Greig 1

The Dilemma of Deliberation: On the Faculty and Mode of Willing in Aristotle and Maximus the Confessor
By Jon Greig

Introduction
Aristotles definition of the will as rational appetite appears to have been a normative definition in anthropological thought for much of the ancient philosophical world well into Late Antiquity thought. One sees this in Middle and Late Platonic-period philosophers like Plotinus, who uses the terminology of the rational appetite as a basis for considering freedom of the will in itself and in relation to the One. 1 So it would come as some surprise that one of the most famous problems concerning the will arose with the sixth century Monothelite controversy regarding the theological question of whether Christ possessed one will or two wills. While the basic understanding of the will as rational appetite had been settled, a point of theological contention had to be settled by a reexamination of the nature of the rational appetite and the activity of willing itself. St Maximus the Confessor, a sixth century Byzantine Church Father, provided crucial philosophic insight into the rational appetite and the process of willing that helped to provide the orthodox Christian answer to the question of how a divine person, Christ, could possess a human and divine will while simultaneously lacking any opposition within himself. In many ways Maximus ultimately has the insights of Aristotle to thank for his philosophy of the will, but his perception into the natural and the deliberative, or gnomic, modes of willing provides something new to the insights Aristotle articulated. Besides asking how these two modes of willing work, one crucial question is: are these two modes of willing essentially different from the faculty and act of willing in Aristotles thought? And if not different, how Aristotles and Maximuss conceptions are connected? As this paper will show, Maximus the Confessors distinction of the natural and gnomic modes of willing provides a better understanding of the process of willing in man, and it will be shown that Maximuss conception finds its seminal root in the thought of Aristotle on the rational appetite and the process of willing. The investigation of this thesis will
Cf. Plotinus, The Enneads VI. 8, On Free Will and the Will of the One, esp. 2-3, which discusses freedom in the appetite and calculation forming the appetite.
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Greig 2 begin with a careful analysis of the faculty and activity of the rational appetite in Aristotles anthropological writings. Likewise, an examination of Maximus the Confessors understanding of the faculty and process of willing with the natural will will reveal a connection with Aristotles thought; this investigation will also show Maximuss particular understanding of the natural will in contradistinction to the gnomic mode of willing, which reveals the distinction between the faculty of the will and the mode and intention of the will.

Rational Appetite in Aristotle

Aristotles consideration of the will arises in his treatise, On the Soul, which considers the lifeprinciple (psuch), or the soul, of living things. The discussion of the will essentially begins in Chapter 9 of Book 3 after a consideration of the powers of sensation, imagination, and the intellect. Aristotle notes the conclusion to the discussion of the latter powers as he begins to consider the locus of movement: The soul of animals is characterized by two faculties, (a) the faculty of discrimination which is the work of thought and sense, and (b) the faculty of originating local movement. Sense and mind we have now sufficiently examined. Let us next consider what it is in the soul which originates movement.2 Next, Aristotle makes further distinctions to fine-tune the particular sense of movement and the particular power, or mode of power, which causes the kind of movement that he seeks. The appetitive power is understood as being distinct, in one way, from the nutritive, sensitive, and imaginative powers of the soul as far as the definition of the appetitive makes it distinct in causing motion. At the same time, Aristotle is careful not to completely separate the appetitive as a distinct power from the three aforementioned powers due to wish [being] found in the calculative part and desire and passion in the irrational; and if the soul is tripartite appetite will be found in all three parts.3 The appetitive is then understood as almost a quasi-power: not a power existing in strict distinction to the other powers of the soul, but as a kind of mode of being for the three powers of the soul. Therefore, the appetitive power in some way incorporates the three primary powers of the soul in its basic outline.

Aristotle, On the Soul III.9 432a15-20; translation in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, tr. J. A. Smith Ibid., 432b5-9.

(New York: Random House, 1941), 596.

