Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-25716 July 28, 1966

FERNANDO LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. GERARDO ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents. Vicente Francisco Sycip and Salazar for respondents. CONCEPCION, C.J.: Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders for the Office of Vice-President of the Philippines in the general elections held on November 9, 1965. By Resolution No. 2, approved on December 17, 1965, the two Houses of Congress, in joint session assembled as the board charged with the duty to canvass the votes then cast for President and Vice President of the Philippines, proclaimed petitioner Fernando Lopez elected to the latter office with 3,531,550 votes, or a plurality of 26,724 votes over his closest opponent, respondent Gerardo M. Roxas, in whose favor 3,504,826 votes had been tallied, according to said resolution. On January 5, 1966, respondent filed, with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Election Protest No. 2, contesting the election of petitioner herein as VicePresident of the Philippines, upon the ground that it was not he, but said respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office. On February 22, 1966, petitioner Lopez instituted in the Supreme Court the present original action, for prohibition with preliminary injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the Presidential Electoral Tribunal from hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional," and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a nullity." Petitioner's contention is predicated upon the ground, that Congress may not, by law, authorize an election contest for President and Vice-President, the Constitution being silent thereon; that such contest tends to nullify the constitutional authority of Congress to proclaim the candidates elected for President and Vice-President; that the recount of votes by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, as an incident of an election contest, is inconsistent with the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the election returns for the President and the Vice-President; that no amendment to the Constitution providing for an election protest involving the office of President and Vice-President has been adopted, despite the constitutional amendment governing election contests for Members of Congress; that the tenure of the President and the Vice-President is fixed by the Constitution and cannot be abridged by an Act of Congress, like Republic Act No. 1793; that said Act has the effect of amending the Constitution, in that it for petitioner.

permits the Presidential Electoral Tribunal to review the congressional proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect; that the constitutional convention had rejected the original plan to include in the Constitution a provision authorizing election contest affecting the president-elect and the vice-president-elect before an electoral commission; that the people understood the Constitution to authorize election contests only for Members of Congress, not for President and Vice-President, and, in interpreting the Constitution, the people's intent is paramount; that it is illegal for Justices of the Supreme Court to sit as members of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, since the decisions thereof are appealable to the Supreme Court on questions of law; that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is a court inferior to the Supreme Court; and that Congress cannot by legislation appoint in effect the members of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Pursuant to the Constitution, "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.1 This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but "the" judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or "all" of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to "judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.2 Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.3 The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that "Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.4 Prior to the approval of Republic Act No. 1793, a defeated candidate for president or vicepresident, who believe that he was the candidate who obtained the largest number of votes for either office, despite the proclamation by Congress of another candidate as the president-elect or vice-president-elect, had no legal right to demand by election protest a recount of the votes cast for the office concerned, to establish his right thereto. As a consequence, controversies or disputes on this matter were not justiciable.5 Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that: There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal ... which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines. has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the President-elect or Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes cast for the

office involved in the litigation as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he 6 is the one elected president or vice-president, as the case may be, 7 and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court," said legislation has conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.8 Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first instance,9 those of court of land registration, 10 those of probate courts, 11 and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations. 12 It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance. 13 In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinct and separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land registration or a probate court, or as a court of juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a provincial capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more limited than that of the same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which are primary within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other words, there is only one court, although it may perform the functions pertaining to several types of courts, each having some characteristics different from those of the others. Indeed, the Supreme Court, 14 the Court of Appeals 15 and courts of first instance, 16 are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are booth trial courts and appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharged said dual functions. A court of first instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court of land registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less broad than those of a court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court. 17 Moreover, the power to be the "judge ... of ... contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of any public officer is essentially judicial. As such under the very principle of separation of powers invoked by petitioner herein it belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise. This is precisely the reason why said organic law ordains that "the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the

election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members" (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution). In other words, the purpose of this provision was to exclude the power to decide such contests relating to Members of Congress which by nature is judicial 18 from the operation of the general grant of judicial power 19 to "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law. Instead of indicating that Congress may not enact Republic Act No. 1793, the aforementioned provision of the Constitution, establishing said Electoral Tribunals for Members of Congress only, proves the exact opposite, namely: that the Constitution intended to vest Congress with discretion 20 to determine by law whether or not the election of a president-elect or that of a vice-president-elect may be contested and, if Congress should decide in the affirmative, which court of justice shall have jurisdiction to hear the contest. It is, even, debatable whether such jurisdiction may be conferred, by statute, to a board, commission or tribunal composed partly of Members of Congress and Members of the Supreme Court because of its possible inconsistency with the constitutional grant of the judicial power to "the Supreme Court and ... such inferior courts as may be established by law," for said board, commission or tribunal would be neither "the Supreme Court, 21 nor, certainly, "such inferior courts as, may be established by law." It follows, therefore, not only that Republic Act No. 1793 is not inconsistent with the Constitution or with the principle of separation of powers underlying the same, but, also, that it is in harmony with the aforementioned grant of "the judicial power" to said courts. Indeed, when Claro M. Recto, Chairman of the Constitutional Convention, proposed that the original move therein to include in the fundamental law a provision creating an Electoral Commission 22 to hear election contests against the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect, be given up, he expressed the view that the elimination of said provision would have the effect of leaving in the hands of the legislative department the power to decide what entity or body would "look into the protests for the positions of President and Vice-President." 23 Twenty-two (22) years later, or on May 3, 1957 then Senator Recto reiterated this view, when, in the course of the debates on the Bill which later became Republic Act No. 1793, he stated: ... Mr. President, as far as I can remember, the intention of the constitutional convention was to leave this matter to ordinary legislation. Such was, also, the impression of Dr. Jose M. Aruego, another prominent Member of the Convention, who says 24 that Election protests for the Presidency and the Vice-Presidendency were left to be judged in a manner and by a body decided by the National Assembly . (Emphasis ours.) No less than one of the main counsel for petitioner herein, himself, another delegate to the Constitutional Convention, evidently shared this view as late as September 30, 1965, for the introduction to his 1965 edition of "the Revised Election Code" states that "he will always be remembered for ... his famous bill creating the Presidential Electoral Tribunal ...". Indeed as a member of the Senate, on January 3, 1950, he Introduced Senate Bill No. 1 seeking to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal "to try, hear and decide protests contesting the election of the

President and the Vice-President of the Philippines", which shall be composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice, and four Senators and four Members of the House of Representatives. Then, again, the records of the Convention show, that in voting eventually to eliminate, from the draft of the Constitution, the provision establishing a Presidential Electoral Commission, the delegates were influenced by the fact that there was no similar provision in the Federal Constitution of the United States. Having followed the pattern thereof, it must be assumed, therefore, in the absence of any indicium to the contrary,25 that the Convention had adhered, also, to the interpretation given to this feature of said Federal Constitution, as may be deduced from the fact that, by an act of Congress of the United States, approved on January 29, 1877, an Electoral Commission was created to hear and decide certain issues concerning the election of the President of said nation held in 1876. It is, also worthy of notice that pursuant to said Act, nothing therein "shall be held to impair or affect any right now existing under the Constitution and laws to question, by proceedings in the judicial courts of the United States , the right or title of the person who shall be declared elected, or who shall claim to be President or Vice-President of the United States, if any such right exists". 26 Thus the absence of a provision in said Federal Constitution governing protests against the election of the President and the Vice-President had been construed to be without prejudice to the right of the defeated candidate to file a protest before the courts of justice of the United States, if the laws thereof permitted it. In other words, the Federal Congress was deemed clothed with authority to determine, by ordinary legislation, whether or not protests against the election of said officers may properly be entertained by the judicial department. Needless to say, the power of congress to declare who, among the candidates for President and/or Vice-President, has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by Republic Act No. 1793. Congress merely acts as a national board of canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty 27 to make said declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. 28 Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has power to do. It is, likewise, patent that the aforementioned authority of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal to determine whether or not the protestant has a better right than the President and/or the VicePresident declared elected by Congress would not abridge the constitutional tenure. If the evidence introduced in the election protest shows that the person really elected president or vice-president is the protestant, not the person declared elected by Congress, then the latter had legally no constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence, he can claim no abridgement thereof.1wph1.t It is similarly obvious that, in imposing upon the Supreme Court the additional duty of performing the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Congress has not, through Republic Act No. 1793, encroached upon the appointing power of the Executive. The

imposition of new duties constitutes, neither the creation of an office, nor the appointment of an officer. 29 In view of a resolution of this Court dated July 8, 1966, upholding the validity of Republic Act No. 1793, upon the ground that it merely vests additional jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, petitioner has filed a motion dated July 13, 1966, praying this Court "to clarify whether or not" this "election contest should as a consequence ... be docketed with, and the records thereof transferred, to this Supreme Court, and all pleadings, papers and processes relative thereto should thence forth be filed with it". The motion is, evidently, based upon the premise that the Supreme Court is different and distinct from the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, which is erroneous, as well as contrary to the ruling made in said resolution. Wherefore, the petition herein is hereby dismissed and the writs therein prayed for denied accordingly. The aforesaid motion is, moreover, denied. With costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners, vs. BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent. G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971 ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and CHIEF, PHIL. CONSTABULARY, respondents. G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971 LUZVIMINDA DAVID, petitioner,

vs. GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, COL. N. C. CAMELLO, in his capacity as Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary and HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE in his capacity as Secretary, Department of National defense, respondents. G.R. No. L-33982 December 11, 1971 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE FELICIDAD G. PRUDENTE, petitioners, vs. GENERAL MANUEL YAN, GEN. EDU GARCIA, respondents. G.R. No. L-34004 December 11, 1971 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF OF GERARDO TOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS "GERRY TOMAS" AND FOR RETURN OF DOCUMENTS ILLEGALLY SEIZED. DOMINGO E. DE LARA, in his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar Association, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondent. G.R. No. L-34013 December 11, 1971 REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, respondent. G.R. No. L-34039 December 11, 1971 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF OF SGT. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO AND HIS WIFE, MRS. BARCELISA C. DE

CASTRO. CARLOS C. RABAGO, in his capacity as President of the Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA),petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent. G.R. No. L-34265 December 11, 1971 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTOLIN ORETA, JR. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., petitioner, vs. GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA and COL. PROSPERO OLIVAS, respondents. G.R. No. L-34339 December 11, 1971 GARY B. OLIVAR, assisted by his father, GEORGE OLIVAR, petitioner, vs. GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, et al., respondents. Ignacio P. Lacsina for petitioners Teodosio Lansang, et al. Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Rogelio V. Arienda. E. Voltaire Garcia II for petitioner Luzvimindo David. Verzola, Africa and Atencio, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Wigberto E. Taada, Fortunato de Leon, R. G. Suntay and Juan T. David for petitioner Felicidad G. Prudente. Ruben L. Roxas for petitioner Reynaldo Rimando. Nuez, Acob, Del Rosario and Ramos for petitioner Carlos Rabago, etc. E. Voltaire Garcia II and M. P. Vivo for petitioner Gary Olivar, etc., et al. Jose W. Diokno and Juanito R. Remulla for petitioner Antolin Oreta, Jr.

