new product introductions are simply extensions of a rms existing offerings and do not take the rm into wholly novel business arenas. As such, it makes sense that internal corporate venturingthat is, a new business activitywould have a lower success rate than that observed for new product introductions. While entering new businesses often involves introducing new products, the new products introduced for a new business will typically take the rm into a new market and industry. Therefore, there is generally more uncertainty associated with entering new businesses than with introducing new products, and the lower success rate of internal corporate venturing activity relative to new product introductions reects this reality.

5. Correlates of corporate venture performance

The research literature has examined a number of factors involved in corporate venturing, such as the relatedness between a new corporate venture and the parent rm (Sorrentino & Williams, 1995), the impact of resource sharing between the new venture and the parent rm (Miller, Spann, & Lerner, 1991), and the performance differences in the resource and strategy implementation of the corporate venture (Schrader & Simon, 1997). However, most of the previous studies have not provided an overall examination of correlates to corporate venture performance. Using the aggregate data that was collected in this study, particular highlights can be extracted in summary fashion in order to gain insights concerning the performance of internal corporate ventures. Since the study focused on corporate-level and venture-level managers currently involved in the process, a number of interesting insights can be gleaned for this article. The following sub-sections present some of the more interesting results in the

5.2. Venturing experience

An interesting nding in this study showed that there was no signicant relationship between the total number of ventures initiated by the rms over the past 7 years and the percentage of their ventures reported as successful, suggesting that greater experience with internal corporate venturing activity is not associated with greater venturing prociency or success. In other words, rms do not seem to get better at corporate venturing as they venture more. This result may come as a surprise to some, but its consistent with anecdotal evidence that has been reported for years in the popular business press.

464 An implication of this nding is that rms with more venturing successes may not possess any particular venturing-related prociency relative to other rms; they simply engage in more venturing initiatives. Likewise, the managers of currently operating and defunct ventures do not signicantly differ in the amount of prior venture involvement and principal-manager experience they report. There was no statistically signicant correlation between perceived venture performance and the number of ventures with which a given ventures manager has been personally and directly involved, or the number of internal corporate ventures for which a given ventures manager has served as the principal manager. As such, greater venturing experience by a ventures principal manager does not signicantly increase the likelihood of venture success. These results parallel the aforementioned nding that the number of ventures a rm has initiated and the rms venturing success rate are unrelated.

D.F. Kuratko et al. concept was operationalized in the current study through two variables: parent-venture product similarity (i.e., the extent to which the venture is similar to other businesses of the corporation in terms of products/services offered) and parent-venture market familiarity (i.e., the extent to which the corporate parent is familiar with the market targeted by the venture). Results indicate that product similarity and market familiarity are marginally stronger among operating than defunct ventures, although not signicantly so. As such, the data provide only modest support for the assumed importance of venturing in adjacent product-market domains.

5.5. Planned vs. opportunistic ventures

The degree to which the venture originated as an autonomous/opportunistic initiative versus a deliberate/planned initiative was examined in this research. The ndings indicate the more successful ventures tended to originate as planned initiatives. The relatively higher success levels achieved by such ventures may be attributable to the fact that they were strategically legitimate at their inception; that is, they were explicitly and formally recognized as desirable initiatives within their corporations business portfolios. Such early legitimacy could increase the likelihood that the ventures would receive needed nancial resources and other forms of support from the corporate parent.

5.3. Resources and core business

Whileas mentioned previously in our discussion of the motives for corporate venturingthe availability of uncommitted nancial resources and the attractiveness of the parent corporations prospects in its core businesses were not associated with the amount of venturing activity in which a corporation engages, these factors were associated with the success of such activity. Specically, both factors are positively associated with the performance of a corporations ventures. It might be speculated that funding limitations are less likely to inhibit a ventures growth and development among resource-rich rms. The nding that attractive prospects in the parent corporations core businesses are positively associated with the performance of that parents venturing initiatives could occur because such parents put less pressure on their ventures to succeed. When corporate parents have attractive prospects related to their core businesses, they may be less likely to engage in counterproductive meddling in the affairs of their ventures, instead granting those ventures the autonomy they need to successfully navigate within their novel business domains.

