CONR "MUST ANSWER" QUESTIONS

SUMMARY: In my view there are three basic areas of interest at CONR; (1) Operations
on 9/11; (2) Training & policies pre-9/11; and (3) Changes to NORAD and the air
defense structure since 9/11. The outline below sets forth question for each. Emphasis
should be on the latter two, and on providing an overall context for us to write the
operational story of 9/11.

CONFIRM THERE ARE NO TAPES OR RECORDINGS FROM 9/11

CONFIRM THERE IS NOT AN AFTER ACTION REPORT
WHY NOT???

I. OPERATIONS ON 9/11 - KEY POINTS

(A) Shoot Down Order

(1) Time and Channel: How and when did CONR leadership first learn of the
shoot down order? If through the "chat log," did the leadership view such
information as notification (i.e., FYI) or as an actual order to take action? (Pin
them down on one or the other, or establish that there was uncertainty and
confusion.) If there was uncertainty, what actions did they take to clarify the
situation? How\when did they obtain certain orders?

(2) Details of Order/Rules of Engagement: Establish the specifics of what

CONR leadership believed they were tasked to do re the shoot down. What was
the authorization and authentication process at each level (pilot, controller,
commander)? Was CONR involvemed in the formulation of the paper ROE that
were ultimately circulated? If so, how were those Rules developed? Prior to the
circulation of these ROE, what ROE were in effect?

(3) CONR Understanding of NEADS Implementation: What was CONR's

understanding - at every level - of NEADS' implementation of the shoot down
order? Did CONR understand that the order was passed to the pilots? Did CONR
approve that "decision" not to pass the order to the pilots? If so, probe how the
order could have effectively been carried out - given the intense time constraints
of the day.

(4) Change to Transitional ROE & Change to DefCon 3: What was the effect
of change in ROE from peacetime to transitional ROE? When did it happen?
Same for Change to DefCon 3....

(5) Clarify Arnold Statement from May Hearing: Walk Arnold through
testimony and clarify what he meant by it. (He conflates a number of issues and
that record needs to be cleaned up.) Moreover, probe his understanding of the
Andrews scramble and General Wherley's ROE. How\where did Arnold learn of
this situation? Was he in contact with Andrews on 9/11?
/

(B) NORAD Command and Control on 9/11

(1) In general, what role did CONR play in the air defense operation on 9/11?
Who were the key players and what did they do? Who was involved in the Air
Threat Conference Call?

- Tracking Suspicious Aircraft: Does CONR have radar equipment and

feeds? If so, did CONR independently track any of the hijacked or
suspicious aircraft that day? If not, what was the internal system of
communication by which they received their information?

(2) What was the role of CMOC? Who, when and at what level was there
coordination between CMOC and CONR? What was General Eberhart doing?

(3) At any point during the day was there a conference (telephone or video) that
included the senior leadership of CMOC, CONR and NEADs? If so, when and
what was the subject? If not, why not?

(4) Assets at non-alert facilities: Did NORAD launch assets from non-alert
facilities on 9/11? (I believe the answer is yes) If it is possible to draw on assets
from other facilities (as was demonstrated) - why wasn't this an option earlier in
the day when the attacks were underway? For example, why couldn't NORAD
draw on the Andrews assets instead of or in addition to Langley? Isn't it a fallacy
to say (as NORAD has done in repeated public statements) that its asset force that
day was limited to 2 planes at 7 facilities?

(C) Coordination with the FAA & National Decision Makers

(1) At the senior levels of CONR, who was talking to the FAA? Who within the
FAA was he/she speaking with?

(2) At any point was there an "open line" between CONR and the FAA? If so,
between what parties? If not, why not?

(3) Notifications: Did CONR receive any notifications from the FAA re hijacked
aircraft? Specifically, what was the source of the following:

CHAT LOG ENTRIES SOURCED TO RADES ? ? ? ? Where do these

come from?

- Flight 175: Source for Chat Log entry (Bates #15939) and NORAD
press release that asserts "1243Z FAA NOTIFICATION OF UNITED
AIRLINES FLIGHT 175 POSSIBLE HIJACK FROM BOSTON -
SOURCE RADES"
 — Flight 77: Source of 0924 notification time that is contained in (1)
NORAD timeline and presentation to Commission last May? What exactly
did they know about AA 77? Fact it was hijacked? Location? If so, how?

-- Flight 93: How and when did CONR first learn about the hijacking of
UA93?

(D) Post 9/11 Representations About "Day of Actions

I assume you have this covered....

II. Training, Mission and Policies Pre-9/11

(A) Exercises

(1) Planning/Conception
Who from CONR was involved with conceiving exercise scenarios? Did
he/she work from intelligence information, own imagination, or both?

(2) Exercises Prior to 9/11

Ask each witness if they have ever participated in an exercise involving
the following scenarios:

Training exercises involving shoot down orders:

Training exercises involving hijacked aircraft on any type of suicide

mission

Training missions involving the National Capital Region

Training missions involving actual coordination (as opposed to

simulated)with any level of the FAA (i.e., Centers, Tracon, HQ)

(B) Quadrennial Defense Review

(1) In connection with the QDR Secretary Rumsfeld has been quoted as saying
that homeland security was at the top of DoD's priority list.

Please describe NORAD's (and specifically CONR's) involvement in

these discussions. What threats were envisioned? Prior to 9/11 what were
the priorities?

(2) To your knowledge — in the context of these discussions or any other - prior
to 9/11 did NORAD ever consider the threat to the homeland posed by a suicide
hijacking? Prior to 9/11, was there any planning or training within NORAD for
such an attack?
 (3) If homeland security was at the top of DoD's priority list prior to 9/11 -
and if NORAD was the primary (or perhaps sole) Command with responsibility
for safeguarding the nation prior to 9/11 - why was NORAD only equipped to
protect against Soviet long range bomber penetration of our intercept zone? (See
McKinley statement to Commission) Do you agree that NORAD's mission was
this limited?

III. Post 9/11 Changes

Yipe! This is an area we can't ignore but have done very little work on. My
understanding from informal conversations at FAA is that McKinley is at the forefront of
the FAA/NORAD changes post-9/11. I would inquire about the following areas:

A. Equipment
How is the radar world different today? What is still outstanding?
B. Facilities
I've seen in the press clips reports of some new secret facility that NORAD uses
for hijack situations - maybe at CMOC? Perhaps Geoff could pull the clips and
turn this into an intelligent question...
C. Coordination with the FAA
(1) Come away with a list of concrete steps that have been taken to resolve these
problems.
(2) Ask witnesses to compare the before and after situation; raise specific issues
like the terminology differences; probe why these existed
D. Results
Refer to recent press clip re intercept testing - things still not running smoothing.
(I believe the clip referred to exercises over the NCA region and statistics re
same)

IV. MISCELLANEOUS

Atlantic City: Were there aircraft scrambled from Atlantic City on the morning of 9/11?
If so, please provide details. If not, why was information fed into the Air Threat
Conference Call - around 10:00 am - that NORAD was generating fighter aircraft from
Atlantic City?

After-Action Review: Ask each witness about their awareness of documents produced
post 9/11 assessing and evaluating the air defense operation that day.

Drug Interdiction: Probe NORAD's involvement with drug interdiction prior to 9/11.
How/when did that function become a part of its mandate? To what extent was CONR
involved in it?