Domingo E. de Lara for and in his own behalf. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo for respondents.

every segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political, social, economic and moral foundations of our existing government and to influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass media organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our society; WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious injury of scores of persons; WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. Presently, petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled cases, by the following persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that of their detention, namely: 1. TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI ALCALA, the petitioners in Case No. L-33964 filed on August 24, 1971 who, on August 22, 1971, between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m., were "invited" by agents of the Philippine Constabulary which is under the command of respondent Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia to go and did go to the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for interrogation, and thereafter, detained; 2. ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, the petitioner in Case No. L-33965 filed, also, on August 24, 1971 who was picked up in his residence, at No. 55 Road, 3, Urduja Village, Quezon City, by members of the Metrocom and then detained;

CONCEPCION, C.J.: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many more injured, including practically all of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them. On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows: WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by a well trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion, whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs; WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically strengthened and broadened their memberships through sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almost

3. Soon after the filing of the petition in Case No. L-33965 or on August 28, 1971 the same was amended to include VICENTE ILAO and JUAN CARANDANG, as petitioners therein, although, apart from stating that these additional petitioners are temporarily residing with the original petitioner, Rogelio V. Arienda, the amended petition alleged nothing whatsoever as regards the circumstances under which said Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang are said to be illegally deprived of their liberty; 4. LUZVIMINDO DAVID, petitioner in Case No. L-33973 filed on August 25, 1971 who was similarly arrested in his residence, at No. 131-B Kamias Road, Quezon City, and detained by the Constabulary; 5. Felicidad G. Prudente, who filed the petition in Case No. L-33982 on August 27, 1971 upon the ground that her father, Dr. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, had, on August 22, 1971, at about 8 p.m., been apprehended by Constabulary agents in his house, at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, and then detained at the Camp Crame stockade, Quezon City; 6. ANGELO DE LOS REYES, who was allowed on August 30, 1971 to intervene as one of the petitioners in Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, he having been arrested by members of the Constabulary on August 22, 1971, between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m., in his residence, at 86 Don Manuel Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty; 7. VICTOR FELIPE, who was similarly allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in said three (3) cases, upon the ground that, on August 23, 1971, at about 8 a.m., he was, likewise, apprehended at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, by members of the Philippine Constabulary and brought, first to the Constabulary headquarters at Canlubang, Laguna, and, then, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty; 8. TERESITO SISON, who was, also, allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in the same three (3) cases, he having been arrested in his residence, at 318 Lakandula St., Angeles City, on August 22, 1971, between 6 and 7 p.m., and taken to the PC offices at Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, then to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, and eventually to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is restrained and deprived of liberty; 9. GERARDO TOMAS, alias Gerry Tomas, a 17-year old second year college students of St. Louis University, Baguio City, on whose behalf, Domingo E. de Lara in his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar Association filed on September 3, 1971, the petition in Case No. L-34004, upon the ground that said Gerardo Tomas had, on August 23, 1971, at about 6 a.m., been arrested by Constabulary agents, while on his way to school in the City of Baguio, then brought to the Constabulary premises therein at Camp Holmes, and, thereafter, taken, on August 24, 1971, to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, and thence, on August 25,

1971, to the Constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained; 10. REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner in Case No. L-34013 filed on September 7, 1971 a 19-year old student of the U.P. College in Baguio city who, while allegedly on his way home, at Lukban Road, Baguio, on August 23, 1971, at about 1 a.m., was joined by three (3) men who brought him to the Burnham Park, thence, to Camp Olivas at San Fernando, Pampanga, and, thereafter, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained; 11. Sgt. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO and his wife, Mrs. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO, on whose behalf Carlos C. Rabago as President of the Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA) filed the petition in Case No. L-34039 on September 14, 1971 against Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia, alleging that, on August 27, 1971, at about 3 p.m., Mrs. De Castro was arrested, while at Liamzon Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig, Rizal, by agents of the Constabulary, and taken to the PC headquarters at Camp Crame, where, later, that same afternoon, her husband was brought, also, by PC agents and both are detained; 12. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., who filed the petition in Case No. L-34265 on October 26, 1971 against said Gen. Garcia, as Chief of the Constabulary, and Col. Prospero Olivas, Chief of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS), Philippine Constabulary, alleging that, upon invitation from said CIS, he went, on October 20, 1971, to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to see Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who referred petitioner to Col. Laroya of the CIS; that the latter, in turn, referred him to CIS Investigator Atty. Berlin Castillo and another CIS against, whose name is unknown to the petitioner; and that, after being interrogated by the two (2), petitioner was detained illegally; and 13. GARY OLIVAR, petitioner in Case No. L-34339 filed on November 10, 1971 who was apprehended, by agents of the Constabulary, in the evening of November 8, 1941, in Quezon City, and then detained at Camp Crame, in the same City. Upon the filing of the aforementioned cases, the respondents were forthwith required to answer the petitions therein, which they did. The return and answer in L-33964 which was, mutatis mutandis, reproduced substantially or by reference in the other cases, except L-34265 alleges, inter alia, that the petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that "their continued detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the Philippines;" that there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this country, and that "public safety and the security of the State required the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," as "declared by the President of the Philippines in Proclamation No. 889; that in making said declaration, the "President of the Philippines acted on relevant facts gathered thru the coordinated efforts of the various intelligence agents of our government but (of) which the Chief Executive could not at the moment give a full account and disclosure without risking revelation of highly classified state secrets vital to its safely and security"; that the

determination thus made by the President is "final and conclusive upon the court and upon all other persons" and "partake(s) of the nature of political question(s) which cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry," pursuant to Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, and Montenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882; that petitioners "are under detention pending investigation and evaluation of culpabilities on the reasonable belief" that they "have committed, and are still committing, individually or in conspiracy with others, engaged in armed struggle, insurgency and other subversive activities for the overthrow of the Government; that petitioners cannot raise, in these proceedings for habeas corpus, "the question of their guilt or innocence"; that the "Chief of Constabulary had petitioners taken into custody on the basis of the existence of evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable ground to believe that petitioners come within the coverage of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended"; that the "continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona fide precautionary and preventive measure demanded by the necessities of public safety, public welfare and public interest"; that the President of the Philippines has "undertaken concrete and abundant steps to insure that the constitutional rights and privileges of the petitioners as well as of the other persons in current confinement pursuant to Proclamation 889 remain unimpaired and unhampered"; and that "opportunities or occasions for abuses by peace officers in the implementation of the proclamation have been greatly minimized, if not completely curtailed, by various safeguards contained in directives issued by proper authority." These safeguards are set forth in: 1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defense, dated August 21, 1971, directing, inter alia, in connection with the arrest or detention of suspects pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, that, except when caught in flagrante delicto, no arrest shall be made without warrant authorized in writing by the Secretary of National Defense; that such authority shall not be granted unless, "on the basis of records and other evidences," it appears satisfactorily, in accordance with Rule 113, section 6(b), of the Rules of Court, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of the acts mentioned in the proclamation; that, if such person will be charged with a crime subject to an afflictive penalty under the Anti-Subversion Act, the authorization for his arrest shall not be issued unless supported by signed intelligence reports citing at least one reliable witness to the same overt act; that no unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in effecting arrests; and that arrested persons shall not be subject to greater restraint than is necessary for their detention; 2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23, 27, and 30, 1971, to all units of his command, stating that the privilege of the writ is suspended for no other persons than those specified in the proclamation; that the same does not involve material law; that precautionary measures should be taken to forestall violence that may be precipitated by improper behavior of military personnel; that authority to cause arrest under the proclamation will be exercised only by the Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers occupying position in the provinces down to provincial commanders"; that there shall be no indiscriminate or mass arrests; that arrested persons shall not be harmed and shall be accorded fair and humane treatment; and that members of the detainee's immediate family shall be allowed to visit him twice a week;

3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, dated September 2, 1971, directing the Chief of the Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups to prevent and/or check any abuses in connection with the suspension of the privilege of the writ; and 4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a Presidential Administrative Assistance Committee to hear complaints regarding abuses committed in connection with the implementation of Proclamation No. 889. Respondents in L-33965 further alleged that therein petitioners Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang had been released from custody on August 31, 1971, "after it had been found that the evidence against them was insufficient." In L-34265, the "Answer and Return" filed by respondents therein traversed some allegations of fact and conclusions of law made in the petition therein and averred that Antolin Oreta, Jr., the petitioner therein, had been and is detained "on the basis of a reasonable ground to believe that he has committed overt acts in furtherance of rebellion or insurrection against the government" and, accordingly, "comes within the class of persons as to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended by Proclamation No. 889, as amended," the validity of which is not contested by him. On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending Proclamation No. 889, so as to read as follows: WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by a well-trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of [actually] staging, undertaking, [and] wagging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion, whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-LeninistMaoist teaching and beliefs; WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically strengthened and

broadened their memberships through sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among our peasantly, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political, social, economic and moral foundations of our existing government and influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass media organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our society; WHEREAS, these lawless elements, by their acts of rebellion and insurrection, have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious injury of scores of persons; WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State; NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion [,] and [all] other [crimes and offenses] overt acts committed by them in furtherance [or on the occasion] thereof[,]. [or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.] 1 On September 1, 1971, Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982 were jointly heard and then the parties therein were allowed to file memoranda, which were submitted from September 3 to September 9, 1971. Soon thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889 was further amended by Proclamation No. 889-B, lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the following provinces, sub-provinces and cities of the Philippine, namely: A. PROVINCES:

1. Batanes 15. Negros Occ. 2. Ilocos Norte 16. Negros Or. 3. Ilocos Sur 17. Cebu 4. Abra 18. Bohol 5. Abra 19. Capiz 6. Pangasinan 20. Aklan 7. Batangas 21. Antique 8. Catanduanes 22. Iloilo 9. Masbate 23. Leyte 10. Romblon 24. Leyte del Sur 11. Marinduque 25. Northern Samar 12. Or. Mindoro 26. Eastern Samar 13. Occ. Mindoro 27. Western Samar 14. Palawan. B. SUB-PROVINCES: 1. Guimaras 2. Biliran C. CITIES: 1. Laog 10. Bacolod 2. Dagupan 11. Bago 3. San Carlos 12. Canlaon 4. Batangas 13. La Carlota 5. Lipa 14. Bais 6. Puerto Princesa 15. Dumaguete 7. San Carlos (Negros 16. Iloilo Occ.) 17. Roxas 8. Cadiz 18. Tagbilaran 9. Silay 19. Lapu-lapu 20. Cebu 21. Mandaue 22. Danao 23. Toledo 24. 25. 26. Tacloban Ormoc Calbayog 3. Siquior

On September 25, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-C, restoring the privilege of the writ in the following provinces and cities: A. PROVINCES: 1. Surigao del Norte 8. Agusan del Sur 2. Surigao del Sur 9. Misamis Or. 3. Davao del Norte 10. Misamis Occ. 4. Davao del Sur 11. Zamboanga del Norte

5. Davao Oriental 12. 6. Bukidnon 13. 7. Agusan del Norte B. CITIES: 1. Surigao 2. Davao 3. Butuan 4. Cagayan 5. Gingoong 6. Ozamiz 7. Oroquieta 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Basilan Pagadian

B. SUB-PROVINCES: 1. Aurora 2. Quirino C. CITIES:

Tangub Dapitan Dipolog Zamboanga Basilan Pagadian.

