TamingtheDragon

AssessingtheMilitarizedAssetsintheSouthChinaSeaandtheir
ImplicationsfortheUnitedStates
JohnCarofano
DR.PHILLIPKARBER
GOVT-451
DECEMBER24,2012
2
INTRODUCTION

ThroughouttheColdWar,Asiawasdelineatedalongideologicalfaultlines,
whichinturnfosteredstabilityandpreventedanylocalactorfromaspiringto
regionalpredominance.Afternearlyfiftyyearswithoutamajorglobalconflict,
however,aweakandineptSovietUnioncollapsedfromwithin.AstheIronCurtain
fell,ColdWarrigiditiesgavewaytoregionalspheresofinfluence,inturnfracturing
thegeopoliticalsystemthatdefinedthegreaterpartofthe20
th
century.
Sincethe1990s,thelackofdirectSovietandAmericaninterferenceinthe
regioncoupledwiththemilitaryandeconomicriseofChinahavefurtheralteredthe
strategicbalanceintheAsian-Pacific.ForthefirsttimesinceWorldWarII,China
candirectlychallengetheUnitedStatesbroaderstrategicaimsintheregion.
Therefore,asChinacontinuestodevelopamodernmilitary,thePRCwilllookto
consolidateitssovereigntyintheregionsmostsignificanttheatre:theSouthChina
Sea.
TheSouthChinaSeaisthebodyofwaterinthePacificthatspansfrom
SingaporeandtheStraitofMalaccainthesouthtotheStraitofTaiwaninthenorth.
Inall,theseaincludesmorethan200smallislandswiththevastmajority
concentratedintheParcelandSpratlyIslandchains.Whilemostoftheseislands
areuninhabitable,theyarebitterlycontestedandthusrepresentsignificant
geopoliticalimportanceintheregion.
Intotal,theSouthChinaSeaisdisputedamongsixoftheregions
predominantactors.TheParcelsaredisputedamongstVietnamandChinawhilethe
muchlargerSpratlyChainisclaimedinwholeorinpartybyChina,Taiwan,Vietnam,
thePhilippines,MalaysiaandBrunei(China,TaiwanandVietnamclaimtheentire
chain).Whiletheclaimsarehistoricallypolitical,theclaimantsbeganbuilding
militaryfacilitiesontheislandsinthe1950stoprojectpowerinthecontested
3
waters.Thisdevelopmentaddedasignificantmilitarydynamictoonetoofthe21
st

centuriesmostcomplexdisputes.
1

ThispaperwillexploretheloomingcrisisintheSouthChinaSeabyanalyzing
themilitarysignificanceoftheoccupiedislands.Moreover,thisstudywillargue
thatintheircurrentstates,themilitarizedislandsintheSouthChinaSeawillnotbe
adecisivefactorinfutureconflict.Thatbeingsaid,givenChinasmilitarydoctrine
andbroaderstrategicaims,controlofthefeaturesintheSouthChinaSeawill
augmentthePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC)anti-accesscapabilities,inturn
shiftingthebalanceofpowerinChinasfavor.Overall,thispaperaimstouncover
whytheSouthChinaSeaissignificantandhoweachclaimantnationcanuseits
militarizedclaimstoprojectpowerintheeventofaconflict.

ASIAPOSTWWII

Aftertwelveyearsofpersistentandunprecedentedwarfare,theJapanese
ruledoveranempirespanningupwardsof7,4000,000squarekilometers.Itwasat
itsapexinJuneof1942,however,whentheUnitedStatesengagedtheJapanesefleet
atMidway.Afterlosingfourofitsaircraftcarriersinoneofthewarsmostdecisive
battles,theEmperorandhisgeneralscouldonlyfighttostemtheAmericantide.
2

Fromthatpointforward,theAlliesdismantledtheJapaneseEmpireislandbyisland,
ultimatelypavingthewaytothebombingofHiroshimaandNagaswakiinAugustof
1945.
TheTreatyofPeacewithJapanwassignedonSeptember8,1951;nearly6
yearsaftertheEmperorofJapanannouncedhisunconditionalsurrender.Whilethe
vastmajorityoftheaccordsarewellbeyondthescopeofthisstudy,ArticleIIreads,
Japanrenouncesallright,titleandclaimtotheSpratlyIslandsandtotheParcel
Islands.
3
Thisissignificantfortworeasons.One,thetreatyfailedtomakeanofficial

1
Cronin,P.,Dutton,P.,Fravel,T.,Holmes,J.,Kaplan,R.,Rogers,W.,&Storey,I.(2012).Cooperation
fromstrength:Theunitedstates,china,andthesouthchinasea.().WashingtonDC:CenterforaNew
AmericanSecurity.34.
2
Pike,F.(2010).Empiresatwar:AshorthistoryofmodernasiasinceWWII.London:I.B.Tauris.62.
3
United Nations Treaty Series 1952 (reg. no. 1832), vol. 136, pp. 45 - 164.
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm
4
resolutionregardingsovereigntyovertheSpratlyandParcelIslands,andtwo,China
alreadydelineatedtheSouthChinaSeain1914andreassertedtheseclaims
sporadicallythrough1947(theseclaimswillbeexplainedindepthlaterinthis
report).
4

Ironically,from1947to1971,Chinasclaimswerelargelyuncontested.This
istheresultofseveralfactors.First,inthewakeofWorldWarII,Asiawasatthe
mercyoftheColdWar.AlmostimmediatelyfollowingJapanssurrender,President
TrumanclaimedthatAmericasprimeforeignpolicyobjectivewasthepeaceful
developmentofnations,freefromcoercion.
5
Moreover,thefreepeoplesofthe
worldlooktousforsupportinmaintainingtheirfreedoms.Ifwefalterinour
leadership,wemayendangerthepeaceoftheworldandweshallsurelyendanger
thewelfareofourownnation.
6
Theseinfamousstatementslaidthefoundationfor
theTrumanDoctrine,whichwouldcommitU.S.foreignpolicytoitsglobal
hegemonicresponsibilitiesforthebetterhalfoftheColdWar.
7

Trumansresolve,however,wasimmediatelychallengedwiththefallof
ChinatoMaoscommunistpartyin1949.AsKimIISungsinvasionofSouthKorea
wouldgoontoprove,U.S.regionalhegemonywassusceptibletowhatatthetime
wereregardedasSovietencroachments.Consequently,Asiabecameatheaterof
significantstrategicvaluefortheUnitedStatesandthehysteriawasenoughto
encourageWashingtontodevelopasignificantforcepostureintheregion.Itis
importanttorecognizethatdespiteseveralhotconflicts,theUnitedStateswasable
tomaintainitshegemonyandencouragemutualstabilityandeconomicgrowthin
theAsianPacific.
8

TheTrumanDoctrinealone,however,cannotexplainAmericassuccessful
policiesorthelackofdisputesintheSouthChinaSea.Inreality,therewereseveral
underlyingdynamicsthatdictatedthecourseofAsianaffairsthroughthe1970sas

