Reports on Philosophy, 22 (2004), 121-142

Roman Ingarden: Ontology from a phenomenological point of view

Arkadiusz Chrudzimski* (Zielona Gra and Salzburg)

Ontology is doubtless the most important part of Roman Ingardens (1893-1970) philosophy.1 Contrary to Husserl, Ingarden always believed that any serious philosophical investigation must involve an ontological basis and he tried to formulate a solid ontological framework for his philosophy. There are several reasons why this ontology deserves our attention. For those who are interested in Husserls transcendental phenomenology, Ingardens ontology could be treated as an ingenious attempt to analyse the conceptual structure and hidden ontological assumptions of Husserls transcendental idealism. (Cf. Ingarden 1967) For those who want to understand the immanent dialectics of the post-Brentanian development of the ontology of intentionality, Ingardens conception of the purely intentional object could be a very valuable tool. (Cf. Chrudzimski 2003) But Ingardens ontology has also independent value, and hence it is also interesting for those who pursue ontology for its own sake. In this paper, I will investigate the basic scheme of Ingardens ontology, including pure qualities, individual real objects, purely intentional objects and ideas.2 This schema will prove to be in many aspects generated by his phenomenological, i.e. descriptive and anti-reductionist, ideology.

1. Things and their properties The problem that since Plato has been regarded as the ontological problem par excellence is
* 1

I should like to thank Alison Braus and Richard Van de Water for brushing up the English of this essay. Ingardens ontology is presented in his 1925a, 1931 and 1964/65. For a general introduction to his philosophy This is by no means a complete inventory of Ingardens ontology. Further important categories that will not be

see Kng 1982.

2

analysed here are: event, state of affairs, process, system and causality.

the famous puzzle of one over many. How can we explain (or explain away) the (alleged) fact that many individually different things often have the same property (e.g. they all are red)? There are in the history of philosophy many answers to this question and I have neither sufficient space nor erudition to treat them all. Allow me therefore to examine only three positions that are particularly relevant for Ingardens theory. (I) There are philosophers (commonly called Platonists) who maintain that the property RED exists separately and independently from all red things. According to this view, all red things have their colour by virtue of a peculiar relation (Plato himself wrote of a kind of imitation) that they all bear to the universal property RED. But the universal property in question exists fully independently of its individual imitations.3 Many aspects of the Platonic view seem to fly in the face of common sense. Still, it is deeply rooted in a cluster of very important philosophical intuitions concerning the traditional problems of necessity and apriority. Many philosophers feel convinced that there exist general and necessary truths, and that we can know at least some of these truths a priori, i.e. independently of any experience of their individual instances. Consequently, it is tempting to suppose that there must be a cognitively accessible realm of special entities that is independent of the contingency of individual things and that contains ontological grounds (i.e. the semantics) for all necessary truths. The typical Platonic explanation of the a priori knowledge of necessary truths refers to the realm of universal properties, and could be summed up as follows:

We can justifiably formulate a modal statement of the form: Necessary: whatever is F is G, if and only if we grasp the relevant relation (of entailment) between the universal properties F and G. 4

A classical contemporary exposition of such a Platonic position is to be found in Chisholm. Chisholm tries to define four basic relations between properties:

D.1 P implies Q =Df. P is necessarily such that if it is exemplified, then Q is exemplified. [...] D.2 P includes Q =Df. P is necessarily such that whatever exemplifies it, exemplifies Q. [...] D.3 P involves Q =Df. P is necessarily such that whoever conceives it, conceives Q. [...] D.4 P entails Q =Df. P is necessarily such that, for every x and every y, if y attributes P to x, than y attributes Q to y., Chisholm 1989, p. 143 f.

For example, the modal statement: (1) Necessary: whatever is red could not (at the same place) be green, could be justifiably stated if and only if we know that: (2) The property RED excludes the property GREEN, and the modal statement: (3) Necessary: whatever is coloured, is spatial, assumes, as its justification, the statement: (4) The property COLOUR includes the property SPATIALITY. If the correlative relations between Platonic properties, as stated in (2) and (4), were not known, and our entire justification for the general statements were inductive, then, according to this theory, we could not justifiably formulate modal statements. We could at most justify general statements that: Whatever is red, could not (at the same place) be green, and Whatever is coloured is extended. (Cf. Chisholm 1977, p. 38) (II) The second classical theory of one over many denies a part of the Platonic intuition. There are, we are told, no uninstantiated properties, either in Platos heaven or anywhere else. The only places where the properties could be found are concrete, individual things in which the properties in question are instantiated. But the explanation of how it is possible that several things are red still involves the assumption that the numerically same universal property is literally present in several individual things. True enough, the property RED cannot be found elsewhere than in red things. Nonetheless, it is literally one in all those things. The red things are red, because they all exemplify the same property. This view is commonly referred to as Aristotelian.5 This theory is supported by a very important common-sense intuition. The intuition states that, although several things really can have the same property, nonetheless there is no such thing in the world as a property without a bearer. The Aristotelian theory gives us a tool by means of which we can dispense with the Platonic heaven of uninstantiated properties, and at the same time retain the quasi-Platonist explanation of necessary truths. Each property is still construed as literally one in many individual things and therefore, if we state an appropriate relation between properties, we can plausibly claim that this relation must hold for all individuals that instantiate these properties. The main disadvantage of the Aristotelian theory in comparison with its Platonist counterpart is the unavailability of a similar simple explanation of counterfactual
5

