Interpretation

A JOURNAL

10F

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Volume 29
Number 2

Winter 2001-2

Harry

Adams

Aristotle Ethical

on

"the Vulgar": An Social Examination

and

and

Nasser Behnegar

The Political

Theological

Psychology

of

Shakespeare's

Measure for Measure

Zdravko Planinc

".

this

scattered

kingdom":

Study

of

King

Lear

Henry

T. Edmondson III

Modernity versus Mystery in Flannery O'Connor's Short Story

"A View Review
Woods"

of the

Essay

Richard Freis

A Triple

Inquiry

into

the

Human Center Book Review Will

Morrisey

The Bow

and the

Lyre: A Platonic

Reading of the Odyssey, by Seth Benardete

Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief
Executive Editor Hilail Gildin, Dept. Leonard
of

Philosophy, Queens College

Grey

General Editors

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interpretation

Interpretation
A JOURNAL
Winter 2001-2

10F

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Number 2

Volume 29

Harry

Adams

Aristotle

on

"the Vulgar": An Ethical

and

133

Social Examination

Nasser Behnegar

The Political
of

and

Theological

Psychology

153

Shakespeare's Measure for Measure

this scattered kingdom": A

Zdravko Planinc

".

Study

of

171

King Henry
T. Edmondson III

Lear
versus

Modernity
of the

O'Connor's Short
Woods"

Mystery in Flannery Story "A View

187

Review

Essay

Richard Freis

A Triple

Inquiry

into the Human Center

205

Book Review

Will

Morrisey

The Bow
of the

and

the

Lyre: A Platonic

Reading

233

Odyssey, by Seth Benardete

Copyright 2002

interpretation, All

rights reserved.

ISSN 0020-9635

Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. Leonard
of

Philosophy, Queens College

Executive Editor
General Editors

Grey

Charles E. Butterworth Seth G. Benardete (d. 2001) Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Hilail Gildin Howard B. White (d. 1974)
Ernest L. Fortin Joseph Cropsey Christopher Bruell John Hallowed (d. 1992) Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield Oakeshott Michael (d. Momigliano Amaldo 1987)

Consulting Editors

1990) Ellis Sandoz Kenneth W. Thompson

(d.

Leo Strauss (d. 1973)

International Editors Editors

Terence E. Marshall

Heinrich Meier

Fred Baumann Maurice Auerbach Wayne Ambler Bonnette Patrick Coby Amy Thomas S. Engeman Elizabeth C de Baca Eastman Maureen Feder-Marcus Edward J. Erler
Pamela K. Jensen

Will Morrisey Ken Masugi Leslie G. Rubin Charles T. Rubin Susan Orr Martin D. Yaffe Bradford P. Wilson Susan Meld Shell Catherine H. Zuckert Michael P. Zuckert
Lucia B. Prochnow

Manuscript Editor Subscriptions

Subscription rates per volume (3 issues): individuals $29 libraries and all other institutions $48 students (four-year limit) $ 1 8 Single
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Theology, Literature,

and

Jurisprudence.

contributors should
or manuals

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on them.

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the

"author-date")

follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 13th or later editions Instead of endnotes, the journal uses the system of notation, described in these manuals, illustrated in cur

"reference-list"

rent numbers of

the journal, and discussed in a sheet available from the Assistant to Editor (see below). Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be trans literated to English. To ensure impartial judgment, contributors should omit mention
of their other publications and put, on the title page

only, their name, any affiliation

and telephone number.
and double space the

desired,
Please

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entire text and reference

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17331 U.S.A.

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Hanover, PA

Inquiries:

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11367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542
Fax

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interpretation

joumal@qc.edu

Aristotle
An Ethical

on

"the Vulgar":
Social Examination

and

Harry Adams
Rice

University
utter

The

of existence a cow

vulgarity of the herd of men leads. (Aristotle 1961,

comes out

in their

preference

for the

sort

10956b20)
some notoriety, to
part of

Aristotle's

practical

by
of

a certain aristocratic or elitist tone.

philosophy is known, with An integral

be

colored

this tone derives

from

his many (which

scattered and pejorative comments on

"the

vulgar,"

"the

vulgar class

men,"

"vulgar

craftsmen,"

and so on.

In this paper, I trace the "inimical to

virtue and on

salient

features
of

center on the ways

vulgarity

is

happiness")

Aristotle's
vulgar

account of vulgarity.

Although concentrating

his

account of the comments on

working class, or
rich."

craftsmen

(banausoi), I

also consider

his

"the

vulgar

In addition, I critically
valuable social such vulgarity.

evaluate

his

account as

being

marked

by

the

following

strengths and weaknesses.

To its credit, his

account contains

many incisive and and influences of

their
relevance

insights concerning the characteristics, causes, As part of the value of these insights lies in

to the moral landscape of contemporary capitalism, I suggest

that, to
it
can
midst a

degree capitalist society suffers from such vulgar influences, improve itself only by squarely facing the vacuum of virtue left in its by these influences. To its detriment, Aristotle's account suffers from
whatever specious and priggish condescension towards the as

morally

"vulgar

masses."

Correspondingly,
an enjoyment of

I argue, Aristotle is to be faulted for fruits

of vulgar

implicitly

endorsing
good

the

labor

by

"the

virtuous,"

without an adequate

vulgars'

appreciation of these

necessary

and substantial contribution

to the

life

of the polis.

THE VULGAR

We may commence by examining what Aristotle means by this term (banousos). In our contemporary usage of the term, we often associate vulgarity
with

'vulgar'

coarseness, repulsiveness,

or profaneness of a

these associations are as misleading as enlightening.

connoted

vaguely sexual nature. But For Aristotle, the term

in the
sense of

a threefold type
and

of

"commonness':
'common'

'common'

fre

quently found
unrefined,

commonplace,
'common'

in the
of

and also

in the

sense

socially crude and base and ignoble. In morally

sense of

interpretation, Winter

2001-2, Vol. 29, No. 2

134

Interpretation
usage of this

Aristotle's

term,

each of these three senses

informs

and overlaps

his meaning,

with now one, now another,

being

emphasized

(E.g. A/1095b20, Aristot

1107M9,
le's
of the

P1260a40

Politics, hereafter
against

cited as

P. For

elucidation of

'vulgarity'

conception of

time,

see

Liddell & Scott).

backdrop of its usage in ordinary Expanding beyond a mere definition

the
understood as a common set

Greek
of the

word, how may we say

vulgarity?

that Aristotle understands and employs the

concept of

At its core, vulgarity may be

centered on pettiness and

shortcomings,

ignobility,
relation

and an

of ethical inversion of base for in inform his interpre

physically
exhaust

lofty
one's

values, that arise

from

an

improper

to the

material resources

life. There

are six

ancillary features that

compose and

tation of this concept. Aristotle associates vulgarity:

(1)

with

ing

and

stultifying
employ
and

bodily labor, leading

to a narrowing of one's ability to de

with

velop

and

reason

(P1258b35-8, 1277M-6); similarly, (2)

mentally

exhausting

overly demanding career work, leading to a reduction of one's to learn and acquire virtue (P1337b5-20); (3) with a lack or misuse of capacity the type of leisure time that wholesomely contributes to one's civic, moral,

intellectual,
cient misuse of

and spiritual enrichment

resources

(P1328b34-29a2); (4)
virtue, or

with a

lack

of suffi

financial

to attain

and support

gaudy

and

these resources;

(5)

with an expenditure of one's time and effort

rather

greedy for

others under

necessary constraint,

than

for

oneself and one's polis under

voluntary
rior,

choice

(P1278a5-21)

and,

ultimate goods and ends with

finally, (6) base, common

see,

with the replacement of supe goods and means (P1341M0-

15, Ar'1095bl4-96al0). As
reasons

we shall

each of these

features

provides

key

why Aristotle thinks vulgarity is inimical to virtue and true happiness. (In light of such a description of the living and working conditions of this poor, vulgar lot, it is no wonder that Marx, who studied Aristotle closely
"alienating"

during

his doctoral
labor"

program and was

"alienated
esp. pp.

such an
and also

surely familiar with these passages, made important tier of his [especially early] work. See Marx,
(banousos technites)
who

77-87,

McCarthy.)
become, for Aristotle,
To be
more

It is

vulgar craftsmen

the

paradigmatic symbol and embodiment of might

these features.

precise, we

draw

for

a certain occupation or class of

distinction between banousos (qua trades) as standing specifically workmen, and banousos (qua traits) as stand
behavioral traits. Although Aristotle
senses, in this
class
paper

ing

for

a certain class of vices or

uses the senses

single

form banousos in both

to overlap; that

of these

I take these

largely largely
shall
of

is, I take this

of workmen to

be characterized, And
as we

though not completely,

rich

by

a certain class of social traits.

see, the vulgar

may be

said to share qualities

3, 4,

and

of the class

banousos-traits,
weak

even though

they

are

mutually

exclusive with the class of

banousos-irades. Because these

minds"

craftsmen come equipped with

employed their

"strong backs
their

and

(after

having long
so

brawn

rather than

brains); because they have

use

little time for leisure (or, if they do have time, it in trivial amusement, rather than in self-enrichment); because they spend

Aristotle
their
the

on

"the

Vulgar"

135

days executing the demands of others, rather than learning how to execute functions of active citizenship and public office; because "they are pre occupied with living, rather than with (P\251b41. To be sure, Aris living
well"

totle

is, in

this passage, referring

and

not

to craftsmen, but to that class of citizens

who are

wealthy

involved in

commerce.

But

as will

become evident, this

characteristic of

"being

living,"

preoccupied with mere

sentative of all the

vulgar,

regardless of their or pleasure to

may be taken as repre occupation); and because they

chief ends

(mis-)take leisure, money,

be their

in life, Aristotle

concludes that these vulgar are

practically incapable of virtue and happiness (P1264M6-23, 1337b3-20). We may guess (since Aristotle does not explicitly

tell us

this)

that their

incapacity

for these things is

not

due to their nature, but

i.e., to the stultifying household and working conditions they live through. For, while Aristotle says that natural slaves are incapable by nature of the reason requisite for full virtue and happiness, freedom and citizenship, he
to their nurture,
situates vulgar craftsmen
natural

ambiguously,
citizens

as

lying

somewhere

between these

lowly

slaves,

and

free, full

(P1254bl6-55a4, 1260bl, P1277a36-bl.

their neighboring classes of slaves, citizens, see

For

detailed

examination of the socioeconomic conditions of these vulgar

craftsmen

in

ancient

Greece, in

relation to

farmers,
Meikle.).

tradesmen

and

merchants, etc.,

and the wealthier class of

Situating

these vulgar craftsmen at this ambiguous level raises potentially

serious problems

for "the

virtue of

Aristotle's

theory."

virtue
at

Aristotle insists
and

that, like slaves, these

that goes

craftsmen are

lacking

in virtue,

least true

full

virtue

beyond the

proper execution

of menial

tasks; he

claims that

"their

bodies
of

and minds

[have]

been

rendered useless

for the

practices and activities

virtue"

rendered

(P1337M1). In claiming here that their bodies and minds have been useless for virtue, he leaves open the suggestion that, unlike true natu
not

ral

slaves, these craftsmen may

lack

virtue

because

of

being

precluded

in

nately,
men

by

nature, from attaining it (P1260M-2).

after

Consequently, training
internal

vulgar crafts

would,

all, seem to have the

nature and

capacity for virtue,

nature

lacking
not

only the

adequate

means, namely proper upbringing,

and education, and

sufficient

leisure time, to
Aristotle
sees

develop
the

it. Where lack

one's

is

the

impediment,
goods as

impeding
will

people

only from attaining

of these types of external means and virtue.

Aristotle

seemed to take

it for

granted that this class

of craftsmen

(along

with

traders) just
be the
case.

lack these

means and goods.

farmers, hired laborers, and But, being the astute empirical

this did not necessarily have to

thinker that he was, he

might

have

realized that

He

might

have

considered

the possibility, realized

in

our

day,

that

such craftsmen will sufficient virtue.

be

able to
and so

have decent

family

training,

adequate

education,

leisure time,

on, so that, in turn,

they

will

be

able to

develop

So if these craftsmen, who make a necessary and valuable contribution to the polis and its good, are capable of virtue but simply lack the necessary
means

to

it, then,

we must

ask, Is it

right

for Aristotle to

presuppose

that

they

136
must

Interpretation
be
so vulgar and unvirtuous?

In turn,

we must ask the

polis

following

critical

questions:

Must the

virtue and good of

Aristotle's

necessarily be based

on

^virtuous and vulgar elements? yet

If the

craftsmen of the polis are vulgar, and

profit

actually from their

capable of

virtue, then what is the justification for continuing to

demeaning

labor (which is, according to Aristotle,

and

what

keeps

them in their vulgar condition), rather than enabling them

not

to achieve virtue?

Is

the only justification

for allowing

wanting

these

(virtue-capable)
for

crafts are

men

to

continue

doing

their

(virtue-inhibiting)
at

work pure expediency?

sacrificed

If so,

not these

craftsmen

(or their virtue,

good of the

polis, and thus (in Kantian terms),

remain

least) being being

the overall

treated only as means?

craftsmen

If Aristotle is to
become

theoretically

consistent, enabling these

to

virtuous would require

freeing

them from their slavery, or at least their

essentially vulgarizing labor; for elsewhere he insists that it is the duty of states men and legislators to try to promote virtue among the citizenry. Granted, these craftsmen are certainly not full citizens, at least not in Athens. Their status as

falling

anywhere

particular constitution

between slavery and citizenship really depended upon what they found themselves under. See Morrison, who argues citizenship
gains greater coherence

that Aristotle's concept of

range of

by seeing

in it

degrees

of citizenship.

Presumably, only full

and significant goods can

citizens, who

make signif

icant

contributions

(holding
in
return.

deliberative

judicial office,

donating

property,

etc.) to the etc.) from

polis'

good, deserve

(honor,

education,

leisure,

the polis

But

it

justifiably

be

said that the contributions

and unde

these craftsmen

make

to the

polis are so

serving
and

of comparable goods of restitution

comparatively insignificant (such as citizenship status, imply)?

education
not.

leisure

and the support towards virtue that these

Certainly

Aristotle

might

reply that there is

difference between the baser

material goods

that these vulgar craftsmen contribute to the polis, compared to the nobler goods

that citizens contribute; and that this difference is what justifies the

full

citizens

receiving the privileges, honor, education, and so on that the craftsmen don't receive. But this reply doesn't seem to hold water, for these craftsmen are capable
of
ral

virtue,

and are thus

slaves,'

arguably undeserving of their lowly lot (unlike true 'natu because who, they are by nature incapable of reason or virtue, are
their

deserving

of

lot, according
no

to Aristotle [P1334al]). In addition, these

craftsmen make contributions to the polis

which, though

perhaps not altogether

noble, are for that reason

less

essential and

important. "Vulgar be

craftsmen are

concerned with crafts without which a city-state cannot some are

managed
living"

(of these

necessary, whereas others

contribute to

luxury
For

or

fine

(P1291al-

3). The
the

goods that

"good

citizens"

enjoy, then, are built upon the

all these

labor,

upon

blood,

sweat,

and

tears,

of vulgar craftsmen.
or virtuous

reasons, it doesn't

seem

ultimately defensible, just,

for

'virtuous'

citizens of the polis

like Aristotle (who

craftsmen

was actually a resident alien of Athens) to denigrate these for their vulgarity, while all the while enjoying, and in fact presuppos labor. Or again, isn't it wrong for these craftsmen ing, the fruits of their
'vulgar'

Aristotle
to be denigrated and criticized for

on

"the

Vulgar"

137

any of the might have ended up with similar characters if they had had to endure similar harsh living and working conditions themselves? Doesn't such denigration re duce to condemning the vulgar for not resources that they never had
so vulgar when

being

'virtuous'

developing

available,
seems to

or

for

not

capitalizing

on chances that

they

were never given?

There

be something
that such

supposing

fundamentally might 'lofty

virtue'

unfair, if

not

exploitative, then,

with pre

be built

upon such

when these vulgar elements are not given their proper

'lowly due. Notwithstanding

labor
and

vulgarity,'

these possibilities, we shall

now

take a closer look

at

the actual

leisure

(or lack thereof)

of these vulgar workhorses.

THE VULGAR, AND THEIR WORK AND LEISURE

Aristotle

reasons that

Since lier

we are

state most

investigating the best constitution, the one that would happy and happiness cannot exist apart from virtue, as
governed given certain

make a

city-

was said ear

possess citizens

ing
are

men who are

it evidently follows that in a city-state unqualifiedly just (and not live the life
and

in the finest manner,

assumptions), the

should not

of a vulgar craftsman or tradesman.

virtue.

For lives

of these sorts
citizens en

ignoble
in

inimical to
since
.

Nor

should those who are

going to be

gage

farming,
. .

leisure is

needed

both to

develop

virtue and to engage

in

po

litical

actions.

if it

renders

Any task, craft, or branch of learning should be considered vulgar the body or mind of free people useless for the practices and activities
crafts that put the

of virtue.

That is why the

wages are called

body

into

a worse condition and work

done for

vulgar; for they debase the

mind and

deprive it

of

leisure.

(P1328b34-29a2, 1337b9-14)

So he

acknowledges a correlation

between

certain professions and the amount

and types of

leisure that these

and

professions allow.

The

professions of vulgar crafts

men, tradesmen,
so on,

farmers, but
require such

also those of

soldiers, wealthy merchants,

and
and-

just happen to

or such careful attention, that

long hours, they leave little

such

demanding

physical

labor,

or no room

for leisure (See

also

P7.15

and

politician

NE10.7). In the latter passage, Aristotle says that "the business of the (1177M3). Now, this would seem to also makes leisure
impossible"

involve him in
statesman
and virtue

contradiction, inasmuch

as

he

also

holds the

politician

(qua

politikos) to
to
require

represent the official embodiment of practical can such a politician

virtue, to be

leisure. How

(who is

supposed

practically virtuous) be virtuous if he has no time for leisure, and leisure is necessary for virtue? The only two possible ways out of this contradiction, it seems, are either (1) for Aristotle to make a distinction between this kind of
so
politician

(portraying him

as a

busy,

scattered, merely bureaucratic type

of

pub-

138

Interpretation
and

lie servant),
virtue,
make or

the type of statesman he holds up as

a paradigm

of public

(2)

to make a much greater distinction than he is normally held to

public virtue of

between the
and

the

politician

and

the deeper

virtue of

the

philosopher,

to reason that the

of virtue.

politician

is

precluded

from

being

able

to

have this latter kind

But leisure is
The intellectual

requisite

for the

cultivation

of virtue

in the

following

ways.

virtues require a significant amount of time spent

a

in reading,
quiet

learning

(perhaps in

kind

of

Peripatetic setting), studying philosophy,

meditation and

contemplation, and so on. The

practical virtues require a signifi

cant amount of time spent

in

public potential

involvement, in learning

to

execute

skillfully

and

diligently

the roles of office-holder and civic leader and, generally,

overall good of the polis.

of good and active

citizen, contributing to the

that the

Aristotle does
same

not presuppose

possession

of mere an

free

time

is the

as, or will issue

in,

such well-spent

leisure time. On

individual level,

he

notes that many people, especially of this vulgar type, will spend whatever little free time they have in the pursuit of frivolous pleasure and amusement.

Perhaps
not

so as to unwind after an

exhausting
what

day

of physical

labor,

this type will

think to spend their remaining free time in what leads to their intellectual

and moral

edification, but only in

leads to their

physical

relaxation, gratifi
a communal

cation,

and amusement notes

(V1150bl6-18, P1337b33-41). On
to

level,
time.

Aristotle

that

people need

be

trained in the proper use of

leisure

Without

such

training, he says,

people

tend to misuse their leisure time so as to

become soft,

intemperate,

and arrogant

(P1334al0-34). He
and educate

claims that
people

it is

an

important responsibility

of

legislators to train
be

their

in how
good of

to be worthy of, and properly take advantage of, these goods and the

leisure (P1334al-10). More

will

said about the significance of a

broader

training
Aristotle

to virtue in the conclusion.

saw education

For

lucid

explanation of the and

way that
necessary

and wise

legislators relating to,

being

conditions

money,

for, any people's ability and leisure, see Irwin.

a people

to relate properly to their goods of property,

Although
prowess and

may have

exercised particular virtues

(such

as

courage) to gain their leisure wisdom) to be

time, they

need other virtues

military (such

as temperance and
claims that
leisure,"

able to maintain

their leisure time. Aristotle

the more a people enjoys the goods of

"luck,

peace, wealth, and

the more

they

need to grow

in temperance

and

the virtues that philoso

phy entails. He uses the example of Sparta as a model of this principle: Aristotle describes this people as militarily virtuous enough to have acquired political

hegemony,
mature

peace, and leisure

time, but

as not otherwise

virtuous, temperate, or

enough

(and

as

not

these goods. "Because the[se

of them to

having Spartans]

just-

or wise-enough

legislators),

to

keep

consider these goods and the enjoyment

be better than the

leisure"

enjoyment of

the virtues,

they

train themselves
virtue

only in the virtue that is useful for acquiring them, and ignore the exercised in (P7.15). Aristotle argues that the Spartans

that is

make a

fatal

Aristotle
mistake

on

"the

Vulgar"

139

concerning their
false

ends and

means, which is the type of mistake charac

teristic of all the vulgar. The vulgar always aim

end as a

for

some mere mean or common

ultimate end rather than

which are virtue and

aiming at the only truly ultimate ends, happiness. In this case, Sparta made military victory, lei
virtue

sure,

and

money, rather than

itself, its

ultimate ends.

In

discussing
(P2.9), he

the

foibles

and

instabilities

of the

Spartan

people and constitution

con

tends that

The

entire system of

[Spartan]
So,
they

law
as

aims at a part of

virtue,

military virtue,
not

since

this is useful
once

for

conquest.

long

as

they

ruled

supreme,

started to

they they decline, because they did

were at

war,

remained safe.

But
to

know how

any kind of training with more authority than military training. Another error, no less serious, is that although they think
at

be

leisure,

and

had

never undertaken

(rightly)

that the good things that people compete

for

are won

by

virtue rather

than

by

vice,
. . .

they

also suppose

(not rightly) that these

goods are

better

than virtue it

self.

Thus,

the

result

their legislator has produced is the opposite of beneficial:

he has

made

his

city-state poor and the private

individuals into lovers

of money.

(P1271M-17, italics mine)

Aristotle insists that

all such

"vulgar He

people"

as these always choose some

lesser,

common end over virtue.

suggests that these people think

they have

good reason to privilege their own

petty indulgences,
end, as

whether

they be

leisure,
make

money, pleasure, or any other

end over virtue amusement not

mere means to an

a preferred and ultimate

itself. Aristotle notes, for instance, that

end.

some vulgar

"people

their

For the
one),

end perhaps

involves

a certain pleasure as an

(though

just any

chance

and

in their

search

for [pleasure

end] they
end of

mistake amusement action.

. . .

for it, because it has

a certain

similarity to the
people

[true]

One

might

plausibly conclude, therefore, that

amusements"

try

to achieve

happiness
ering how

by

means of pleasant much this scenario might

(P1339b31-9. It is

provocative

to consider

how

apply to present-day America,

consid

energy and resources we often spend pursuing leisurely escape and amusement). We shall now examine the way that Aristotle perceives the vulgar as relating, not to the "common material of their leisure and
much
resource"

leisure time, but to their

money.

THE VULGAR AND THEIR MONEY

In
garity

relation

to work and

leisure,

we saw that
classes.

Aristotle tends to
relation

associate vul
might

with the poorer and

working

So in

to money, we

expect

him to

make

the same

association.

But he does

not.

Instead,
on

and some

what

surprisingly, when he

ity

with the rich.

(For

is talking about money he tends to helpful analysis of Aristotle's views

associate vulgar

property

and

140

Interpretation
relations of

into the
of

the wealthier and

poorer classes

to the property

conditions

his day,

see

Mayhew.) According
"vulgar"

to the way he
not all

understands

vulgarity,

Aris

totle thinks that certain of

(but certainly

of) the rich may be every bit as

some

deserving

of the title

as the poor.
more

In

places, in

fact, he

even

insists that the "vulgar

"constitutional health

rich"

may be

vulgar,

and more

harmful to the
poor"

polis,"

of

their

than their corresponding "vulgar

of the virtue of

(P1267al3-5, 1297all). In his discussion

for example, he has this to say
gaudy
and about

philanthropy (NE4.2),

the rich man who spends his money

in

self-flattering way,
way:

rather

than in

a well-calculated and

community-

enhancing

Corresponding
who spends
occasions

to the

[philanthropic]
He

man on the side of excess

is

the vulgarian,

too

much.

spares no expense

in

order to make a splash on

were

trifling

he happens to be
ple,
. . .

dining financing

the members of his club as if

a

comedy)

insisting
make a

wedding guests and (if they that the chorus be dressed in pur
all this

noble

committing aspiration. All he

and

similar faux pas. wants to

And in

he

will not

be fired
since

by
he

any

do is

display
little

of

his opulence, he
ought

imagines that he is
and much where

admired

for

that.

He

spends

where

to spend much

but little is

called

for. (Thomson trans.)

These

comments provide clues as to

how Aristotle
consists not

people as

being

vulgar.

Their vulgarity
and

money in

a restrained and well-directed

wealthy to use their in inability only but inversion of in their true, noble way,
ones.

understands such

values with great value

false, ignoble,
in the

"common"

These kinds

of vulgarians place

enhancement of

their own

personal

prestige, but little value

From this inversion, Aristotle reveals the dangerous potential of money to breed a narrow and selfishly indi vidualistic spirit, rather than a selfless esprit de corps (cf. P1263M-5). in the
enhancement of their community's good.

Aristotle First
and

provides a

litany

of transgressions which these vulgar rich

fall into:

foremost,

as

mentioned, these vulgarians place greater value on money

on virtue and noble,

(and its

extravagant

power) than

the virtuous will recognize and

appropriately

support.

worthy causes, which only In these ways, the vulgar

and educational
promote
.
.

rich resemble the aforementioned

Spartans,
not

whose oligarchic constitution repre

sents all oligarchies

insofar

as

they do

"organize their laws

are

system to promote all the

virtues, but instead

vulgarly inclined to

the ones held to be more useful and more conducive to acquisition.

consider these ment of

They

[material]

goods and

their enjoyment to be better than the enjoy

mine).

the

virtues"

(P1333M0, 1334b3, italics

Secondly, but

similarly,

these vulgarians view money as an end and good

in itself,

rather than as a means

to an end. "The masses take [the supreme good] to be

tangible, like

pleasure or

[or

"businessman,"

as

money or social standing. Thomson translates], his life is

. .

something plain and As for the money-maker

under some

kind

of re

straint; clearly,

wealth

is

not

the good which we are

trying

to

find, for it is only

Aristotle
useful,

on

"the

Vulgar"

-141

i.e., it is only
and

a means to

else"

something

(yV1095a23, 1096a6, Ostwald

people also make all of

trans.). On this point, Aristotle says that "these

these

[goods
wealth

skills] into forms

and that

of wealth acquisition

in the belief that acquiring

end"

is the end,

everything
and

ought to promote

the

(P1258al3).

Thirdly, in overemphasizing
rich vulgarians exalt much

the value of money in relation to other values, these

themselves

look down

on others who
as

don't have
on this

as

money

as

they. Aristotle describes oligarchies

being

based

logic

of

smug

arrogance:

"Oligarchies

arise

from

those who are unequal

[or,

actually,

superior] in

some respect taking themselves to be wholly [superior]: for being in [superior] property, they take themselves to be unqualifiedly (P1301a31-3, see also 3.9). Fourthly, these vulgarians do not recognize the

[superior]"

proper what

limits to

wealth and wealth acquisition.

a mere means

If they

recognized wealth

for

calls

to the good life, they would see what Aristotle But, since they view it as an end in itself, they take it as having no limits. Consequently, "there is no limit to the end of this kind of wealth acquisition, for its end is wealth in that form, that is to say, the posses
limit."

it really was, its "natural

sion

of money.

[So]

wealth acquirers go on

increasing

their

money

without

limit"

(P1257b24-34). In their inordinate

recognize and acknowledge no

acquisitiveness
clear point

(pleonexia),

these vul
point

gar

rich

of excess,
"unnatural"

to the

wherein their

careers, pursuits,
comprises

and character

become

(P1256b27-

57a4). (This
greed.)

Aristotle's

psychological account of the

genealogy

of

Finally,

and as a result of these previous greed.

reasons, these vulgarians be virtue, however small,

posses

come ruled

by

"For they
and

consider

any

amount of

to be sufficient, but seek an unlimitedly excessive amount of wealth,

sions, power, reputation,

ment

the

like"

(P1323a36). With this

vicious

develop
the

towards greed, the deleterious effects of vulgarity begin to

of

exceed

bounds done to

harm done to the

character of

individuals,

so that significant

harm is

the character of the whole polis.

cycle

Particularly

in oligarchies,
to

a vicious

two-way
polis

develops, whereby both individual

in turn, the

greed seeps out

corrupt

the

constitution of the polis, and,

acquisition-oriented constitution of the

back, as Aristotle says, to "make the private individuals into lovers of In fact, Aristotle sees this vulgar greed, including the distortions, corruptions, imbalances, and distributional injustices that come in its train, to be a central cause of constitutional instability (P2.7; 5.2).
turns
money."

take Aristotle's

descriptions (which here to be

quite

also

serve,
and

of

course, as criticisms) of

these "vulgar
reasons.

rich"

incisive

valuable, for the

following
at

First, I

take them to be instructive in their

capacity to

serve as remind

ers of the ethical

dangers

its

more unbridled

contemporary capitalism, forms. I thus take many of his comments about

case

of

living

under

least in

oligarchic

constitutions

to apply to capitalistic states. (Lewis also makes the

that Aris

totle's
and

various criticisms of oligarchies are altogether applicable

prescient

to capitalism,

that Aristotle offers a

critique

of

forces.) Obviously,

there are many and significant

many contemporary market structural differences between

142

Interpretation
forms
of

ancient

oligarchy

and current

forms

of capitalism.

For example, many

are

Western

capitalist

societies, to the

extent

that

they

are

liberal democracies,
ancient

infused with,
e.g.,
a

and animated after

by,

principles

fairly

foreign to these

regimes,

striving ism. On another level,

of rule
people,"

toleration, individualistic freedom,

whereas

and multicultural plural

Aristotle plainly

states that oligarchies are

forms "the

by by

the rich, we modems would like to believe we are ruled

"law,"

by

by

"the

majority,"

etc., or

anything

else that allows us to

defer the

question of

how

much we

may be

ruled

by

the rich. These differences

and capital

should not obscure the one common

similarity between oligarchy

end

ism, however,
I
must

namely, their organization around the

wealth. acceptance of

(telos)

of the acquisi

tion and maximization of

further qualify my

his

critique of such

forms
not

of oligar

chy-capitalism

(or,
his

perhaps more

accurately, "plutocracy").

I do

think the

plausibility

of

views comes as a result of their

a sound

being

a sound

economic, as

much as their

being

ethical,

critique.

This distinction is important. Espe

cially in

our present post-Cold

criticisms of capitalism as

War era, there is a tendency to interpret all outmoded forms of economic myopia that are blind
a more

to the ways capitalism is

or

simply

efficient,

and perhaps even more stable

just,

system.

But,

although capitalism

other types of political

more

may be a more efficient system than not automatically mean that it is a this does economy,
system.

ethical,

i.e.,

virtuous,

Consequently, I
of a

think Aristotle

is

right

to

hold that

an appreciation of the economic virtues

system should not obscure

the recognition of the ethical (or in this case "vulgar") vices of that system. Aristotle is insistent upon these points and distinctions. For example, in his

discussion insists that

of what makes
a regime

for

a more stable

tyranny, he

that is altogether ruthless and iron

quite straightforwardly fisted may, nonetheless,

be in many ways And he denounces those

"brutally"

efficient, well-organized, and

constitutions

that do

not

self-preserving (P5.ll). "organize their laws and edu

are

cational system to promote all the

promote

virtues, but instead

and more

vulgarly inclined to
acquisition"

the ones that are most useful

conducive as

to
comes

(P1333M0. Although in this passage,

what

Reeve takes

"vulgarly"

from the Greek phoptikos

nent

rather

than from

banausos,

the point still seems perti

[Goodin

and

Reeve].)
through Aristotle's kindred claim about the ethical
claims that certain types of

These

claims are reflected

character of constitutions.

In this case, Aristotle

citizens

constitutions will produce certain correspondent

types of citizens and of constel

lations
who

of virtues a citizen

in these
in
a

(P3.4-5). "For is
often not one

[instance,]
in
an

the sort of person

is

democracy

oligarchy"

(P1275a3).
a

Whereas democracies
civic

might produce citizens

tending towards, say,

of rule

greater

involvement

or political

awareness,

oligarchies will produce citizens tend

ing

towards a more vulgar acquisitiveness.

"The kind

is

not

in terms

of

excellence or
chies"

virtue, but is based on wealth and power [in the case of] oligar
an

(7V1161a2; 1173a25-b5). As mentioned,

oligarchy may thus be taken

Aristotle
as
a

on

"the

Vulgar"

143
differ is

general prototype
extent

of modern

capitalism

(notwithstanding
and

certain

ences), to the
such a

that both prioritize the acquisition of wealth.

oligarchies and

If

there

similarity between forms

capitalism,

if,

as

Aristotle claims,
we not con

oligarchies tend to produce such vulgar acquisitive clude that modem

traits, then may (If

of capitalism will also produce citizens

tending

towards z,
and

the same constellation of "vulgar and acquisitive traits"?

x

x produces

is sufficiently
us,

similar to

y, then

will not

produce

z?) What does this

imply
to vul

about

as citizens of

"capitalist

constitutions,"

and our vulnerabilities

garity?

THE VULGAR AND THEIR (LACK OF?) HAPPINESS

We have

seen that vulgar craftsmen are precluded

from

being

virtuous

be

cause of their

stultifying

work and their

lack

of adequate resources

like leisure

time

(MT1099a32-b7);
virtuous

and we

have

seen that the vulgar rich are prevented

from

being
of

by

their own greed and overly

distracting

work and their misuse

money and leisure time. However plausible these claims are, should we also accept Aristotle's further claim, that these vulgar are not, or cannot be, happy
(P1264b22)? Must their lack
of virtue entail a

lack

of

happiness?

To
est.

answer these
we

Cannot

questions, let us try to imagine this vulgar class at its happi imagine certain craftsmen, such as might be represented by the
workers of our own
a

so-called
cause of of

blue-collar

day,
yet

as

being

substantially

happy

be

possessing, say,

labor-intensive

satisfying job,

an endless

supply

cheap beer, and a widescreen TV equipped with portable remote and satellite hookup? Of course, we have to factor in the fact that this contemporary worker
enjoys a so.

degree It is

of

leisure time

undreamed of

by

his

ancient

counterpart.

It
we

seems

even easier to

imagine the

vulgar rich as

happy. Cannot

imagine them
wealth, gaily
sion?

as

being
ugly,

supremely happy, deluged in

champagne and material

pleasure or posses

traveling
are

the globe, and

which

denying

themselves no

(If they

Aristotle

mentions as one

impediment to happi

ness,

they

can even

hire the

most skillful of plastic

would abjure such a

life because

of the sheer and essential unhappiness

surgeons.) How many of us it con

stereotypical)
caricatures

tained?

But,

more

importantly, don't

these

(admittedly

force

us to admit that the vulgar are

answer of

in fact

altogether capable of

happiness?
"happiness."

The

to this last question turns on our understanding of

meant

Aristotle,
term than

course,

what we often mean

something very different and by it. Without going into

more specific

by

the

an extensive analysis

of the term

which

(as many others have done), Aristotle took happiness (eudaimonia, I hereafter refer to as 'happiness,') as the following: as a lifelong experi
only

ence attained

by

those virtuous in character, that consists in the possession

goods

of a full array of the nizing

of life,

each

held in

their

proper place

by

harmo
helpful

and well-developed reason

(cf. NE\.4,5,1

-\2.

Akrill

presents a

144

Interpretation
this central topic,

account of

including
see

discussion

of the much-debated ques

tion of whether Aristotle sees greater happiness

posed

lying in
who

the theoretical, as

to the practical, life.

Also,
not

McDowell,

discusses the

senses

op in

which end

Aristotle does

and

does

take eudaimonia to be the proper and ordering

we often

[telos]

of the good

life.)

In contrast,

take happiness (and I will

hereafter

refer

to our common understanding of this as

as

"happiness2") in

a much

sense, meaning something like a state of experience character ized by a predominantly greater balance of pleasure over pain. This distinction should help clarify that the life of the vulgar may indeed be characterized by
more general

happiness2, but
perhaps even

not

by

happiness].

Is this distinction

so significant?

If the

vulgar can

enjoy

life

of

happiness2,
that

one of

intense pleasure,

can we so

say, along

with

Aristotle,
less

these vulgar lives are still so

an overall

deplorable,

sense), than the lives of the virtuous?

inferior, happy (in is it inconceivable that Indeed,

and so much

vulgarians

may

experience a greater amount or

persons?

intensity

of pleasure

through

their lives than Aristotle's virtuous

and rich sensualists

What

about all those vulgarians of

like Sardanapalus (a
their time
and

regal

Hugh Hefner-type
and

his day),
predomi

who spend so much of

money pursuing,

attaining,

nantly hedonistic

pleasures?

The
and

common run of people and the most vulgar

identify [happiness]

with

pleasure,

for that

reason are satisfied with a

life

of enjoyment

(Ostwald trans.). Accord

ingly they
good

ask

time. (I have

for nothing better than the sort of life which consists in having a in mind the three well-known types of life that just mentioned,
The
utter

that of the man of affairs, that of the philosophic student.)

herd

of men comes out view would

in their

preference

for the

sort of existence a cow

vulgarity of the leads.

Their

hardly

get a respectful

hearing,

great positions sympathize with a monster of

were it not that those who occupy sensuality like Sardanapalus (Thomson

trans.).

(NE1.5)

Does this possibility (of the very happy2 vulgar person) raise problems for that part of Aristotle's ethical theory that suggests that the virtuous man just will be
the

happiest,,

and

the
at

one

who

experiences

the

greatest

overall

pleasure

(/V1099a8-30)? Not
these two types of

all, I think, if we remember to distinguish between happiness. (Morris documents contemporary parallels among

American

businessmen.)
and

To defend
to
understand

further clarify Aristotle's answers to these questions, we need why he argues that happiness, is superior to such pleasure and
might admit that a vulgarian could experience

common

happiness2. Aristotle (at least

more pleasure

of a sensual

kind)

than

a virtuous

man, in the same

way

that he would have no trouble

possess more

admitting

that some vulgar

rich person could

being

just

another

money than a lesser and

virtuous man.

For,

ultimately, he

sees pleasure as good

constitutive good

(like money,

leisure,

looks,

Aristotle
and so

on

"the

Vulgar"

145

on), that

comprises the greater good of

happiness,. He (however

views pleasure not

as equivalent to

happiness,, but only

would not admit that

as a significant component of

happiness,.
satisfied

Accordingly, he
with

any

vulgarian

intensely

pleasure)

could experience more

happiness,
we

than any virtuous

now see

person.

Keeping
happiness,
ways, the
of

these

distinctions in mind,
he
offers

may

why he

considers the

of

the virtuous to be superior to the

happiness2

of the vulgar.

In many

reasons

for this

claim of

his

whole practical philosophy.

Henry

superiority comprise the cornerstone B. Veatch captures these reasons in a

passage

that is worth

quoting

at

length:

Not the least

interesting

feature

of

Aristotle's Ethics is the

effort which

the philoso

pher makes to give an account of

human happiness

which would make

it

not a mat

ter of mere subjective

feeling
put

on

the part of the

colloquial

tively determinable. To
seems to run
cause

it in

individual, language, the relevant

he
was

but something

objec

consideration

something like

this: a man might think

in

excellent

health be far from

he felt just

fine,

yet a medical examination would show that

he

was

well; so a man might think

would

himself to be

quite

happy

and

contented, because he
self'happy'

feel

quite satisfied and not at all

reproach, yet
man was

it

would no

really

either complaining or be only too obvious to an objective observer that this better than a fool, his whole way of life being not intelligent, but

inclined to

[vulgar:]

stupid and unenlightened and perhaps even mean and petty, and
'But,'

so, in

perfectly objective sense, miserable and unhappy. feels contented and satisfied, is he not really To
so?'

you which

may retort, 'if a man the answer is that being

satisfied or contented or

happy

must always

involve

being

satisfied or contented or

in something comes: in what sort

happy

or with of

something or by something. The question then be thing does a given individual find satisfaction? If it is any human

thing less

than what as a

being

he is

capable of and

what, as we have al
we should

ready seen, he is naturally say that such a person had know

what was good

ordered and oriented settled

toward, then
should

certainly

for less than he

have,

or that

he didn't

therefore of happiness

for him, or that his sense of achievement and satisfaction and had somehow become perverted and corrupted [and vulgar

ized]. (Veatch,

p.

70)

Supposedly,
towards"

human

being

"is

capable

of, and is naturally ordered

and ori

ented

the cultivation of reason, which

other creatures

is

what

ates

him from

like

cows and pigs.

particularly differenti "Reason and understanding (PI 334b). Human lives, kinds
of

constitute our natural end.

training
baser

of our

habits

should

Hence they are the be organized to

ends that procreation and the

promote"

of course, can
ends

be unnaturally

oriented and organized towards the

lesser,

they
one's

share with cows and pigs:

These include the

of

end of

merely

satisfying
producing
others

bodily

appetites, the goods, or the

ends

merely reproducing

oneself or

mere material

end of

(and,

to insert Kant again,

not also

existing merely as a means for being an end in oneself). Each of

these lesser ends, if not accompanied

by

and ordered towards the greater end of

146

Interpretation
a vulgar

the cultivation of reason, will then become

end,

and will end

up

vulgar

izing

the person who so takes them as his end.

end

If

a person

takes leisure to be

his highest
is thus
still

(so

that

he

even achieves great relaxation and amusement),

more

he

vulgarly
end

rewards of a participation

be his highest

himself from experiencing the enriching of reason. Or if a person takes money to (so that he even achieves great wealth), he is still vulgarly

delimiting

in the life

delimiting
civic

himself from experiencing the nobler rewards of participation in the life of his polis. And if a person takes pleasure to be his highest end (so

that he even becomes a

Hugh Hefner,

or achieves great

happiness2), he is

still

vulgarly delimiting himself from lime rewards of true happiness,.

experiencing the wider,

fuller,

and more sub

Only
(leisure,
vulgar

the virtuous person knows how and why he should

keep

all

lesser

goods

money, property, pleasure,

as mere parts

and so

idols, but

of, and

on) in their proper place, not as means to, happiness,. Subsequently, it is

only

the virtuous person who can experience the

truly

superior and

surpassing

end of

happiness,. "A

happy(1]

life for human beings is

characters and minds

possessed more often

by

those who have cultivated their

to an excessive

degree,

but have been

have
the
former"

moderate

in their

acquisition of external

goods, than

by

those who

acquired more of the

latter than they can possibly use, but are deficient in (P1323a40-b5). The virtuous would never regard any of these
to

goods as competitors
recognize

happiness,,

as

the vulgar might, because the virtuous to the greater

these goods as

being

lesser

and more common supports

and nobler good of

happiness,. John Stuart Mill

these perfectionist claims: "It

is better to be

famously human being

supports

Aristotle

on a

dissatisfied than
a

pig satisfied; better to be [a virtuous] Socrates dissatisfied than

satisfied.

[vulgar] fool

And if the

fool,

or the pig, are of

know only their knows both

own side of the question.

different opinion, it is because they The other party to the comparison

did
not

sides"

(Mill,

p.

10). Even if

a virtuous person

have

more of

a particular good

(such

as a certain

kind

of

hedonistic satisfaction) than any narrowly fixated

in two
ways:

a vulgar

ian, then,

the virtuous person would not

fret, knowing

that the overall good he

vulgarian.

experienced would

be

greater than that of

Sum

ming up, Aristotle argues that the

surpass the

happiness, (eudaimonia)

of the virtuous will

happiness2 (pleasure)
enjoy

of the vulgar

(1) in many

cases,

the virtuous will

a wider range

and greater number of goods

than the

vulgarian, others;

who tends to
and

fixate

upon certain particular goods to the exclusion of

(2)

in

all cases, the virtuous will

than the vulgarian, who

fixates

upon more

enjoy more noble or sublime base and common goods.

goods

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR (A

VIRTUOUS)

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

Let

me sum

up three

of the main themes considered so

not

far. We have seen,

first,

that vulgar

laborers,

only

certain

craftsmen, but any others who

labor

Aristotle
under

on

"the

Vulgar"

147

stultifying working
judgments

and

living

conditions,

cannot attain

virtue, in large

part, because of these conditions. I questioned Aristotle for making specious

moral about such people while

simultaneously enjoying the fruits

virtue such as

of

their hard

labor, in
upon

other

words, for smugly presupposing that

his

may be built
virtue

vulgarity (or "vulgar

labor")

such as theirs.

In this context,
condition of

we saw that the

following

salient questions arose:

If

necessary

laborers, isn't it morally

gar"

among the citizenry is (benefits coming from the toil of) a class of vulgar problematic for any who so benefit to treat these "vul
disdain
might

with so

or moral condescension?
perhaps

And isn't it
a sense of

plausible

that
or

benefit

be obligated, (See Miller

question

from

reciprocity

any who fair play,

to see that such laborers are afforded the opportunities and resources to attain
virtue themselves?
and also

Goodin,
are

who argue that such obligations

do exist.) This last

to
pursue

demands

a qualification.

Aristotle has

maintained

that workers cannot attain virtue when

they

left

with

inadequate leisure time

not a

it. But it

must

be

noted

that adequate leisure time is

sufficient,

but only a necessary, condition for virtue. For, although Aristotle's vulgar banausoi lacked adequate time for the pursuit of virtue and private enrichment,
"vulgar"

many contemporary dented amount of leisure

and

workers enjoy a tremendous, historically unprece free time. So whereas a lack of leisure time might

help

to explain the

lack

of virtue

among

ancient

workers, it

cannot

by

itself For

explain whatever

lack

of virtue exists

among contemporary working

classes.

an explanation of such elsewhere.

lack

under

offer one possible explanation

contemporary capitalism, below.

do
not attain

we need to

look

Second,

we

have

seen that the vulgar rich

virtue, at least in part,

due to their gaudy and greedy misuse of, and improper relations towards, mate rial resources. I took Aristotle's arguments here as providing insights not only into
oligarchic"

certain

"vulgarly

features

of

his

own

society, but into similar

features
cannot

of our own capitalist society.

Here again,

a qualification

is in

order.

We

facilely

assume that either the mere temptations of wealth or a culture of explain

pleonexia are

sufficient, in themselves, to

vulgarity
although

and a

corresponding

lack

of virtue

culture
need

among may influence wealthy individuals to become more materialistic, we to ask what has caused our culture to become like that in the first place.
of today's

today's wealthy. That

is,

today's materialistic

If many
what

wealthy
what

class share character traits with those

"vulgar

rich"

of oligarchic

Sparta,
been

really

accounts

for this? And,

class

we might also

ask,

features

would be necessary to turn these vulgar rich towards the virtue of aristocratic not

those who have

merely in
of

but in

character?

Here, too,

postpone

my

response

to these question.

Third,

we saw that

both these types do

not attain

vulgar, the vulgar

and the vulgar rich,

happiness,
city-state

because

of

working class their lack of virtue. is best for

and acts

poor-

Aristotle has
nobly.

said that

"the

happy],)

is the

one that

[And]
part

the best

life, both for individuals separately

sufficiently
actions"

and

city-states

collectively, to take

is in

life

of virtue

equipped with the resources needed

virtuous

(P1323b31,41). But

here,

again, we

are

driven

148
back

Interpretation
to the same fundamental
these persons
questions:

What

accounts

for
an

lack

of virtue
relation

among

(considering
part

that

it

cannot

be merely

improper

towards leisure time

resources needed

and material resources)?

Conversely,

to take

in

actions"

virtuous

(considering

that these resources cannot consist

what exactly are "the true happiness, thereby, and, abundance of lei an merely in

sure time and material resources)?

Irving Kristol,
modem capitalist

for one, has tried to answer these questions, in relation to society. In his Two Cheers for Capitalism, he argues that in

feudal societies,

affairs were

and an aristocratic plane of masses

culturally ville) that

inherently structured to accommodate high culture living and virtue for an elite few, while leaving the impoverished and vulgarized. Kristol claims (quoting Tocque-

"in democracies, in contrast, there is little energy of character but customs are mild and laws humane. If there are few instances of exalted heroism or of virtues of the

highest, brightest,
rare, information the
production of

and purest more

temper,

men's

habits

are regular.

Genius becomes
abundance,

diffused. There is less perfection, but

...

more

in

all

arts."

the
p.

In short,

an amiable philistinism

is inherent in bour

geois society.

(Kristol,

258)
in

And why is this

"philistinism"

so pervasive
an ethical system

capitalist society?

Because,

ac

cording to Kristol,
once robust enough

(namely,

the Protestant

Ethic)

that was
the public

to

infuse both

a private code of character and also

system of

law

and government

tems
priate

(Kristol'

s so-called

has gradually been replaced by efficiency sys Darwinian and Technocratic Ethics) that are appro
neither private nor governmental

to,

and

inspiring for,

spheres, but

are

efficacious

for only

the marketplace.

Kristol

retells

the Weberian account of this

transformation wherein the spirit of capitalism supplanted the Protestant

with virtue

Ethic,
and

vicious

getting lost in the shuffle, that is, wherein a certain traits (individualism, greed, "profit maximization come
acquisitiveness) gradually
as

constellation of
may,"

what-

consumption-oriented of virtuous traits

eclipsed certain constellations

and production-oriented

(such

piety, neighborliness,

indus

try).

In

response

to what he takes as this essentially decadent process,

Kristol
educa

advocates a renewed commitment

to various traditional sources of moral

reinvigorate virtue

tion. His hope is that these sources will

among the

citizenry.

In this regard,
regard

Kristol'

s account aligns

fairly

well with

Aristotle's, in

that both

training in virtue, rather than merely the provision conditions, as essential for happiness, and "the good
While there is in in
midst,"

of adequate material

life."

much

to

agree with

in Kristol's be

account

here,

this cannot be

the end of the story.

our
a

For, regarding

what might

an explanation of

we also need to take

into

account the

different dynamics
and

"vulgarity of being

(1) In

specifically liberal, as earlier Protestant

opposed to
capitalist

merely Protestant

capitalist, society:
with a more

society,

culture was

infused

Aristotle
homogeneous
conception of the good

on

"the

Vulgar"

149

life.

Along
virtue

with

this came
young.

relatively

clearer and more

homogeneous training in

for the

Accordingly,

the tables of virtues to be sought and vices to be avoided were more uniform

uniformly promulgated by the parents, schoolteachers, legislators, and As many have chronicled, this greater moral uniformity had both its positive and negative aspects (Cf. Bellah, et al., and Douglas and Tip
and more elders of that era.

ton).

The

positive

side was that the moral

expectations

and

tutelage of that

culture were simpler:

if

one wanted

to be

good and

happy,

all that were needed,

supposedly,
the

were obedience to the

laws

of

God

and

man, prayer, and

study

of

Scriptures. This uniformity

and

simplicity Whatever

allowed

the youth of that time

to be raised without the

deep

moral

ambiguity, or

moral

vacuum, that many

that

contemporary had to endure, they did

struggles as of

youth suffer through.

not

other struggles youth of

day

have to

endure two of our

experience of

much, namely, anomie (the

values and

characteristically modem being caught in a vertigo

conviction that there an account that

conflicting

norms)

and nihilism

(the

haunting
p.

are no real

norms, truths, or values. (See

Merton,

162. For

contrasts earlier versus more recent moral

repressive and anomie

environments, with emphasis on their

effects

on

youth, see

Goodman.) Even

so,

of

course,

Protestant

capitalism was not without

its equally

salient and pernicious negative

features,

which

included

sometimes severe

intolerance,

sectarianism, and repres

sive authoritarianism.

(2) By
ferent

contrast, contemporary liberal

environment, in
regard

capitalist

moral

to the

society provides a quite dif training in virtue of the young. On

the positive side, the state under liberalism has chiefly learned to be tolerant. In

fact,
any
any

the liberal state has prided itself

on

not

in particular,

its neutrality, its liberal

strict

only on its tolerance of insistence on not favoring

comprehensive view of

diversity but,
or

supporting

one conception of
other.

virtue, or any one

regimes

the good, over

As

a result,

have

shed much

of the

sectarianism,

authoritarianism, oppressive
preliberal regimes.

bias

and exclusivity, and so on that marked

many
moral

This

public

neutrality,

including

a retreat

from the

life, has had its drawbacks, however (For critical analyses of such drawbacks, see Goodin and Reeve, and also Sher.). On the negative side, many
issues
of

youth,

as suggested

above, have been left in a kind of moral vacuum, where

they have had to contend, if not with some form of anomie and nihilism, at least with a lack of clear and consistent moral guidance and a thorough lack of moral
inspiration. And
guidance all these children who

in their families
public sphere.

and private

up without strong moral lives have had no more available help

grown

have

from the
have

This is in

contrast

to preliberal youth, all of whom did

the public space, even

greater encouragement
private.

to virtue

from

if

some

lacked

it from the
moral

vacuum, in

an environment

So if vulgarity is precisely what takes root and grows in a lacking in training to virtue, then it seems

that

liberal

capitalism consigns all children who grow

up

without

strong

private

moral guidance

to a

destiny

of vulgarity.

If

a child

is

not

encouraged,

either

in

150

Interpretation

the private or public sphere, to recognize virtue as attractive, how can she come

to recognize

vulgarity as being so unattractive? What implications do these differing dynamics have for
that, if Aristotle
of virtue and
material

our

discussion?

They
to

imply
ment

and

Kristol

are

right, then

what

is

needed

for the

attain

happiness,

and the avoidance of

vulgarity (in

addition

like nonstultifying work and adequate leisure where is in such virtue is generally supported in the public virtue, time) training sphere, even if it has not been thoroughly provided in an individual's family. If
certain
preconditions

this is so, we seem to be left with three

possible options.

Our first option,

as a

society, is to

revert

to the Protestant capitalist model, that

is,

to aim not

for

a certain

level

of material

goods, but concomitantly for

a certain

only level of

moral

(qua spiritual) good, through

spheres,
wherein all

an attempted reunification of the public and

private

youths, if

they

are not

adequately trained

will at

least be

able

to be morally inculcated through a

home, (specifically "Christian")

at

virtuous public culture.

But this

retrogressive option

because the

costs that would

come, in terms

of suppressed

is obviously unacceptable, diversity, lost liber

and so

ties, totalitarianism,
too
that
great.

various new

forms
be

of witch

hunts,

on, would be just

capitalist

Our

second option

is to

maintain our current

consigned

liberal

model,
and

is,

to let all

training in

virtue

to the

private

sphere,
we

to

reserve the public sphere

our culture

only for "morally doesn't harbor too much vulgarity, if

have
real access

neutral"

activities.

If

think that

we

think that all or enough

young

members of our culture

to

training in

virtue,

and

if

we

think that there is no better alternative than the "virtue-neutral

state,"

then per
no

haps maintaining this

alternative,

status quo model will

be

acceptable.

But is there

better

no preferable and

feasible third
our public

option?

Perhaps there is.

support and even pro

A third

option would

be for

institutions to

mulgate virtue

in

our midst much more

traditionally

neutral

liberal

regimes.

aggressively than they have done under How could his model be advanced without

falling
mind:

back into the first type

To say that the
be

of model?

By keeping
neutral

an

important distinction in
to comprehensive
not

state should

be

with

regard

conceptions of the good

(which I believe the

state should

be) is

it

should

neutral with regard

to specific goods or virtues (which

to say that I believe it

would

should not

be). Take the

virtues of
claim

honesty, kindness,
in
no

or

diligence. It

be

ludicrous to infer, from the

comprehensive

that the state should be neutral

regarding

doctrines,
be

that the state should

way
are

champion these virtues.

In fact,

a case could

made that virtues

like these

integral to any properly

functioning

state, any good, and any decent way of life. For what would a comprehensive doctrine look like that had "virtues" no place for these, or that championed opposite values such as the of

robust comprehensive conception of the

deceit, cruelty
would

and sloth?

Would

such a

doctrine be worthy

of equal respect? or

of disdain, as an essentially banal doctrine? Such publicly supportable virtues might be drawn along the following lines, then. In a Rawlsian vein, such a table of virtues could be seen as comprising an
not

it

be worthy, rather,

Aristotle

on

"the

Vulgar"

151

"overlapping
in most, if Aristotelian
teristics that

virtue,"

consensus of

that

is,

as virtues that are shared and

honored
a more

not

all,

cultures and comprehensive ethical systems.

Or, in

and naturalistic

vein,

they

could

be

seen as general traits and charac

lead to, and are necessary components of, a life of flourishing for individual or society. If such suggestions hold promise, then there should any be a fairly robust notion of virtues that any liberal state will be able to aggres

sively support,
haps

while

remaining true to its ideals

of

fairness, tolerance,
comments about

and per

even neutrality.

And perhaps, then, Aristotle's

"legislators

(P1334al-10) would responsibly training and educating their people in not have to be taken as archaic or illiberal. It is not to offer a full intention my account of such a third option here. I suggest this option only to point briefly
out

virtue"

the general

direction that, I believe,

achieve

any

overall

"stagnation in

vulgarity."

liberal society must take if it is to progress in virtue, if it is to escape its commonly decried Communitarians, virtue ethicists, liberals themselves,
our
of

and classical republicans of

these supposed

foibles

many stripes have provided critical discussions of liberalism. For salient examples, see Maclntyre, Etzinot

oni,

Mason, Macedo, and Dagger. Otherwise, if we do ahead in this third direction, it is likely that the "vulgar
will remain
virtue and

insist

on

forging
in"

masses"

(both

poor and part

rich)

"unequipped
and

with all the resources needed

to take

both

happiness,,

that,

as

usual, such

virtue and

happiness,

will

remain

the possession of only some

lucky,

elite portion of citizens.

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The Political
of

and

Theological

Psychology

Shakespeare's Measure for Measure

Nasser Behnegar
Boston College

The story

of

Shakespeare's Measure for Measure is dark,

of the play, the

perhaps

too dark

for

a comedy.

The hero

Duke,

admits

that his reluctance to

afflicts

punish

lawbreakers is

responsible

for the licentiousness that

Vienna. To

correct this
moderate
people.

temporarily hands over his power not to his trusted and advisor, Escalus, but to Angelo, a man who is all too ready to punish

situation, he

Almost

immediately
Claudio

after

taking

the helm of power, Angelo sentences

a woman whom convince

Claudio,
who

a noble man who

had impregnated

he intended to
sister

marry, to death.

asks

his friend Lucio to

a

his

Isabella,
Clau

is in the

process of

becoming

nun, to

plead

his

case with

Angelo. Her

pleas,

however, have
exchange

an unexpected consequence.
not

Angelo

offers to pardon

dio in

for her body. Claudio does

sister thinks otherwise.

think this is too high a

as a

price

for
to

his life, but his

the rescue.
should

The Duke, disguised

friar,

comes

He

suggests that
substitute

Isabella

should accept

Angelo's

offer

but that
wronged

she

secretly

for herself Mariana,

whom

Angelo had

refusing to keep his promise to marry her wreck. This proposal also has an unexpected
with

once she

lost her

consequence. promise

by dowry in a ship After having sex

Mariana, Angelo decides

of a prisoner who

to

renege on

his

to pardon Claudio. He
to send Angelo the

is

saved

because the disguised Duke had just died

persuades

the

provost

head

of

fever instead
Duke
as

of

Claudio's. The ending

of the play, the triumphant return of the

once

the dark clouds of neglect, selfishness,

punished

himself, seems to banish at deception, cruelty, and injustice.

with

Angelo is
and

by

justice that is tempered

mercy; the Duke's

gentle

decent
a

officers are praised or

rewarded; Mariana is

righted; Isabella is
to be
rescued

of

fered

extremes of
other.

worthy marriage; license on the

and the one

city

of

Vienna

seems

from the
on the

hand

and a

tyrannically

severe

morality

Yet it is difficult to love wholeheartedly the man responsible for all these good things, who seems less like a human being than an impersonal or a control

ling

force that directs the

quoted

play:

"we

never p.

think of him
not

by

his name,

Vincentio"

(R. W. Chambers
tation of
actions.
twitch"

in Eccles,
us

432). It is

just the impersonal

presen

the Duke that distances

seems

from him but

also

He

to "treat

his

subjects as puppets

his apparently offensive for the fun of making them

"he lies to
and

(William Empson

quoted

in Eccles,

p.

433)

and

deceives

INTERPRETATION,

Winter 2001-2, Vol. 29, No. 2

154

Interpretation
again"

almost everyone over and over

(Bloom,

p.

338). Even if

at the end of

the play everything turns out well, the emotional torture that the Duke inflicts
on

Isabella, Claudio,
the

and

Juliet,

the false

absolutions

he

grants

Mariana,
much on a

and

even

trap

that he sets

for Angelo leave play

bitter taste in

our mouths.

Our

view of

the Duke and of the

as a whole

depends very

how

we understand

its

plot.

On the

one

hand, it
the

seems that the

play:

Duke, like

divine

power, is in

control of all the actions of

With the
acter
all

exception of

The

Tempest,

this is Shakespeare's only play in which a char

complete

is

allowed

to play God. The Duke Vincentio is in

control,

directing
deserts,

events,

knowing
p.

the consequences of each person's actions, meting out

of unspoken thoughts and

and

aware, like divinity,

instincts. (Donald A. Stauffer

quoted

in Eccles,

433)
Duke apparently did not anticipate seem in the development of the plot. For instance, he apparently
renege on

On the
did

other

hand,

accidents that the

to play a crucial

role

not anticipate

Angelo's decision to

his

promise

to pardon Claudio.

What
of the

would

have happened had Angelo have

changed.

pardoned

Claudio? The
anticipate

play fusal to be

would

Nor did the Duke

of

ending Barnardine's re

entire

executed or

the

timely death

Ragozine,

a notorious pirate who

looked very much like Claudio. Could he have fooled Angelo without Ragozine's death? The Duke himself characterizes Ragozine's death as "an accident
that heaven
provides"

(IV, iii, 75). Does God

to
raise

rule

agent, the Duke? Or does the Duke rule the play?

the play with the help of his Is the Duke god or man? The

ambiguity that leads

success of the

us

these questions is necessary

for the

artistic

play, for the more we think that the Duke is

more questionable

responsible

for

everything in the play, the

become.

he

and

the lesson of the play

The formal
Although he

explanation of the

Duke's
a

plan

is

given we

by

him to Friar Thomas.

reasons

seems to

treat the Friar as

confidant,

have

to question

the candor of his speech. As we have noted, the Duke is rarely forthright. More over, in this particular case there is a practical reason for the Duke's meeting
with the

Friar. He

needs a

friar's

clothing.

Consequently, his

explanation of

his
the

plan might

have been influenced

and guided

by

the necessity of

approbation of the
reasons

Friar. The Duke tells the Friar that he has

at

winning least three

for

leaving

is his

project

for the

his post, but he only informs him of two of them. The first reformation of Vienna. The reformation he speaks of is
outcome of

very different from that actually embodied in the pleasing to a friar. He acknowledges that he has
law slip in the last fourteen
years.

the play but more

made a mistake

in

He describes the

strict statutes and

letting the biting

not

laws

of the state as needful

bits

and curbs.
are

The

problem

in Vienna is

that

the laws are

tery

extremely harsh. The punishment for adul is that these laws have not been enforced death. The problem is apparently

loose; in fact, they

The
and

Psychology

of Measure for Measure

155

he

consequently have lost their teeth. According to the Duke's own statement, has in effect been absent for fourteen years, for laws that are not enforced are hardly laws. Paradoxically, he prepares his return by first becoming
as a prince

literally
This

absent.

As Claudio says,

new governor

Awakes

me all

the enrolled penalties

Which have, like unscoured armor, So long that nineteen zodiacs have
And
none of

hung by

the wall

gone round

them been wom

...

(I, ii, 169-73)

According
and

to

Claudio,

the

Duke has

not enforced the

laws for leads

nineteen

years,

according difficult to account for this discrepancy. Since

princes,

to the Duke he has

not enforced

them for

fourteen
us

years.

It is

the play

to think

about
thirty-

however,
Duke

we might observe

that fourteen and nineteen add up to

also an absent prince.
possible

three,

the age of

Jesus

at

his death. Jesus is

Is it

possible

that the

somehow represents

Jesus? Is it

that his attempt to en

strange

force his laws

represents the restoration of the rule of

Jesus? However

these suggestions may seem,

they become somewhat more plausible if one con siders that in returning to Vienna the Duke insists on a number of his friends with Roman names meeting him and that there is another character in the play
who

has

a remarkable resemblance

to the devil:

Lucio, like Lucifer, derives from light. He brings light,

comic version of reason.

sheds

light.

he is like for

the

devil, light-heartedly diabolical, spitefully harming

"devil,"

no good

He loves to slander, and the word derives from the Greek verb "to knew,

as

Shakespeare undoubtedly
pp.

slander."

(Lowenthal,

255-56)

Shakespeare describes Lucio

against the

as

fantastic,

Lucio'

and

one

of

accusations

Duke is that he is fantastical.

However that may be, it is plain that Vienna is not in good shape. In particu with lechery. In Act I, scene ii, Shakespeare lets us hear a between Lucio and two other gentlemen. In conversation "in a public

lar, it is infested

place"

this conversation the number of

staggering.

remarks and

jokes

about venereal

diseases is

From the very beginning of the play we notice ture of Vienna: no one is married except the foolish Elbow,

another strange

fea

whose wife acciden

tally
and

walks

into

a whorehouse.

Indeed,

throughout the play all the crimes that

poet suggests that

are punished are connected with sex.

The

laws restraining
to the
preserva

moderating
where

sexual

behavior

are needful and perhaps crucial

as a whole.

tion of a community, and to justice prison,

sexual

Pompey's

observation

in the

he

meets all sorts of

criminals,

reveals the connections

between

behavior

and crime.

156
I

Interpretation
am as well acquainted

here

as

was

in

our

house

of profession: one would think of

it

were

Mistress Overdone's

own

house for here be many

her

old customers.

(IV,

iii, 1-4)
Whoremongers tend to
pected of

commit other

crimes, even

as

being

thief. Those who visit whorehouses are

Pompey himself is sus likely to break or

actually have already broken the marriage contract, and those that break the marriage contract are likely to break the social contract.

Sexual desire is the

interest in the
good or

most powerful

natural

desire that leads

us

to take an

the pleasure of another human being. But as this play

were

demonstrates, if
for
asserts

such

demonstration
soon as the

necessary, it is
not

not a sufficient

basis

a community.

As

laws

are

enforced, sexual promiscuity

itself. The

reassertion of sexual

nature, albeit his animal nature.

words of
allow

This

view

promiscuity is the reassertion of man's finds its expression in the play in the

Pompey,

the

clown.

When Escalus tells

your

prostitution, he replies, "Does

city?"

Pompey Worship mean

say:

that the law does not

to geld and splay all

will

the youth of the

(II, i, 241). And

when

Escalus informs him that they

hang
If

and

behead the offenders,

head

Pompey

has this to

you

and

hang

all that offend that

glad to give out a commission

for

more

way but for ten year together, you'll be heads. If this law hold in Vienna ten year,
bay. If
you

I'll

rent

the fairest house

in it

after threepence a

live to

see this come to

pass, say

Pompey
to

told you so.

(II, i, 226-32)
cannot

According
and

Pompey, human beings

help following

their

natural

desires,

ing

any law that attempts to suppress those desires can only succeed by destroy human beings. He, however, proves to be not such a shrewd student of
nature.

human
be

He

seems to

be

hedonist

who thinks that men

by

nature seek

pleasure and avoid

pain, but he himself disregards Escalus's threat that he will

a

whipped

for

being

bawd
has

on

the ground that "the

valiant

heart's

not whipped

out of

his

trade"

(II, i, 244).

Moreover,

he

expects

Lucio to bail him out, but

and

Angelo's

proclamation

made

his lecherous friend

former

client

into

an

enemy
it?"

bawds. Lucio tells him, "What say'st thou, trot? Is the world as it was, man? Which is the way? Is it sad, and few words? Or how? The trick of
of

(Ill, ii, 48-50). Pompey

legislation to is
not

underestimates

both the force

of

morality

and the

power of

alter and mold the world.

Lechery
side.

the whole of Vienna. Angelo and Isabella represent

about

its

other

Although Isabella is

to

enter a

Catholic order,

she complains that

their rules

are not strict enough.

Angelo has

such a reputation

for austerity that

Lucio says,
Some report,
a sea-maid spawned

him. Some, that he

was

begot between two is

congealed

stock

fishes. But it is

certain that when

he

makes

water, his

know to be true. And he is

a motion

ungenerative;

ice; That I That's infallible. (Ill, ii, 104-8)

urine

The
Both Angelo
he has to
to restore
and

Psychology

of Measure for Measure

in the Duke's
the
plan.

157

Isabella play
about

a prominent part plan to reform

After the

Duke informs the Friar

abandon

his

Vienna,

Friar If
the

asks

him why
wanted

his

position

in

order to

fulfill this

plan.

Duke

justice, he
in
your

could

have done it himself:

It

rested

Grace

To

unloose this

tied-up justice
dreadful

pleas'

when you

d;

And in

you more

would

have

seem'd

Than in Lord Angelo. (I, iii, 32-36)

The Duke's
would

response

is that

since

it

was

his fault to

give the people

scope, it
will

be his

tyranny

to strike and gall them. With the

help
Friar,

of

Angelo he

be
the

able

to restore order without

laws.

Listening

tarnishing his to the Duke's conversation

He
confesses

reputation and the reputation of with the one

is tempted to
a revival

conclude

the Duke has recently experienced a moral revival or at least

of political prudence.
ways:

his

errors as a ruler and wants to mend

his

Sith 'twas my fault to give the people scope, 'Twould be my tyranny to strike and gall them For
what

I bid them do: For

deeds have their
punishment.

we

bid this be done,

pasts,

When
And

evil

permissive

not

the

(I, iii, 35-39) in fact

Yet he

since the

Duke does

not

restore

the enforcement of the old

other

is difficult to believe that this

never repeals

was ever

his intention. On the

laws, it hand, since

them, it is difficult to believe

Could it be that he

that he wanted to replace those

laws
those

with milder ones.

wished

but

was unable to enforce

laws?
seem to

At any rate, there

be two

other reasons

for the Duke's

plan.

First,

the Duke wants to test Angelo:

Lord Angelo is precise;

Stands

at a guard with

Envy;

scarce confesses

That his blood flows; Is more to bread than If

or that
stone.

his

appetite

Hence

shall we see

power change purpose, what our seemers

be. (I,

iii, 49-52)

The Duke tests Angelo

evil

by

deeds that he has

that has brought

never

placing him in a situation that will tempt him to do done before. Indeed, Angelo thinks that it is the

Isabella to him: "O cunning enemy that, to catch a saint,/ dost bait thy (III, ii, 180-81). It was Lucio who brought Isabella to Angelo. Second, the Duke seems to have an interest in Isabella.

devil
with

hook"

saints

158

Interpretation
we

Earlier

have heard him

reject the

Friar's

apparent suggestion that

he

sought

to disguise himself for amorous purposes, and profess his stoic

self-mastery:

"No, holy father,

throw away that thought,/

Bosom"

Believe

not that the

dribbling

dart

of Love/Can (I, iii, 2-3). Yet three days later the Duke asks Isabella to marry him. Since the Duke implies that there is at least one more reason for his plan, it is hard to believe that his desire to marry
pierce a complete

Isabella

was not another motive.

Needless to say, the Duke has Friar.

good reasons

for

hiding
to

this

intention from

the

Even if the Duke is merely

reason
expose

a secular ruler and not a of

divine prince, he has

the

hypocrisy
Vienna,
As

Angelo. Let

us recall what we

have

said about

the state of affairs in

namely, that it is divided between the extremes of

promiscuity a loose society

would

and piety.

was made clear religious

in

our time

by

the revolution

in Iran,

with a

deep

tradition is

a virtual

time bomb. The Duke

political

be the

fatality

in

such an explosion.

More generally, in

life there

is

a risk that excessive

liberty

will somersault

into

excessive restraint.

However
sick
and

much people of

enjoy their loose morals, some among them are likely to get immorality. One rarely sees a person who has no concern for virtue,

most people

identify

virtue with what

is difficult for them. Even

the

lecherous

Lucio

respects and admires

Isabella for

becoming

a nun.

I hold

you as a

thing
with

enskied and sainted an

By
As

your

renouncement,

immortal spirit,

And to be talk'd
with a saint.

in sincerity,

(I, iv, 34-37)

Isabella thinks Lucio is mocking her by speaking to her in such a think she is wrong about him, and even if he were mocking her, it

manner.

could not

have been entirely tongue in cheek. For why else does Lucio think that marrying a prostitute is worse than being tortured and executed? This admiration of virtue,
which

may be

suppressed

in

an

easygoing

and

loose society, is As Claudio

likely

to

be

revived when
arrest:

licentiousness

reaches an extreme.

explains

his

own

From too

much

liberty,

my Lucio.
of much

As surfeit, is the Father

Liberty, Fast;

So every scope by the immoderate use Turns to restraint. Our Natures do pursue, Like rats that ravin down their proper bane, A thirsty evil;
and when we

drink,

we

die. (I, ii,

118-22)
Duke's authority
confirmed

By

in

effect

allowing
the

sexual promiscuity, the

of the

rests on tot

tery legs. Indeed,

shaky authority
he himself

Duke is
to

by

the

first

words of the play, which

addresses

Escalus, his subordinate.

The
Of

Psychology

of Measure for Measure

159

government the properties to unfold

Would Since I

seem

in

t'

me

affect speech and

discourse,

am put to

know that

your own science

Exceeds, in that,

the

list

of all advice
.

My
In

strength can give you

(I, i, 3-7)

the same scene the

Duke

makes a similar comment to

advertise"

Angelo: "But I do

bend my speech to one that my part in him know" is "put to that his subordinates know
than he does.

(I, i, 40-41). The Duke

the art of government

more about

Moreover,

there seems to be a possibility of war, and from what

we see of the gentlemen of

Vienna they

are

hardly

sensitivity

to his reputation as a soldier reveals

never accused the

ready for a war. The Duke's itself in his dealings with Lucio.

Although Lucio

claims at the end of the

and while still

Duke of any lack of military virtue, the Duke play that Lucio had called him a coward (V, i, 497-503), disguised a friar he defends himself to Lucio thus: "Let he be
soldier"

forth, and he shall appear to the envious a (III, ii, 137-38). Angelo, unlike the old, loyal, and moderate Escalus, is a real danger to the Duke. First, in times of war a political community looks to a tough leader, and
scholar,
a

testimonied in his own bringings

statesman,

and a

from

the perspective of the people it seems no one is tougher than Angelo.

apt to

Second, Angelo is

have

some contempt

for the Duke for his

laxity

in

matters that are of such

importance to Angelo:

We

must not make a scarecrow of the of

law,
it

it up to fear the birds And let it keep one shape till

Setting

prey,

custom make

Their perch,

and not

their terror.

(II, i, 1-4)
he is

Finally, Angelo is
in
second place.

not a moderate

man,

and

Notice the

readiness with which

not easily satisfied with being he interprets the Duke's contra

dictory
and

letters

as a sign of

his

madness.

What,

above

all,

makes

his threat

real

radically distinguishes him from Escalus is his willingness to break his promises. Just as he was willing to break his promise with Mariana when it was

in his interest, he

might

turn against the Duke when the time is right.

not

Consequently,
whether

the

Duke's interest is
he
seems to

merely is

a speculative

desire to

see

Angelo is

what

be;

rather,

knowing

him already, he

wants

to

neutralize

his threat. Unlike Escalus

anticipated

who

surprised and shocked

by

Ange

lo's actions, the Duke

his

attempt

to force Isabella to have sex with

him. From the very beginning he expected that Angelo would abuse his author ity and reveal his nature as a man made of flesh and blood. He says of him:
Lord Angelo is precise,
envy, scarce confesses

Only

this one

Stands

at a guard with

160

Interpretation

That his blood

flows;

or that

his

appetite shall we see

Is If

more

to bread than stone.

Hence

power change purpose, what our seemers

be.

(I, iii, 50-54)

What better bait than the beautiful

cal

and chaste

Isabella? Angelo finds her

physi

beauty

attractive, but this is

not what

is

crucial.

According
her

to

him,

strumpets

with all their art could not ever stir

his temper. It is Isabella's chastity, her

ability to conquer the demands more. He himself says,

of the

flesh,

that makes

beauty

shine all the

These black

masks

Proclaim
Than

an enciel'd

beauty

could,

beauty ten times louder display 'd. (II, iv, 78-81)

It is
all

merely a desire for the forbidden that attracts Angelo to Isabella. We know that it is more honorable to love a woman for the virtues of her soul
not

than those of her

body,

and

Isabella
urine

possesses what

Angelo

considers

to be the

human he is

virtue.

Unless Angelo's

is

congealed

ice, he

could not

attracted

to Isabella. Angelo is a hypocrite in the original sense of

be sexually the term, but

not a

hypocrite in the

sense that

he merely feigns

respect

for virtue;
what

hypocrite in the loose

while

sense of the

term would not be surprised to

discover,
he
Isabella

praying, that his thoughts to be virtue, but his

attractive to

are not on

God. He genuinely loves

virtue that makes

considers

problem

is that the

sexually arousing
comes to

these passions, Isabella

that he did not

his very sexual attraction as sinful. By helps Angelo discover something about himself know. Few men are more dangerous than a proud man who
condemns
a

him

believe he is in fact
more

low human being. Instead

grows

he becomes
of other

tyrannical; he
and

indifferent to

the

of reforming himself feelings and affections

human beings. Angelo does defile her "raze the his

not

try

to win

Isabella's love. Instead, he

the virtue that made

wants to

sanctuary."

He

resents

him

depravity. His pride, his sense of self-respect, wants to debunk Isabella's virtue. Note the argumentative nature of their second en
conscious of own counter.

does

violate

Before violating her in deed, he has to her in speech:

violate

her in

speech.

And he

She is forced to
and

admit

that she sets different standards for her brother and herself

that Angelo

portantly, she
gelo

simply applies laws, the principles of which she accepts. More im is forced to agree that her refusing to have sexual intercourse with An
Angelo's be
refusal to pardon a similar act

is

akin to

by
of

her brother. Angelo tells her

act.

her that
ness of

she will

pardoned

by

God for the intention

The

outrageous-

the situation,

in

which the enforcer of the

law is
p.

now

breaking it,

helps to

conceal the weakness of

Isabella's

position.

(Bloom,

334)

The
Angelo has to
prove

Psychology
not

of Measure for Measure

better than he is,

-161

to himself that she is

and she senses

that in a decisive respect he is right.

Angelo's injustice to Claudio

and a son of a virtuous

stems

from his

pride.

Claudio is

an aristocrat

man,

and

five thousand times

example of sensible

more

than

according to Mistress Overdone, he is worth Lucio or the average Viennese. By making an

him, Angelo will demonstrate his authority to the whole city. This account, however, is not exhaustive. We are told that Claudio has been
in
promise-keeping,"

"ever ise
tue

precise

and we

know Angelo has

reneged on a prom

already.

Perhaps

uncertain of

his superiority, Angelo

s vice.

seeks

to

prove

his

vir

by harshly
in the

Claudio'

punishing

"Pride

plays a greater part

than kind

ness

reprimands we address to

wrongdoers;

we reprove

them

not so much
faults"

to reform them as to make them believe that we are

free from their finds

support

(La

Rochefoucauld, Maxims,
speare's text.

no.

37). This

observation

in Shake
after

Originally
erred

Claudio'

s execution was scheduled asks

for three days

his

arrest

(I, ii, 68). When Escalus

have

Angelo to forgive Claudio, because he

reacts

also could

in this point, he
he has

by

the next

day

(II, i, 34). When he knows for

after

speeding up the execution to certain that he too is guilty of

at

Claudio's vice, i.e.,

sex with
execute
more

again and orders the

Provost to

Claudio

bring

his

bloody
greater

head to him. The

more

speeds up the execution four in the morning and to the distance between him and Claudio
proud

Mariana, he

is diminished, the

vehemently his

heart

wishes to affirm

itself

by

showing act is not to be dismissed, but to consider it as the sole reason, or even the deepest and main reason, is to indulge along with Angelo in mere rationaliza
tion.

cruelty to Claudio. The rational

account

he

offers

for his last

Although Isabella is
at

a more attractive a

human
are

least for

some

time,

hypocrite. We

being than Angelo, she is also, amazed by her very first words in
from
sisterhood, the

the play. She claims that she does not distinguish the privileges of nuns

their

restraints.

She

wishes even a more strict restraint upon the

votarists of

Saint Clare,

which

is

all the more

shocking

when we are

informed

of the restraints these sisters

faced:

When

you

have vow'd,
presence of

you must not speak with men

But in the

the prioress;
must not show your

Then, if
Or if

you

speak, you

face;

you show your

face,

you must not speak.

(I, iv, 10-35)

her temptations, but
one

Perhaps
der

she needs more restraints to control

may She

won

whether

her desire for

restraints

is

not at

least partly due to her

more privileges.

pride.

She

wants more

restraints, in effect because she wants

wants

to shun the world completely, because she wants to be

preferred over others

by

God. Isabella is

highly

self-absorbed:

"When Isabella first hears

of

Mariana's

162

Interpretation
she says that

plight, with her typical generosity with the lives of others,

would can

Mariana

be better

dead"

off

(Bloom,

pp.

338-39). As Bloom
prurient

also observes, she

hardly
of

talk about chastity without

becoming

(p. 338). It is

a combi

nation

her

pride

and

her love

of virtue that refuses

to yield to Angelo's

demand

and save

her brother. She thinks,

virtue which compels

and

is only her concern for her to let Claudio die. After calling her brother a beast

however, it

praying for him to die, she meets the Duke (disguised as a friar) who asks her decision. She gives a revealing response: "I am now going to resolve him. I had rather my brother die by the law, than my son should be unlawfully
about
bom"

letting
is

(III, i, 188-90). Before she met Claudio, she had a different reason for Claudio die: "Then, Isabel live chaste, and brother, die:/More than our
chastity"

brother is
her from

our

(II, iv, 183-84). After

the prospect of

she treats a

her brother

brutally,

it

not so much

helping

chastity but bearing her brother. In the battle between her

bastard

son that prevents

duty

to her

brother

and

her legalistic understanding of Christian virtue, the latter comes out on top, but that virtue is badly injured. We are not privy to her thoughts, but how could she
not

death
well

feel guilty about the way she behaved to her brother? After the of her brother, Isabella abandons the legalistic understanding of
as

apparent

virtue as

suppressing her desire for revenge. When the Duke offers to set up the sexual encounter between Angelo with Mariana, the chaste Isabella is not only not offended but she says, "the image of it gives me content
any
pretense of
already"

(II, i, 260). To

avenge

both to lie

and to claim that she

her brother's death, Isabella becomes willing committed adultery. After the Duke disbelieves
effect against

her,
for

she appeals

to heaven but her appeals are without

education

the power
plea

of the

Duke. Her

becomes

complete when she accepts

Mariana's

of the

help in saving Angelo. She puts aside her dead brother's concerns living Mariana's concerns. What is more she actually gives a
Duke
should show some

in favor
credible

argument that the

mercy to

Angelo,

which

is something
are some

she was unable to reasons

do in her brother's
a

case.

Mercy

is justified if there

such

for mitigating reasons. Instead

punishment, and in the case of Claudio there were many

only
sin.

on the

of referring to those reasons, Isabella argued for mercy basis that Angelo himself was not free from the taint of Claudio's

She did this because she accepted at the time the strictly legalistic under standing of Christian virtues. Only after Isabella defended her brother's killer does the Duke reveal that her brother is still alive and in the same breath asks

her to marry him. Christian, and it is

be thought We have in
which

By defending
proper

her brother's killer, Isabella becomes

of the

true

for her to become the bride

Angelo

Duke,

who might

of as a new

Christ.
and

seen that the actions of

Isabella in the

extreme situation what about the

they

were placed are plausible psychologically.

But

psychology his understanding

which

of the

being

who places them

in that

situation?

of the relation of the ruler and the ruled

The Duke suggests in a series of images

he

uses

in

describing

his

problem and plan

to the

Friar:

The
We have
strict statutes and most

Psychology

of Measure for Measure

163

The

needful

bits

and curbs

to

biting laws, headstrong weeds,

have let slip;
cave,
as a

Which for this fourteen

Even like
That
an o'ergrown
goes not out

years we

lion in

to prey.

Now,

fond fathers,

Having
Only

bound up the threatening twigs of birch, to stick it in their children's sights

For terror, not to use, in time the rod Becomes more mocked than feared, so Dead to infliction, to themselves
And
are

our

decrees,

dead,

The

liberty plucks justice by the nose; baby beats the nurse, and quite athwart
decorum. (I, iii,

goes all

19-31)

In

the

first

parable

the

Duke is

represented as a
people.

horseman,

and the

laws

and

statutes as
one used

bits

and curbs

that control the

This image is

similar to the

by

Claudio

of

Angelo:

Whether it be the fault

Or
whether that the

and glimpse of
public

newness,

body

be

A horse

whereon the governor

doth ride, may know feel the spur;

Who, newly in
He

the seat, that it

can command,

lets is

straight

(I, ii, 157-61)

Although

a rider

lets the horse feel the

the

spur

in

order to

demonstrate his
needs a

com

mand, he is

not oblivious to

animal's

welfare, for he
provide

healthy

horse
the

that can serve him well. Not only does he

for the

preservation of

horse, but he itself; and if

neck.

also gives

it

an occasional pat on the neck when

most

it distinguishes
pat on

this horse

is like

noblemen, he delights at this

the

Whereas Claudio's image

characterizes the public as a noble

horse that

carries and obeys

people. phor

its legitimate ruler, the Duke's image is less flattering to the The people are not noble horses but headstrong weeds. The mixed meta
received considerable criticism
"steeds"

has

from

the editors.

(Against

suggested

emendations
are

[for example, to to regard as impossible any going

emendation"

or

"wills"]

M. R.

Ridley

argues:

"If

we
a

word which

involves Shakespeare in

violence of mixed metaphor we shall

strong

[quoted in Eccles,

p.

certainly need bits and curbs for head 44].) W. G. Stone argues:

Shakespeare
the

was careless

in

idea

of a well-bitted

horse

linking metaphors. I think it possible that he combined (literally equivalent to enforcement of law), and the
spring up in
p.

picture of a

rank, noisome growth of weeds, suffered to

fair

garden

(literally

equivalent

to relaxation of law). (Quoted in

Eccles,

43)

164

Interpretation
parts of the metaphor make sense

Yet if the two riding

weeds.

separately, the image

makes us

of men

on weeds remains

bizarre. Its strangeness

linger
the

over

it,

and

think about what Shakespeare intended

The image brings to

mind

by characterizing another image, the parable

people

here

as

of the weeds

in

Matthew

13, in which God allows weeds to grow until the harvest, that is, the of and then He will burn them. Instead of burning them, the judgement, day Duke rides and curbs the headstrong weeds, Angelo and Lucio, and uses them
to his advantage. Had it not been for
might

Lucio,

Isabella's
her

encounter with suit

Angelo
and

have

ended with

Angelo's initial
and

rejection of

(II, ii, 42),

his

meeting
God

with

Isabella

education and contribute

promises

his injustice toward her play a crucial role in her to the setting up of her marriage to the Duke. Where Duke only
controls them.

to

destroy

the weeds, the

I think this is

one of

the reasons that some

find the
be to

outcome of

the play, especially Angelo's

punishment, unsatisfying: "Angelo's crimes were such, as

must sufficiently jus innocent from suffering, or to deter guilt by example; and I believe every reader feels some indignation when he finds him (Samuel Johnson quoted in Eccles, p. 420).

tify

punishment, whether its

end

secure the

spared"

The
passed.

second of the

three images is the shortest and hence most easily

one.

by

It

also

happens to be the harshest

The Duke

compares

himself to
ruler as a

an overgrown
predator and

lion that

goes not out

to

prey.

This image depicts the It is

a curious and

those who break the law as his

of

prey.

disturbing

image because

the suggestion that the the ruled but his own

ruler's concern

is

not the good of

good.

in enforcing the laws in contrast to the first Moreover,

killing. This is harsher than

image, it
Lucio'

suggests that

enforcing the laws

requires

s similar

image:

He,
As

to give fear to use

and

liberty,
the hideous law

Which have for

mice

long
. .
.

run

by

by lions,
to

(I, iv, 62-64)

According
ters,
are

Lucio,

those who break

laws,

at

least laws regarding

sexual mat

too insignificant to be of much concern to the rulers. Although Lucio

calls the

law hideous, he has

a rather sanguine view of

the relation of rulers and

the ruled:
attempts

lions usually do
to
speed

not

prey

on mice.

In the

course of the play, the

no avail.

Duke

up the

execution of

Barnardine but to

person who plays an

indispensable

dies in this play is Ragozine, the notorious pirate. role in his plan, for the wretched head for Claudio's
had
noble

The only Ragozine's head

of

Barnardine is
"a

a poor substitute man of

head.

Ragozine,
of will

unlike

Barnardine, is
deception is

Claudio's years; his beard

who
Barnardine'

and

head just

his

color."

The Provost's
quite

fear that Angelo,

reasonable,

seen them s

both,

discover

the

even when

head is for his

shaved and

his beard dyed. Since

Ragozine's death is
accused of

presented as an accident

actually

killing

someone

own

in the play, the Duke cannot be interest. But this exculpation

The
of

Psychology

of Measure for Measure

1 65

relatively ending of the play depends in a decisive manner on chance. In the third and the most visible image the Duke is portrayed as a

the Duke is bought

at

the price of the realization that the

happy
gentle

father,
his
a

who

is

reluctant at

first to

punish

his

children

but learns that he

this

must use

rod.

The Duke
and a

speaks of

justice only in

regard to

image,

since

between his for

father
his

son, unlike between a rider and a horse or a

not

predator and

prey, there is some sort of common good. A child is

of

father,

and

he is

punished not

only for

the sake of

merely his father but

pluck

an

instrument
also

his

own good.

When

children are given excessive

liberty, they

justice

by

the nose and beat their own nurses. The nurse

used

in this image is the law that is

a subject undermines the of the

by

the

king

to nourish his subjects.

When

law,
good

he

cuts off

his

own source of nourishment.

and

The authority

father is

for both the father

his

children.

The

character that represents a spoiled child

in the play is Pompey, who simply does not fear the rod of law and prefers to follow his own desires. Moreover, he is punished by the Duke not for the sake
of

punishing his

evil

but for the

sake of

improving

him.

Take him to prison, officer: Correction and instruction must both Ere this
rude

work

beast

will profit.

(Ill, ii, 30-32)

Despite the harsh

to be punished;

words

rather

he

he uses, the Duke does no say that Pompey deserves should be punished in order to become a better human

being.

By

reflecting

on these three

images,

one realizes

the Duke's

view

that

different

people need

to be

punished

differently.

discussed the Duke's understanding of his relation to his subjects, we now consider the cause of his new interest in politics. He is essentially a private man, as we learn from his conversation with the Friar.

Having

My holy

sir, none better knows than

ever

you

How I have

lov'd the life remov'd,

price

And held in idle

to haunt assemblies,

Where youth,

and

cost, witless

bravery keeps. (I, iii, 7-10)

both

This he is

view of

the Duke

is

confirmed

by

Escalus
as a

who views

him

as a scholar
agree

and a philosopher, and

Lucio

who views

him

lecher.

They

both

that

fundamentally
since

a private person. a slanderer.

Perhaps

one ought

to disregard Lucio's
of

testimony,

he is

Although Lowenthal denies the truth

Luc

io's accusation, he
(p. 254). Like the
ders. Consider

observes that

Lucio he

seems

to have

supernatural

knowledge he
slan

original slanderer

often reveals the truth even as

when

he

slanders

Friar Lodowick (the disguised Duke):

this
not

"Cucul-

lus

non

facit

monachum"

(V, i, 261). Is

the truth? After the second

scene of the play, Shakespeare's discretion transports us not to the

beginning

166

Interpretation
midst of

but to the
response answers:

the conversation

between Friar Thomas

and the

Duke. In

to Thomas's question, which is concealed from the readers, the Duke

No.

Holy Father,
not

throw

Believe
Can

that the

away that thought; dribbling dart of love bosom.

pierce a complete

Why

I desire thee

To Of

give me a secret

harbour hath

a purpose
and ends

More

grave and wrinkled youth.

than the aims

burning

(I, iii, 1-6)

may surmise the nature of the Friar's question. It was something along this line: Are you planning on meeting a woman in the monastery? According to the Duke himself, this Friar knows

Judging

from the Duke's

response we

much about

him:

"My holy

sir,

none

better knows than

interest in

you/

How I have

ever

loved the life friar

removed"

(I, iii, 7-8). It is perplexing

a sexual

that

both Lucio

and this

assume that the

Duke has This

rejects

this suggestion.

According
steal

he adamantly to Lucio, the Duke likes to kiss old beggars

women while

who

smell of garlic.
of

accusation reminds us of another;

"It

was

a mad

fantastical trick
never

him to

from the

state and

usurp the

beggary

he

was

bom

to"

(III, ii, 88-89). As Lowenthal has observed, the

hint
at

reference

to

"beggary"

is

the Duke's

having

assumed the role of a

friar (p. 254).

The truth underlying Lucio 's that Duke as a representation

slander that the

of

Duke kisses

old

beggars is that

The play is set in motion entry into the convent is the only reason the play to be a bride of Christ, but the only way that she

Jesus has many brides in the form of nuns. by the Duke's haste to leave Vienna. Isabella's
offers can

for this haste. She

wants

truly be the bride of Christ is to marry the Duke instead of going to the nunnery. The second reason for the Duke's more active political interest is his concern for his authority. We have
already
and that of

spoken of

Vienna

as a time

bomb,

ripe

for

kind

of religious rebellion,

Angelo is

likely

to be the leader of such a rebellion. The

would and

Duke, because
political.

his
no

position

and

actions,

be the

prime

target of his movement. He

can

longer ignore
the

politics must

is

compelled a

to become actively

Consequently,
Christian

Duke

deliver

blow to the
a

claims of the church and

virtue.

The

exposure of

Angelo is

blow

against the

hypocritical

and

legalistic understanding of Christian virtue. Moreover, he asserts his supremacy over the church in a revealing passage in Act V. After declaring the Duke unjust, Friar Lodowick (the disguised

Duke)

warns

Escalus

not

to touch him.

Be

not so

hot: the Duke

this

Dare Dare

no more stretch

finger

of mine than

he

rack

his

own.

His

subject am

not,

Nor here

provincial.

(V, i, 311-14)

The
Just
on as

Psychology
took the
order

of Measure for Measure

from the Pope

167
it

Napoleon
with

at

his

coronation

crown

and placed

his head

his

own

hands in

to let the world know that his authority

the people of Vienna
not supported

did

not come

see the

from the Church, the Duke lets Isabella and tottery legs of the Church's authority when it is
Escalus
sends this saved

by

the

Duke,

friar to the rack for slandering only because he is also the Duke. But what about his interest in the welfare of his community or for justice? The Duke clearly has an interest in these matters. Let us go over the punish
as
against

the state.

Friar Lodowick is

ments

that he metes out at the end of the play.

In the

case of

Angelo,

the

Duke
the

first

sentences

him

to marry Mariana and then to death.

He then

commutes

latter

sentence once

it is

revealed that

Claudio is

still alive.

Since Angelo

actu

ally intended to rape Isabella, to break his promise to her, and to murder Clau dio, marrying Mariana is hardly an adequate punishment. Indeed, the Duke does
not even present

it

well"

as a punishment:

"Well, Angelo,

your evil quits you

(V, i, 493). This is indeed a disturbing statement, for justice demands that "like doth quit (V, i, 408). The Duke does not implement his own principle of
like"

justice.

In the

case of

Lucio,

the Duke

first

sentences

him to be

whipped and

hanged he

for slandering him

and to

be

married to

the mother of

his child,

whom

apparently had promised to marry. The Duke forgives the first punishment after Lucio reminds him that if his slander undermined the Duke's authority he is
also responsible
made you a

than tute:

my lord, is pressing to death, whipping, and (V, i, 519-20). This circumstance would seem to be a cause for mercy. Perhaps instead of marrying Kate Keepdown Lucio should pay child support. Both
a punk,

by the "Marrying

for restoring his authority: "Your highness said even now, I (V, i, 512-13). But Lucio seems to be less troubled by death prospect of marrying the woman in question because she is a prosti
Duke"

hanging"

Bloom

and

Jaffa

obscure the

justice

Lucio'

of

s protest:

"Since

marriage

is the

same sentence

imposed

by

the Duke on Angelo (not to mention

finally,
who

himself), it

would not seem to no

be

severe"

disproportionately
compelled

Claudio, and (Jaffa, p.

he has

217). Yet Kate Keepdown is

Isabella. "Lucio is

to marry a woman

has, according
and whom

to

Lucio'

s own admission,
whore"

bome him
p.

a child that

denied

he

now calls a

(Bloom,

have been honorable for Lucio to

no reason

call the mother of

344). Although it may not his child a whore, we have

name

to doubt the truth of his claim, given her

the child

and the

fact that
to

Mistress Overdone has been raising

Lucio'

(III, ii, 189-94). In

response

s plea, the Duke says that slandering a prince

deserves it. This is

surpris

ing, because he had just forgiven him for

in fact incapable
of

the slander. It seems that the

Duke is

forgiving

a slander against

himself.

Finally,

there

is

the mysterious pardon of

Barnardine.

According

to

Bloom,

"Barnardine is pardoned by the Duke probably because there is some doubt (p. 341). whether he actually committed the murder of which he was not he was executed the previous the reason was This doubt, however, during
accused"

168
nine

Interpretation
years,
and the provost,

who

is

neither cruel

nor rash,

has informed the

Duke that

new evidence proves

his

guilt

beyond any doubt. In

describing Bar
Duke's

nardine, the provost gives an important clue as to the character of the

rule:

He hath

evermore

had the

liberty

of prison.

Give him leave to

escape

hence, he

Drunk many times a day, if not many days entirely drunk. We have very oft awaked him, as if to carry him to execution, and showed him a seeming warrant for it. It hath not moved him at all. (IV, ii, 144-49)
would not.

This

prison combines

amazing

laxity

and cruelty.

On

the one

was allowed to

drink

and to escape

from the
It

prison.

On the

other

hand, Barnardine hand, he was

nine

often subject to mock threats of execution.

would seem
some

that the mock execu

tions were meant to correct Barnardine

years

by

they had
more

failed,

but

on the

day

of

putting his execution, Barnardine

fear into him. For I

seems to take will

death
have

somewhat more seriously:

"I have been

drinking
beat
out

hard

all night and

time to prepare me, or

they

shall

will not consent to

die this day, that's

certain"

my brains with billets. I (IV, iii, 51-54). Since this is the

only

new

action

on

would seem that the most the

and place

Barnardine's part, it must be the basis of his pardon. It Duke can do is put a little fear into this murderer

him in
to

According
aims at the

custody of Friar Peter to help him mend his ways. Tovey, "despite the fact that many readers find his means dis
the

tasteful in the extreme, it

is

an undeniable

fact

of the

good, but that he actually achieves it.

play that duke not only Certainly the final act of the
(p. 65). What
subjects
gives

play reveals him to be benefactor to all his impression that the Duke is the benefactor

subjects"

the

of all

his

is his

apparent
and

establishment of a new political order that escapes the twin evils of

license

moral tyranny.

Men

are not executed

for illegal

sexual

intercourse,

but they

have to marry the mothers of their children or the women whom they promised to marry. But this is nothing new. Lucio tells us that he was accused before the

Duke

by Mistress Keepdown
have
married me

and that

he had denied the

medlar"

charges

because

"they

would else

to the

rotten

(IV. 3. 170). To be sure, Vienna

after the return of the

Duke is different from before his departure. The Duke

obtained

has discredited Angelo,

so

Isabella,

and put much

fear into his But he does

subjects all

that

they
any

are

likely
return

to take

his laws

more

seriously.

this

without
after the

reformation

in the

execution of the

Duke's

is

fundamentally
Duke,

laws. In this respect, Vienna the same as Vienna before his depar
his

ture.

If

we are correct about the

some of

otherwise questionable
and

actions,

for instance, his giving of that she is already married,

tions are justified
wise and

by

persuading her to think are perfectly legitimate. The other questionable ac his limited power. According to Shakespeare, the Duke is
not omniscient and

absolution to

Mariana

just, but he is

he has

no power other

than

making

The
marriage possible

Psychology
people

of Measure for Measure

169

and

deceiving

with

that Shakespeare can

defend the

wisdom and the

empty threats. Indeed, it seems justice of the Duke only by

questioning his

power.

REFERENCES

Bloom, Allan. Love

ed.

and

Friendship. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.

A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare: Measure for Measure. New Eccles, Mark, York: Modem Language Association, 1980.

Jaffa, Harry
and

"Chastity
Measure."

as

Political Principle: An Interpretation

as

of

Shakespeare's John E. Alvis

Measure for

In Shakespeare

Political

Thinker,

edited

by

Thomas G. West. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2000. Pp. 20-40. Lowenthal, David. Shakespeare and the Good life. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
1997.

Shakespeare, William. Measure for Measure. New York: Penguin Books, 1969. Tovey, Barbara. "Wisdom and the Law: Thoughts on the Political Philosophy of Measure for In Shakespeare's Political Pageant, edited by Joseph Alulis and Vickie Sullivan. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. Pp. 61-75.
Measure."

".
A

this scattered
of

kingdom":

Study

King

Lear

Zdravko Planinc
McMaster University

While nursing his blinded and despairing father, Edmund leams "The worst is not/ So long as we can say, 'This is the (Act 4, scene 1, lines 27-28.
worst'"

All

citations and quotations are

from David Bevington's

edition

of the

play it
as

[New York: Bantam, 1988]).

King Lear,
not the

Shakespeare's

most profound

tragedy,

is

saying

of the worst.

It is

thing itself. It brings

us as close to

any saying can, however. We

need not concern ourselves with

the famous warn

not

ings

against

tragedy
are

made

in Augustine's Confessions (1.13; III.2),

because they

disingenuous
to

they

are

written,

after all

but

rather

simply because

they
way

are not relevant

King

Lear. Shakespeare has

attempt

written the

that it

deliberately
fallacy:

subverts

the theatrical

spectators are

the worst, and sympathetic souls

action.

any by denied any distance or sense of escape from are denied any illusion that cathartic release is
audience

its

play in such a find comfort in to

As

much as

learn

about our

any saying can, King Lear compels us to face the worst, to imperfect and broken nature, and to consider the consequences
others.

of these things

for

human existence, in coming to an under standing of the nature of suffering and death, one leams the deepest truths; and in considering their consequences, not only for oneself, but more, for others, one leams how these existential truths should affect ethics and politics. There
of
are a good

In confronting the limitations

many

straightforward political

lessons that be divided

of

can

be learned from

King
con

Lear. For

example: a

kingdom

should not

against

itself;

succession

controversies should

be avoided; different types be be fought

authority

should not

be

fused;

foreign

power should never

given control of the

capital;

and wars

of national

defense

must

even when one's

domestic be

allies are worse

than one's foreign enemies. As well,

relevance

King

Lear

can

read as

having

direct

for

the political and religious circumstances in which

it

was written:

Albany

stands

for James

I,

and the great

Anglican

compromise

political auton

omy for the kingdom, while recognizing the moral superiority of foreign author ities to homegrown Machiavels is once again affirmed. There is a great deal

Many

thanks to Pamela

Jensen

and

Paul Cantor for their helpful

comments on an earlier version

of this paper, presented at the

2000

meetings of the

American Political Science Association, Wash

assistance on that occasion. sensitive

ington, DC;

and to

Barry

Cooper for his indispensable

am also

very

grateful to the

journal's

anonymous referee

for

an

exceptionally

reading

of

my

work.

INTERPRETATION, Winter

2001-2, Vol. 29, No. 2

172

Interpretation
ethics,
politics and religion

that the play can lead us to see, however. in considering the manner in which Shakespeare (1.1.41). depicts Lear's "crawl[ing] toward Shakespeare has crafted King Lear in such a way that its aesthetic form
more about

Its deepest insights

emerge

death"

guides one

toward,

mentary materials for the play: some have

are used

eventually reveals, the play's full significance. The for its form are source-texts. Shakespeare uses several
and

rudi sorts

long

been

obvious

to scholars, some have not;

and some

for outlining
well

the play's dramatic action, some

for

ing. It is

known, for

example, that the main features

disclosing its mean of King Lear are taken

from the Leir story in Geoffrey's History of the Kings of Britain (11.11-15); that Shakespeare uses an episode from Philip Sidney's Arcadia (11.10) as the basis for the
texts are the
and subplot

involving

Gloucester

and

his sons;

and that

Shakespeare's
source-

combination of

the unrelated stories points

of the plot of

foundation

King

up their affinities. These two Lear. Shakespeare also uses classical Although
than

biblical texts in
use of them not

remarkable ways

throughout the play, however.

evident

his

is less

immediately

(they

are often

little

more

direct references) their hermeneutical significance is central. It is through studying the place and function of these occulted source-texts in the
allusions,
unique aesthetic

form

of

King

Lear that the

most

difficult

aspects of the play's

unsettling,

and even

shocking, depiction

of the worst

For instance,
Lear is
not

there

is

no

direct

reference

may be brought to light. in the play to Plato's Republic. King

to which
of macrocosm and mi

fully

understood,

however,

unless one recognizes the extent

Shakespeare
crocosm,
an not

was

familiar

with the

dialogue's mirroring
own

necessarily from his intimate awareness of how its

authors.

reading

of

the work, but certainly from

argument and

imagery

had been

adopted

by

Christian

In

the

order of the

something of the king's "two

similar.

city in a He

Republic, Plato parallels the order of the soul and the complex poetic image; in King Lear, Shakespeare does
in
a

uses traditional

bodies,"

Christian symbols, primarily the doctrine Platonic manner to parallel Lear, as man and
England"
.
.

king,
cf.

and

King
of

his realm, "this little world,/ this (Richard II, 2.1.45, 50; Lear, 3.1.10). The aesthetic device is quite deliberate and not a complex
.

form

the pathetic fallacy. The experiences and sufferings of

realm

Lear

are

"writ
ac

large"

in the

through the

play's geographic movement and poetic

dramatic

tion.

Therefore, by studying Shakespeare's

possible

depiction
of the

of events

in the
and

polity, it is

to
and

learn

of

his understanding
and the nature of

soul, its order

and

disorders, its justice

To be
the play.
characters
clear: this

injustices,

its suffering
of that sort

death.
of

is

not yet another argument quite enough

for

an allegorical

decoding
already. are all

There has been

in

scholarship
in
a

The

King

Lear

are not ciphers

morality play; they play

fully

realized and unique of an encoded

human beings. And the

events of the

are not signifiers

message;

they

are

completely

understandable on their own terms.

Nonetheless, Shakespeare has

crafted the play's aesthetic

form to be

macro-

this scattered

kingdom"-

Study

of King Lear

173

cosmic around

depiction Lear
and

of

Lear's

"crawl[ing]
realm

toward
also

death."

Everything

that occurs

throughout the

is

The

main characters can

are reflections

relations

through the geographic

nature. Their changing Lear's changing condition. And their movements space of England and the dramatic time of the play's read as

be

aspects of

something Lear's

that occurs within Lear.

of

unfolding are movements within Lear's Consider the dramatis personae. Lear in Sidney's Arcadia, the
wives;
"Gloucester'

soul as
and

he

confronts are

death.
similar.

Gloucester

very
a

Indeed,
have
no

character

is himself

king.

They

they

each

have

children of
same

starkly different quality; they

and at the same

mistake

their

children's qualities

time; they suffer greatly for their mistake; and, together, they learn difficult truths before they die. If King Lear is the tale of one man's journey toward death, then the roughly way
parallel plots

in the

centering

on

Lear

and

Gloucester depict the

a

related experiences

of the soul and the

body during

the

journey. As

symbol, Gloucester

represents
and

the

body;

as a

man, Gloucester has two sons, Edmund the bastard

Edgar

the legitimate.

Edmund is Ed-mund, the Ed of the world; and Edgar is Ed, by the godson of the King. Lear's three daughters similarly divide Gar, by God, themselves into two camps: Goneril and Regan are the worldly sisters, the lovers
of

Edmund; in

contrast, Cordelia is

transcendently

graceful.

The two

camps that

form in

the play, and eventually confront one another as opposed armies, are in
or motions of the soul:
and

part representations of two polar orientations

toward

worldly
"flesh"

matters even

to the exclusion of the transcendent,

toward the tran the

scendent even to the exclusion of the world.

"spirit."

Let them be

called

camp

of the

and the

camp

of the

Shakespeare has
the

a classical

understanding
nature

of the various aspects of

human
use

nature

body,

the psyche, their parts, their

relation
action.

but he tends to

biblical

symbolism

in

depicting

human

in

The geography
of the event can

of

England is the

space

in

which the action occurs.

The

events

play be determined, in part,

moves.

are arranged on two spatial

axes; and the character or quality of any

by

the place in which it occurs and the direc

tion in which it

Draw

line from

Albany (Scotland)
midway.

to Cornwall: that

is the
tual"

"worldly"

axis.

Gloucestershire is symbolically
west

Draw the

perpen

dicular from Gloucester in the

axis.

to Dover on the channel: that is the "spiri

an

It may be that
and

no man

is

island, but
island

this
are

island is

man, or rather,

the life of a man,

channel whose

and the

borders

of the

the

extent of

his life. The

France is the beyond-land, the "undiscovered country from bourn/ No traveler (Hamlet, 3.1.80-81). Gloucester does not go is death;
returns"

over,

although

he tries to do
quite

so when

he

arrives at since

Dover. And Lear does

not

go over

(this is

significant, especially
on

Shakespeare

deliberately
to

varies

from Geoffrey's
with the goes

History

this point)

although

Lear does

attempt

cut a

deal

lords

of the

beyond-land

at the

beginning

of the play.

Only

Cordelia

over and returns:

Cordelia,

the embodiment of the soul's proper

loving

174

Interpretation
leaves
and

orientation as she
preferred

with the

King

of of

France (not
redemptive

with

Burgundy, Lear's
as

suitor)

the

embodiment

grace

she

returns

(4.6.205-7). Christian symbolism extensively in the composition is far from the orthodoxy of any Christian denomina tion. Indeed, the play suggests that a good deal of such orthodoxy is superstition. It is Edmund who gives the most concise critique of superstition in the play: "the Shakespeare
uses such
result

of the

play, but the

excellent

foppery

world,"

of the
and

evidence of our
and

desire to

excuse our

failures,

weaknesses, vices

bad fortunes,

to

evade the

things for which we bear

the responsibility even

causes: to
"necessity,"

if

we

cannot

master

compulsion,"

to

"heavenly
critique of

35). Edmund's Machiavellian

by appealing to external (1.2.121"a divine thrusting superstition is not only a distaste for
them,
on"

ignorance

and weak

will; it is

also

his insight into how

political

such opinions might

be

manipulated

to

acquire

power; it announces his

theology, the

ascension

of

bastards (1.2.21-22). Shakespeare's further than Edmund

critique of

superstition,

however,

goes

much

might suspect.

No

appeal to natural or supernatural

forces,

to necessities or miracles,
ever

and no reliance on providential guidance or

"foppery."

intervention is

Christian,
happens to

whether

No matter whether it is anything but it is made by Machiavels or divines, or whether

us such

pagan or or not

it

work out.

Shakespeare teaches hopes

lessons in

King

Lear

by allowing

us to

build

our

and expectations and

then

suaded

by

Edgar

when

he

sets out to

subverting join the battle

them. We are always

and says to

entirely per his father, "Pray

We are always shocked when he returns with the news may that the forces of the right have lost, that Lear and Cordelia are taken (5.2.1-5).
that the right

thrive."

And

we never

learn, it

seems.

We
of

are again

entirely
right

persuaded

by

the

chivalry

of

Edgar's
and

return and the

bravery

his

challenge of

Edmund, distracted by
(5.3.110 ff). And

trumpets

dreams

of providential victories

for the

as we relish
not even see

Edmund's

defeat 'The gods are

just,"

we think

(5.3.173)

we

do

that the test of arms was worse than a

great evil that

it

causes

is

almost

chancy illusion that worked out. The invisible. Cordelia is killed as everyone on

Had they not been distracted, as we are, Albany might easily have discovered Edmund's intent and acted in time to save Lear and Cordelia. When Kent interrupts Albany's idle speculations on "The judg
stage watches the spectacle.
ment of the
heavens,"

he

comes to

his

senses:

Edmund,

where's the

King? And

Cordelia?"

where's

"Great thing of us forgot!/ Speak, (5.3.235-42). Too late.

Shakespeare
right; there is

allows us no

false hopes

of salvation or redemption.

There is
in

grace.

But fulfillment
and

and peace are

momentary,

and even the

best

resolutions are

imperfect

fall to bits.
husk

Every

moment of calm or

joy

King Lear,
illusion

every

restoration of order or

justice, is
of the away.

shattered,
of

and we are

forced
or the

to wonder what remains when the

of escape

illusion

permanence,

from

the worst,

is blown

".

this scattered

kingdom": A
of the play,
attendant

Study
Lear

of King Lear
attempts

175

himself

From the first: In the opening scene of his worldly authority and its

to unburden

"cares

business"

and

(1.1.39).

The strictly political consequences of his decision aside, his plan to divide the realm into three parts has a "darker (1.1.36). It represents the manner
purpose"

in

which

he is

resolved to

"crawl toward

death."

At the

end of

the

Tempest,
he

Prospero
says

retires to

Milan, "where/ Every

third thought shall be my

also

grave,"

purpose"

(5.1.315). Lear's every third thought is concerns his third daughter.

married

his grave,

and

his "darker

Lear's two worldly daughters,

peripheral

to

Albany

and

Cornwall, inherit
her French
attempts

two-thirds

of the realm.

Their

commanded eloquence

is irrelevant:
suitor

"A third

opulent"

more

is already

set aside

for Cordelia
is

and

(1.1.86). The

significance of the plan's symbolism

clear.

Lear

to

put

all matters of the world and the

parts of

flesh beneath him

and

and give over the

highest
the

his

soul

Cordelia, his heart

joy,

and

his capital, the

seat of

realm

itself

to the lord of the beyond-land.

In exchange, he

expects

to master

the things of the spirit. There will be no suffering; he will "rest/

[in

Cordelia's]
in this life
But

kind
will

nursery"

(1.1.123-24). And ultimately, nothing

will retain the as

of significance

be lost. He
and

France Lear's

back,

it

pleases

authority him. Death

of

the crown, passing from England to

will

be

robbed of

its

victory.

The suffering immortality of dying and the circumstances of death cannot be mastered, even if they may be anticipated, and the afterlife is not an open book, nor are its lords bound by
vision of personal
and perpetual peace mad.

is

contract

to the living. Cordelia's love

cannot

be mastered,

coerced or

bargained

away. of
of

And Lear, it turns out, has bargained with the lesser lord, the red Duke Burgundy, not the king of France. Burgundy will not have her in the purity her love, without the consequences, for Lear, in the dowry she would bring.
she

France takes her up immediately: (1.1.265).

loses her home, "a better

where to

find"

Lear has debased his

desire for
reaction,
. .

soul's proper relation to a transcendent ground with a all

mastery.

His plan, for

its cleverness,

must

fail,
.

and
.

in his

extreme
. .

disowning
benison"

Cordelia, he is left in despair, "Without

center cannot

grace,

love,

[or]
of

(1.1.269). The

hold. The

order of the realm

collapses.

In

prideful

anger, Lear divides the

power of the crown and all the

lands
king"

England between

Albany

and

Cornwall,

though he insists he will some

th'

how still be master of the realm, retaining 'The name and all (1.1.136). The court, however, disperses. Lear will no longer

addition to a
sit

in

council

in his capital, der between

somewhere

between Gloucester Cornwall

with

and

Dover. Instead, he
of one

will wan

Albany

and

his

retinue

hundred knights, different

and sort.

following
the two

the cycles of the moon.

This too is lunacy, but

marginalization

of a

The

geographic shift
poles

from Lear's initial

"worldly"

of

Albany
with the axis

of the

axis, in his

bargaining

Cornwall, French, to his

of the

sudden rejection of all things oriented

along the

"spiritual"

in favor

176

Interpretation
"worldly"

extremes of the

axis

indicates that Lear has

turned

from

a willful

attempt to master the things of the spirit to an

equally impossible

or mad attempt

to master the things of the world and the flesh.

Madness is

disorder
part

of the

soul,

and

Shakespeare

symbolizes the nature of

Lear's disorder in

by

the happenings in court. When Cordelia is

"mad"

disowned,

Kent, Lear's

ing

and insist loyal counselor, is banished for calling Lear Cordelia love the that his actions are is in soul, or (1.1.146, 169). As most
"evil"

"grace,"

to

use

the

Christian symbol, Kent is discretion

or proper

judgment. is

Without the
silenced,
of

enlightenment of

love,

the soul

loses its counsel,

is

right reason

and

the seat of the soul's highest

powers

given over

to the desires

the flesh.

The two

spatial axes on which the

dramatic

action of the

play takes
of the

place

intersect in Gloucester's household. In the

symbolic

economy

play,

Gloucester is the body,

is
not the

and

his fate

parallels

the fate of

Lear,

the soul.
"spirit"

The

body

flesh,

nor

is the

soul the spirit.

The terms

"flesh"

and

designate
complete:

orientations,
souls and

not entities.

All the

characters

bodies, perpetually

caught

in the play are, of course, in the struggle between spirit

and

flesh.

Gloucester himself had "good

and

sport"

in the

breeding

of

his bastard

son

(1.1 .23)

ters, however, in their Lear's

succumbing to the flesh. All the charac function also dramatize the striking changes in Lear's dispensation. In this sense, Gloucester's role is the bodily parallel to
lives to learn the
consequences of
symbolic
psychic struggles.

Indeed, Gloucester's household may

even

be

under

stood as the
of

body

in

a neutral

sense, the site of the conflict between the camps

the spirit and the flesh. Part of the charm of the scene

(2.2)

in

which

Oswald
at each
all-too-

Kent, acting other when they

and

as messengers or embodiments of another's meet at

will, have
of the

Gloucester's house is its dramatization

conflicting
wills of the

familiar
The

manner

in

which the

flesh

and spirit contest

for

control of the

body.

body
is

procreate

one of

is lesser than the soul, but it is not inherently base. The desire to the lesser erotic desires, but it too is not inherently base. To

symbolize the

flesh, however, Shakespeare

improper
psychic orientation

uses

explicitly

sexual

imagery. He
world and

associates the

toward the things of the

the flesh with the male genitals, and the male genitals: the
rhea
"clap"

then,

to be more precise, with a disease of

(1.4.293),

the potent brew of syphilis and gonor

that had become

of

quite common

in London.

Taking

a cue

from Geoffrey's

naming who lead the camp

parts

Leir's

eldest of the

daughter, Shakespeare

associates the three characters

flesh, Goneril, Regan

and

and

Edmund, first

with the three

of the

male

genitals,

then with the disease that infects them and

through them destroys the whole

her

sisters on

sophomoric

man. Cordelia's striking manner of addressing father" her "The jewels of our leave, taking (1.1.272), is not a double entendre. Or not only a double entendre. Neither are Goner-

il's

words on

first

kissing

Edmund: "Decline

your

head. This

kiss, if it durst

this scattered

kingdom": A

Study

of King Lear

177

speak,/

Would
reply: a

stretch

thy

spirits
ranks

telling

"Yours in the

up into the air. of (4.2.22-25).

death"

Conceive."

Nor is Edmund's

Even in

leisurely

reading

one

cially in recurring analogy of the in mind, however, that "This is not

used

discovers many such lines in the play, espe eyes and nose for the genitals. One must keep
fool"

altogether

(1.4.149). The

imagery

is

to depict death

crawling through Lear. Consider the

obvious parallels:

As

one sister moves

the other and the bastard rises with their

backing,

the disease

works through

the

body, ravaging everything

a poison capable of

blindness in the eyes, delirium

the soul with despair. In

in the brain
the end,

becoming
three/
on
. . .

infecting

Goneril

poisons

Regan

and

then
an

Edmund, "All
of the

marr[ied] in

instant"

dies, stabbing herself, together with (5.3.232-33); but the disease

flesh lives
return

in Edmund's final order,

killing

Cordelia

and

then Lear.

To
il'

to an earlier time of Lear's dying:

When he is driven from Goner

Gloucester's house, Lear

house,
as

refused

by Regan,
attempt

and then turned out of

begins to learn that his ately his

attempt

to master the

to master the spiritual

has failed as desper worldly realm. He recognizes Goneril and her

realm
mine"

sister as

24)
of

(2.4.223"a disease that's in my flesh/ Which I must needs call but does not know what to do. He is at home nowhere, but now the condition ruthless.

No longer just misdirected, Lear lacks direction altogether; no longer capable (the hundred knights of his train are not only whittled away, they are gone) Lear is powerless against the elements and even the crudest needs. He cannot turn back, but he does not know how to go on. He
his homelessness is
must

learn to be

at

home in this

nowhere and

this nothing. He must endure and

forebear the

worst of

the storm, both its

physical and psychic

ravages, if he is

to discover the way from Gloucester to Dover and, hope

ciled with

against

hope, be

recon

Cordelia.
when

In the times
will never

by

any

rest or

hellish pain, suffering and despair make it seem that there resolution, it is sometimes best to cower down under
coward overcome

them like a poor wretch and a

in battle. Pride then

this,"

melts as a

though to water,

and

the recognition of oneself as "no more than

worse

"poor,
even

so far bare, forked (3.4.100-108), leads

animal," grave"

than nothing that it might be "better in a

to humility.

If any

comfort

can

be

found,

though

fleeting,

then with

humility

comes

the possibility

of spiritual

healing.

On the

moor that

is nowhere,

exposed

to the tempest of elements that rages as

o'

Bedlam (3.4.12), Lear leams from Tom wildly as the "tempest in [his] the violence of the (3.4.105). From "unaccommodated what it is to be the he finds a scant but welcome comfort in Tom's hovel; and "tyrannous
mind" man" night,"

from
and

the

hovel,

through Gloucester's

kindness, he is brought
returns

to where "both

fire

food is

ready"

(3.4.144-46). A

moment's peace.

Gloucester,
He learns,
children.

still

divided in his loyalties,

more

home to

grisly

welcome.

as

Lear did, but

viscerally, the

consequences of

mistaking his
. .

With his

eyes gouged out

by

Cornwall, Gloucester is "thrust

out at

178

Interpretation
onto the

gates,"

moor, to "smell/ His way to

somehow

Dover"

(3.7.96-97). In his great

pain and

anguish,

following

Lear's path, he is discovered

by Edgar,

who nurses

him

and guides
and

to succumb to despair

him along the way, repeatedly counseling him not Gloucester's bitter sufferings move "ill
thoughts."

him to say that

we are to the gods

"As flies to

wanton

boys
and

./

They

kill

us

for their
patient

sport."

Yet

"endure,"

we must

Edgar

reminds

him,

"Bear free

and

thoughts"

(4.1.36-37; 4.6.80; 5.2.9-11).

sufferings

It is
disguise
ence.

wise counsel.

as poor

It lacks something, however. Edgar's Tom were imposture. He does not speak from
Edmund in is
combat

in his

sufficient experi

After

defeating
recent

(a

lucky

thing) Edgar's

triumphal claim
account of

that

"The

just"

gods are

spoken too quickly, too easily.

And his

Gloucester's

198-203). It is from Lear's suffering

what we

death is already nothing but a sentimental story (5.3.173, and death that we better learn to "Speak
say"

feel,

and not what we ought

to

(5.3.330). When Lear dies lament

of escape

ing
or

Cordelia's death,

we are

left
are

without

any illusion
and

from the

worst.

We know that

peace and

joy

momentary,

that every conviction of order

justice, however true, will be shattered. And that there is nothing more. In Lear's journey to Dover, Shakespeare shows us stunning moments of com fort and healing, of reconciliation and justification, of equanimity and grace.
Not
one endures.

Every

glimpse of the eternal

perfection.

in

time

is

eclipsed.

There is

no

movement

in time toward

Nor does

an end redeem a single moment

of suffering.

In

what refuge can

be found

on

the moor, Shakespeare has Lear struggle to

collect the parts of

his "scattered

kingdom"

(3.1.31). The

scene recalls

Plato's

Republic,
the "good

as

its

argument and

imagery
Lear

had been

represented

in

various ancient
spirit of

and medieval works.

Athenian"

Lear

seeks

justice

as well as mercy.

And in the

philosopher

tries to

grasp justice
to

be

possible

bring

quality of justice to the realm. Goneril

(3.6). The
"justicer[s]"

as a

Tom (3.4.171, 176, 180), he the kingdom of his soul in order that it may
sees

in

poor

and

Regan

are put on

trial

in

a courtroom

in

speech

are
a

called, and Lear considers

how to
the

arrange

them on the bench in

fitting
is he to
"wits"

order.

First,

poor

Tom; then,
their proper

Fool;

oh, yes, Caius too

but

where of the

sit?

Considering
nature.

arrangement

is itself

gathering

his
of

madness

has scattered, for

each of them represents an aspect or

itself,"

function

Lear's

Tom is "the

thing
and

the bare nature of "unaccommodated

an

man"

(3.4.105-6). Caius is in judgment,

plain

several things:

"honest-hearted
and

fellow,"

direct

and clear

diligent in carrying speaking 99-101). The Fool? He is 35; 2.2.93,

frank,

out a true master's will

(1.4.18,

27-

"sapient"

(3.6.22). And so, the

"yoke[d]"

body

and

its

needs, the heart

and

the will, judgment and wisdom, all

together

by

Lear for justice (3.6.37).

All three
nor

Finally

in

order.

And

yet their order

is

not right.

are not quite who

they

seem to

be. Lear does

not recognize

them,

do they all recognize each other. Tom is Edgar, unrecognizable even to his father; Caius is Kent; and the Fool, someone hidden in plain sight, taken by all

this scattered to be

kingdom": A

Study

of King Lear

179

his disguise. Their veiled quality is a symbol of the relation between Lear's continuing madness and the part of the soul still lacking for true justice. From the moment he abused Cordelia, Lear's soul was divorced from love and
grace.
pelled

His

wits were scattered

for lack

of what

binds them together

and com

to go their ways separately, unrecognized. Of course, love cannot be

entirely absent from the soul: in the play, there is word of Cordelia's return well before it occurs, and Kent carries a letter from her (2.2.168-69). Similarly, the
madness that results absence of right

from

disordering

of

love in the

soul

is
to

not

the complete

reason,

judgment

and will:

Lear

attempted

banish Kent from

the realm when

Lear, "pin[ing]
73). But Kent
Fool? His

away'

he disowned Cordelia, and the Fool himself refused to attend for Cordelia from the moment she left for France (1.4.72in disguise, her letter in his
"bitter"

returned to court

pocket.

And the

sweet

fooling

became

(1.4.134-35), but he

counseled

Lear

well on the errors of

"nothing."

uses of

the wound
appears.

his judgment, even teaching him the many meanings and The Fool is an absent Cordelia. His pining is Lear's longing, in his soul. And when Cordelia returns, the bitter Fool no longer
"fool"

Cordelia is Lear's
effort to restore

sweet

(5.3.311). does
not

Lear's but it is

his

soul's order

entirely dispel his madness,

enough

a sign of

calming

and a

Along
soul

with the provision of the

rediscovery barest physical comforts, it is

of the soul's proper orientation.

for him

to be at peace

for a moment. He sleeps, resting his body; and in his sleep, his begins to heal. Before Gloucester leaves them, he urges Kent and the Fool to "Take up [their] and "drive toward where greater "welcome
master"

Dover,"

protection"

and

await

(3.6.91-92). When he wakes, he is in the French

period of spiritual

camp.

In

other

words, a
and

long

sleep
part

and

recovery begins

when

Gloucester
same route

Lear, the body and independently, suffering

the soul,

company.

They
Lear's

travel the
revels

similar experiences, and

in

the nowhere of Arcadia are a

as

ity"

beautiful dream that gradually dissipates in waking Lear recognizes Gloucester again. The initial shudder of sensing his "mortal (4.6.133) is eased at Dover by the tenderness of his nursing: undisturbed
care of a
o'

rest, the

doctor,
"in

gentle music to rouse at

him.

Thinking
Cordelia,
is

taken "out
not

grave"

the

first, Lear

wakes to see

and though cured

himself wrongly he is

immediately
and

[his]

mind,"

perfect

his

madness

finally
her:

by

her

love

forgiveness (4.7.46, 64). Her kiss, his is

restored.

recognition of

grace moves

the soul and the order of love

The

"Restoration"

fails (4.7.27). The French forces

latter'

are

defeated. In

other

words, the camp

we most wish

of

the flesh defeats the camp

s victory.

of the spirit at the are raised

for the

Our hopes

to be shattered. And then

paraded

they

are raised again.

very Shakespeare only When Cordelia and Lear are

moment

by

in

triumph as

Edmund's prisoners,
them.

all seems

lost

until

Lear,

no

longer

"old

foolish"

and

(4.7.90), lucidly describes for Cordelia

for If the
world will not allow
i'

the joys that prison

will

will make possible souls

them, they

be free

in prison, singing "like birds

the

cage."

180
...

Interpretation
So
we'll

live,
sing,
and

And pray, At
gilded

and

tell

old

tales,

and

laugh

butterflies,
and who

and

hear

poor rogues
too-

Talk

of court news; and we'll talk with them

Who loses
And take As if

wins;

who's

in,

who's out

upon

's the mystery

of

things,

we were

God's

spies.

(5.3.8-19)

There
throw

need

be

no

tears

for

"sacrifice,"

such a

Lear

says.

"The

gods

themselves

incense"

on

it (5.3.20-21).

Alas,
in
a cell

the world extends

into the

prison too.

Any freedom

for the

soul

found

is

permitted

by
are

the same worldly indifference that

overlooks

it

outside

the cell. Once

they

known, however, God's

not a moment

spies are tolerated nowhere.

Lear

and

Cordelia have
orders

to themselves to savor "the mystery of

still

things."

Edmund

their immediate death. And yet, there is

and

hope. Alba

ny's

inquiries

after

Cordelia

Lear,

lucky

circumstance, kindle a spark in

captured

us that

becomes

a wildfire when our attention

is

by

Edgar's dramatic,

staged return as

the providential champion of divine justice. Edgar defeats Ed

of the spirit triumphs over the

mund, the

camp

triumph provides just enough smoke to allow a

camp of the flesh; and the dagger to be driven into Lear's

but imprisoned, is
as

heart. Shakespeare's trope drawn

of

Lear

and

Cordelia,

reconciled
Jesus'

largely from the Johannine depiction of persecuted by "the world": in it, but not of it (John
love the world, because the love
of the

disciples

hated

and

17: 14-16),

and

of

God is

not

in "the lust

of the

refusing to flesh, the lust

eyes,

and the pride of

life"

(1 John 2: 15-17). In lesser part, the

of the
as

imagery

is

understanding body (soma) When such an understanding is mentioned in Plato's dialogues (e.g., Gorgias 493a), the discussion often turns from the nature of the
also

drawn from the

classical

the prison

or tomb

(sema)

of the soul.

soul to the

likelihood

of

its immortality. In the New

Testament,

personal

immor

tality

and

the possibility of salvation

of the

in the

afterlife are articles of and

faith. Shake

speare's

depiction

deaths

of

Cordelia

Lear, however,

challenges all

accounts of an afterlife.

In

contrast to

its silencing honesty,

even classical under

standings of the soul's

our of

immortality

seem as much a superstitious expression of

and evil as the

desire for

a permanent escape

bodily
It

resurrection and

from suffering final judgment.

the dramatic
classical

Christian story Lear that implies

a

might

be

supposed
manner of

from

development
and

of

King

Shakespeare's in the

blending
plays.

Christian

symbols

critique of paganism's

limitations,

perhaps even

making it

a confessional work

style of the

morality

Shakespeare's

qualified use of the

Platonic mirroring
order the parts of

of macrocosm and microcosm

his "scattered

kingdom"

might

originally in showing Lear's struggle to suggest that the highest spiri

tual aspirations of the ancients were not

illuminated

by

grace.

It

requires Corde-

".
lia's
return

this scattered

kingdom": A

Study

of King Lear

-181

from

the

he for
the

awakens

in her presence,

beyond-land for Lear to recover, and the scene in which cured of his madness, is quite obviously a metaphor
As well, Lear's
movement

spiritual rebirth, perhaps even resurrection.

"spiritual"

play's

axis,

from Gloucester
up"

to

Dover, begins just

"drive toward

as

along he falls
with

asleep.

Shakespeare has Gloucester initiate the

hasty

Dover"

insistent command, "Take up, take (3.6.95), a reference to the famous conversion scene in Augustine's Confessions (VIII. 12) in which a voice saying,
the

"Take

up
up

and read, take

read,"

to pick

the

book

of

up and Paul's epistles for

provides

the final

impetus for Augustine

pagan and

and awaken

from his

dogmatic

slumbers.

Equally compelling
be found in its
crowned with
king"

evidence

an apologetic scene.

interpretation

of the

play

can

most

"pagan"

explicitly

Shakespeare's
himself

portrayal of

wildflowers,

briefly
above

at peace with

and all

Lear, beasts, "every (4.6.86,

and

inch

a
art,"

of and

Arcadia, is

a celebration of

the many respects in which "Nature's

above

in particular,

the conventions of all human society

cured of

107). When Gloucester joins

now

him, recently

his despair

by

Edgar

better

able to

bear his sufferings, the image

seems complete:

Gloucester,

body, and Lear, the purified soul, are brought together and de by Edgar, the godson. Something is lacking, however. The beatitudes of nature cannot be sustained. The flesh smells of (4.6.133); the carnal of "copulation and sinks to "hell, dark (4.6.114); ity everything
the chastened

fended

"mortality"

thrive[s]"

ness,
of

[and]

the sulfurous

pit"

(4.6.128). A human

being
a

is

"ruined

piece"

work,

and a

"natural fool
slips
men

fortune"

of

(4.6.134, 191). Without

dream
of

grace, he is

nothing.

As Lear

into delirium again, this time, find him. One

"Sweet"

bloody

ven

geance, Cordelia's
as the

daughter "who
to"

redeems nature

tellingly describes Cordelia the general from curse/ Which twain have
of the men redemption

brought her

(4.6.206-7).

(4.6.93) is

the cure

for

our

fallen nature, enabling us to bear the worst. When Lear is reunited with Cordelia, reborn in her love,
bearable. But the
cannot
pels

all

things seem
of

worst

is

not yet.

And

an apologetic

interpretation

King
the

Lear

overstep the stumbling block of Shakespeare's shocking

use of

Gos

in

depicting
and

the

deaths

of

Cordelia

and

Lear.

When Lear

returns

from

prison,

howling
"the

claiming

that all who

carrying the murdered Cordelia in his arms, witness it must howl too, the scene is both
horror"

end"

promised

and an

"image

of that

(5.3.268-69). It is the final

episode of

Shakespeare's

macrocosmic

depiction

of

Lear's dying,
Jesus'

and

it is

also

the
of

thing itself,

the murder of a gentle, beloved child and the wrenching grief

symbolism

her father. The

for

the scene is taken from

allows

crucifixion, but

redeems

Shakespeare's theology it: nothing that

no

of the came

cross

no

before,

no matter

Nothing edifying how gracious; nothing to come,

sentiments. most

for there is

more; and nothing in the moment,

concerns and

certainly
a great

not

the

incom

prehension, petty worldly

fearful hopes is

of those who stand

by,

merely

moved

by

the tragedy. The birth of a child

joy

for

a parent,

1 82

Interpretation

but the giving of life is also the giving of suffering and death. It is so by nature, even in Arcadia. Lear reminds Gloucester: "Thou know'st the first time that we
smell the air/ come/

We

wawl and cry.

/ When

we are

bom,
it

we

cry that

we are

To this

fools."

great stage of

Nor is there

an end to

as we crawl toward
Mark"

death. For

Lear, this is all of theology: "I will preach to thee. 83). For Shakespeare, as well: his theology of the cross is based
Mark. In Mark's account, the

(4.6.179-

on the

Gospel

of

"King

of the

Jews"

is

condemned

by

Pilate

and sent

to

be

crucified at

Golgotha

so weakened

his

cross on the

way (15:12-22
"He

[King

by his scourging that he cannot bear James Version]). As he is dying, he is

save"

reviled and mocked:

saved others;
with a

himself he

cannot
.
. .

(15:31). In the

dark hour

of

his death, he "cried

loud voice, saying,

'My God,
his
words

why hast thou forsaken When he gives up the ghost

twain

me?'"

(15:34). Some

misunderstand

my God, (15:35).
rent

with a

loud cry, "the

veil of the temple

[is]

in

from the top to the

and moved

by

such

(15:37-38). A centurion, pitying his death (15:39). omens, says, "Truly this man was the Son of
God"

bottom"

The Gospel then

Jesus'

ends with the

story

of

his

resurrection.

Of the four Gospel

spair of

accounts of the crucifixion, this

is the bleakest. The de for others, in his

earliest)

dying

words almost overshadows the promise,

death

and resurrection.

In

subsequent

Gospels (Mark is last

considered the

the promise eclipses the despair. Matthew repeats

with embellishments.

Mark, for

the most part, but

Luke

Jesus'

changes

words to

have him

joyously

an

ticipate his own resurrection and alters the sequence of events the better to suit
the mood (23:43-46).

John

mentions

ise

of

the resurrection,

not even a

nothing that might detract from the prom darkened sky, and has the dying Jesus reflect
scripture

on the manner

in

which events

have fulfilled

(19:28). The intent

of

such

rewriting

emerges most

explanation of the consequences of the crucifixion:

clearly in the dialectical formulations of Paul's "the preaching of the cross

unto us which are saved

is to them that
God."

perish and

foolishness; but
of

it is the

power

of

Jews

Greeks

who seek wisdom are

called, but they

will perish:

"Because the foolishness

God is

wiser than

men; and the weakness of God

even

is

men"

stronger than

(1 Corinthians 1:18-25). For Shakespeare, however,

not pagan enough.

the

Gospel

of

Mark is

and Edmund die, consuming themselves in their passions scourging desires and pangs of the flesh die, too. The body seems a benign prison for the soul: Lear, imprisoned with Cordelia, is at peace. Perhaps death is a parting of body and soul: Gloucester and Lear have gone

As

Goneril, Regan

and poisons, the

their ways separately. Perhaps it

is,

at

worst, like the

report of

Gloucester's

own

death,
still

a moment of

"conflict
to die

./

Twixt two

extremes of passion,

joy

grief,"

and

allowing

one

"smilingly"

(5.3.201-3). Lear had hoped to "die

of

bravely, like a smug with Cordelia, he hopes

19). An
endless

bridegroom"

(4.6.198). In the lightness

.

his imprisonment
ones"

to "wear out/
a

packs and sects of great

(5.3.17-

singing in

cage, the

easy

immortality

of the soul.

But

Ed-

".
mund's

this scattered

kingdom"-

Study

of King Lear

183
of

death sentence, like Pilate's, is not rescinded. The "burning mortality strike deep into the heart, splitting it in killing Cordelia,
soul's sense of the order of

spits"

killing

the

love (3.6.15; 5.3.22). Lear kills the

save

soldier who

hanged Cordelia, but he

misplaced praise

The

murdered

he is sorely distracted by the receives for saving himself, but not another (5.3.279-82). Cordelia in Lear's arms is a symbol of the greatest anguish a soul
cannot and

her,

he

can experience.

Lear's

soul

is forsaken cry

by

God in the hour "heaven's

of

its death. He howls (5.3.262-64). And

"faint,"

his despair
when

so

loudly

that his

almost cracks

vault"

he

gives

"pass[ing]"

a gentle

those watching imagine his death to be a up "his from "this rough (5.3.317-20). Kent acts the
ghost," world"

part

of the centurion.

He

and

Edgar

speak

"what

[they]
Lear

ought to

say,"

mistaking France
at

"what

[they]

feel"

(5.3.330). Neither the

neither

body
nor

nor the soul goes over to the

beyond-land, however:
There is The image
symbol of
of

Gloucester

crosses to

Dover.

no resurrection.

Lear's death,

horror is far less difficult to behold than the thing itself. The understood as the narrative resolution of Shakespeare's
easily
as spectators concerned

tragedy,

allows us to retreat too

primarily

with

our own aesthetic sensibilities.

Shattering

the narrative,

Cordelia, the woman, not the symbol, and the ing father, leave us no escape. Shakespeare compels
What is more, he

however, the murder of death of Lear, the man, the griev

us to

face death directly.

the

shames those who avert their eyes

by showing
and

jarring
who,

indignity
Lear's

of

their behavior.
of

keening

Cordelia is interrupted

by Kent,

Edgar

Albany,

because they cannot see what is before their eyes, speak to Lear and draw him into the petty affairs of the world to which he is now blind. The news of Ed
mund's
nor are

ments

death is nothing in this moment, but neither is news of Edgar's victory, Albany's trumpeted proclamations, apportioning rewards and punish to friends and enemies in the image of a final judgment that cloaks the death in
an

nature of

illusion

of transcendent

justice (5.3.300-310). With his

eyes set on
all!"

Cordelia, friends

and enemies are alike on

(5.3.274). But Kent insists

being

for Lear: "murderers, traitors recognized. The indecency of his de

sire

to be known

by

his "good
guise as actions

services to

him in his

the goodness of Kent's

not only for who he is but also for his Caius (5.3.272, 288-95), is disgraceful. Though is unquestionable, they are mixed with an intent

master,"

"To be
cannot

acknowledged"

by his

lord

at the right time

(4.7.1-11). Kent's

virtues

be

shaken

that he

would

by baser worldly concerns, but his loyalty to the "fain call (1.4.27-30) is inseparable from an
master" virtue"

"Authority"

aspiration

to "taste/ The wages of

in

of reward and punishment

in

life to

come arise

higher accounting (5.3.308-9). Visions from unseemly longings for

of justice and

recognition and cloud over the

hard truths

injustice, suffering
come no more,/

and

mercy, in life as it is.

Lear turns away

and

looks

again at

Cordelia: 'Thou'lt

Never,

never!"

never, never, never,

(5.3.313-14)

184

Interpretation
and our

All things have their birth

"horrible
"unkindness"

their death.

"slave"

We, too,

are

to nature's
hither."

pleasure,"

There is In the
and

no

enduring in this

"going hence, even as [our] coming (3.2.16-19; 5.2.9-10).

words of a man who served another nature

friendship: "In
"law,"

there's no

well, suffering much for his love blemish but the mind;/ None can be call'd

deform'd but the

powers as

unkind"

(Twelfth

Night,

3.4.363-64).
a

as
not

does Edmund (1.2.1), is

brutish

Taking nature's harshest deformity of the soul and

in is
which men attempt
not more

mind, but it is
to master what

thereby

the most vicious of the ways

is beyond them. Brash

and unqualified vice

unsightly
A free

than the eclipse of virtue

by

vice.

Kent's demand for

recognition reveals a slav

ish

nature

attempting to

master

authority through

good and

loyal

service.

soul, in contrast, loves

not

without calculation of

benefit,

cares

for

others and

graciously,

from fears for itself,

and nurses and comforts the

suffering

despair

of

others

grace, their

in anonymity if need be. If Cordelia is the personification of love and essence is expressed in her first words, spoken to herself in trying
"Love
and

circumstances:

be

silent"

to

Lear's hideous
us

question of

(1.1.62). Silence is the only possible answer his daughters, "Which of you shall we say doth
master

love

most?"

(1.1.51). His desire to

almost

his

own

death deforms his

a pitiful old

soul so

far that love is

killed in it,
and the
mad.

and

he becomes

fool, bitterly
done to him
and

reckoning up the

"faint"

"Sharp-toothed

unkindness[es]"

(1.4.67; 2.4.134)
As
much as about

until

he is

His

penance

is to

crawl to

Dover

have

Cordelia hanged before his

eyes.

learn

any saying can, King Lear forces us to confront the worst, to our imperfect and blemished natures, and to consider the conse for
others.

quences of these things

as

Lear leams the final things

to there are
with

at

Dover,

as much

any

man can.

Along

the

premonitions; and with each

"lie"

Dover, way foresight of the end,

"ague-proof"

strong intimations and each hint that he must

there comes a simple
go the things of

that he is up the lesson about his dealings with

give

(4.6.104-5),
eyes,"

others as man and

.

king. How

the world? "A man may see how

with no

Lear tells Gloucester in

Arcadia (4.6.150-51). What is worldly justice? Is it by the hypocrisy and lies of "scurvy

not rank

injustice,
and

masked

politician[s],"

"justice[s]"

"beadle[s]"

in "Robes
. .

and

furred

gowns"

(4.6.160-72)? A "farmer's

dog barkfing]

at a

beggar

./

[is]

the great image of authority: a

what

dog's/

obeyed

in

office"

(4.6.155-59). Poor

Tom taught Lear

it is to be

body,

soul and mind, alone

Bedlam beggar, writhing in the pains of in the bleakness of the moor. The sight of him was
a
"unbutton"

enough to compel

Lear to

and
body"

offer

him his

clothing.

But

even

before seeing Tom's "uncovered

skies"

exposed

to the

"extremity

of the

(3.4.100-108),
ness and

taste of the storm's

abused the proper

unceasing
of

violence was enough to show

Lear how he had urging

authority

his

office.

Shunning

his

mad

others to take shelter

before him, he

"pray[s]:"

Poor

naked

wretches, wheresoe'er

you

are,

That bide the pelting

of this pitiless

storm,

".
How
shall your

this

scattered

kingdom': A
sides,
you

Study

of King Lear

185

houseless heads

and unfed

Your looped

and windowed raggedness,

defend

From

seasons such as these?

care of

O, I have

ta'en

Too little That

And

this!

Take physic, pomp;

what wretches

Expose thyself to feel

feel,

thou mayst shake the superflux to them

show

the

heavens

more

just.

(3.4.27-36)
grave.

Lear

takes the

lesson

of

kindness to his
asks:

As he

dies,

as

he becomes the
sir"

wretched

"thing

itself,"

he

"Pray

you,

undo this

button. Thank you,

(5.3.315).

Modernity versus Mystery in Flannery Short Story "A View of the

Woods"

O'Connor's

Henry T. Edmondson III

Georgia College
and

State

University'

"Fiction is the

concrete expression of
at

mystery,"

Flannery

O'Connor

wrote who

(1979,
at

p.

144). In arriving

this opinion, she was inspired

by Aquinas,

believed that
the

humanity boundary of the

contrast

is

entangled

spiritual

in this mystery because human beings reside and the material. So situated, humans are com
creatures and of

plex, in

to the

disembodied beings
not

angels.

simplicity of lower embodied At this juncture of the material

that

the

higher

and the

immaterial, human
in relationship
them."

are

"middle

creatures,"

is, they "must be

also

understood

only to what
embodies a

is beneath them but kind

at

to what is above

Humanity,
tenable

then,
of the

of

mystery, because of its

precarious and

barely

position,

standing

the apex of animal

ascends

theological ladder that

to

life, but also occupying the lowest rung God (O'Connor, 1979, p. 144; Aquinas,

I,

qus.

75-89. Also

see

Aristotle, De Anima).
especially her Catholic upbringing, imbued her with a This sense of mystery was reinforced by several The Grammar In of Assent, which appears in her library Newman
suggests that the

O'Connor's faith,

and

deep
of

appreciation

for

mystery.

her favorite

writers.

collection, John

Henry

overlap

of

human life
and so

and

divine life is impossible for the human

be
accepted as a

mind to comprehend

fully
be

it

must

mystery;

what cannot

be

understood must

met with

faith

and

devotion. "The
heaven,"

pure and

indivisible Light is

seen

tants of
of

Newman argues, but "here

supplies."

we

only have
.
.

by
.

the blessed

inhabi

such

faint
not

reflections

it

as

its diffraction
of

Although these

reflections

may

satisfy
and

the

demands
the

human reason,

"they

are sufficient

for faith

devotion"

and

though

human

mind

may try
a

to wrench a more rational explanation

from them, "you

mathema

gain

nothing but a O'Connor owned

mystery"

(Newman,

pp.

116-17).
and there the

copy

of

Pascal's Pensees,

French

tician and

philosopher offers a

mystery man beings "are blown to

I
and

of

human
fro."

existence and

different but complementary perspective on the its attendant uncertainty. He observes that hu

floating
Just

in

a medium of vast extent, always

drifting

uncertainly,

when we

identify

"fixed

point

to which we can

cling

am grateful to

Professor John Desmond for

helping

me

to understand this short

Condition,"

Fund Colloquium entitled, "Liberty, Responsibility, and the Human 9-12, 2000, Mulberry Inn, Savannah, GA, although he may not agree with the drawn.

Liberty

story at a November

conclusions

1 have

interpretation, Winter

2001-2, Vol. 29, No. 2

188

Interpretation

and make

fast, it
to

shifts and

leaves

behind."

us

Should
us"

we pursue

it,

"it eludes

our

grasp, slips away, and flees eternally before

(Pascal, No. 72).

can explain

According
tery.

O'Connor,
which

not even

Thomas Aquinas

away

mys

Perhaps it is better
beyond
warned

said

especially St. Thomas, because he

reason nor even revelation

recognizes can

the

boundary
O'Connor

neither

penetrate you

her friend Cecil Dawkins, "I don't

but don't
read

want to

discourage
"prayer"

from reading St. Thomas, clear anything up for

p.

him

with she

the notion that he is offered, was

going to

you."

Her best solution,

(1979,

308). She

counseled a

Emory University, "Mystery

grows

knowledge"

along is
one

with

young isn't something that is gradually evaporating. It (1979, p. 489). The more one knows, the more
and cannot

student who wrote

her

after

her

appearance at

he

realizes what

he does

not

know.
a

Thus,
sense,

a mature view of more

the

world

in

which the mysterious

becomes, in

mysterious, not

less,

and

those elements of life shrouded in mystery become darker still. the novelist Walker

Think
voca

ing
tion
and

of

O'Connor,

Percy

observed, "If the scientist's

the novelist's aim is to

is to clarify

and

simplify, it
p.

would seem that

muddy
that

complicate"

(1954,

108). In his

Confessions, St.

Augustine

admitted

only

by

faith

could

he find intellectual

satisfaction

in the face

of the

inscrutabil human
wont to

ity

of

human

suffering.

At first the theological

to the

explanations

for

such

strangely"

conundrums were
me."

"sounding
once

point

that

they "were

offend

But,

he

acknowledged and see

"the depth

mysteries"

of the of religious

he

was

credence"

able to submit to

their authority
p.

them as

"worthy

(Augustine, 1952, For O'Connor,

for this mystery
ers who are

90). fiction is to

the purpose of

help

the reader cultivate respect

of

human life. She

"regional"

once explained the

and

difference between

writ

the podium

merely from which to

writer

writers,
address

those who use their surroundings as

themes of universal importance. She wrote,

a

"The Southern

his

vision goes no
.

has certainly been provided with farther than these materials, then he
.

variety of riches, but if would have been as well

don't
p.

off without them. element of

Those

people

become

regional writers who

hand"

reveal

any
the

mystery in the rich material they have at O'Connor admitted, though, just how difficult it

(1957,

3).

was

for her to

articulate

theological sense of
more appreciation

mystery in discourse, and this admission gives the reader for why she would resort to fiction as the best means of
She
once apologized

depicting
able

mystery.

to

Mary at
was
can

Lee that

she

had

not

been

to respond

adequately in

correspondence to a point of

theological debate:
and cliche-ridden.
approach"

"You

are of course

It

always will
p.

be. These

entirely right that the reply are mysteries that I

inadequate
in
no

way

(Lee,

1976,
nor

57).
to the fiction writer is especially pressing

The

challenge

because,
made

as

O'Con

noted, the modem world

is "a

generation that

has been

to feel that the mystery,

aim of

learning
can

is to

mystery."

eliminate
disturbing,"

For

readers

loath to

confront will

"fiction

be very

because

a writer

like O'Connor

be

looking

Modernity
for every opportunity to
"the
the
concrete world of sense material to place upon
"irresistible"

versus

Mystery

in

Flannery O 'Connor

1 89

present

experience"

mystery through the matter of everyday life, (1969, pp. 124-25). In searching for

best

her

rural poor

because

literary palette, she found writing about the the "mystery of existence is always showing
lives"

through the texture of their

ordinary
make

(1969,
it
more

p.

132).
one to appreciate

She

explained that education

this existential

may mystery, apparently because the everyday life,

difficult for

overeducated mind

is impatient She said,

with the mundane character of

finding

it

commonplace. not

'The type
cated

of mind that can understand good

is at all

fiction is

mind, but it

times the kind of mind that

necessarily the edu is willing to have its sense

of

mystery deepened

by

contact with
p.

reality, and its sense of reality deepened

she spoke of
part of

by
of

mystery"

contact with

(1969,

79). Elsewhere is divided

"those depths

mystery

which the modem world

while another part

about

mystery

tries to rediscover

it trying to eliminate it in disciplines less personally

centuries

religion"

demanding
view

than

(p. 145). She argued, "For nearly two

generation

the

popular spirit of each

succeeding

has tended fall before

more and more

to the

that the mysteries of life will eventually

endeavored to use

man"

the mind of

(p.

158). O'Connor

literature to

urge the reader toward the mys of

tery

that lies behind the

even

everyday facts

and events

life,

the mystery that

writer presents

inheres

in

custom and prejudice.

She admitted, 'The fiction

mystery through manners, grace through nature, but when he finishes there al ways has to be left over that sense of Mystery which cannot be accounted for

by

any human

formula"

(p. 153). Even Catholics,

mystery"

she admitted,
any.

given to the

Instant

Answer."

But "[fjiction doesn't have

"are very much It leaves us

.

with a renewed sense of

(1969,

p.

184).

In her

short

mystery is an inexpugnable part of the human condition, and it is most acutely felt in the face of human suffering. If one should attempt to eradicate human suffering without
est warnings.
admonishes the reader that

story "A View of the Through the story, she

Woods"

O'Connor

offers one of

her harsh

some thoughtful respect quences

for the mystery

with which

it is shrouded, the

conse

reader to

to may be more tragic than the suffering itself. In addition face the mystery of human suffering, "A View of the

forcing

the
also

Woods"

prediction mystery of human nature that makes the angelic and and control of human behavior so difficult, given the conflicting bestial elements of man's internal makeup. Most importantly, through an in

exposes the reader to the

triguing

use of

metaphor, O'Connor argues

nature and

to the mystery of human

the mysterious

in this story that the proper response suffering is recourse to another mystery
view

redemptive work of

Christ.
that evil

Finally, in keeping
this

with the

Thomistic

is the

absence of

good,

story

suggests

that when one is faced with

life's mystery, if

rashness re

places

proper

consideration, such injudicious conduct can create the vacuum

into
this

which evil
element

of

Jacques Maritain is especially helpful in explaining the teaching of St. Thomas and, by implication, how it might be may
rush.

190

Interpretation

illustrated

by

O'Connor's

story.

More specifically, Maritain

shows

how human

thoughtlessness first creates the vacuum that is tain

filled later

with evil action.

Mari
of

further

suggests that the neglect of proper moral consideration

and as such

is

kind

"nothingness,"

is

dimension

of the moral nihilism so characteristic

of the modem age.

O'Connor told
she sent the

friend that

upon the completion of which

"A View

of the

Woods,"

story to Harper's Bazaar

previously had

published other of

her

stories.

Referring

to the women who would read the magazine at the

beauty
other
p.

parlor, she cautioned, "it may be a little grim

for the dryer

set"

set."

On the

hand,
while

she

concluded, those ladies are "a pretty grim

warned graduate cheer

themselves

(1979,
for

175). She

her friends
school, "I
not

Sally
very

and

Robert Fitzgerald,

with whom she of mine

lived
your

in

enclose

little morality play

Christmas it

but it is

cheerful, I'd advise you to leave off

reading

season"

until after the

(p. 186).

THE STORY

This is

Mary
ther,
the
she

Fortune.
also

story of an old man, Mr. Fortune, and his granddaughter, Mary Fortune's father, Pitts, who is son-in-law to the grandfa plays an important role as a foil to his father-in-law. The elements of
a tragic
mundane as

story are as fashions out

those of any

of this

ordinary

material one of

story that O'Connor has written, but her most artistic and philosophi

cally unsettling short stories. As the story opens, a backhoe is clearing an area of rural pasture; throughout the story, O'Connor describes the machinery in baleful language. Mary Fortune
sits on the
gorge

hood

of

her

grandfather's car

watching "the

big
p.

disembodied

gullet

itself

on the

clay, then with the sound of a

deep

sustained nausea and a

slow mechanical ground are a

revulsion, turn and spit it

and

out"

(1988,

525). In the back

lake

"a black line

of woods which appeared at

both

ends of

the view to walk across the water and continue

along

the edge of the

fields"

(p.

525). This description like

miracle of

of

the woods appearing to perform the miraculous Christ

walking

upon water

symbolism,
at the end.

a symbol that will

is an early hint that the woods be developed throughout the story,

possess

divine

and

especially

Fortune has

no respect

for

anyone

in the

family

except

his

granddaughter. and

His daughter, Mary's mother, "had married an idiot named Pitts seven children, all likewise idiots except the youngest, Mary

had had

Fortune."

The fam

ily lives on the larly reminding

parcel of

grandfather's

them that

land, and he uses the land to control them, regu it is his, and occasionally vexing them by selling a
reduced

it to

outsiders.

He has

his

eight-hundred-acre tract

by selling
Pitt's

"five twenty-acre lots

on the

back

of the place and

every time he

sold one,
as

blood

pressure

had

points"

gone

up twenty

but only

because,

the old man

Modernity
explained to
with the was
future"

versus

Mystery

in

Flannery

O'Connor

-191

his granddaughter, her father "would let a cow pasture interfere (p. 528). The grandfather always had thought that Mary Fortune
than the
rest of

like him

rather

her family, heads

on

who

"are the kind that

would

let

a cow pasture or a mule

lot

or a row of
me with
cow"

beans interfere

with progress";

but, he

adds, "People like you and

their shoulders know you can't

stop the marcher What the old

on

time

for

(p. 528).

man cannot control are the regular and

beatings that Pitts inflicts

pounded

his daughter: "Time

again, Mr. Fortune's heart had

.
.

to see him
with no

rise

and abruptly, for no reason, slowly from his place at the table explanation, jerk his head at Mary Fortune and say, 'Come with

me.'"

A look that

was

man could not

completely foreign to the child's face define the look but it infuriated him. It

would appear on

it. The

old

was a

look that

was part

ter

ror and part respect and part

something else, something very like

cooperation.

(P.

530)

Mary's father
frustrated
mine

would

then take her in his truck

out of earshot and

beat her. In
who

this lies his revenge upon, and his

as as

only

control

of, his father-in-law,

feels
me."

if he himself
and

were

doing

the beating. Pitts

defiantly

tells

Fortune,
father

"She's

Mary

whip Fortune, for her

and

to

I'll whip her every

her

day

of the year

if it

suits

part, will never admit to her grandfather that her

she reflects grandfather's
obdurate pride.

beats her

in this

When he

demands to know why she retorts that "'nobody beat

submits to the abuse, she

denies the

obvious and

beat

She also ominously predicts, "'Nobody's ever (p. 530). life and if in my anybody did, I'd kill In this familial duel between grandfather and son-in-law, the elder plans a
him'"

me.'"

me

new move sure

to grieve the younger. Whereas previously it was

only land to
to

the rear of the tract that had been sold, Fortune

sell
a parcel

is

about

to

close negotiations

to

Tilman,
of the

local

storeowner who will

construct a gas station

directly
the few

in front

family
and

home. To the family, this two-hundred-foot it

provides a

stretch of

field is "the
cows.

lawn,"

play

area and a

grazing field for

family

Most importantly, it
plans

allows a view of
use

the woods across

the highway. Even though Fortune

account and

to

the proceeds to build a bank

for his granddaughter,

she

fiercely

objects when on

he divulges his plans,

view

he finds incomprehensible her insistence

retaining "a

of

the

woods."

road,"

"We

won't

be

able

to see the

woods across

the

she said.
road?"

"The "We "The

"The

old man stared at won't

her. "The

woods across she said.

the

he

repeated.

be

view,"

able

to see the

view?"

he

repeated.

woods,"

she

said; "we

won't

be

able

to see the

woods

from the

porch.

(P.

532)

192
The
"Do
fire."

Interpretation
old man
you

fumes

at

her

senseless objections

and, referring to her

father,

asks,

calves?

think I give a damn hoot where that fool grazes his

Mary

Fortune portentously warns, "He who calls his brother a fool is subject to hell Fortune retaliates with a reminder of her meek acquiescence in her fre
quent whippings.

She retorts, "'He

nor

measuring off each word in a deadly (pp. 532-33). me and if anybody did, I'd kill
him'"

nobody else has ever touched flat tone. 'Nobody's ever put a hand

me,'

on

Shortly thereafter, at the dinner table, Fortune alarms ing his plans, and Pitts makes it an occasion to abuse
"had
and

the

family by
at

announc again.

his daughter

He

stopped

eating

and was

said, '"You done this to

granddaughter

staring in front of As the old man

us.'"

him."

He looked his

Mary Fortune
take
con

watches

son-in-law
sick."

his

away, her
not

submission

"made him physically

response

He

demns his daughter for

intervening, in
excuses

to which she indicts him

an old man with a

for

the same passivity.

"

But he

himself with, '"I'm

heart

condition'

(pp. 533-34).

Fortune's relationship with his granddaughter begins to degenerate in ways that he does not understand and that he cannot control. During a trip to see

Tilman,

the

prospective

buyer

of the

front lot, Fortune instructs his

granddaugh

ter to wait in the car, but she leaves the porch,

him

and walks

back home. He finds her

she
not

on

looking
I

out across

the yard, and asks

a slow emphatic
alone.'"

why

left.

"

T toljer I

was

went,'

going

and

she said

in

voice,

now you can go on and

lemme

Fortune hears

looking at him, 'and something "very final, in

their
disputes."

the sound of

this,

a tone that
at

had

not come

up before in

As

she

speaks,

Mary

is gazing

the skyline, and

by describing Mary's
black

gaze

in this fringed distant

manner, O'Connor
moral on

means

to focus the reader's attention on the story's unfolding

at

drama.

Mary

sits

"staring

the sullen line of

pine woods

top

with green.

Behind that line

was a narrow gray-blue

line

of more

beyond that nothing but the sky, entirely blank except for one or two threadbare O'Connor explains that Mary Fortune "looked into this
woods and
clouds."

scene as
suggests

if it

were a person

that she preferred to

him,"

and

by

this the author

more

symbolically her

grandfather

has threatened something

not a

sacred

than their relationship, in spite of her obvious affection for him. But Mr. Fortune
cannot comprehend what
woods,'"

troubles Mary: "There's

thing

over there

but

the

he

protests

(pp. 535-37).

Fortune,"

That evening at dinner, "nobody addressed a word to him, including Mary and he spends the remainder of the evening alone in his room again,
to himself his plans. He reasons,
gas.

justifying
do
would

'They
of

would not all

have to
would

go

any
gas

distance for

Anytime they
out
more

needed a

loaf

bread,

they

have to

be step

their front door into Tilman's back

door."

Tilman's

station would
future"

bring

traffic,

more stores.

Selling

the lot would "insure the

(pp. 538-39).
and

The next morning brings no improvement in Mary Fortune's mood, disposition is reflected in the weather: The sky "was an unpleasant gray

her

and the

Modernity
sun

versus

Mystery

in

Flannery
it

O'Connor
on the

193
front

had

not

troubled to come

out"

(p. 540). Fortune finds

was
able

Mary
to

porch

again, gazing

straight ahead, and once again,

"apparent that this

entice

morning
that this

she preferred the sight of

the

woods."

He is
so

her into

town to visit the boat store, but once

there,

she

is

despondent

and

indifferent
be acting

Fortune "could way

not

believe that

a child of

her intelligence

could

over the mere sale of a

field."

The

offer of an

ice

cream cone elicits

store.

no more

interest,
The

nor

does

a subsidized visit to the

ten-cent

She

finally
into
a

responds to

his queries,

again

insisting,
so

'"We

won't

be

able to see the woods

more.'"

any nearby
office

old man

is

irked

with

her

attitude that
estate

he

storms

to have a deed drawn up for the real

transaction. At this

point, O'Connor uses the weather yet again, this time to warn the reader of

impending
tide

disaster: "The sky had darkened also in the air, the kind felt when a tornado is

and

there was a hot sluggish

possible"

(p. 541). As the

pair

are en route to close the

deal

with

Fortune
drawn,"

also transmits a and

"he

might

warning of have been chauffeuring

emphasis added).

Tilman, O'Connor's description of Mary imminent calamity. She has become "with
a small

dead

body

for

all the

answer

he

got"

(p.

542,

At the

precise moment

that Fortune and Tilman shake hands over the sale,

a

Mary
and

Fortune

goes

berserk. She hurls She is

bottle

at

Tilman that he

barely
her

avoids

begins to
her

wreck the store.

within

"screaming something
Fortune

unintelligible and when

throwing everything
caught
and

her

reach."

finally

subdues

"he

by

the tail of

her dress
and silent

and pulled

her backward into the

car.

store"

out of the

then lifts her

whimpering"

"wheezing
minutes

He drives down the

a

highway
in the
child of

for five
his

in

seat"

comer of the

and

is

fury and Mary "snuffling and

so

Fortune is "rolled into He is him

ball

heaving."

stunned that a so severely.

relation would

behave

He

concludes that

he has been

overindulgent.
her"

violently "He
and

and embarrass
saw

that the time had come,

reaches

that he could no longer avoid whipping

so, when he

his

own

property, he turns off

spot where

a side path and

drives down into the

her."

woods to

"the

exact

he had

seen

Pitts take his belt to

It is
red

a widened place

in the

clay

road where a car could

turn around, "an ugly

bald

spot surrounded

by

long

thin pines that appeared to be gathered there to witness anything that would
clearing"

take place in such a

(pp. 543-44).

Only
a

at

this

point

does the

adolescent realize

why they have

distorted

stopped:

"Where

few

seconds
now

before her face had been

red and

and

unorganized, it
positiveness, a

drained

of

every

vague
past

line

until

nothing

was

left

on

it but
beat

certainty

look that
peats

went

slowly

determination

and reached

She then
she

re

said, her warning to her grandfather, '"Nobody (p. 544). Fortune warns her not to give 'and if anybody tries it, I'll kill but his "knees felt very unsteady, as if they might turn either him "no
ever
him'"
sass,"

has

me,'

backward
"'Don't'

forward."

or

Mary
he

responds

by instructing
high

him to

remove

his

glasses.

orders!'

give me ankles with

said

in

voice and slapped

awkwardly

at

her

his

belt"

(p. 544).

194

Interpretation
gesture unleashes a violent

The

fury

in

Mary

Fortune for
girl

which the

incident

in Tilman's
so

store

had been only

an omen.

The young
which
of

is

over

her

grandfather
whether of

quickly "that he could not have recalled weight of her whole solid body or the jabs
on

blow he felt
or the

first,

the

her feet

pummeling
one child

her

fist

his

chest.

...

It

was as

if he

were

being

attacked not

by

but

by

a pack of small
fists"

demons

all with stout

brown

school shoes and small rocklike

(pp. 544-45).
she pauses

When

advantage.

Now

on and

in her assault, Fortune finds the opportunity to grab the top and looking down at her with her neck in his hands, "he
brought it down
more."

lifted her head

once

hard

against

[a]

rock.

Then he

brought it down twice

Then
him

looking

into the face in

which the
...

eyes, slowly rolling

back,

appeared

to pay

not

the slightest attention.

(p.

545)
he
an said

"This
with

ought to teach you a good

lesson,'

in

a voice that was edged

doubt"

(p. 546). He

stands

up but feels

"enlargement

of

his

heart,"

and

he falls

again as

"his heart

motion."

expanded once more with a convulsive

He

begins to imagine that he is moving through the woods toward the lake, and even, in his fantasy, "perceived that there would be a little opening there, a little place where he could escape and leave the woods behind (p. 546).
him"

On both files that

around

sides of

him he

saw

that the gaunt trees

water and

had thickened into

mysterious

dark

marching across the desperately for someone to

were

help

away into the distance. He looked him but the place was deserted except for
as

one

huge

yellow monster which sat

to the side,

stationary

as

he was, gorging it

self on clay.

(P.

546)

MYSTERY AND EVIL

There is
Woods"

a similar

despair that

attends to the conclusion of

"A View

of the
neither

and

O'Connor's

stories. story offers even On the contrary, the denouement is darker, more tragic. Although in many of her stories, she often uses evil to set the stage for the introduction of grace, in these two stories the extent of evil leaves less room for the operation of grace. It is as if the evil is more extensive in these stories than others. "The Lame

disquieting story "The Lame Shall Enter First": the muted hope one finds in others of O'Connor's short

Shall Enter
offers an

First"

is

a pungent

literary

account of the phenomenon of evil;

Aquinas'

it

especially clear illustration of St. Thomas teaching on evil as a deprivation and distortion of good. "A View of the also suggests the Thomistic teaching on evil, and in this case Jacques Maritain 's published lecture Saint Thomas and the Problem of Evil is especially helpful in underWoods"

Modernity
standing O'Connor's
the

versus

Mystery

in

Flannery
is
a

O'Connor

195

reliance upon

Thomas. Maritain begins

of evil: evil

by acknowledging
defect
of

starting

point of

the

Thomistic doctrine

good,

not

entity of its own. In this instance, though, Maritain explains that this defect can be a voluntary and free defect, the consequence of an individual's "free and this becomes the "root of that will come to full fruition
a separate
choice" evil"

in

later activity (Maritain, p. 23). One must, St. Thomas explains, consider a certain defect in the will, a certain deficiency prior to the
one's
choice which

"lpreact

of

is

itself

deficient.'

"

Maritain

offers a gloss on

Thomas's passage,
acting, to consider

explaining that the

"defect"

occurs when one

fails, before

the principle, or rule, proper to the moral question at hand and so the evil arises

from the failure properly

24-25).

to

apply

moral evaluation to the

dilemma

at

hand (pp.

Accordingly, the freedom

source of evil.
cise

of one's

will

becomes, in

a perverse

way, the

The

exercise of that

will,
a

or more

accurately, the failure to exer

use of the will that

the will in proper consideration, is

defective

has

as

its

consequence evil action

and of

because

one

does

not make use of

"the

rule of reason

divine

law"

According
principles

to

before taking important Maritain, an individual is

and

far-reaching

moral action.

not required always

to hold moral

consciously before him any more than a carpenter must carry a ruler with him at all times; rather, what is required is that when it comes time to act, or cut as in the case of the carpenter, then attention must be given to the princi
of the soul

ple, or ruler, that should guide such action. As he explains, "What is required

is

not that

it

should always

look to the

rule or

have the
at

ruler con

stantly in hand, but that it should produce its (Maritain, p. 27). St. Thomas elaborates,

act while

looking

the

rule"

Thus the

craftsman
cut

does
in

not err

in

not always
ruler.

having

his

ruler

in hand but in

pro

ceeding to
not

the wood without his

act

The faultiness

of will

does

not consist

in

paying

attention

to the

rule of reason or of

divine law, but in this:

that

without

taking heed

of the rule

it

proceeds to the act of choice.

(Maritain,

pp.

27-28)
As
the
a consequence of

this

defect,

the

neglect of proper and

due consideration,

individual
have"

acts without the guidance of either reason or act of

divine law

as

he

"proceeds to the
it
would
Maritain'

choice,
p.

which

is consequently deprived

of the rectitude

(Maritain,
and

29).

s analysis suggests that the evil act that occurs

in

the simultaneous
roots

deaths

of

Mr. Fortune

Mary

is

an act that

Mr. Fortune's

headstrong

attempt

may have had its to manipulate his extended

have
guided

earlier, in
without

family

proper consideration of the principles that should

tions. It was clear on the afternoon prior to the violent

final

day

his weighty ac that Mr. Fortune

than hesitate

did

not understand

the situation of which

he

was a part;

yet,

rather

until

he had the

confidence

that a clearer

grasp

of the relevant principles might

1 96

Interpretation
pushed ahead with a

have supplied, he

decision fraught

with grim

implications

for his family.

That afternoon, Fortune
to look "out the
wouldn't
not a retires

to his room to
'lawn'

rest

but he

arises several

times

window across

the

to the line of woods

sees

[Mary]

said

they

woods"

nothing but ordinary "woods mountain, not a waterfall, not any kind of planted bush or flower, just (O'Connor, 1988, p. 538). Yet his bewilderment, rather than giving him be
more."

able

to see

any

But he

pause, stiffens his resolve to sell, with the vague plan that he can compensate

Mary
seems
as

Fortune

"by buying

her

something"

he does
to

not understand. come

The third time he

(p. 538). He is clearly troubled that gets up to look at the woods, he

the closest to

grasping

the moral dimensions of

more

his circumstance,

he perceives, however incompletely, something

than a line of trees.

The

old man stared

out of

of an

for some time, as if for a prolonged instant he were caught up everything that led to the future and were held there in the midst uncomfortable mystery that he had not apprehended before. (P. 538, emphasis
the
rattle of

added)

This

"glimpse"

something vital though unknown, and for this reason he should have hesitated; but he ignores even this partial revela tion, making him all the more culpable for his later willful behavior and its
horrific
consequence.

suggests the existence of

Maritain
has

elaborates upon

nor reader the means vidual

made

by

which to

St. Thomas's principle, thereby offering the O'Con judge Mr. Fortune's behavior. Once the indi

the willful choice not to

identify

and

means there now exists an

produce evil

"absence

good,"

of

that while
choice

apply the rule, his choice not evil in itself, will bears
all the character as

if left

uncorrected. and not

This

"voluntary"

istics

of

Thomistic evil,

coincidentally

of nihilism as

well,

it

is

a certain

nothingness, the nothingness

of

the consideration of the rule,

it is

a certain
a

nothingness

introduced

by

the creature at the start of his action; it is

root proper of evil action.

a mere

absence,

mere nothingness,

but it is the

(Maritain,

pp.

29-31)

Mr. Fortune's behavior, to

nothingness."

use

Maritain's words, bears "in itself the teeth-marks

of

The

conclusion to
an

Maritain's
apt

explanation of this
of

dimension

of

Thomistic
"Here
we

evil

seems

have traced

evil to

equally its innermost

characterization

Fortune's behavior:

hiding-place"

(pp. 33-35).

By
more

the time Mr.

Fortune takes

Mary

to the woods to beat

her, he has lost

is crum he has accordingly lost his self-confidence. When he announces to his granddaughter, "Now I'm going to whip O'Connor describes his voice
philosophical world view

than his control over

and

Mary

Fortune. His

bling,
as

you,"

"extra

loud"

but

"hollow"

(p. 544). But

by

this time

it

is too late to

regain

Modernity
the secure

versus

Mystery
supply,

in

Flannery

O'Connor

197

ward, devoid
of

grounding that of divine or

wisdom can

and so

reasonable guidance and upon

he blusters his way for propelled only by the force

granddaughter.

his

will which

he vainly tries to impose

his doomed

O'CONNOR ON THE MYSTERY OF SUFFERING

His
and

granddaughter's

because mystery
it

she submits to
of

suffering maddens Fortune because he cannot control it it. O'Connor implies that Fortune fails to appreciate
with

the

suffering

its inexplicable

and uncontrollable nature.

He

regards

quickly and forcibly, rather than as a com plex and difficult forethought before action. After one of her mystery requiring beatings, he wonders to himself,
solved

as a problem to

be

What

was the matter with

her that

she couldn't stand

this one flaw in

was an

her

character when

up to Pitts? Why was there he had trained her so well in everything else. It
added)

ugly

mystery.

(P.

536,

emphasis

O'Connor
her writing
ous"

offers a correction

to

Fortune's

attitude

toward suffering, both

by

by her life. She was, of course, well acquainted with "mysteri suffering because of the enigmatic disease of lupus she inherited from her father that took her own life prematurely at the age of thirty-nine. The late Sally
and

Fitzgerald reported, "When

under the

she came

hard

constraint of

home to Georgia for good, it was of course disseminated lupus erythematosus, a dangerous [au
of metabolical origin

toimmune

deficiency] disease
drugs

incurable but its

controllable

by
an

steroid

which exhausts the energies of

life"

victims and necessitates

(O'Connor, 1979, p. xvi). Some of extremely careful and restricted O'Connor's friends were slow to realize the seriousness of her illness because
O'Connor
wrote either understated

it

or treated

it

with

humor. From Rome, Italy,

she

her friends the Cheneys regarding the

agreed, "Have
endured.

pilgrimage

to which she had reluc the last

of

tantly

Cheers,

Flannery"

(O'Connor, 1958). In

year of

her life, Brainard

which you

Cheney

wrote, "I
p.

somehow can't realize the

degree

hazard in
whom

live!"

(Stephens,

188). A fellow lupus

reports

sufferer with
was

O'Connor corresponded, DeVene Harrold,

appreciative

that

O'Connor

wryly

that if one must suffer a fatal

disease,

the more mysterious

the ailment, the better. Harrold reports, "We had

chats about

lengthy
She

letters

and

lengthy

lupus.

They

were

factual

and matter-of-fact.

was of

the opinion

that it was a fine

ailment

to have
n.d.).

if

you

HAD to have

one

simply because

it

mystery."

was a

(Harrold,

Another

of

her

stories sheds

light
a

on

O'Connor's

view

of tragic suffering:

"Good

People"

Country
of a

involves

fering

lost leg. Even worse,

she suffers

young woman, Joy, who lives with the suf from a weak heart, and the doctors
with the

had told her mother, Mrs.

Hopewell, "that

best

of

care, her daughter

198

Interpretation
forty-five."

Joy
it

might see

not

for her

physical

Joy, who limitations,

calls

herself Hulga, had

be
...

made

it

clear were

she would

at a

people who

knew

what she was

people"

good

country O'Connor

talking (O'Connor, 1988,

Hulga'

about,
p.

university far from these

"lecturing
red

to

hills

and

268).
which
render

suggests that

encouraged

by

her overeducation,

rejects

suffering became the pretext by the idea that tragedy can

would never

she,

life

richer and more meaningful.

Hulga

have imagined that

one might

experience

joy

and

suffering

simultaneously.

Hence,
writes

the symbolism inherent

in

her

"Joy,"

given name

a name she rejects

in favor

of

O'Connor, in
527).

the penultimate year of

her life,

her ugly creation, Hulga. to her friend Janet McKane,

way"

"Perhaps however

joy

is the

outgrowth of

suffering in

a special

(1979,

p.

Joy

may be the

result of

embracing

one's

suffering, but such an experience

requires one to choose the transcendent over the material.

"We

all prefer comfort

to

joy,"

O'Connor

once observed

(1979,

p.

926).
suffering,
although

By

this time, the writer was

intimately

acquainted with

it

never stole

her humor.

stayed and

[at

Emory Hospital]
technician,

month, giving generous

samples of

that

the other

all

hours

of the

day

and

night, but

now

my blood to this, I am at home

verse and

receiving any more awful cards that say to a dear sick friend, in what's worse. Now I shoot myself with ACTH oncet daily and look very well do nothing that I can get out of doing. (1979, p. 24)
again and not

The ACTH treatments

were a

blunt instrument to

alleviate

the

suffering

of

lu

pus, but she once admitted, "The large doses of ACTH send you off in a rocket

scarcely less disagreeable than the disease (1979, p. 26). She never failed, though, to find redemptive merit in her pain. She wrote to fellow writer Robert Lowell, "I am making out fine in spite of any conflicting stories. I have
and are
.

enough

energy

to write with and as that

is

all

can with one eye squinted take you come to observe more

it

all as a

I have any business doing anyhow, blessing. What you have to measure
myself"

out,

closely, or so I tell

(1979,

p. xvi).

One

of the most poignant and

insightful
who came

portraits of

was written

by Richard Gilman,

O'Connor's suffering to Milledgeville to interview the

O'Connor's
collection of es writer

New York Review of Books says, Mystery and Manners. Gilman was
author
a

for

piece on

apprehensive about

meeting the
"she

because he knew that

pled and

by

that time (four years

before her

death)

was

crip

that the disease had distorted her

past

face."

He admitted, "I found

myself

glancing wanting
was

yet to see
at

her face, averting my eyes when she moved laboriously about, not But then, Gilman explained, "something broke and I
her."

looking

her,

at

her face, twisted to

and at

one
and

side,

at

her

stiff and somewhat

puffy hands

and

arms,

her thinning

lusterless

hair."

In

a remarkable

observation that articulates even as

O'Connor's

own vision

he

resisted

"an

occasional spasm of

for suffering, he admits that her appearance was abpity,

...

Modernity
sorbed

versus

Mysten-

in

Flannery O'Connor
lightly
or

199

for

me

into her

presence and

I don't

use

the word

transfigured

by

it."

He wrote,

"Tough-minded, laconic,
she made me and

with a marvelous wit and an absolute

as never

absence of

self-pity,

understand,

before

since,

what

spiritual

heroism

beauty
met

be"

can

(pp. 53-54).
she was
"amazing,"

Walker
and

Percy

only

O'Connor once, but he thought

that

he

seemed to perceive the connection

work.

it lent to her

He
an

noted

between her suffering and the richness during the entirety of her short publishing
as the age of

career, she was

dying

untimely death. As early

had been hospitalized in Atlanta

with a major attack of the same

twenty-five, she intractable

was a

disease that had taken her father. The

she

occasion of their

delivered
"her face

at

Loyola in New Orleans.

lupus.
strange." .

Percy

meeting recalls, "I could

lecture
chin"

recognize the

symptoms of advanced
and

She had lost

most of

the tissue of her

was

very

trance.

going into this lecture hall, and she came in from a side en her from the university and helped her. She had crutches Somebody and they helped her to the podium, where she sort of hung on and delivered a up lecture. Then she answered questions and was just extraordinary. stunning
remember we were was with
. .

(Percy, 1993, O'Connor

pp.

205-6)
in
a

once commented on the subject of suicide

letter to her intimate

a

correspondent

Betty

Hester. She said,

"My

Mother

said

to [the wife of

suicide]
thing."

that she didn't see how anybody with any faith in God could do such

O'Connor
know

concluded

insightfully, "His tragedy

his
suffering"

was

suppose a

that he didn't

what to

do

with

(1979,

p.

287). (This is

tragically ironic
after

excerpt given that nor's

Hester herself

committed suicide

in 1998,

long

O'Con

Indeed, O'Connor was quick to express gratitude for her illness because it made her life more meaningful. She explained, "In a sense sickness
is
a

death.).

place,

more

instructive than
company,

long trip

to

Europe,

and

it's

always a place
a

where there's no

follow."

where

nobody

can

She added, in

startling
who

observation, that illness is an opportunity to experience the mercy of God. She added, "Sickness before death is
a

very

appropriate

thing
p.

and

I think those

don't have it in

miss one of

God's

mercies"

(1979,

163). Such

an attitude

is

remarkable given the extent of

postscript
a

O'Connor's suffering;

she once added a poignant

requested.

letter to

another
p.

friend, Louise

Abbot: "Prayers

am

sick of

being

sick"

(1988,

1210).

For many, though, the temptation to nihilistic or existentialist skepticism is strongest when one looks in the mysterious face of suffering. This was the rock
on which the

brilliant

rhetorician

Augustine

of

Hippo foundered for

years.

He

Manichean remedy that God and the Devil are coequal oppo nents; human suffering occurs when the fight tilts toward the latter. After St. Augustine concluded that the Manichean solution was simplistic, he converted
embraced the

first

to

Christianity, accepting

the

Judeo-Christian doctrine

that

human suffering

can

200
never

Interpretation
be

fully

understood

but

should

lead to

an

increasingly

greater

dependence

upon

God,

not a rejection of

his

existence nor a resignation that

life is tragic

and absurd.

C. S. Lewis's The Problem

of

Pain,

which appears

in O'Connor's

personal

library

with

many annotations, is an apologetic for a God whose benevolence is

not contradicted

by

intense human

suffering.

When O'Connor

read

it,

one might

reasonably surmise that she read not with detached philosophical curiosity, but with immediate personal interest. Lewis argues that suffering is not incompati ble
with a

loving
of

God because it is

complexity

human life. He

inextricably tied to the very dignity and explains, "Try to exclude the possibility of suffer
free
wills

ing

which the order of nature and the existence of you

involve,

and you

find that

have

excluded

life

itself."

In this regard, Lewis

not

reinforces one of

O'Connor's favorite themes: divine love is

non;
tion.

primarily

a sentimental phenome

instead, it may be

a no-nonsense reminder of the

reality

of the

human

condi

kindness."

Lewis says, "If God is Love, He is, by definition, something more than mere Lewis adds, "He has paid us the intolerable compliment of loving us,
most

in the deepest,

tragic,

most

inexorable

sense"

(1962,

pp.

34, 41).

MODERNITY AND REDEMPTION

In his

advice on

dealing

with

uncertainty, the
concerns

political philosopher

Niccolo
and,
might

Machiavelli
more

anticipates

O'Connor's

in "A View

of

the

Woods"

generally, introduces the

modem response to mystery.

Machiavelli
.

have been speaking for Mr. Fortune when he advised, "I judge that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is
necessary, if one wants to hold her

down,

to

beat her

and strike

her

down."

Machiavelli continues, "And one sees impetuous than by those who proceed
Those
cartes an

that she
coldly"

lets herself be
(p. 101).

won more

by

the

still confident with the exaggerated rationalism that

eliminate all

began

with

Des

hope to

quer all

ever-cresting wave of human suffering

mystery from life. The modem world has been riding technology that has emboldened man to try and con
and want.

O'Connor

warns that there will always

be

limits to progress, and,

woods"

even more to the point, that there

is

"view

of the

that cannot and should not be eradicated

by

science and technology.