On October 4, 1971, the suspension of the privilege was further lifted by Proclamation No. 889-D, in the following places: A. PROVINCES: 1. Cagayan 5. 2. Cavite 6. 3. Mountain Province 7. 4. Kalinga-Apayao B. CITIES: 1. Cavite City 3. 2. Tagaytay 4. Legaspi Trece Martires Camarines Albay Sorsogon

1. Angeles 10. Manila 2. Baguio 11. Marawi 3. Cabanatuan 12. Naga 4. Caloocan 13. Olongapo 5. Cotabato 14. Palayan 6. General Santos 15. Pasay 7. Iligan 16. Quezon 8 Iriga 17. San Jose 9 Lucena 18. San Pablo The first major question that the Court had to consider was whether it would adhere to the view taken in Barcelon v. Baker, 2 and reiterated in Montenegro v. Castaeda, 3 pursuant to which, "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." Indeed, had said question been decided in the affirmative the main issue in all of these cases, except L-34339, would have been settled, and, since the other issues were relatively of minor importance, said cases could have been readily disposed of. Upon mature deliberation, a majority of the Members of the Court had, however, reached, although tentatively, a consensus to the contrary, and decided that the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ; but before proceeding to do so, the Court deemed it necessary to hear the parties on the nature and extent of the inquiry to be undertaken, none of them having previously expressed their views thereof. Accordingly, on October 5, 1971, the Court issued, in L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating in part that ... a majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for all persons detained or to be detained for the crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout the Philippines, which area has lately been reduced to some eighteen provinces, two subprovinces and eighteen cities with the partial lifting of the suspension of the privilege effected by Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889-B, 889-C and 889-D) and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution; and considering that the members of the Court are not agreed on the precise scope and

As a consequences, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is still suspended in the following eighteen (18) provinces, two (2) sub-provinces and eighteen (18) cities, to wit: A. PROVINCE: 1. Bataan 10. North Cotabato 2. Benguet 11. Nueva Ecija 3. Bulacan 13. Pampanga 4. Camarines Sur 14. Quezon 5. Ifugao 15. Rizal 6. Isabela 16. South Cotabato 7. Laguna 17. Tarlac 8. Lanao del Norte 18. Zambales 9. Lanao del Norte

nature of the inquiry to be made in the premises, even as all of them are agreed that the Presidential findings are entitled to great respect, the Court RESOLVED that these cases be set for rehearing on October 8, 1971 at 9:30 A.M. xxx xxx xxx On October 8, 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but, this time jointly with cases Nos. L-34004, L-34013, and L-34039, and the parties were then granted a period to file memoranda, in amplification of their respective oral arguments, which memoranda were submitted from October 12 to October 21, 1971. Respondents having expressed, during the oral arguments, on September 1 and October 8, 1971, their willingness to impart to the Court classified information relevant to these cases, subject to appropriate security measures, the Court met at closed doors, on October 28 and 29, 1971, and, in the presence of three (3) attorneys for the petitioners, chosen by the latter, namely, Senator Jose W. Diokno, Senator Salvador H. Laurel, and Atty. Leopoldo Africa, as well as of the Solicitor General and two (2) members of his staff, was briefed, by Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Felizardo Tanabe, Col. Tagumpay Nanadiego, Judge Advocate General, JAGS (GSC), and other ranking officers of said Armed Forces, on said classified information, most of which was contained in reports and other documents already attached to the records. During the proceedings, the members of the Court, and, occassionally, counsel for the petitioners, propounded pertinent questions to said officers of the Armed Forces. Both parties were then granted a period of time within which to submit their respective observations, which were filed on November 3, 1971, and complemented by some documents attached to the records on November 6, 1971, and a summary, submitted on November 15, 1971, of the aforesaid classified information. In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivar) had been filed and the parties therein were heard in oral argument on November 4, and 16, 1971, respectively. On November 15, 1971, the Solicitor General filed manifestations motions stating that on November 13, 1971, the following petitioners were: (a) released from custody: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Teodosio Lansang -G.R. Bayani Alcala -" Rogelio Arienda -" Nemesio Prudente -" Gerardo Tomas -" Reynaldo Rimando -" Filomeno M. de Castro -No. " " " " " " " L-33964 L-33964 L-33965 L-33982 L-34004 L-34013 L-34039

(8) Barcelisa de Castro (9) Antolin Oreta, Jr. -- " " L-34264.

--

"

"

L-34039

(b) charged, together with other persons named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, with a violation of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City: (1) Angelo de los Reyes (2) Teresito Sison -- " " L-33982 * -G.R. No. L-22982 *

(c) accused, together with many others named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, of a violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the Court of First Instance of Rizal: (1) Rodolfo del Rosario (2) Luzvimindo David (3) Victor Felipe -- " " L-33982 * -G.R. No. L-33969 ** -" " L-33973

and continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and praying that the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013 and L-34039 be dismissed, without prejudice to the resolution of the remaining cases. Copy of the criminal complaint filed, as above stated, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of said court which was appended to said manifestations-motions of the respondent as Annex 2 thereof shows that Gary Olivar, the petitioner in L-34339, is one of the defendants in said case. Required to comment on said manifestations-motions, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, in his comment dated November 23, 1971, urged the Court to rule on the merits of the petitions in all of these cases, particularly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 889, as amended, upon the ground that he is still detained and that the main issue is one of public interest involving as it does the civil liberties of the people. Angelo de los Reyes, one of the petitioners in L-33964, L33965 and L-33973, Nemesio E. Prudente and Gerardo Tomas, for whose respective benefit the petitions in L-33982 and L-34004 have been filed, maintained that the issue in these cases is not moot, not even for the detainees who have been released, for, as long as the privilege of the writ remains suspended, they are in danger of being arrested and detained again without just cause or valid reason. In his reply, dated and filed on November 29, 1971, the Solicitor General insisted that the release of the above-named petitioners rendered their respective petitions moot and academic. I Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr. in L-34265, question the formal validity of the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In this connection, it should be noted that, as originally formulated, Proclamation No. 889

was contested upon the ground that it did not comply with the pertinent constitutional provisions, namely, paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of our Constitution, reading: The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of the same instrument, which provides that: The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Regardless of whether or not the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case of "imminent danger" of invasion, insurrection or rebellion which is one of the grounds stated in said paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution, but not mentioned in paragraph (14), section 1 of its Bill of Rights petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof," and that, consequently, said Proclamation was invalid. This contention was predicated upon the fact that, although the first "whereas" in Proclamation No. 889 stated that "lawless elements" had "entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion," the actuality so alleged refers to the existence, not of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or insurrection, but of the conspiracy and the intent to rise in arms. Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has been rendered moot and academic by Proclamation No. 889-A, issued nine (9) days after the promulgation of the original proclamation, or on August 30, 1971. Indeed, said Proclamation No. 889-A amended, inter alia, the first "whereas" of the original proclamation by postulating the said lawless elements "have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one ...." Moreover, the third "whereas" in the original proclamation was, likewise, amended by alleging therein that said lawless elements, "by their acts of rebellion and insurrection," have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State. In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy and of the intent to rise in arms to overthrow the government,

Proclamation No. 889-A asserts that the lawless elements "are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion" to accomplish their purpose. It may not be amiss to note, at this juncture, that the very tenor of the original proclamation and particularly, the circumstances under which it had been issued, clearly suggest the intent to aver that there was and is, actually, a state of rebellion in the Philippines, although the language of said proclamation was hardly a felicitous one, it having in effect, stressed the actuality of the intent to rise in arms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion itself. The pleadings, the oral arguments and the memoranda of respondents herein have consistently and abundantly emphasized to justify the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus the acts of violence and subversion committed prior to August 21, 1971, by the lawless elements above referred to, and the conditions obtaining at the time of the issuance of the original proclamation. In short, We hold that Proclamation No. 889-A has superseded the original proclamation and that the flaws attributed thereto are purely formal in nature. II Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended. Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been and there is actually a state of rebellion and that 4 "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State." Are these findings conclusive upon the Court? Respondents maintain that they are, upon the authority of Barcelon v. Baker 5 and Montenegro v. Castaeda. 6 Upon the other hand, petitioners press the negative view and urge a reexamination of the position taken in said two (2) cases, as well as a reversal thereof. The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors, namely: (a) it relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott 7 involving the U.S. President's power to call out the militia, which he being the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces may be exercised to suppress or prevent any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty; and (b) the privilege had been suspended by the American Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all government authority emanates . The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case was based mainly upon the Barcelon case, and hence,

cannot have more weight than the same. Moreover, in the Barcelon case, the Court held that it could go into the question: "Did the Governor-General" acting under the authority vested in him by the Congress of the United States, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under certain conditions "act in conformance with such authority?" In other words, it did determine whether or not the Chief Executive had acted in accordance with law. Similarly, in the Montenegro case, the Court held that petitioner therein had "failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive ...." In short, the Court considered the question whether or not there really was are rebellion, as stated in the proclamation therein contested. Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence is neither explicit nor clear on the point under consideration. Although some cases 8 purport to deny the judicial power to "review" the findings made in the proclamations assailed in said cases, the tenor of the opinions therein given, considered as a whole, strongly suggests the court's conviction that the conditions essential for the validity of said proclamations or orders were, in fact, present therein, just as the opposite view taken in other cases 9 had a backdrop permeated or characterized by the belief that said conditions were absent. Hence, the dictum of Chief Justice Taney to the effect that "(e)very case must depend on its own circumstances." 10 One of the important, if not dominant, factors, in connection therewith, was intimated in Sterling v. Constantin, 11 in which the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared that: .... When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals charged with the transgression. To such a case the Federal judicial power extends (Art. 3, sec. 2) and, so extending, the court has all the authority appropriate to its exercise. .... 12 In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had "tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion,

insurrection, or rebellion" or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" "when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist." 13 For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility. Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth, regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest order is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth and development. Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be forewarned against mistaking mere dissent no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize. As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public safety

must require the aforementioned suspension. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions are present. As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence 14 attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have waned notably; but, the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the devastation and havoc, and the proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant with the military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequent liberation, brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with such vigor as to be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army called HUKBALAHAP, during the occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMP) after liberation which clashed several times with the armed forces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v. Castaeda. 15 Days before the promulgation of said Proclamation, or on October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were apprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the crime of rebellion, they served their respective sentences. 16 The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were concerned. Still, on June 20, 1957, Rep. Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, was approved, upon the ground stated in the very preamble of said statute that. ... the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control; ... the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines; 17 and ... in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country.... In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4, 1971, by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven copy of which Report was filed in these cases by the petitioners herein