A contemporary partisan of this kind of Aristotelian position is D. M. Armstrong; Cf. his 1978 and 1989.

conditionals. Notice that within the framework of the Platonist theory we can say not only that: (3) Necessary: whatever is coloured, is spatial, but also: (5) Necessary: whatever is Pegasus is winged. In the Aristotelian theory, however, the truth of (5) can no longer be explained by the statement: (6) The Platonic property PEGASUS includes (entails) the Platonic property WINGED, because within the Aristotelian framework there are no uninstantiated properties, and consequently no such property as (being) PEGASUS. Facing this sad consequence, the proponent of the Aristotelian view must claim that any property that can be used in our explanations of necessary statements must be either itself instantiated, or, otherwise, it must be somehow reducible to a logical construction of instantiated properties. (In our case to a conjunction of the properties WINGED and HORSE). (III) Still other philosophers hold a theory to the effect that there is really no one over many. Each individual thing, we are assured, has its own individual properties that in principle cannot be had by another thing. Two things cannot thus have a literally common property. One can, if one wishes, say that this view amounts to the claim that there are really no properties but only instances. (Cf. e.g. Grossmann 1974, p. 5) One thing can therefore be red only if it has its own individual redness. All properties are exactly as individual as their bearers.6 The philosophical intuition at the behind this theory says not only that there is no property without its concrete subject, but also that every individual subject has its individual properties that must be individually different from the properties of any other subject. If I destroy my chair, then its properties of being made of wood or being comfortable will vanish together with it. Of course another chair can be made of wood or be comfortable, but these properties, as they persist even in the case of the above-mentioned destruction, have to be treated as individually different from the properties of my chair. But if we accept this argumentation, how can we explain the (alleged) fact that two

Such individual properties are nowadays commonly called tropes. This rather misleading name was

introduced by D. C. Williams. Cf. Williams 1953. G. F. Stout is frequently referred to as the father of this ontological position. Cf. his 1921/1922, 1923, 1936 and 1940. But in point of fact the concept of an individual property can be traced back to Aristotle (cf. his Categories 1a 201b 9), it was discussed by the schoolmen, and it is the only concept of property accepted by Franz Brentano and his followers like Carl Stumpf or Anton Marty.

different material things can be both justifiably classified as red, green, or made of wood? What is there about the particular things that makes them belong to these groups? Proponents of the theory of individual properties typically refer to the relation of similarity. Several things are red, blue or made of wood if each of them has its own instance of redness, blueness or being made of wood. What makes two instances into instances of the same property, is the relation of similarity that obtains between them. So if I destroy my chair, then its property of being made of wood will really vanish with it. Other chairs can be made of wood as well, but this comes down to the mere fact that they are similar. Unsurprisingly, the main difficulties of this theory concern the very notion of similarity used. First of all, things are similar in some respects and not in others, and the respects in question seem to be nothing other than properties. Secondly, the relation of similarity must be conceived as a universal, exemplified by all the sets of similar objects, rather than as an particular; for if it were to be treated as a particular (as an instance), then, in order to be an instance of the similarity at all, it would have to be similar to the other similarities, and the theory would invite a spectacular infinite regress. (Cf. Armstrong 1978, vol. 1, p. 54, Grossmann 1974, p. 5) Consequently, in the frame of this theory, one has to speak not of the similarity between individual concrete things, but rather of the similarity between their individual properties; and secondly one has to construe this similarity not as a normal relation but rather as a kind of primitive nexus that in principle cannot be explained further.

2. Ingardens theory of one over many Ingardens theory of one over many proves to be perfectly ecumenical, as it assimilates in a sense all three theories referred to above. According to Ingarden: (I) There is a realm of universal Platonic entities, called pure ideal qualities, that is wholly independent of the world of real individuals. If an individual thing is red, then there must be a pure ideal quality RED that corresponds to this thing. And if two things have the same colour (e.g. both are red), then they must both correspond to the same pure ideal quality. (II) But this relation of correspondence is defined as a relation of exemplification or instantiation. All red things are red because they exemplify the same pure ideal quality. (III) Yet, what this exemplification results in is that each red thing has its own redness, which is individually different from the 5

redness of any other red thing. No doubt, these two individual instances of redness are similar, and, granted Ingardens rich ontology, this similarity is very easy to explain. Two individual properties are similar if and only if they are exemplifications of the same pure ideal quality. Needless to say, the ecumenical character of Ingardens theory results from his phenomenological methodology. The phenomenological point of view essentially involves an attempt to reconcile as many different and often apparently incompatible philosophical and pre-philosophical intuitions as possible. Every such intuition concerns something that is prima facie given; and the first rule of any phenomenological philosophy is that a detailed description and analysis of such given facts must precede any attempt to build a theory to explain them.7 Moreover, a phenomenological explanation very seldom amounts to merely explaining away certain theoretically unwanted entities. According to Husserls famous principle of all principles (cf. Husserl 1913, p. 43 f.) every object that presents itself in a philosophical or pre-philosophical intuition is in an important sense given and, consequently, it is to be taken at its face value.