5.6. Management support

The literature has continually proposed that management support is a key factor in corporate venturing (Kuratko, Ireland, Covin, & Hornsby, 2005; Miller, Spann, & Lerner, 1991; Schrader & Simon, 1997). One of the strongest correlates of venturing success is the level of top management support given to the venture. Top management support was dened in the current research as the extent to which the parent corporations senior-level management is supportive of the venture. Similar to the situation discussed above regarding planned ventures, when a venture has top managements support, it is more likely to be regarded as strategically legitimate and receive the needed resources its parent corporation is capable of providing.

5.4. Market/Product similarity

It is a generally accepted tenet within the corporate venturing literature that ventures will be most likely to succeed if they operate in product-market domains that are adjacent to those of the rms established business (Birkinshaw, van Basten Batenburg, & Murray, 2002b; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Thornhill & Amit, 2001). The adjacency

5.7. Venture goal clarity

Success is also strongly predicted by the extent to which the ventures goals and value proposition (i.e., the intended basis on which it would appeal to the market) were clear to the ventures management at the ventures early development stage.

Corporate venturing: Insights from actual performance Venture initial goal clarity and venture initial value proposition clarity were found to be signicantly correlated with venture performance and differed between operating and defunct ventures, with operating ventures scoring higher than defunct ventures on both elements. As such, while corporate ventures are inherently experiments whose outcomes cannot be perfectly predicted in advance, this doesnt mean that targeted outcomesthat is, the ventures goalsand the means by which they might be achievedas expressed through the ventures value propositionshould be left indenite or nonspecic at the ventures founding. Clear initial goals and value propositions provide needed guidance to the venture as it purposefully navigates within its novel business domain. The preceding discussion point recognizes the inherently uncertain nature of internal corporate ventures. That is, ventures operate without a historyor much historythat might be relied upon to reveal the lessons of successful business practice. As such, strategic miscalculations often occur as ventures establish their initial goals and value propositions. These miscalculations are recognized as performance-related feedback is gathered, forcing ventures to rethink their initial goals and value propositions. Our results suggest that a modest level of goal evolution and value proposition evolution occurs as ventures develop. Notably, goal evolution is negatively associated with venture performance and value proposition evolution is modestly greater among defunct than operating ventures. Care must be exercised when inferring implications from these results because, as suggested above, poor venture performance may cause ventures to change their goals and value propositions, rather than be the result of ventures changing their goals and value propositions. Nonetheless, one conclusion from the data is clear: ventures interests are generally best served when their goals and value propositions are right from the start.

465 corporate parent managementis responsible for the design of the ventures internal operations; and 3. Venture operations independence: The extent to which the ventures operations are linked to those of other businesses of the corporation. Again, the previous literature had extolled the importance of relatedness to parent operations (Sorrentino & Williams, 1995). However, in our study, only venture planning autonomy exhibited a strong relationship with venture success, with greater planning autonomy being associated with higher performing ventures. Venture-level self-determination with regard to such strategic management decisions as goal selection, strategy formulation, and performance criterion establishment may be positively associated with venture performance because venture-level management often has the best knowledge of how to strategically lead their business. When important strategic management choices are dictated to a venture by higher-level organizational authorities, those choices will sometimes be made with less complete, timely, or accurate information than that which might be available at the venture level. Moreover, because venture-level management will typically be held responsible for the performance of their business, they have a strong incentive to make strategic management choices which reect the realities of the ventures operating environment, and likely speed and trajectory of development.

5.9. Strategic assets

For the purposes of this research, a ventures strategic assets are dened as the key knowledge, technologies, competencies, and other resources needed to excel in the ventures business. They represent simply the necessary resources for a venture. Three strategic asset-related variables proved to be strong predictors of venture success in this research: 1. Parent possession of the ventures strategic assets: The extent to which the ventures strategic assets are similar to those possessed and/or employed by other businesses within the corporation; 2. Venture initial strategic asset endowment: The extent to which the ventures strategic assets were possessed, controlled, or owned by the venture at its early development stage; and 3. Venture initial strategic asset certainty: The extent to which the ventures strategic assets

5.8. Venture operations

Three variables were assessed which reect aspects of how the venture operates within its parent corporation: 1. Venture planning autonomy: The extent to which the ventures management teamversus corporate parent managementis responsible for establishing goals, timetables, event milestones, and strategy for the venture; 2. Venture operations autonomy: The extent to which the ventures management teamversus