The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the Philippines) among the workers; the Malayang Samahan ng mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand of nationalism. 18 Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups, one of which composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines early in 1969 and established a New People's Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the "Protracted People's War" or "War of National Liberation." Its "Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution" states, inter alia: The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general programme for a people's democratic revolution. All Filipino communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for the worthy cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and completely independent, democratic, united, just and prosperous ... xxx xxx xxx The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political power. The Communist Party of the Philippines assumes this task at a time that both the international and national situations are favorable of asking the road of armed revolution ... 19 In the year 1969, the NPA had according to the records of the Department of National Defense conducted raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in other violent incidents numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In 1970, its records of violent incidents was about the same, but the NPA casualties more than doubled. At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although they may disagree on the means to be used at a given time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a New People's Army, other, of course, that the arm forces of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is per se proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering

that its establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual commencement of hostilities. We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines. In fact, the thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People's Army proper is too small, compared with the size of the armed forces of the Government, that the Communist rebellion or insurrection cannot so endanger public safety as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This argument does not negate, however, the existence of a rebellion, which, from the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not be widespread or attain the magnitude of a civil war. This is apparent from the very provision of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of rebellion, 20 which may be limited in its scope to "any part" of the Philippines, and, also, from paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of the Constitution, authorizing the suspension of the privilege of the writ "wherever" in case of rebellion "the necessity for such suspension shall exist." In fact, the case of Barcelon v. Baker referred to a proclamation suspending the privilege in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas only. The case of In re Boyle 21 involved a valid proclamation suspending the privilege in a smaller area a country of the state of Idaho. The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the validity of the suspension of the privilege namely, that the suspension be required by public safety. Before delving, however, into the factual bases of the presidential findings thereon, let us consider the precise nature of the Court's function in passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended. Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant 22 the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from being identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin.

Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the judicial authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as regards findings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English law, the reviewing court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative findings; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. The administrative findings can be interfered with only if there is no evidence whatsoever in support thereof, and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases, in both jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence" rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla" or "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," 23 even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence in the sense in which the term is used in judicial proceedings before enacting a legislation or suspending the writ. Referring to the test of the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, expressed, in the leading case of Nebbia v. New York, 24 the view that: ... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio ... With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practically of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal ... Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General ... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endanger by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily. No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test. Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889, as amended? Petitioners submit a negative answer upon the ground: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As above indicated, however, the existence of a rebellion is obvious, so much so that counsel for several petitioners herein have admitted it. With respect to the normal operation of government, including courts, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, suffice it to say that, if the conditions were such that courts of justice no longer functioned, a suspension of the privilege would have been unnecessary, there being no courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, petitioners' reference to the normal operation of courts as a factor indicative of the illegality of the contested act of the Executive stems, perhaps, from the fact that this circumstance was adverted to in some American cases to justify the invalidation therein decreed of said act of the Executive. Said cases involved, however, the conviction by military courts of members of the civilian population charged with common crimes. It was manifestly, illegal for military courts to assume jurisdiction over civilians so charged, when civil courts were functioning normally. Then, too, the alleged absence of any untoward incident after August 21, 1971, does not necessarily bear out petitioners' view. What is more, it may have been due precisely to the suspension of the privilege. To be sure, one of its logical effects is to compel those connected with the insurrection or rebellion to go into hiding. In fact, most of them could not be located by the authorities, after August 21, 1971. The alleged July-August Plan to terrorize Manila is branded as incredible, upon the theory that, according to Professor Egbal Ahman of Cornell University, "guerrilla use of terror ... is sociological and psychologically selective," and that the indiscriminate resort to terrorism is bound to boomerang, for it tends to alienate the people's symphaty and to deprive the dissidents of much needed mass support. The fact, however, is that the violence used is some demonstrations held in Manila in 1970 and 1971 tended to terrorize the bulk of its inhabitants. It would have been highly imprudent, therefore, for the Executive to discard the possibility of a resort to terrorism, on a much bigger scale, under the July-August Plan. We will now address our attention to petitioners' theory to the effect that the New People's Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines is too small to pose a danger to public safety of such magnitude as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The flaw in petitioners' stand becomes apparent when we consider that it assumes that the Armed Forces of the Philippines have no other task

than to fight the New People's Army, and that the latter is the only threat and a minor one to our security. Such assumption is manifestly erroneous. The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, the Executive had information and reports subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by the abovementioned Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee of Seven 25 to the effect that the Communist Party of the Philippines does not merely adhere to Lenin's idea of a swift armed uprising; that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh's terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperative local official; that, in line with this policy, the insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970; that the Constitutional Convention Hall was bombed on June 12, 1971; that, soon after the Plaza Miranda incident, the NAWASA main pipe, at the Quezon CitySan Juan boundary, was bombed; that this was followed closely by the bombing of the Manila City Hall, the COMELEC building, the Congress Building and the MERALCO substation at Cubao, Quezon City; and that the respective residences of Senator Jose J. Roy and Congressman Eduardo Cojuangco were, likewise, bombed, as were the MERALCO main office premises, along Ortigas Avenue, and the Doctor's Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Building, in Caloocan City. Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that as per said information and reports the reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's concept of protracted people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of the political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves; that conformably to such concept, the Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive and intensive program of subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the organization of armed city partisans and the infiltration in student groups, labor unions, and farmer and professional groups; that the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making Communist fronts of eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang Molave (SM) and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino(MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the KM had two hundred forty-five (245) operational chapters throughout the Philippines, of which seventy-three (73) were in the Greater Manila Area, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central Luzon, forty-two (42) in the Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party had recorded two hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured; that most of these actions were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front organizations; that the violent demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group of armed agitators; that the number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those of 1970; and that twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of fifteen (15) persons and the injury of many more.

Subsequent events as reported have also proven that petitioners' counsel have underestimated the threat to public safety posed by the New People's Army. Indeed, it appears that, since August 21, 1971, it had in Northern Luzon six (6) encounters and staged one (1) raid, in consequence of which seven (7) soldiers lost their lives and two (2)others were wounded, whereas the insurgents suffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26, 1971, a well-armed group of NPA, trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked the very command port of TF LAWIN in Isabela, destroying two (2) helicopters and one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in Central Luzon a total of four (4) encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the Government, one (1) BSDU killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an encounter at Botolan, Zambales, one (1) KM-SDK leader, an unidentified dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of the dissident group were killed; that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in the barrio of San Pedro. Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC and the NPA, in which a PC and two (2) KM members were killed; that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces have been rendered more complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in mid-1971, a KM group, headed by Jovencio Esparagoza, contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in their settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, and offered them books, pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted teach-ins in the reservation; that Esparagoza an operation of the PC in said reservation; and that there are now two (2) NPA cadres in Mindanao. It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations are, according to intelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives out of locally available materials; that the bomb used in the Constitutional Convention Hall was a "clay-more" mine, a powerful explosive device used by the U.S. Army, believed to have been one of many pilfered from the Subic Naval Base a few days before; that the President had received intelligence information to the effect that there was a July-August Plan involving a wave of assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism and mass destruction of property and that an extraordinary occurence would signal the beginning of said event; that the rather serious condition of peace and order in Mindanao, particularly in Cotabato and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces sufficient to cope with the situation; that a sizeable part of our armed forces discharge other functions; and that the expansion of the CPP activities from Central Luzon to other parts of the country, particularly Manila and its suburbs, the Cagayan Valley, Ifugao, Zambales, Laguna, Quezon and Bicol Region, required that the rest of our armed forces be spread thin over a wide area. Considering that the President was in possession of the above data except those related to events that happened after August 21, 1971 when the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and national security required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with violent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and the bombing or water mains and conduits, as well as electric power plants and installations a possibility which, no matter how remote, he was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest.

He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel that the situation was critical as, indeed, it was and demanded immediate action. This he took believing in good faith that public safety required it. And, in the light of the circumstances adverted to above, he had substantial grounds to entertain such belief. Petitioners insist that, nevertheless, the President had no authority to suspend the privilege in the entire Philippines, even if he may have been justified in doing so in some provinces or cities thereof. At the time of the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, he could not be reasonably certain, however, about the placed to be excluded from the operation of the proclamation. He needed some time to find out how it worked, and as he did so, he caused the suspension to be gradually lifted, first, on September 18, 1971, in twenty-seven (27) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and twenty six (26) cities; then, on September 25, 1971, in order fourteen (14) provinces and thirteen (13) cities; and, still later, on October 4, 1971, in seven (7) additional provinces and four (4) cities, or a total of forty-eight (48) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and forth-three (43) cities, within a period of forty-five (45) days from August 21, 1971. Neither should We overlook the significance of another fact. The President could have declared a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No. 889 limited the suspension to persons detained "for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith." Even this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-A, which withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes and offenses committed "on the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident thereto, in or connection therewith." In fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-34004 concede that the President had acted in good faith. In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2)other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh. In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrary in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional. III The next question for determination is whether petitioners herein are covered by said Proclamation, as amended. In other words, do petitioners herein belong to the class of persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended? In this connection, it appears that Bayani Alcala, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Gerardo Tomas, petitioner in L-34004, and Reynaldo Rimando, petitioner in L-34013,