3. The objects of thought The second problem that is crucial for the development of Ingardens ontology is the ontological status of so-called objects of thought. The introduction of such special objects is forced upon us above all by the well-known puzzle commonly referred to as the nonextensionality of intentional contexts (i.e., contexts that are placed in the scope of the socalled intentional operators, like John believes that..., Mary wonders if..., Jack thinks of... etc.). The main obstacle for a consistent extensional treatment of such contexts is the apparent failure of two important logical rules, (i) the rule of the mutual substitutivity of identicals salva veritate (i.e. without change of truth-value) and (ii) the rule of existential generalisation. Thus, even if (7) Jack admires Zeus, were true, we could not infer that (8) Jack admires the Lord of Olympus, in spite of the fact that the identity: (9) Zeus = the Lord of Olympus is, as we know, true; for the validity of the inference from (7) to (8)

A good illustration of the phenomenological method can be found in the writings of H. N. Castaeda. Cf. e.g.

his 1977.

unfortunately depends not on the truth of (9) but on the question of whether Jack actually believes (9) to be true or not. Similarly, the existential generalisation (10) There is something that Jack admires could turn out false, because Zeus does not exist, and our (8) does not imply that there exists something else that Jack admires. These are, in a nutshell, the reasons why we are tempted to postulate some special objects that could restore the logical regularity of intentional contexts. We want to find (or invent) some category of objects such that, first of all, we might infer the existence of an object of this category from any intentional idiom; and secondly, the identity of these objects must be strong enough to allow us to apply the rule of the substitutivity of identicals salva veritate. The reasoning leading to the introduction of the ontological category of objects of thought goes as follows. Although the fact that a subject S intentionally refers to an object O does not imply that there is a genuine object of reference, the phenomenological description of this situation essentially involves a reference to O. Consequently, we are tempted to conclude that there must be some counterpart of O that we can call object of thought O*, such that the subject in question uses O* in his (successful or non-successful) intentional reference to O, and that O* somehow represents O, so that the entity that the subject has before his mind when he refers to O is in point of fact not O, but the object of thought O*. The list of objects that, in the history of philosophy, have been proposed as appropriate objects of thought is very long. Their history can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, but for our purpose it is reasonable to start with Brentano. In his Psychology from the empirical point of view (1874) Brentano introduced objects of thought construed as peculiar mind-dependent entities that are in a rather obscure sense immanent to the mind of the relevant subject. (Cf. Brentano 1874, p. 124 f.) Brentano claims that each mental phenomenon is directed at such an immanent object.8 It goes without saying that this position was in many psychological as well as ontological aspects counterintuitive.9 It is then of no surprise that even in Brentanos school his theory was gradually modified. One of the first important steps was taken by Twardowski

8 9

For the rather complicated story concerning Brentanos immanent objects see Chrudzimski 2001. As is well known, Brentano rejected his earlier theory after 1904.

in the work On the Object and Content of Presentation (Twardowski 1894). Twardowski proposes an important modification of Brentanos picture. He introduces an important distinction between the object and the content of a mental act. Only the mental content is claimed to be immanent in a relatively clear psychological sense, while the objects of acts are, in the normal case, transcendent to the subjects mind.10 However, Twardowski felt forced to assume that every mental act has both its content and object. Even such acts as thinking of a golden mountain or of a triangular circle have, according to Twardowski, their objects. The consequence of this view, fully developed by Meinong, was that there must be a sense in which there are non-existent objects. 11 The works of Husserl that were a direct source of inspiration for Ingardens theory of intentionality belong to this broadly-construed Brentanian tradition. In his Logical Investigations (1900/1901) Husserl accepts Twardowskis content-object distinction, but, contrary to Twardowski and Meinong, he introduces no special entities beyond being and non-being that are to fulfil the function of the target of intention. If there is a real referent of the mental act, then it is its object, and if there happens to be no such referent, then, sadly enough, the act has no object at all. The puzzle of how an objectless act could nonetheless be said to be intentional is answered by reference to Twardowskis content. Every mental act is intentional in virtue of its having such a content. No special kind of object is then needed. (Cf. Husserl 1894, pp. 317, 332 ff, 336 ff. and Husserl 1901, pp. 386 f., 439) This theory seems to be perfectly consistent and indeed very interesting, but nevertheless it did not survive very long. As early as in his Vorlesungen ber Bedeutungslehre (Husserl 1908) Husserl believes himself forced to modify this position. He introduces a new category of peculiar, ontologically puzzling, mind-dependent entities that function as the target of intention. In his 1908 lectures he calls them ontic meanings (ontische Bedeutungen), and later, in his Ideas (1913), he terms them noemata. The reason why Husserl abandoned his early theory was, as should be clear, phenomenological. The entire argumentation, contained in his 1908 lectures, comes down to this: From the phenomenological (or descriptive) point of view there always seems to be
10 11

The obvious exception are acts that are directed to mental states of the relevant subject. Cf. the (in)famous claim from Meinongs programmatic ber Gegenstandstheorie (1904): [E]s gibt Gegen-

stnde, von denen gilt, da es dergleichen Gegenstnde nicht gibt., Meinong 1904, p. 490.

something that is placed before my mind, when I perceive, hallucinate, fancy or speak about an object. However, the contents of our intentions are normally not placed before but, so to say, inside our minds. They are, according to Husserl, cognitively accessible exclusively by a rather sophisticated process of reflection. Consequently, we need some entity beside the mental content that can function as a phenomenologically given target of intention in all typical cases of a direct reference. (Cf. Husserl 1908, p. 35 f. and Kng 1973)