4
Garofano, J. (2008). China, the south china sea, and U.S. strategy. China's energy
strategy: The impact on beijing's maritime strategy (pp. 279). Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press. 279-281
5
Pike,107.
6
Ibid
7
Ibid,110.
8
Ibid,113.
5
muchifnotmorethanWashingtonscommitmenttotheprotectionoffreepeoples.
WhiletheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionsoughtgloballeadership,themajority
ofAsiawastoopoorandinternallyfocusedtomakeseriousbidsforregional
predominance.
9
Coupledwithaprimitivealliancenetworkandbittermemoriesof
WorldWarII,mostleaderswereleftwithlittlechoicebuttoacceptWashingtons
presence.
Moreover,acommitmenttoeconomicdevelopmentcreatedaculturethat
believedstabilitywasessentialforthebroaderdevelopmentoftheregion.This
culturesooninterlockedtheregionssecuritypartnershipswithatradingcyclethat
broughttogetherAmericanconsumers,NorthAsianmanufacturing,SoutheastAsian
labor,andAustralianmineralsandenergy.
10
ThebondamongstAsias
noncommunistcountrieswhetheractiveAmericanalliesormeredependentson
Americasregionalrole-grewsostrongthatitwaseventuallyinstitutionalizedas
theAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)in1967.
11

Takentogether,thesedevelopmentsencouragedaperiodofpeaceand
prosperitythatappliednotonlytotheregionaswhole,butalsotothewatersofthe
SouthChinaSea.Overthelastdecade,however,anewhierarchicalparadigmstarted
toemergeasChinadevelopedaneconomythatcouldsupportmilitary
modernizationandregionalambitionsnotseensincetheoutbreakofWorldWarII.

HistoryoftheDispute
TheentireSouthChinaSeacontainsupwardsoftwohundredislands,rocks,
andothernegligiblefeaturesthataremostlyconcentratedintheSpratlyandParcel
Islandchains.WhiletheParcelsareonlydisputedbi-laterallybetweenChinaand
Vietnam-whichtheformerhascontrolledsince1974-theSpratlyIslandsareclaimed
inwholeorinpartbysixnations:China,Taiwan,Vietnam,thePhilippines,Brunei,
andMalaysia.China,Vietnam,andTaiwanclaimallofthe230featureslocated

9
Wesley,M.(2012).Asia'snewageofinstability.TheNationalInterest,(November-December2012),
1.
10
Ibid,2.
11
Ibid
6
withinthechainwhilethePhilippinesandMalaysiaclaim53and12respectfully.
12

Asnotedabove,however,Chinadisregardsallotherpartialclaimsbydeclaring
indisputablesovereigntyovertheentirearea.
13

EverynationinvolvedintheterritorialdisputeovertheSouthChinaSea
providesrationaleforitsclaimsthroughhistoricalrecords,the1982UnitedNations
ConventionontheLawandtheSea(UNCOLS),oracombinationofthetwo.
AccordingtoArticles55though57ofUNCLOS,theExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ)
ofastateencompassesa200nauticalmilezonethatallowsthestatetoexploreand
exploitanynaturalresourceswithinthisarea.Article76goesontodefinethe
continentalshelfofanationascomprisingtheseabedandsubsoilofthesubmarine
areasthatextendbeyondits[thenations]territorialseathroughoutthenatural
prolongationofitsland.
14
Theinnateproblemwiththeloftyrhetoricistwofold.
One,themaritimerightsdescribedaboveconcernquestionsofjurisdictionnot
sovereignty.Inotherwords,thelawslaiddownbytheUNCOLSonlypermitstates
toexploittheresourceswithintheirrespectivezones.Second,eachstateinterprets
theconventioninitsownway.Vietnam,Malaysia,thePhilippines,andBruneieach
measuretheirEEZsfromtheircoasts,whileIndonesiaassertsitsrightsfrom
NatunaIsland.
15

EvenmoreproblematicisChina.AsnotedaboveChinabegandelineatingthe
SouthChinaSeabasedonhistoricalrecordsdatingasfarbackastheHanDynastyin
thesecondcenturyBC.ThePRCallegesthatdiplomatsmadevarioussovereign
claimsovertheSouthChinaSeaanditsislandsduringtheSong,Yuan,Ming,and
Qingdynasties.Suchclaims,however,arelargelyambiguousandarecompletely
irrelevantwhenhelduptointernationalscrutiny.Thatbeingsaid,amapissuedby

12
Cronin,P.,Dutton,P.,Fravel,T.,Holmes,J.,Kaplan,R.,Rogers,W.,&Storey,I.(2012).Cooperation
fromstrength:Theunitedstates,china,andthesouthchinasea.().WashingtonDC:Centerfora
NewAmericanSecurity.34.
13
Ibid,57.
14
Joyner,C.C.(2002).Thespratlyislanddispute:Legalissuesandprospects.InJ.Baker,&D.
Wieneck(Eds.),Cooperativemonitoringinthesouthchinasea().Westport:Praeger.
15
Cronin,34.
7
| 11
in any fundamental way. But it will take persistent,
long-term eort.
Despite the increasing summit-level attention
focused on Asia and the South China Sea, much
of Washingtons strategic focus remains on the
Middle East, which remains volatile despite a
decade of warfare and state-building. In the
summer of 2010, following acerbic verbal volleys
between U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang
Jeichi at the ASEAN
9
Regional Forum in Hanoi,
a distinguished American statesman queried
his State Department colleagues about why the
United States was confronting China and pressing
for a multilateral mechanism to avert conict in
the South China Sea.
10
For at least this American
statesman, the South China Sea did not hold obvi-
ous geopolitical value for the United States.
e United States must rebalance away from the
conict-ridden Middle East and toward the Asia-
Pacic region, the center of the world economy.
e SLOCs of the South China Sea are at the nexus
of globalization and geopolitics. Less obvious is
the fact that the South China Sea may be a critical
CHI NA
S O U T H
C H I N A
S E A
Kuala Lumpur
VI ETNAM
LAOS
THAI LAND
CAMBODI A
MALAYSI A
I NDONESI A
I NDONESI A
MALAYSI A
BORNEO
BRUNEI
Singapore
SPRATLY
I SLANDS
G U L F
O F
T O N K I N
G U L F
O F
T H A I L A N D
SUMATRA
Brunei negotiated maritime boundary
Indonesia negotiated maritime boundary
Malaysia negotiated maritime boundary
Thailand negotiated maritime boundary
200-nautical-mile limit
Chinese nine-dash line
Major shipping lanes
Phnom Penh
Ho Chi Minh City
S
T
R
A
I T
O
F
M
A
L
A
C
C
A
Hanoi
Bangkok
Hong Kong
PARACEL
I SLANDS
BRUNEI
HAI NAN
I SLAND
PALAWAN
( Phi l i ppi nes)
TAI WAN
Taipei
Bandar Seri
Begawan
Cam Ranh
Bay
Manila
PHI LI PPI NES PHI LI PPI NES
Source: Middlebury College, Asian Studies Vitual Library, southchinasea.org. Accessed September 29, 2011.
theNationalistChinesegovernmentin1947(seebelow)symbolizesthePRCsmost
officialclaimtodate.
16

Thegraphanditsnine-dashlinedwereadoptedbythePRCin1949and
werecodifiedintolawthroughtheLawofthePRConTerritorialSeaandContiguous
ZoneandtheLawontheExclusiveEconomicZoneandtheContinentalShelfofthe
PRCin1992and1998respectfully.
17
Asaresult,ChinainterpretsitsEEZfromboth
disputedislands(suchastheSpratly)andtheChinesemainland,effectivelyplacing
90%oftheSouthChinaSeainChinasjurisdiction.
18
Whileitisclearthatthe
Chinesehistoricalrecordlegitimizesoverlappingandconflictingclaims,itisfar
moreimportanttorecognizethattheassertionscoincidewithaperiodofgreat
prosperityandregionalinfluenceinChinashistory.Notonlydoesthisperiodevoke
immensenationalistpride,butitalsoservesasabenchmarkthatChineseleaders
arestrivingtorestore.
19

TakenfromCooperationfromStrength

16
Ibid.
17
Jamandre,T.(2011).ChinaaccusesPhilippinesofinvasion.VERAFiles,,2012.
18
Ibid,14.
19
Cronin,34.
Figure1:DelineationintheSouthChinaSea
8
PreviousConfrontation
Despitethecomplexnatureofthedispute,ChinasclaimsintheSouthChina
Seawerelargelyuncontesteduntilthediscoveryofpotentialhydrocarbonsinthe
1970s.
20
Infact,noclaimantevenactivelydefendeditsclaimsupuntilthatpoint.
Sincethen,however,theregionhasbeenplaguedbysporadicconflict.