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Greig 3 Aristotle next focuses on local movement where he discriminates the particular movement of growth and decay, which all living things possess, from local movement. 4 With the nutritive faculty eliminated as a source of local movement, the next question is where local movement originates. Rather than provide a positive identification, Aristotle begins his search for this faculty by way of negation. Aristotle first negates the source of this activity lying solely in the mind, since the mind by itself does not dictate whether one should pursue or avoid an object. 5 Likewise, Aristotle also says the appetite by itself does not fully account for movement, since some can avoid the appetitive desire by following the minds dictates.6 From these observations, at the beginning of Chapter 10, Aristotle concludes that both the mind and the appetite must together act as the source of local movement in some way. 7 Aristotle then elucidates how the appetite and the mind work in originating movement: Both of these then are capable of originating movement, mind and appetite: (1) mind, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e. mind practical (it differs from mind speculative in the character of its end); while (2) appetite is in every form of it relative to an end: for that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of mind practical; and that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of action. It follows that there is a justification for regarding these two as the sources of movement, i.e. appetite and practical thought; for the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to movement, the object of appetite being to it a source of stimulation. So too when imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite. 8 Recognizing that the mind and the appetite are responsible in some way for movement, Aristotle here seems to outline the process of willing as beginning with: (1) the appetites focus on (and intention for) the object; (2) the mind being given the appetites object as an end; (3) the mind calculating means to that object as an end; and (4) action commencing with what is last in the

4 5 6 7 8

Ibid., 432b10-14. Ibid., 432b27-433a1; trans. Basic Works, 597. Ibid., 433a1-8. Ibid., 433a9-12.

Ibid., 433a13-21; trans. Basic Works, 598. Remembering Aristotles division of the mind into the passive part which receives the sensibles with the intelligible content and the active part which abstracts the intelligible content from the sensible material from Chapters 4 and 5 (Ibid., 429a10-430b25; trans. Basic Works, 589-592) helps to provide context for how mind as a whole is involved with the appetite in causing movement for even the animals. The animals, however, only possess imagination as some form of passive mind or intellect, while man as a rational animal also possesses the active intellect in addition to the passive mind or intellect. (Ibid., 433a10-12, esp. when imagination is described as a kind of thinking, relating to mind.)

Greig 4 process of thinking. Thus the process willing is seen to be what eventually becomes the rational appetite. Yet, while the two faculties of mind and appetite are at work in this process of willing, Aristotle next says that the faculty which originates movement must still be one: That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of appetite; for if there had been two sources of movementmind and appetitethey would have produced movement in virtue of some common character. As it is, mind is never found producing movement without appetite (for wish is a form of appetite; and when movement is produced according to calculation it is also according to wish), but appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is a form of appetite. 9 The appetite is then seen as the one faculty at work in all circumstances, while the mind sometimes may or may not contribute to movement. In the activity of movement, mind acts more as a guide for the appetite than as a source. Aristotle says that motion may happen in accordance with calculation as well as wish, even though wish and desire are the essential elements in that motion. Calculation may then be seen as a means towards attaining the wish, as described earlier, and so the mind can then be seen as rationally informing the appetite through calculation (or imagination), while the appetite still constitutes the sole source of movement. Aristotle explains that this particular process of willing arises in beings with a sense of time, when mind foresees the future while desire perceives the immediate good in the present. 10 This kind of phenomenon was earlier seen in the description of how movement is originated, where the appetite provides the end desired to the calculative mind which deliberates the means to attain that end. While the appetite already sees the good it lacks, the mind either foresees the good to be pursued via imagination, or it foresees through calculation how this good might be accomplished through its understanding and ordering of means towards this end. 11 After saying this, Aristotle concludes: . . . it follows that while that which originates movement must be specifically one, viz. the faculty of appetite as such (or rather farthest back of all the objects of that faculty; for it is that itself remaining unmoved originates the movement by being

Ibid., 433a22-26. Ibid., 433b5-10. Ibid., 433a14-16.

