The Development of Character in Kantian Moral Theory

J E A N P. R U M S E Y

1. INTRODUCTION IN HER I985 PAPER, "The Practice of Moral Judgment," Barbara Herman carefully analyzes Kant's account of that process. On the basis of her analysis Herman postulates what she calls "Rules of Moral Salience" as an essential part of that process. In the absence of sufficient textual evidence to warrant postulation of such rules, she claims that they, or something like them, are needed to make a Kantian account of moral judgment work. Her project, then, is not to provide a faithful exegesis of Kant's views, but to provide a "normative reconstruction" of Kantian ethics, in order to present "a plausible moral theory that is clearly and distinctly Kantian. "~ This paper, similarly constrained, is an effort to arrive at a plausible account of the development of character which is clearly Kantian, but which has not been fully articulated in Kant's own work. My project here is to examine carefully the Kantian view of the process of character development, in relation to both intelligible character (the rational capacity which is its foundation and guide) and empirical character (character as it develops or fails to develop in the lives of particular human beings). While there is considerable textual material on each dimension of character, Kant wrote little about the relationship between the two. Perhaps he thought that their relationship was simple and clear, as hc implies in the Preface to the second edition of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, where he wrote that the terms virtus phaenomenon and virtus noumenon were only used because they were clearer to philosophers. The matter itself, he wrote, "is contained,
I should like to thank Professors Claudia Card and Patrick Riley of the University of Wisconsin and a referee from this journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Barbara Herman, "The Practice of Moral Judgment," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 82, no. 8 (August 1985): 414-36.

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though in other words, in the most popular children's instruction and sermons, and is easily understood."* However, the relationship between the rational capacity for development of good character and its actualization is not that simple. In particular, when considered from the former perspective, claims about the latter may seem incompatible with basic premises of Kant's theory. Thus Kant holds that every human being, as rational, can recognize the moral law, and this capacity both obligates and enables him to develop a will in which the moral incentive is sovereign. However, when Kant turned his attention toward the actual world, away from the rational Kingdom of Ends, he found many obstacles to that development, not only in human inclinations but in human society. Particularly in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, but also in his more narrowly political writings, Kant seems to be saying that for certain persons, given their backgrounds, occupations, or social roles, development of good moral character is difficult, if not impossible. If this is true, what, then, becomes of moral causality? Because the development of character seems to provide a natural bridge between the two dimensions, I will examine this process with care. My goal is to provide a normative reconstruction of Kant's theory of character which will show crucial interrelationships between intelligible and empirical character, interrelationships which Kant himself did not spell out with care.
2. THE PROBLEM

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Kant set forth the rational foundations of the development of moral character; in the Doctrine of Virtue he articulated a theory of virtues which a moral agent should develop in order to achieve the two obligatory human ends, one's own perfection and the happiness of others; and in the Religion he further defined good character and forms of evil character. The foundation of good character is the moral causality of the rational agent. If the agent recognizes the moral law, and commits himself firmly to act from respect for the moral law, he has established a sound basis for developing good character. From time to time he may be mistaken in describing his maxim (for instance, self-interest rather than beneficence may be the basis for his assistance to an ailing, wealthy spinster aunt) but if he conscientiously submits all maxims which might conflict with the moral law to its review, his will is fundamentally good. However, developing the several virtues comes

" Kants Werke, Akademie-Textausgabe[hereafterAk] (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), 6: 14; Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Row, 196o), 13.

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slowly, through careful exercise of choice in motivation and action, and is easier or more difficult depending upon the agent's own temperament and experience. A naturally generous person may find it easy to develop the virtue of beneficence, while a naturally unsympathetic person may have trouble developing this virtue, though finding it easy to develop self-mastery. Similarly, one who has no personal experience of illness is enjoined by Kant to visit the sick, in order to develop sympathetic feelings which will, in turn, facilitate development of the associated virtue. Possession of the several virtues, however, is not sufficient to insure that the agent has developed good character, for their possession could be an artifact of temperament, upbringing, or experience. The virtue of conscientiousness, though pivotal in Kant's view, is hollow in a self-deceptive agent, so Kant holds that the only proof that the agent has developed good character lies in his unfailing truthfulness, to himself as well as to others.3 However, in the Religion Kant is more cautious; the agent cannot know "the subjective first ground of his maxims," yet must be able "to hope through his own efforts to reach the road which leads thither, and which is pointed out to him by a fundamentally improved disposition, because he ought to be a good man.'4 The Kantian assumption here, again, is that "ought" implies "can," that it is morally within the power of any human being to develop character. What are we to make of those passages in Kant's writings on empirical character which seem to call this fundamental assumption into question? At times Kant seems to be providing counterexamples for his own theory. However, I believe that a careful examination of these examples will reveal significant relationships between morality and politics in Kant's overall theory. In particular, this examination should provide insight into the kinds of political structures and cultural values which are conducive to the development of character, on Kant's account, and into those which thwart its development. The apparent contradiction between Kant's account of intelligible and empirical character which I shall examine has its roots in the tacit assumption (rarely an explicit claim) that even though some human beings, or classes of human beings, are in full possession of the faculty of reason, they do not typically develop good moral character. Although in Kant's basic moral theory he seems to hold that the possession of reason is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the worth both of moral actions and agents, he seems to hold in his empirical writings that it is not sufficient; that there are other prerequisites for the development of good character, such as independence
3 Ak 89: 295; Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. MaryJ. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), x6o. 4 Religion, 46.

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(personal, political, and economic) and an adequate early training. Kant explicitly states that members of certain occupational groups are not able to do so. Thus neither the minister, the courtier, nor the poet can develop character, for none of them is his own master (the minister serving two masters, God and man, the courtier a succession of masters, while the poet is slave to his own wit).~ Further, what Kant considers a poor cultural environment can thwart moral development; for instance, the infant brought up by gypsies "until the habit of evil conduct has become a necessity" is less responsible for his actions and the vices they indicate than an agent who has had an upbringing which enables him to tell right from wrong, and been free to choose his own actions and motivations.6 Although Kant nowhere stated in so many words that the female of the species is unable to develop moral character, I shall argue that he presents them in his empirical writings in just that light. In brief, my argument will be that he portrays women as morally limited in three important ways: i) as guided by feelings, taste and pragmatic intelligence rather than by principle through the exercise of practical reason; 2) as necessarily dependent upon men for economic goods, and under their direction politically in the institution of marriage; and 3) as beings whose purposes are not their own, but have been co-opted by nature in order to carry out her great purposes, the propagation and civilization of the race. Because of these limitations, they are able typically to aspire only to functional character--goodness in their role--rather than to moral character itself. Because Kant wrote extensively on this topic, and somewhat less about the impediments other social roles or circumstances present to character development, I shall focus on the moral status of women, as Kant interpreted it in his time. If the claim above is true, the problem for Kant's moral theory is evident. For women are members of the human species; they are rational beings. If Kant's theory applies to all members of this species, then they, too, should be able to develop a good will with its principled virtues. If they are not, then the universality of his theory is vitiated, and his claims about the powers of moral causality are rendered suspect. Alternatively, if Kant is presenting two different theories of character, one intelligible and one empirical, then one must question whether or not these two theories can be integrated within a Kantian framework. If, however, the claim is overstated, and it is possible for women to develop good character, then we stand to learn something about Kant's view of character development, as we understand why those features of women's situation stated above function as moral impediments.
5 A k 89: 295; Anthropology, 16o. 6 Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield(NewYork: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 62, 64.

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My procedure will be as follows: first, I will outline the development of character according to Kant, noting factors necessary or conducive to that development. Second, I will sketch female nature and character as Kant has described it. Third, I will examine Kant's view that women's purposes are not their own, but nature's, and the consequences following therefrom. On the basis of this analysis I shall address the problem of whether Kant's view of women represents an inconsistency in Kant's complete moral theory. In conclusion I shall make three claims: 1) While Kant's denial that women typically develop moral character seems inconsistent with his fundamental moral theory as expressed in the Groundwork, this apparent inconsistency vanishes when one takes a broader perspective which includes Kant's theory of character. When the foundational perspective (humans considered as members of the class of rational beings) is augmented with the perspective of character development (humans considered as possessing both rationality and animality, and necessarily situated in a particular society, at a particular time in history) the difficulty of actualizing one's rationally-based capacity for developing character becomes apparent. Support for this claim is found in "What Is Enlightenment?" (1784), in which Kant urges his readers to have the courage to use their own reason, admitting that most persons in the world do not: "The guardians who have kindly taken upon themselves the work of supervision will see to it that by far the largest part of mankind (including the entire fair sex) should consider the step forward to maturity as highly dangerous."7 Kant elsewhere provides a special explanation for the immaturity of women. Unlike their male counterparts, women are not even potentially in control of their own lives, but serve as vehicles of nature's purposes: to propagate and civilize the race. Kant further holds that hazards incurred in carrying out the primary purpose require that the female must exist under the lifelong guardianship of the male, to whom they are subject in marriage. Women's purposes are thus co-opted by nature, and they are politically subject; it is difficult, therefore, to see how they would be able to achieve the moral autonomy which defines good character for Kant. To provide this special explanation is not to deny woman's fundamental moral capacity, but to explain why she is unable to develop it properly, because of her function. 2) There is, however, a serious inconsistency in Kant's position: it seems to me that he cannot simultaneously hold both that all human beings have a capacity for moral autonomy, for reflective choice of their own principles, motivations, purposes and actions; and that women's purposes are not their own, but are ordained by nature. To scholars wishing further clarification on
7 Ak 8: 36; "What Is Enlightenment?" in Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197o), 54.