Figure2:TakenfromChinasGatheringAmphibiousandAirborneExpeditionaryCapabilities
Date NatureofIncident
1974 ChinacapturestheParcelsfromVietnam
1988 Chinasinks3Vietnameseshipsnearthe
SpratlyIslands,killing70
1992-1994 Vietnamreports134incidentsof
Vietnamesevesselsbeingharassed,
inspected,ordetainedbyChina
1995 Chinainvadesandcapturesthe
PhilippinesMischiefReef
May2000 FilipinotroopskillaChinesefisherman
andarrestsevenothersneartheisland
ofPalawan
April2010 20Vietnamesefishingandcoastguard
shipssurroundaChineseFisheries
Administrationpatrolvessel
February25,2011 Chineseshipsfirethreeshotsat
unarmedFilipinofishermen
May26,2011 ThreeChineseshipsstopaVietnamese
seismicsurveyandsupposedlycutthe
shipsseismiccables
April8-10,2012 ThePhilippineNavyinterceptsaChinese
trawlerintheScarboroughShoal
April14,2012 ChinasendsmoreshipstotheShoal
afteraweekofstandoffs

20
Garofano,278.
9
SignificanceoftheSouthChinaSeainthe21
st
century

Simplyput,theSouthChinaSeaiswhereglobalizationandgeopolitics
collide.
21
Spanning3.5millionsquarekilometers,theSouthChinaSeaisthesixth
largestbodyofwaterintheworld,andfromaneconomicstandpoint;theSouth
ChinaSeaisarguablythemostsignificantseaonearth.Situatedinthefastest
growingregionintheworldandsurroundedbyover3.5billionpeople,theSouth
ChinaSeassealinesofcommunication(SLOCs)seethreequartersoftheworlds
hydrocarbonsand90%ofallcommercialgoodspassthoughitswaterseachyear.
22

Comparatively,theflowofoilthroughtheSCSisthreetimesthatthroughtheSuez
CanalandfifteentimesthatthroughthePanamaCanal.
23
In2011alone,70,000
shipscarried$5.3trillionworthofgoodsthroughtheregionsSLOCs,ofwhich$1.2
trillionwastradedirectlyaffiliatedwiththeUnitedSates.
24

Tradeaside;theSouthChinaSeaishometowhatsomeanalystsseeasthe
worldslargestuntappedoilandnaturalgasfields.The2012U.S.Energy
InformationAdministrationAnnualEnergyOutlookestimatesthatChineseoil
consumptionwillgrowby2.8%from8.33millionbarrelsperday(mmb/d)to18.50
mmb/dbetween2009and2035.Duringthatsameperiod,Chineseoilproductionis
onlyexpectedtogrowby.4%perannumfrom3.99to4.70mmb/d.Thismeansthat
by2035,Chinawillrelyonimportstocover13.8mmb/dofitsoildemand.
25
This
sametrendholdstruefortherestoftheclaimantsasASEANconsumptionis
expectedtogrowatanaveragerateof4.4%from375milliontonsofoilequivalent
(MTOE)to1,018MTOEfrom2007to2035.
26

21
Cronin,7.
22
Ibid
23
Garofano,279-281.
24
Halloran,R.(2012).Stormcloudsoverthesouthchinasea.AirForceMagazine,95(8)
25
U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.(2012).Annualenergyoutlook2012.().WashingtonDC:
U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.170.
26
3rdASEANenergyoutlook.(2011).().Japan:TheASEANCenterforEnergy.1.

10

Withprovenreservesupwardsofsevenbillionbarrelsandanestimated900
trillioncubicfeetofnaturalgas,theSouthChinaSeahasthepotentialtoalleviate
regionwideenergyinsecurity.
27
Notsurprisingly,Indonesiabeganexportinglimited
amountsofgasfromfieldssurroundingNatunaIslandviaa400-mileundersea
pipelinein2001.Furthermore,thePhilippineslinkedtheMalampayaandCamago
gasfieldswiththreepowerplantsthroughanextensive312-mileunderseas
pipeline.
28
Bothofthesedevelopmentsareinwatersclaimedinwholeorinpartby
thePRC,butoppositionhasbeenlimitedtodate.Thisislargelytheresultofthe
frontiernatureoftheplays.Asdeepwaterdrillingtechnologiescontinuetodevelop,

27
Cronin,7.
28
U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.(2008).Southchinasea.RetrievedNovember12,2012,
fromhttp://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS

Figure3:U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.(2008).Southchinasea.
RetrievedNovember12,2012,fromhttp://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-
topics.cfm?fips=SCS

11
however,explorationwillmovefurtheroffshoreintoincreasinglycontested
portionsoftheSouthChinaSea.
Ironically,Vietnamsdevelopmentofoffshoreoilalreadysparked
confrontationandheavy-handedthreatsfromthePRC.Inearly2011,staterun
IndianoilfirmOilandNaturalgasCorporationsingeda3-yeardealwith
PetroVietnamtocooperativelydeveloptheoilsectorinVietnamsExclusive
EconomicZoneintheSouthChinaSea.
29
Inresponse,ChinasForeignMinistry
Spokesman,HongLei,stressed,anyforeigncompanythatengagesinoil-
explorationactivityinwatersunderChinasjurisdictionwithouttheagreementof
ChinahasviolatedChinassovereignrights.
30
Sincethen,Chinaissuedadirective
prohibitinganyforeignoilcompaniesfromhelpingVietnamdevelopitsresourcesin
theSouthChinaSea.
31

ThisisindicativeofChinasstarkrejectionofforeigninterferenceinthe
regionandofthetrendtowardsincreasedconfrontationasexplorationand
productiondevelops.InDecember2008,thePRCapprovedaChinaNational
OffshoreOilCorporations(CNOOC)Chinasthirdlargestoilproducer-program
thatallocates$29.2billiontowardsthedevelopmentofoilandgasresourcesinthe
SouthChinaSeathrough2029.
32
CNOOCexpectsthedealtoincreaseSouthChina
Seaoilproductionto1millionbarrelsperday,whichexceedsproductionatChinas
biggestonshoreoilfieldatDaqing.Theoutputwillalmostexclusivelydependon
deepwaterandultra-deepwaterexplorationandproduction(E&P)atdepthsof
1,500to3,000meters.
33

Itisobviousthatenergyinsecurityisandwillcontinuetobeamajor
strategicthreattoallactorsintheregion.Thehugeenergyrequirementsjust
described,butmoreimportantlytherelianceonimportsfromabroad,hasthe

29
Blanchard,B.,&Huang,S.(2011).Chinapaperwarnsindiaagainstvietnamoildeal.Reuters,
30
Page,J.,&Wright,T.(2011).Indiafacesstandoffwithchinaonseaoil.WallStreetJournal,
31
Westhead,R.(2012).Battleforthepacific:Navalarmsraceinthechinasea.TheStar
32
ASEANStudiesCenter.(2009).Energyandgeopoliticsinthesouthchinasea:ImplicationsforASEAN
anditsdialoguepartners.(No.8).Singapore:ISEASPublishers.25.
33
Ibid
12
potentialtodestabilizetheentireregionintheeventofamajorhydrocarbons
discovery.

