International Phenomenological Society

Aesthetics, Signs, and Icons Author(s): Charles Morris and Daniel J. Hamilton Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Mar., 1965), pp. 356-364 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106096 Accessed: 13/12/2010 09:44
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AESTHETICS,SIGNS, AND ICONS In 1939, CharlesMorris, one of the co-authorsof the present paper, publishedtwo articles on aestheticsand the theory of signs.' Since that and date, numerouscomments,suggestions, criticismshave appearedconcerming, first, the feasibilityof applyinga theory of signs in aesthetics, and, secondly, how such a theory, if practicable,should be formulated. For purposesof presentation,this currentpaper is divided into three main sections. The first section briefly restates the major points of Morris' early position. In the second section, some of the suggestions and criticismswhich have been made concerningthis earlierposition are noted and discussed. Finally, the third section deals with the present status of the relationshipbetween aestheticsand a theory of signs. I Morris'early position,with regardto aestheticsand the theoryof signs, characterized work of art as a sign, which was, in all but the simplest the cases, itself a structureof signs. A sign situationwas formulatedas any situation in which one thing takes account of somethingelse, which is not directlycausally efficacious,throughthe mediationof a third someis thing. This "thirdsomething" that thing which operatesas a sign and is called the sign vehicle. The act of mediated taking account of, perThat which is taken formedby an interpreter, called,an interpretant. was account of mediately was called the designatum.By definition, a sign must designate,but it need not denote. For example, a certain whistle train were approaching; causes one to act as if an otherwiseunperceived train to the person hearingthe the sound then signifies an approaching whistle, and therefore, functions as a sign. However, one may take account of an approachingtrain (act as if a train were approaching)
' "Esthetics and The Theory of Signs," The Journal of Unified Science (Erkenntnis), Vill, #1-3 (1939), 131-150 and "Science, Art, and Technology," Kenyon Review, 1, (1939), 409-423.

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when in fact no train is coming;in this case the whistle designatesbut does not denote.2 Aesthetics, when formulatedin terms of signs, becomes a branch of semioticor the generaltheory of signs. Withinsemiotic, aestheticsis distinguished fromother sign-functioning activitiesby regarding aesthetic the sign as a distinctkind of sign. First, the aestheticsign is, an iconic sign. An iconic sign is one which denotes any object which has a certaincollectionof propertiesit itself has. In addition,the aestheticsign designates valuesand such values are consideredas propertiesof an object or situation relative to an interest. Hence, when an interpreterapprehendsan aesthetic sign vehicle which is, by definition, iconic, he apprehends directly what value or values are signified. Thus, both mediated and unmediatedtaking account of these value propertiesoccur. Since semioticcontainsas sub-branches sciencesof semantics,synthe tactics, and pragmatics,aestheticsmay also be characterized aesthetic as semantics,aestheticsyntactics,and aestheticpragmatics. The studyof the relationof aestheticsigns to what is designatedor denotedmay be called aestheticsemantics;the study of the relationsof aestheticsigns to interpretersmay be called aestheticpragmatics; and the study of the relation of aesthetic signs to other aesthetic signs may be called aesthetic syntactics. Many of the details of Morris' 1939 proposal have been eliminated in the above summary.Nevertheless,the majorpoints, as presented,will serve as a point of referencefor examiningthe numerouscommentsand criticismswhich, throughthe years, have appearedin answerto Morris' outline of an aesthetic semiotic. II Some of the many articles and books which have dealt directlyor indirectly with Morris' proposal of an aesthetic semiotic can be broadly classifiedas follows. First, one group of these is representative those of who oppose a theory of aestheticsigns on the basis that such a theory, howeverformulated, no applicationto art, or, in some instances,has has no applicationto certainforms of art. A second group of writers,on the Otherhand, expressesthe view that a theory of signs would be useful in an analysis of the arts, but questions certain aspects of the notion of iconicity in art. This secondgroupof writers,therefore,is in basic agree2 The formulation of semiotic summarized here is contained in detail in C. W. Morris' monograph, Foundations of the Theory of Signs (University of Chicago Press, 1938). This monograph constitutes Number 2, Volume 1 of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.