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this point I recommend Keith Ward's The Development of Kant's View of Ethics, in which Professor Ward argues that the divergent teleological and rationalistic strands in Kant's ethical thought constitute "a central contradiction within the view i t s e l f . . , an unsolved, perhaps unsolvable, metaphysical problem in Kant's thought on ethics. ''8 In this paper I must confine myself primarily to my third and most important claim. 3) If we adopt the perspective suggested in claim one, it becomes clear that the human rational capacity, while the foundation of moral worth both of character and of action, is not in itself sufficient to explain the actualization of that capacity in good character (though it may suffice to explain moral worth in particular actions). Whether the agent develops good character or not depends partly upon his courage and determination, but also upon his social situation and upbringing. One may object that this is a revisionist claim; indeed, it can be objected that the attempt to pull together a "theory of character" from Kant's widely dispersed passages bearing on character is itself a revisionist task. My claim here is not, however, that Kant should have said, for example, X rather than Y, but that had he viewed his foundational theory in conjunction with this position on character development in the human world, he would have arrived at a synthesis of the two which would have been substantially in agreement with the conclusions maintained here. This claim will be elaborated as the discussion progresses; further, from this more complete perspective, certain apparent inconsistencies between the two dimensions of his theory can be reconciled.
3. T H E D E V E L O P M E N T
OF MORAL CHARACTER

Kant's account of good character rest on three premises: x) reason is the necessary basis of an objective morality; 2) the ability to acquire moral character--to become one who acts on principle, not from impulse, selfinterest, or external suasion--is the distinguishing feature of the human species; and 3) good character is defined as a will structured by the Categorical Imperative, in all its forms. Its empirical manifestation is the development of certain principled virtues such as beneficence, conscientiousness, and truthfulness. These virtues are to be distinguished from natural dispositions such as beneficence or sympathy, and from the "social virtues" such as affability and courtesy. Although the latter are non-morally good, Kant argues that they are not true virtues for they do not spring from the rational will but from temperament, training, or convention. True moral virtues are developed through the agent's exercise of choice guided by rational reflection. The end of this process of character development is a will so structured that the Willki~r, or choosa Keith W a r d , The Development of Kant's View of Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972 ), 174.

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ing will, is directed by the Wille, or rational will. This is the intelligible dimension of character; the inward maxim is crucial, for by mere observation, it is impossible to distinguish an action which has sprung from the agent's character from one which has been prompted by self-interest, mere habituation, or inclination. However, reason is not the only basis for the development of character. Reason gives access to the moral law, while moral dispositions which are a part of the normal agent's nature enable him to feel its pull: moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and self-esteem. Kant holds that these "lie at the basis of m o r a l i t y . . , for they are the means by which human agents can be obligated." Their significance is perhaps obscured by Kant's terminology; to say they are "subjective conditions of our receptiveness to the concept of duty, n o t . . , objective conditions of morality" indicates that they pertain to the moral agent rather than to the moral law, and does not diminish their necessity in that respect.9 It is perhaps not too strong to call these prerequisites for character development. Should a person be lacking in these dispositions, Kant says that he would have no duty to acquire them, but would remain a stranger to morality, or, in other words, "morally dead. ''1o In addition to enabling the agent to feel the pull of obligation in general, these moral dispositions also facilitate development of particular virtues, such as that of beneficence. Kant holds that we have a "conditioned" or "indirect" duty to cultivate "the natural sympathetic (aesthetic) feelings in us and to use them as so many means" to participate actively in the fate of others, "from moral principles and from the feeling appropriate to those principles." More strongly, Kant states that the natural disposition to sympathy "is still one of the impulses which nature has implanted in us so that we may do what the thought of duty alone would not accomplish."" Thus far we have considered only two kinds of natural human capacities which contribute to the development of moral character, reason and sensibility. But since every agent lives in a particular society, with particular cultural values and, in particular, social roles, the question arises as to the influence of these social factors in character development. Although this is a topic on which Kant has written extensively, it is not a question which he has answered systematically, much less unequivocally. Its importance warrants inquiry into the question, despite the uncertainty of arriving at an adequate answer. We may begin this inquiry with Kant's characterization of political reality in "What Is Enlightenment?" Here he depicts a paternalistic world in which

9 Ak 12: 399; The Doctrine of Virtue, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Harper and Row,

1964), 59.

1o Ak 12: 399; Doctrine of Virtue, 6o. " Ak 33: 455; 35: 457; Doctrine of Virtue, 125-26.