466 were known to venture management at the ventures early development stage. Each of these variables exhibited statistically signicant correlations with performance and was signicantly more pronounced in operating than defunct ventures. As such, knowing what resources are needed to facilitate a ventures success, operating in a parent corporation that possesses those resources, and having those resources installed in a venture as part of its initial asset base are crucial drivers of venture success. Combined with the aforementioned ndings regarding the importance of ventures having clear initial goals and value propositions, a strong theme is evident in the data regarding the need for ventures to be founded with clear purposes and essential resources in hand. More specically, the trajectory of a ventures development seems to be established early in the ventures life, and this trajectory is likely determined by the clarity of the ventures initial strategic choices and the adequacy of its initial strategic assets. Strategic asset transferability (the extent to which the ventures strategic assets are easily transferable) and strategic asset source responsibility (the extent to which the ventures strategic assets are to beor have beensourced from the corporate parent versus developed from within or acquired by the venture itself) were not found to be signicantly associated with venture success. In conjunction with the preceding results, these ndings suggest that, as a determinant of venture performance, it does not matter from where the venture acquires its strategic assets, only that it has them.

D.F. Kuratko et al. ventures operations has increased over the course of the ventures development; and 3. Venture demonstrated learning capability: The extent to which the ventures managers have exhibited the ability to learn and apply valuable operations-related knowledge during the period of the ventures existence. This last variable is computed, using data furnished in response to items of the venture knowledge adequacy and venture knowledge acquisition extensiveness scales, by weighting the degree to which new knowledge has been acquired over the course of the ventures development by the adequacy of that knowledge. Not surprisingly, the results indicate that the perceived adequacy of venture management knowledge is positively correlated with venture performance and signicantly stronger among operating than defunct ventures. Knowledge acquisition extensiveness, on the other hand, is not associated with venture success. This nding likely reects the possibility that extensive knowledge acquisition may be as much a consequence of low venture performance as it is an antecedent of high venture performance. Finally, venture demonstrated learning capability islike venture knowledge adequacypositively correlated with venture performance, and signicantly stronger among operating than defunct ventures. Venture demonstrated learning capability is superior to venture knowledge adequacy as a venture capability indicator because the former explicitly considers how far the venture has come in acquiring venture management-related knowledge of a particular adequacy level. By contrast, venture knowledge adequacy is simply an indicator of the perceived quality of existing management-related knowledge; it doesnt explicitly reect the level of learning prociency exhibited by the venture managers in their acquisition of that knowledge.

5.10. Venture management knowledge

Venture managers knowledge of effective business management practices is an obvious consequence to venture performance. Three measures of venture manager knowledge were included in this research: 1. Venture knowledge adequacy: The perceived size of the gap between what the ventures management currently knows and what they believe they need to know regarding various aspects of the ventures operations in order to have condence in the quality of the business decisions they make based on this knowledge; 2. Venture knowledge acquisition extensiveness: The extent to which venture managements knowledge pertaining to various aspects of the

5.11. External environment

Two variables were measured as regards external environment: environmental hostility (the degree to which a ventures industry environment is competitively harsh, challenging, or threatening) and environmental dynamism (the degree to which a ventures industry environment is changing, unstable, or unpredictable). As might be predicted, both of these variables were negatively correlated with venture performance, although there were no signicant differences in either the hostility or the dynamism scores of the operating versus defunct ventures.