GeostrategicSignificance
Sofar,thispaperhasdiscussedtheeconomicsignificanceoftheSouthChina
Sea.Whileonecannotargueagainsttheimportanceoftradeandenergyinthebasin,
thesemotivationsarelargelyovershadowedbythegeopoliticalimplicationsfor
China,theregion,andbyassociation,theUnitedStates.ForChina,theSouthChina
Seaisaboutconsolidatingsovereignterritoryandprojectingregionalsupremacy.
TheUnitedStatesontheotherhand,islookingtomaintainbothitshegemonyinthe
regionandthebalanceofpowerthathaspersistedsinceWorldWarII.
34
Evenin
theirsimplestforms,thesestrategicgoalsareatutteroddswithoneanother.
WhetherpolicymakersinWashingtonwanttoadmititornot,theSouth
ChinaSeawilldeterminethefutureroleoftheUnitedStatesinAsia.
35
Withoutthe
properpolicyorforceposturing,theSouthChinaSeacanverywelltransformfrom
anopenandprosperousmaritimecommonstoapolarizedhotbedof
contestationwithColdWarlikerigidities.
36
Whilelarge-scaleconventionalconflict
isunlikely,currenttrendswillsoonshiftregionalpowerinChinasfavor,thus
fundamentallychangingtheUnitedStatesroletheregion.

ChineseNavalStrategy
ThemodernizationofthePeoplesLiberationArmyNavy(PLAN)overthelast
decadeistheculminationofthepreviouslydiscussedtrends.Whileconcrete
numbersareimpossibletocomeby,estimatesclaimthePRCwillspend$106billion
onitsmilitaryin2012,nearlyaneightfoldincreasefrom2000.
37
Theexpansionary
budgetallowedChinasnavytogrowfromtwoSoviet-eradestroyersin1990toa
forceofroughly78principalsurfacecombatants,71submarines,211patroland

34
Cronin,7.
35
Ibid
36
Ibid
37
Westhead
13
costalcombatants,andafunctioningaircraftcarrierin2011.
38
Whilethenumbers
arecertainlyimpressive,theyareirrelevantwithoutanunderstandingofhowChina
perceivesfutureconflict.
Chinaalwaysstressedapeacefulrise,andjustifiesitsmilitarybuildupasa
meanstoprotectitscorenationalinterests.
39
Historicallyspeaking,thetermcore
interestswasusedinstrictlyadomesticcontext.ItwasnotuntilJanuary19,2003
inameetingbetweenthenSecretaryofStateColinPowellandformerChinese
ForeignMinisterTanJiaxuanthatthetermwasusedinreferencetoaforeign
objectiveinanofficialcapacity.
40
StateCouncilorDaiBingguoclaimsChinascore
interestsarethreefold:topreserveChinasbasicstatesystemandnationalsecurity,
toenforcenationalsovereigntyandterritorialintegrity,andtocontinuestable
developmentofChinaseconomyandsociety.
41
Notsurprisingly,national
sovereigntyandterritorialintegritytheunderlyingrationalforChinasclaimsin
theSouthChinaSeaarewidelyregardedbyChineseofficialsasChinasmain
diplomaticpriorities.Todate,theseprioritieshaveincludedTaiwan,Tibet,Xinjiang,
andtheSouthChinaSea(althoughthereismuchspeculationastowhetherthe
SouthChinaSeaisactuallyconsideredacoreinterestbythePRC).
42

Coreinterestsareperceivedasstrategicobjectivesthatarenon-negotiable,
thusconveyingalevelofrigidityandperhapsmilitancytowardwhateverissue
mightbedefined.
43
Therefore,theclassificationoreventhementioningofthe
SouthChinaSeaasacoreinterestjustifiesChinasnavalmodernization.According
totheDepartmentofDefenses2011reporttoCongressonthemilitaryandsecurity
developmentsinthePRC,PLANdoctrinefocuseson6campaigns:blockade,anti-sea
lanesofcommunication,maritime-landattack,anti-ship,maritimetransportation

38
InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies.(2012).Themilitarybalance2012.().London:
InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies.
39
An.(2010).Modernizingnavyforselfdefense.Xinhaunet,,November10,2012.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-07/13/c_13397060.htm
40
Swaine,M.(2011).China'sassertivebehavior-partoneoncoreinterests.ChinaLeadership
Monitor,34.3.
41
Ibid,5.
42
Ibid
43
Ibid,1.
14
protection,andnavalbasedefense.
44
Ifcorrectlyimplemented,thePLANdoctrine
willdirectlysupportanoffensiveintheSouthChinaSea,whilepreventingforeign
(UnitedStates)intervention.
ThisrepresentsasignificanttransformationofMaosPeoplesWardoctrine.
Fromthebeginning,thePRCfoughtastrategicallysuperiorenemy.Activedefense
andtacticalsuperiorityhavebeenatthecenterofthePeoplesWardoctrinefrom
thetimeoftherevolution.Therefore,theshiftisawayfromMaosmanover
weaponsmentalitytoonethatfocusesonlocalwarunderhigh-technology
conditions.
45

Chinaisnotanirrationalactor.PLAstrategistsarewellawareoftheUnited
Statestechnologicalandmilitarysuperiority.Thatbeingsaid,DengXiaopings
TheoryofWarandPeaceassertsthat,TheUnitedStateslackstheeconomicpower
todominatetheworldwhichhascreatedasituationwherebyvariousforcesare
increasinglybalancingeachother.
46
Thisperceivedcloutinanincreasingly
multipolarworldencouragedPLAofficialstofocusondefendingtheperiphery
throughmaritimeforceprojection.
47
Thismeansdevelopinganavythatcan
effectivelycontroltheSouthChinaSeawhilesimultaneouslypreventingU.S.
interferenceintheregion.