If

this

view

is lost along

with the

humility

that should attend

it,

one risks a

disaster
of

worse than the pain and

story is
ress"

darkly

suffering he is trying to erase. The final event ironic precisely because the grandfather, in trying to force
for the mystery
a of

this

"prog

without regard

human

nature and

suffering,

confirms

that

mystery

by perpetrating

tried to eliminate.
called progress placed

suffering far more ghastly than that which he O'Connor's warning against overweening confidence in sois symbolized by her disturbing descriptions of the bulldozer,
at the

like bookmarks

beginning

and end of the story.

As the story opens,

Modernity
Mary
with

versus

Mystery

in

Flannery

O'Connor
on the

201

Fortune

watches

"the

big disembodied

gullet gorge

itself

clay, then

the sound of a

deep

sustained nausea and a slow mechanical revulsion,

of the

turn and spit

of

it

out."

At the conclusion

tale, the

grandfather's
as

last

view

is

"a huge
on

yellow monster which sat

to the side, as

stationary
of

he was, gorging
often

itself

clay"

(1988,

pp.

525, 546)
suggests that the

"A View

of the

Woods"

mystery

suffering

is inter
of

twined with another element of life's mystery, namely, the

man nature.
p.

inscrutability
when

hu

O'Connor

once

noted, "Good fiction deals with human

nature"

(1969,

126). And so,

at one point

in their death struggle,

to ask

Mary

still

has

the upper

hand,
he

she pauses

long

enough
of

if her

grandfather

"has had
was

enough."

The

old man saw

something

his

own nature old man

in her face but it

an element

looked up into his own image. It was triumphant and (1988, p. 545). All through the story her grandfather has willed himself to believe that she carried only the Fortune
could not understand.
hostile"

"The

inheritance,
confident
shared

not

the

legacy

of the

Pitts

family

as well.

But he is
confident

in this opinion,
own character

his

only hopeful. His is "like the gentle little tide

at times

never entirely belief that she

lake,"

on the new
predict

but he her
(p.

is

also

troubled that

perhaps

he

could not

completely

or control
and

nature.

He is reluctantly
surface

aware that she of

is

"Pitts,"

perhaps a

also,
an

this trou

bles the 533). An

serenity

his belief

as

it "pulled back like

undertow"

unfamiliar voice emanates

view with

its

announcement of the

intractability

from Mary, threatening his confident world of human nature embodied in

his

granddaughter's

defiance:

"You been

whipped,"

it said,
Pitts."

"by
(P.

me,"

and

then it added,

bearing

down

on each

word, "and I'm PURE

545)
"Pit,"

The
Pit"

"Pitts"

name

corresponds with the

the

place of

judgment

resigned

for if

those who follow their irrational instincts.

evokes the

Associating
nature

one's name with

"the

lower, darker

side of

human

that we would all change

we could. make

But it is the

folly

of presumption that these wayward

leanings that

human
not

existence so mysterious can

only misunderstands the girl's dimension of his own character. Hence the 'There's
not an ounce of

Fortune

easily controlled. Mr. he is also blind to the vicious nature, be

erased or
severe

irony

when

he asserts,

Pitts in

me,"

as

he

murders

his

own granddaughter

by

slamming her head down cruelly on a rock (p. 545). O'Connor offers another clue to the problem of human nature in this story by assigning the old man a "heart His physical ailment is symbolic of the sickness with which
condition."

his

humanity
and

is

afflicted.

The
the

author would most

of

likely

have been familiar

with

the oft-quoted verse

from

Book
can

things

beyond

cure

/ Who

Jeremiah, "The heart is deceitful above all (Jer. 17:9, New International understand
it?"

Version).
O'Connor develops her
concern over

the mystery of human

nature

in

other

202

Interpretation Her
Own"

places.

story "The Life You Save May Be Your the machinations of Tom T. Shiftlet, a one-armed vagabond
short

revolves around

who takes advan

tage of a mother and her handicapped daughter

abandon
a

by

her

after

he has

stolen the

family's

car.

marrying the daughter only to Shiftlet, as his name suggests, is

cunning swindler who distresses even himself by his wayward conduct. When he first meets the mother and daughter he proposes to do handyman tasks in
exchange

for food

and shelter.

At that time, he
so,

offers an

the older woman, and

side of

in
He

doing

provides a general comment on

inadvertent warning to the darker in Georgia's

human

nature.

explains the work of thoracic surgeons

capital,

"There's

one of these

doctors in Atlanta that's taken he repeated,

knife

and cut the

human

heart

the

human

heart,"

leaning forward,
palm

"out

of a man's chest and

were slightly day-old chicken, slid

held it in his
lady,"

hand,"

and

he held his hand out,

studied

up, as if it
was a

weighted with the

human heart, "and

a

it like it

and and
me."

he said, allowing
p.

long

significant pause

in

which

his head

forward
you or

his

clay-colored eyes

brightened,

"he don't know

no more about

it than

(1988,

174)
the illustration to himself when he says, "If
out
. .

Shiftlet later

applies

they

was to

take my heart and cut it

they
and

wouldn't

know

me"

thing

about

(p. 180).

O'Connor in "A View

she

embeds yet a

third,
She

the most

important,

component of

mystery
when

of the

Woods."

provides a

fascinating
question

gloss on this

story

answered

a correspondent's

misguided

Mary

Fortune's father,
she

was a

"Christ

symbol."

regarding "I had that role

whether cut out

Pitts,
the

for

woods,"

explained.

She

continued

Christ because he "is

child to ease
pathetic

a pathetic

figure

by noting by virtue of
a

that Pitts cannot represent the fact that he beats his

a

his feelings his

sins."

about

Mr. Fortune. He is
"Christ

Christian

and a

sinner,

by

sins."

virtue of

Accordingly,

figure"

can't

be "pathetic
water,"

by

virtue of

his

It is the

woods themselves that

"walk

across the

she explained.

the edge of

Furthermore, O'Connor explained that the old man only runs to the water in his imagination, and the writer changed the verb to the
to make this clear. Hence "the old man felt as

"conditional"

if he

were

being

pulled, felt as

if he

were

running

as

fast

as

he could,

[but] Fortune, in fact,

dies

all the while that the woods are, in his imagination, by Mary Fortune's imitating Christ's miraculous feat of walking upon water (1988, p. 546; 1979,
pp.

side"

189-90,
and

emphasis
"mystery,"

added).

The woods, then,

compatible

simultaneously
Christ
as

represent

"Christ"

two

mutually

designations,
work of

since the

Church

identifies both the

mysteries.

person

and the

redemptive

theological

The
might

grandfather's

help

the reader understand why

failure to grasp the redemptive symbolism of the tree line O'Connor's judgment on the grandfather
the woods he

is

so

harsh:

by destroying

is rejecting Christ's

redemption. O'Con-

Modernity
nor

versus

Mystery

in

Flannery O 'Connor
subject

203

scripture to
fire"

apparently struggled over the inclusion of Mary Fortune's her grandfather, "He who calls his brother a fool is
(see Matt. 5:22). She
was reluctant to remove

quotation of the

to hell's

it, though,

since the grand

father's
ment.

arrogant and violent rejection of redemptive prediction of

She concluded, "Some

mystery warranted punish hell for the old man is essential to

story"

my
the

(1979,

p.

187). Whereas "Pitts

and

Mary

Fortune

realize

the value of

woods,"

the grandfather

does

not.

When the

grandfather

looks those three

times out of

his bedroom

window at

the woods on that restless afternoon, the

gaze

limited insight he

gains upon

his third

suggests that the woods

hold

theological mystery,
number three.

especially

given the obvious theological significance of the

By
Christ

the third
and

instance,

the tree line emerges more clearly as a metaphor

as the

for

his passion; he died, "as if

Scriptures report,

"tree"

upon a

(Acts

5:30,

New International Version). O'Connor

grandfather
blood."

writes that the tree

line

appears to the

someone were wounded

behind the for the

woods and the trees were old man

bathed in
mines

It is

an

"unpleasant

vision"

because it

under

his fragile self-assurance by calling attention to his need for redemption. As O'Connor herself explains, only "the woods and the woods alone are pure enough to be a Christ symbol if anything (1988, p. 538; 1979, p. 190).
is"

The

grandfather might men

have

profited

from G. K. Chesterton's admonition,

morbidity"

"Mysticism keeps
when
you

sane.

As

long
create

as you

destroy mystery for many times that the human condition generates a longing, however vague, redemption. The proper response to mystery, according to this short story, is the
you
recognition and acceptance of man's need redemption.

have mystery you have health; (p. 48). O'Connor argued

for

another

mystery, the mystery of

REFERENCES

Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica, "Treatise

tian

Man."

on

Westminster, MD: Chris Books,

Classics, 1981.

Augustine. Confessions. Translated

by

Edward B. Pusey. New York: Pocket

1952.

Chesterton, G. K. Orthodoxy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974. September, 1960, From The New York Re Gilman, Richard. "On Flannery O'Connor. view of Books, 21 August 1969, 24-26. In Conversations with Flannery 1987. Rosemary M. Magee, ed. Jackson: Jackson Press of Mississippi, Harrold, De Vene. P.O. Box 1622, St. Augustine, FL 32084, no date supplied. The Flannery O'Connor Bulletin, 5 (Autumn, 1976). Lee, Maryat, "Flannery Lewis, C. S. The Problem of Pain. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1962. The Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. Chicago:
O'Connor," 1957."

University
Maritain,

of

Chicago Press, 1985.

and

Jacques. Saint Thomas

the

Problem of Evil. Milwaukee: Marquette

Univer-

204

Interpretation

sity Press, 1942. Maritain's reported sources for this essay, though not clearly de noted, are Summa Theologica, I, qu. 48, a.l, a. 2, a. 6; qu. 49, a. 1; I II, qu. 112, a.

3; Summa Contra Gentiles, III, cap. 7, 8, and 9; Quaestiones Disputatae, de Malo, 1, 1; 1,3. Newman, John Henry. The Grammar of Assent. New York: Image Books, 1955. O'Connor, Flannery. Address to Georgia State College for Women. No date supplied. In
correspondence given
_.

to Rebeka Poller

February

1957.

To Mr. And Mrs. B. Cheney, 1958, no day or month supplied, from Rome. Mystery and Manners, Occasional Prose. Selected and edited by Sally and Rob

ert

Fitzgerald. New York: The

Noonday Press, Farrar,

Straus & Giroux, 1969.

and

Letters of Flannery O'Connor: The Habit of Being. Selected Fitzgerald. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1979. Collected Works. New York:

Edited

by Sally

Literary

Classics

of the

Pascal, Blaise. Pensees,

and

the

Provincial Letters. Translated

World."

United States, 1988. by W. F. Trotter

the

and

Thomas M'Crie. New York: The Modern Library, 1941. In The Message in Percy, Walker. "A Novel About the End of the
How Queer Man
Other.

Bottle:
the

Is, How Queer Language Is, and What One Has New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1954.
with

to

Do

with

More Conversations
A. Kramer. Jackson: The

Walker Percy. Edited

by Lewis

A. Lawson

and

Victor

University

Press

of

Mississippi, 1993.
and

Stephens, C. Ralph,

The Correspondence of Flannery O'Connor Cheneys. Jackson: The University Press of Mississippi, 1986.
ed.

the

Brainard

Review

Essay

A Triple

Inquiry

into the Human Center

Richard Freis
Millsaps College

Eva Brann, The Ways of Naysaying: No, Not, Nothing, and Nonbeing (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), xviii + 247 pp., $35.00.

The Ways of Naysaying is the third book in Eva Brann' s "trilogy human (Brann, 2001, p. xi), the embodied soul, which is the site
center"

of the
of the

three

inter-implicated human
"Naysaying"

capabilities which the

trilogy

explores:
present

imagining
book, nay
what

(Brann, 1991), experiencing

saying.
claims

time

(Brann, 1999),

and, in the

means

to be or is not there or is
p. xiii).

for Brann "to say that something is not non-existent or is affected by

it

Nonbeing"

(Brann, 2001,
of

the inquiry into naysaying in order to clarify further the subjects her first two inquiries: the imagination, whose images are and are not what they image, and in this respect mingle Being and Nonbeing; and time, in which a present is surrounded by a past constituted of present memory images of what
no

Brann began

longer is The

and a

future

constituted of present

anticipatory images

of what

is

not only aims to clarify the presuppositions of the intends to offer a comprehensive survey of the questions raised by the capacity for negation in speech, thought, and perhaps in the world. The three books are linked not only by their subject matter but also as exemplifi not yet.
present

book

earlier

inquiries, it

also

cations of a particular

intellectual mode,
large

which

Brann

"inquiry."

names

Since this book

consider

completes a

and

integral intellectual venture, I

will

it

My

object

only in itself, but in relationship to certain features of the whole. in this review, therefore, is twofold. Part I is an extended consider
not
Brann'

ation of

inquiry in
it
Part II

s sense as a philosophic mode and, more generally,

the question
philosophy.

raises of

the proper

examines

The

(literary form) for presenting Ways of Naysaying itself, an inquiry into a

genus

dicendi

world

our world

in

which

thought, speech, action, the imagination, time,

would

like to

acknowledge

manuscript and

improved it
and

by

their

review in my debt to the following colleagues who read this suggestions: Catherine Ruggiero Freis, Robert H. King, Har

rison

J. Sheppard,

Steven G. Smith.

INTERPRETATION,

Winter 2001-2, Vol. 29, No. 2

206
and

Interpretation human
and nonhuman nature appear to

be threaded through

with and per

haps founded in that

willful

which our most taken-for-granted experience presents as

philosophical

No, logical Not, logical Nonexistence,

and

Nonbeing, dialec

tical

Negativity,

the Nihil

Absolutum,

sheer

Nothing.

I. REFLECTIVE INQUIRY AND ITS PRESENTATION

Problems
nal

are ultimately exercises, mere means, but human business. (Eva Brann, 1968, p. 379).

questions are the serious and

fi

1.

Inquiry
as an

Inquiry
cation

intellectual

mode

is introduced

by Brann in
reason

Paradoxes of Edu
modes of
enlightenment remarks made

in

Republic (Brann, 1979a),

of the
of

as a mitigation of

dilemmas in
of our

thinking

characteristic

United States

by

founding. The features

throughout the trilogy.

inquiry

are confirmed and elaborated

in

Brann

marks

out

the character of
place

modes of thinking.

In the first

inquiry by discriminating it from other inquiry is distinct from a number of

non-

philosophic modes of

thinking. These include knowhow or technique

exalted or

(Brann,
tribe"

1990,
arises

p.

34);

the appeal to the

unchallenged

everyday

opinions whose

authority
aligned

from their

currency

or the age-old

"traditions

of the

(pp.

34-35);

science, the rational,

often mathematical

model-making

with the methodical observation of experiment and

frequently

associated with

technique

for the

sake of control of

human

and non-human nature

(p. 35);
not seek

and

scholarship, which may seek the truth

philosophical

about a philosophy,

but does

the

truth (p. 35).

contemplative and reflective a

Brann 's deeper discrimination is between

in

quiry and another form of philosophical thinking, (or dissolving) mode, which Brann does not give
call

problem-setting-and-solving a circumscribing name. I will theory,

appears

it

constructive theory. neither

Perhaps

mode,

inquiry

nor constructive

pure, but there are

constitute what

sufficiently

constant and numerous marks of

in any thinker distinction to

a configura

Brann

elsewhere calls
cohere"

"a kind

of cloud

formation,

tion of features that seem to

guish

inquiry

and constructive

to thought, the character of

(Brann, 1997g, p. 132). These marks distin theory in the following respects: the instigation the thinking organ, the character of the world the
and

thinking
means.

organ opens will take

onto, its disposition toward that world, its purpose,

its

Inquiry
because

up each of these features in turn. is instigated by wonder, a sudden defamiliarization has been taken for
granted

of the

world,

what

suddenly

appears

self-contradictory

Review
(cf.

Essay

207

Plato, Republic, 523b-525a; Phaedo, 102b-e),

pp.

or

1997c,

102-3)
depths
p.

or

bespeaks

attractive

depths
pp.

revealed and concealed

p.

extraordinary (Brann, in the

102). To
experi
wonder"

shining-forth of phenomena
ence such

(Brann, 1990,
one

32-33; 1997c,
good

as attractive

implies that "the may

add

is the

object of

(Brann, 1979a,
is the

62). Perhaps
its

that since one element of wonder

knowing, an experience of wonder is simultaneously "the apprehension of our ignorance, which is the launching pad of our receptive and trustful (Brann, 2001, p. 188). "Philosophical perplexities are wonder given (Brann, 1997e, p. 186), formulation as questions. "A genuine question is, when still within the questioner, an expectant vacancy, a receptive openness, a defined ignorance, and, above all, a directed desire of the intellect (Brann, 1979a, p. 143). We
object exceeds our
inquiries" formulation"

recognition that

experience such questions a

less

as

originating in

ourselves than as a response to

compelling
p.

address

in the
p.

moment of wonder

by

the world to us

(Brann,
open gaze

1997c,

115; 1997e,

187). In seeking

an answer we remain

to the world,

allowing the

object of the question

receptively to disclose itself to our

and our reflection without

constraining

the possible answer

by imposing
p.

a preset p.

method or

delimiting
objects of

a priori acceptable

terms

(Brann, 1968,
cannot
a

379; 1979a,
mystery:

138). The

inquiry

have the

character of

fundamental
be

its

questions can

be further clarified, therefore, but

same

resolved

(Brann,
lives

1991,

p.

5). At the

time such matters have so great

bearing

on our

that we are

unwilling to leave them simply

do
not render

as unexamined opinion.

Therefore

such answers as we achieve

the question otiose.

The

questions of such partial

and

inquiry
seeing
come

also remain alive

are a

because
of the

even such provisional what-is.

answers,

relationship

intellect to

Here

knowing
1990,
group
p.

loving

30). Brann

offers

very close together (Brann, 1997c, pp. 102-3; cf. a brief parable about such questions in a lecture to a
students:

of undergraduate

honors

That [the for the

life

questions of

inquiry do

not go

away] is because those

who

truly

ask

long

answer not
me

its light. Let

because they want to be finished with them; they want to live by give you a hypothetical example of what I mean. Suppose after a

given to the quest

for God

you

found

yourself

throne.

You
be

would not rub your a

hands

It

would

beginning,

not an end.

"Well, that's (Brann, 1997f, p. 403)

and

say,

suddenly standing before His and lose interest.

that"

Constructive theory,
and

by

contrast, is instigated

by

the will to harness

human
p.

or nonhuman nature
p.

for

desired is
not

outcome

thinking (Brann, 1979a, p. 131;

child of adventitious
putting-into-ques-

1997g,
tion,

127; 1997d,
to
pierce

149). Its

mood

wonder, the

occasions, but
a will

methodical

doubt
and

or suspicion or systematic

illusions

delimit beforehand is its

what might

be known

with

certainty:

to secure a
can

starting

point which

own evidence and

from which,

therefore,

be methodically

constructed a

well-ordered,

complete system of

208

Interpretation
known (Brann, 1979b,
p.

that which can be

93). Here

belong

the great philo

sophical systems of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,

constructed under
physics.

the spell of the successes of mathematics

and mathematical

And

as

Tarcov

and

Pangle

point

out, summarizing

the thought of

Leo Strauss, here

belongs the

modem movement toward the rationalization of the state:

the effort to make probable, The underlying unity Strauss discerned in modernity was also responsible in his view or guarantee the actualization of, the right order

many transformations modernity has undergone. Just as the new political losophy of Machiavelli sought to guarantee the actualization of the right order

for

the

phi

through the natural

end of

man,

so

the

new natural science of

Bacon

and

Descartes
that

sought to guarantee the actualization of wisdom through

not p.

foolproof
(Tarcov

method

did

depend

on the natural

intelligibility

of the universe.

and

Pangle, 1983,

917)

And

much more which

humbly, here belongs, too,

"problem"

the misnamed classic

"mystery"

novel,

preconceived

is paradigmatically a X, is reached by ingenious is

set out.

novel, in which the solution, the

rearrangement of

just the terms in may be taken

often

which the problem

If

a question

is

the typical expression of

inquiry,

a problem

as

the typical expression of constructive theory.

By

"problem"

ing

traditional understandings, means a task set before one to be

Brann, done,

appropriat

by

means of a

construction,

quires a solution within

may be a theoretical construct, and which re the framework of the terms in which it is set (Brann,
which
a

1968,

p.

379). She

suggests the powerful appeal of

as a problem rather

than as

direction for
the

being able to pose a question inquiry (Brann, 1968, p. 380) by

analytical

quoting the

great

boast that

closes
right

Vieta's Analytical Art: "Finally, the

proud problem of p.

art appropriates

to itself

by

problems, which

is: TO
origi

SOLVE EVERY
nal). right pp.

PROBLEM"

(Brann, 1968,
sustaining

377;

capitals

in Vieta's

This is

the

beginning

of the

modem

hope that

by fashioning

the

method, one can turn every question into

a soluble problem

(Brann, 1968, intellect,

a

377-80).

The primary

organ of

inquiry

is the

faculty

of the soul named

capacity both receptive and reflective. Insofar as it is receptive, its activity is what the Greeks called theoria, the unscripted gaze of contemplation, open to its objects in its willingness to be determined by them. Insofar as the activity of the intellect is reflective, it clarifies the appearances presented to it in "the cog
nitive

clearing

of the

imagination"

(Brann, 1991,
and
now and

p.

789)

as well as

"the

pure

absorption

in beings

of thought

their relations,

experiencing for which the

beyond

intellect is

fully

awake

but,

at

least

then,

out of the world and

interior"

even our personal

(Brann, 1999,

p. xii).

The primary
is the agency
of

organ of constructive

theory,

by

contrast, is the
mind

mind.

Intellect

thinking

understood as

receptive;

is the agency

of

thinking

Review
understood as poietic

Essay 209
written

or

fabricating. As David Lachterman has

in

different

context:

[T]he
tween
a

contest with the ancients

intrinsic to the idea

of the modern

is

not one

be
named

competing theories or conceptions of the

"mind,"

as though this
renderings.

term

"Mind,"

philosophically neutral agency with ancient and modern Richard Rorty has recently suggested, is itself a modem
needs to

as

"invention;"

it is,

one

add, tailor-made to fit the specifications

required

for

competence

in making

and constructing.

(Lachterman,

p.

4)

From the
nature and

point of view of

mind, intellect is

deficient, because it only

of nature

receives
p.

is

not an

instrument for the transformation

(Lachterman,

4); from
rational

the point of view of

intellect,

mind

is deficient, because it
mind as

cannot see

the nature of beings. Hence

self"

Brann describes the

p.

"the instrumental,

tool of the

(Brann, 1979a,
a

"represents the
p.

self-diminution"

power-charged

138)

of the

intellect. Mind is
the

21), whose particular rationality (Brann, 1979a, pp. 143-44; cf. diminution of the intellect, because it does
power, theoria; it

not recognize

intellect's

contemplative

is

power-charged,

because it is itself
to

a constructive

faculty

and

because its

constructions are aimed

effect control over

internal

and external nature.

neither power

It is

perhaps worth

remarking that
respect,

has

ever

been completely
thinkers rated
passage

eclipsed

in

recognition and

although

typically

premodem

the intellect higher as modems have the mind. The

following

from
its

Thomas Aquinas,
contrast,

which

confess

I have

sharpened

in English to

emphasize

shows this:

Things

are related

to the

productive

[practicus: like
productive

factum,
are

the word embraces both

precedence over

doing
lativa

and

making, though here the

a

meaning takes

the

prudential] intellect in
=

different

manner than

they

to the

contemplative [specu-

mirrorlike] intellect. For the intellect in its

productive

intellection is the

cause of

things,

and

thus it

is the

measure

of

those things it causes.

The intellect in

its

contemplative

intellection is the
those

receiver of

things

and

it is in

some sense stirred makes

to motion

by

them;

things, therefore,
which our

are measure

of the intellect. This

it

clear that natural

things, from
.2;

intellect

receives

knowledge,

measure

our

intellect. (De Veritate, 1

emphasis

added)

The
true"

constructivist

chimes with
and can

understanding of a problem as a task to be done Vico's famous dictum: "Verum et factum

[factum]"

(factum)
("To be
that what

conve

"to be

made

are

interchangeable). Vico

means

be

transparent to our
statement

to be. His

is

understanding is only what we ourselves have caused bold revision of the scholastic maxim: "Ens et verum "to be
what
true"

convertunter"

("To

be"

and

are

interchangeable). His

restriction of rather

what can

be

fully

known to

has been his

made

by

human beings

than

embracing

all

beings

as such makes

work emblematic

for

modernity.

210

Interpretation
claimed

Vico himself downgrades the knowledge

edge of

by

natural

science,

knowl
(The it

the world of nature,

para.

"which,

since

God

made

it, He

knows"

alone

New

Science,

331). And he
of

upgrades

from the low

position given

by

Descartes knowledge
made

"the

world of civil

by

men, [and whose]

of our own

principles are
mind"

society, [which] has certainly been therefore to be found within the modi
para.

fications

human

(The New Science,

331). Kant

accepts

for the possibility of our knowing, namely, as Jacobi framed the understanding common to Vico and Kant, "that we can grasp an object only insofar as we can let it come into being before us in thoughts, can make it or
the same condition
create

it in the

understanding"

(cited

by Lachterman,
of nature.

p.

9). Kant,

however, is
respect

most concerned to

certify
to

our

knowledge

He

sees that to accomplish

this, he

must

be

able

understand nature as made

in the decisive
which

by

the human mind.

Brann
its

sums

up

the argument

understanding
"The

and

consequences

for

our

by knowing

Kant justifies this

sentences:

in two sharp

account of nature and the account of

identical. That is because the

system of nature

Sensibility
us"

forms

and our
p.

Understanding
157).

of nature are for Kant is determined by the way our functions over the sensations that come
the
science

to

(Brann, 1997b,

The development knowable

of

as a realm of

modernity has been a progressive eclipse of beings independent of the fabricating activity
true

nature

of the

human
'exact,'

mind.

This has been for

is
us

that remains

in every branch of philosophy. Even the nature has become unnatural. As Jacob Klein has written, "The

nature

not

something that is

concealed

behind the appearances, but

'evidence'

rather a symbolic

things"

experience of

disguise concealing the original (Klein, 1985, p. 84). Our belief that

and

the original

what can

be known

is only

fully

has constructed, because only in this case can the mind know its elements and their structure, has fostered in self-fulfilling proph
what the mind

ecy a reductio omnium ad opinionem (reduction of all things to opinion), which has become in postmodernism a constitutive reductio ad absurdum (reduction
to the absurd).
world onto which intellect and mind open, therefore, is understood by in correspondingly different ways. Intellect understands itself to open onto world that possesses its own intrinsic nature. This nature is capable of reveal

The

each
a

ing itself to thought's receptive beholding. Its appearances, by Brann, clarified by the imagination and projected back as
encies upon the

to

adapt a passage

world,

captivate thought and

p.

rectifying transpar incite it to transcend them in search

extent

of their unseen core of

(Brann, 1991,

786). To this Here the

will

for Brann the

exercise

intellect depends

on construction.

is

active not as willful

deter

mination of the world

mined

by thought,

but

as willingness

for thought to be deter

has
in-

by

the world as it gives

itself

to the

inquiring

intellect.

Mind, by
political

contrast, understands itself to

or

open onto a world which mind

already shaped, tacitly

by intentional

theoretical construction, in thought,

practice, and technology. Mind's disposition toward this world is

Review
strumental and

Essay 211

willful, albeit often in the applauded forms of creativity (Brann, 147-49) and the transformation of nature in the service of benevo lence (Brann, 1979a, p. 26). If intellect is, in the traditional phrase, "the mirror

1997d,

pp.

nature,"

of

mind

is

a source of which nature

is the projection, creation,

or mirror.

So, for

ing

example, Aristotle teaches that the very intelligible form which is shap the subsistent thing in the world I am understanding is also at work deter
receptive

mining my
the world
which

intellect;

whereas

for Kant, my shaping any

mind

determines

understand and

I have

no access to

nature or

thing-in-itself

may be beyond.
worth observing here briefly that Brann 's work implies that the ancient between philosophy and poetry continues in the modem period, but both

It is
quarrel

transformed onto a modem common ground.

represented

by

the

as that absolute

philosophy as Critique of Pure Reason: "[For Kant my 'self] shows itself and pure original activity, which Kant calls spontaneity (B 130,
means

Consider this

on

428).

The activity character is thought, which works according to none but its own laws. At the root to think and to will are the same, and it is this identification
wilfulness, radical
self-determination.
which

Spontaneity
has this

which makes the critical man

and

both the theorizer

of

the Critique of Pure Reason

Reason"

the doer of deeds of the second

pp.

Critique,
on

the Critique of Practical

poetry:

(Brann, 1976,
ject'

43-44). And this

Romantic

"By

'self

or a

'sub
of all

is

meant an original source of all

. .

representations, or

more

simply,

experience

It is therefore easily play

of the

seen as the
which

very
p.

principle of

art, interpreted
no rules

as the externalized

subject,

is

carried on

according to

but those

established

by

itself"

(Brann, 1997a,
is
nor

71).

The

envisioned purpose of

inquiry

commensurate with

its features

so

far

sketched:

it is

not

to solve a problem
new

to construct a

solution nor add

poses

something
critical

to the store of

theory nor to certify a knowledge, characteristic pur

refuse

of constructive an

theory. Nor does

inquiry
way:

fundamental
be certainly

questions answered.

because

initial

delimitation

suggests

they

cannot

Brann describes

the end of

inquiry

in this

It

gives

to

an ultimate enigma clears

that articulation which the writer can best

live

with

for the time being. It

up apparently inadvertent
to a

fusions,
with

and relocates perplexities

better

place.

con but usually revealing It does away as far as possible,

intermediate mystifications,
of the matter.

and preserves, without embarrassment, the

p.

final

mystery

(Brann, 1999,

199;

cf.

2001,

pp.

xv, xviii;

1991,

p.

5) theory

In reaching
often

this articulation,

inquiry

uses means which constructive within an

forgoes.

Inquiry

recognizes that

it begins

encompassing horizon
argues,
are not neces

of opinion,

present

and past.

The

results of

inquiry, Brann
But the

sarily determined
various

by

the "climate of

opinion"

that surrounds

it,

as

is

claimed

in

forms
takes

of

historicism

and conventionalism.
one might

questions

from

which
pro-

inquiry

its departure (and,

add, its expression) are often

212
vided

Interpretation

by

perplexities

in

current opinion or
p.

the concerns of the world contempo

rary But this does

with the thinker

not

(Brann, 1997g,

132).

fully

resolve

the question of the

ability

of

inquiry
with

to reach

beyond the horizon

of the climate of opinion.

For the terms in

which questions

and alternative answers are

formulated
open

are themselves

freighted

assump

tions that may

of the

preempt a

truly

inquiry. For this reason,

a critical

genealogy

question

meaning of terms and of the formulation and proposed answers to a in the textual tradition become important means in pursuing an inquiry
p.

(Brann, 1979a,
tradition

21; 1991,

p.

33; 2001,

pp.

1-2, 4-5

4). This turn to the

questions and there

is

a tribute to the persistence of the

continued relevance of

fundamental

fore to the

the most

searching

prior responses.

It is

also

an obligation

imposed

by

the intentional

history

"Traditio,"

of speech.

the root

of the word
on,"

"tradition,"

preservation, and
us

itself has the revealing double meaning of "handing betrayal. Terms and positions come to "handing
over,"

embodying the interlacement

the strata of
pp.

of successive of

insights, forgetfulness,
meaning, in Husserl's
entangled

and

rein-

"sedimentation"

terpretation,
network of

metaphor

(Klein, 1985,

74-84). To

avoid

becoming blindly

in this tacit

preservation and

reactivate them, to trace the layers of forgetfulness and reinterpretation of the original sig betrayal, nificance, in order to turn inherited opinion into critically discriminated, reflec

meanings, it is necessary to

tive understanding and accept it or reject it in this

pp.

recovered

light (Klein, 1985,

are

74-84; Strauss, 1959,

Another
powerful

pp.

73-77).
which

set of opinions

the inquirer

must

assess

the

disciplinary and professional conclusions ing the competence to gauge and use the
ity"

of experts.

Here the task is

"develop

experts'

competence with some author

abandoning the open horizon of inquiry (Brann, 1979a, p. 124). Constructive theory often forgoes the philosophically open study of tradition under the spell of a vision of its philosophical autonomy. In doing so it trusts
without

that premodem thought

and that

has been

superseded

in

philosophy's modern a

maturity

thinking

can

find

a self-evident or

simply

point on whose

basis it

can construct

its

projects.

practically effective starting Brann points out the frequent

paradoxical result of such an effort

in her

work on

Kant:

For these

qualities all serve to veil

from

view

the real roots of the system

the stu

pendous assumptions

that are packed

into its technical terms, the

strange abysses

that are opened

plied

up beyond its

well-delineated
p.

foundations,
.

and the

human

pathos

im

in its

projects

(Brann, 1997b,

154)

[Thus]

in the

name of completeness

it throws

open

dizzying

depths for inquiry.

Q3rann, 1979b,

p.

91)
contextualized marks
a

Collecting
of

combining these distinction between inquiry and

and

partial and

differently
is
an

constructive

theory may have

misleading
"jig"

rhetorical effect.

For it may
to

suggest that

inquiry

alternative method to
a

constructive theory:

use one of

Brann's

recurrent

images,

different

or

Review
preset guiding-gauge.

Essay

213
is

So it is necessary to
sense would

point out once again

that

inquiry

not methodical

in

the modem

inquiry
tory

method"

in this

meaning be

of a preset

as misconstrued and

investigatory procedure: "the internally contradic

usage or

a phrase as

"the Socratic

method"

in its ordinary

"the discussion

method."

Inquiry
searching,

may,
not

however, be

called a methodos

in

the classical sense, a path of

nature of

preset, but

responsive

to its context and the

its

object.

In

Socrates'

words

from the Phaedrus, joints

of a
are

inquiry

aims

"to be

able

to

cut

through,

sort

by

sort,

where the

by

nature, and not set one's hand to shatter any

part, after the

fashion

bad

butcher"

(265e). Of course, this

also

nonmethodical

determination of the object of

one

inquiry

may

falsify
not

that object. For example,

might mis-see

what

belongs

and

what

does

belong

to the naturally
misde-

articulated part which

is the

object of

inquiry,
be

although often an original

termination

becomes

clarified and can

revised

in

the progress of thinking.

and

Inquiry depends lowing its way.

Brann herself

on an ever-awake prudence of the

intellect in setting

fol

alludes to the classical provenance of

many

of the marks of
marks

inquiry

and the modem provenance of

many

of the

inquiry-repudiating

of constructive theory.

For Brann the

modes of

preference

for

inquiry

is

not a return

to

the past, but a choice to the

of the
p.

among

thinking

still available.

When

she refers

premodem and modem eras as

west,"

however,

she opens

up

"the two complementarily distinct epochs further question for inquiry (Brann, 2001,
or

49): Are these

modes

complementary

mentary, to what extent, on what

simply incompatible? And if comple grounds, and in what hierarchy?

2. The Presentation of Inquiry

Jose Ortega y Gasset,

accused of

sharply

responded

that the

proper genus

writing literature rather than philosophy, dicendi (literary form) for presenting

philosophy is

a matter not yet resolved

(Ortega,

p.

86). We may accordingly

and others are

ask whether some

mensurate with
Brann'

forms

of

speaking
of

and

writing are,
as

not, com

the understanding

philosophy designates

inquiry.
whether

"inquiry,"

s presentations of what she

in the

com

pendious

The World of the Imagination

axe

or the compact

lectures

and essays of

The Past-Present, be the

nature of
reader.

clearly intended to
as a mode of

accord with what she understands and

to

inquiry

thinking
"inquiry"

to be a

cause of such

inquiry

in the

In this

respect

Brann 's

(I

will use the name now also to

designate the
to to

literary form, trusting that context will make clear whether it refers earlier attempts mode of thinking, literary form, or both) is a cogenre of many them being the shape a genus dicendi with the same aims, the greatest of
and

Platonic dialogue Let

me

the Thomistic

quaestio

(question).

list

some of

the common features of these (and

typically other) forms

214

Interpretation
inquiry. In this
context

shaped to present

it

will

frequently

seem more norma]

to refer to the

presenter as

teacher and the

receptive and reflective

listener

as

learner. And this

reflects

the

fidelity

of such

forms to the

purposes

of their

Socratic

origin.

(1) The
p.

teacher leads the learner to

recognize

something to

wonder at or to

find something perplexing in the subject,

and thus to a genuine

question

(Pieper,

96;

cf.

the sequence:

Plato, Theaetetus, 151d-155d). (2)

to listen with unforeclosed and

The teacher listens

and encourages the student

serious attention to other participants

world which seems

in the conversation,

including

that
pp.

in the

94;

(Pieper, 83-84, Plato, Phaedo, 88e-91d). (3) The teacher and learner recognize that they are members of a community of inquiry, past and present, on whose partnership depend and to are gratitude responsible whom in turn (Pieper, p. they they by In No. cit. p. 84). In 83; Aquinas, Met., 12,9; 2566, Pieper, (4) listening and in
moment of wonder

to address us in the

cf.

speaking the teacher

it breaks the
p.

and

the

learner

under

his

or

her

guidance refuse the

tempta

tion to eristic ("Eristic

nexus

is

argument carried on under

a question and

the aegis of the will to win;

response."

between
out of

its intrinsic

[Brann, 2001,

18])

and,

indeed,

desire for truth

seek the most persuasive statement

opposing position before responding (Pieper, pp. 82-83; cf. Simmias and Cebes: Plato, Phaedo, 84c-91d; Glaucon and Adiemantus: Plato, Republic, 357a-367e). (5) The teacher models and demands of the student a willingness
of an

to speak, to take
with the
lent.'

a position and answer

for it. "Wittgenstein

ends

his Tractatus

famous demand, 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be si Schools must make the complementary requirement, 'Whereof one would
oneself, thereon one
speak.'

express

must

And that

reasons"

means

giving

willingness: Plato, (Brann, 1979a, p. 135; Pieper, pp. 85-87; cf. refusal: Plato, Theaetetus, 146b, 162a-b; Meno's Theaetetus, 151d-e; resistance: Plato, Meno, passim). (6) The primary language of inquiry is ordi
Theodoros'

Theaetetus'

nary speech,
even

used with more

than ordinary attention to its multiple,

perhaps

mutually contradictory,
obscure a

may
pp.

implications. Technical terminology just because it is univocal and therefore subject, paradoxically,
meanings and

conceals the perplexities the subject presents

(Pieper,

pp.

102-17; Klein, 1977,

presentation a

2-3; 1965,
Brann
writes

pp.

47-52).

throughout in accordance with these features of the

she

of

inquiry. The language that

forges

as medium of

inquiry

deserves

brief

further description. It is distinct

It

and

distinguished,
incorporate

flexible

mode of conversa

tional speech, which can modulate to

vivid colloquialism.

technical passages as well as

uses the resources of parallelism and or

metaphor, especially

spatial metaphor
and

latent for
it

explicit, for clarity

and the resources of compactness

intellectual
and

wit

energy.

experience,
essays,
as

would not

long

as one adds

The prose also easily accommodates personal be wrong to call the presented inquiries personal this: The person who engages with the inquiry and

with the reader

is present,

not

in the

accidents of

her

individuality,

but in the

Review
full
range of

Essay
human

-215

her

common

human

being

addressing the

common

being

of the reader.

There
more

are

two

further features

of these

literary

forms

which

will touch on

fully.
cogenres we

The first feature is this: The three

addressed

have been

to beginners. This is indicated in Plato's dialogues

with which the partners of

Socrates

or sometimes of

ers are youths or older men who

have

resisted

earthly philosophy for

discussing are all by the frequency or heavenly strang

other reasons. unto

Aquinas, in his turn, cites St. Paul's words to the Corinthians, "As ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not (lCor.3,1-2),
meat"

little

to

justify
Josef

writing the Summa Theologiae Pieper in this matter:

as a

textbook for beginners. Let

me quote

[T]he teacher, insofar

ner,
partakes of

as

he

succeeds

in

lovingly identifying

himself

with the

begin

men:

he

sees

something that in the ordinary course of nature is denied to mature the reality just as the beginner can see it, with all the innocence of a
and yet at

first encounter,
and penetration

the same time with the

matured powers of comprehension

that the

cultivated mind possesses.

(Pieper,

p.

95)
captured at

The

significance of this

hard-earned

second

innocence is

its

core

in Seth Benardete's

characterization of

Leo

Strauss'

s manner of

interpretation:

He knew how to

start again, not as

.
.

if he

were

starting for the first time, but really

dead"

This experience calls for a practice of being without starting for the first time. and identified it "the practice of dying and being Socrates called it habits;
.

with philosophy.

(Benardete, 2000,

p.

410)
inquirer is further
suggested

The way this is

a gift

for the

mature

by

some

often-quoted words of

Strauss himself:

There is

no surer protection against the

understanding

of

granted or otherwise

despising

the

obvious and surface.

anything than taking for The problem inherent in the

of things.

surface of

things,

and

only in the

surface of

things, is the heart

(Strauss,

1958,

p.

13)
is the
problem

What is first for

us

(Brann

might

or may perplexity) inherent in the surface of things. We may But itself. first in what is ascend from what is first for us to accept an answer as

say the question-generating not be able to

as soon as we

full

and

final,
If

we

foreclose further

attention

to the problem
wisdom

which appears

in the

surface.

we take

seriously that human

The

may

simply
the

be the ever greater grasp of the fundamental

of things

questions and

alternatives, to the

surface

is for

us the

heart

of things.

repeated return

216

Interpretation
in teaching beginners may then serve to advance the mature The claim of some teachers that they and their students remain shock to the assumption of freshmen that teachers simply know simply know if they
are

surface required

thinker's inquiry. coinquirers, a

and

they

themselves will

diligent, is
is
this:

always

true and

in

the best case recognized and acknowledged.

The

second

further feature

of these cogenres

The forms in
the
poet

which

inquiry
used

is

presented are open ended.

To borrow

a phrase which

Horace

to describe the openings of Homer's epics, the

close

presentations of

inquiry

typically
gates

in

medias res

(in the

middle of things):

"they
so

throw open the

to an infinitude of further

seeking"

(Pieper,

p.

99). And

far from trying

reader to

to disguise
emphasize

this, it serves their function as a cause of inquiry in the it. As Jacob Klein writes of Plato's dialogues:

By imitating
all

discussion the

character of

incompleteness

can

be

accentuated: as we

know,

the movement inherent

complete agreement or complete uation.

in any discussion, if it does not reach an end in clarification is the best inducement to its contin
...

A properly
alive

written text will

have, therefore,

to imitate this

movement and

keep

it

swers.

by stringing it along (Klein, 1965, p. 17)

there

decisive

questions and partial or ambiguous an

Finally,
at

is

a significant respect

in

which the

dialogues

of

Plato differ,

least in degree, from the Thomistic

order to

quaestiones and

Brann. In

frame it, I

will refer to

Brann's

inquiry inquiry into questions:

as practiced

by

For

responsible

their presumptions.

questioning of traditional ways requires appreciative In the analysis of questions, such contextual [Presumptions frame

awareness of are

"presumptions"

distinguished from logical "presuppositions

pertain

to the

larger setting,
which make

the communal

basis,

such as the

of rights and obligations, of

any questioning,
p.

including

the

questioning

authority itself,

possible.

(Brann, 1997e,

183)
the Platonic dialogues

Surely
place

more

than any other

philosophical

literary form,

before

our eyes the extended communal presumptions of

their inquiries
of these pre

and,

indeed,

sometimes obliquely, make the nature and

bearing

sumptions a theme of the

inquiry.
be
recognized as a philosophical genus
and an awareness of

Leo

Strauss'

s writings too must

di

cendi governed

by

the aims of

inquiry

tions. First
which

is the

awareness that radical

inquiry

presump destabilize the beliefs on may

its

public

society rests; and reciprocally, the desire to protect philosophy from those who may believe that its radical and destabi inquiry has indeed been

lizing

to the

public order.

Second, his

writings are

corrupting intended to elucidate

and

as

fully
form

as possible the

fundamental

questions of political

the most

important

answers that

have been

given.

philosophy Hence the proper

to evaluate

literary

Review

Essay

'211

for philosophy must wed complete freedom of inquiry with circumspection of speech designed to protect the interests of both the public realm and philosophy
to teach young philosophical readers both circumspection and inquiry. Strauss found the model for a literary genre ministerial to philosophy in the
and writings

largely
to

of those premodem thinkers who present an exoteric

public realm and a more

teaching

that respects the needs of the

accessible

radical,

esoteric

more patient and thoughtful readers.

That this has

inquiry bearing for

all an

philosophic

speech even of

today is implied by
Maimonides'

a conclusion

in Strauss's discussion

of the

literary form

Guide for the Perplexed: "Above

seems to

esoteric

interpretation

of the
p.

Guide

be

not

only advisable, but even Strauss

points

necessary"

(Strauss, 1952,
as a

56). Throughout this

work

to the

many-plied nature of such

advisability

and such necessity.

The quaestio,
before the
reader.

form, is less
Brann Plato

constituted to

bring

presumptions

regularly

The

writings

in

which

presents

position public

between those

of

and

discourse

about matters of of

her inquiries occupy an intermediate Thomas. In their form they are a model of common human importance. Indeed, if one
statesman

accepts the with

implication

Socrates that the true

is

most concerned

education,
of

they

are a modest contribution to political reconstruction.

For
as a

the

form

inquiry

is

reached

in Paradoxes of Education in

Republic

way to

correct

disbalances in the
enlightenment

nation's characteristic modes of

thinking
place

which us

spring from its

founding.

Inquiry does,

therefore,

before

a moderated version of our communal presumptions.

II. THE TRIPLE INQUIRY AND THE WAYS OF NAYSAYING

How many victims have they claimed, The North Pole and the South'7

Not only are they nothing, named; Such as they aren't, they each year Turner

wobble.

Cassity

(p.

12,

vv.

1-4)

1. The Book's Purpose

and

Structure

the The Ways of Naysaying is a book with two purposes. First, as I said at the inquiries into earlier Brann's complete to opening of this review, it intends

imagination

and time.

Second, it
in
in
"rings"

takes us through a critical

whether

conspectus

of the

forms

of naysaying,

order

to discern

there is something "that

p.

all sorts of

naysaying have
and time

(Brann, 2001,
the
conspectus

211). The

treatment of

imagination

of naysaying:

the two earlier inquiries are

briefly

re-

218

Interpretation
in the
preface

viewed

in

order to show

how they
where

raise

the question of
on the

naysaying
and

and are again examination

time"

taken up in the conclusion,

of

Brann draws
and

intervening

naysaying to

articulate

"the nay

yea of

imagination

(p. 216).
question also

A third

persons, a non-being of

haunts the book: "Is there, besides the nay-saying of (p. things, be they objects of thought or of
negative objects

nature

211). Are there

inherently

nonbeings or

nonexistents, noth
and

ings

or

Nothing? This third

question makes

canvassed

synoptically in
speech,"

section

of

its way into every chapter the conclusion (pp. 213-16).

"brings its objects to

is

it is

"[Tjhinking goes about discerning

a
rich

writes

Brann,

a standstill even as

properties"

them through their

(p. 64

22). This book

prepares of most

expression

of

"the

discerning

of

divisions

[which]

thoughtful

conclusions"

(p. 213). Brann distinguishes the

ways

naysaying

into

six

kinds, allotting

each a chapter.

These chapters, in turn,

are

divided into

as many as seven sections and the sections into as many as seven subsections. Each subsection offers a concise presentation of the gist (or, better, the heart for

thought)
of the

of the matter

it takes

up.

Brann

uses the

approximately eighty

segments

two hundred and twenty-six pages of text to structure an articulated

display of the forms and questions of naysaying rather than as stages of a single, developing argument. This diverse multiplicity makes the experience of reading
book sometimes like wandering through the mazy forest of an Italianate Renaissance epic, in which a succession of individual marvels absorbs our atten tion. The diversity, however, is not simply the indulgence, in Isaiah Berlin's famous distinction, of the fox, who "knows many but signposts along
the
things,"

the hedgehog's path to come to "know one

common to all the

thing,"

big

in this

case what

may be

forms

of naysaying.

the reader, who must

This compact, differentiated multiplicity offers one of the main challenges to be ready to move flexibly among comprehensive, particu
and

lar,

in-between perspectives;
and

philosophical and

technical
of

horizons;
and

exposi

tion, explication, argument; ity for each reader. Brann is well

constitute the ways of with previews and other

and an

array

of

disciplines

varying familiar
byways"

aware

how many "highways

and

naysaying (p. xiv)

reminders of

reviews,

supporting the reader relevance, very explicit transitions, and

always

is

orienting

remarks.

inheres in our ordinary relationship to the negative in our thought and speech, in our imagination and sense of time, and appearing perhaps in the structure of the world. It is so variously present, so familiar, that
second main challenge

it is difficult to step back

and recognize
a complete

it

as questionable.

It takes

an effortful of

re-envisioning way are,

of the

world,

shift, to awaken to the strangeness

and

the evidences of nothingness we live

and an even greater effort

among

in

some

to remain in that

imperfectly graspable far-reaching strangeness

and unknowing.

Review
2. The Conspectus of the Kinds of Naysaying What
are the ways of naysaying?

Essay 219

Brann distinguishes them into

six

kinds. I

believe it

will

be

most

helpful if I straightforwardly
"no"

summarize them with an

occasional comment.

that is an expression of the will naysaying is the (chapter 1). This kind of naysaying appears conspicuously in the future-laden achievements of infants and toddlers: in the willed use of the semantic content
of of negation

The first kind

in

the gestural and verbal

"no,"

in

the cognitive distinction between

self and mother accompanied

of the negation-threaded activities of

naysaying also appears daimonion (divine thing);

of independence, and as an aspect imagining, pretending, and lying. Willful in ill-willing devils, in well-willing guardian

by

the

"no"

Socrates'

and

in

Turgenev's nihilist, Bazarov,

and

imagined naysaying human beings as the hero of Bartleby the Scrivener by Herman
such

Melville,

our greatest poet of the various persistent

forms

of naysaying.

Brann

catches

Bartleby's

fascination for
is
a screen a choice

subsequent readers and writers exactly:

Bartleby's "I
tions (for

prefer"

preference

is

life leave him alone, is the

mild

and

that hides behind a polite pretense of agreeable op among positives) his fully determined will to make that failing, to become null and void. His "I prefer not
undertow of

to"

ripple

on the

implacable

his naysaying
"no"

will.

(P.

17)
eristic and

And

finally,

and perhaps most

ominously, willful
subversion of reason.
negation

appears

in

lying

speech as the
second

intentional
of

The

kind

naysaying is the in
classical

that belongs to logic (chapter

2). Brann begins

principles

with a succinct reflective primer of the

founding
negation

questions and and

of negation

logic:

she

defines

its kinds,

examines the

different

"not"

possible

positions

of the negative
positions positive

particle

in

statement and the

implications

of these

different

for just is

what

is

being
to the

denied,
which

and explores

whether, or rather, why, the

always prior symbolic and

negated.

She then introduces those contrasting developments of form an entering wedge for the question: "[W]here [do]
. . .

logic

'true'

'false'

first

appear

in the world, in speaking

reader

or

in the

themselves?"

statements

(p.

43). This brings the

cal and modem

naturally

upon a characteristic

fissure between

classi

logic:
logicians truth

For [modem]
propositions.

philosophical

comes

from

the world, and negation

around:

is in

For traditional philosophy it is just way beings of the intellect, and of appearances and in the propositions. (P. 48, italics original)
the other

Negation is is in the

in the

world

truth

Brann follows issues

of

with three more

negation:

loosely

connected sections negative

devoted to special
negative

logical

double negation,

self-reference, and

220

Interpretation
and zero.

numbers

The

section

on

negative

self-reference, especially, stays

aside

strictly

within the

bounds the book

sets

for itself, turning

from the issues

of postmodernism.

But Brann does

make observations

that glance at them:

Although

such simultaneous self-contradictions

[as

appear

in the Cretan Liar

para

dox]

are out of the context of

working reality,

they may

thus well mirror an

ineradi

cable negative

decision,
the

capability of kind of neurosis

our thinking: that of of the

intellect,
A

enmeshing itself in infinities of in loss of self-control compounded of

self-reference and self-contradiction.

sound mind

[one hears behind this

phrase

Socratic

virtue whose name

positivity, the

setting

of

it translates: sophrosyne] seems to crave periodic thought in definite affirmation or determinate denial.

(P.

54)
third

The
Brann's

kind

of

most engaged

naysaying is speaking about nonexistents (chapter 3). concern is with a particular set of nonexistents, the per
of
a

sons and places of

showing how the

nonexistent

question of their character

fiction. She leads up to the discussion is raised by

fictional
larger

entities

by

concern with

objects

discussion

of the

classical and

in twentieth-century logic, however. And she frames the of nonexistents in turn by showing how the medieval concern with being is replaced in the philosophical logi logical treatment century

cians of the past crete realities about

by

existence, which

pertains

in time

and space.

The

difficulty

that appears

only to individual, con in ordinary speech

and that
a

fictive beings, which commonly affirms both that they are nonexistent it is possible to make true or false statements about them, is caught in
sentence:

single, witty

In saying

of

anything that it does

not exist we

do

not seem

to be

thinking
object]

and speak

ing
it,

of nothing, both because

"Unicorns

we are

focusing

on

[the

nonexistent

somewhat

as we would on things that such as

do

exist and

because
when

we can

are winged

horses,"

they

are, in

say false sentences about fact, homed horses, and

only Pegasus is

winged.

(P.

81,

emphasis

added)

Russell, in his Theory

of

Denotation,

paraphrases

cate and argues that propositions about

away the subject of the fictive beings are false; Parsons,

a sort

predi adapt

ing
of

Meinong's

Theory

of

Objects, distinguishes between

to the

two kinds of attribution

of

existence, and so allows existence of theories to

beings

fiction. Brann

subjects these and other

a subtle critique and

finds them inadequate

she

to our experience of the

argues, is to treat

actuality of great fictional beings. More adequate, fictive beings as belonging to the realm of images:

But

images,
.
. .

as

formulations melding
attain an

merged the presence and absence of the

actual

Being and Nonbeing, as being they represent,

objects

in

which are

seem to me somehow

[Factions

actuality

of which nonexistents are

incapable. (P. 103)

Review
Brann
and

Essay
a

221

closes the chapter with the question whether nonexistence

course of

is

predicate,

in the

answering it
and

proof of

the existence of God

of

notably lucid its implications.

offers a

analysis of

Anselm's

The fourth kind

ter

naysaying is
treats

speech about philosophical

Nonbeing.

Chap

4, in

which

Brann

Nonbeing, is

the center and one of the peaks of the

whole

book. It is

constituted of explications of two

decisive texts.

Nonbeing
of

appears on the philosophical scene as an unintended consequence

Parmenides'

initiating
.
.

vision

of

"unconceptualized

Being, undetermining
goddess who
"Is,"

thought,

the pure experience of

'Isness' "

(p. 134). The

initiates

follows with the Parmenides, in commanding him to cleave to the way of not injunction to pursue the way of "Is (p. 137). This injunction and parallel
not"

negatives

in

Parmenides'

philosophical poem seem

to

"[show] forth Being

as

as

infused

with

Nonbeing,

that

is,

with

distinctions,
(p. 137).

or

alternatively

carrying

Nonbeing
Two
that flow

shadow"

about as an external

generations

later in

the dialogue Sophist think that

Plato

addresses the paradoxes chief speaker

from attempting to
a stranger

Nonbeing
mean

is. The

in that
that

dialogue,
not.

to Athens from

Parmenides'

hometown, Elea,

proposes

when we speak of

Nonbeing,
two great

we

don't

to say that something simply is

Rather there

are

world-

and

and the other

Other,

which allow us to
else.

say

of

speech-constituting forms, the Same anything that it is the same as itself and

than everything

As Brann frames it:

[The

Other] is
what

the

very

principle of

bonding diversity,
each of

of relationality.
related

For

each

be

ing
ers

is

it is

by

reason of
-it

its

own selfsame

nature, but it is

to all the oth

other.

by

mutual otherness

is bonded to

them as that other's

(P.

141)

Hence,

when we speak of

that it is nothing, we

something as, for example, mean that it is other than just.

about

not

just,

we

do

not mean

And Brann

adds

a sentence

further form

significance

of

Otherness for
makes a
makes

human life: "But

bond
of

whereas the universal

of mutuality, the

Other,

diversity among
only true
oft-told

the

forms,

when

it descends into speech, it

(p. 143,

possible not

negations

but false

attribution

emphasis added).

This is

an

tale. Brann tells it superbly. In

refusal to transpose it

particular

her

fidelity

to

Parmenides'

meaning, her

into

subtly

or us

not-so-subtly

falsifying
fruit

modem

idiom,

and the skill she

displays in nudging
Parmenides

into

position are the

so we can

open toward what and

only

what

experienced

of rare mastery. of naysaying, whose name

"Dialectic"

The fifth kind

is taken from Hegel, is dialectical

self-movement of

negativity (chapter 5). and in Hegel's analysis,

self-movement.

here

means the

thought,

"negativity"

is the
attempt

engine which

drives that
'Is'

patterned

Brann

writes:

"The

[to

give

an account of

dialectical

negativity]

is

not unlike

the attempt to recover the sense of

in Parmenides

both

are

experiences

of

human

reason"

(p. 158).

222

Interpretation
rendition of

negativity in his biography, or auto biography, of the Spirit, the Phenomenology. Then, after a brief analysis of Kant's static negating understanding, she turns to Hegel's Logic:

Brann turns first to Hegel's

[I]n
ally

this

logic the dialectic

. . .

of thought can

be

most

re-performed

The

most

dramatic way to

see

purely witnessed, or better, actu the independence of logical con

tent from

embodied

the most cited sentences of

essence

human subjectivity is to see it [and here she quotes from one of Hegel] as "the exposition of God as he is in his eternal
Nature
and

before the

creation of

finite

Spirit."

(P.

162)
a tacit

One
of

relevance of

Hegel's logic to Brann's larger

inquiry is

implication
pure

Hegel's
as

account of the origin of conceptual

self-

movement

in

Being:

"[J]ust

motion,

Nothing Being could

not

has

come out of

Being,

so,

by

the

Nothing"

come out of

(p. 164).

Brann argues, Hegel's

The
sixth

the

logic

of the

system,

gives

symmetry Only Hegel's prejudice, Being priority over Nothing:

of the

dialectical

thought contains

in itself

seeds of nihilism.

naysaying is Nothing (chapter 6). After a brief review of some "appearances of (p. 170) in poetry and physics, and a glance at the serene attainment of Nothing (Brann coins a Latin phrase, nihilismus hilaris
of
nothing"

kind

[blithe nihilism] [p. 172] to

turns to the encounters with

allude

to

Nothing

Eastern traditions, the book in the West. Brann first circumscribes "a
certain

it) in

brief
about

account of
it"

how

and when we

find

[Nothing]

and

how

we manage

to talk

(p.

175)

and

then,

following

Michael Gillespie,

she

traces the roots

and

rise

of modem nihilism:

[The
lute

deep

root of modern

nihilism] is the

evolution of

the idea of
man

God's
. .

will as ab
abso

solute and the subsequent

willfulness

devolution
nihilism.

of this will will

from God to

[but]

is

next

to

except

affected

by human fiat which by nothingness. (P. 181)

culminates
us

is everything, nothing is what it is is to say that existence is founded on Nothing and is

For if the

This tradition brings before

ics?"

in the

existential nihilism of

Heidegger,
"Angst'

which

Brann

in

a scrupulous

interpretation

of the

essay, "What is Metaphys

Here in the human

attunement

to the world called

(dread) Nothing

manifesting source of Being. Finally Brann turns to death, and closes with a brief word about the way awareness of death ought to shape the way we live. Thus the last word of the conspectus of ways of naysaying is
comes to sight as the ethical:

But for the

think of
as

purposes of

daily life, I
also

hold

with the example of

Socrates,

with what

his

orthogonal mode of

living:

takes us out of
aspect of

time, but

things.

Of course,

doing

vertically likewise

horizontally forward to the death outward to a daily absorption in the

that's another
matter.

that

timeless

(P

198)

Review
3. The Triple

Essay

223

Inquiry

Resolved
into naysaying, in the
there

After the

intervening inquiry

attempt

to answer both to all the

and

the questions that

introduce the book: Is

And how does
conclusion. on

forms

of naysaying?

negation

something bear on imagination formulations

common

time?

Brann formulates her tus, for

sometimes

The
also

conclusion sits

obliquely to the

conspec

drawing

it, but
I

introducing

new

and

topics,

example, the perspectival nature of

privative

Being, both

of which

will

ordinary naysaying and the character of discuss below, which are barely mentioned
sections.
at the

in the

conspectus.

The

conclusion

has three looks

of

The first
sayer.

section of the conclusion

might

activity

of the

human

nay-

One

image the naysaying

everyday

experience

as

Brann de
as cen

scribes

it in two

concentric spheres

extending
ways.

around each

human

being

ter. The nearer sphere embraces what is me-us-our ways, the farther sphere
embraces what

is him-her-them-their

And, before

reflection, we spontane

ously

see

the nearer sphere as good, the farther as less good or bad.

Ordinary

naysaying, that

is, is

self-centered and perspectival.

great

It is possible, but takes

perspective.

effort, to free oneself from this self-centered

allows us

In human

affairs

empathy

to stand in the

place of another

and see ourselves as that other's

other; in

the realm of reason logic remains

lucidity"

positionally

neutral

"from

abstraction

for the love

as

of

(p.

212)

and phi
move

losophy

seeks such positional

neutrality

is

possible and as

fosters its

ment toward wisdom.

Brann's ful
ethical

ordinary naysaying has power implications. Perspectival naysaying, for example, is the source of
account of

the

perspectival nature of

"pseudospeciation,"

what

is

now named

by

the technical term,

the cognitive act

kind or species. whereby differences of degree are construed as differences of some respect differ from When this is at work, other human beings who in

"us"

in degree may be
the

seen as a

different

species

and, therefore, as

not

potentialities, needs and

rights

of a

human being. Brann's

account

possessing implies

that the full and stable empathy, one

allows us to take the own

might call

it

existential

empathy, which

lives

of other

human beings

is

not

simply

form

of sensibility.

It

rather

as seriously as we take our depends on that thought-struc

ture, the

thought-structure of
view

Nonbeing
from

as

otherness, which allows us to rise

and

stably to the "panoramic every positive is also a

depends
wise on the
mere

negative"

every other is an other's other (p. 218). Genuine ethical growth follows
which

and

increasing
imitation,

realization of our
equivalent

human

cognitive

capacities; other

it is

the the

in

action of opinion

in thought.

The

second section of

conclusion moves

from the

structure of our acts of

whether there are negations naysaying to the question

in

the world, to which

our

naysaying

refers:

intrinsic nothings, nonexistents,

nonbeings.

After

review

ing

her

earlier treatment of

Nothing, Brann

turns

first to

sensible nonexistents

and then to

Nonbeing,

which

belongs to the intelligible

realm.

224

Interpretation
realm of

In the

the senses,

Brann

notes that we

do

not

directly

observe gaps

or absences

in

the

sensory

continuum of existents.

It is only because

we compare

the continuum of existents before

us with our imagination- and memory-held

images
nize

of what

is distant, past, fictional

or

ideal

and normative that we

recog
"We

their absence

from among the

existents that are present

here

and now.

are schooled

in the

absences within existence

by

imagination"
. .

our

(p. 217).

In
two

the intelligible realm, she presents an

aspects.

Nonbeing, is
the

the

Nonbeing

Nonbeing possessing discovered in Plato's Sophist, Nonbeing

of as

image

as the

Other,

intelligible

source of the principle of mutual

distinction,

which

every other being's other. She calls Nonbeing, horizontal, because in making all beings distinct in the same way it puts them on the same level. Nonbeing2 is the complement to Nonbeing,. "This Nonbeing is not objecti
makes each

being

fied relativity but has in it something of absolute inferiority, of defective or (p. 216). It is the "responsible cause deficient of defective or defi
Being"
.

cient

Being

which

seems

to fit certain objects as we

mistakes"

analyze

them in

images, fictions, lies, hierarchy, their rank depending

thought:
that enters

(p. 216).

Nonbeing2
vertical

puts objects

in

on the

degree
calls of

of presence or privation of

Being
ranks

into their
or

constitution.

She

Nonbeing2
Being.

because it

being

as

higher

lower in their fullness forms

of

Brann later
which mirror

correlates these

Nonbeing
of

with the

forms

of

naysaying
sake of

them, reformulating the kinds

naysaying
how the

as two

for the

exhibiting I note briefly that Brann does

distributed First
over the two she

the correspondence.

not spell out

ways of

summary kinds. I believe it must recapitulates the ways of naysaying as five:

seemed to

work

naysaying like this.

are

Negation has then

the

be:

[1] feeling and saying no [Cap. 1], for negative objectives in thought and expressing them in sentences quali [2] having fied by not [Cap. 2], [3] for entertaining negative objects of sense and thought such as Nonexistence and Nonbeing [Caps. 3 and 4], [4] for the conceptual motion of dialectical negativity [Cap. 5], [5] and, finally, for the feel of nothingness and the apprehension of Nothing [Cap.
6]. (P.

human capacity for

217)
these ways of naysaying are redistributed
must

Second,
two, One
and

into two. Of these, one,

four

be

elements of

naysaying,, the

discursive, distinction-making

thought and speech which expresses the mutual otherness caused

contributes a

by

Nonbeing,.

willful,

as well as a

tacitly cognitive,

element to perspectival

naysaying.

Five

and

three are then elements of naysaying2, which embraces

those denials which are

"ineradicably denigrations,

recognitions of a

hierarchy
or

among beings or existents, insofar as they are infected by Nonexistence (p. 217), of which the responsible cause is Nonbeing,.
vation]"

[pri

Review
One
other matter must

Essay

225
to

be brought back

on

stage

before Brann is
model

able

formulate the human

theory"

conclusion of
presents

her inquiry. This is her

this model (a
of the

of the embodied

soul.

Brann
at

"working hypothesis,
book. It

nothing like

a
a

[p. xi])

the

very opening

pictures the soul as

having

front,
it

a
.

middle, and a back. "The front is

where a world

that impinges on us as

senses"

wills

confronts us: at the organs of our external

(p. xi,

emphasis

added).

The back is

where

the soul thinks.

as

"[Thinking] is
. .

behind

and

beneath in

everything
coeval with

we are and

do,

its prop
xi).

and ground

Naysaying
territory;

originates
perhaps

this most ultimate and

dominating
(p.

rear of our psychic

it is

itself"

thinking

It is the
we

area

representations"

contain earlier

in between sensing and thinking, the "large middle space where (p. xi), the imagination, that was the focus of

Brann's

inquiries,

the original
of

inquiry

into how

we

have

images,
neither

and

the second

into how the images internal

memory

and anticipation contribute

representations

to the
the
re

constitution of our
presence of

sense of

time. These

"are

thought nor the presentations of sense, yet

compounded of

both:

presentations structured
sense"

by
a

the distinctions of thought and filled with the echoes

of

(p. 216).

She closing

now

frames for

final time the

question she will then answer

in the two

paragraphs of

the book:

Imagination

and

time seem to

lie, in

the imagined

topography

of the

soul, between

the negativity of
and speech

thinking

and

the positivity of sensing.

Is the naysaying of thought

appear and

recognizably
constitution

related

to the yea, and particularly the nay, which

that
arise

to lie in the
memory?

of the

representations

in the imagination

in

(P.

218,

emphasis

added)

In

short: are the

forms

of

ing

which contribute

to the

Nonbe naysaying recognizably related to the forms of constitution of the images of imagination and our

sense of time?

Perhaps the best way to clarify the very dense final movement of the book is to recognize that it continues, and sometimes reprises, the correlated dichoto argument from mies initiated above. It serves both as a summation and as an between the objects of the correlated dichot probability based on the similitude comment on it. omies. Let me trace Brann's further analysis. Then I will that depend on our faculty of capacities two the Brann begins

by taking

up

imagination. Capacity,, sensing time, is our ability "to live longitudinally might the now point, preserving what no longer is and projecting what

around
be"

(p.

218). Capacity2, imagination, is

appearances

our

present"

in

a timeless

ability "to (p. 218). (p.

experience nonentities

as vivid

mirror"

These two

capacities

"seem to

218)

the two
of

kinds

of

naysaying
and the

articulated above.

The

similitude

between the two kinds

naysaying

two

capacities of

sensing

time and

imagining

becomes

clearer when we make

226

Interpretation
of thinking the two kinds of naysaying embody. It persuades our belief that the kinds of naysaying underlie
representational capacities.

more explicit the structures

is this

similitude which

and structure the

two inward

Naysaying,

is discursive thinking,
here"

which

is "always passing from this to

not

this, from here to

not

(p. 218). In terms

of the model of the embodied

human soul, Brann defines naysaying, as the intelligible structure which distin guishes the images of memory and anticipation so they contribute to the consti tution of our sense of time passing from here to not here, from not yet to now
to no longer.

Naysaying2 is intuitive thought, "which

nate

has before it beings

and

their subordi
of the as

nothings"

reflections, nonbeings, nonexistents,

of the
embodied
.
.

(p. 218). In terms

model

human soul, Brann distinguishes naysaying2

existence-

"the

thought structure

inward

images"

(p.

voided sensation [which] mates with the middle space sensation and in between 218)
.

to produce thought.

pause

to

note

that

it is

not quite clear

how many

steps are understood

in

this process of image-formation. Brann's metaphor pictures it as a mating be tween the thought structure of

Nonbeing

and existence-voided sensation.

Here

is my question: If a sensation is existence- voided, must not Nonbeing already be at work? And if Nonbeing has already been at work, why must there be a
second negation

by Nonbeing

to transform the
question

now existence-voided sensation

into

an

image? Or to frame the

in

another way:

In this

process or

there
exis-

seem to arise
tence- attached

in

sequence three objects of awareness:

(1)

perception and

sensation,

How does

one

distinguish
image?

(2) existence-voided (2) and (3)? Is not

sensation,

(3)

the image.

existence-

voided sensation

already already

constituted constitute

by

the mating of sensation and Nonbeing?

Why

does this

not

it

as an

With these

similitudes

established, Brann is
of this

able to write a

closing

sentence

which concludes the of

inquiry

book into

what

is

common

among the ways

of the

naysaying

ways of

simultaneously the triple inquiry into the relationship naysaying to the imagination and, in consequence, to time:
and
at

It is in these images
come

the center of our

us

human

being

that all the ways of

naysaying

together to

deliver

from

the

ing
What

us

to the blank nothingness

of

brute positivity oblivion. (P. 218)

of existence without consign

all the

ways

of

naysaying have in
all their

common turns out to

be,

not

"one

meaning"

ultimate

(p. xiv), but

collaboration

in producing the images

of our

imagination

and time

in

saying

activity.

There is, indeed,

of

a slight

naysaying"

be

said

ambiguity in this formulation. May "all the ways to come together in the images at the center of our human

being (1)
the
emphatic

because
as

image

such,

Naysaying, and Naysaying, are both considered to constitute or (2) because in this closing formulation the foregoing
and

distinction between the image

time is dropped and

sensing time,

Review
which

Essay

227

in

part

depends

in the

reference to the

mental to note

on the images of memory and anticipation, is embraced image? Both may be true, but the second is more funda in the horizon of the triple inquiry.

As I

remarked at the

beginning

of this review,

Brann's book

merits our atten

tion because it invites us to

reflect on

thinking

and as the appropriate

inquiry literary form for

both

as a mode of philosophical and

presenting philosophy;

to

reflect also on

the

the negative that appears

This

reflection

try to cope philosophically with in speaking. our multifariously is sometimes invited by small ambiguities or lacunae in the

issues

that arise when we

text, which open onto large questions. The conclusion, in particular, because of its intricate themes and lapidary conciseness, raises such questions. Let me give
two examples as contributions to a discussion at the far
edge of

Brann's inquiry.
are

1. Brann remarks, "Collections

course also modes of

and

overviews

and of

direct insights

of

thinking, but

the

discerning

divisions

prepares most

conclusions"

thoughtful

(p. 213). The

"but"

adversative and prior

suggests that the

dis

cerning

of

divisions

can occur

collecting,

forming

overviews,

distinctly from and having direct

a

to the unifying modes of

conclusions.

This is, to be sure,

book

about negation.

insight in preparing thoughtful But one must wonder

whether the act of

discerning
a prior,

divisions intuitive
a

can

be

understood at all without

seeing

it

(a)

as

based

upon with

presupposition

of a whole and

(b)

as,

simultaneously a. The discerning

every dividing,
of

constituting of a new collection. divisions depends on a prior, immediate, wholelike

mirrors

con

texture of opinions, which waveringly

the interwoven entities of Becom

occurs within an

ing
sive

and, perhaps, of stable

Being

beyond. Thus every division

anticipatory,

confused, and taken-for-granted pre-collection, which the purpo

and collection aim to make more precise.

division

In this

perspective, the

taken-for-granted collections that opinion constitutes

may be

said to prepare all

thoughtful divisions.

b. Because

our

thinking begins

within

and presupposes

this given, always

division that we already roughly articulated whole, every is a re-division. And it is simultaneously sive

make with our purpo

thinking

a re-collection,

for it
of
of

redistributes the parts within the given whole.

In this perspective, to think

concomitant constitution

the

discerning
is
a

of

divisions

as separated

from the

unities

misleading abstraction, for division

and collection
"fittingness"

mutually

consti

tute one another.

And, indeed, if consistency,

whole, is

the

of each part with

every
of all

other part within a

one sign of a

true account, the fullest

move

seeing

divisions

and collections together

2. Some

of the questions that arise

is necessary to are intrinsic to

toward it.

one sort of

division in

formulations: Are the branches of the dichotomy exhaus speech, dichotomous the two all of a given kind between them? And are they exclusive,

tive,

dividing

branches Further
which

of the

dichotomy
arise

excluding

each

other

in thought
of

or

in the

world?

questions

from the

schematic

correlations

the

dichotomies,

suppress

secondary distinctions

and correlations that

may be important

228
for

Interpretation
Such questions, for example, arise in Brann's conclusion with the negations that constitute an image and (b) the negations that
time

understanding.

regard

to

(a)

constitute time. a.

side

In setting up her analysis of the image and of her dichotomies, Nonbeing, (horizontal,
and on the other

Brann correlates,

on the one

relational

otherness), naysaying,
and

(distinction-making, discursive thinking

time) and,
tion of

speaking)
the

capacity,

(sensing

side, Nonbeing2 (vertical, Being), naysaying2 (denigrating denials that

and

responsible cause of priva recognize

the privation of
a timeless pres

Being, intuitive thought)

ent).

capacity2

(experiencing
the

images in

Because

of these

correlations,

Nonbeing2,

responsible cause

that makes
appears as

every image

a privative or

quasi-being in relationship

to

its original, least two

the only explicit

form

of

Nonbeing

that constitutes an image.

Yet Nonbeing,,
ways: as a

the principle of otherness, contributes to the

image in

at

picture, the image's parts are

as a quasi-thing, the

internally

articulated as other

than each other, and

thing,

including

image is distinguished from every other thing and quasiits original, as their other. Both sorts of Nonbeing, as the clos
are essential

ing

sentence

implies,

to the constitution of the

image, but

the un

qualified,

correlated

dichotomies in

veil the grounds to understand this.

b. Parallel

problems occur

determining

the

negative constitution of

time.

First,

the

dichotomous formulations depends

suggest that

forming
this

images
not so.

time are alternative capacities on the same level.

But

is

sensing The capacity

and

to sense time in
to

part

on and so

is derivative from the primary capacity

explicitly correlates experiencing images only with Nonbeing2, so it explicitly correlates sensing time only with Nonbeing,. Yet as in part derivative from the experience of images the experi
ence

have images. Second, just

as the conclusion

of time

must

already

require

both forms direct

of

Nonbeing. Let

us

extend

slightly this analysis of the

Our is
experience of present

negative structure of

time.
perception-cognition of what

time mingles

(1)

the

before

us with

(2)

consciousness of the

inner images

which

embody

sequentially future.
Let every
us

ordered memories of the past and anticipations of the yet unrealized

look first

at

the work of

existent

belongs to the

Nonbeing2 in the experience of time. Because realm of Becoming, it is always marked by a

already embody
Non-

privation of

Being. So the

originals we perceive-cognize

being,. And the images

which constitute our memories and anticipations em

body
ing^
plays

a second

derivative from
And
one

of privation of Being. Our sensing time, therefore, as capacity to have images, depends on two degrees of Nonbe could discern privations of Being of other degrees.
our

degree

Now let

us

turn to the work of

role we

Nonbeing,

in the

experience of

time.

First, it

the double

articulating each part of from other existents and quasi-existents, including its original. Then cooperates with Nonbeing2 in constituting the Becoming which our

have already outlined in the constitution of images, an image from every other and distinguishing the image

Nonbeing,
experience

Review
of time reflects.

Essay 229

The

passage of

time is a continuous othering. As soon as we

try

to conceptualize this othering we tun into all the perplexities of conceptualiz

motion.

ing

But

we can

certainly say temporal

we can observe

passage passage

is

a continuous expres

sion of
ulated:

Nonbeing,. And

that this

is itself

inwardly

artic

It has different depths, tempi, Music

offers an example of

articulated

extents, overlapping wholes

and parts.

this configured othering, in which aural

perception-cognition collaborates with aural

images
an

to form an articulated
entwined with

whole.

All this implies in

the multiple degrees of

Nonbeing2
all entities

memory and anticipation infinite play of Nonbeing, discussed above.

sorts of

as

Only

when we acknowledge that

both

orate, that there are degrees of

are, and that

privation of

Being

as entities more or

Nonbeing collab less fully

only

Nonbeing,

sponsors otherness

in infinite

respects and number,

then do we get a

feel for how variously the

negative threads and shapes our

ordinary world. We must transcend the unqualified dichotomies of the conclu sion in order to be able to extend Brann's analysis to its full explanatory reach.

4. Coda: Metaxic Inwardness In closing let use the language

me set the concerns of the of

trilogy in

larger horizon. I

will

Plato in

doing

so. often recurred

yet

Plato's intellectual imagination

middle element which unity.

to the figure of the mean, the

extremes

distinguishes

bonds two

in

differentiated

So the Timaeus, for example,

represents

the divine Workman as

binding
order

the primal elements together to

make

by

continued geometric proportion

(31cff.) in

the cosmos "one whole, one of all the wholes,

complete and

unaging
the word

unailing"

and

(33a-b). The intermediate is

preposition

often

indicated in Plato

by

metaxy, an adverb and

of all

Becoming,

whose structure

the

receptivities and activities of

meaning between. The metaxy is the domain is a melding of Being and Nonbeing. Thus all (p. xi) the embodied soul, "the human
structures of metaxic

center"

are, to coin a term of convenience,

inwardness.

Brann's trilogy may be

ties that

characterized as a monumental

inquiry

into

capabili

belong

to the realm of

metaxic

inwardness. Of these, the

inquiry

into

and, in its breadth and explicitness, the imagination is the imagination and its the least precedented. As Brann frames the place of the
most compendious attraction

for inquiry:
placed

[Imagination] is
soul and world.
without.

faculties centrally between the

this
great power even

and

intermediary between
it to the
objects au

Thus it both holds the

given

soul together and connects

Yet the treatment

by habitually

definitive

thors like Aristotle or

Kant is tacitly

unfinished, cursory, and

problematic.

The

imag
first

ination

appears

to

pose a problem
philosophy.

too

deep
was p.

for

acknowledgment.

It is,

so to speak,

the missing mystery of

It

both the mystery

and

its

neglect

that

drew

me

to the

subject.

(Brann, 1991,

3)

230
The
the

Interpretation
subjects of the

later two books, sensing time,

naysaying,
which structures the constituted

which

is derivative from
are

imagination,

and

imagination,

equally
and

embodiments of metaxic

inwardness,
of

by

the mingling of

Being

Nonbeing. The features

human
metaxic

existence which can

only if seen in the light of dom I mention the virtues,

and are attuned and

inwardness

are uncountable. which

be rightly understood Almost at ran

themselves embody

cardinal and

theological,

to

a world marked

by

presence and absence

together,

by Being

Nonbeing

both:

Temperance, Courage, Justice,

Love.
on virtue

and

(human) Wisdom; Faith,

this
out

Hope,

and embodied

Plotinus in his treatise

ontological

(Ennead 1 .2)

points

in analyzing the
called

foundations

of the civic virtues.

These

cannot

properly be

godlike, for

they

cannot occur

in the divine

realm:

First, it is debatable
have temperance,

whether all

courage.

To [the World

nothing outside it. Nor [for the desire to have or take which might

[virtues] belong to [the World Soul], e.g., that it Soul] nothing is frightening, for there is same reason does] any sweetness draw near [it], a
arise

if [the sweetness]

were absent.

(1.2.1.10-13)
In short, the
realm civic virtues take

their shape from the metaxic, absence-threaded

in

which

they

occur and

disappear

as

one mounts

through the higher

realms,

where the gradations of

Being

are

increasingly
and

full.

Here, too, in
the

the

metaxic realm
pher.

belong

the prayer of the

believer

the

reflection of

philoso

And

here, responding in different

presence, are bom that

ways to the same mysterious copresence

and constructive

of absence and

inquiry

theory.
an analysis of

(I

note

briefly

Plotinus
an

also

introduces in this Ennead

structure of vertical

nonreciprocal

likeness,

important

Nonbeing:

[Let us] remark that likeness is two-fold. The one kind in the like things, those whose likeness arises from the
other

requires

something the

same

same

[Form].
not

Among

the

kind,
in

one

thing is like

an nor

other, but the

other

is primary,

turning

about to
must as

ward that

[secondary] thing
a

being

said to

be like it. In this case,

"likeness"

be

said

different respect,

not

requiring

the same
since

Form [in the primary

in

the

secondary thing] but

rather an other

[Form],

it is like in

an other respect.

[1.2.2.4-10]
This
means

that objects of the same ontological order can have a reciprocal

likeness, but in the case of divine Cause and nondivine effect, we can be said to be like the Cause, but the Cause cannot be said to be like us. For the influence
of this
see

distinction in Christian theology

pp.

and

the arts in the service of

theology,
with the

Trimpi,

166-228.)
of metaxic

One further feature

inwardness, intimately intertwined

naysaying, seems notably

inquiries into

imagination, time,

and

absent.

Its

im-

Review
plicit presence and actual absence appears

Essay

231
from

in

an

image Brann

summarizes

the

Republic:
Thus Socrates

says that the

beginning

of

reflection, the "winch of the

soul"

from

Becoming

to

Being, is

when we see that our

fourth finger

embodies a contradiction
pinkie and

since we must

smaller than the middle

say that it is larger and smaller at once finger. (Brann, 2001, p. 52)

larger than the

What is

unmentioned at the

here is the

power

that drives the winch, Eros. For

Eros,
.
. .

too, belongs
tence.

heart

of the graded

intermediations that

constitute our exis a great

As Diotima tells Socrates in the

Symposium, "Eros is
and mortal
.

daemon,

for everything daemonic is between god both and fills up the interval so that the

[I]t is in the

middle of

whole

itself has been bound together

as multifarious

by
p.

it"

(202d-e; Benardete, 2001,

as

p.

32). Eros is
compares
things"

in his

appear

ances as the sophist to whom

Diotima
of good

him (203e; Benardete, 2001,

p.

34). But

"the

whole

desire

(205d; Benardete, 2001,

wisdom.

36),

Eros in his

most enlightened

form is the desire for

Eros is that

passion

without which

the philosopher would not open onto the whole and,

erotic

through his own daemonic

of

Eros,

to

adapt a

inwardness

seems

indeed, life, bond the whole. This negative silhouette metaphor Brann favors, in the trilogy on the forms of metaxic to call for a fourth inquiry, a sober satyr play.

REFERENCES
Plato."

Benardete, Seth.
Greek

"Strauss
and

on

Poetry

Philosophy. Edited

1993. In The Argument of the Action: Essays on and with an Introduction by Ronna Burger and Allan

Michael Davis, Bloom

and

pp.

407-17. Chicago:

Plato 's Symposium. Translated

Seth Benardete.

University of Chicago Press, 2000. by Seth Benardete with Commentaries by Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Liberal Education

Brann, Eva. "The Student's

369-85. "An Appreciation
dents."

Problem."

54,

no.

3 (October, 1968):

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction for Stu In Essays in Honor of Jacob Klein. Annapolis, MD: St. John's College Press,
of
a

1976.
Paradoxes of Education in Republic. Chicago:

University

of

Chicago Press,

1979a.
"What Is
a

Body

in Kant's

System?"

The Independent Journal of Philosophy 3

(1979b): 91-100. "What Is

Philosophy?"

Energeia (Winter, 1990): 32-35.

jhe World of Littlefield, 1991.

Brann. Edited 1997a.

the Imagination:

Sum

and

Substance.

Lanham, MD: Rowman &

"Xhe Venetian

Phaedrus."

1971. In The Past-Present: Selected Writings of Eva

pp.

by

Pamela Kraus,

61-77. Annapolis, MD: St. John's College

Press,

232

Interpretation
"Kant's
Imperative."

1979. In The Past-Present: Selected Writings of Eva

pp.

Brann. Edited

by Pamela Kraus,

153-65. Annapolis, MD: St. John's College

Press,

1997b.

"Plato's Brann. Edited

Theory of by Pamela Kraus,

Modernity."

Ideas."

1979. In Past-Present: Selected Writings of Eva pp. 99-116. Annapolis, MD: St. John's College

Press, 1997c.
"The Roots
of pp.

by

Pamela

Kraus,

1979. In The Selected Writings of Eva Brann. Edited 143-51. Annapolis, MD: St. John's College Press, 1997d.
Questions."

"The Second Power

of Eva Brann. Edited

of

1992. In The Past-Present: Selected Writings

pp.

by

Pamela

Kraus,

167-89. Annapolis, MD: St. John's Col Selected MD: St.

lege

Press,

1997e.
an

"Do You Know What

Writings of Eva Brann. Edited John's College Press, 1997f.

1993. In The Past-Present: Odyssey Pamela Kraus, pp. 401-8. Annapolis, by

Is?"

"Philosophical
Brann. Edited

Paganism."

1995. In The Past-Present: Selected Writings of Eva

pp.

by

Pamela Kraus,

117-41. Annapolis, MD: St. John's College

Press,

1997g.

Cassity,

The Ways of Naysaying. Turner. "The Power of

What, Then, Is Time? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.
Abstraction."

In The Destructive Element: New

and

Selected Poems, pp. 12-13. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998. Klein, Jacob. A Commentary on Plato's Meno. Chapel Hill: University

of

North Carolina

Press, 1965.

University of Chicago Press, 1977. 1940. In Lectures and Essays. "Phenomenology and the History of Edited by Robert Williamson and Elliott Zuckerman, pp. 65-84. Annapolis, MD: St.
Science."

Plato's Trilogy. Chicago:

John's College Press, 1985. Greek Mathematical Thought

and

the

Origin of Algebra. 1934-36. Translated

by

Eva Brann. New York: Dover, 1992.

Lachterman, David Raport. The Ethics of Geometry: A Genealogy of Modernity. London: Routledge, 1989. Ortega y Gasset, Jose. The Origin of Philosophy Translated by Toby Talbot. New York: Norton, 1967. Pieper, Josef. Guide to Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Pantheon, 1962. Strauss, Leo. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952.
.

Thoughts

on

Machiavelli. Chicago:

What Is Political Philosphy?

University of Chicago Press, 1958. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959.

Tarcov, Nathan,
Political
and

Thomas L. Pangle. "EPILOGUE: Leo Strauss and the History of In History of Political Philosophy. 3d ed. Edited by Leo Strauss Joseph Cropsey, pp. 907-34. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
and
Philosophy."

Trimpi, Wesley. Muses of One Mind: The Literary Analysis of Experience

nuity.

and

its Conti

Princeton: Princeton

University Press,

1983.

Vico, Giambattista. The New Science of Giambattista Vico. 1744. Translated by Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968.

Book Review

Benardete'

Odyssey
Odyssey

Seth Benardete, The Bow and the Lyre: A Platonic Reading of the (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), xiv + 175 pp., $29.95. Will Morrisey
Hillsdale College

Philosophy
'philosophic
of

asks

questions of
must

tradition, then

spins tradition of

its

own.

tradition'

be

some

tradition that builds questions of

tradition generally, into itself. One such tradition interrogates the

poetry.

itself, and Odyssey,

seeking philosophy in Homer's

unnecessary to the
acquired that

Few

modem philosophers

this tradition, such philosophers

having

judged the

learning

have taken up needed to do so

philosophic quest as

they

conceive

it. Seth Benardete has

learning,

and with

it the

strength to

follow the tradition. He departs

from

modem philosophers, as the phrase

renewing
goes,
offers

an old voyage.

His book,

resists summary.

But it

encourages

insight,

and

listing
He

some

insights Benardete

may invite

consideration of

his

argument.

recalls

the acknowledged wisdom of poets and

philosophic wisdom

philosophers and asks readers poetic.

to wonder if and how

nal

diverges from

Does the

ratio

dialectic

of argument
or plot

differ
(p.

fundamentally

from the "poetic

Achilles

dialectic"

of

speech and action,

xiii)?

1. "Whereas the Iliad begins

with the names of

and

his

father,"

the
a

Odyssey
feats least
In

begins

with a man

in

much-traveled man separated

whom anonymity is from "father and

One,"

coupled with

knowledge,

fatherland"

(p. 3). Odysseus de

the Cyclopes
'rooted,'

so

and by using his mind, the calling himself "No the most anonymous human characteristic. doing, and yet also in so doing as part of a voyage back to his father

by

land, back to his the fatherland, the

his voyage, he
natural right. wisdom will

'roots,'

rule

Odysseus radically alters the conditions of his rule of (p. 4). Before he had won by revolution or "natural
right"

ruled

by

natural right

but had

not used

his

mind

to

understand

"[W]hat

was

originally

an accidental coincidence of power and

effort

have to be

replaced

by

the conscious

to

put

them together;

effort"

but the terrible

seem to

consequences of

that

deny

the

desirability

of

their

coincidence.

(the slaying of the suitors) "would Homer seems to have re

flected

on the

Platonic possibility

of philosopher-kings

(p. 4). The Olym

pian gods are the ones who overthrew

their

fathers,

the cosmic gods, and Odys-

interpretatton,

Winter 2001-2, Vol. 29, No. 2

234
seus

Interpretation
imitated them. Associated
respecting the
always with

the Olympians (while his men

remain pious

Sun), Odysseus

understands the world as nature not upon natural right not paternity,

cosmos,

understands political rule as

founded

and rules accordingly.

Any
chy,

monarchy
usual

must concern

itself

with succession.
presents

A its

natural

right

monar

one

that sees mere paternity as

inadequate,

ruler with a problem

beyond the

The

people of

worry that the legitimate heir to the throne may prove a dunce. Ithaca are restless, understandably: the brothers and cousins of
suitors

Penelope's importunate
king. The Olympian
new regime

had been led to

violent

death

by
on

her husband the

how to found
must a

gods of natural

right instruct Odysseus in

which son

in the "postheroic

world"

Telemachus

live,

an

iron

age ruled

by

Athena
out"

or mind

(p. 13). Telemachus

advice"

consults

Athena but (pp.

imprudently
a remarkable

"blurts
puts

her "private

in front

of the suitors question.

14-15),
is
events"

failure that

his

own natural right

to

rule

into

'The

Odyssey

for

the light touch with which Athena guides the course of

ancients there

(p. 15); for the

is

no

reason and the slaughterbench of conceived as a

'history'

very tight connection between the (that is to say, there is no This is so,
even

rule of

'history'

dialectical
the

course of events).

if Athena

occasion

ally 2. In the

commends

use of

the slaughterbench to rulers.

Odyssey
in

the person who most closely resembles a historicist

events

is

Nestor,
icy"

who

believes human
which

to be explicable in terms of "a strict theod

everything that happens happens because wise and just gods cause it (p. 19). Those slaughtered are rightly slaughtered; only the good survive. Nestor is no poet; his speeches lack both simile and dialogue.
or moral tale

Simile

and

dialogue

bring duality in, Poetry

brings

and with

it

moral ambiguity.

Poetic dialec
than it
evil,"

tic yields no grand synthetic end and raises questions more

sets
at

insistently

down

answers.

with

it "a

perspective

beyond

good and

account

least in any narrow or leads in the end

'moralizing'

sense of the phrase

(p. 21). The Nestorian

not

to piety but to the disappearance of the gods, who

are relativized to certain places and times.

Duality
wanted to

also

inheres in the distinction between

appearance and

reality, a dis

tinction that would

bedevil the thinkers

of the

Enlightenment,

who said

they
the

bring
of

reality to the

surface and make

it publicly

authoritative.

But

harshness

its publicity a source of endless vengeance, or of despairing listlessness; political life, impossible without memory, is only pos sible if memory is limited wise forgetfulness, as when Helen drugs men, by
reality
would make malignant

making them "forget their

some memories and mixed

thoughts

sorrows"

and

(p. 27).
acts

covering others, poetry in its doubleness

best poets; they

By selecting like the drug

must plan

by

the

beautiful, Argus-eyed,
gods and the

transpolitical Helen. Founders

thoughtfully like
plans and even

must also understand that the

the planning, the work of the mind, also affect (at worst

infect)

the workings of the heart or spirit (thumos). "Helen seems to

of the

have

all the traits

poet, from the coolness with which Homer depicts the most terrible things

Book Review
to

-235

his mimetic capacity to insight into the hiddenness

even
ite"

make

things appear in all their vividness and his

things"

of

(p. 29). But Homer's Odysseus

excels

her;
of

unlike

her, he "seems

never to

have fallen

under the spell of

choose

Aphrod

and so exhibits a

instead
3.

strong moral immortality? godly

choice of

character.

Why

then does he

mortality
a

Odysseus'

mortality

occurs

during

his stay

with

Calypso,

stay
of

that the wise Athena (not

Aphrodite)

arranges so that the natural

softening

democratic

in Ithaca may take place, and King potential successor, Telemachus, may mature both in the course of nature, over time. In choosing mortality, Odysseus rejects the mindlessness of paradise, where "there seems to be no place for (p. 35). It is a wise choice, especially given the suspicion that Calypso's offer was empty, and Odysseus would have been killed, not deified, had he accepted it (p. 37).
resentments
Odysseus'
man"

This
seus'

non-choice points to the

'double'

frustration
to

of

life,

the anger of thwarted

or to the gods.

desires
'Odys

that cause minds to

by 'talking
his
new

themselves,'

may be
At the

a pun on

odussamenos, the anger

of someone against someone

rule of

else.

founding

stage of

regime, the natural-right

the angry
reli

but

not mindless man will

be terror (p. 34). If the

at the same

gods withdraw,

human

ance upon mind and

need

force, but
with

time human

self-opacity
stay

and the

for

caution and
a

questioning, all intensify.

4. After
cians,
who

long

stay

Calypso, Odysseus has

human
paradise

a short

with the Phaea-

live in

a sort of

"without

suffering"

pain or

(p. 47).

Having

chosen the

human, Odysseus
legal
(p.

will

induce the Phaeacians to

make the

same choice.

Odysseus is the humanist

reconciliation of

evangel.

A human life, in its doubleness,

longs for the

but only
rily,

right with natural right. and therefore

This

can

be done,

at the expense of eros

59),

it

cannot

be done

satisfacto

once and

for

all.

5.

Centrally, Homer
story,
at the

goes

along
of

with

human

his

own

prompting

In telling his story, with his considerable ingness "to

an act of run risks

Odysseus'

King "morally

Alcinous
neutral

duality by having Odysseus tell ("Brain") of the Phaeacians.

curiosity"

is

on

display, along
will siege of

moral virtues.

The two
(p. 69).

come

together in

Odysseus'

for

knowledge"

Participating

in the

Troy,

ways of

dubious justice, Odysseus want to know more about the conflicting (alaomen, and so voyages. 'There are forms of the verb 'to
wander'

mai) that

are

indistinguishable from

be

but cannibalistic, insular, and (p. 72). Odysseus outwits them, using the
apart"

(p. 72). From the orderly doltish Cyclopes he leams that "law and order can
universal-anonymous mind,
anger.
Odysseus'

'true'

(alethes)"

which at the

crucial moment overmasters

From his disastrous

encounters with

incestuous Aeolus limitations

and cannibalistic

Laestrygonians he begins

to see the

natural

of the rule of the

mind, namely, the

bodily

and the

democratic.
These
ceives
adventures and misadventures prepare
Odyssey"

him for the

education

he

re

from Hermes, "the

peak of

the

(p. 84). After committing his

236
first
men

Interpretation
act of

justice that does

not serve

himself

(embarking
Hermes,

on the rescue of

his

from

Circe) Odyssey
shows

sees the revelation of

nature of

who not

only tells him

about, but

him the
his

the moly, a plant that protects him against

the witch's spells. Knowledge of

of the gods without power arises

nature

"lets Odysseus

share

in the knowledge
gods'

having

to share

in their

being"

(p. 85). "[T]he

of

from

the

knowledge"

of the nature of of the

things, especially
mind:

human

beings. The human

body

is the true home

human

this

discovery
rooted-

reconciles the quest of the rootless mind with the

ness.

longing
come

for home, for

one.

plant

that

has both flower

and

root, it is two and it is to have

"It

now seems

that

Homer

was

the

first,

as

far

as we

know,

to an

this philosophic principle, to which he gave the name that had to precede its
ery"

'nature.'

understanding of The experiences

of

discovery
odyssey

are

the measure of the

difficulty
as

its discov
philoso

(p. 87).

Odysseus'

represents the philosophic quest.

The

pher

is both human,

an embodied

mind,

and

divine, insofar
suggests

he knows himself
though

(as

an embodied mind). man as

The

philosophic not open

life

"a

humanity that,

it belongs to he is is

man, is

not necessarily unless Without that knowledge he can be

every man, since what he is necessarily he knows that that is what he is necessarily.
to
rule"

enchanted and made subject to perfect

(p. 87). How then

could a philosopher

live (as he must,

given

human
men

limitations)
a

among fellow
version of the

men who are not philosophic?

Unphilosophic
man"

"must have

knowledge

of what constitutes

(p. 88). That knowledge is

the

story

of

Hades,
of

which teaches all men that soul and

body

are

separable,

and

that mindlessness is to be feared. Hades

is "a lawful
before

Odysseus'

equivalent of

knowledge

his

nature"

(p. 88).
and after

Odysseus'

knowledge

requires moral virtue

receiving it. Hu

man are

being,
visible,

anthropos, is intelligible and

invisible;

manliness and womanliness

bodily,
man

necessary.

Odysseus

must resist

the temptation of

Circe;
(p.

"there is in

choose to call

capacity to resist, a strength of soul or it, that can be lost or diminished regardless of
some virtue encompasses not self-control

whatever we

knowledge"

89). This thumotic

other

men, the unphilosophic ones;

and that

political

losopher,
must

life includes

a measure

only life remains necessary for the of piety. The suitors ignore the

but sympathy for

phi

wis

dom that begins

be
so

cans need
can

Hades, and this is the real reason why they for the good of both philosopher and city. Ithaforcefully punished, to be re-minded. The philosopher, for his part, needs to learn that he
with the of
not

fear

know, but
way"

know all, that he

can resist

but

not

finally
fate"

defeat evil,

and

that he can persuade, but only to a point.

Self,

gods,

and other men

"stand in

his

(p. 100). He

must

in this

sense

"submit to his
may be
seen

(p. 100).
return

6. The limited freedom

Odyssey

enjoys

in his lies. Upon

ing home, he

would

rule, but ruling after the experience of philosophic noesis

differs from ruling before it. Odysseus will soon push off for another voyage, a second sailing. To leave his kingdom (p. 104), safely "in the hands of his
son"

Book Review
he
must

237

employ both force

in the

and

fraud.

Having
is

employed

town will be both the

combine

philosophic and

the

politic move

to

make.

them, getting out of Force and fraud

a punishment

killing

of the suitors, which

not

merely

but

an

exemplary the future indignation

phize and side with

punishment

"designed to illustrate the principle, 'Fear the

men'"

gods and

of

(p. 106).

Liars, including

poets, can philoso

the gods.

7. Once the
of

gods

"have

withdrawal"

completed

their

(p. 120),

eyewitnesses

divinity

will give

way to

prophets who

hear the divine. Such hearsay,

thoughts"

at

least

in Telemachus, "seems to be nothing but his own (p. 1 17). The noetic experience will become more internalized in the twilight world, the iron age. The twilight
rule the

of the gods and

heroes

also

brings democracy. Telemachus Eumaeus

will

future Ithaca, but

will share power with

and even a cowherd.

philosophic
reason"

As for Odysseus, his

character.

political character comes

care

to dominate his

Homer takes
Odysseus'

(p. 126),

distinguishing

"how closely anger can pose as the bow from the lyre, and both from the liar. The
to
show

anger not

built into
always

name comes to the surface

in the

end.

Philosophy
rarest

does

'take,'

even after one experiences

it.

Philosophy
Laertes'

is for the

natures;

perhaps one should not suppose oneself

to be a

philosopher.

shroud 8. Penelope's weaving and unweaving of prudent political their most them from course, ors, distracting

enchants the suit which would

responsible

have

been to form
deaths
of so

oligarchy and ignore the many Ithacan men, will kill

an
soft-spirited survivors will

woman.

Odysseus,

for the

spirited. allies

The

the remaining feel guilty, because one

most of and punish

ones who are

Odysseus'

of

tells them that the gods favor Odysseus

them for

failing

to

oppose the suitors through

Odysseus. Guilt

enables

the gods to withdraw, to

others must

become invisible;

'works'

guilt

only
gods.

with the

base. All
that

be killed, if

they have

rejected

the

spirited ones

will

arise.

in coming generations, new therefore. Men will need Homeric Regimes change,
It
might

be

noted

wisdom until there are no men.

9. The Enlightenment
episodes of the revealed as

wanted to substitute might seem and

knowledge for belief. The final

that
project.

Odyssey
at

to

support

Odysseus
the

stands

himself

last,

he

rules.

The

consignment of

souls of the

heroic
would

world

to Hades

also seems consonant with

equivalent

Enlightenment,

with whatever

be the

ancient-world

of embourgeoisement.

The Enlighten

ment made much of recognition, and

a political world animated

in this Hegel, the

philosopher who wanted culmination.

by

mutual recognition,

is its

The

end of

the

Odyssey

seems

full

of acts of recognition, and of the restoration of

authority

founded

upon recognition.
more closely,

Benardete looks
ope she

however. He

sees that

Odysseus

grants

Penel
on

little

or no recognition
aside

for her

sagacity, and
son she

indeed "from the first book

and

is

pushed

in favor
old

of the

fostered

protect

(p. 150).

Odysseus teases his

father,

who cannot

his

son after

twenty

years of wear and

seriously be expected to recognize tear on both of them. In so doing,

238

Interpretation
aims at

Odysseus
he
wants

two things

at

once,
as

which

he believes to be
not want

somehow connected:

Laertes to know him

he is, but he does

Laertes to know him if

not genuinely miss him. Only if his grief is real should be recognize the real Odysseus. These are competing demands unless the standard is doglike devotion; but no human being can be like Argus, and Laertes fails the test of loyalty with

he does

knowledge.
tioned is

Loyalty

and

knowledge

are as

far

apart

from

one another as

the unques

from the

result of

questioning, or as Odysseus the homeward-bound is

from Odysseus the

start

wanderer.

The

entire

Odyssey
who

seems

to have

strained

from

the
pro

to

assert

their togetherness in

Odysseus,
mind.

first

chose

memory

and

then

fessed to
Odysseus'

represent

the anonymity of

(P.

152)
knowledge"

"destiny

is to

establish

belief

and not of political

(p. 152). He is

poetic-dialectical proof of the

impossibility
rationalist

enlightenment, of straight

forward

anti traditionalism.

The

dialects

of

Hegel

and

Marx

are

taller

tales than Homer's. With a dialectic both rational and poetic, Benardete shows

here that

one

may

reject

the dialectic of Enlightenment without

falling

into

antiphilosophic obscurantism.

The definitive commentary

on

Husserl's Ideas I.

Belief
in Ideas I

and its
of

Neutralization
Phenomenology
Marcus Brainard

Husserl's System
Marcus Brainard

fry
1
.

Presenting

the

first step-by-step commentary

and not

on

Husserl's Ideas I, Marcus Brainard's Belief

Neutralization provides an introduction
central

Its
f*jk-\
'

only to this

work,

but

also to the whole of

transcendental

phenomenology.
account of each

Brainard

offers a clear and

lively
with a

''^'^^'iCil')

key

element

in Ideas I, along

Belief and its

Husserl's System
of

novel

reading

of

Husserl,
on

one which

may

well cause

Neutrali2ati(^

|
&

scholars

to reconsider

many

long-standing

views on

his thought, especially

and scope of the
universal

the role of
and

belief, the effect

of

;j

epoche,

the significance

the

Phenomenology in /

neutrality "This book articulates Husserl's

is

modification.

phenomenological

system within the context of

its guiding intentions.

work of

The

result

an

overpowering

scholarship, allowing it to be

unquestionably ranked as the best discussion on Husserl's Ideas I, future." now or in the foreseeable Burt C. Hopkins, editor of
Husserl in Contemporary Context: Prospects and Projects for Phenomenology

"Brainard's

achievement

is

not

to

but instead

to

have let Husserl

speak

have merely written about Husserl, for himself.The author has worked
able

his way into the philosopher's thought so well that he has been grasp and discuss the various steps of Husserl's thought from
To grasp
a thinker

to

within.

in this way, the interpreter

Brainard
most

must

himself be
is."

animated

by a

philosophical eros,and

certainly

Walter Biemel,

editor of several volumes of

Husserl's

collected works at

(Husserliana)
and provided

Marcus Brainard is Postdoctoral Fellow

the Carl Friedrich von the

Siemens Foundation in Munich. He edited, translated, introduction

of Modernity, also published

to Heribert Boeder's Seditions: Heidegger and the Limit

by SUNY Press.
in

volume

in the SUNY

series

DlATE UNIVERSITY
_. .

Contemporary Continental Philosophy

Dennis J. Schmidt,
331
pages
editor

OF NEW YORK KRESS

www.sunypress.edu

Illustrated: 2 figures

to

order call:

1-800-666-221 1

$29.95

paperback

ISBN 0-7914-5220-4

e-mail:

orderbook@cupserv.org Amex, Disc, MC,Visa

Leo Strauss Collected Writings

in Six Volumes
Edited by Heinrich Meier
ISBN
3-476-01222-0

The publication
the

of the

third volume concludes

critical edition of all of

Strauss's known

writings

(many of which

are published
emigration

here
to the

for the first time) before his

United States
a substantial philosophical correspondence with

of America

in

1938.

In addition,

four

key figures in Strauss's

the letters
are published se

intellectual in the
rious

career

is

presented.

Both the

writings and

original

languages. This

critical edition will

be indispensable to any

study

of

Strauss's philosophy in the future.

Volume

v.

Die Rellglonskrltik Spinozas

Leo Strauss
Gesammelte Schriften Bandl Die Religionskririk Spinozas und zugehorige Schriften
Zweite Auflajre

und zugehorige Schriften

2001.

xx, 460 pp.,

cloth with

dust jacket,

44,90

(subscription

price:

39,90).

ISBN 3-476-01856-3

Contains the
Spinozas

critical editions of Die

Religionskritik

(1930), Cohens Analyse der Bibet-WissenschaftSpinozas (1924), Zur Bibelwissenschaft Spinozas und seiner Vorlaufer (1926), Das Testament
Spinozas (1932). The second, revised, and
edition enlarged

j-aMFrau*

by
on

includes three previously unknown early essays Strauss from the years 1925-1929, among others
Freud's
The

Future

of an

Illusions

Volume
1997.

2:

Philosophie und Gesetz

pp., cloth with dust jacket,

Friihe Schriften
44,9o(subscription price:

xxxiv,

635

39,90)

ISBN 3-476-01212-3

Contains the
more

critical editions of 29 essays from the years 1921 to 1937, than a quarter of which are published here for the first time: Quelques

remarques sur
0n

la

science politique

de Mai'monide
and

et

de Farabi (1936),

Abravanel's Philosophical Tendency

Political Teaching

Das
Der

Erkenntnisproblem in der
Konspektivismus

philosophischen

Lehre Fr. H. Jacobis

Eine

Erinnerungan Lessing

(1929), Religibse Lage der Gegenwart (1937), and more. The marginalia from

(1937), (1921), (1932),

Strauss's

personal copies of

these writings are published here for the first time.

Volume 3:

Hobbes'

Leo Strauss
Gesammelte Schriften
Band 3
Hobbes'

politische
-

Wissenschaft
49,90

und zugehorige
2001. xxxviii,

Schriften
with

Briefe

799 pp., cloth

price:

dust jacket,

(subscription
Wissenschaft
Briefe

44,90). ISBN 3-476-01213-1

politische

und zugehorige

Contains, among other writings,

German
manuscript of
Hobbes'

critical editions of the politische

Schriften

Wissenschaft
translation
Die

(1935) along with the variants of the English

from 1936,
as well as

the book-length manuscript

Religionskritik des Hobbes (1933/1934), published here for the first time. In addition, 320 letters, over 400 pages
of philosophical correspondence with

Jacob Klein,

Gerhard Kriiger, Karl Lowith,

and

Gershom

Scholem, in

the original languages (German and English).

Volume 4: Politische Philosophie

Studien zum theologisch-poUtischen Problem

Contains the first

The

publication of two
of

Living Issues

key essays, Reason and Revelation* and German Post-War Philosophy, along with numerous

German translations. Volume 5:

Ober Tyrannls

Contains the German translation along with the correspondence between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojeve (1932-1965) published here for the first time in its entirety in the original languages (German and English). Volume 6: Gedanken Each
uber Machiavelli

volume contains a

foreword

by the editor of the

Gesammelte

Schriften

which

introduces the
text as

reader to

the circumstances surrounding the composition separately, but subscribers pay approx. subscription price for the first

of each

well as

its

central concerns. purchased

Each
15%

volume

may be
to

less than list

price per volume.

Choosing the

three

volumes obliges one

purchase all six volumes.

Subscribers

receive

the

following at no extra

charge:

Heinrich Meier: Die Denkbewegung Die Geschichte der Philosophie

1996.

von

Leo Strauss
Intention des Phllosophen

und die

66 pp.,

9,90.

ISBN

3-476-01504-1.

The essay is the philosophy. The

to be

result of a

long and intensive involvement with Strauss's

the
most comprehensive

appendix contains

bibliography yet

presented of Strauss's writings.

^VERLAG

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P.O.Box
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21

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Modern Enlightenment
and

the

Rule

of

Reason

EDITED BY JOHN C. McCARTHY

An

extensive examination of

the historical
character of

and philosophical

CONTRIBUTORS:
Paul J.

the Enlightenment.
question:

Bagley

Nicholas Capaldi

The essays in this volume pose the

was

F. J. Crosson
Richard Kennington

"the

Enlightenment"

truly enlightened
clarity

or enlightening?

Alan Charles Kors Pamela Kraus Robert P. Kraynak Terence E. Marshall John C.

The

collection seeks philosophical

of modernity's enlightenment with

by beginning

Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes. Consideration of Pascal, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Rousseau, Lessing, and Kant all
philosophical

McCarthy

Philippe Raynaud Kenneth L. Schmitz

JohnR.Silber

critics,

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the book
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vitality by hold philosophical sway in this century. "The book as a whole displays both a
breadth
of

outlining ways it continues to

Studies in

Philosophy and the History

focus

and a

depth

of critical

of Philosophy Series, Volume 32

1998

exposition.

It contributes significantly to
and

Enlightenment studies,
current

in turn to the

/ 308

pp.

ISBN 0-8132-0904-1

discussion concerning the nature

of
modernity."

$59.95

cloth

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foundations

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Sean Quinn, Xavier University

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