Corporate venturing: Insights from actual performance

467
Covin, J. G., & Miles, M. P. (1999). Corporate entrepreneurship and the pursuit of competitive advantage. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 23(3), 4764. Dess, G. G., Ireland, R. D., Zahra, S. A., Floyd, S. W., Janney, J. J., & Lane, P. J. (2003). Emerging issues in corporate entrepreneurship. Journal of Management, 29(3), 351378. Govindarajan, V., & Trimble, C. (2005). Building breakthrough businesses within established organizations. Harvard Business Review, 83(5), 5868. Hamel, G. (2000). Leading the revolution. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. (1989). Strategic intent. Harvard Business Review, 67(3), 6776. Hill, S. A., & Birkinshaw, J. (2008). Strategy Organization congurations in corporate venturing units: Impact on performance and survival. Journal of Business Venturing, 23(4), 423444. Ireland, R. D., Covin, J. G., & Kuratko, D. F. (2009). Conceptualizing corporate entrepreneurship strategy. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(1), 1946. Kuratko, D. F. (2007). Corporate entrepreneurship. Hanover, MA: Now Publishers Inc. Kuratko, D. F., Ireland, R. D., Covin, J. G., & Hornsby, J. S. (2005). A model of middle-level managers entrepreneurial behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(6), 699716. Miles, M. P., & Covin, J. G. (2002). Exploring the practice of corporate venturing: Some common forms and their organizational implications. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 26(3), 2140. Miller, A., Spann, M. S., & Lerner, L. (1991). Competitive advantages in new corporate ventures: The impact of resource sharing and reporting level. Journal of Business Venturing, 6(5), 335350. Morris, M. H., Kuratko, D. F., & Covin, J. G. (2008). Corporate entrepreneurship & innovation. Mason, OH: Cengage/SouthWestern Publishers. Schilit, H. A., Maula, M. V. J., & Keil, T. (2005). Explorative and exploitative learning from external corporate ventures. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(3), 493515. Schrader, R. C., & Simon, M. (1997). Corporate versus independent ventures: Resource, strategy, and performance differences. Journal of Business Venturing, 12(1), 4766. Shah, C. M., Zegveld, M. A., & Roodhart, L. (2008). Designing ventures that work. Research Technology Management, 51(2), 1725. Shane, S., & Venkataraman, S. (2000). The promise of entrepreneurship as a eld of research. Academy of Management Review, 25(1), 217226. Sorrentino, M., & Williams, M. L. (1995). Relatedness and corporate venturing: Does it really matter? Journal of Business Venturing, 10(1), 5973. Thornhill, S., & Amit, R. (2001). A dynamic perspective of internal t in corporate venturing. Journal of Business Venturing, 16(1), 2550. Tidd, J., & Taurins, S. (1999). Learn or leverage? Diversication and organizational learning through corporate ventures. Creativity and Innovation Management, 8(2), 122129. Vanhaverbeke, W., & Peeters, N. (2005). Embracing innovation as strategy: Corporate venturing, competence building, and corporate strategy making. Creativity and Innovation Management, 14(3), 246257.

6. Final thoughts
Innovation is a critical challenge for companies today. In response, entrepreneurial activity is being embraced by executives as a critical path to an organizations success. Entrepreneurial actions result in innovations that renew rms, their markets, and their industries (Vanhaverbeke & Peeters, 2005). In order to establish some factual foundations amid the popular folklore which surrounds corporate innovation today, we sought to examine the actual factors that inuence systematic explorations of internal corporate venturing success within the realm of a corporate entrepreneurship strategy. Identication of what works and what does not work is sorely needed within the corporate venturing arena (Shah, Zegveld, & Roodhart, 2008). Our study examined 145 internal corporate ventures (early-stage, middle-stage, and establishedstage) operating in 72 rms. Data were gathered from corporate-level managers, as well as venturelevel managers. Information gleaned from the companies was more in-depth as regards their current (and defunct) internal corporate venturing operations than has been identiable through previous studies. Using highlights of the aggregate data in the study, insights on some of the key correlates of corporate venturing performance were revealed. Each of the major correlates examined has previous literature regarding its signicance, and the observed ndings both corroborate and challenge existing conventional wisdom regarding enlightened internal corporate venturing practices. Importantly, the insights from this study can provide signicant benchmarks which executives may use to gauge the development, and predict the success, of their own internal venturing program.

References
Birkinshaw, J., van Basten Batenburg, R., & Murray, G. (2002a). Corporate venturing: The state of the art and the prospects for the future. London: London Business School. Birkinshaw, J., van Basten Batenburg, R., & Murray, G. (2002b). Venturing to succeed. Business Strategy Review, 13(4), 10 17. Covin, J. G., & Kuratko, D. F. (2008). The concept of corporate entrepreneurship. In V. Narayanan & G. OConnor (Eds.), The Blackwell encyclopedia of technology and innovation management. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.