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ment with certainpartsof Morris'generalposition, and differsfrom him with respectto how such a theory of signs should formulatethe role of the iconic sign in aesthetics.A third group can be consideredas preaesthetics. senting various other criticisms against a semiotically-based Each of these three groups will be considered. Argumentsagainst consideringthe work of art as a sign. The most basic argumentagainst a semiotic theory of art is the argumentthat a work of art is not a sign. If this argumentholds, then the applicationof a semioticin the area of aestheticsis greatly reduced,if not completely One writerwho arguesthat all semiotictheories are systemeliminated.3 He is aticallydefectivewhen appliedto aesthetics RichardRudner.4 argues if a work of art is consideredas a sign, then one cannotcharacterize that taking accountof" and a the aestheticexperienceas both an "immediate the takingaccountof." If we characterize aestheticexperience "mediated as an immediatetakingaccountof something,such as a work of art, then the work of art, at that time, is not functioningas a sign. If, on the other the hand, we characterize aestheticexperienceas a process of "mediated taking accountof," Rudnermaintainsthat there is no way to distinguish the aestheticexperiencefrom other experienceswhich involve mediation. One way to combinethe mediateand immediateaspectsof the aesthetic experience,and, therefore,meet this criticismof Rudner,is to arguethat the work of art involvesboth a sign vehicle and its functioningas a sign.5 The sign presents values mediately, while the sign vehicle presents the same values immediately.This is the position taken by Morris in his earlier articles. Such a position depends on the sign being iconic, however, and there are many problemswith the notion of iconicity, as will be shown. Another way of answeringthe problem of combiningmediation and immediacyis given by CharlesStevenson.6He asserts that if the interpretant of the aesthetic sign process is consideredas a disposition to respond,rather than an actual response, it can be maintainedthat the is work of art, to the extent that it involves an interpretant, functioning
3 One could, of course, maintain that even though the work of art is not a sign, it is composed of signs, and, therefore, a semiotic could still have some application in aesthetics. 4 "On Semiotic Aesthetics," Journal of Aes and Art Crit, X (Sept., 1951), 67-77. See also Kingsley Blake Price, "Is a Work of Art a Symbol?,"Journalof Phil., L, (1953), 485-503. 5 For an additional treatment of this problem see Edward G. Ballard, "In Defense of Symbolic Aesthetics," Journal of Aes and Art Crit, XII (Sept., 1953), 38-43. 6 "Symbolism in the Representational Arts," Language, Thought, and Culture, ed. Paul Henle (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 226-257.

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as a sign (is mediational),and at the same time results in no subsequent overt behavior,and is, to that extent, an immediateexperience. Stevensonpresents this theory of an interpretantas a dispositionin arts. He further showinghow symbolismfunctionsin the representational maintains,however,in anotherarticle, that there is no need to consider arts as symbolic.7 His main purpose in this the non-representational article is to show that an alternativeframeworkcan be constructedto arts, which does not require treating examine the non-representational of them as symbolic.Stevenson,in effect, limits the application a semiotic arts, and in doing so, reduces the area of practito the representational cable applicationfor a semiotic in aesthetics. AbrahamKaplan,in settingforth a theory of aestheticsdifferentfrom Stevenson,also attemptsto limit the applicationof semioticto the representational arts. Kaplan asserts that all art is expression, and in the arts, referentialaspects of art supportand contributeto representational arts, such expressions In the non-representational however,no reference is involved.Hence, Kaplanalso attemptsto explainthe symbolicaspects art, of representational and, at the same time, deny that non-representational art has any symbolicfeatures.
Problems concerning iconicity. Many writers have agreed that a semi-