SignificanceofMilitarizedClaimsintheSouthChinaSea
Chinasanti-accessdoctrineismotivatedinpartbythemilitarysignificance
oftheislandsintheSouthChinaSea.Todaytheclaimantsactivelyoccupy48
featuresoftheSpratlyIslands.Vietnamoccupies27features;thePhilippines,8;
China,7;Malaysia,5;andTaiwan,one.Militaryoccupationbeganin1956when
TaiwanestablishedTaipingIsland-thelargestdisputedisland-asapermanent

44
DepartmentofDefense.(2011).Militaryandsecuritydevelopmentsinvolvingthepeople'srepublic
ofchina.().WashingtonDC:DepartmentofDefense.
45
Pillsbury,M.(Ed.).(1998).Chineseviewsoffuturewarfare.WashingtonDC:NationalDefense
UniversityPress.XCXII.
46
Ibid
47
Cliff,R.,Burles,M.,Chase,M.,Eaton,D.,&Pollpeter,K.(2007).Enteringthedragon'slair:Chinese
antiaccessstrategiesandtheirimplicationsfortheunitedstates.SantaMonica:RAND.XIV
15
militarybase.Itwasnotuntiltheearly1970s,however,thattheothernationsbegan
establishinganenduringpresence.
48

Figure4:NavalBalanceintheSouthChinaSea
PLAN PLANSouth
SeaFleet
Taiwan Vietnam Philippines
Submarines 71 1SSBN;2
SSN;18SS
4SSK 2SSI 0
PrincipalSurfaceCombatants 78 5DDGHM;8
FFGHM;15
FFG
4CGHM;
20
FFGHM;
2FFGH
0 1FF
PatrolandCostalCombatants 211+ 40
PCFG/PCG
2PCFG;
59PCG;
4PBG;8
PBF
7PCFGM;
2PCC;8
PBFG;3
PBFT;3
PHT;2
PH;20
PB;4
PBR
1PCF;13
PCO;18PBF;
33PB
Mine
Warfare/Countermeasures
161 10MCMV 8MSC;4
MSO
2MSO;4
MSC;7
other
0
Amphibious(LCandLS) 238 1LPD;51
LS
2LSD;13
LST;288
LC
3LSM;3
LST;30
LC
7LST;26LC
TakenfromtheIISSMilitaryBalance2012(seeAppendixAforabbreviations)

WiththeoverallnavalbalancefromFigure4inmind,thefollowingsection
willassesswhatmobilizationwouldlikeintheeventofaconflict,andhoweach
claimantsoccupationsinthecontestedwaterswouldassistand/orhurttheir
strategicobjectives.WhilethisstudyonlyconsidersthesignificanceofChina,
Taiwan,VietnamandthePhilippinessmajoroutposts,thereareotherislands
withinthecontestedwatersthatbearmilitaryvalue,butweredeemedinsignificant
giventhepapersobjective.

48
Cronin,34.
16

TakenFromhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands

Figure5:ClaimsintheSouthChinaSea

17
Taiwan
TaipingIslandSpratlyChain
Figure6:http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1027416/senior-taiwan-officials-raise-tensions-
visit-taiping-island

Withanareaof41.3hectares,TaipingisthelargestislandintheSpratly
chainandisthemostheavilyoccupiedislandintheSouthChinaSea.
49
Taiwanhas
occupiedandadministeredovertheislandsince1956,butVietnam,thePhilippines,
andthePRCalsoclaimsovereigntyovertheisland.WhiletheTaiwanese
governmentiscommittedtoapeacefulresolutionoftheterritorialdisputes,many
high-rankingofficialshavecalledformoreaggressivebehavior.
50
Forexample,after
astarkincreaseinconfrontationinthesummerof2011,advisorsinsidePresident
MasNationalSecurityCouncilproposedremilitarizingTaipingunderthebackdrop
ofincreasedU.S.presenceintheregion.Someevenwentasfarasadvocatingfor
increasedoccupationintheSouthChinaSea.
51
Whiletheproposalwasultimately
rejected,thosewithintheNationalSecurityCouncilmerelydisagreedonitstiming,

49
InternationalCrisisGroup.(2012).Stirringupthesouthchinasea:Regionalresponses.(No.229).
Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup.37.
50
Ibid,12.
51
Ibid,13.
18
andagreedtoactproactivelyafterasignificantoildiscoveryorintheeventof
adversarialactionthatcouldthreatenTaiwansaccesstovitalresources.
52

Taiwanhasnotstationedanyactivetroopsontheislandsincethe
replacementofmarineswithcoastguardtroopsin2000.Thatsaid,remilitarization
ofTaipingiswellunderway.AftertwoVietnamesevesselsencroachedwhatTaiwan
perceivesasitssovereignwatersaroundTaipinginMarch2012,membersofthe
ParliamentaryForeignandNationalDefenseCommitteevisitedTaipingtoassessits
defensecapabilities.GivenitssituationwithChinaandtherecentVietnamese
incursion,however,Taiwanbelievesithasalimiteddiplomaticroleinanyfuture
SouthChinaSeadisputes.Inturn,Taiwaniscommittedtosendanadditional100
coastguardtroopsanddoubleitsmortarunitsontheisland.Moreover,the
TaiwaneseDefenseMinistrydisclosedaspecialairborneunitthatcandeployto
TaipingviaC-130sinjustunderfourhours.
53

DespiteTaiwansdecreasedmilitarypostureoverthepastdecade,theisland
isstillfundamentallystrategic.ItsmainassetistheTaipingAirport,whichwas
completedinDecember2007.The1,200-meterlong,30-meterwiderunwaycan
accommodatetwoC-130transportplanes,andtheROCiscurrentlyconstructingan
antennatowerandotherassociatedfacilitiesinanefforttoexpandtheairports
operationalcapabilities.Thefacilityalsoconsistsofahelipad,whichTaiwan
infrequentlyuses.
54

Furthermore,JapanhistoricallyusedTaipingasawartimesubmarinebase,
addingsignificantvaluetotheisland.Taiwanacknowledgesthatintheeventofwar
withChina,submarinesstationedatthebasecoulddeployintotheSouthChinaSea
toattackChineseoiltankers.However,thesmallpieratthesouthwestcornerofthe
islandlimitscurrentnavalactivitytothreeM-8TaiwaneseCoastGuardvessels
(Nanhai4,Nanhai5,andNanhai6)thatpatroltheisland.
55

52
Ibid
53
Ibid
54
Iacono,N.,Gordon,P.,&Preskenis,K.(2012).Thesouthchinaseainbrief.().Georgetown
University.
55
Ibid
19
PeoplesRepublicofChina
WoodyandRockyIslands-ParcelChain

AsChinasonlytruenavalbaseintheSouthChinaSea,WoodyIslands
strategicsignificanceishardtooverstate.First,Woody(Yongxing)Islandislocated
intheParcelIslandchainandisroughly300kilometerssoutheastoftheChinese
mainland.LocationalonegreatlyextendsthePLANsoperationalcapacitywithin
theSouthChinaSea.Second,WoodyIslandisthePLANsmaincontrollinkbetween
theMalaccaStraightandtheSouthSeafleetheadquartersatZhanjiang.
56

LocationsofChinesemilitaryelectronicareconcealedonthemainland,but
aremuchmoreobservableintheSouthChinaSea.
57
Overheadsurveillancesuggests
thattheislandsupportsChineseType791X-bandprecisionapproachradar,which

56
Bussert,J.,&Elleman,B.(2011).People'sliberationarmynavycombatsystemstechnology.
Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress.141.
57
Ibid,140.
Figure7:TakenfromGoogleEarth
20
issimilarincapabilitiestotheSovietTwoSpotRSP-7system.
58
TheType-791hasa
6-dwgree-elevationantennathatsupportsveryhighfrequency(VHF)andultra-high
frequency(UHF)aircommunications.
59
Moreover,a2001WashingtonTimesarticle
claimedthePLAinstalledHY-2anti-shipcruisemissiles(ACSM)ontheisland.This
particularweaponssystemrequireslong-rangesurface-searchradar,whichif
accurate,meanstheislandiscapableoftargetingsurfaceshipsremotelyand
strikingacombatantvesselwithinits95-100kmeffectiverange.
60

