On the Origins of Kant's 'TranscendentaP*

by Ignacio Angelelli, Austin It is a commonplace of philosophy dictionaries, starring perhaps from Mellin1, that the term 'transcendental* has two different meanings: the scholastic (predicates are transcendental if they apply to all objects) and what may be regarded s the main Kantian sense (propositions are transcendental if they concern the a priori legitimacy of other propositions). The form 'transcendentalis' was quite normal in the "modern", prekantian, 16th18th centuries, s opposed to the Middle Ages, when the form 'transcendens* prevailed2. Thus, it makes sense to wonder how or why the term 'transcendentalis' fared so oddly from its scholastic to its Kantian meaning. Literature on this subject, or more or less relevant to it, has been available for a long time3. Such scholarly efforts, however, are of very little help except when the author is sufficiently acquainted with the relatively traditional trends surviving and developing during the 16th17th centuries (which is quite different from being acquainted with medieval philosophy proper or with "modern" philosophy in the still current sense). * The Interpretation of Baumgarten included in this paper was first presented by me in a seminar conducted by Prof. R. Zodier, Erlangen University, 19656. The researdi was done under a grant from the A. von Humboldt Stiftung. I am grateful to Prof. Zodier for his valuable comments. 1 Transcendentalis, transcendental. Dieser Ausdruck, der schon bei den alten Logikern von einem Begriff gebraucht wurde, der von jeder Kategorie gilt, und also noch ber die Kategorien hinausgeht (transcendit), z.B. Ding, Sache, usw. ist von Kant festgesetzt worden, um diejenige Erkenntnis damit zu bezeichnen, weldie die Mglichkeit und den Gebrauch der Erkenntnis a priori betrifft (G. 80). G. S. A. Meilin, Encydopdisches Wrterbuch der kritischen Philosophie, 1797. (I owe this Information to T. Pinkard.) In the Italian Enciclopedia FHosofica (6 vols. 1970) the article on 'transcendentale9 Starts with the following remark: // termine ha due significati radicalmente diversL 2 For example, in Scheibler's Metaphysics (Marpurgi 1629, copy U. of Texas Library), we find both bonitas transcendens and bonitas transcendentalis, even within one sentence: Sed de bonitate transcendentali, est questio, an scilicet sint bona, sicut lapides plantae calor frigus etc. sunt aliquid boni, quorum omnium bonitatem complectitur bonitas transcendens (Bk I, eh. 10, titulus 3, art. 2). 1 A bibliography is included in N. Hinske, Kants Weg zur Transzendentalphilosophie, Kohlhammer, 1970. I shall add two curiosa to Hinske's list: W. L. Godshalk, 'Transcendental9: antedated, redefined, in Notes and Queries, 211 (1966), 254255 (I owe this Information to E. de Olaso), H. Scholz, Kant (Vorlesung SS 2932), ed. by Mathematische Arbeitsgemeinschaft, Mnster L W., 235 p.

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Pcrhaps the best survcy so far has been given by Hinske4. He points out that in the two centuries immediatcly preceding Kant, 'transcendental' was used in senses different both from the above mentioned scholastic meaning and from the Kantian one. He tries to construe these deviations s "links" or intermediate Steps that help to understand the history of the term, by bridging the gap between the medievals and Kant. Three groups of candidates are examined by Hinske: (1) the post-renaissance (mainly 17th Century) metaphysical tradition, (2) the Wolffian cosmologia trnscendentalis and (3) Baumgarten's Metaphysica. From the point of view of construing these facts s "links", Hinske's results are the following. In the postrenaissance metaphysical tradition, 'transcendental' becomes a predicate of theories (sets of propositions) and not merely a predicate of other predicates. This is not exceedingly interesting, because the transcendental nature of the theory simply means that the theory is about the transcendental notions in the old sense. As opposed to this, in the particular case of the cosmologla transcendentalis, Hinske claims that the use of the word 'transcendental' primarily means that the theory is a priori, rather than its having to do with universal notions5. Finally, Hinske does not find in Baumgarten any use of 'transcendental' that might be viewed s a "link" for our purposes. Baumgarten's use of the term is interpreted s being itself something that cannot be meaningfully related to the old sense6. Clearly the piece de resistance of Hinske's analysis is his evaluation of the second group of candidates. It might be said that in the first group (metaphysical tradition) we are just one step closer to Kant: the term becomes a predicate of theories. In the second group, the tradition related to the casmologia transcendentalis, we are two Steps closer to Kant: in Statements of the form *T is transcendental', 'transcendental' primarily means (according to Hinske) that the theory T is a priori.
4

N. Hinske, Die historischen Vorlagen der Kantischen Transzendentalphilosophie, in Ardiiv fr Begriffsgesdiidite, Band XII (1968), 86113. Reflektiert man auf die spezifische Bedeutung des transcendere, das in der Konzeption jener neuen transzendentalen Philosophie gedadit wird, so zeigt sidi: es ist nidit mehr das transcendere des ens" und seiner passiones" ber die Kategorien, sondern das transcendere der apriorischen Begriffe und Grundstze ber die Erkenntnisse der empirisdien Naturwissensdiaften. Die Transzendentalitt wurzelt jetzt nicht mehr in der Gemeinsdiaft und Allgemeinheit des Seins", sondern in der Allgemeinheit des Apriori gegenber der vereinzelten und blinden Erfahrung. (Hinske's paper mentioned in footnote 4, p. 102.) So gesehen enthllt die Verwendung des Terminus bei Baumgarten die fortschreitende Aushhlung und Entleerung der transzendentalphilosopliischen Tradition. Der Traditionsbruch (oder Verlust), der mit der Kantischen Transzendentalphilosophie verknpft scheint, vollzieht sich in Wahrheit weniger bei Kant selber als vielmehr in Wolffs transzendentaler Kosmologie und in Baumgartens Transzendentalienlehre. (Hinske's papei footnote 4, p. 107.)

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On the Origins of Kant's 'Transcendental'

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There is still a gap, however. Kant requires that T be not merely a piece of a priori knowledge, but also an explanation of the possibility of other pieces of a priori knowledge. Moreover, Hinske's evaluation "of 'transcendental* in the second group of candidates does not seem to be sufficiently supported by the texts he quotes. He emphasizes the a priori nature of the cosmologia transcendentalisy but one could just s easily justify an emphasis on the role played by the idea of universality in the evolution of the transcendental cosmology. The cosmologia transcendentalis may be a priori, but it is explicitly named 'transcendentalis' because it is universally applicable to all possible worlds. If it is a foundation of other theories (fundamentum, s Baumeister says), this is due to its universality7. Thus one may wonder to what extent Hinske is right in asserting that ctranscendentar in the old ontological tradition meant precisely universality. I will not, however, attempt to argue further against Hinske's evaluation of the second group s a "link* in the history of our term. Instead, I will argue that a far more interesting "link" is to be found in Baumgarten. Hinske's negative results about Baumgarten seem to depend on his Interpretation of Baumgarten's 'transcendental'. According to this Interpretation, 'transcendental1 means the same s 'essential'. That is, the use of the two terms is determined by the rule transcendental <==> essential, where fx' represents properties, 8 predicates, etc. . But a careful examination of the texts shows that this Interpretation is not accurate. Let us consider the relevant passages9:
73. Posito ente ponitur essentia, ergo complexus essentialium, hinc posito ente simul ponuntur essentialia omnia, et ita quidem, ut nullum possit tolli. Ergo essentialia entis sunt per se inseparabilia. Unum (Eins) est cuius determinationes sunt inseparabiles, et transcendentaliter quidem (wesentlidi eins) cuius determinationes sunt per se inseparabiles. Ergo omne ens est unum transcendentale. 89. Veritas metaphysica (die metaphysisdie Wahrheit), realis, obiectiva, materialis, est ordo plurium in uno, veritas in essentialibus et attributis entis, transcendentalis (die nothwendige metaphysisdie Wahrheit).
7 8 9

Demonstrantur quoque in cosmologia generali eiusmodi positiones quae, quia sunt universaliores, fundamenti loco substernuntur. (Quoted by Hinske, ibid. p. 102.) ,Transcendental* bedeutet soviel wie ,nothwendig' oder ,wesentlidic, Transzendentalitt heit Essentialitt... (Hinske, ibid, p. 107). Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysica, reprinted in volume 17 of the Akademie edition of Kant: 73. If being is posited, then essence is posited. Therefore the set of essential properties is posited s well. Hence, if being is posited, all the essential properties are posited at once and in such a way that none of them can be taken away. Therefore the essential properties of being are inseparable (per se). One, Eins, is that whose determinations are inseparable, and one transcendentally, wesentlidi eins, is that whose determinations are per se inseparable. Therefore every being is a transcendental one. 89. Metaphysical truth, die metapbysisdje Wahrheit, (realis, obiectiva, materialis) is the order of a multiplicity into one. Truth, in the essential properties and attributes of beings, is transcendental, die nothwendige metaphysische Wahrheit.

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90. Quum omnis cntis dctcrmlnationcs coniungantur... omnc cn$ est verum transcendcntalitcr. 98. Conscnsus esscntialium cst pcrfectio esscntialis transcendentalis (wesentliche), affectionum accidcntalis, utraque interna. Consensus relationum est pcrfectio externa. 99. Esscntialia omnis cntis conscntiunt ad csscntiam eius, et attributa. Ergo omne ens cst pcrfcctum transccndcntalitcr. 100. Bonum est quo posito ponitur perfectio. Ergo omne ens est bonum transcendentaliter.

It follows from Hinske's Interpretation that any essential property is transcendental. Each of the various, singly taken, predicates that constitme an essence would be transcendental. Referring to familir examples from classical ontology, animal, rational, etc., singly taken, would be transcendental, because they are essential predicates, or parts of the essence man. But whlte would not be transcendental, for it does not belong to any essence (of substances, at least). Baumgarten, however, means something different, s may be seen from the texts10. The predicates that constitute an essence are not transcendental, singly taken. Rather, the way in which they "hold together", or the way in which they are "one", is transcendental. To be one transcendentally is to be unified in the way essences, conceived s pluralities of predicates, have unity. Many groups of predicates "hold together" in a merely accidental way; such groups or sets of predicates are not transcendental. The set {animal, rational} is transcendental; the set {animal, wbite} is not. The term 'transcendental' in Baumgarten represents a property of sets of (two or more) properties, rather than a property of single properties. Perhaps a single essential property such s man, which happens to represent by itself a whole essence, could be called transcendental in Baumgarten's sense. This would be true only insofar s 'man' Stands for and "unifies" a certain plurality of predicates (the whole Porphyrian tree) and not because the property man is essential. If we said that the unity of essence is "essential" s opposed to "accidental", then we would have a use of 'essential' that would be synonymous with 'transcendental' in Baumgarten's sense. Indeed, such a use of 'essential' occurs in the above
90. As the determinations of every being are conjoined ... hence every being is transcendentally true. 98. The agreement of the essential properties is an essential, transcendental perfection, whereas that of the affections is an accidental perfection, and both are internal. The agreement of relations is an external perfection. 99. The essential properties of being agree among themselves ... therefore every being is transcendentally perfect. 100. Good is that which, if posited, also perfection is posited. Therefore every being is transcendentally good. 10 My Interpretation was reached independently of F. Delekat, 7. Kant, Heidelberg 1969 (3rd ed.), p. 77, 9798. In Delekat's book the problem of the semantical changes of 'transcendental' is not considered.

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On the Origins of Kant's Transcendental*

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quoted text 98. (But notice that then the compound 'essentialis transcendentalis* is superfluous, s 'transcendentalis transcendentalis'.) In Baumgarten, and in the pre-kantian tradition generally, the unity of essence was a necessary condition both fr there being objects (entia) in the world and for the possibility of what Kant would call synthetic a priori knowledge. The latter was discussed within the theory of propria (predicates that are neither in the essence nor accidental, but "flow*, s Locke says, necessarily from the essence). According to Baumgarten's treatise, *if there is no essence, there are no objects* (in a free translation of sublata essentia, tollitur ens, 63). Also, according to Baumgarten, the ratio -sufficiens of the attributa propria is the unity of essence- (51). Baumgarten surely did not call the unity of essence 'transcendental' because of its explanatory power. A plausible conjecture, however, is that a reader of Baumgarten who was primarily interested in an explanation of Gegenstndlichkeit berhaupt and synthesis a priori, may easily have begun to use the term 'transcendental' precisely to designate that explanatory power, regardless of whether the unity of essence really has it. In fact, from the point of view of the history of 'transcendental' it is irrelevant that our imaginary reader rejects the unity of essence and claims that other things provide a better explanation. The word 'transcendentaT will still have the same meaning that our reader has "discovered* s potentially given in Baumgarten. It is not unplausible to think of Kant s such a reader of Baumgarten, who replaces the unity of essence, apperceptibilis in the outside reality11 by the unity of apperception, and regards the latter s the true explanation of objects and scientific knowledge (within the limits of possible experience12). Kant himself in fact, invites us to do so, when he justifies bis calling the unity of apperception 'transcendental' by saying that this tenn is used um die Mglichkeit der Erkenntnis a priori aus ihr (= unity of apperception) zu bezeichnen (B132). It is not necessary, however, to make any empirical assumption about Kant's actual choice of the word *transcendental'v It is sufficient to observe that, given (1) Baumgarten's use, (2) Kant's philosophical program and last but not least (3) the already established use of 'transcendental' s predicate of theories, it is only natural that the word acquired the Kantian meaning. I would like to contrast this Interpretation with Hinske's assertion that Kant's meaning cannot be directly derived (geradlinig abzuleiten) from its antecedents (cf. book mentioned in footnote 3, p. 79).
11 lf

Certitudo obicctiva cst apperceptibilitas veritatis in cnte (Baumgarten, Metapbysica, 93). The uniry of apperception alone corresponds to the category of cogitabile among the late sdiolastics 'Cogitabile* is a predicate applying not only to all real beings (entia realia) but also to entia rationis. Fonseca says that this kind of predicate was called by the late sdiolastics (a recentioribus) 'supertranscendentalis? (Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Ocio, Lugduni, 1611, Liber l caput 28). Gassendl uses 'supertranscendens* (In Meditationem V> Dub. 2, Inst.). Should Kant have said 'supertranscendental unity of apperception'?

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But now we have to facc a new problem: how to explain the transition from the old, scholastic scnse to Baumgarten's meanlng? The answer is rather simple s soon s one observes a main feature of the metaphysics prevailing in the 17th and 18th ccnturies. This was definitely an essentialist metaphysics. Ens was for such authors s Suarez, Scheibler, Wolff, the same s essence, because being (ens) did not include for them the actus essendi (existentia, actuality13). Thus, under the essentialist approach the transcendentals, i. e. the properties of all entia, become properties of all essences. Instead of ' ens ++ one', our essentialist metaphysicians should really say: ' essence ++ one', and similarly for 'true', 'good', c perfect', etc. As a matter of fact, we find in Scheibler, together with the official definition of 'transcendental' in terms of universality and transcending the categories, a less obvious definition of it s designating what follows from essence s such14. The transcendentals, being predicates coextensive with 'essence' turn out to be propria of it. Thus, Baumgarten's sense naturally "flows" from the combination of two historical conditions: transcendentality s universality and metaphysics s scientia possibilium.

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14

Ens est quod habet essentiam, Essentia igitur est id quo ens est ens (Metaphysica, I, di. 2). Ens nominaliter sumendum est. Nam ens dividitur in Ens acni et potestate. Ut de consequens est, Ens ut sie sumptum praescindere ab actu essendi... (ibid. tit. l, art. 7). Compare Crusius' impressive remark on this point: Es wird audi dieses denenjenigen nidit fremde vorkommen, welche sich nidit an eine soldie unvollstndige Ontologie gewhnet haben, darinnen man auf nichts als auf das Wesen der Dinge, nidit aber auf ihre Existenz Adit zu haben pfleget (Ch. A. Crusius, Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, Leipzig 1745, p. 91). Affectiones entis sunt, quae ad essentiam consequuntur, ut quod Ens dicitur Unum, Verum, Bonum et sie deinceps. Rectius dicuntur Attributa (Scheibler, Metaphysica, I, eh. 3: De transcendentalibus affectionibus entis in genere). There is a striking analogy between this text and Kant's Reflexion 4025: transcendentaliter wird etwas betrachtet, wenn es beziehungsweise auf sein Wesen als die Folge erwogen wird.

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