10 11

Greig 5 apprehended in thought or imagination), the things that originate movement are numerically many.12 So in addition to the distinction made between the faculties of mind and appetite in bringing about movement, a further distinction must be made between (1) the many objects that bring about movement for the appetite, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the faculty of appetite itself which has as its object the farthest back of all the objects of that faculty. The appetite may then have many objects presented before it which themselves potentially cause movement, but movement only occurs when the appetite fixes on the highest object, or good, which remains unmoved. So, while the mind may dictate that an action should be avoided, like drinking excessively, if the appetite does not see this object as higher than the other object of actionto drink excessivelythe latter action will inevitably occur since it stands unmoved for the appetite. Thus, mind plays a guide here, but it is the way that the appetite grasps objects presented to it that determines what kind of movement will occur. In summary, Aristotle describes the faculty of appetite as the source of movement in the animal, and particularly in man, but the appetite is also rationally informed and shaped through the minds calculation and imagination providing the means towards attaining a good. The appetite, however, always defaults to the highest, unmoved object among the other objects with which it is presented. We can see, then, that some form of habituation is at work in the appetites selection, but we may also ask whether a highest, absolute object of desire exists for the appetite among its other desires. This question Aristotle ventures to answer in the Ethics in his consideration of happiness as the highest good that man pursues. This concept develops out of the premise that everything aims at its highest good and completion: Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.13 Taking the concept of the highest, unmoved object of the appetite to a further consideration of the highest desire for the complete good for man, Aristotle goes on to consider in what way we would be concerned with the highest good: If then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to

12 13

Ibid., 433b10-13; trans. Basic Works, 598-599. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.2 1139a17-31; translation in Basic Works, tr. W.D. Ross, 1023-1024.

Greig 6 infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. 14 Universally, man is then concerned with the final good and ultimately desires it, but how this good may be achieved is in properly choosing goods and sources of action for the sake of this highest good. As Aristotle later shows, some people mistake the constitution of the highest good for mere pleasure, wealth, or honor, even though they all aim at what they believe to be that good. The problem in this case is making a proper intellectual judgment about the constitution of the highest good before one can make the proper choices and habituations of the appetite toward attaining the chief good. Incontinence is a more realistic example of this, when a man grasps the universal principle that something is to be done but his appetite has yet to properly desire it, in turn.15 In both cases, some sense of deliberation on the part of the mind is needed to decide on the proper path to achieve the highest good which the rational appetite fixes on above all its other desires. However, as will be discussed later, the virtuous man has no need to deliberate if he possesses the proper power of soul to act in ways that achieve this good with the proper ordering of desires in the appetite to make this possible. It will also be shown, Maximus the Confessors understanding of the operation of the natural will, and the modes of the will, contextualizes this problem in more precise terminology.

The Natural Will as Rational Appetite in Maximus the Confessor

As with Aristotle, Maximus the Confessor treats the process of willing as an interplay of the activities of both the intellect and the appetite. In a dedicated text on the will from the first chapter of Opuscule 1 of the Theological and Polemical Works, Maximus outlines the order of willing: For we desire before we deliberate; and after deliberating, we judge; and after judging, we freely choose that which has been shown by the judgment to be the better [course of action] over that which has been shown to be worse.16 In contrast to Aristotle describing the work of each faculty in the process of willing, Maximus synthesizes desire, deliberation, and judgment into the process of conscious willing. As seen from Aristotles discussion about the process of willing, desire is first in the chain of willing, and

14 15

Ibid., I.2 1094a18-22; trans. Basic Works, 935.

Ibid., VII.1 1145b7-15; tr. Basic Works, 1037, espescially regarding incontinence in comparison to continence.
16

Maximus the Confessor, Opuscula Theologica et Polemica I, PG 91:13A.

Greig 7 deliberation follows upon the object seen in desire as an end to which the proper means must be considered in this process of deliberation. Maximus, however, considers the extra acts of deliberation, judgment, and free choice, while Aristotle considers calculation in place of these three acts in On the Soul. Here, calculation appears to be the common characteristic for deliberation and judgment in Maximuss thought, while free choice may either be an aspect of calculation or an act of the mind proceeding from calculation. Otherwise, Maximus here describes a process similar to Aristotle when considering the activity of willing. Further evidence for this may be seen in Maximuss more elaborate description of willing in the tenth section of Opuscule 1, where the capability for willing is described as being necessarily attached to the rational nature: For after intending it [i.e., that which is rational by nature] inquires. And after inquiring, it examines. And after examining, it deliberates. And after deliberating, it judges or decides. And after deciding, it freely chooses. And after freely choosing, it initiates [an action]. And after initiating [an action], it employs something. And in the employing [of an object], it ceases from the appetitive motion towards that thing. For no one makes use of something without having first initiated [the act]. And no one initiates [an act] without having first decided [what to choose]. And no one deliberates without having first examined [the alternatives]. And no one examines [the alternatives] without having first intended. And no one intends without having first reflected. And no one reflects without having first been moved by appetite. And no one is intelligently moved by appetite without being by nature rational. Therefore man being by nature a rational creature is appetitive, reflective, capable of intending, inquiring, examining, freely choosing, initiating [an act], and employing [something].17 The last premise in the argument that Maximus providesthat no one is intelligently moved by the appetite without having a rational naturehas parallels to Aristotles last statement in Chapter 10, Book 3, of On the Soul, that the appetite does not move without either imagination or calculation. 18 Both imagination and calculation are aspects of the mind in Aristotles thought, so the connection of the appetite to the rational nature via the mind acting as guide is no surprise in this context. One difference of this passage from Aristotles discussion of the rational appetite is its explicit claim of the inherent connection of the will to rational nature. Aristotle discusses the will in a general consideration of appetite with other living things in On the Soul, while Maximus here shows how the will is an essential property of a rational nature connected with the mind. This emphasis by Maximus, however, still agrees with Aristotles statements that the appetite is a kind of power that
17 18