4. Ingardens theory of purely intentional objects Ingardens theory of intentionality emerged from an attempt to clarify Husserls later position. Ingarden accepts Twardowskis content-object distinction and treats the object of intention as a mind-dependent, noema-like entity, but at the same time he tries to situate this object in the framework of his systematicaly developed ontology. The result was his theory of purely intentional objects. Such objects have an interesting double-sided structure. (Ingarden 1964/65, vol. II/1, pp. 211 f.) Every purely intentional object is something created by a mental act,12 but it also has a content that represents a certain mind-independent object.13 This representation consists in the fact that a certain set of pure ideal qualities is actualised in the content of a purely intentional object. This actualisation is not an instantiation (or an exemplification), for in that case the content in question would have to be an individual real entity.14 The purely intentional object O*
12

Ingarden says that purely intentional objects exist heteronomously, i.e. only in relation to a mental act. He

contrasts this kind of existence with autonomous existence. Cf. Eine Gegenstndlichkeit (im Sinne von irgend etwas berhaupt) existiert autonom (ist seinsautonom), wenn sie in sich selbst ihr Seinsfundament hat. Und sie hat es in sich selbst, wenn sie in sich selbst etwas immanent Bestimmtes ist. Eine Gegenstndlichkeit ist dagegen seinsheteronom (existiert heteronom), wenn sie ihr Seinsfundament auerhalb ihrer selbst hat., Ingarden 1964/65, vol. I, p. 79. Nonetheless, Ingarden claims that purely intentional objects have an important kind of transcendence. Cf. Ein Gegenstand ist dem ihn betreffenden Bewusstseinsakte gegenber auf strkere Weise strukturell transzendent, wenn nicht nur keine seiner Eigenschaften und kein Moment eine Eigenschaft oder ein Moment des betreffenden Aktes bildet, und umgekehrt, sondern wenn er auerdem ihm gegenber ein zweites seinautonomes Ganzes darstellt. In diesem Sinne dem Bewusstseinsakte gegenber transzendent ist sowohl der seinsautonome als auch seinsheteronome, blo intentionale Gegenstand., Ingarden 1964/65, vol. II/1, p. 225
13 14

Save when the subject is intentionally directed to his own mental states. Cf. Wird durch den Bewusstseinsakt ein rein intentionaler Gegenstand (z.B. ein Ding) geschaffen, so ver-

mag die in ihm enthaltene Intention keine echte Realisierung irgendeiner idealen Wesenheit hervorzubringen. Das intentional geschaffene Ding ist im strengen, seinsautonomen Sinne z.B. nicht rot. Damit es das sein

corresponds to some real mind-independent entity O if and only if there is in the mindindependent, extra-mental world an entity that exemplifies the same set of pure ideal qualities that are actualised in the content of the purely intentional object in question. In such a case the subject that has mentally projected the purely intentional object O* intentionally refers to the real mind-independent entity O.15 We see that Ingardens theory of intentionality seems to be a version of the so-called description-theory of reference that is commonly attributed to Frege and Russell. (Cf. Frege 1892, Russell 1905) The description-theory of reference claims that entity X can represent entity Y only if entity X specifies some set of properties that makes it possible to identify entity Y. (Cf. Chrudzimski 1978, p. 252) Ingardens version of this theory reads as follow:

A subject S is intentionally directed at something that is F, if and only if the subject S performs a mental act and in the content of the purely intentional object of this act the pure ideal quality F is actualised. This act is successful if and only if there is in the extra-mental world something that is F; otherwise the act is unsuccessful, having only its purely intentional object and no genuine real mind-independent reference.16

5. The general scheme of Ingardens ontology But even this highly liberal ontology, containing pure ideal qualities, real individuals and purely intentional objects, is not the complete story, for in addition to pure ideal qualities, Ingarden introduces a further kind of Platonic entities. I mean Ingardens Ideas the entities that have proved to be extremely difficult to understand and to assess philosophically.

knnte, msste es eine echte Realisation der Wesenheit Rte in sich reell enthalten. Gerade dieses reelle Enthaltensein, dieses Immanentsein der Realisation einer idealen Wesenheit in einer Gegenstndlichkeit und andererseits auch diese Realisation selbst vermag der reine Bewusstseinsakt nicht hervorzubringen. Es bleibt immer nur bei dem frher beschriebenen vortuschenden Quasi-Enthaltensein und bei der Quasi-Realisation, die einerseits auf das intentionale sic iubeo des Bewusstseinssubjektes, andererseits auf die entsprechende ideale Wesenheit zurckweist., Ingarden 1931, p. 388 (the page reference is to the 4th edition, Tbingen 1972).
15 16

On purely intentional objects cf. Ingarden 1964/65, 46-48 and Ingarden 1931, 20-22. Cf. Chrudzimski 1998, p. 253. Such a descriptive theory of reference is nowadays commonly criticised. (Cf.

Putnam 1975, Putnam 1989, pp. 22-25, Kripke 1980. In Chrudzimski 1999b, Chrudzimski 2002 and Chrudzimski 1998 I argue that Ingardens theory of a specific linguistic reference is not a descriptive one.

10

Like a purely intentional object, an idea is also double-sided. It has properties qua idea and content. The content of an idea consists of a concretisation of a certain collection of pure ideal qualities.17 (That the pure ideal qualities are concretised means that they are neither instantiated nor actualised.) An idea I corresponds to an individual object O (O falls under I) if and only if O has a concrete essence that is an exemplification of the same set of pure ideal qualities that is concretised in the content of I. Consequently, Ingarden proposes a rather complicated three-level ontology. (Cf. Haefliger 1994, p. 100) On the first level we have pure ideal qualities that correspond roughly to Platonic universal properties; on the second level these qualities are concretised as the content of an idea; and finally, on the third level, the same pure ideal qualities could (but need not) be particularised (instantiated) as the concrete, individual properties of an individual object. The relation of falling under an idea between concrete individual objects and their ideas is possible only in virtue of the contents of ideas. And, granting this framework, the relation is simple to define. An idea I is the idea of an object O (O falls under I) if and only if the same set of pure ideal qualities Q that is particularised as essential features of O is concretised as the content of I.18 If we also take into consideration purely intentional objects we immediately get the fourth level, for the corresponding sets of pure ideal qualities can be also actualised in the content of such objects. Consequently we obtain the following general scheme:

17

Cf. Jede Idee zeichnet sich durch eine eigentmliche Doppelseitigkeit in ihrem formalen Aufbau aus. Einer-

seits hat sie einen Bestand an Eigenschaften, die sie qua Idee charakterisieren, andererseits birgt sie einen Gehalt in sich, in welchem ideale Konkretisierungen in einer bestimmt umgrenzten Mannigfltigkeit von reinen Qualitten auftreten, vermge derer die Idee einen Bezug auf mgliche individuelle Gegenstndlichkeiten gewinnt., Ingarden 1964/65, vol. I, p. 39, cf. also ibid. vol. II/1, pp. 231 f.
18

The foundations of Ingardens ontology of pure qualities and ideas are formulated in Ingarden 1925a and in

Ingarden 1964/65, 6 and 49-51. In his theory Ingarden developed ideas of Jean Hering. Cf. Hering 1921).

11

realm of the pure ideal qualities

idea concretisation f g h j k

content f g h j k

j* k* l* m* n* l m n abstraction

instantiation abstraction actualisation f g h mental content subject j k l m n content purely intentional object j k l m n properties real object p q r essence

The real object of intention instantiates a set of pure ideal qualities {f, g, h, j, k, l, m, n, p, q, r}. Only the subset {f, g, h, j, k} of this set is essential for the object in question. Consequently the idea of this object contains (as its content) the concretisations of only those five qualities {f, g, h, j, k}. The intentional reference to the real object, as it results through the purely intentional object in a descriptive way, must specify some properties of the referent by means of which it can be identified. This specification amounts to the actualisation of an appropriate set of pure ideal qualities in the content of the purely intentional object. These qualities could be both essential as well as non-essential to the real object in question. (We can mentally describe a horse as: an animal with the nature N, but also as: my favourite animal.) In our scheme these qualities build the set {j, k, l, m, n} that contains some, but not all, essential properties of the object of reference. Since the immanent mental content is, after all, also an individual structure, it must instantiate an appropriate set of Platonic properties. Consequently, we find in our schema a further set of pure ideal qualities. That is the set {j*, k*, l*, m*, n*} that we obtain by applying a procedure of abstraction to the immanent content of the mental act. Ingarden says nothing about these qualities, but the problem seems to be important enough to be treated here. As our notation suggests, the pure ideal qualities {j*, k*, l*, m*, n*} that are instantiated in the immanent content of the mental act correspond to the pure ideal qualities 12

{j, k, l, m, n} that are actualised in the content of the purely intentional object, which in turn correspond to the instances of the same pure ideal qualities that must build the subset of the properties of the object of reference (if there is such an object at all). If we take seriously Ingardens claim that the content of a mental act determines completely the content of its purely intentional object,19 then there must be a kind of relationship or correlation between the sets {j*, k*, l*, m*, n*} and {j, k, l, m, n}. In consequence, the qualities {j, k, l, m, n} that are actualised in the content of the purely intentional object must be, as it were, somehow preestablished in the immanent content of the mental act. If we assume, as we should, that the concrete mental content of intention is not a mysterious entity beside or in the intention, but instead that the word content signifies this very intention conceived as referring to such-and-such a determined object, then our notation n* turns out to mean nothing more than to refer intentionally to something determined as n, or, in Chisholms adverbial phrase, to mean n-ly. We can call the ordered pairs of the correlative qualities m, m*, n, n*, j, j* etc. the intentional-correlative-properties-pairs (ICPPs), and the relation that is defined by the set of these pairs the intentional-correlative relation (IC-relation). Now, it seems that if we have such an IC-relation, then we can perfectly do without purely intentional objects. For, if our mental intention is n*, then it is immediately clear that it refers to something that is n (naturally, if there is something that is n at all). So we need no supplementary purely intentional entities that would be intentionally projected by mental acts and that should mediate the intentional access to genuine objects of reference. Put differently: if we have our ICPPs, we seem to have eo ipso intentionality. Precisely such a theory was presented in Husserls Logical Investigations. We remember however that Husserl himself rejected this conception, and we recall that he made this move under pressure of phenomenological reasons. It goes without saying that the same kind of reasoning is active in the generation of Ingardens theory of purely intentional objects.
19

Cf. Jeder rein intentionale Gegenstand hat einen Gehalt [...]. Seinen Gehalt bestimmt der unanschauliche

Inhalt des zugehrigen Meinungsaktes sowie der betreffende Modus des Momentes der Erfassung seiner Existenz [...], der in dem Meinungsakte enthalten ist., Ingarden 1964/65, vol. II/1, p. 211. Nur diejenigen Seiten seines Gehalts sind ein- oder mehrdeutig bestimmt [...], die durch ausdrckliche Intentionsmomente des unanschaulichen Inhalts des zugehrigen Meinungsaktes intentional entworfen werden., ibid. p. 219 f.

13

From a purely theoretical point of view we need either the immanent mental content or the special purely intentional target-entity. But according to the phenomenological line of thought we are descriptively acquainted with both structures. As we have seen, Platonic properties (in Ingardens system: pure ideal qualities) and the relations between them have a very important function. They justify the modal discourse that many philosophers regard as metaphysically indispensable. Moreover, when applied to mental contents or purely intentional objects, the apparatus of Platonic entities allows us to explain the next important puzzle of the one over many, which became particularly important in the Frege-Husserls discussions of the (in)famous challenge of psychologism. The puzzle reads: How could two subjects have the same thought. The Fregean answer was: Two subjects mean the same, if and only if they mentally grasp the same Platonic ideal entity that Frege called sense; Husserl at the time of his Logical Investigations answered: Two subjects mean the same, if and only if their mental contents are instantiations of the same set of ideal species; and Ingarden proposes the theory to the effect that: Two subjects mean the same, if and only if the contents of the purely intentional objects of their acts are actualisations of the same set of pure ideal qualities. Now, it is not clear what explanatory function Ingardens ideas have. It seems prima facie that we could do without them and explain all the questions of one over many, of apriority and necessity and of intentional presence in absence in terms of pure ideal qualities. (Cf. Haefliger 1994, pp. 81 f., 89 f.) The content of an idea, if we neglect Ingardens puzzling distinction between the pure quality as such and the quality concretised in the content of an idea, seems to be simply a collection of those pure qualities that are essential to some object (consequently the contents of ideas seem to be subsets of the domain of pure ideal qualities). Ingardens explanation of the ontological status and explanatory role of his ideas leaves much to be desired.

6. Ideas as theories. The problem of form We can guess however that, if there is a justification for the introduction of Ingardens ideas, it must be phenomenological. Now, if the introduction of ideas were to be phenomenologically warranted, then either (i) ideas would have to present themselves to the phenomenologists mind in a way that is not reducible to the ways in which the other entities 14

present themselves, or (ii) they would have to present the phenomenologists mind with some important aspects that otherwise were not accessible. Indeed, it seems that both conditions (i) and (ii) are fulfilled. First of all, it is not exactly the case that the contents of ideas are simply subsets of the realm of pure ideal qualities. Ingarden writes that the content of an idea also includes correlates of the objectual forms. A full analysis of Ingardens conception of form cannot be carried out here, but it is important to keep in mind that an idea is not a mere reduplication of the pure ideal qualities that are essential to an entity. An idea also shows the formal aspects of the entity in question. It shows whether it is an object, an event, a process, a state of affairs etc.20 Now, formal ontology is a very important branch of Ingardens philosophy, and, as there are no forms in the realm of pure ideal qualities, it seems that if there were no ideas, then forms could be found exclusively in the concrete, individual objects, and consequently formal investigations could be pursued only on the basis of empirical experience a consequence that certainly would not have been welcomed by Ingarden. Secondly, as we have seen, for Ingardens theory of ideas the distinction between the essential and non-essential properties of an object is important. The content of an idea should contain concretisations of precisely those pure ideal qualities that are (or at least could be) instantiated as the essence of some real individual object. Ideas, then, seem to show the formal structure and important relationships of the essential aspects of the real world. They are, contrary to the mere recombinations of pure ideal qualities, not mere sets of items somehow determining all the wildest combinatory possibilities, but they seem to be structures systematically and intelligibly arranged in order to make the world of individuals as rationally accessible as possible. Now, such a segregation and ordering of the properties of some object into essential and non-essential ones can be accomplished only from some point of view. Even for the most realistic of the realists, it should be clear that, depending on the point of view, there are
20

In addition to the constant items of the content of an idea (concretisations of pure ideal qualities and formal

moments) there are also, according to Ingarden, variable ones. For example, the idea of horse contains no determinate colour, and consequently in its content there is no constant corresponding to some determinate colour, but as each horse necessarily must be of some colour, there must be in the content of its idea the variable: some colour. Cf. Swiderski 1975.

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different aspects of each object that are essential, and that the very concept of an essential aspect involves the concept of a point of view.21 So if we want to have such a segregation, we need an intentionality that will focus on some important aspects of reality. Ideas therefore become structures that resemble something like true theories of individual objects. The concretisations of pure ideal qualities in the content of an idea list the essential features of an object and this list is put in a clear, intelligible relation to the formal aspects of the object that are similarly listed. (Cf. Ingarden 1964/65, vol II/1, p. 251) This means that the content of an idea differs significantly from the content of a purely intentional object. In the content of a purely intentional object, the actualisations of the pure ideal qualities stand, according to Ingarden, in the appropriate objectual form. Hence they build a kind of reduplication of the object of reference, so that a purely intentional object can, as it were, stand for a genuine target of reference, as for example in cases of hallucination or fiction. (Cf. Chrudzimski 1998, pp. 254 f., Chrudzimski 2003) But this analogy between ideas and theories is undercut by an important claim made by Ingarden. Surprisingly enough, we are told that ideas are totally mind-independent.22 Now, how should this independence be understood? First, we must keep in mind that if ideas were to be interpreted as theories at all, then they would be, at any rate, not our fallible and incomplete hypothetical constructions, but rather something like an ideal limit of a complete, true theory that could be ideally reached by scientific investigation in the long run.23 If the differentiation of the essential and non-essential properties needs some intentionality, then such an intentionality should not be conceived as idiosyncratic. We should assume that the property is essential if it occurs essentially in the framework of an idealised, complete theory that would eventually be reached if the scientific investigation were pursued long enough. This reservation frees ideas from dependence on an individual mind, but not, as it seems, from dependence on the transcendentally construed Peircean society (or, for that matter, on the
21 22

I do not want to insinuate, however, that the last claim is without controversy. Ingarden writes: Die Ideen sind mitsamt ihrem Gehalte den Erkenntnisakten gegenber radikal transzendent

[...].,Ingarden 1964/65, vol II/1, p. 253. Radical transcendence is defined as follows: Ein individueller Gegenstand ist dem Bewusstseinsakte gegenber, in dem er gegeben oder blo vermeint ist, radikal transzendent, wenn dieser Akt weder durch irgendeines seiner Momente noch durch die Tatsache seines Vollzugs in ihm irgendeine Vernderung hervorzurufen imstande ist., ibid. p. 225.
23

Of course, I am toying here with the well-known Peircean idea. Cf. Peirce 1868, p. 52.

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Husserlian world of inter-subjectively interacting transcendental egos). I suggest that we should accept this last dependence. Imagine then that Ingardens idea is really an ideal theory that could be formulated by an ideal society of impartial scientists in the long run. If we assume, as we should, that such theories, if they are to be classified as scientific theories at all, must in some non-trivial sense be controllable by certain mechanisms of falsification, then an idea construed this way would finally (in the long run) turn out to be materially dependent exclusively on the objective structure of reality. Still, formally, it turns out to be in a sense a correlate of the general form of scientific cognition. Just for this reason, the idea has the form of a theory, and precisely for this reason it specifies the form of its objects so that it is a theory of something, i.e. of the items that could be intentionally meant, could be subjects of predication, could be quantified etc. Hence the ideas are not materially mind-dependent in the sense in which mentally projected purely intentional objects are, but nonetheless the formal constituents of ideas are dependent on the form of the theorising mind on the general form of intentionality. From this point of view we can understand more easily the conception of form that is involved in Ingardens ontology. He defines form as something radically non-qualitative, and as something in which any quality must stand.24 Now, needless to say, quality is everything that makes any material difference. Whatever the content of our theories, then, it is quality and nothing else. But the fact that these theories are formulated as theories and that they are theories of something (i.e., of objects formally construed), belongs to the formal structure of the world that must be phenomenologically interpreted, as I want to claim the mirror image of the intentional nature of the mind. In this respect it seems that not only Ingardens concept of the purely intentional objects, but also his ontology of ideas, is constructed rather from an epistemological point of view. Notice that Ingardens definition of form strongly suggests the ineffability of the formal structure of the world. If all specification that makes any material difference refers to the qualitative determination of the world, and if each quality must stand in some form, then it seems that for the form we have only one place. This place is the logical syntax that builds the
24

Ingarden defines: Form im Sinne der formalen Ontologie: das radikal Unqualitative als solches, in dem das

Qualitative steht; [...] Materie: das Qualitative im weitesten Sinne, die reine Qualitt als Ausfllung einer Form., Ingarden 1964/65, vol. II/1, p. 28.

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formal framework (the formal conditions) of all material determination and that eventually culminates in the form of a theory, construed as something like a system of scientifically important axioms that when closed under logical implication gives us a scientifically complete description of the world.25 I suggest that this syntactical structure, if it were to be treated phenomenologically at all, should be interpreted as a mirror-image of the intentional nature of the mind, granted that this intentional nature is construed in extreme, and indeed, formal generality. The analogies of this interpretation with the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein and a broadly construed Kantian tradition should be obvious for the reader.26 To close, I want to assure that I do not want to claim that Ingarden himself would accept my last suggestions without reservations. Almost certainly he would protest. Already in his early work ber die Stellung der Erkenntnistheorie im System der Philosophie (Ingarden 1925) he claims that ontology is to be pursued in full independence of any epistemological considerations. My interpretation, explaining the ontological status of ideas and the formal structure of the world by reference to the intentional activity of theorybuilding, seems to relate ontology to such considerations, and is hence in this respect rather anti-Ingardenian. What I want to claim however, is that such an interpretation could be very illuminating, both for the understanding of Ingardens concept of idea and for a proper understanding of his concept of form. Literature: Armstrong, D. M. 1978: Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. 1/2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, D. M. 1989: Universals, Boulder - San Francisco - London: Westview Press. Brentano, F. 1874: Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Bd. I, hrsg. von O. Kraus, Leipzig: Meiner 1924. Castaeda, H. N. 1977: Perception, Belief, and the Structure of Physical Objects and Consciousness, Synthese, 35 (1977), pp. 285-351. Chisholm, R. M. 1977: Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
25

Such a description need not be complete in Laplaces sense of strictly determining all events in the world. In In Chrudzimski 1999a I argue that Ingardens pure epistemology with its central concept of the general idea of

the world there can be room for indeterminacy and freedom.