61
Evenifthe
laterprovesfalse,knowncapabilitiesallowlocalfleetcommanderstocommunicate
directlywiththeislandviasatelliteandradiocommunications.
62

Coupledwithasignalsintelligence(SIGNIT)stationontheattachedRocky
Island(thehighestpointintheParcelchain),thedevelopmentofadvanced
command,control,andcommunicationcapabilitiesonWoodyIslandpresentsa
uniqueopportunityforthePLAs2
nd
Artillertytheballisticmissilebranchofthe
PLA.
63
IfthedeploymentofHY-2ACSMisanyindication,Chinaispreparedtouseits
claimsintheSouthChinaSeaasforwarddeploymentpostsforitsballisticmissiles.
Figure8:StrikingDistanceofPLAAircraftandBallisticMissilesTakenfromFASReport

58
Ibid,143.
59
Ibid
60
Ibid
61
FASMilitaryAnalysisNetwork.(1999).C-201/HY-2/SY-1CSS-N-2/CSS-C-3/SEERSUCKER.
Retrieved,2012,fromhttp://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/c-201.htm
!"#$%&'$(%)*+$,-$
!"#$%&'('.+/$0%&1/$23$456,7$89:(;$<2#=%)"*2&$>"?+$.+%?$23$@?+/)$<+"&/*/$:%AA"*?"B$("**"A/*$%&'$
<2#C%?$0%'"D*$23$9?)"E/$8")B)%3?'
$
!"#$%&F$G%&$H%&$.2A;$(%)E$ID&J"&1/);$8&')/>$!)/="&/H"B+;$%&'$G"#$.+2#%*;$9/%$:%??A/F$8$K2"&?6236
4/=%)?D)/$@=/)%?"2&%A$<2&B/=?;$LM%*+"&1?2&;$4<F$</&?/)$32)$9?)%?/1"B$%&'$:D'1/?%)N$8**/**#/&?*;$
7O$(%N$,P7PQ;$R+??=FSS>>>TB*C%2&A"&/T2)1S=DCA"B%?"2&*S,P7PSP-S%")*/%6C%??A/6B2&B/=?SU$
V%BB/**/'$7$@B?2C/)$,P7,W;$=T$7OT$
21
Kim anu Naish 24
!"#$%&'('ASBN Concept of 0peiations'
!"#$%&: The People's Libeiation Aimy Navy: A Nouein Navy with Chinese Chaiacteiistics,(Suitlanu,
NB: 0ffice of Naval Intelligence, August 2uu9), <http:www.fas.oigiipagencyonipla-navy.puf>
|accesseu 1 0ctobei 2u12j, p. 27.!

AlthoughWoodyIslanddoesnotyethavethelogisticalcapabilitiesto
supporttheabovemissileplatforms,thePLANcanandwilllikelyaugmentits
missilesystemsontheisland.Thisextendstherangeofitssystemsanadditional
162nauticalmilescomparedtoalaunchfromtheChinesemainland,whichallows
theD-3AtostrikeU.S.forcesinGuam.WithregardstotheSouthChinaSea,
however,theincreasedstrikecapacityoftheDong-Feng(DF)21wouldbethemost
decisiveinapotentialconflict.
64

TheDF-21anti-shipballisticmissile(ASBM)iscapableofperformingamid-
courseballisticmissilecorrectionmaneuverthatallowstheweapontoreadjust
andstrikeamovingtargetusingaManeuveringReentryVehicle(MaRV).
65
This
changeintrajectoryallowstheDF-21toeffectivelyneutralizeamovingvessel,
includingU.S.carriers,andcomplicatesanyenemyefforttointercepttheprojectile
withmissiledefense.
66
Fromastrategicperspective,theDF-21allowsChinato
createitsmuch-emphasizedkeepoutzone.WhileitsunclearifChinaactuallyplans
todeploytheDF-21toWoodyIsland,theover-the-horizonradardescribedaboveis
anessentialfirststepinretrofittingthebaseforDF-21deployment.Whenandif
thathappens,WoodyIslandwillexpandthePLANsanti-accesscapabilities.

62
Ibid
63
Bussert,143.
64
FASSlideshow
65
AmodernnavywithChinesecharacteristics.(2009).().Suitland:OfficeofNavalIntelligence.
26.
66
ibid
Figure9:DF-21ConceptofOperationsTakenfromAModernNavywithChineseCharacteristics
22
Inreality,theelectronicsandcombatsystemsdescribedabovederivemost
oftheirutilityfromtheaircraftandwarshipscapableofusingWoodyIslandasan
operationalbase.Althoughstrategicallylimitedgivenitssize,WoodyIslandisoneof
twoexternalPLANbasesthatcansupporttheSouthSeafleetssubmarinesand
ships.
67
Whiletheharborsspecificaccommodationsarehardtoconfirm,analysis
suggeststheharborcandockvesselswithlessthan5,000tonsofdisplacement.This
iswellwithintherangeofthePLANsLuda-class(Type-051)andLuhu-class(Tyep-
052)guidedmissiledestroyers.
68

Ofthe22submarinesintheSouthSeaFleet,onlytheHan(Type-091),Kilo,
Romeo,Ming(Type-035),Song(Type039),andtheYuan(Type39A/B)submarines
arecapableofsurfacingatWoodygivenitsdisplacementrestrictions.Althoughthe
strategicfleetstilloperatesoutofZhanjiang,Woodyallowsthetacticalarmofthe
SouthSeaFleettooperatewithinthewatersoftheSouthChinaSea.Eachofthe
submarinesaboveareequippedwith533mmtorpedotubes(TT)andtheKiloand
SongclassesarecapableoflaunchingKlubanti-shipcruisemissiles(ASCM)and
SaccadeASCMrespectfully.
69
Eventhoughthesesubmarinesaretheoldestand
leastadvancedintheSouthSeafleet,theyallowthePLANtopatroltheSouthChina
Seawithincreasedfrequencyandreducedresponsetimeintheeventofaconflict.
Therefore,theislandsinherentstrategicvaluerestswiththeYongxingIsland
Airport,whichwasconstructedbythePRCinJuly1990.Theairports7,874-foot
runway,fourhangers,andseveralfueltankssupportmanythird-generation
PeoplesLiberationAirForce(PLAF)fighterssuchastheH-6bomberandother
resupplytransports.
70
Consequently,theairstripcompensatesforthelackofan
aircraftcarrierintheSouthSeaFleetbyincreasingthePLAsmaritimeprojections
intheSouthChinaSea.Whilethefacilitycannotsupportaircraftforextended
periods,planescanstillland,refuel,andredeploytoattackforwardtargetsoutside
thescopeofattackslaunchedfromthemainland.