Ibid., 21D-24A. On the Soul, 433a13-14; trans. Basic Works, 598.

Greig 8 essentially inheres in the rational, as well as irrational, powers of the soul. This can be seen even in animals which are first moved and guided by the mind through imagination, and in man as a rational animal, imagination as well as calculation are involved in moving and guiding man through the appetite.

Modes of Willing in Maximus the Confessor

With the essential connection of the will to rational nature established, Maximus the Confessor goes on to describe the will as having a natural inclination for what is good in Opuscule 3, with his interpretation of the Fathers statements about the two natural wills in Christ: For the natural will is the power that longs for what is natural and contains all the properties that are essentially attached to the nature. In accordance with this to be disposed by nature to will is always rooted in the willing nature. 19 The statement that the natural will longs for what is natural may appear mysterious at first glance, given that the appetite was seen to desire the real or the apparent good, which may or may not accord with what is natural or good for man. Maximus, in this case, appears to be talking about the power of the faculty as such for the good, in whatever form it takes. This good would be a natural good for man insofar as it fulfills and completes mans nature, as Aristotle mentions in Ethics. 20 Given this understanding, Maximus here appears to talk about the inherent desire of the will for the good which naturally completes man, even though the will may immediately desire the real or the apparent good when in operation by a particular man. This much is made manifest by what Maximus next says: For to be disposed by nature to will and to will are not the same thing, as it is not the same thing to be disposed by nature to speak and to speak. For the capacity for speaking is always naturally there, but one does not always speak, since what belongs to the essence is contained in the principle of the nature, while what belongs to the wish is shaped by the intention [gnm] of the one who speaks. So being able to speak always belongs to the nature, but how you speak belongs to the hypostasis.21 Thus, the disposal by nature to will is a function of the wills inherent desire for the good, but it is when the particular person, or hypostasis, forms a specific desire through the particular gnm that the perceived object of appetite is actually desired whether or not truly good. In a manner of speaking,
Maximus the Confessor, Opuscule 3, 45D-48A; translation in Maximus the Confessor, ed. and tr. Andrew Louth (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 1996), 193.
19 20 21

Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a7-18; trans. Basic Works, 943. Opuscule 3, 48A; trans. Maximus, 193.

Greig 9 the faculty of the will, by itself, is a potentiality, whereas the action of the will, like how you speak, is an actualityinsofar as the individual through his intention (gnm) brings about this actuality through his free choice. Considering the distinction between the will as a power and the will in activity through the individual, Maximus makes a further distinction in the modes of a particular persons actions, specifically between the gnomic and natural modes of willing. Again in Opuscule 3, Maximus brings up the distinction when indicating that the multiplicity of natural wills in Christ does not necessitate a multiplicity of intentions or modes of willing: If, however, this will is gnomic, then it will be characteristic of his single hypostasis. For the gnomic is defined by the person, and, according to you, it will be shown to have another will from the Father and the Spirit, and to fight against them. . . . The Fathers seeing this, openly confessed the difference between two natural, but not gnomic, wills in Christ, lest they proclaim him double-minded and double-willed, and fighting against himself, so to speak, in the discord of his thoughts, and therefore double-personed.22 In highlighting that there would be an absurdity to suggest different intentions of wills between the Son and the other persons of the Trinity, the beginning of the passage implies that the multiplicity of persons within the divine nature does not imply a multiplicity of intentions. Since Christ is a divine person, it would follow that Christs own will or intention could not be at variance with the other divine persons in either the divine nature or human nature. From this, the statement is later made that Christ possesses no gnomic will. The implication behind the statement that Christ possessed two natural wills and not gnomic wills implies that a unity exists between the natural wills which does not exist in the gnomic will in distinction to the natural will. This much Maximus implies when he goes on to discuss the relation of the gnomic mode of operation in humanity in contrast to the non-gnomic mode that Christ operated in: For they [the Fathers] knew that it was only this difference of our gnomic wills that introduced into our lives sin and our separation from God. For evil consists in nothing else than this difference of our gnomic will from the divine will, which occurs by the introduction of an opposing quantity, thus making them numerically different, and shows the opposition of our gnomic will to God.23

22 23

Ibid., 43C, 56B; trans. Maximus, 196-197.

Ibid. 56B; trans. Maximus, 197. The linking of the gnomic wills opposition to the natural will and simultaneous opposition to God refers to an earlier statement by Maximus: For nothing that is natural can be opposed to God in any way . . . (Ibid., 49A; trans. Maximus, 194). In the context of this passage, the opposition to God is therefore an opposition to what is natural or good, and vice versa.

Greig 10 With Maximus calling the human gnomic will the cause of evil by its numerical difference from the natural will, Maximus implies that two kinds of will or modes of willing exist with the faculty of the wills operation: the gnomic mode of willing and the natural mode of willing. At the same time, earlier in Opuscule 3, Maximus referred to the natural will as a faculty, while he here refers to it in contradistinction to the gnomic mode of willingimplied by the numerical difference with the opposing quantity. While this may appear to be a puzzling equivocation, the definition of the natural will as the power that longs for what is natural implies that its corresponding mode is the actualization of that longing. The natural mode of willing is then numerically the same with the power of the natural will, since there is no opposing quantity which diverges from this natural longing of the faculty of the will. The distinction of the gnomic mode of the will by contrast arises in choosing something which is divergent and numerically distinct from the pre-existing natural desire for the good. Therefore, the natural and gnomic modes of willing can be described as arising out of the wills natural operation, even though the determination of these modes originates with the individual persons choice.

A Comparison of Aristotle and Maximus on Modes of Will

Given the discussion of the modes of willing in Maximus and considering Aristotles definition of the rational appetite as a faculty and in its act, we may now answer the question of how the natural and gnomic modes of the will for Maximus are connected to Aristotles understanding of the will as rational appetite. Three distinct considerations from Maximus should be made in answering this question: (1) the wills natural longing for what is truly good, (2) the natural mode of willing, and (3) the gnomic mode of willing as a divergence from the wills natural longing. 1) The Faculty of Wills Natural Desire Maximus considers the will as a faculty to be the natural will, defining it as the power that longs for what is natural, containing all the properties that are essentially attached to the nature.24 The former part of the definition can be seen in the rational appetites desiring what is good, whether real or perceived. A connection can be further seen by Aristotles statement that all men by nature desire the highest, chief good as the end for which they act in all things. This is also related to

24

Opuscule 3, 45D; trans. Maximus, 193.

Greig 11 the rational appetite having as its first object the furthest back and unmoved of all the objects of appetite presented to it, as shown in On the Soul. However, the natural will is also described as containing all the essential properties connected with human nature. Given the context of the passage, this may also mean that the natural will contains the virtues completing the human nature which correspond to the various properties of man.25 While Aristotle does not specify this, he implies that this is the case when he says in Ethics that virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature but by our nature we can receive them and perfect them by habituation.26 Our nature thus contains the potential existence of the virtues, even though the virtues do not exist in actuality in our nature. Because the natural will as rational appetite has the desire for the real good which completes man, the virtues exist potentially within that natural desiring of the will. 2) The Natural Mode of the Will The natural mode of the will is analogous to the state of virtue that Aristotle considers in Ethics. This state of virtue arises out of developing and exercising the activities of virtue that bring about happiness for man, which Aristotle implies when he defines happiness for man: Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say a so-and-so and a good so-and-so have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases . . . human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete. 27 Coupling this definition of the good for man with another property of happiness as something final and self-sufficient, and [being] the end of action,28 the natural mode of the will corresponds to the actual possession of the virtues which constitute the completion of mans functions. This may be implied in Maximuss understanding of the natural wills desire for what is naturalthat which completes man. Seeing that the natural mode of the will is a natural progression out of the natural