were, on November 13, 1971, released "permanently" meaning, perhaps, without any intention to prosecute them upon the ground that, although there was reasonable ground to believe that they had committed an offense related to subversion, the evidence against them is insufficient to warrant their prosecution; that Teodosio Lansang, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Rogelio Arienda, petitioner in L33965, Nemesio Prudente, petitioner in L-33982, Filomeno de Castro and Barcelisa C. de Castro, for whose benefit the petition in L-34039 was filed, and Antolin Oreta, Jr., petitioner in L-34265, were, on said date, "temporarily released"; that Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Victor Felipe, an intervenor in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, as well as Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, are still under detention and, hence, deprived of their liberty, they together with over forty (40) other persons, who are at large having been accused, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, of a violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act); and that Angelo delos Reyes and Teresito Sison, intervenors in said L-33964, L33965 and L-33973, are, likewise, still detained and have been charged together with over fifteen (15) other persons, who are, also, at large with another violation of said Act, in a criminal complaint filed with the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City. With respect to Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang petitioners in L-33965 who were released as early as August 31, 1971, as well as to petitioners Nemesio Prudente, Teodosio Lansang, Rogelio Arienda, Antolin Oreta, Jr., Filomeno de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro, Reynaldo Rimando, Gerardo Tomas and Bayani Alcala, who were released on November 13, 1971, and are no longer deprived of their liberty, their respective petitions have, thereby, become moot and academic, as far as their prayer for release is concerned, and should, accordingly, be dismissed, despite the opposition thereto of counsel for Nemesio Prudente and Gerardo Tomas who maintain that, as long as the privilege of the writ remains suspended, these petitioners might be arrested and detained again, without just cause, and that, accordingly, the issue raised in their respective petitions is not moot. In any event, the common constitutional and legal issues raised in these cases have, in fact, been decided in this joint decision. Must we order the release of Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Angelo de los Reyes, Victor Felipe and Teresito Sison, intervenors in L33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, who are still detained? The suspension of the privilege of the writ was decreed by Proclamation No. 889, as amended, for persons detained "for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion and other overt acts committed by them in furtherance thereof." The records shows that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor Felipe, Angelo de los Reyes, Teresito Sison and Gary Olivar are accused in Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal with a violation of the AntiSubversion Act and that the similar charge against petitioners Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison in a criminal complaint, originally filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, has, also, been filed with said court. Do the offenses so charged

constitute one of the crimes or overt acts mentioned in Proclamation No. 889, as amended? In the complaint in said Criminal Case No. 1623, it is alleged: That in or about the year 1968 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter up to and including August 21, 1971, in the city of Quezon, Philippines, and elsewhere in the Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts became officers and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines, a subversive association as defined by Republic Act No. 1700, which is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a communist totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control; That all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines conspiring, confederating and mutual helping one another, did then and there knowingly, wilfully, and feloniously and by overt acts committed subversive acts all intended to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows: 1. By rising publicly and taking arms against the forces of the government, engaging in war against the forces of the government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting public lands or property from the law purposes for which they have been appropriated; 2. By engaging by subversion thru expansion and requirement activities not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the united front organizations of the Communist Party of the Philippines as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), Movement for the Democratic Philippines (MDP), Samahang Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK), Students' Alliance for National Democracy (STAND), MASAKA Olalia-faction, Student Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP), KASAMA, Pagkakaisa ng Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (PMP) and many others; thru agitation promoted by rallies, demonstration and strikes some of them violent in nature, intended to create social discontent, discredit those in power and weaken the people's confidence in the government; thru consistent propaganda by publications, writing, posters, leaflets of similar means; speeches, teach-ins, messages, lectures or other similar means; or thru the media as the TV, radio or newspapers, all intended to promote the Communist pattern of subversion;

3. Thru urban guerilla warfare characterized by assassinations, bombings, sabotage, kidnapping and arson, intended to advertise the movement, build up its morale and prestige, discredit and demoralize the authorities to use harsh and repressive measures, demoralize the people and weaken their confidence in the government and to weaken the will of the government to resist. That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: a. That the offense was committed in contempt of and with insult to the public authorities; b. That some of the overt acts were committed in the Palace of the Chief Executive; c. That craft, fraud, or disguise was employed; d. That the offense was committed with the aid of armed men; e. That the offense was committed with the aid of persons under fifteen(15) years old. Identical allegations are made in the complaint filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, except that the second paragraph thereof is slightly more elaborate than that of the complaint filed with the CFI, although substantially the same. 26 In both complaints, the acts imputed to the defendants herein constitute rebellion and subversion, of in the language of the proclamation "other overt acts committed ... in furtherance" of said rebellion, both of which are covered by the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ. It is clear, therefore, that the crime for which the detained petitioners are held and deprived of their liberty are among those for which the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended. Up to this point, the Members of the Court are unanimous on the legal principles enunciated. After finding that Proclamation No. 889, as amended, is not invalid and that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison are detained for and actually accused of an offense for which the privilege of the writ has been suspended by said proclamation, our next step would have been the following: The Court, or a commissioner designated by it, would have received evidence on whether as stated in respondents' "Answer and Return" said petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion."

It is so happened, however, that on November 13, 1971 or two (2) days before the proceedings relative to the briefing held on October 28 and 29, 1971, had been completed by the filing 27 of the summary of the matters then taken up the aforementioned criminal complaints were filed against said petitioners. What is more, the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges contained in said complaints has already begun. The next question, therefore, is: Shall We now order, in the cases at hand, the release of said petitioners herein, despite the formal and substantial validity of the proclamation suspending the privilege, despite the fact that they are actually charged with offenses covered by said proclamation and despite the aforementioned criminal complaints against them and the preliminary examination and/or investigations being conducted therein? The Members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of the opinion, and, so hold, that, instead of this Court or its Commissioner taking the evidence adverted to above, it is best to let said preliminary examination and/or investigation to be completed, so that petitioners' released could be ordered by the court of first instance, should it find that there is no probable cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest could be issued, should a probable cause be established against them. Such course of action is more favorable to the petitioners, inasmuch as the preliminary examination or investigation requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed to establish that the Executive had not acted arbitrary in causing the petitioners to be apprehended and detained upon the ground that they had participated in the commission of the crime of insurrection or rebellion. And, it is mainly for the reason that the Court has opted to allow the Court of First Instance of Rizal to proceed with the determination of the existence of probable cause, although ordinarily the Court would have merely determined the existence of the substantial evidence of petitioners' connection with the crime of rebellion. Besides, the latter alternative would require the reception of evidence by this Court and thus duplicate the proceedings now taking place in the court of first instance. What is more, since the evidence involved in the same proceedings would be substantially the same and the presentation of such evidence cannot be made simultaneously, each proceeding would tend to delay the other. Mr. Justice Fernando is of the opinion in line with the view of Mr. Justice Tuason, in Nava v. Gatmaitan, 28 to the effect that "... if and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern ..." that the filing of the above-mentioned complaint against the six (6) detained petitioners herein, has the effect of the Executive giving up his authority to continue holding them pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, even if he did not so intend, and to place them fully under the authority of courts of justice, just like any other person, who, as such, cannot be deprived of his liberty without lawful warrant, which has not, as yet, been issued against anyone of them, and that, accordingly, We should order their immediate release. Despite the humanitarian and libertarian spirit with which this view had been espoused, the other Members of the Court are unable to accept it because: (a) If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid and We so hold it to be and the detainee is covered by the proclamation, the filing

of a complaint or information against him does not affect the suspension of said privilege, and, consequently, his release may not be ordered by Us; (b) Inasmuch as the filing of a formal complaint or information does not detract from the validity and efficacy of the suspension of the privilege, it would be more reasonable to construe the filing of said formal charges with the court of first instance as an expression of the President's belief that there are sufficient evidence to convict the petitioners so charged and that hey should not be released, therefore, unless and until said court after conducting the corresponding preliminary examination and/or investigation shall find that the prosecution has not established the existence of a probable cause. Otherwise, the Executive would have released said accused, as were the other petitioners herein; (c) From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation of the act of the President in having said formal charges filed is, We believe, more beneficial to the detainees than that favored by Mr. Justice Fernando. His view particularly the theory that the detainees should be released immediately, without bail, even before the completion of said preliminary examination and/or investigation would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from filing formal charges as long as it may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage the early filing of said charges, so that courts of justice could assume jurisdiction over the detainees and extend to them effective protection. Although some of the petitioners in these cases pray that the Court decide whether the constitutional right to bail is affected by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, We do not deem it proper to pass upon such question, the same not having been sufficiently discussed by the parties herein. Besides, there is no point in settling said question with respect to petitioners herein who have been released. Neither is necessary to express our view thereon, as regards those still detained, inasmuch as their release without bail might still be decreed by the court of first instance, should it hold that there is no probable cause against them. At any rate, should an actual issue on the right to bail arise later, the same may be brought up in appropriate proceedings. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional; 2. Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039 and L-34265, insofar as petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda, Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente, Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando, Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are concerned; 3. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges for

violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison, and to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against them, or, otherwise, to order their release; and 4. Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of the aforementioned preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of the proper orders or resolution in connection therewith, the parties may by motion seek in these proceedings the proper relief. 5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 92649 February 14, 1991 SPOUSES LEONOR and ROSA BADUA, petitioners, vs. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION, CORDILLERA PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, MANUEL TAO-IL, AMOGAO-EN KISSIP, DALALO ILLIQUES, JUANITO GAYYED, PEDRO CABANTO, VICENTE DAYEM and DAVID QUEMA, respondents. GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p Whether a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory decision in a land dispute is the legal issue presented by this petition. The petitioners, spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua, allegedly own a farm land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra. In July 1989, they were forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a "decision" of the Cordillera Bodong Administration in Case No. O, entitled "David Quema vs. Leonor Badua." The factual background of the case, as recited in the undated "decision" (Annex A, translation is Annex A-1) is as follows:

In 1966, Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra, evidenced by Tax Declarations Nos. 4997 and 4998 mortgaged said parcels of land for P6,000 to Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land twenty-two (22) years later, on August 14, 1988, long after the mortgagee had already died. He allegedly paid the redemption price of P10,000 to the mortgagee's heir, Jessie Macaraeg. On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land was sold to her by Dra. Erotida Valera when she was still alive. However, Rosa could not produce the deed of sale because it is allegedly in the possession of Vice-Governor Benesa. As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, he filed a case before the Barangay Council, but it failed to settle the dispute, A certain Judge Cacho advised Quema to file his complaint in the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. The tribal court conducted a trial on February 19, 1989 and rendered the following decision: 9. The Maeng Tribal Court, therefore, decides to give the land to DAVID QUEMA and ROSA BADUA and her husband must pay the persons to whom they mortgaged the said land. The Maeng Tribal Court also decides that ROSA BADUA and her husband must reimburse the expenses of DAVID QUEMA in following-up the land case amounting to P2,000.00. The Maeng Tribal Court further decides to penalize ROSA BADUA and her husband in the amount of P5,000.00 for telling the lie that they bought this land from the late DRA. EROTIDA VALERA; for misleading the Maeng Tribal Court which handled the continuation of this case here in Bangued, CBA Provincial Office where they failed to make an appearance; and their illegal acquisition of the said parcel of land. This decision is based on the "PAGTA." (pp. 16-17, Rollo.) When Leonor and Rosa Badua did not immediately vacate the land, they received on June 30, 1989 a "warning order" from Ka Blantie, Zone Commander, Abra Zone-1 of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, thus: WARNING ORDER Mr. & MRS. LEONOR BADUA A last warning from the armed CPLA of the CBA reiterates the order that you not to interfere any longer with the parcels of land decided in favor of DAVID QUEMA as per "Court Order" of the Maeng Tribal Court. You are also to pay back the expenses he incurred for the case amounting to P2,000.00 and your fine of P5,000.00.