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the majority of physically mature humans ("the great unthinking mass") is morally immature, controlled by a relatively few self-appointed "guardians. ''1~ Although their reasoning capacity is not impaired, the many are unable to direct themselves by means of that capacity, because of weakness and fear; the guardians, unless themselves directed by reason rather than self-interest, do not treat their ward with the respect they possess as rational beings. Significantly, while Kant here exhorts individuals to have the courage to rely on their own reason, he holds that it is highly difficult in such a world for each separate individual to achieve moral maturity. However, the entire community may emerge from its dependency through the public use of reason, creating political conditions which will then foster the development of good character in its members. ~3 Second, Kant's distinction between the active and passive citizen, in his theory of the state, bears on this question. The active citizen is characterized by freedom and economic and political independence; he must have "an independent position among the people," enabling him "by his own free will [to] actually participate in a community of other people." In contrast, persons who must "depend on their living (i.e., for food and protection) on the office of o t h e r s . . , have no civil personality.",4 While both kinds of citizens are, as human beings, morally equal, it would seem that the passive citizen's dependence upon others for sustenance and protection might prove a serious obstacle to the development of mature, self-legislative moral character. Education, too, is an important means of readying the young person for moral maturity. In their broadest sense, cultural values, expressed in social practices, are of great importance. The young can learn to respect and love others from social practices such as courtesy, politeness, affability and propriety, which can body forth these moral feelings. Kant is explicit in the A n t h r o p o l ogy that he considers civilized practices ("[this] cultivated propriety that is the preparatory training for morality and its recommendation") an important element in moral development.x5 In its narrower sense, Kant stresses the importance of early training for character. The child should be carefully taught to respect the rights of others, and to be aware of the worth and dignity of humans. In other words, the child should be taught to appreciate values which are consonant with the categorical imperative, even before he is mature enough to commit his own will to its service. Resoluteness of will should be developed, and habits of obedience, 6: 36; Kant's Political Writings, 55. 8: 37-38; Kant's Political Writings, 57. 14 A k 6: 3a4; Kant's Political Writings, 139-4o. 15 Ak 89: 3o6; Anthropology, 169.
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truthfulness, and sociability should be inculcated.x6 Ideally, he should act from maxims "the reasonableness of which he is able to see for himself," the principles behind the mandates.~7 Most importantly, he should learn that he has a capacity for choosing well or poorly, rightly or wrongly; the development of this capacity of reflective choice is the ever-present goal of his long tutelage. This early training is preparatory to moral education itself, addressed in the Doctrine o f Virtue rather than in the Education. Kant here primarily concentrates on virtue in its single sense (the commitment of the will to the guidance of practical reason, rather than by one's own inclinations or by others), for he holds this to be necessarily prior to the acquisition of particular virtues, even one so pivotal as conscientiousness; that commitment itself necessitates the development of that particular virtue. Kant holds that while a young person might learn to behave generously, or respectfully, from admired models, the agent can learn little from others in this fundamental choice of intelligible character. This choice must be made, as Kant puts it, within "the subjective autonomy of each man's practical reason"; the standard here is not one's own society, nor the saints and heroes within it, but "the Idea of humanity (what man ought to be) and so with the [moral] law. '''8 Because of this, examples are not used, though a catechism is designed to present the moral law in its relation to the agent's happiness, duties, and inclinations. The shamefulness rather than the harmfulness of vice is emphasized, as is the rightness rather than the utility of virtue. Again, questions are designed to guide the student to an awareness of his own agency and choice. The cooperation of all these factors can result in good character, in its intelligible dimension of commitment to the moral law, and its empirical objectification through mastery of the particular virtues the law enjoins. Both dimensions are encompassed in Kant's definition of character as "the property of will by which [the agent] binds himself to definite practical principles that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason."~9 As we have seen, Kant holds that forging one's character is a difficult project, even in the best of circumstances. It is a lifelong process, ending only at death, its basis is rarely secured before the age of thirty. Finally, even the agent herself cannot gain complete certainty that she has established good character, but must infer her moral progress from her satisfaction in the consistent performance of the duties it enjoins, and her acquisition of the dispositions it recommends. ,6 For a fuller discussion of conventional elements in moraljudgment, see Herman, "Moral Judgment," cited above. ,7 Ak 9: 475; Education, trans, not credited (Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press, 1980, lo8. ~8 Ak 5~: 480; Doctrine of Virtue, 153. ~9 Ak 89: ~9~; Anthropology, 157.

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T h e f o r e g o i n g account o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f empirical character, in which the agent's practical reason is a u g m e n t e d by nature, the political order, education and civilized practices, is Kant's account o f how character should develop in a rational being. We are now ready to examine the question o f why, in Kant's view, the female o f this rational species does not, or cannot, develop moral character. 4.
THE PROBLEM OF W O M E N ' S CHARACTER

Kant's portrayal o f female character in the early Observations on the Feeling o f the Beautiful and the Sublime was not purely a description o f female "nature," but was o f f e r e d as a criterion for what that character should be. While he identified female qualities with the beautiful, and masculine with the noble, he states that he did not m e a n to assert that women are entirely lacking in noble qualities, or that m e n are entirely bereft o f beautiful ones. H e asserts r a t h e r that "all the o t h e r merits o f a woman should unite solely to enhance the character o f the beautiful, which is the p r o p e r r e f e r e n c e point; and on the o t h e r hand, a m o n g the masculine qualities the sublime clearly stands out as the criterion o f his kind." Praise and blame must be assigned in terms o f these criteria, as well as "all education and i n s t r u c t i o n . . , and all efforts to advance the moral perfection o f the one or the o t h e r . . , we must r e m e m b e r that they are not alike. ''2~ T h e s e early remarks are not cited as evidence for Kant's final view, but as clues to the puzzle o f women's character. Let us p u r s u e them. How, then, if at all, are w o m e n different f r o m men, f r o m a moral point o f view? Kant's most general statement denies that women are moral beings: "Nothing o f duty, nothing o f compulsion, nothing o f o b l i g a t i o n . . . I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable o f principles. But in the place o f it Providence has put in their breast kind and benevolent sensations, a fine feeling for propriety, and a complaisant soul. ''2~ This different nature fits them for their societal function; declaring in his work on education that w o m e n "have but little character," he prescribes that they are not to be educated for character, but for their special role in society. "A woman's education is not instruction, but guidance. She must know men r a t h e r than books. H o n o r is her greatest virtue, domesticity her merit. ''2~ T h e context makes it plain that " h o n o r " h e r e means irreproachability in matters o f sex, not moral uprightness, as it would when applied to h e r brother. Kant is h e r e u p h o l d i n g the criterion for a good woman, not a good person.
2o Ak 2: 228; Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 196o), 76-77 . 2~ A k 2: 229; Observations, 81. 2, In The Educational Theory oflmmanuel Kant, trans. Edward F. Buckner (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 19o4), ~22.

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Similarly, in the A n t h r o p o l o g y Kant makes a point of spelling out women's virtues, as contrasted with man's. She is patient, he tolerant; as in Aristotle, woman saves, while man acquires; she naturally possesses social grace and refined feelings, which enable her to run a civilized household, while the man, through his understanding, is fitted to its rule.~3 These functional "virtues" are not principled, but are tendencies present in temperament or developed by imitation and role-playing. Thus Kant recommends that "children, especially girls, must be got used to smiling in an easy, unconstrained way when they are still very young; for this illumination of the face gradually moulds them from within as well as establishes a disposition to joy, friendliness and sociability which is an early preparation for this approximation to the virtue of benevolence."~4 The base coinage of what Kant calls the "social virtues" is the going currency for females. However, Kant does proffer what we might call a "surrogate principle" which underlies the several virtues of women. This is the conventionalist principle that "what the world says is true, and what it does, good"; he points out that this "principle" is "hard to unite with character in the strict sense of the term." Nonetheless, he is at pains to claim that good women have existed, when one takes into consideration their "vocation" and the "relations in which they have been placed." Kant offers as an example John Milton's wife, even when she urged her husband to take employment against his principles to ease the family's financial straits. Kant judges that this was proper, coming from her, but that Milton was right in refusing. He quotes the latter as follows: "Ah, my d e a r . . , you and the rest of your sex want to travel in coaches: but I--must be an honorable man."*~ It is clear that Kant is giving this faint praise to women's functional character, not to moral character. There is a sense in which we might respect a good woman, not for herself but for the useful and agreeable qualities she possesses; the sense in which we would respect the talents of a good physician, a good horse-trainer, or a good bassoon player. This is respect for someone who is good of his or her kind, good at doing something, or fulfilling a certain social role. But this is hardly the respect for someone who is, through her own commitment to the moral law, becoming herself morally good. Kant's women, then, are proto-emotivists, guided by their feelings and a merely pragmatic intelligence, rather than practical reason. But how could women's reason differ so from the reason that characterizes their species? Kant comes closest to addressing this question directly with respect to theo,3 Ak 94 Ak 95 Ak

89: 306, 31o; Anthropology, 169, 17~. 13: 151; 14: a53; 79: ~65; Anthropology, a51, 153, ~,65. 89: 3o8; Anthropology, 171.

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retic reason. For he admits that a w o m a n might have a considerable power o f theoretic reason, but cautions her not to develop it. Kant warns that if a w o m a n should succeed in some field o f learning, this "destroys the merits that are p r o p e r to h e r s e x . . , and will weaken the charms with which she exercises her great p o w e r over the o t h e r sex. '''6 With respect to practical reason, Kant seems to hold that it is (or o u g h t to be) s u b m e r g e d in h e r feminine nature. Because o f this, woman's moral develo p m e n t is held to be d i f f e r e n t f r o m man's. Young men, as we have seen, are guided to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the moral law and to an appreciation o f their own agency. Y o u n g women, in contrast, will be e n c o u r a g e d to b r o a d e n their moral feeling, as Kant says, " o f course not by universal rules but by some j u d g m e n t u p o n the c o n d u c t they see about them"; they are to refine their sentiments in the best H u m e a n manner. Kant specifies that this is "never a cold a n d speculative instruction but always feelings, and those indeed which remain as close as possible to the situation o f her sex."27 Kant describes women's effective reason in the Anthropology. T h e y are, he claims, guided by "technically-practical" reason; that is, reason t u r n e d to pragmatic ends. Kant holds that not wisdom but power is woman's touchstone; they b e n d their mental powers to dominate and manipulate others. Kant notes that feminine ways are "precisely the r u d d e r s women use to steer m e n and use them for their own purposes. ''28 H e f u r t h e r suggests that because w o m e n have no rights or goods, but are d e p e n d e n t u p o n m e n for their welfare, their intelligence has d e v e l o p e d its pragmatic cast. However, this view is not consistent with his analysis o f h u m a n nature in the Religion. T h e r e he constructs a tripartite division o f h u m a n nature as follows: 1) the predisposition to animality in man, taken as a living being; ~) the predisposition to personality in man, taken as a living, rational being; and 3) the predisposition to personality in man, taken as both a rational and an accountable being. Kant holds that the second predisposition is based on "practical reason, but a reason thereby subservient to o t h e r incentives" such as gaining p o w e r over others, in particular, over rivals. Only the third is based on "reason which is practical o f itself, that is, reason which dictates laws unconditionally." Kant underlines the fact that all h u m a n s must have all three dispositions by saying that the first two can be used in a way which is contrary to their ends, but that n o n e o f the three can be extirpated.20 O n Kant's own account, it

96 97 98 99

Ak Ak Ak Ak

2: 229; Observations, 79. 2: 231; Observations, 8 1 . 89: 3o4; Anthropology, 167. 6: ~8; R e l i g i o n , ~ 2 - 2 3 .

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would seem that women, as human, must have all three predispositions, including the reason that is practical of itself. What can we conclude, then, about the character of women, as Kant conceived it? First, for Kant, character is acquired by understanding the moral law through reason and structuring one's will accordingly. Women do not do this: women's feeling, however broadened, remains feeling. They operate through sensibility, not reason. Since acting morally is defined by Kant as acting from principle, it would seem that women are strangers to morality. While Kant does hold that they are by nature beneficent, sympathetic, and sociable, it should be clear by now that for the post-critical Kant, having a good nature or temperament implies nothing about one's moral character. But if women are members of the human species, whose first characteristic is its power, as rational, to acquire character, then how could they be Without the capacity to do so, or without the possibility of its actualization? Susan Moiler Okin has argued that Kant must hold that women are able to acquire moral character, because of his stress on "the universal applicability of his moral and political philosophy," and because he argues strongly that "in morals, no gap is to be tolerated between theory and practice." Further, she points out that Kant clearly states that his system holds "not merely for men, but for all rational beings as such"; noting that the use of "men" in this context is surely generic.3o However, we must distinguish between the capacity for development of moral character and that development itself. If it is true that the women of Kant's time did not develop character, it does not follow that they lack the capacity. One must look in vain through the Kantian corpus for a denial that women lack such a capacity. To posit this deficiency would threaten the universality of Kant's system. Let us therefore examine the hypothesis that, although women possess this capacity, they do not actualize it because features of their particular situation-features which would be regarded as serious obstacles for any person, male or female--Meter or block its development. The surface inconsistency may point to a more basic truth: in order that any human may shape his own character to the demands of practical reason, certain broad social and political conditions must obtain. We have noted that Kant held that the clergy, courtiers, and poets cannot develop moral character because, in different ways, they are not their own masters;just so, in Kant's society, the woman was under the tutelage of her husband for the duration of her adult life. Surely one of the most serious obstacles which the embodied, encultured
so S u s a n Moiler O k e n , " W o m e n a n d t h e Making o f t h e Sentimental Family,"

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adult meets in regard to the forging of his or her moral integrity is the continued domination by other persons. The clergy, courtiers, and even poets could change their occupations, but women could not, in Kant's time, renounce the role assigned to them on the basis of their sex. The salient feature of that role, on Kant's view, is its dependency. In the next section we shall examine Kant's teleological explanation of their anomalous position.
5" N A T U R E ' S P U R P O S E S AND W O M E N ' S TASKS

Kant's primary reason for holding that women are morally immature is that their own purposes are co-opted by nature's. Unlike men, who (other things being equal) are free to forge their wills into that purity of purpose which constitutes character, women must serve nature's purposes. To succeed in comprehending the female sex, Kant says, "we must not use as our principle what we make our end, but only what the end o f nature was in devising the female sex."3~ This end is two-fold: the continuation of the species, and its progressive civilization, or, in Kant's phrase, "the cultivation and refinement of society." Kant holds that nature has bestowed on the female certain qualities which enable her to perform those tasks well. To equip her for the second task, she has been given special powers, such as "modesty and eloquence in speech and expression. It made her precociously shrewd in claiming gentle and courteous treatment by the male, so that he finds himself imperceptibly fettered by a child through his own generosity and led by it, if not to morality itself, at least to its clothing, the cultivated propriety that is the preparatory training for morality and its recommendation."3' By her use of these powers, she is the primary means by which civilized values are transmitted through generations. However, the characteristic which nature has given the female to aid in performing the first task, the propagation of the species, is not a power but a liability. Nature itself feared for its future, and therefore implanted in woman fear and timidity in the face of physical dangers, including those of pregnancy and childhood. From this trait flows a significant consequence: "Through this weakness woman rightfully demands that man be her protector."3a She is thus not her own person, but belongs to her protector, and, in a different way, to the progeny with whom she has been entrusted by nature. This fear and concomitant need might prevent her from being able to forge her own integrity, and explain her moral shortcomings. We recall that in his essay, "What Is Enlightenment?" Kant castigated the bulk of humanity, including all women,
s~ Ak 7: 306; Anthropology, 169. 3, Ak 89: 306; Anthropology, 169. s3 Ak 89: 3o6; Anthropology, 169.

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for "self-incurred" immaturity due to "laziness and cowardice." If, however, nature, for its own purposes, has caused women to be thus dependent, then it would seem that they are not culpable for their immaturity.34 To the teleological arguments for the subordination of women Kant adds a political one: "If a union is to be harmonious and indissoluble.., one party must be the superior of the other in some way, in order to be able to rule and govern him. For if two people who cannot dispense with each other make equal claims, self-love produces nothing but wrangling." In a household, "there can only be one person who coordinates all occupations in accordance with one end, which is his." Kant here allows that the woman reigns, while the man governs, "for inclination reigns and understanding governs."a5 In the following section we will evaluate this argument.
6. KANT'S VIEW OF WOMEN: IS I T K A N T I A N . )

Kant took the model for the rightful structure of the most basic social unit, the family, from actual patrilineal forms of his day. However, in his political philosophy he took as the rightful political structure the egalitarian republic, not the prevailing monarchy, which is, in effect, the patrilineal principle writ large. A republic, Kant asserts in Perpetual Peace, is "the only constitution which can be derived from the idea of an original contract, upon which all rightful legislation of a people may be founded." It is based upon three principles, which contrast markedly with Kant's conception of those governing the marriage relationship. These are: l) freedom for all members of a society (as human beings); ~) the principle of the dependence of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and 3) the principle of legal equality of everyone (as citizens).36 If this is the only form of government which is consonant with human dignity and freedom, then it could certainly be argued that it should be the only form governing lesser associations of adults. It would seem to be our duty to try to bring our personal associations into line with this model,just as it is, as Kant holds, the duty of persons and governments to try to implement an egalitarian republic. But if the subjugation of women is opposed to Kant's political ideal, it is also at odds with his moral ideal. For the paternalism argument cuts both ways. In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant holds that it harms both protectee and protector alike. For the equal respect which should mark adult human relationships is precluded by the inequality of the marriage relationship. For one adult to keep another under guardianship in perpetuity, even if that person
34 Ak 8: 35; Kant's Political Writings, 54. 35 Ak 89: 31o. 36 Ak 8: 35o; Kant's Political Writings, 99-

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prefers it to moral maturity, is w r o n g on Kantian principles. Both beneficiary and p a t r o n stand to lose morally, Kant argues, for the one "who freely consents to submit to this c o n d i t i o n . . , commits the s u p r e m e rejection o f his humanity." T h e master, however, commits "the injustice o f depriving someone o f his freedom."37 We have seen that woman's enculturation and her status as a pawn in nature's cosmic chess game present formidable obstacles to the d e v e l o p m e n t o f h e r character. Nonetheless, if she does possess the moral capacity o f her rational species, Kant should w o n d e r that this capacity could be thus stifled. A utilitarian might a r g u e that this can be justified, if evidence exists that societies in which women's role is so conceived are arguably happier societies than those in which w o m e n are equal. However, a Kantian must reject this consequentialist a r g u m e n t ; such a t r a d e - o f f between happiness and morality would be wrong. Just as we would not expect a good Kantian to accept similar a r g u m e n t s about the benefits o f slavery, we would not expect a Kantian to accept consequentialist a r g u m e n t s about the utility o f men's and women's roles, so defined. For this reason I argue that Kant's teleological arguments about the contribution o f w o m e n to the civilizing and thus the moralizing o f the race are basically c o n t r a r y to Kantian tenets. I f women are rational creatures, then they are, in principle, able to choose their own purposes and motivations, to structure their own wills on the basis o f the moral law, or to fail to do so. Further, Kant's own situation may have blinded him to what seem to me clear implications o f his c o m p r e h e n s i v e theory o f character, which includes both the basis in practical reason o f the capacity for developing good character, and specifies the kinds o f social and political values and institutions which foster its development. Realizing that the agent's moral choices are structured, in part, by one's relation to these values and institutions, the true Kantian position would be that women's lives should be altered. T h e i r education should no longer be aimed at developing merely functional "virtues" but toward enlightenment, both o f the world itself and o f their own developing wills. W o m e n should be accorded the respect due them as rational beings, and led to respect their own capacity for self-direction. This may come about, in part, when political equality and economic o p p o r t u n i t y free them f r o m the need o f a lifelong protector. Even considering woman's special teleological function, it could be a r g u e d that women would then find it possible to develop their latent but undeniable moral capacities. This is not to d e n y that in Kant's view the agent herself is the most important causal factor in character development, nor is it to imply that in the world 37 Ak 89: 333; Anthropology, 193.

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of justice and equality, every agent would develop good character. It is to claim only that Kant's comprehensive theory of character development shows us the interrelation of the moral and the political, the individual and the community. The development of good character is not merely a private, internal matter, a battle between inclinations and reason within the individual agent, but a political problem in the broadest sense. In solving this problem, Kant claims in this important essay "What Is Enlightenment?" we must look to the free, public use of reason to continually test the community's laws, practices and institutions against the measure of the moral law.~8 7- CONCLUSIONS We are now ready to address the problem of possible inconsistencies between Kant's account of the intelligible ground of character (the rational capacity which is its foundation and guide) and its empirical dimension (character as it develops or fails to be developed in the lives of individual human beings in human society). With respect to the latter, Kant has presented women as, in general, unable to develop moral character as such, but only functional character, or goodness in their social role. But as members of the human species, women are rational beings. If Kant's theory applies to all members of that species, then they, too, should be able to develop a good will along with its concomitant principled virtues. If not, the universality of his theory is vitiated, and his claims about the powers of moral causality are rendered suspect. Alternatively, if Kant is presenting two different theories of character, one intelligible and one empirical, one must question whether both accounts can be integrated within a Kantian framework. I believe the most essential elements in both accounts can be so integrated, if one moves to the perspective of Kant's theory as a whole. More importantly, I believe that the resulting twoaspect rather than two-world theory is much more adequate than Kant's critics have generally recognized. Let me state my conclusions in detail. First, in view of Kant's analysis of the preconditions of character development, it seems clear that women, or any other group of humans similarly handicapped, would necessarily be unable to develop moral character. Woman's inability to do so can be seen as a vindication of, rather than a contradiction within, his completed theory. Because of nature's usurpation of women's purposes and their consequent need for a lifelong guardian, women lack the independence which is essential for building moral character on a Kantian view. Their education is directed toward making them functionally good, fulfilling their important roles in propagating and civilizing the human race. On Kant's reading, they are shaped by nature and society to serve others, not
3s Ak

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to develop their own character; to be good women, not good persons. To ignore the moral consequences of their role is to ignore Kant's analysis of the political and cultural conditions which foster moral development, as well as his warnings about the pernicious moral effects of inequality and paternalism. Second, Kant's claim that women's purposes are not their own, but nature's, is inconsistent with Kant's view of human beings as self-directing. For what it is to be a human moral agent is to be someone with the capacity to set his or her own purposes. As he writes in the Doctrine of Virtue: "Now another person can indeed compel me to perform actions which are means to his end, but he cannot compel me to have an end; only I myself can make something my end."39 In subsuming human purposes under nature's, Kant here places teleology over morality, allowing nature to use women only as a means to achieve her own purposes. As a consequence of this inversion, women are in perpetual tutelage, unable to actualize their latent rational capacity. This is patently inconsistent with Kant's position on the absolute worth of all human beings. The third and most important conclusion goes beyond questions of consistency, and shows the adequacy of Kant's complete theory. Having understood the problems surrounding Kant's view of women, we can understand, by negation, the social and political conditions which foster or thwart the development of moral character. Notwithstanding the tradition of Kantian criticism, it seems clear that from this broader perspective we can see that the human rational capacity, though pivotal, is not itself sufficient for character development in the human agent. In addition to the rational ability to grasp the moral law, the agent must have, first, a certain sensibility: moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and a basic self-esteem. In addition, the agent should be free from dependence on others for political direction or for basic economic needs. A good education, directed toward the inculcation of civilized values as well as to the strengthening of the will, is important; and it is helpful to live in a society whose practices and institutions reflect the love and respect which should mark one's relationships with others. Finally, a political order which is based on republican principles fosters the development of character in its citizens. All these internal and external factors contribute to character development in Kant's comprehensive view. When the Kantian account is fully understood, its adequacy in this respect is patent. In conclusion, it is appropriate to turn to the broader teleological question which Kant raises at the end of his section on character in the Anthropology. This is the question of whether the human species, as a whole, could ever, in this world, realize the ideal of good character in their lives. The political dimension of this moral ideal is again salient. If the species is to develop moral s9 Ak 1: 380; Doctrine of Virtue, 38.

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character, it must become civilized; further, its members must be free and equal citizens of self-governing polities. It is interesting to note that the conditions demanded by this regulative ideal are very like those required for the political ideal of peace. Kant closes the Anthropology as follows: "we cannot expect the end to be attained by the free accord of individuals, but only by a progressive organization of the earth into and towards the species, as a system held together by cosmopolitan bonds."4o

Clarion University of Pennsylvania

4o Ak 89: 333; Anthropology, 193.