otic would be useful in aesthetics,but have questionedvarious aspects of Morris'emphasisupon the aestheticsign as an iconic sign, and also questionedthe concept of iconicity in aesthetics.Benbow Ritchie,9 for example, accepts the notion of iconicity in art, but desires to amplify what he calls "formaliconicity."In explainingwhat is meant by "formal iconicity,"Ritchie divides aesthetic value into formal values and extraformalvalues. A formalvalue is a value which satisfiesan interestwhich has been arousedby some aspectof the aestheticobject.An extra-formal value, on the other hand, is a value which satisfies an interestwhich has been broughtready-madeto the work of art. Iconic signs are then clasicons, dependingon whetherthey sified as formalicons and extra-formal value. signify a formal value, or an extra-formal of the Since Ritchie emphasizes importance formalvalues for the over7 Charles Stevenson, "Symbolism in the Nonrepresentational Arts," ibid., pp. 196-225. 8 "Referential Meaning in the Arts," Journal of Aes and Art Crit, XHI (June, 1954), 457-474. An additional example of emphasis upon expression in art can be found in Isabel C. Hungerland, "Iconic Signs and Expressiveness," The Problems of Aesthetics, ed. E. Vivas and M. Krieger (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1953), pp. 234-239. 9 "The Formal Structure of the Aesthetic Object," The Problems of Aesthetics, ed. E. Vivas and M. Krieger, pp. 225-233.

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all appreciation of art, he places major importance upon the formal

iconic signs in art. Accordingly,semiotic should formulatemore clearly the role of formal icons of value within a work of art. Another writer, Louise Roberts,1oalso considersthe function of the iconic sign in the aestheticexperienceas important.She does not, however, maintainthat a semiotic can furnish a complete analysis of art. of she Furthermore, considersMorris'formulation iconicity as essentially in various places. The major problems center around the ambiguous betweenconventionalsigns and iconic signs, and the distincrelationship tion between signs as they function within a work of art, and the work of art itself, consideredas a sign. She says.
A work of art as a whole may be an iconic sign in a simpler sense of imitation.... It is a product of the selections of the artist and as such is indicative of his values.... Furthermore, a work of art, beside being an iconic sign, may contain other iconic signs.... A syntactical problem lies in the organization of signs within a work of art. This is complicated by the fact that some of these signs may be conventional, some may be both conventional and iconic, others may be predominantly iconic with little conventionalization. It is further complicated by the relation between these signs and the iconic function of the work of art as a whole."

Robertsconcludesthat the notion of iconicity is useful in aesthetics,but the above complicationsand problems show that a detailed analysis of iconicity, and its function in art, is necessary. of An additionaltreatment the questionsraisedby Ritchie and Roberts concerningthe differencebetweenthe work of art as an iconic sign, and iconic signs as componentparts of the work of art, can be found in an articleby CliffordAmyx.12Amyx maintainsthat the conceptof iconicity as originally formulated was a semantical concept. The concept was semanticalto the extent that a sign's denotatahad to be consideredin whethersuch a sign was iconic, and questionsabout a sign's determining denotingare questionsof semantics.Amyx then arguesthat many writers, such as Ritchie, in attemptingto develop a theory of iconicity within a work of art, have had to consider the relation between iconic signs as they function as componentparts of a work of art. This, accordingto Amyx, is a syntacticalproblem,ratherthan a semanticalproblem. problem,Amyx's disWhilewe may not agree that this is a syntactical the cussion does again point up the problemof clearly formulating rela10 "Art As Icon: An Interpretationof C. W. Morris," Tulane Studies In Philosophy, IV (1955), pp. 75-83. 11 Ibid., p. 82. 12 "The Iconic Sign in Aesthetics," Journal of Aes and Art Crit, VI (Sept., 1947), 54-60.

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tion between the work of art as an iconic sign, and iconic signs within the work of art. It also indicatesthat additionalwork is requiredin formulatingthe roles of aesthetic semanticsand aesthetic syntacticswithin an aestheticsemiotic. -A furtherproblemassociatedwith the role of iconic signs in art is the which signs are to be consideredas iconic. An difficultyof determining iconic sign, as originallyformulatedby Morris, was a sign whose sign in vehicle possessed certain properties, common with the propertiesof those objects which the sign did or might denote. The major problems with this formulationare, first, what common propertiesare to be conmust sideredas relevantto iconicity,and, secondly,how many properties be found to be common in order to call the sign iconic. These problems indicatethat some study is requiredin order to distinguishbetween an iconic sign and a non-iconic sign. One method of partially avoiding the above problems would be, to eliminatethe dichotomybetween iconic signs and non-iconic signs, and replace it with a scale of iconicity. Such a scale would be broadly formulated,having at one end signs with little or no iconicity, and at the other end, signs with a high degree of iconicity. In between these two extremes,signs could be placed dependingupon their degree of iconicity. This would emphasizethe fact that iconicityof a sign is, to a large extent, such a matterof degree, and not governedby a strict rule. Furthermore, how many common of determining a scale would eliminatethe,problem propertiesa sign vehicle and its denotata must possess in order to call the sign iconic. Unfortunately,a scale of iconicity would not eliminate just which propertiesare essentialto iconithe necessity of determining This, presumably,would vary with different sign situations, for city. propertieswhich are relevant to the iconicity of a sign vehicle in one situationneed not be relevantin anothersituation. arts, Stevenson, in attacking symbolism in the non-representational everyarguesagainsticonicityby assertingthat underone interpretation, thing can be consideredas an iconic sign of itself, and, therefore,the notion of iconicitywithin art is trivial. He says,
Moreover, since a sign becomes iconic in virtue of a similarity between itself and its designatum, we need only the principle, "everything resembles itself," to conclude that a Greek border can be an iconic sign of itself. Note that the same thing can be said of anything on earth, provided that it is perceivable and of sufficient interest to get a second look.13

between an iconic sign and a non-iconic The difficultyof distinguishing it is pointedup by Stevenson'scriticism.Furthermore, seems to lend sign to the desirabilityof formulatinga scale of iconicity. support
13

Stevenson, "Symbolism in the Nonrepresentational Arts," p. 200.

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One final point which is of interest may be mentioned as relevant to

iconicity within aesthetics.In Morris' early formulationof semiotic, as was noted previously,all signs, by definition, must designate,but they need not denote. The iconic sign, however, was said to have its sign vehicle amongits denotata.Therefore,an iconic sign, under this formulation, will always denote at least one object, its own sign vehicle, and this is in contradictionto the previous position that all signs must designate but need not denote. Obviously, the whole question of the denotationof iconic signs needs careful investigation. Additionalproblemswithin an aestheticsemiotic. As has been noted, the main argumentswhich have been presented against a semiotic for aestheticshave attemptedto show, first, why a work of art should not be consideredas a sign, and, secondly, why Morris'formulationof the aestheticsign as an iconic sign presentscertainproblems.In additionto these two main areas of disagreement,however, various other isolated problems have been raised in connection with applying a semiotic in aesthetics. For one example, Allen Tate,14 and others, argue that Morris' proposal of a semiotic does not adequatelytake into account the role of cognition in the aesthetic experience.In his formulation,Morris maintained that value propertiesof an aestheticobject, in some sense, "stand out" for inspection, and the perceiver, therefore, has a "direct apprehension" of such value properties.Tate's main criticismis that the use does not show how of terms, such as stand out and direct apprehension, some act value propertieswithout performing apprehends the interpreter of cognition. Tate's criticismsuffers somewhatfrom his use of the word cognition, which he never adequatelyinterprets.Nevertheless,his criticism does point up certain difficultiesin using terms, such as direct apprehension of value properties,and indicates that additionalclarificationis necessary on this point, such as the inclusionof variousexamplestaken from the arts. Another issue is concernedwith extendingthe subdivisionsof semiotic (syntactics,semantics,and pragmatics)into the area of aesthetics.Such an extension, as has been previously noted, results in characterizing aestheticsas aestheticsyntactics,aestheticsemantics,and aestheticpragfactor matics.For example,John Ransom15 maintainsthat the pragmatic of an aesthetic semiotic is of considerablyless importancethan is the
Reason In Madness (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1941), pp. 20-62. The New Criticism (Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1941).

14 15

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both Ransom and Stevensonquestion the semanticfactor. Furthermore, importanceof syntacticsfor aesthetics.Ransom says,
He [Morris] claims that art is especially interested in the syntactical dimension of discourse, but offers almost no study of how art makes a syntax out of its peculiar mixture of pure symbols and iconic signs.... Is its syntactical validity comparable with that of science? Is its syntactical validity comparable with its own semantical validity . . . ? 16

Stevenson,questioningthe same point, says,

Presumably, the syntactical rules of music are no more than the rules of harmony and counterpoint, together with those broader rules of composition that concern the form of the sonata, the fugue, etc. And it is not clear that these familiar disciplines, once they are classified as "syntax,"will have enough in common with the syntax of ordinary languages, or the syntax of logic, to make the classification useful.'7

These criticisms make evident the fact that additionalwork may be aesthetic syntactics,aesthetic semantics,and necessaryin characterizing aestheticpragmatics,in order to insure the usefulnessof the distinction. Althoughother criticismshave been raised againstapplyinga semiotic within aesthetics,those selected for examinationin this section seem to be the more significantones. With these criticisms and suggestionsin to mind, it is now advantageous examine the present status of the relationshipbetween aestheticsand a theory of signs. III of The early formulation a semioticfor aestheticscan be consideredas a generalproposal of a terminologyfor talking about art, and, because of its generality,many individualpoints and issues were not elaborated. One way, perhaps, to determinethe significance of a proposal is to examine the amount of comments and criticismsit engenders,for it is these subsequentsuggestionsand criticismswhich point up weaknesses and also areas which need expansion.For this reason, the large number which appearedfollowingMorris'early articleson semiotic of discussions and aestheticsis gratifying. In general,this article has not been concernedwith answeringcriticisms, nor in preparinga defense of an aesthetic semiotic. Also, it has not in most cases offered any expansion of troublesomeissues which were indicatedin the various suggestionsby other writers. This would be a task for a later, and more extensive,study.Nevertheless,the examination of criticalmaterialand suggestionsin the precedingsections does indicate certain generalizations.
'6 17

Ibid., p. 287. Stevenson, "Symbolism in the Nonrepresentational Arts," p. 201.

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First, it is evidentthat to what extent a semioticcan be appliedwithin aesthetics is an open question. At present, it is not maintainedthat aestheticscan be exhaustivelyanalyzedthrougha semiotic. However, it is apparentthat signs do functionin art, and, in this respect a semiotic would be helpful. Moreover,in the early formulation, emphasiswas placed upon the,role of the iconic sign in art. Subsequent criticismsand suggestions now make it evidentthat serious problemsare,associatedwith the notion of iconicity, and additionalanalysis is requiredhere. It is, believed at this,time that the iconic sign functionssignificantlyin art, althoughthe degree of this significanceis, again, an open question. More detailed work is required to show the role of signs in art. Stevenson,in his article on symbolismin the representational arts, has attemptedto elaborate and analyze in detail the way in which signs function in art and also enrich the aesthetic experience.The results of such work are encouraging, and it is hoped that it will be continued. at In conclusion,the major requirement, present, seems to be recogfor nition that a theory of signs offers one possible framework analyzing works of art. The degree,of significanceof such a semiotic in the area of aesthetics is a question which cannot be resolved until additional study, along the lines indicated,is completed. CHARLESMORRIS DANIEL J. HAMILTON.
UNIVERSITYOF FLORIDA.