Non-compliance of the said decision of the Court and any attempt to bring this case to another Court will force the CPLA to settle the matter, in which case, you will have no one to blame since the case has been settled. (p. 20, Rollo.) Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. In September 1989, his wife, Rosa, was arrested by the Cordillera People's Liberation Army and detained for two days. On April 2, 1990, the Baduas filed this petition "for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs" (which may be treated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition) praying that: 1. a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to stop the respondents from enforcing the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration during the pendency of this case; 2. the respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial power and hearing cases; and 3. the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong Administration and Cordillera People's Liberation Army be clarified. Petitioners allege that the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration is null and void because: 1. petitioners were denied due process or formal hearing; and 2. the Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial power nor jurisdiction over the petitioners nor over the private respondent as neither of them are members of the Maeng Tribe. Upon receipt of the petition, the Court on April 5, 1990 required the respondents to comment, but, unable to serve said resolution on the respondents, the court requested the Philippine Constabulary Commander of the Cordillera Region to do it. Respondents through counsel, Atty. Demetrio V. Pre, filed their comment on October 26, 1990. They alleged that: the Maeng Tribe is a cultural minority group of Tingguians inhabiting the interior mountain town of Villaviciosa, Abra. The tribe is a part of the Cordillera Bodong Association or Administration whose military arm is the Cordillera People's Liberation Army. The tribal court, or council of elders, is composed of prominent and respected residents in the locality. It decides and settles all kinds of disputes more speedily than the regular courts, without the intervention of lawyers. Respondents further allege that the proceedings and decisions of the tribal courts are respected and obeyed by the parties, the municipal and barangay officials, and the people in the locality, ostracism being the penalty for disobedience of, or non-

compliance with, the decisions of the council of elders in the areas where tribal courts operate. Respondents contend that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the tribal courts because they are not a part of the judicial system. Respondents concede that if the petitioners "want to test the wisdom of the decision of the council of elders," the petitioners should file the necessary suit, not in the Supreme Court, but in the trial courts where evidence can be presented. Respondents pray that the decision of the tribal court be maintained and the petition for certiorari and prohibition be dismissed. After deliberating on the petition and the comment thereon of the respondents, which the Court decided to treat as the latter's answer, the Court finds the petition to be meritorious, hence, resolved to grant the same. In Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990, the Court en banc, found that in the plebiscite that was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act 6766, the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and city * of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province, hence, the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be. Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended. As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army as a regional police force or a regional command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally exist. Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community. Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or

conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise. An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and through the regular courts today. WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. The decision rendered on February 18, 1989 by the Maeng Tribal Court in Case No. 0, entitled "David Quema vs. the Leonor Badua," is hereby annulled for lack of jurisdiction. The respondents Cordillera Bodong Administration, Cordillera People's Liberation Army, Manuel Tao-il, Amogao-en Kissip, Dalalo Illiques, Juanita Gayyed, Pedro Cabanto, Vicente Dayem and David Quema, are hereby ordered to cease and desist from implementing said decision, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action by the parties in the proper competent courts of the land as provided by law. Costs against the respondents. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by Attorney-in-Fact, TRINIDAD S. VIADO, Petitioners, G. R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988 -versus-

REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN CITY, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, Respondents. TOMASA BARTOLOME, in Her Own Behalf and in Behalf of the Other Members of the CONSUELO HEIGHTS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Petitioners-Intervenors.

specified, the acceptance of such certificate making the occupant a debtor of the government; [2] until the price was fully paid, however, title was reserved in the Government, and any sale or encumbrance made by the purchaser prior to such full payment was explicitly declared to "be invalid as against the Government and, in all respects, subordinate to its prior claim;" [3] in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of purchase money and interest thereon, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands [now Director of Lands] had the duty at once to protect the Government from loss by bringing suit to obtain judicial authority to enforce the Government's lien on the property and by selling it in the same manner as for foreclosure of mortgages, the purchaser at such sale being deemed to acquire a good and indefeasible title, and the proceeds of the sale being applied to the payment of the costs of the court and all installments due or to become due; and [4] in the event of completion of payment, the Government transferred title to the land to the purchaser "by proper instrument of conveyance", the certificate of title over the land to issue and become effective in the manner provided by the Land Registration Act.[1] Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding[2] that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. It adjudged that: According to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by the Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of said Association [3] stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the Government and the land now occupied by the members of said Association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic of the Philippines being, therefore, null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy. Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them for "disposition and sale pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended."[4] It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his Decree contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging, on the one hand, that the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon, he states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. [are] the present bona fide occupants" of all said lots. The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent with the former but is both a physical and legal fallacy. Wellknown is the rule of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. And the absurdity of the subsumed proposition is self-evident for persons not in possession of land, who probably have not even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed "occupants" thereof, much less "bona fide" occupants.

DECISION NARVASA, J.: A more despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government power than that manifested in this case can scarcely be found in the sordid annals of the Martial Law regime. Relief to the victims must be, as it is hereby, extended by the grant to them of the extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition condemning as unconstitutional, and annulling and perpetually enjoining the acts complained of. Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. [hereafter simply, Carmel] a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens Title [No. 64007] over the lot was cancelled and a new one [ No. 8314] issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property. Some eight [8] years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof." On September 14, 1973, a year almost to the day after the declaration of Martial Law, Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The Decree invalidated, inter alia, the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public[(the Tuasons being among the buyers]. The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate [one of the so-called "Friar Lands"]. Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Under these statutes: [1] a bona fide settler or occupant was allowed to purchase [if he did not wish to lease] the portion occupied by him at the price fixed by the Government, in cash or on installment; the interested buyer was given a certificate of sale, which was regarded as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price in the and at the interest

But this notwithstanding and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as they, in the following imperious manner: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree that any and all sales contracts between the government and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent transferees, and any and all transfers thereafter, covering Lots 979, 981, 982, 985, 988, 989, 990, 991 new, 1226, 1228, 1230, and 980-C-2 [LRC PSD1730], all of Tala Estate, Caloocan City, are hereby declared invalid and null and void ab initio as against the Government; that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62603, 62604, 62605, covering Lots 1, 2 and 3, PCS-4383, all in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc., which are a consolidation and subdivision survey of the lots hereinbefore enumerated, are declared invalid and considered cancelled as against the Government; and that said lots are declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended. On the strength of this Presidential Decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following: MEMORANDUM. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this Certificate of Title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos Decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain[5] but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; [6] and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund. Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the Decree. In his Comment on the Petition, [7] he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal contemplation,[8] they had never become owners thereof because of nonpayment of the purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest; and the Decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they had theretofore been residing. He expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything from the Assurance Fund.

Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four [64] persons, members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been divested of their lands by the same Presidential Decree No. 293, adopting as their own, the allegations and prayer embodied in the Tuasons' petition. The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari[9] may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power. The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, [10] or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause.[11] He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of the Association [of homeowners] stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that "any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic were null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy." These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law,[12] the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as Chief Executive and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the Martial Law regime. Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power i.e., determined the relevant facts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons [and the petitioners in intervention] were never confronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other

words, not only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had, in addition, exercised it unconstitutionally. In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the Petition for Certiorari as one for Prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. [13] Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction, exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws, and had, furthermore, performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the parties' pleadings.[14] There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was actually issued to it by the Government. This, of course, gives rise to the strong presumption that official duty has been regularly performed,[15] that official duty being in this case the ascertainment by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands of the fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for such issuance, i.e., the payment in full of the price, together with all accrued interest. Against this presumption, there is no evidence. It must, hence, be accorded full sway in these proceedings. Furthermore, the title having been duly issued to Carmel, it became "effective in the manner provided in Section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act."[16] It may well be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of the price of the land purchased by it from the Government pursuant to the provisions of Act 1120. This is a possibility that cannot be totally discounted. If this be the fact, the Government may bring suit to recover the unpaid installments and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance involving the land subject of the sale, and enforce the lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in the manner provided by Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety for the foreclosure of mortgages.[17] This it can do, despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. Prescription does not lie against the Government. But until and unless such a suit is brought and results in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title by Carmel and the purchases by the petitioners and the petitioners-intervenors from it of portions of the land covered by its original title must be respected. At any rate, the eventuation of that contingency will not and cannot in any manner affect this Court's conclusion, herein affirmed, of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of Presidential Decree No. 293, and the absolute lack of any right to the land or any portion thereof on the part of the members of the so-called "Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc." The Decree was not as claimed a licit instance of the application of social justice principles or the exercise of police power. It was in truth a disguised, vile stratagem deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and disdainful disregard of the rights of others. It was, in reality, a taking of private property without due process and without compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by law. One last word respecting the petitioners in intervention. Their petition to intervene substantially fulfilled the requirements laid down for a class suit [18] and was consequently given due course by the Court. They are, therefore, covered by this judgment.

WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the property therein respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth, to refrain, cease and desist from implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991 HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication? The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases

recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth. 1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3 Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4 2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5 3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8

4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded." 5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10 6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11 On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition: To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence. xxx xxx xxx

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14 8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.: a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17 9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga " to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra). It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition. The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case ( i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and 2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike. The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely. The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22 The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; (5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; (6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; (10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights . It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such

rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26 But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29 "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31 In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32 Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it

means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34 Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them. This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done. In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service

Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case ( i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-61259 April 26, 1983 LIONS CLUBS INTERNATIONAL and JAMES L. SO, petitioners, vs. HON. AUGUSTO M. AMORES, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIV, COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE JOSEFA, respondents. Marcia M. Magsino Law Office for petitioners. Arturo S. Santos for respondents. GUERRERO, J.: Where the Constitution of petitioner association, the Lions Clubs International, specifically provides that all Lions Clubs so organized shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the International Board of Directors (Sec. 5, Art. III) and that all District Governor election results shall be adopted by the International Board of Directors and thereby become effective, except in the case of an election protest filed or legal action resulting therefrom, in which event the appointment or election of such District Governor shall be subject to action by the International Board of Directors [Sec. 8(a), (1) 2nd par., Art. VII] and in accordance therewith, the election protest between petitioner So and respondent Josefa for the position of District Governor of District 301-Al Philippines for the fiscal year 1982-1983 was filed and elevated to the International Board of Directors through its Constitution and By-Laws Committee following the prescribed Constitutional Complaints Procedure and said Committee conducted a hearing therein attended by the parties, each claiming to be duly elected

to the disputed position, the decision of the International Board of Directors adopting the Committee's Report and approving the election of petitioner James L. So to server as District Governor of District 301-Al for the fiscal year 1982-1983 is final, binding, and conclusive, it being a question of policy, discipline, and internal government in the relation of the mother organization with local clubs organized, chartered and supervised exclusively thereunder, absent any clear showing of mistake, fraud, conclusion or arbitrariness and, therefore, the basic matter in dispute in the instant petition as to who has the right to the contested office presents no justiciable controversy that necessitates judicial interference or intervention. The case at bar is a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayer to lift the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals, (now the Intermediate Appellate Court) in CA-G.R. No. 14599- SP entitled "Vicente Josefa. Petitioner, versus Hon. Judge Augusto M. Amores, Lions Clubs International, and James L. So. Respondents." The principal adversaries in this controversy are respondent Vicente Josefa of the Manila Traders Lions Club and petitioner James L. So of the Manila Centrum Lions Club, which Lions clubs are duly organized, chartered, and affiliated with Lions Clubs International having its International offices at 300 22nd Street, Oakbrook, Illinois 60570, U.S.A. The Manila Traders Lions Club and the Manila Centrum Lions Club, together with other Lions clubs, are embraced and constituted into the newly organized District 301-Al. The Lions districts in the country form the so-called Multiple District 301,Philippines. All clubs so organized and chartered under the Constitution of Lions Clubs International are under the exclusive supervision of the International Board of Directors. The records show that on July 1, 1982, Vicente Josefa filed a complaint for Quo Warranto, Injunction, Damages with writ of preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 82-10588 in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Lions Clubs International and James L. So, defendants. alleging inter alia the following material and pertinent allegations: that Josefa and So filed their certificates of candidacy for the position of District Governor of District 301Al for the fiscal year 1982-83; that before the elections, or on April 22, 1982, an agreement was executed between Josefa and So for the purpose of avoiding an expensive, full-blown election contest, whereby the latter withdrew his certificate of candidacy in favor of Josefa; that said withdrawal of So was duly accepted by District 301-A through Governor Huang who affixed his signature to the aforesaid agreement; that however, news items were published conveying the Idea that So had not withdrawn from the gubernatorial race; that Gov. Huang informed Josefa that So had not filed a new certificate of candidacy and that the District did not recognize So as a candidate to any position; that a telex was sent to Lions Clubs International requesting information whether So was still a candidate after his withdrawal and Lions International admonished incumbent Governor Huang to enforce the Constitution and By-Laws of Multiple District 301 if the withdrawal was in fact made and accepted by the District.

It was further alleged that on the day of the election, June 6, 1982, the Chairman of the Nominations Committee reported at the Plenary Session of the 33rd Multiple District Convention held at the Little Theater of the Olongapo High School, Olongapo City, that because of So's failure to file another certificate of candidacy, the District recognized only one candidate, Vicente Josefa, for Governor; that, however, some members of the Council of Past District Governors arbitrarily set aside said report and proclaimed So as a qualified candidate, which action was vigorously objected to by some Lions present in the Plenary Session on the ground that the session was not the proper quorum to deliberate and decide on the matter as some of those present were Lions and Lionesses who were not qualified to vote; that the Past District Governors dismissed the members of the Nomination Committee, Election Committee, and other committees incharge of the accreditation of votes and unlawfully appointed new members thereof. The complaint likewise alleged that during all this time, armed men by force and intimidation prevented known leaders and followers of Josefa from entering the Plenary Session; that forced by the deteriorated peace and order in the convention hall and by virtue of the powers vested in him by the State Council of Governors, as well as the Rules of Procedure, Gov. Huang through his Cabinet Secretary announced in the Plenary Session that he has changed the venue of the election from the Little Theater of the Olongapo High School to its new site at the ground floor of Admiral Hotel, also at Olongapo City; that to this transfer, Vice Chairman of the State Council of Governors, Gov. Ramon Beleno and the Secretary General of the hosting clubs Estanislao Cesa, Jr. made no objections, provided the cost of facilities of new venue is not shouldered by them. Plaintiff Josefa also alleged that So and some members of the Council of Past District Governors continued to hold and supervise an illegal election at the old site where voting and non-voting delegates and alternates were allowed to cast their votes without ballots, without ballot boxes and without the issuance of valid accreditation papers of the registered voting delegates; that in the meantime, at the election held at the Admiral Hotel Supervised by Gov. Huang, Josefa obtained 115 votes, a majority of the qualified voting delegates duly accredited, and was duly proclaimed as the Governor-elect of District 301-Al by the State Council of Governors; that, however, defendant Lions Clubs International unlawfully recognized So as the winner. And finally alleging that So would assume the powers and prerogatives of Governor of District 301-Al at the closing program of the International Convention on July 3, 1982, Josefa prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or at least a temporary restraining order. He likewise asked for moral damages and for attorney's fees. Finding the foregoing allegations of the complaint to be sufficient in form and substance, the Court of First Instance on the same date, July 1, 1982, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining So from assuming the powers and prerogatives of the office of Governor of District 301-Al, and Lions Clubs International, represented by Antonio Ramos, from recognizing and proclaiming So as the Governor of District 301-Al for the fiscal year 1982- 1983.

On July 8, 1982, defendants So and Lions Club International filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Lift Restraining Order on the grounds that: (1) the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendants or over the subject of the action or suit; (2) venue is improperly laid; and (3) there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. Plaintiff Josefa filed his Opposition, to which defendants filed a Reply. On July 26, 1982, the Court of First Instance issued an Order denying defendants' motion to dismiss. Finding the Motion to lift restraining order to be meritorious, the Court set aside said restraining order. Before the hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Josefa filed in the Court of Appeals on July 29, 1982 a petition docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14599-SP for certiorari with preliminary and mandatory injunction and a prayer for a temporary restraining order, assailing that portion of the Order of the Court of First Instance dated July 26, 1982 lifting the restraining order. Josefa contended that by lifting said restraining order without awaiting the evidence on his petition for a writ of injunction, So would immediately assume the contested position, the very act sought to be enjoined, thereby making the action moot and academic and whatever favorable judgment may be rendered in the main action would be rendered useless and nugatory. The appellate court in a Resolution dated July 29, 1982 issued a temporary restraining order "restraining and prohibiting the respondents (Hon. Judge Augusto M. Amores, Lions Clubs International and James L. So) from implementing the questioned Order of July 26, 1982 issued in Civil Case No. 82-10588 particularly the portion thereof lifting the temporary restraining order issued by the respondent Judge on July 1, 1982 until further orders ... " Herein petitioners Lions Clubs International and James L. So now come to this Court attributing grave abuse of discretion to the Court of First Instance of Manila for the denial of their Motion to Dismiss dated July 6, 1982, and contending that the Court of Appeals acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing its temporary restraining order of July 29, 1982. As prayed for by said petitioners, We issued on August 4, 1982 a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the assailed temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals. The basic issue posed for Our determination is the justiciability of the election dispute between herein petitioner James L. So and private respondent Vicente Josefa for the position of District Governor of District 301-Al Philippines. It is petitioners' submission that the subject matter of the instant case is purely an internal affair of the Lions organization and, therefore, is beyond judicial review. On the other hand, private respondent maintains that court intervention is warranted when, as he alleges in this case, there is fraud, oppression. bad faith, when the proceedings in question are violative of the laws of the association, or where the proceedings are illegal.

We find for the petitioners and in finding so, We adopt the general rule that "... the courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of an unincorporated association so as to settle disputes between the members, or questions of policy, discipline, or internal government, so long as the government of the society is fairly and honestly administered in conformity with its laws and the law of the land, and no property or civil rights are invaded. Under such circumstances, the decision of the governing body or established private tribunal of the association is binding and conclusive and not subject to review or collateral attack in the courts. " (7 C.J.S. pp. 38- 39). The general rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of associations is, however, subject to exceptions, but the power of review is extremely limited. Accordingly, the courts have and will exercise power to interfere in the internal affairs of an association where law and justice so require, and the proceedings of the association are subject to judicial review where there is fraud, oppression, or bad faith, or where the action complained of is capricious, arbitrary, or unjustly discriminatory. Also, the courts will usually entertain jurisdiction to grant relief in case property or civil rights are invaded, although it has also been held that the involvement of property rights does not necessarily authorize judicial intervention, in the absence of arbitrariness, fraud or collusion. Moreover, the courts will intervene where the proceedings in question are violative of the laws of the society, or the law of the land, as by depriving a person of due process of law. Similarly, judicial intervention is warranted where there is a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal conducting the proceedings, where the organization exceeds its powers, or where the proceedings are otherwise illegal. (7 C.J.S., pp. 39-41). In accordance with the general rules as to judicial interference cited above, the decision of an unincorporated association on the question of an election to office is a matter peculiarly and exclusively to be determined by the association, and, in the absence of fraud, is final and binding on the courts. (7 C.J.S., p. 44). The instant controversy between petitioner So and respondent Josefa falls squarely within the ambit of the rule of judicial non-intervention or non- interference. The elections in dispute, the manner by which it was conducted and the results thereof, is strictly the internal affair that concerns only the Lions association and/or its members, and We find from the records that the same was resolved within the organization of Lions Clubs International in accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws which are not immoral, unreasonable, contrary to public policy, or in contravention of the laws of the land. It is of judicial notice that a Lions club is a voluntary association of civic-minded men whose general purpose and aim is to serve the people and the community. It appears from the records that duly organized and chartered Lions clubs all over the world are under the supervision of the mother club known as The International Association of Lions Clubs for Lions Clubs International) which holds international offices in Illinois, U.S.A., and is governed by its constitution and by-laws. The objects of this worldwide organization are:

(a) To create and foster a spirit of understanding among the peoples of the world. (b) To promote the principles of good government and good citizenship. (c) To take an active interest in the civil, cultural, social and moral welfare of the community. (d) To unite the clubs in the bonds of friendship, good fellowship and mutual understanding. (e) To provide a forum for the open discussion of all matters of public interest provided, however, that partisan politics and secretarian religon shall not be debated by club members. (f) To encourage service-minded men to serve their community without personal financial reward, and to encourage efficiency and -promote high ethical standards in commerce, industry, professions, public works and private endeavors. (Constitution of the International Association of Lions Clubs, Article II, Section 2.) Member clubs are chartered in accordance with the provisions of its constitution which provide that: Section 4. ... A Lions club shall be considered chartered when its charter has been officially issued. The acceptance of a charter by a Lions Club shall be a ratification of, and agreement on its part to be bound by, the Constitution and By-Laws of this Association and a submission by said Lions Club to have its relationship with this Association interpreted and governed by this Constitution and By-Laws according to the laws in effect, from time to time, in the State of Incorporation of The International Association of Lions Clubs. Section 5. Except as otherwise provided herein, the International Board of Directors shall have full power and authority to sanction the organization and chartering of all clubs, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and By-Laws, all club so organized shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of said Board of Directors."

