The academic field known in the English-speaking world as industrial relations (IR) has little institutional presence in the

universities of continental Europe and those other parts of the world where anglosaxon modes of analysis are not dominant. Rather than focussing on wider questions of social relations, it has historically concentrated on worker and employer organization and collective behaviour, workplace conflict over work-related matters, and (in particular) the regulation of the formal employment relationship, whether via the law or collective bargaining. Thus, for example, during the 1980s, IR research in the UK was dominated by analyses of the effect of the Thatcher administrations labour law reforms on collective bargaining and industrial action and on the responses of unions to attacks on their established institutional position and prerogatives. One of the most important theoretical developments in this Anglophone research tradition was the publication in 1966 of a paper written for a UK government commission of inquiry into workplace relations. The author, Alan Fox, used this paper to introduce what he called the frames of reference approach to IR. His book Beyond Contract, in which he added a third frame of reference to the two he had previously identified, followed in 1974. Since then, IR as an academic discipline has seen few if any truly significant theoretical developments. This paper argues that the essence of Foxs theory the idea that subjective conceptual structures condition attitudes and behaviour in economic and organizational contexts remains valid, but that there is a need both to broaden and to deepen Foxs work. First of all there is a need to add to the categorisation of ways of seeing economic and organizational phenomena. Second, there is a need to better understand how social learning processes lead to the adoption or rejection of different frames of reference. These learning processes include both analyses of the functional efficacy of conceptual models and the evaluation of the outcomes of social action against normative standards. The principal aim of this paper is to address the first of these needs, although it will also make some proposals with respect to the second. The theoretical resources required for these tasks are drawn from the work of Jrgen Habermas.

UNITARISM, PLURALISM, RADICALISM... AND THE REST ?

Conor Cradden

Working Paper N7 / 2011

Conor Cradden est charg de cours et matre-assistant au Dpartement de Sociologie de l'Universit de Genve.

Dpartement de sociologie

UNITARISM, PLURALISM, RADICALISM... AND THE REST ? Why the frames of reference approach is still relevant to the study of industrial relations, but why we need nine frames rather than just three.
Conor Cradden

Sociograph - Working Paper n7 / 2011

Citation conseille : Conor Cradden (2011). "UNITARISM, PLURALISM, RADICALISM... AND THE REST ? Why the frames of reference approach is still relevant to the study of industrial relations, but why we need nine frames rather than just three." Genve : Universit de Genve Publication sur Internet : www.unige.ch/ses/socio/

AsKaufmanpointsout(2004,p.4356),ithasfrequentlybeenremarkedthattheacademic fieldknownintheEnglishspeakingworldasindustrialrelations(IR)haslittleinstitutional presenceintheuniversitiesofcontinentalEuropeandthoseotherpartsoftheworldwhere anglosaxonmodesofanalysisarenotdominant.Kaufmantracesthisabsencetoa divergenceindiscursiveconventioninthe19thcentury(2004,p.3235).WhereasinFrance andGermany,industrialunrestandtherelationshipbetweenworkersandemployerswas typicallythoughttobeinseparablefromthebroadercontextofclass,socialrelationsand thepoliticalandlegalstructuresofsociety,inBritainthetendencywastorefernottothe socialquestionbuttothelabourproblem,thusfocussingmuchmorenarrowlyonthe conflictbetweencapitalandlabour.Inconstructingsocialconflictasthelabourproblem, thecleavagebetweentheownersofcapital(andtheiragentsinmanagement)andthe organisedworkingclasswasidentifiedasthemostfundamentalfractureinthesocialfabric, and,assuch,astheappropriatelocusofeffortsatsocialengineeringdesignedtomendthat fabric.Thefieldofindustrialrelationsemergedspecificallyasaresponsetothelabour problemandassuchhashistoricallyconcentratedonworkerandemployerorganization andcollectivebehaviour,workplaceconflictoverworkrelatedmatters,and(inparticular) theregulationoftheformalemploymentrelationship,whetherviathelaworcollective bargaining.Thus,forexample,duringthe1980s,IRresearchintheUKwasdominatedby analysesoftheeffectoftheThatcheradministrationslabourlawreformsoncollective bargainingandindustrialactionandontheresponsesofunionstoattacksontheir establishedinstitutionalpositionandprerogatives. WhileIRisdefinedbyitsobjectofstudyratherthanbyadisciplinaryorientation themethodsofeconomics,politicalscience,sociologyandlawareallfreelyusedithas arguablymanagedtomaintainakindoftheoreticalcoherencearoundthecrucial importanceofthesocialcontextofworkandworkplacerelations.Forexample,John Commons,thefounderofacademicindustrialrelationsintheUSA,washeavilyinfluenced bytheGermanhistoricalschoolofeconomics,whichprivilegedtheanalysisoftheempirical andhistoricalcontextofeconomicdecisionmakingovertheabstractlogicalor mathematicalmodellingofbehaviour.IntheUK,atleastupuntilthe1970s,theexplanation ofoutcomeswastypicallybasedondetailed,almostanthropologicalobservationof workplaceinteractions.Itwasrarelyifeverassumedthathigherlevelsocialandeconomic processescouldcutthroughthespecificitiesofeachinteractionsituationandthe participantsinterpretationsofthosesituations. ItwasAlanFox,alectureratOxfordUniversityactivefromaround1950untilthe mid1980s,whobestcapturedthistheoreticaltendency,arguingthatattitudesand behaviourineconomicandorganizationalcontextsareconditionedbycontingent, intersubjectiveconceptualstructuresarisingbothfromgeneralprocessesofsocialisation andfromdirectexperienceintheworkplace.Foxfirstsetouthistheoryinhisfamouspaper IndustrialSociologyandIndustrialRelations(Fox1966),whichwaswrittenasabackground paperforaUKpublicenquiryintolabourmanagementrelationspromptedbyconcerns aboutincreasedlevelsofindustrialconflictanddecentralisedunionaction.Inthispaper, Foxintroducedtheframesofreferenceapproachtoindustrialrelations(IR)inwhichhe arguedthatitisalwayspossibletoconceivetheemploymentrelationshipineitheroneof twoincompatibleways.Eitheritisarelationshipofsocialmembershipwhichexiststo satisfycommoninterests(theunitaristframeofreference),oritisanegotiated,contractual relationshipwhichexiststosatisfytheinterestsofseparatebutinterdependentgroups(the pluralistframeofreference).InhisbookBeyondContract(1974)headdedathird

conceptualpossibility,theradicalframeofreference,fromtheperspectiveofwhichthe employmentrelationshipisanentirelyillegitimaterelationshipwhichexistssolelytosatisfy theinterestsofthedominantparty. FoxsframesofreferenceapproachstillstructuresmuchIRteachingandresearch. Theyearssinceitwasfirstmootedhaveseenfewifanysimilarlysignificanttheoretical developments.Inthispaperwearguethatthisapproachremainsvalid,butthatthereisa needbothtobroadenandtodeepenFoxswork.Firstofallthereisaneedtoaddtothe categorisationofwaysofseeingeconomicandorganizationalphenomena.Second,thereis aneedtobetterunderstandhowsociallearningprocesses,whetherthosefocusingonthe functionalcharacteristicsofsocialsystemsorthosefocusingonthenormativeoutcomesof socialaction,leadtotheadoptionorrejectionofdifferentframesofreference.The principalaimofthispaperistoaddressthefirstoftheseneeds,althoughitwillalsomake someproposalswithrespecttothesecond.Thetheoreticalresourcesrequiredforthese tasksaredrawnlargelyfromtheworkofsociologistandphilosopherJrgenHabermas (1984,1987,1996). AccordingtoHabermas,thefundamentalbuildingblockofanytheorizationofsocial action,regardlessofthecontext,shouldbethemeansofactioncoordination.Heargues thattherearethreebasicmodesofsocialactioncoordination.Twoofthesemodesof coordinationareformal,whichistosaytheyarebasedonlegalorquasilegalrules.These aremarkets/contractsandbureaucraticregulation.Inactioncontextsgovernedprincipally bytheseformalmodesofcoordinationwecantalkabouttheexistenceofsocialsystems.By contrast,thethirdmodeofcoordinationcoordinationonthebasisofsocialnorms,values andconventionsisentirelyinformalinthatitremainsuncodifiedandissubjectto unintendedchangeandvariationacrosstimeandsocialcontexts.Whatremainsunresolved withinHabermassworkistherelationshipbetweenthesedifferentmodesofcoordination. Whereashismainargumentisthatamarketorbureaucratic/organisationalactioncontext effectivelyinsulatesactorsfromtheinfluenceofmoregeneralnormsandvalues,leaving onlytheempiricalmotivationofsanctionandrewardtoguideaction(Habermas1987, p.308),healsosuggeststhatthedegreetowhichformalandinformalmodesof coordinationinfluenceanyparticularactionsituationisanempiricalratherthana theoreticalquestion(Habermas1987,p.312). TheanglosaxonIRtraditionissurprisinglycoherentwiththisanalyticscheme.1On theonehand,IRintheEnglishspeakingworldhastendedtoprivilegefunctionalist theoreticalapproachesthatfocusontheformallycoordinatedaspectsoftheemployment relationship.Withinthisintellectualcurrent,theunitaristpluralistdichotomyalsoreflects certainaspectsofHabermassdistinctionbetweencoordinationviabureaucraticregulation (therulesoforganisationalmembership)andcoordinationviamarkets(contracts).Onthe otherhand,wealsofindwithintheanglophoneapproachtoIRastrongcurrentofresearch andteachingthatinsiststhatworkplacebehaviourissignificantlyinfluencedbyinformal norms,valuesandconventions,whetherthosearisingintheworkplaceitselforthose importedfromthesocialworldbeyondthefactorygates.Aswiththedebatesurrounding Habermasswork,notrulysatisfactoryconclusionshaveeverbeendrawnaboutthe relationshipbetweenconceptualisationsofemployingorganisations,thenormsandvalues
1 ThiscoherenceisperhapslesssurprisingifoneconsidersthattheprincipalintellectualinfluencesonangloamericanIR Marx,Weber,DurkheimandParsonsarethosewhoseworkHabermassynthesiseswithinhisTheoryofCommunicative Action.

ofthecommunitieswithinwhichworkplacesareembeddedandsocialbehaviouratwork whetherthatofemployeesorthatofmanagers. Giventhisambiguity,itseemswisetostartfromtheassumptionthatthereisgood reasonforthedifferentcurrentsandsubcurrentsofIRresearchtocoexist.Iwantto proposethatemploymentissusceptibletoeitherpluralistorunitaristinterpretationquite simplybecauseitissimultaneouslyanexchangerelationshipwithinalabourmarketsystem andarelationshipofmembershipinanorganizationalcommunitydefinedanddelimitedby asystemofbureaucraticrules.Similarly,Iwouldarguethatresearchfocusingoninformal socialnormsintheworkplacehasgivenrisetovaluableinsightsbecausethesenon economicvaluesandconventionsaremuchmorethansimplynoiseinrelationships governedprincipallybyexternalforces. Ifwewanttomaintainthattheseapproachescanallbevalidatonce,however, therearetwosignificantproblemsthatneedtoberesolved.Thefirstisthatthesimple distinctionbetweenunitaristandpluralistframesofreferencedoesnotadequatelycover thevariationsinperspectivethatexistinpractice.Theradicalframeofreference,for example,sharespluralismscentralanalyticfocusonthebalanceofinterestsbetweenthose whoworkandthosewhoownthemeansofproduction,butisdistinguishedbyapre commitmenttotheimpossibilityofachievingagenuinelyanddurablyfairbalanceinthis respect.Similarly,theverydifferentprescriptionsofhardandsofthumanresources managementarisefromconceptualpositionsthatarebothrecognisablyunitarist. Thesecondproblemisthattherelationshipbetweenthedifferentmodesofsocial actioncoordinationisnotatallclear.Weneedtobeabletosuggesthowthedifferent modesofformalcoordinationinteract,andwhatroleisplayedbyinformalcoordination mechanismsincontextsofactionthatareorappeartobeprimarilyformallycoordinated. Whatfollowsfallsintotwoparts.ThefirstofthesebuildsonFoxsapproach,arguing thatframesofreferenceshouldbeunderstoodasconceptualconstructsthatpermitactors tograspthefunctionalcharacteristicsofsocialsystems.Thesecondpartbuildsonthe propositionthattheenduringappealoftheunitaristpluralistdichotomyisaconsequence ofitsreflectingthegenuineambiguityordualityoftheemploymentrelationship.Itargues thatemploymentissimultaneouslyanexchangerelationshipandarelationshipofsocial membership,andthatforthisreasonwecanconceptualizedifferentvarietiesofIRsystem bylookingattheinteractionbetweenperspectivesonmarketeconomicsystemsand perspectivesonemploymentsystems.Threepossiblecategoriesofoverallnormative evaluationofformalsocialsystemsareidentified,whichinthecontextoftheinteraction betweentwodifferentsystemsthemarketeconomyandtheemploymentsystemgive risetoapotential9differentframesofreference. Foxsdualism Sincethemid1960sthedistinctionbetweenunitarismandpluralism,proposedastwo incompatiblebasicconceptualizationsoftheorganisationandtheemploymentrelationship, hasbeenthesinglemostimportantelementinindustrialrelationstheory.Althoughsimilar dualismshadbeensuggestedbeforeinparticularClarkKerrsdistinctionbetweenthe economicandthesociologicalperspectiveontheanalysisofindustry(Kerr1964)Fox clarifiedandcontrastedthetwoapproachesinhispaperfortheDonovanCommission(Fox 1966),locatingthemwithinasimpleandcompellingtheoreticalframeworkdrawnfrom socialpsychology.Unitarismandpluralismweretwoframesofreference;twoconflicting andincommensurablewaysofseeingtheworldwhichhadverydifferentimplicationsfor

practice.Theessentialdifferencebetweenthemisstraightforward.Theunitaristsees employmentasarelationshipbetweenmembersofasinglesocialgroup,agroupwitha commonpurposeor,touseRousseausterm,ageneralwill.Thenaturalstateofthe relationshipiscooperation,withoutpreconditions,inpursuitofthegroupsaimsand values.Crucially,theseaimsandvaluesexistpriortoanyplansforaction.Membershipof thegroupispremisedontheacceptanceofthesefundamentalactionorientations(touse Habermassterm)andnotsolelyontheparticularcomponentoftheplansandstrategies derivedfromthemthatitfallstoanyoneindividualtoexecute.Thepluralist,ontheother hand,conceivesemploymentasastrategicrelationshipbetweenstrangers.Employeeand employerhavedifferentandcompetingaimsandvaluesandhencecannotbesaidtoforma singlesocialgroup.Theyhavenocommonpurpose,andnogeneralwillcanbeattributedto them.Employment,then,isarelationshipcharacterizedbyconflictandtheresolutionof conflict.Anycooperationthatarisescanonlybebasedontherecognitionofthe participantsmutualneedforthehelpoftheothertoattaintheirseparategoals. Membershipofthegroupispremisednotonapriorcommitmenttoanyparticularsetof aims,butonastrategicrecognitionofmutualdependenceandawillingnesstoseekto defineplansandstrategieswhichwhencarriedoutwillsatisfytheindividualorsectional interestsofallinvolved. WewanttoconsiderFoxsworknotmerelyasatheoryofindustrialrelations,butas asocialtheory,albeitarudimentaryone,whichattemptstoexplainthebehaviourofactors inthecontextofthecapitalistemploymentrelationship.Foxrecognizedthatbothframesof referencewereinacertainsensedefensible,oratleastthatitwaspossibletounderstand whytheiradvocatessawtheworldinthewaythattheydid.Heattemptedtoexplainthe factorsthatmightleadactorstoadoptoneperspectiveortheotherandwhatthe consequencesofthismightbeintermsoforganisationalstructure.Whatweproposetodo inthenexttwosectionsofthepaperistoproposeareadingofFoxsworkthatwewillthen useasthestartingpointforthedevelopmentofamorecompletepictureoftheframesof reference.Forthemomentwewanttofocusonhisearlierposition,beforetheintroduction ofwhathasbecomeknownastheradicalframeofreference.

theirbeingthesortofpeopletheyare,butalsobythetechnologywithwhichthey work,thestructureofauthority,communicationsandstatuswithinwhichtheyare located,thesystemofpunishments,rewardsandothermanagementcontrolsto whichtheyaresubjectedandvariousotheraspectsofthestructuresofthe situation.(Fox1966,para60)

Foxintroducestheconceptsoftheroleandofrolebehaviourasmediating betweenstructureandchoicesaboutaction.Roles,heargues,arelargelystructurally determined,eachapatternofrequiredbehaviourwhichinsomemeasureexists independentlyofthepersonfillingitatanyonetime(Fox1966.,para62).Rolesconstrain anddeterminethebehaviouroftheiroccupantstosuchanextentthat,regardlessofwhois fillingthem,therelationshipbetweenroleswillalwaysbemoreorlessthesame.Thusto changebehaviouryouneedtochangeroles,andtochangerolesyouneedtochange structure.InessenceFoxscontentionisthatifthestructuresoftheenterpriseremainthe same,thenotherattemptstochangebehaviourwhetherthroughexhortation,incentives orthreatsarefutile. However,whileemployeeshavelittleornoinfluenceoverthebasicpatternof behaviourdictatedbytheirplacewithintheorganisation,thequestionsofhowthey experienceandinterpretthisrequirementforconformity,theattitudewithwhichthey approachit,andwhetherandtowhatextenttheymaychallengeitremainopen.Thisis whereactionlevelfactorsenterintothepicture.AlthoughFoxspendsverylittletime definingordiscussingthebasicconceptofaframeofreference,itseemsclearthatthat framesofreferencefallintothecategoryofactionlevelfactors.Whatdistinguishesthem fromotherfactorsofthistypeisthattheyariseonlyinsofarasthereisaneedtograspor understandwhatHabermascallsformallyorganisedcontextsofaction.Framesof referencegivemeaningtoparticipationinthetypeofcoordinatedsocialactionwhicharises notfromsharedaimsandvaluesbutfromthestructuresofthesituation.Byapplyinga frameofreference,participantsareabletounderstandtheirstructurallydetermined behaviourassomethingotherthanbareconstraintorcompulsion.Framesofreferenceare interpretationsofstructuralrolebehaviourthatexplain,rationaliseandprovidenormative supportforornormativelymotivatedrejectionofaparticulartypeandrangeofrole requirementsandconstraints.Fromtheunitaristperspective,forexample,theemployment relationshipcanbeunderstoodasakindofsocialmembership;asthecooperativepursuitof commonaimsandvaluesonthebasisofatechnicallyeffectivedivisionoflabour.Fromthe pluralistperspective,employmentistypicallyunderstoodasparticipationinanexchangeof acertainamountandtypeoflabourforacertainamountofmoney.Thedifferent participantsgetwhattheyneedwithouthavingtoacceptthevalidityoftheaimsandvalues oftheothers.Thusframesofreferencepermitactorstounderstandsocialsituationsand relationshipsthatwouldotherwisebemeaningless. Framesofreferencealsoinformtheworkofthosewhodesigntheorganisational systemsthatgiverisetostructuralroles.Crucially,thedifferentframesimplyverydifferent workplacestructuresandrelationships.Foxsdiagnosisofthetimesisthatwhilethevast majorityoforganisationsinthe1960swerestructuredfromaunitaristperspective,the majorityofemployeeshadapluralistperspective.Hebelievedthatthegenerallackof cooperationandhighlevelsofovertconflictthatcharacterisedBritishindustrywerethe directresultofadissonancebetweenstructurallyconstrainedorrequiredrolebehaviour andtheactionlevelfactorsthatwouldotherwisemotivatesocialaction,asmediatedbythe pluralistframeofreference. 8

Theideaofframesofreferenceassocialtheory Foxs1966paperattemptstostepawayfromthepoliticalargumentsofthedayinorderto explainwhytheunitaristroutetoimprovedcooperationbetweenworkersand managementinindustrywastobeobjectedtoonstrictlyscientificratherthannormative grounds.ImpliedinFoxsapproachisadistinctionbetweenthestructuraldeterminantsof behaviourandwhatwecancallactionleveldeterminants.Theformersetoffactorsis externaltotheindividualactor,constraininghisorherchoicesofactioninarather concrete,materialway.Thelattersetisinternal,affectingbehaviourviaattitudes,culture, socialisation,perceptions,definitionsandothersubjectiveandintersubjectivemeansof makingsenseofthesocialworld.Intheabsenceofstructuralconstraints,behaviouris determinedbyactionlevelfactors. Atfirstglance,the1966paperwouldprobablyleadonetobelievethatFoxconsiders thestructuraldeterminantsofbehaviourtobetheonlyimportantfactorsinthe organisationalcontext.Thesedeterminants
exerttheireffectsirrespectiveofnormalvariationsofpersonalityandpersonal relationships.Abriefstatementofthisapproachmightbethattheindustrial behaviourofindividualsandrelationshipsbetweenthemareshaped,notonlyby

Therearetwopossibilitiesfortheresolutionofthisdissonance.Thefirstisto somehowtogetworkerstoaccepttheunitaristframeofreference.Foxdoesnotsetout systematicallywhyoneframeofreferencemightbeadoptedasopposedtoanother,but theoverallpictureisclearenough.Framesofreferenceariseandareadoptedonthebasis oflivedexperienceintheworkplace;assessmentsofthestateofpowerrelationsinindustry andthebalanceofinterestsintheeconomy;generalsocioculturalattitudes;andthe norms,conventionsandvaluesheldtobevalidinactorsimmediatesocialenvironments, whetherwithintheworkplaceorbeyond.Foxallowsthatincertaincircumstancesitmaybe possibletopersuadeorcajoleemployeestoaccepttheunitaristperspective:

Historyandcurrentobservationshowthatmanagementmaysucceed,witha judiciousblendofauthoritarianismandpropagationoftheunitaryideology,in mouldingsubordinatesperceptionsverydifferently,particularlyifitcandraw supportfromtheculturalvaluesofthelocalcommunityorwidersociety(Fox1974, pp2712;emphasisadded).

However,hecommentsthatthecapacityofemployerstoproducethiskindof legitimisingsentimentinemployeesisdiminishinginthefaceofgeneralculturalchange andtheshiftingbalanceofpowerinindustry.ForFoxthereisnoquestionthatthesecond possibilityforresolvingthedissonancethatgivesrisetoindustrialconflict,restructuring industryalongpluralistlines,istheonlyeffectivesolutioninpractice. Inshort,then,Foxsadvocacyofpluralistindustrialrelationsisbasedonthe empiricallygroundedbeliefthatcooperationcanbestbeachievedbystructuralchangein industry.Theorganisationalstructuresofthe1960s,whichhadbeeninheritedfromBritains industrialpast,werebasedontheassumptionofaunityofinterestatthelevelofa stratifiedclasssocietyinwhichthemajorityofindividualsknewandacceptedtheirplace. Howeverthedeference,povertyofaspirationandpowerlessnessthatcharacterizedthe workingclassesinthatsocietyhaddisappeared.Therolesthatemployeeswererequiredto takeonasaconsequenceoftheexistingmodesofworkorganization,workrulesandwork practiceswerethereforeinconflictwithempiricalsocialreality.Workwasadenialrather thananaffirmationofworkerstruesocialidentitythesame,ofcourse,couldbesaidof managersandhencetheorganizationofindustrywaspreventingcooperationrather thanmakingitpossible.Inordertoimprovecooperationandthereforeeconomic performance,industrialstructureshadtoberedesigned.Thisobviouslyhadtobeginwitha soberandobjectiveassessmentofthenatureofcontemporarysociety.Suchanassessment clearlysuggestedthatsocietywasexperiencingamajorclashofvalues.Thedominanceof thecapitalowningclasses(andtheiragentsandcollaboratorsinmanagement),aswellas theirrighttoclaimthefruitsofcollectivelabourforthemselveswasbeingopenlyand consciouslychallengedbyorganizedworkers.Foxsawlittleornopossibilitythatmanagers couldsimplypersuadeemployeestoaccepttheirauthoritywithoutdemur.Indeed,ashe measuredit,thegapbetweentheemergentsocialrealityandtheunitaristoutlookwasso widethattheunitaristperspectiverepresentedakindofcognitivedysfunction.Hetalks aboutthehighemotionalyieldthatmanagersgotfromtheirideology,andtheguiltthey mayhaveexperiencediftheysurrenderedwhattheysawtobetheirproperdecision makingprerogative.Managerscouldalsodemonstrateagenuineincapacitytounderstand theconflictgeneratedbypluralisticforces(Fox1966.,para489).Perhapsmostdamningly, hecommentsthatunitarismisnotananalytictoolforsocialdiagnosisandprescription,but aninstrumentbywhichmanagersseektoreassurethemselvesandpublicopinionthat 9

thecauseoffailurelieselsewhere(Fox1966.,para51).ForFox,thepluralistperspective wasbyfarthemoreaccuratereflectionofsocialreality,anditwaspluralismthatshould providetheconceptualbasisforthereformofthestructuresoftheenterpriseandof industrialrelations. Theradicalframeofreference:valuesandtheinstitutionaldimension Initsearlierincarnation,theframesofreferenceapproachremainsfirmlyrootedinsocial psychology,theinfluenceoftheTavistockInstitutebeingparticularlyclear(seeforexample Fox1966,para16).Assetoutinthe1966paper,themechanismthatdrivesconflictisnotto befoundatthelevelofinterestsorpoliticalconsciousness,but,aswehavejustseen,atthe cognitivelevel.Conflictistheresultofadissonancebetweenworkplacerolesandthe framesofreferencethatarisefromtheperceptions,definitions,beliefs,attitudesand assumptionsthatunderpinwidersociallife.Aligningthestructuralandactionlevel determinantsofbehaviourwouldresolvethedissonanceandremovethesourceofconflict, openingthewaytoimprovedcooperationwithalltheresultanteconomicbenefits. WhileBeyondContract(1974)doesnotcontradictthisanalysis,itaddstworather moresociologicalelementstothepicture.Firstofallitrecognisesthattheadoptionofa frameofreferenceinvolvesmakingsignificantnormativejudgements.Actorschoiceof perspectiveisnotmadesolelyonthebasisofadisinterestedortechnicalanalysisofsociety. Second,itsuggeststhattheinstitutionaldimensionoftheemploymentrelationshipinthe broadsenseofinternalenterpriseprocedures,employmentlawandtheotherinstitutions ofIRbeyondtheworkplacelevelneedstobeconsideredseparatelyfromthemarket dimension. Asiswellknown,Foxcametoseethepluralistapproachnotasapotentialsolution toindustrialconflictbutaspartoftheproblem.Hebecameconcernedaboutthevaluesthat werebuiltintopluralistindustrialrelationsandaboutthepoliticalpurposesthatitmight therebyserve.Ashehimselfargues,thepluralistperspectivemakesnosenseunlessitis acceptedthatfreedomof(collective)contractisnotafictionthatthepoweroforganised workersissuchastobalancetheinherentadvantageoftheemployerintheemployment relationshipandthattheagreementsstruckbetweenunionisedworkersandtheir employersaretherebymorallybinding(Fox1974,p272).Thisassumptionisimplicitinthe 1966paper,butby1974Foxwasreadytoarguethatamereonpaperbalanceofpoweris notthewholestory:
thenegotiationoforderwithintheenterprisetakesplaceonlyatthemargins. Managementandtheemployeeinterestsdonotjointlybuilduptheircollaborative structurefromthegroundfloorup.Powerandsocialconditioningcausethe employeeintereststoacceptmanagementsshapingofthemainstructurelong beforetheyreachthenegotiatingtable(1974,p.286;emphasisadded).

Asaconceptualapproachtopublicpolicy,then,pluralismlentitselftooeasilytoco optionintoaconservativesociologyofworkinwhichtheoverarchingideologicalgoalwas thepreservationoftheexistingorderratherthananyemancipatoryproject:thepluralist ideologywouldbethechoiceofastructuralfunctionalistseekingtoidentifytheappropriate integrativemechanismsforindustrialrelationssystemsinWesternsocietiesfunctionally appropriate,thatis,whateveritsprofessedintentions,inmaintainingthestatusquoof highlyunequalpower,wealthandprivilege(Fox1974,p.282).

10

 ForFoxthekeyaspectoftheradicalframeofreferenceistherecognitionofthis conservatismtherecognitionthatcertainantiworkervaluesandinterestsareinherentin theinstitutionalstructuresofemploymentandIRandthatforthisreasonnosignificant emancipationofworkerscanbeachievedwhilepreservingtheessentialsoftheexisting system.Theradicalframesharesthepluralistassumptionthattherearedistinctand competingsetsofvaluesandinterestsatplaywithintheenterprise.However,italso assumesthatthecapitalistemploymentrelationship,togetherwiththeinstitutionalIR structuresthatsupportit,cannotcorrectorcompensateforthisimbalanceinthewaythat pluralismsupposes.Onlyafundamentalrestructuringofeconomicandsocialrelationscan correcttheimbalance.Wecanargue,then,thatthereareinfacttwodimensionstothe choiceoftheradicalframeofreference.Firstofall,thereisthebeliefthatthevaluesof capitalismandthemarketeconomyarenotuniversal;thatcapitalisminvolvesthepursuitof theaimsandinterestsofthefewratherthanofthemany.Second,thereisthebeliefthat theinstitutionalstructuresofemploymentandIRarethemselvesvalueladenanddonot permitanappropriatebalancetobestruckbetweentheinterestsofworkersandthoseof employers/owners. TakingupwhereFoxleftoff WehavereachedthepointatwhichFoxalonecantakeusnofurther.Whatwewanttodo nowistoclarifyandexpandoncertainproposalsthatareimpliedbyhisworkbutthathe himselfdoesnotmake.Wewillbeginwiththedistinctionbetweenthemarketandthe institutionalorregulatoryaspectsofemployment. OneoftheabidingcharacteristicsofIRintheangloamericantraditionisthe assumptionthattheemploymentrelationshipcannotbereducedtoafinancialexchange. ThisassumptionistosomeextentaninheritancefromAmericaninstitutionaleconomics, whichwouldarguethatclassical(orneoclassical)economictheoryisinadequatetothe explanationofconcreteeconomicbehaviourbecauseitemphasizesmonetaryexchangeat theexpenseofother,equallyimportantformsofsocialinteraction.Themostimportantof thesearetheinteractionsthattakeplacewithinenterprises.Commons,forexample,argued thatmarketexchangeisonlyoneofthreeformsoftransactioninwhichownershipis legallytransferred(Kaufman,2004,pp.1049).Theothertwo,therationingtransaction(the exchangeofpropertyrightscommandedbyalegalsuperior)andthemanagerialtransaction (theexchangeoftheworkerspropertyrightsoverherlabourpowerwiththeemployer) requirethepresenceofaninstitutionalstructurethatgoeswellbeyondthesimplelawof contract.Theconceptsoftherationingtransactionineffect,managerialplansand strategiesandthemanagerialtransactionthesocialorganizationofthelabourprocess allowtheconstructionofarathermorerealisticapproachtoeconomicsinwhichthe existenceofpositivetransactioncostsisrecognized.AsKaufmanargues,thenon neoclassicalassumptionsofboundedrationality,imperfectinformation,incompletemarkets andcostlyenforcementofcontractspermittheconceptualizationoftheeconomyasamix ofmarketsandorganizations,includinglargehierarchicalfirmswithanemployment relationship(2004,p.105). IfwestickwithFoxsterminology,then,wecanproposethatwhenitcomestothe employmentrelationshiptherearetwoaspectstothestructuresofthesituation:a market/exchangeaspectandanorganisational/institutional/regulatoryaspect.Aswe suggestedabove,webelievethatinadoptingaframeofreference,actorsinfactassessthe valuestatusofeachoftheseaspectsseparately.Ifthisisthecase,thenframesofreference

arecharacterisedbytheinteractionofviewsabouttwodifferent,ifinterrelated,social systems:themarketeconomyandwhatforthesakeofbrevitywewillcalltheemployment system. Thevaluestatusofsocialsystems Elsewherewehavearguedthattherearethreepossibleassessmentsofthevaluestatusof socialsystems:positive,negativeandmeaningless(Cradden2005).2 Understandingasystem aspositiveimpliesthatconformitywiththerequiredrolebehaviourisavalidendinitself ratherthansimplyameanstoavoidsanctionsorseekrewards.Itneedsnofurther justification.Workingwiththegrainofthesystemisnotsimplylikelytobeeffectiveasa meansofpursuingtheaimsandgoalsofitsparticipants,itiseffectivebecauseitistheright thingtodo.Forexample,ifwagesaresetatthelevelthelabourmarketcanbear,thenby definitiontheyarefairwages.Ifsystemsaregivenapositivevaluestatus,thenfromthe politicalethicalstandpoint,resistingtherequiredrolebehaviourisaculpablefailure.To challengetheauthorityofanofficeholderinanorganization,forexample,istoputoneself inoppositiontotheorganizationalcommunityasawhole;toopposeacommunitytowhich oneowesadutyofloyalty.Giventhattheaimsandgoalsofthecommunityhavebeen determinedvialegitimateprocedures,theonlyacceptableattitudeiscooperation. Systemscanalsobeaccordedanegativevaluestatus.Fromthisperspective,the requirementforparticularkindsofrolebehaviourcanonlybecoercivebecausetheaims andvaluesbuiltintothatsystemarenotthoseofthemajorityofparticipants.Actorswill complyonlyfortheempiricalreasonsofmaterialnecessityortheavoidanceofsanctions. Sincerolerequirementsarisebecauseofthe(culpable)actionsofotheractorsthosewho designandmanagethestructuresofthesituationgivingasystemanegativevaluestatus necessarilyimpliestheexistenceofathemwhoseinterestsconflictwiththoseofus,and whohavethesocialpowertopursuethoseinterestsattheexpenseofothergroups.There aretwopossiblerationalresponsestonegativelyevaluatedsystems.First,participantsmay engageinconflict,whetherviacheating,sabotage,publicprotestorsomeothermeansof directorindirectoppositiontothem.Second,participantsmayattempttoorganize themselvessoastoformacountervailingsocialpowerwiththeaimofreachingabargained accommodationwiththem,therebydefusingthecoerciveaspectsofthesystem. Wheresocialsystemsaredeemedtobemeaningless,thecompulsionorconstraint thattheyproduceisgiventhesamestatusasphysicalnecessity.Itisthoughttobeexternal toandseparatefromimmediatedecisionsaboutcoordinatedaction.Compliancewiththe requiredrolebehaviourisameanstoanendratherthananendinitselfandisnomorea capitulationtootherparticipantsthantakingshelterfromtherainisacapitulationtothe weather.Theoughtofsystemicactionisentirelyhypothetical.Thevendorofacommodity whoisobligedtosellatalossbecausethemarkethasmovedtoherdisadvantagemaynot behappy,butherattitudeislikelytobeoneofresignationratherthanresentment.Shewill
2

In making this argument we part company with Habermas and many others, who believe that social systems are by definitionblocksofnormfreesocialityinwhichvaluejudgementsare,inthefinalanalysis,oflittleornoconsequence. Habermas argues that behaviour in economic and bureaucratic contexts is determined by what he calls steering imperatives the term steering is taken from Parsons system theory that reach through and beyond the action orientationsofparticipantsinsocialaction,i.e.thethingstheywanttodoandthewaysoflivingandbehavingtheybelieve toberight.Actorsrecognisethattheirchoicesintheseactioncontextsareconstrainedbyforcesexternaltothem,butare unable to assess the normative value of these forces. By contrast, Fox implies that systems can be deemed either norativelypositiveornormativelynegative,butseemstodiscountthepossibilitythattheycanremainwithoutmeaning.

11

12

notseektoblameanotherindividualorgroupforhermisfortune.Similarly,actorsin organizationswillhaveapragmaticattitudetoworkingwiththegrainofthesystem.Atthe politicallevel,attitudestosystemsarealsolikelytobepragmatic,stressingtheneedto avoidthepoliticizationofeconomic,administrativeororganizationalaction. Givingavaluestatustothemarketeconomy Itiseasiertoseehowthenegativeandmeaninglessvaluestatusescanbeappliedtothe marketeconomythanthepositivestatus.Theimperativesofthemarketarefrequently depictedeitherasnomorethantheembodimentofthepartialinterestsoftheownersof capital,orasnormativelyneutralsurvivalimperativestowhichThereIsNoAlternative.To arguethateconomicimperativescangivepoliticallyandethicallylegitimatedirectionto decisionsaboutactionseemsdifficulttosustain.Ontheotherhand,however,theideathat asingleexchangeorpricecanbefairthatitreflectsareasonablebalancebetweenthe interestsofeachpartyisperfectlycommonplaceandcomprehensible.Ifallexchanges werefair,thensincethemarketisnomorethananaggregationofhistoricalinformation aboutexchangesthathavealreadytakenplace,marketimperativeswouldrepresentaguide tosociallyusefuleconomicaction.Bycomplyingwithmarketimperatives,overallutility wouldbeincreasedinamannerthatdidnotproducesustainedunfairadvantagefor particularindividualsorgroups. Itisalsocommonplace,ofcourse,torecognisethatamarketpriceisnotnecessarily afairprice.Notallparticipantsareorientedtowardsfairnessandeveniftheywere, economicinstitutionsareimperfectandmayintroducedistortionsandbiasesintothe processofaggregatinginformation.However,thefactthatwecanrecognisethatan exchangeisnotfairevenifitappearstocomplywithmarketcriteriameanswearenottied tothedictatesofanimperfecteconomicsystem.Accordingthemarketapositivevalue statusinvolvesacceptingthatexchangeoughttobesubstantivelyfair,andthatsincefair exchangesarealwayspossibleinprinciple,itisthedutyofmarketactorstointerpret marketimperativesthroughthelensoffairness,filteringoutthosepossibilitiesforaction thatdonotmeettheappropriatenormativecriteria.Thisistheprincipleunderpinningthe fairtrademovement,forexample.3 Givingavaluestatustotheemploymentsystem Viewsabouttheemploymentsystemtaketheformofopinionsaboutthevaluestatusofthe internalorderoftheenterprisewhatFlanders(1975)wouldcallmanagerialrelationsas wellasthelegalandinstitutionalstructuresthataffectit.Opinionscanrangefromabelief thattheorderoftheenterpriseisentirelyvalidorlegitimateinitself,throughtheviewthat itissimplywhatisrequiredinorderthattheindividualaimsandinterestsofmembersbe satisfied,tothebeliefthatitreflectstheinterestsonlyofcertainmembers,privilegingthese attheexpenseofthoseoftheothers. Deemingtheemploymentsystemtohaveapositivevaluestatusimpliesthatthe enterpriseisacommunityfoundedonsubstantiveaimsandvalues.Therelationshipsthat existwithinenterprises,forallthattheywouldnotexistintheabsenceofthecorporate context,haveanintrinsicvalue.Wemightsaythattheyaretheanalogueintheeconomic sphereoflegitimatepoliticalinstitutions.Thereisapresumptionthatdecisionmaking procedureswillconformtothesamestandardsoflegitimacythatapplyinpoliticalcontexts.
3

Dependingonhowthemarketisconceived,thisimpliesdemocraticparticipative, consultativeorbargaineddecisionmaking. Whereemploymentsystemsareinterpretedasmeaningless,thentheyare understoodashavingnolegitimizablecontentbeyondthatborrowedfromthegoalsthey seektorealize.Therelationshipsthatexistwithinthesesystemshavenointrinsicvalue,but theabsenceofsuchvalueisnotexperiencedasaculpablefailure.Theemploymentsystem isthereforeapurelypragmaticmodeofactioncoordinationthatcanbespecifiedfroma technicalperspective.Itisassumedthatthedesignofeffectivesystemsisamatterofthe applicationofexpertknowledge.Forthisreason,democraticformsoforganizationareseen asinappropriate. Theuniquefeatureofthenegativeemploymentsystemframesofreferenceisthat participantsbelievethatthenormativeorderoftheenterpriseandtheinstitutionsofIR privilegetheaimsandvaluesofcertainparticipantsoverthoseoftheothers.Theseframes ofreferencecanthereforebecharacterizedprincipallybytheabsenceofanyassumption thattrustandunderstandingbetweenthedifferentmembersoftheenterprisecanorwill naturallyarise.Therelationshipsthatexistarepremisedonthebeliefthatwilling cooperationwithintheenterpriseismoreorlessimpossible. Conflictismorelikelytooccurwhenparticipantsperceivetheemploymentsystem ashavinganegativevaluestatusthanwhentheyperceivetheeconomicsystemasnegative. Nomatterhowlargeanorganizationis,itremainsconsiderablysmallerandeasiertograsp thattheeconomy.Itisthuseasiertopersonalizeconflictsofinterest,blamingthelackof balanceinthecorporateorderonaninternal,identifiablethem,almostinevitably managementfromtheemployeesperspectiveoremployeesespeciallyiforganizedina tradeunionfromthemanagerialperspective. Negativeemploymentsystemscanexistonlybecauseofthematerialneedof participants.Fromtheemployeeperspective,thesanctionattachedtononcompliancewith managementauthorityisexclusionfromtheenterpriseandhencefromthematerial benefitsofmembership.Fromthemanagementperspective,failingtosecurethe complianceofemployeeswithinstructionswillmeanthefailuretoachievecorporate objectives.Mutualdependenceisthustheonlyreasontheemploymentrelationship persists. The9framesofreference Theinteractionbetweenthedimensionsoftheeconomyandtheemploymentsystemgives risetothenineidealtypicalframesofreferencethatwewanttopropose,andwhichareset outinthetablebelow.Eachoftheframesofreferencerepresentsapossiblewayofthinking aboutandunderstandingtheenterpriseand,byextension,therelationshipsthatexist withinit,althoughitshouldbeclearthatsomearerathermoreapparentinpracticethan others. Deliberativeunitarism Thefirstframeofreferencerepresentstheinteractionofapositivelyevaluated employmentsystemwithapositivelyevaluatedmarketeconomy.Theultimatemarket

Thisisaverybarestatementofaverycomplexargument.ForafullerexplanationseeCradden2005and2009.

13

14

Table1:The9FramesofReference
Market economy Positive Meaningless Negative EmploymentSystem Positive DeliberativeUnitarism HighCommitmentUnitarism IntegrativePluralism Meaningless BureaucraticUnitarism LowCommitmentUnitarism AdversarialPluralism Negative EthicalConflict LocalizedConflict Radical/ClassConflict

goalsofenterpriseaction,theintermediateplansandstrategiesoftheenterpriseandthe socialrelationshipsbywhichthoseplansarerealizedarealldeemedtohaveapositivevalue status.Perhapsthemostdistinctivefeatureofthisframeofreferenceistheideathatthe enterpriseisconnectedtosocietyviaalegitimatemarket.Sincemarketrelationshipsare legitimaterelationships,theenterpriseanditsmembersdonotformanisolatedgroup actingonlyonitsownbehalf,butinsteadareactiveparticipantsinthesocialprocessof materialreproduction.Theenterpriseexistsbothtosatisfytheinterestsofitsmembersand tocontributetothefairdistributionofcommoditiesacrosssocietyasawhole.Ifitcanbe assumedthatsuchafairdistributionisachieved,orthatitrepresentsagenuineoverarching goal,thenfromthesocietalperspectivetheactionsoftheenterprisearenotsimply permissibleortolerable,butarelegitimateinahighlygeneralizablesense.While participationinsomeparticularenterprisemaynotbeobligatoryinitself,theactionsof thosewhodochoosetoparticipatearesociallyusefulandtothatextentlaudable. Fromthisperspective,andleavingasideanyobjectivelytechnicalorscientific aspects,theroleofmanagementisoneofpoliticalleadershipandrepresentation.The actionsoftheenterprise,likethoseofanymarketactor,willhaveaneffectonthe legitimacyofthemarket.Ifitisassumedthattheconditionsforperfectcompetitiondonot obtaininpractice,thenmarketactorsarelikelytobefacedwitharangeofchoicesofaction inresponsetomarketimperatives.Thevalidchoiceisthatwhichpreservesorimprovesthe fairnessofthemarketasawhole.However,thesechoicesarenotsimplygiven.Rather,they dependoninterpretationsoftheeconomicsystem.Theseinterpretationscannotbe technicalinthesensethatmedicalorengineeringknowledgeistechnical.Theyare inherentlynormativebothinthesensethattheyrelyonassumptionsaboutthevalidityof aimsandvaluesinsocietyasawhole,andinthesensethattheyembodytheaimsand valuesofthemembersofthecorporatecommunity.Whenviewedfromtheperspectiveof deliberativeunitarism,topretendthatsomekindofpurelytechnicalapproachto managementcoulduncoverthisnormativeknowledgeoftheorganizationalandmarket systemsinsuchawaythatitwouldbebeyonddisputewillappearratherfarfetched.Thisis nottosaythatcertainindividualswillnotbecapableofreadingagroup;ofgraspingits selfidentityinawaythatthegroupsmembersrecognizeasaccurate.Itmakesperfect sensetosupposethatactorscouldcometotrustanindividualtoarticulatewhotheyareas membersofaenterpriseandofsociety,andhencetotrustinthatindividuals recommendationsforaction.Nonetheless,whetherornotindividualmanagershavethis abilityisentirelyanempiricalquestionanditcanbeassumedneitherthatanysuch individualswillexist,northattheircapacityforleadershipistransferablebetweendifferent socialgroups,northatthiscapacitycanpermanentlybetrusted.Inthesamewaythatit wouldbeunwisetoassumethatitwillalwaysbepossibletofindaphilosopherkingwhois abletoarticulatethegeneralwillofapoliticalcommunitybetterthanthemembersofthat

communitycouldarticulateitthemselves,fromtheperspectiveofthedeliberativeunitarist frameofreferenceonlytheproceduralguaranteeofdemocraticformsofmanagement togetherwiththeanalogousproceduralguaranteeoffreetradecanprovidean appropriatedegreeofassurancethatcorporateactionwillbelegitimate. Fromtheperspectiveofthedeliberativeunitaristframeofreference,thereisno permanentpreconceivedideaofwhatthatidealemploymentsystemwilllooklike.Instead, itwillbetheoutcomeofcooperation;ofongoingprocessesofconsensusformationin language.Theroleofformalregulationisthereforeextremelylimited.Indeedonemight evensaythataneffectiveemploymentsystemisbestachievedbydissolvinghierarchical administrativesystemsinfavourofflexiblesystemsofselfmanagement.Thus,decisions aboutwhattheenterpriseistodocanbefocusedonitsresponsestoeconomicimperatives, buttheidentificationbothofwhattheseimperativesareandtherangeofeffective responsesthatarenormativelyacceptablewillbeamatterforallmembersofthe enterprisetoagreeonthebasisofopendiscussionanddialogue. HighCommitmentUnitarism Whereapositiveevaluationoftheemploymentsysteminteractswithamarketeconomy deemedtobemeaninglesswefindhighcommitmentunitarism.Withinthecommunitythat istheenterprise,effectivemarketactionisplacedattheheadofthesocialorderingof culturalvalues.Fromthisperspective,thereisnodistinctionbetweenastrategyformarket actionthatistechnicallyeffectiveandonethatispoliticallyandethicallylegitimate.The backgroundconsensusofthecommunitythatpredefineslegitimatecoordinatedaction simplyreferstowhateveraimsandvaluesmakeforeffectiveactioninthemarket.In practice,thisreferenceistomanagerialexpertise. Managerialexpertisecanbeequatedwithtechnicaleffectivenessbecauseofthe objectivistconceptionoftheeconomythatischaracteristicofthehighcommitment unitaristframeofreference.Theeconomyisseenasanonnormativephenomenonthathas tobedealtwithinthesamewayasphysicalnecessity.Fromthisperspective,tosayweare coercedbytheeconomicsystemonlymakesasmuchsenseassayingthatourbodiesforce ustoeatorthattherainforcesustotakeshelter.Atthesametime,neitherdoesitmake anysensetosaythattheoughtinweoughttoeatorweoughttotakeshelteris anythingotherthanhypothetical.Theinterpretationofwhatthemarketdemandsfromthe enterpriseisthereforeconceivedasatechnicalprocessandmanagementasaprofession whosemembersaimonlytomakethemostscientificallyeffectiveinterventions.Hence,the formallegalspecificationofthescopeofmanagerialcompetencecoincideswiththe managerialdefinitionofmarketeffectiveness. Theobjectivistunderstandingoftheeconomyalsomeansthattheenterpriseis conceivedasunconnectedtowidersociety.Thefactthatthemarketalsoinvolvesother individualsisoflittleimportance.Theyandtheirsituationsremainanonymousand impersonal.Takingactioninthemarketisnotanactivitythatconnectsonetoothersin anythingotherthanthemostsuperficialsense.Forthisreason,thegoalsoftheenterprise cannotbegeneralizedbeyonditsboundaries.Itisanisolatedgroupofactorswhosevalues andinterests,likethoseofthemarket,remainentirelynongeneralizablefromthesocietal perspective. Inthiscontext,then,legitimatedecisionmakingdoesnotnecessarilyrequirewhat wewouldrecognizeasdemocraticprocesses.Sincethecommitmentofparticipantstothe orderoftheorganizationisessentiallyhypothetical,sincetheoptionofexitalwaysremains

15

16

open,andsincemanagerialdecisionsareassumedtobeeffective,itcanstraightforwardly beassumedthatcommunitymembersactivelyconsenttotheauthorityofmanagers, whateverthisshouldinvolve.Theywillhaveapositivenormativecommitmentto managerialdirection.Inaword,themembersoftheorganisationalcommunityareflexible. Theothersideofthisemployeecommitment,however,isanopenandliberalstyleof management.FlexibilityisincompatiblewithaTheoryXapproachtomanagement(Pugh andHickson,1989,pp.15661).Fromwithinthehighcommitmentunitaristframeof reference,rigid,onewayauthorityrelationships,thecloseprespecificationofemployee effort,andsurveillanceorientedsupervisionareallentirelyinappropriate. Integrativepluralism Fromtheperspectiveoftheintegrativepluralistframeofreference,theeconomicsystem cannotberepresentedaspoliticallyneutralorfairinitself.Rather,itembodiesthevalues andinterestsofalimitedgroupinsociety:theownersofcapitalandtheiragentsin management.Justastheexistenceofcompetinginterestsinsocietydoesnotmeanthat legitimateformsofpoliticalorganizationareimpossible,thisdoesnotmeanthattheorder oftheenterprisecannotbevalid.Itsimplymeansthatvaliditymustbetheoutcomeof bargainedcompromises. Thosewhoadopttheintegrativepluralistframeofreferenceseethedemandsofthe market,articulatedbyemployersormanagers,asvalueladen.Theyarepragmatic recommendationsdrawnupwiththeaimofrealizingthevaluesandinterestsofcapital.As such,theymaywellbehighlyeffective,buttheywillnotbeuniversallyvalid.AsFlandersput it,Managerialinitiative,evenwhenitisintelligentandfarsighted,istakentosuittheaims ofmanagementandthesedonotnecessarilycoincidewiththeaimsofunionsandthe peopletheyrepresent(1975,p.23).Thishavingbeensaid,itremainsthecasethattheaims andvaluesofmanagementareperfectlylegitimateinthesenseofbeingsocially permissible.Employersandtheownersofcapitalareentitledtoproperrepresentationof theirinterestsinthegoalsoftheenterprisejustasworkersare.Whileitisnotrationalfor workerstocooperatewithemployers(andviceversa)regardlessofwhattheotherwants todo,itiscertainlyrationaltoseektostrikeabargaininwhicheachsidegetsascloseto whatitwantsasiscompatiblewiththesameoutcomeforall;inotherwords,abargain whichisfair. Sincethevalidityofanybargainisdefinedinrelationtothissubstantivestandard,it cannotbesaidthatafairbargainisnecessarilythebestbargainpossibleforonesideorthe otheronthebasisoftheempiricalbalanceofpower.Thedemandsofthemarkethavetobe respectedbecausetheyrepresentthelegitimateinterestsofonegroupinsocietywithout thecooperationofwhichothergroupscouldnotpursuetheirowninterests.Therespect due,however,islimitedbytheneedtoaccordequalrespecttotheinterestsofother groups.Onceagain,thiskindofbalancecannotbespecifiedinconcreteterms,butitis possibletodrawupproceduralparametersfornegotiationthatensurethatoutcomeswill befair. Inthecontextofthesekindsofbargainingprocedure,thebusinessplansand strategiesoftheenterprisearetheconcernofmanagementalone,justastheaimsand valuesofworkersarenoconcernofmanagement.Whatisofjointconcernisthelabour process,inwhichworkersmakethecontributionforwhichtheyarecompensated,andin whichemployersreceivethevalueoftheworkerslabourpower.Thelegitimacyof managerialauthoritydependsnotonthevalidityoftheaimsandvaluesofmanagement,

butonthevalidityofthecompromisebetweentheseandtheaimsandvaluesof employees.Wheremanagerialinstructionsarecoherentwithafairnegotiatedorder,then theywillberecognizedasvalid. Theconceptionoftheeconomicsystemasasocialstructurethatembodiesinterests beyondtheorganizationmeansthatthevalidityofthenegotiatedarrangementseventually agreedcanbegeneralizedbeyondtheorganization.Iftheinterestsofemployeesare conceivedinasolidaristicway,thatisasasubsetofaworkersinterestonanationalor eveninternationalscale,thenanorganizationalorderbasedonfaircompromisehasa politicalethicalvalidityatahighlevel.Forthosewhohavechosentobeinvolved,therights anddutiesoftheorganizationalorderinparticularthedutytorespectbargained agreementsrepresentnotjustmutualobligations,butobligationstosocietyasawhole. Bureaucraticunitarism Fromtheperspectiveofthebureaucraticunitaristframeofreferenceinmanyways assimilabletotheclassicalWeberianmodelofpoliticaladministrativebureaucracy economicsuccessisseenasapositivesocialvalue,abenefittosocietyingeneral.However, theimperativesofthemarketareconceivedbroadly,insuchawayastobemoreorless selfevident.Muchmoreimportantarethetechnicalmeansbywhichtheseendsare achieved.This,ratherthantheinterpretationofthemarket,isthefocusoftheexpertiseof management.Theaimistodesignandoperatethemostefficientandrationalorganization thatispossibletofindsomethinglikeTaylorsonebestwayoforganizingproduction. Corporaterolesareconceivedimpersonally,inisolationfromthecapacitiesofindividuals. Atthesametime,thepositivevaluestatusofthemarketmeansthatconformity withthetechnicalbureaucraticrequirementsoforganizationisinvestedwithanethical valueinsuchawaythattheenterpriseappearsasacarrierofthevaluesofthesocietyin whichitoperates.Theparticularroleofeachemployeemayhavenointrinsicvalue,butthe factofbeingacoginthemachineisnonethelesslaudable,somethingtobeproudof.The enterprise,withitsextensiveformalregulationandtheculturethatfixesaninterpretation oftheserules,isthefocusofitsemployeescollectiveidentity.Theselfunderstandingof theenterpriseisdominatedbythetechnicalneedsoftheemploymentsystem:whatisgood fortheenterpriseisgoodforitsmembers. Theenterprisesroleasacarrierofsocialvaluesalsomeansthatitislikelytobe accordedadefactoroleinnationaleconomicgovernance.Whileenterprisesmaynot featureinthelegalstructureofdemocracy,consultationwithbusinessleadersinadvanceof policymakingisentirelycoherentwiththeideathattheeconomyisalegitimatesocial phenomenon. Lowcommitmentunitarism Lowcommitmentunitarismrepresentsthemostanomicpossibleconceptionofthe enterprise:themeaninglesscorporatestructureinpursuitofmeaninglessmarketgoals. Fromthisperspective,managementisanentirelytechnicalprocessencompassingboththe interpretationofmarketimperativesandtheirtranslationintocorporateactionvia organizationstructuresandmodesofproduction.Participationintheenterpriseiswholly strategicandhenceindividualswillseedutiesassomethingtobeminimizedandrightsas somethingtobemaximized.Theenterpriseislikelytobecharacterizedbyrigidauthority relationships,limitationofemployeeeffort,andsurveillanceorientedmanagement.

17

18

 Theobjectivistconceptionofboththeeconomicandemploymentsystemsmeans thatmembersoftheenterprisewillnotconsiderthemselvestobeconnectedtosocietyvia theirparticipationincollectiveaction.Thetwosystemsarenotconceivedasprovidingany normativelinkagebetweenactors.Whilenormalsocialrelationsmaypersistoutsidethe corporatecontext,withinitactorsareentirelyisolated. Adversarial(standard)pluralism Thekeycharacteristicoftheadversarialpluralistframeofreferenceisthebeliefthattoact accordingtothedemandsoftheeconomicsystemistoactintheinterestofacertainsocial groupofwhichemployeesarenotmembers.Nevertheless,sinceemployees,whether individuallyorcollectively,candonothingtochangethissituation,theyareforcedbytheir materialcircumstancestoworkwithinthateconomicsystem.Itisthereforerationalfor employeestocooperatewithemployersinthesenseofworkingtowardsthefulfilmentof marketdemandsifthiscooperationisrewardedinsuchawaythattheirmaterialneeds aremet.Similarly,employerscandolittletochangethepoliticallyorsociallysanctioned abilityofemployeestoresisttheirauthority,whetherthisresistancetakestheformof organizedcollectiveactionormoreindividualizedconflictualpractices.Hence,itisrational forthemtoacceptthepowerofworkersaslongasitispossibletomaintainanadequate returnontheinvestmentinlabour.Thedefinitionofadequacyhereistacticalorpragmatic: anadequaterewardorreturnoninvestmentisthelargestwhichispractically(politically) possiblegiventhebalanceofpowerbetweencapitalandlabour.Employeeswillcarefully measureandrestricttheirinputtoensurethattheemployergainsnothingforwhichshe hasnotpaid.Fortheirpart,employerswillcarefullymonitorthebehaviourofemployeesto ensurethattheircontributionispreciselyashasbeenagreed. Onthisview,boththedemandsoftheeconomicsystemandtheessentiallynon economicindividualorcollectivegoalsofworkersortradeunionsarereflectedinthe negotiatedorderthatgovernstheenterprise.Perhapsmostimportantly,sincemarket imperativesmerelyrepresenttheintentionsofaparticulargroup,theviabilityofenterprises neednotbedamagedbytheapparentnonoptimalityofenterpriseactionunderthese circumstances.Allthatisrequiredisanadjustmentofcapitalsexpectationstothe unavoidablesocialrealityofworkerpower.Optimalcorporateperformancefromall perspectivesdependsontheadoptionofthemosttechnicallyeffectivesystemsof collectivebargaining. EthicalConflict Wherethemarketeconomicsystemisviewedpositively,buttheemploymentsystemis seentobeillegitimatethatis,thewayinwhichactioniscoordinatedisnotthoughttobe rationallydefensiblethentheenterprisewillexperiencepoliticalethicalorevenmoral conflict.Participantswilltendtoblamethefailureoftheenterprisetoconstructa universallyacceptableorderontheotherparticipants.Employeesmayblamecorporate failureonmanagers,forissuinginstructionsthatdonotaccuratelycapturethecollective interestoftheenterprisesmembers.Managerswhowillconsiderthattheirinstructions doproperlyreflectthecollectiveinterestmayinturnblameemployeesforrefusingto comply,therebyunreasonablyputtingtheirindividualinterestsaheadofthoseofthe enterprise.Inbothcases,theblamehasamoralcharacter.Theblamedparticipantsare seentobeselfishlypreventingtheenterprisefromeffectivelypursuingmarketgoals,an activityofgreatvaluetosociety.

Atthesametime,thepositivevaluestatusofthemarketmayleadactorstoremain withintheenterprisedespiteitsinternalproblems.Themembersoftheorganizationwill notpersistwiththeirconflictualrelationshipssimplybecauseoftheirindividualmaterial need,butbecauseoftheneedsofthelocalcommunityorsocietyingeneral.While negotiatedformsoforganizationmaybeseenasfundamentallyforced,theywill nonethelessbeperceivedasbetterthanabandoningtheenterprisealtogether. LocalizedConflict Thedistinctionbetweenthemoralconflictandlocalizedconflictenterpriseframesof referenceturnsontheperceptionofthemarket.Whereasintheformercaseitisseenas socialphenomenon,inthelatteritisthoughtofassomethingobjective.Forthisreason,the failureofparticipantsinactiontoagreeonmodesoforganizationwillnotbeconsideredan injurytosociety,butamatterofbadfaith,ignoranceorincompetenceonthepartof existingmembersoftheenterprise.Theconflictwithintheenterpriseisthereforeunrelated toanyfeaturesofwidersociety.Memberswillpersistwiththeirparticipationinactiononly foraslongastheirindividualsituationsmeanthattheirinterestinmembershipremains positive. ClassConflict Wheretheenterpriseisconceivedasthesiteofclassconflict,participantsactionswillbe designedtopursuethepartialvaluesandinterestsofreferencecommunitiesbeyondthe enterprise.Fromtheperspectiveofthisframeofreference,theenterpriseispermanently andirrevocablydividedintoanusandathem.Divisionwithintheenterprisereflectsthe conflictingeconomicinterestsofcapitalandlabourinwidersociety.Anagreeddefinitionof effectiveorganizationissimplyimpossible,asitmakesnosensetoarguethatinterestscan bealignedeventemporarily.Dependingonwhetheroneadoptsanemployeeormanagerial perspective,eithertheenterpriseexploitsthematerialneedoftheworkers,ortheworkers exploittheinitiativeandorganizationoftheenterprise.Eachsidecoercestheother.The organizationsofeachsideemployersassociationsandtradeunionstakeontheaspect ofconspiraciesplottingtopreventtheotherfromreceivingitsproperentitlements. Maintainingtheenterpriseinaminimallyviablefunctionalstateisthebestthatcanbe hopedfor. Conclusions Intheauthorsopinion,Foxwasbysomewaythemostsophisticatedexponentofthe Oxfordschoolofindustrialrelationsresearchandtheframesofreferenceapproachhas virtuesfarbeyonditsclarityandintuitiveintellectualappeal.Inparticular,Foxdrew essentiallythesamedistinctionbetweensocialactioncontextsthatisatthecentreof Habermasssocialtheory,thedistinctionbetweencontextsinwhichsocialactionis coordinatedviasteeringmechanismscontextsthatforFoxarecharacterisedby structurallydeterminedrolebehaviourandcontextsinwhichitisdeterminedbythemess ofbeliefs,opinions,socioculturalnormsandconventionsthatformthebackdropof everydaylife.Moreimportantly,Foxmanagedtosuggestamechanism,theframesof reference,bywhichthoseverydifferentcontextsarerelatedandcaninfluenceeachother, somethingwhichHabermashasnevermanagedtodoconvincingly.Foxrecognisedthat socialsystemsandstructurescouldbeinterpretedassomethingotherthanobjective, meaninglessphenomena;thattheycouldbesubjecttonormativeaswellasfunctional

19

20

evaluationandthattheseevaluationshadimportantconsequencesforbehaviour,most notablythewillingnessofemployeestocooperatewiththeiremployers.Aswehavedefined themhere,framesofreferenceincludemodelsofsystemfunctioning,historicalknowledge abouttheoutcomeofactionswithinsystems,andevaluationsoftheoverallnormative characterofsystems.Theyareproducedandreproducedthroughpersonalexperienceof participatinginsocialactioninsystemiccontexts,aswellasthrougheducationandother socializationprocessesbothwithinandbeyondtheworkplace.Theyaresimultaneously pragmaticandnormative,notonlyrepresenting(moreorlessrational)expectationsrelating actionstooutcomes,butalsoaccordinganoverarchingvaluestatustosystems,giving directionandmeaningtothesocialactioncarriedoutwithinthem.Forthisreasonwehave proposedthatsocialnormsandvaluesinformalcoordinationmechanismsaresignificant preciselybecausetheyarekeyelementsinthedeterminationofwhichframeofreferenceis adopted. InaddingtheradicalframeofreferencetotheunitaristandpluralistframesFoxalso touchedontwoimportantideas.First,thereistheideathatsocialsystemsmayembody partialratherthanuniversalvaluesandinterestsandthattheadoptionofaframeof referenceisinfluencedbyanassessmentofwheretheindividualstandsinrelationtothose valuesandinterests.Second,thereistheideathatthestructuresoftheemployment situationhaveamarketeconomicaspectandanemploymentsystemaspect,andthat normativeassessmentsofeachoftheseaspectscanbemadeseparately.WhatFoxdoesnot seemtorecogniseisthepossibilitythatsocialsystemscanbeandfrequentlyareinterpreted asmeaningless;asbeinginsusceptibletonormativeevaluation.Forthesereasonshewas unabletodistinguishbetweenthedifferenttypesofunitarismandpluralisminthewaythat wehavedonehere.

References Cradden,C.(2005)RepoliticizingManagement:ATheoryofCorporateLegitimacy,Ashgate, Guildford. Cradden,C.(2009)Canwehavegenuineworkplacedemocracyinthemarketeconomy?, ReimaginingSocietyProject,http://www.zcommunications.org/workplace democracyandmarketsbyconorcradden Flanders,A.(1975)ManagementandUnions,Faber&Faber,London. Fox,A.(1966)IndustrialSociologyandIndustrialRelations,HMSO,London. Fox,A.(1974)BeyondContract:Work,PowerandTrustRelations,Faber&Faber,London Habermas, J. (1984), The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1: Reason and the RationalizationofSociety(trans.T.McCarthy),Polity,Cambridge. Habermas,J.(1987),TheTheoryofCommunicativeActionVolume2:LifeworldandSystem ACritiqueofFunctionalistReason(trans.T.McCarthy),Polity,Cambridge. Habermas,J.(1996),BetweenFactsandNorms(trans.W.Rehg),MITPress,CambridgeMA. Kerr,C.(1964),LabourandManagementinIndustrialSociety,Doubleday,GardenCityNY. Kaufman,B.(2004),TheGlobalEvolutionofIndustrialRelations:Events,IdeasandtheIIRA, InternationalLabourOffice,Geneva. Pugh,D.andHickson,D.(1989),WritersonOrganizations,4thedn.,Penguin, Harmondsworth.

21

22