Further support for this comes in Maximus the Confessor, Dialog with Pyrrhus, PG 91:369b, where the virtues are described as pre-existing properties of human nature.
25 26 27 28

Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a2326; trans. Basic Works, 952. Ibid., 1098a7-18; trans. Basic Works, 943. Ibid., 1097b21; trans. Basic Works, 942.

Greig 12 wills desire for what is natural, the analogy between the natural mode and the state of virtue which constitutes happiness can be seen. 3) The Gnomic Mode of the Will By contrast, the gnomic mode of the will in relation to Aristotle is analogous to the man who, while possessing the good as the end for which he acts, mistakes the good for a false principle as the vicious, or self-indulgent, man29; or such a man may rather perceive the principle that pertains to the natural good for manand so is not viciousbut fails to desire and intend this in choice as the incontinent man. 30 In both cases whether in ignorance or knowledge of the real good, such a man acts in divergence from the proper mode or path towards achieving or attaining the virtues which constitute the natural, chief good for mansomething which the natural will has the natural longing for, in Maximuss understanding, but which the individual fails to realize in his willing. Such a state for that person can be seen to be the gnomic mode of willing, when the habit out of which a man acts is in divergence to the natural desiring of the will.

Conclusion
Having described Aristotles and Maximus the Confessors understandings of the will as a faculty and in its activity, the concepts of the natural will for Maximus and the rational appetite for Aristotle are identical. Yet, in comparing the modes of willing in Maximuss understanding of the will to the faculty and virtues proper to the rational appetite in Aristotle, one may ask in what way the terminology of the former adds to the understanding of the latter, if at all. One should notice that whereas Aristotle considers the virtues and happiness as things to be inquired into and sought in themselves for the sake of achieving the chief good in man, Maximus the Confessor is concerned with the relation of this happiness, and the virtues related to this, to the rational appetite in itself. In talking about a unique theological circumstance with the Incarnation of Christ and the
Considering vice to be equivalent with self-indulgence; cf. Ibid., VII.7 1150b29-1151a4; tr. Basic Works, 1049, esp.: The self-indulgent man, as was said, is not apt to repent; for he stands by his choice; but any incontinent man is likely to repent. . . . the former [self-indulgence] is permanent, the latter [incontinence] an intermittent badness. And generally incontinence and vice are different in kind; vice is unconscious of itself, incontinence is not . . . Aristotle implies that self-indulgence, or vice, is a mistake in believing or choosing something to be the good when it is, in fact, unconscious of itself as objectively evil and not good.
29

Cf. Ibid., VII.1 1145b7-15, esp.: . . . the same man is thought to be continent and ready to abide by the result of his calculations, or incontinent and ready to abandon them. And (2) the incontient man, knowing that what he does is bad, does it as a result of passion, while the continent man, knowing that his appetites are bad, refuses on account of his rational principle to follow them.
30

Greig 13 preservation of the divine and human natures, a description was needed of the will and the possibility for the possession of a natural mode of operation which harmonized with the intention of the divine willthat is the source and creative power of what is natural. In talking about a natural mode of willing which arises by nature in something which was created by a divine power, one can then philosophically consider in what way a natural harmony can be achieved in two different natures. The further philosophical and anthropological implications behind an understanding of the modes of the will include the fact that that human willing has a certain determination for what is natural. The person (hypostasis), however, ultimately establishes himself or herself through his or her actions in one mode of being or another: either by following the natural determination of the will or by falling into an aberrant determination which falls short of the complete natural end for man. The understanding of modes of the will then implies a kind of state of being for man which reflects either union with what is natural or separation from what is natural. The understanding of the natural will also implies that there is a pre-existing natural state for man which man has the capability of returning to or attaining, in seeking the end of all desire that leads to happiness.

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