Aside from the obligation to carry on activities for the advancement of the civic, cultural, social or moral welfare of the community and for the promotion of international understanding, a chartered Lions club shall "(j) abide by the policies and requirements as determined, from time to time, by the International Board of Directors." (Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1). The International Board of Directors is composed of the President, Immediate Past President, First and Second and Third Vice Presidents and 28 Directors. (Art. V, Sec. 1, Constitution). In the matter of the election for the office of District Governor, the Constitution of Lions International provides: Section 8 (a) Subject to the provisions of Sec. 2 of this Article VII: (1) ... An election for the office of District Governor shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the respective District (Single, Sub or Multiple) Constitution and By-Laws. The results of each District Governor election shall be reported to the International Office by the respective current District Governor and/or the Association's Extension Representative. The results so reported shall be presented to the International Board of Directors. All District Governor election results shall be adopted by the International Board of Directors and thereby become effective, except in the case of an election protest filed or legal action resulting therefrom in which event the appointment or election of such District Governor shall be subject to action by the International Board of Directors, (Emphasis supplied) The records disclose that the election dispute between petitioner James L. So and respondent Vicente Josefa was brought before and elevated to the International Board of Directors through the Constitution and By-Laws Committee of Lions Clubs International, 300 22nd Street, Oakbrook, Illinois 60570, U.S.A. (See Letter Protest of petitioner So marked Annex "20", pp. 187-190, Records and Answer of Gov. Huang marked Annex "21 ", pp. 191-196, Records). In his formal protest dated June 11, 1982, petitioner So assailed the validity of the "alleged election and proclamation" of Lion Vicente Josefa as District Governor of District 301-Al for the Lions fiscal year 1982-1983 and called attention to the "blatant display of oppressive conduct of Gov. James T. Huang of District 301-Al before, during, and after the just concluded convention in the hope that the mistakes and miscarriage of justice be rectified." Narrating the sequence of events, petitioner claimed that Gov. Huang failed to constitute and present within the prescribed periods, the District Nominations and Elections Committee in violation of the Multiple District 301 Constitution and By-Laws; that duly registered delegates were deliberately disenfranchised; that Gov. Huang arbitrarily transferred the venue of election from the Little Theater, Olongapo City National High School, to the Admiral Hotel which was the

headquarters of his opponent, Vicente Josefa, without the sanction and authority of the State Council of Governors and the Convention. Petitioner So pointed out that he was duly nominated by the District Nominations Committee as well as respondent Vicente Josefa and in the elections duly conducted by the Election Committee at the official venue at the Little Theater, he received 147 votes as against 3 votes in favor of Josefa and that the 147 votes he received is a clear majority of the total number of registered delegates of District 301-Al which was 251, or a clear majority of 59%. The election results were duly certified by the Convention Chairman and by the official representative of the State Council of Governors, District Gov. Ramon Beleno of District 301-E. Petitioner, therefore, prayed that he be recognized as the duly elected District Governor of District 301-Al for the Lion fiscal year 1982-1983. Answering the letter-protest of petitioner So and as directed by Lions Clubs International, Gov. Huang in his letter dated June 17, 1982 denied the assertions of the protestant, petitioner So, and maintained that he had faithfully performed all the duties and responsibilities of his office in accordance With the Constitution and ByLaws, of the Multiple District, citing incidents wherein followers of petitioner So allegedly created trouble by booing, shouting and uttering invectives and armed men intimidated followers of Josefa from entering the Little Theater. In changing the venue of elections, Huang said he wanted "a democratic and peaceful election which could not be achieved in the old site because of the unruly and deteriorated atmosphere caused by the agitations from the camp of James L. So." Gov. Huang, moreover, contended that the election in the Little Theater was never legally convened as there were no ballots, no accreditation papers, no ballot boxes and other important papers relative to an honest election. And since the election of Josefa was proclaimed by the State Council of Governors, Gov. Huang prayed that the election of Governor-elect Vicente Josefa be sustained and affirmed. Filed and attached to the Answer of Gov. Huang is the Report of the Governor to Lions Clubs International including reports of the Election Committee, the Board of Canvassers, Minutes of the Election Proceedings, Certification of the Proclamation of Governor-elect Josefa and Resolution of the State Council of Governors confirming the proclamation. (See Annex "22", pp.197-203). Thereafter, the Constitution and by-Laws Committee, through Joseph D. Stone, General Counsel of the International Association of Lions Clubs, submitted to the International Board of Directors the following Report: The International Board of Directors has received a complaint filed by Lion James L. So. This complaint has been filed in accordance with the Constitutional Complaints Procedure of the International Board of Directors. All parties have been given the opportunity to respond and have filed their official response with the International Association. Your Committee has examined the evidence submitted by the parties and has conducted a hearing attended by Lion So, District

Governor of District 301-A Lion James Huang Lion Vicente Josefa and Multiple District 301 Council Chairman Lion Antonio Ramos. Your Committee hereby makes the following finding of facts and recommendations respecting the election for the office of District Governor in District 301-Al for the fiscal year 1982-83: 1. That there were two properly nominated candidates for the office of District Governor, District 301-Al, for the fiscal year 1982-83: Lion James L. So and Lion Vicente Josefa. 2. That one hour after the designated convening time, District Governor Huang transferred the election meeting from the designated site to the Admiral Royal Hotel. 3. That after the announcement of District Governor Huang transferring the election meeting, a majority of the delegates of the newly authorized District 301-Al remained at the designated site and convened an election for District Governor between the two candidates, Lion So and Lion Josefa. 4. That there were two elections held on June 6, 1982 for the office of District Governor of District 301-Al. 5. That one election was held as a part of the official District Convention at the designated election meeting site, the Little Theater Olongapo National High School, at which Lion So received 147 votes and Lion Josefa received 3 votes. 6. That the other election was held at the Admiral Royale Hotel at which Lion Josefa received 115 votes. 7. That the action of District Governor Huang in transferring the election meeting away from the convention site was without approval of a majority of the delegates and was without any clear authority and justification. 8. That the said election meeting held at the Little Theatre Olongapo National High School was properly conducted and resulted in the election of Lion So. 9. That said election of Lion So was duly certified by the official Election Committee Chairman Lion Ernesto Castaeda, appointed by District Governor Huang and District Governor

Beleno of District 301-E, the official Multiple District Council representative. Based upon the above finding of facts your Committee is of the opinion that Lion James L. So was duly elected as District Governor, District 301- Al for the fiscal year 1982-83 and that said election should be recognized by the International Board of Directors. Your Committee is also of the opinion that the election conducted by District Governor Huang, 301-A, at the Admiral Royale Hotel was unauthorized and improper and is thereby null and void. Your Committee recommends that the Board concur in said finding of facts and recommendations by the adoption of RESOLUTION III-A hereinafter." (Annexes "O" and "O-1", Reply, pp. 237-238, Records). At the meeting of the International Board of Directors held on June 27, 1982, the election of petitioner James L. So to serve as District Governor of District 301-Al for the fiscal year 1982-83 was approved and said petitioner was duly informed thereof by Richard G. Rice, Manager, District Operations Department, Lions Clubs International in his letter dated July 8, 1982 and marked Annex "K" to the petition, p. 79, Records. Petitioner attended and completed the District Governors' Executive Seminar as District Governor of 301-Al (see Annex "L", P. 80, Records). On June 29, 1982, petitioner So was proclaimed, sworn to and installed to office as District Governor of District 301-Al by the President of Lions International at the close of the 65th Lions Clubs International Convention held in Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A. The Report of the Constitution and By-laws Committee duly approved and adopted by the International Board of Directors clearly belies the claim of injustice alleged by respondent Josefa in his complaint in Civil Case No. 82-10588 that petitioner So was illegally and arbitrarily nominated; that the latter's election was illegal and that he (Josefa) was legally elected in a valid election held at the new venue and was duly proclaimed by the State Council of Governors and that Lions International unlawfully recognized So as the winner on the basis of his illegal election. These findings upon the evidence submitted and examined at the hearing of the election protest before the Committee personally attended by both petitioner So and respondent Josefa may not be disturbed by the courts. The decision of the Association's tribunal, the International Board of Directors, is controlling since respondent Josefa alleges no invasion of this property or civil rights and neither is it claimed that the government of the Association is not fairly and honestly administered in conformity with its laws and the law of the land. It is clear that under the Constitution of Lions International, Art. IV, Section, 8, the District Governor serves without compensation. Lionism prides itself in that its motto is: "We serve", and "Liberty, Intelligence, Our Nation's Safety" its slogan or credo. (Secs. 2 and 3, Art. 1, Constitution). There is, therefore, no proprietary or pecuniary interest involved in the membership of the Lions and in the offices they seek and hold in the club and district levels. Being merely a member or officer of the Lions Clubs or District is only a privilege and an opportunity for service to the community that is not

enforceable at law. And since the disputed election to the position of District Governor is within the peculiar province and function of Lions International through its established tribunal to decide and determine in accordance with its governing laws, its resolution may not be questioned elsewhere, much less in the courts. Thus, in Our jurisprudence in U.S. vs. Caete 38 Phil. 253, the Supreme Court held that in matters purely ecclesiastical, the decision of the proper church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil tribunals and that a church member who is expelled from membership by the church authorities or a priest or minister who is by then deprived of his sacred office, is without remedy in the civil court, which will not inquire into the correctness of the decision of the ecclesiastical tribunals. So also in Felipe vs. Leuterio, et al, 91 Phil. 482, We held that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the Board of Judges of an oratorical contest and for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions. In essence, the courts, considering the nature of the action or suit at bar, are without jurisdiction and authority to review and reverse the decision of the International Board of Directors, Lions Clubs International, approving and recognizing the petitioner as duly elected District Governor of District 301-A1 for the fiscal year 1982-1983. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Civil Case No. 82- 10588 entitled "Vicente Josefa vs. Lions Clubs International, Antonio Ramos and Lion James L. So", Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIV (now Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region) and the petition entitled "Vicente Josefa vs. Hon. Judge Augusto M. Amores, Lions Clubs International and James L. So", CA-G.R. No. 14599-SP (now Intermediate Appellate Court) are hereby DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED