MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to be established, as the mithyAtva of duality, the unreality of duality.

In defining mithyAtva, one of the definitions ta en up was the one from the panchapAdi A of PadmapAda. MithyAtva is defined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot be categorized as sat or asat. More specifically, this was defined to be sadasadanadhi araNatva, which was clarified by MadhusUdana to be the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva. The opponent had raised the objection of arthAntara against the definition of mithyAtva or sadasadanadhi araNatva, not being a substratum of either existence or non-existence. MadhusUdana refuted these objections. He also offered an alternative definition of sadasadanadhi araNatva, namely the absolute difference from existence and the absolute difference from nonexistence which rules out any possibility of arthAntara (proving something other than what is intended). The opponent could, however, level another charge against MadhusUdana's definition. By defining sadasadanadhi araNatva as the difference from existence and difference from nonexistence, there is at least a defect of proving something a part of which has already been proved. For example, if you see to prove A AND B, when you now that one of the two, say B, is already proved, your proof will have the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana, ie. aMshataH siddha-sAdhana. Your proof will be partially redundant and one of the worst mista es a logician can commit is being redundant! Here, the opponent claims, the partial siddha-sAdhana arises from the fact that the realists, including the navya-naiyAyi as and the mAdhvas, already have accepted the world's absolute difference from nonexistence, in the sense that the world is absolutely real. So the part of the advaitin's proof which establishes absolute difference from nonexistence is redundant. But, MadhusUdana explains, the sAdhya in this case CANNOT be split into two terms A and B, such that each can be independently proved. We HAVE to consider the combined difference from existence and nonexistence. Why? Because, the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptiblity), in this case is the hetu for the CONJUNCTION (or combination) of absolute difference from existence AND absolute difference from nonexistence. (Recall that the sAdhya is to be inferred from the invariable concomitance of the hetu with the sAdhya.) Without further ado, let us hear the unassailable reply of MadhusUdana: Text: nacha - asattvavyatire a-aMshasya-asadbhedasya cha prapaJNche siddhattvena-aMshataH siddha-sAdhanamiti - vAchyam.h | "guNAdi aM guNyAdinA bhinnAbhinnaM samAnAdhi R^itatvAt.h" iti bhedAbhedavAdiprayoge tAr i AdyaN^gI R^itasya bhinnatvasya siddhAvapi uddeshya-pratItyasiddheryathA na siddha-sAdhanaM, tathA pra R^ite .api militapratIteruddeshyatvAnna siddha-sAdhanam.h | yathA tattvAbhede ghaTaH uMbha iti sAmAnAdhiaraNya-pratIteradarshanena militasiddhiruddeshyA, tathA pra R^ite .api sattvarahite tuchchhe dR^ishyatva-adarshanena militasya tatprayoja atayA militasiddhiruddeshyeti samAnam.h | Translation: (And you) cannot charge that there is the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana (aMshataH siddha-sAdhana) because the part (of the proof) consisting of (establishing) the absence of asattva (nonexistence) and the difference from nonexistence (in the alternative definition) is already

established regarding the world. The (mAdhvas) hold that a quality and the substance that possesses that quality are different AND non-different from each other. In arguing with the tAr i as (the naiyAyi as, sAn hyas, the bhATTas, etc.) who accept the difference (of a quality from the possessor of the quality), they (the mAdhvas) say: "the quality and its possessor are different and non-different from each other because they can be cognized to be related by a relation of non-difference." (So, they say,) there is no siddha-sAdhana because the intended cognition (CONJUNCTION of difference and nondifference of a quality and its possessor) is NOT proved , even though the difference (of a quality from its possessor) is already proved. Similarly, in (our) present case (of establishing absence of sattva AND the absence of asattva) too, the cognition that is intended (to be proved) is CONJUNCTION (combination of absence of sattva and absence of asattva). So (we) cannot (be charged with) siddha-sAdhana (redundancy in reasoning). (You may say that the CONJUNCTION of ours is not justified. But we say, no!) In the case of identical things such as a "pot" and a "jar" (which are terms that stand for the same thing), there is no cognition of difference and nondifference of the form "The pot is the jar." (Therefore,) the conjunction of difference and nondifference is intended to be established. (This is your stand.) Similarly, in the present case (ie. of absence of sattva and absence of asattva), perceptibility is not (a characteristic of) a totally nonexistent thing that lac s existence (sattva). (Therefore,) conjunction (of absence of sattva and absence of asattva, or equivalently, difference from sattva and difference from asattva) is a prayoja a (a necessary factor) for dR^ishyatva, perceptibility (which is the hetu) and (so) the establishing of that CONJUNCTION is what is intended. Notes: ViTThalesha describes that the hetu dR^ishyatva is an invariable concomitant (vyApya) of ubhayatva ("both-ness" or conjunction) of sadbheda and asadbheda. dR^ishyatvasya sadbheda-asadbhedobhayatva-avachchhinnaM vyApyatvam.h The vyApyatva (invariable concomitance) of perceptibility (the hetu in this case) is delimited (characterized) by the conjunction of difference from sat and difference from asat (or equivalently the absence of sattva and absence of asattva, in which case the proper term would be "sattva-abhAva-asattva-abhAvobhayatva-avachchhinnaM"). And as BrahmAnanda explains, such "ubhayatva" is the prayoja a in establishing dR^ishyatva: tatprayoja atA- ubhayatva-vishishhTasya dR^ishyatvopapAda atA Discussion: -----------Here the argument runs as follows: mAdhva: We may ma e a charge or partial siddha-sAdhana against you, the advaitin, because the establishing of absence of sattva and absence of asattva has a part, the establishing of absence of asattva with regard to the world, that is already established by others. advaitin:

Well, in that case, we can ma e the same charge against you because your establishing of the difference and nondifference of a quality from its possessor has a part, the establishing of difference of a quality from its possessor, is already established by others such as the bhATTas, naiyAyi as, sAM hyas, etc., who admit the difference of a quality from its possessor. mAdhva: Not so. You cannot establish such difference and nondifference independently of each other. You have got to establish the conjunction of the two conditions, namely difference and nondifference of a quality from its possessor. The hetu here is "samAnAdhi R^itatva", which is explained as being capable of being the content of a cognition of a relation of nondifference in the same substratum where there is difference. Or, we can explain the hetu, samAnAdhi R^itatva, as being capable of being cognized as a qualifier (visheshhaNa) of the possessor of the quality. In the cognition, "the pot is blue", (ghaTo nIlaH), the blue color of the pot is cognized as the qualifier, visheshhaNa of the pot which is the qualificand, visheshhya. The particular instance of blue color of the pot is different and nondifferent from the pot (although the generic character of blue color is accepted to be only different from the pot.) If we split the sAdhya into bheda (difference) and abheda (nondifference), then we run into the following problem. The sAdhya abheda in itself CANNOT be a necessary factor (prayoja a) of the (sole) hetu. For example, there is no cognition of the form "the pot is the jar", where the terms "pot" and "jar" are synonyms and the hetu samAnAdhi R^itatva is present. Therefore, even though there is abheda between "pot" and "jar" here, there is no hetu. And in the case of the (erroneous) cognition "the pot is the cloth", there is bheda between the pot and the cloth but again there is no hetu, samAnAdhiR^itatva. Therefore, we need the conjunction of bheda and abheda as the sAdhya so that the sAdhya becomes a prayoja a of the hetu. But, in your (advaitin's) case, things are different. You claim that the world is unreal (mithyA) or has the absence of sattva and the absence of asattva (or the difference from sattva and the difference from asattva), because of the hetu, dR^ishyatva, perceptibility. (What is perceptible or cognizable is mithyA.) Now, perceptibility is a characteristic of everything other than Brahman, as per your view. And Brahman is "sat". All you need to prove is absence of sattva or difference from sattva with regard to the world. Proving the absence of asattva (or difference from asattva) is redundant. Hence the charge of partial siddha-sAdhana. advaitin: What you say is not justifiable. Just as in your case, the conjunction of bheda and abheda is a necessary factor (prayoja a) of the hetu, so in our case too the conjunction of absence of sattva and the absence of asattva (or equivalently the conjunction of difference from sattva and the difference from asattva) is the prayoja a of the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptibility). Here is why. If we ma e just the absence of sattva the sAdhya, then we run into a problem in the case of a fictitious entity (a chimera). A fictitious entity, such as the horn of a hare, has absence of sattva only. But here the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present. A fictitious entity is never perceived. Again, if we ma e just the absence of asattva the sAdhya, then we run into a problem in the case of Brahman. Here, we have absence of asattva, but again the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present in Brahman. Therefore, we need to have the conjunction of absence of sattva and absence of asattva as the sAdhya in order to ma e the

sAdhya a necessary factor (prayoja a) of the hetu. The charge of siddha-sAdhana against us cannot be made. Notes: 1) The thrust of the argument is that the hetu for the sAdhya in the mAdhva's case as well as for the advaitin has to be a prayoja a, a necessary factor of the hetu. In other words, the hetu must occur exactly wherever the sAdhya occurs, no more no less. This is more restrictive than the general form of vyApti, as may be recalled from the introduction to nyAya in the third part of this series. When the mountain has the hetu, smo e and we infer the sAdhya, fire, the vyApti is less restrictive in the sense that we may allow the sAdhya fire to occur without smo e, although the smo e must always be accompanied by fire in order for the inference to be valid. But in the present discussion, we cannot allow the sAdhya to occur where the hetu is not found. The occurrences of sAdhya and hetu must exactly coincide. Here, the sAdhya for the advaitin is sadbheda and asadbheda and the hetu is dR^ishyatva. By defining a "tight" form of vyApti, what the advaitin is saying is: Whatever is perceptible (cognizable) is different from sat AND different from asat. The converse also holds. Whatever is different from sat AND different from asat is perceptible (cognizable). Symbolically spea ing, if H is the hetu, and the sAdhya is the logical conjunction (AND) of S1 (sad-bheda) and S2 (asad-bheda), we may write: H -> S1 AND S2 S1 AND S2 -> H where "->" means "implies" 2) The mAdhvas' view here regarding the bheda-abheda of a quality from the possessor of the quality is used here by MadhusUdana as an example only. It does not necessarily mean that MadhusUdana endorses this view of the mAdhvas in a broader context, as for example, with respect to an exegetical context. Indeed, the mAdhvas seem to come under some heavy attac from the VishishhTa-advaitins for not recognizing the bheda (difference) between dravya and adravya as RAmAnuja holds. In his fourth volume titled "History of Indian Philosophy", Dasgupta outlines the criticism of the mAdhvas by the vishishhTa-advaitin, Para Ala Yati in his VijayIndra-parAjaya. Para ala Yati points out how several texts in the upanishads become absurd if the mAdhva position on dravya and adravya is held. Another major disagreement between the two schools of Vaishnavism is the Ananda-tAratamya position which is held by the mAdhvas but rejected by the vishishhTa-advaitins. The latter cannot accept (nor can the advaitins) that there is gradation in Bliss (Ananda) in the state of mo shha. This position is also criticized by Para Ala Yati on exegetical grounds as well. There is another vishishhTa-advaitin wor named Ananda-tAratamya- haNDana that is also mentioned by Dasgupta. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the advaitin's use of the

mAdhva example on "guNa" and "guNI" is for illustration only. Any other example would also be fine. Anand