67
Bussert,72.
68
Ibid
69
InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,232.
70
Bussert,142.
23
Figure10:H-6BomberRangeTakenFromInstituteforDefenseStudyandAnalysis

Takentogether,theislandhasupsidepotentialasaforwarddeployment
baseforoperationsintheSouthChinaSea.Intheeventofconflictoperationswill
havetobelaunchedfromHanin,butasupgradescontinue,thecommunicationlinks
andenhancedmobilityfromWoodyIslandwillallowthePLANtooutmaneuver
regionalcompetitorsintheabsenceofdirectU.S.support.
71

71
Bussert,180.
24
Vietnam
TruongSaIsland-SpratlyChain
Figure11:TakenfromVietnamNetBridge

VietnamhasoccupiedTruongSaIsland(SpratlyIslandProper)since1974
despiteclaimsbythePRC,Taiwan,andthePhilippines.Located254nauticalmiles
fromCamRanhPort,TruongSaIslandisVietnamsadministrativecapitaland
militarystrongholdfortheentireSpratlyChain(whichitclaimsinwhole).
72

Moreover,theislandholdssentimentalvalueforVietnamesenationalsfollowing
clasheswiththeChineseNavyinthesurroundingwatersthatleft68Vietnamese
soldiersdeadin1988.
73

Theislandsmilitarysignificanceistwofold.Intermsofactualmilitary
facilities,theislandoffersa610-meterairstripcapableofaccommodatingsmall,
fixed-wingreconnaissanceaircraft.
74
WhiletherunwayistooshortforVietnams
MiG-21bisandMiG-21UMfightergroundattack(FGA)jets,TruongSaiswithinthe
rangeoftheBe-12MailMaritimePatrolAircraft,whichiscapableofseatakeoffand

72
Truongsalon:Growingtownatsea.(2011).RetrievedNovember2,2012,
fromhttp://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Truong-Sa-Lon-growing-town-at-
sea/20115/18351.vnplus
73
Cronin,34.
74
Iacono
25
landings.
75
TheBe-12isprimarilyanantisubmarineamphibiousaircraft,butcan
easilyserveasareconnaissanceplane.Thatbeingsaid,itsmaximumweaponsload
isroughly3,000kgandincludesacombinationofdepthcharges,mines,bombs,
anti-shippingmissiles,homingtorpedoes,androckets.
76

Theislandisalsoequippedwithahelipad,asmalljettywithtwopiers,anda
radiotower.
77
Givenitsrangefromthemainland,theMi-24Hindattackhelicopter
andtheKa-28HelixantisubmarinehelicoptercanaccessthehelipadonTruongSa
intheeventofaconflict.
78
TheKa-28istheexportvariantoftheRussianKamovKa-
27PLandiscapableofcarryinguptoa2,000kgpayload.
79
Witharangeof800-km,
thehelicoptercanstrikeanyfeatureintheSpratlyChainwithacombinationof
homingtorpedoes,torpedorockets,uptotenPLAB250-120bombs,andtwoOMAB
bombs.
80
Moreover,theweaponssystemcancarryRussianSV3depthbombs,which
usesonarguidancetotrackelusivesubmarines.
81
Finally,theMi-24Hindisan
assaultgunship,butislimitedtoarangeof450km.Itisequippedwith412.7mm
machineguns,a30-mmtwinbarrelcannon,57-mmrockets,andAT-2C/6CSpiral
anti-tacticalguidedmissiles(ATGM).
82

Outsideofdirectmilitaryvalue,theislands1000civilianinhabitantsraiseits
significanceintheeyesofVietnamesestrategists.
83
Tothatend,theVietnamese
mainlandrecognizedTruongSaIslandonmultipleoccasionsformilitaryexcellence,
givingtheislandssoldiersthe3
rd
GradeMilitaryMedalin2011,thetitleHeroof
thePeoplesArmyForcesin1985,the3
rd
ClassFeatofArmsMedalin1984,andthe
2
nd
ClassFeatofArmsMedalforfiveconsecutiveyearsfrom1996-2000.
84

75
InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies
76
AeroFlight.(2010).Berievbe-12mali.RetrievedOctober30,2012,
fromhttp://www.aeroflight.co.uk/aircraft/types/beriev-be-12-mail.htm
77
Ibid
78
InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,282.
79
SinoDefence.(2009).Ka-28helixnavalhelicopter.RetrievedNovember1,2012,
fromhttp://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/helicopter/ka28.asp
80
Ibid
81
Ibid
82
FASMilitaryAnalysisNetwork.(2000).Mi-24hind.RetrievedOctober29,2012,
fromhttp://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/mi-24.htm
83
Iacono
84
VietnameseNationalPress.(2012).Truongsalonisland.RetrievedOctober29,2012,
fromhttp://www.qdnd.vn/qdndsite/en-US/75/72/182/155/188/195578/Default.aspx
26
Philippines
ThituIsland-SpratlyChain
Figure12:TakenfromIslamTimes

ThituIslandisthesecondlargestintheSpratlychain,andisthePhilippines
mostsignificantmilitaryholdingintheSouthChinaSea.Theislandhasbeen
occupiedbythePhilippinessince1970andhassincebeenretrofittedwitha1.4km
unpavedairstrip.AsidefromTaiwansTapingIsland,ThituIslandistheonly
featureintheSouthChinaSeacapableoflandinglargeresupplyaircraftliketheC-
130.Inaddition,therunwaysimpressivelengthcansupportawidearrayof
PhilippineNavalandAirForceaircraft.Thatbeingsaid,thecapabilitiesofcurrent
Phillippineaircraftareessentiallylimitedtomaritimepatrolandintelligence,
reconnaissance,andsurveillance(ISR)functions.Ofparticularsignificancearethe
F-27-200,N-22SLSearchmaster,andtheOV-10Bronco.
85
Therefore,theislands
truepotentialrestswiththePhilippinescloserelationswiththeUnitedStates,and
theU.S.PacificCommandsaircraftfleet.
86

85
IISSMilitaryBalance2012,268.
86
AsidefromJapaneseoccupationbetween1942-1945,thePhilippineshavebeenunderU.S.
sovereigntysincetheendoftheSpanishAmericanWarin1898.(TakenfromtheStateDepartment)
27
Ascanbeseeninthepictureabove,ashallowcoralbasesurroundsThitu.
ThecoralreefcausedtheBRPLanaodelNortetorunagroundin2004andhas
preventedthePhilippinesfromusingThituasanavalbase.Asaresult,the
PhilippineNavyproposedaplantoupgradetheislandsairstripandbuilda
causewaytothedeepwaterssurroundingtheislandin1999.
87
Whileneverputinto
motion,theincreasedcontestationintheSouthChinaSeaespeciallythe
encroachmentoftwentyChinesefishingvesselsandtwofrigatesearlierthisyear-
revitalizedimplementationefforts.
88
Officialreportsclaimdevelopmentsarebeing
drivenbycommercialfactors,buttheexpansionofThitusfacilitieswillopenthe
islandtothePhilippines,andbycorrelation,UnitedStatesNavy.
Tosummarize,Thituclearlyholdslittlemilitaryvaluewithouttheproposed
expansions,buttheUnitedStatesdeeprelationshipwiththePhilippinesgreatly
enhancestheislandsstrategicsignificanceintheeventofaconflict.

87
Gupta,V.,&Bernstein,A.(1999).Keepinganeyeontheislands:Remotemonitoringinthesouth
chinasea.().OfficeofStrategicServices.38.
88
Pilapil,J.,Depasuil,W.,&Bauzon,C.(2012).Navytodeployshipstopag-asa.ManillaTimes,

28
Conclusion

TheDangerousRoadAhead
Onanindividualscale,noneofthemilitarizedfeaturesintheSouthChinaSea
holdenoughmilitaryvaluetodictatetheoutcomeofafutureconflict.Thatbeing
said,ChinasforceposturingonWoodyIslandoffersthegreateststrategicbenefit.
Therunwaycoupledwithonetheseaslargestnaturalharborswouldatthevery
leastallowthePRCtolaunchstrategicbombingcampaignsinboththeParceland
theSpratlychains.Moreover,submarinesandlightvesselscanquicklyresupplyat
theisland,whichgreatlyincreasesboththePLANsoperationalreachand
enduranceintheSouthChinaSea.
Thatbeingsaid,themilitarysignificanceoftheislandsintheSouthChinaSea
meansmuchmorethanaccesstoresourcesorsimpleforceposturingforthePRC.
Theabilitytocontrolalloftheseascontestedfeaturesensuresthesuccessofthe
LocalWardoctrine,whichinturnincreasesanti-accesscapabilitiesandpreventsthe
UnitedStatesfrominterferinginAsianaffairs.Ashydrocarbonexploration
progressesandthebalancecontinuestoweighinChinasfavor,theheatedrhetoric
andmilitarydemonstrationssurroundingtheSouthChinaSeadisputewillboilover
intoalimited,butpotentiallydestabilizing,conflictintheabsenceofenhanced
politicaleffortstodiffusethesituation.

ImplicationsfortheUnitedStates
Shouldwarbreakout,Chinasamphibiouslandingcapabilitiesandsuperior
firepowerwillallowthePLAtotakealmostallofthedisputedislandswithoutU.S.
intervention.Thisis,ofcourse,ahypotheticalsituation.Giventhestrategic
significanceoftheregiontobothtradeandU.S.globalhegemony,anyopenconflict
betweenChina,Vietnam,Taiwan,thePhilippines,orMalaysiawilldragtheUnited
Statesstates-willinglyorunwillingly-intothedispute.Therefore,theconflictwill
quicklyevolveintoonebetweentheUntiedStatesandChinaasopposedtoone
amongregionalcompetitors.
29
Althoughoutsidethescopeofthispaper,theconventionalmilitarybalance
stronglyfavorstheUnitedStates.ThePLAslackofdirectcombatexperience
coupledwithatechnologicallyinferiormilitary,however,willforcethePRCto
resorttoasymmetrictactics,thatintheory,willcounterU.S.superiorityandalter
thebalanceofpowerintheSouthChinaSea.Thisassumptionisbasedonseveral
perceivedvulnerabilitiesintheUnitedStatesabilitytooperateeffectivelyinthe
region.
89

First,shouldtheUntiedStatesgetinvolvedinaconflictintheSouthChina
Sea,Washingtonwillhavetoplanandfundtwomajorcontingencesatoppositeends
oftheglobe.EvenastroopswithdrawfromAfghanistanin2014,theUnitedStates
isforevercommittedtotheMiddleEastandSouthAsia.Moreover,current
developmentsinIranandSyriaarelikelytogetworsebeforetheygetbetter,and
willrequiredirectU.S.involvementtopreventregionwidechaos.
90

Second,defensespendingcutstoavoidthefiscalcliffandaworrisome
declineinU.S.maritimepowerwillseverelyconstrainanyU.S.effortstopivotto
Asia.ThecurrentUnitedStatesNavalFleetstandsat284ships,downfrom600
duringtheReaganEra.
91
WhiletheNavyhopestoincreasethisnumberto313,
proposedcutscoupledwithdecommissioningwillreducetheNavysfleetto250
ships.
92
TheU.S.isalreadyataseriousdisadvantageintheSouthChinaSeagivenits
lackofsubmarinesinthe7
th
SeaFleetandsequestrationfurtherrestrains
operationalcapacityatatimewhenChinasdefensebudgetisessentiallylimitless
andsolelyfocusedontheFirstandSecondIslandchains.
Third,theUnitedStateshastotravelaconsiderabledistancetodeployan
effectiveforceintheSouthChinaSea.NotonlydoesthisaffectthetimingofaU.S.
responsetoanySouthChinaSeasituation,butitalsoallowsChinatolaunchcyber
attacksagainstcriticallogisticssystemsandcommunications.Moreover,theUntied

89
Cliff,R.,Burles,M.,Chase,M.,Eaton,D.,&Pollpeter,K.(2007).Enteringthedragon'slair:Chinese
antiaccessstrategiesandtheirimplicationsfortheunitedstates.SantaMonica:RAND.Executive
Summary.
90
Ibid
91
Cronin,8.
92
Ibid,6.
30
Statesdependsonpotentiallyunreliablealliesthatareincreasinglymoreconcerned
withappeasingBeijingthanWashington.Intheeventofaconflict,Chinawill
pressureitsregionalpeerstolimitU.S.accesstoitsregionalbases,thuspreventing
theU.S.fromprojectingpowerintheSouthChinaSea.
93

Finally,ChinahastheabilitytodenytheUnitedStatesaccesstotheSouth
ChinaSea.TechnologicaldevelopmentssuchastheDF-21giveChinatheupper
handineffectivelyimplementingakeepoutzoneinitsdirectperiphery.Liketactics
developedbyinsurgentsinIraqandAfghanistan,ChinawillfocusonU.S.
vulnerabilities-themostsignificantofwhichistheaircraftcarrier-togainan
operationaladvantage.
Therefore,withoutadiplomaticsolution,theSouthChinaSeaisapolitical
andmilitaryquagmirefortheUnitedStates.Chinasabilitytoconquertheislandsin
theSouthChinaSeawhilesimultaneouslypreventingtheUntiedStatesfrom
accomplishingsomeorallofitsmilitaryobjectivessignificantlyraisesthecostsfor
theU.S.tooperateintheregion.Thispresentstwolikelyoutcomes.Eitherthe
UnitedStatesdecidesthepriceforSouthChinaSeainterventionistoohighandasa
resultstaysoutofafutureconflictinturnsacrificingitsregionalhegemony-orthe
U.S.engagesChinainacostlywar.Whileeitherscenarioisunlikelygiventhe
regionsmutualinterestincontinuedeconomicprosperity,theSouthChinaSeawill
ultimatelydictatewhethertheUnitedStatesorChinacanexploittheregionforits
ownstrategicaims.

93
Cliff,ExecutiveSummary.
31
AppendixA
SSBN=nuclearpoweredballisticmissilesubmarine
SSN=attacksubmarinenuclearpowered
SSI=attacksubmarine
SS=diesel-electricsubmarine
SSK=conventionalsubmarine
CGHM=cruiserwithAShM(anti-shipmissile)withhangerwithSAM
DDGHM=destroyerwithAShMwithhangerwithSAM(surface-toairmissile)
FFGH=frigatewithAShMwithhangar
FFGHM=frigatewithAShMwithhangarwithSAM
FFG=frigate
FF=fastfrigate
PH=patrolhydrofoilship
PHT=patrolhydrofoiltransport
PCB=patrolboatwithguidedmissile
PBF=fastpatrolboat
PBFT=fastpatrolboat
PBFG=fastpatrolboatwithguidedmissile
PBR=patrolboatreconnaissance
PCFG/PCG=fastpatrolcraftwithguidedmissile
PCO=patrolcraftoceanic
PCFGM=fastpatrolcraftwithguidedmissilewithSAM
LPD=landingplatform/dock
LS=landingship
LST=landingshiptank
LSM=landingshipmaritime
LC=landingcraft
LSD=landingshipdock
MSC=minesweepercraft
MSO=minesweeperordinance(non-magnetic)
MCMV=minecountermeasuresvessel
32
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