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cognition as such and with its thesis of privileged access in the form of the theory of Intuition des Durchlebens should be interpreted in this way. In this work, I have noticed that a similar technique could be fruitful in the interpretation of Ingardens entire concept of form. The last part of the present paper is but a further suggestion in this direction. The full working out of this fascinating theme must be left for some future work.

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Chisholm, R. M. 1989: On Metaphysics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Chrudzimski, A. 1998: Teoria Intencjonalnoci Romana Ingardena (Ingardens Theory of Intentionality), Edukacja Filozoficzna, 25 (1998), pp. 249-262 Chrudzimski, A. 1999a: Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden, Dordrecht: Kluwer. Chrudzimski, A. 1999b: Are Meanings in the Head? Ingardens Theory of Meaning, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 30 (1999), Nr. 3, October, pp. 306-326. Chrudzimski, A. 2001: Intentionalittstheorie beim frhen Brentano, Dordrecht: Kluwer. Chrudzimski, A. 2002: Von Brentano zu Ingarden. Die phnomenologische Bedeutungslehre, Husserl Studies, 18 (2002), Nr. 3, 185-208. Chrudzimski, A. 2003: Brentano i Ingarden - kopoty z przedmiotem intencjonalnym (Brentano and Ingarden - Some Problems Concerning the Intentional Object), in: J. Perzanowski, A. Pietruszak (eds.), Od teorii literatury do ontologii wiata, Toru, 125-141. Frege, G. 1892: ber Sinn und Bedeutung, Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, 100 (1892), pp. 25-50 (reprinted in: G. Frege, Kleinere Schriften, hrsg. von J. Angelelli, Darmstad 1967, pp. 146-162). Grossmann, R. 1974: Meinong, London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Haefliger, G. 1994: ber Existenz: Die Ontologie Roman Ingardens, Dordrecht: Kluwer. Hering, J. 1921: Bemerkungen ber das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee, Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und phnomenologische Forschung, 4 (1921), pp. 495-543. Husserl, E. 1894: Intentionale Gegenstnde, in: Husserliana XXII, pp. 303-348. Husserl, E. 1901: Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. II (Husserliana XIX). Husserl, E. 1908: Vorlesungen ber Bedeutungslehre. Sommersemester 1908 (Husserliana XXVI). Husserl, E: 1913. Ideen zu einer reinen Phnomenologie und phnomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch (Husserliana III/1), the page references are to the first edition of this book from 1913. Ingarden, R. 1925a: Essentiale Fragen. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Wesens, Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und phnomenologische Forschung, 7 (1925), pp. 125-304, Ingarden, R. 1925b: ber die Stellung der Erkenntnistheorie im System der Philosophie, in: R. Ingarden, Frhe Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 6, Tbingen, Niemeyer 1994, pp. 277-309. Ingarden, R. 1931: Das literarische Kunstwerk, Halle: Niemeyer (Engl. translation: The Literary Work of Art, Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1973). Ingarden, R. 1964/65: Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, vol. I/II, Tbingen: Niemeyer. Ingarden, R. 1967: Einfhrung in Edmund Husserls Phnomenologie. Osloer Vorlesungen (1967) (Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 4), Tbingen: Niemeyer 1992. Kripke, S. 1980: Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press. Kng, G. 1973: Husserl on Pictures and Intentional Objects, Review on Metaphysics, 23 (1973), pp. 670-680. Kng, G. 1982: Roman Ingarden (1893-1970): Ontological Phenomenology, in: H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, third revised and enlarged edition (Phaenomenologica, vol. 5/6), The Hague: Nijhoff, pp. 223-233. Meinong, A. 1904: ber Gegenstandstheorie, in: Gesamtausgabe, hrsg. von R. Haller und R. Kindinger, vol. II, Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt 1971. Peirce, C. S. 1868: Some Consequences of Four Incapacities, in: idem, The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 1 (1867-1893), Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press 1992. Putnam, H. 1975: The meaning of meaning, in: H. Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 215-27. Putnam, H. 1975: Representation and Reality, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 19

Russell, B. 1905: On Denoting, Mind, 14 (1905), pp. 479-493. Stout, G. F. 1921/1922: The Nature of Universals and Propositions, Proceedings of the British Academy, 10 (1921/1922), pp. 157-72, Stout, G. F. 1923: Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol., 3 (1923), pp. 114-22. Stout, G. F. 1936: Universals Again, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol., 15 (1936), pp. 1-15. Stout, G. F. 1940: Things, Predicates and Relations, Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 18 (1940), pp. 117-30. Swiderski, E. 1975: Some Salient Features of Ingardens Ontology, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 6 (1975), No. 2, pp. 81-90. Twardowski, K. 1894: Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, Wien: Hlder. Williams, D. C. 1953: The Elements of Being I, Review of Metaphysics 7 (1953), pp. 3-18.

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