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Survival: Global Politics and Strategy

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Accommodating China
Amitai Etzioni

To cite this article: Amitai Etzioni (2013): Accommodating China, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 55:2, 45-60 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.784466

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Accommodating China
Amitai Etzioni

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There are increasing signs that the United States and China are on a collision course. Some scholars see this course as following the historical pattern by which a declining power refuses to yield to a rising power, and war ensues. Yet the collision is by no means inevitable. The United States should be able to accommodate Chinas rise without compromising its core interests or its values. Freed from his pre-election necessity to appear tough, President Barack Obama now has the opportunity to re-examine the pivot to Asia he announced in 2011 to choose between a quest for a regional accommodation and a military confrontation. Accommodation should not be misconstrued as appeasement or unilateral concession. It should be conceived, rather, as action in the interests of both sides that contributes to global stability. It proceeds from the assumption that relations between international powers can benefit from significant complementary interests, even if other interests conflict. Washington and Beijing share interests in nuclear non-proliferation, securing global commerce, stabilising oil markets and preserving the environment, as well as preventing terrorism, piracy and the spread of pandemics. To these ends, China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, joined the UN Security Council in unanimously condemning North Koreas 2012 ballisticmissile test and January 2013 nuclear test, and conducted its first bilateral anti-piracy operation with the US Navy in the Horn of Africa at the end

Amitai Etzioni is University Professor and Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University, Washington DC.
Survival | vol. 55 no. 2 | AprilMay 2013 | pp. 4560DOI 10.1080/00396338.2013.784466

46 | Amitai Etzioni

of last year. China is also a member of the World Trade Organisation and the Financial Action Task Force, and its increased contributions to the International Monetary Fund in 2012 were of great benefit to failing economies in Europe. Although they have the potential for greater cooperation, the United States and China already work together on many issues.

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Strategic assumptions China is rising as a regional, rather than global, power. It has neither the capability nor evident desire to establish a new world order and appears uninterested in exporting its version of authoritarian capitalism to other nations. China views its key geopolitical interests in a regional context, focusing on Tibet, Taiwan and the South China Sea, and its military is largely designed to enhance its power in East Asia, as shown by the deployment of its most advanced weapons systems near Taiwan and its concentration on anti-access and area-denial capabilities. Chinas explicit foreign-policy doctrine has been one of peaceful rise, more recently evolving into peaceful development. Accordingly, in recent decades China has often reached compromises in conflicts with its neighbours, settling them via negotiations or other peaceful mechanisms.1 Between 1949 and 2005, Beijing settled 17 of 23 territorial
disputes with other governments, in most cases receiving less than half the land in question.2 It has, to be sure, become more assertive in recent years, but this has been almost exclusively in regional matters. China shows little interest in promoting its ideology of state capitalism globally. Economic growth is slowing and China faces a range of environmental, demographic, social and political challenges. It is likely that Beijing will remain preoccupied with domestic matters (although some of these have international implications, as it will need to ensure access to foreign energy and raw materials to secure economic growth and political stability). It has very few allies in East Asia, as most of its neighbours fear and oppose its attempts to establish regional superiority. The United States and its allies therefore have little reason to replay the Cold War by seeking to contain China. Instead, the West could readily tolerate some expansion of Chinas regional influence by allowing it to

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secure access to vital resources as long as it abides by international law.3 Accommodating such expansion is more likely to lead to a peaceful, limited rebalancing of power than seeking to block China on all fronts by establishing counter-alliances. Crucially, China does not pose an immediate threat to US interests in the same way as Iran or Pakistan. It is still in the early stages of building-up and modernising its military. Rather than rushing to preempt China as a military threat with a more aggressive defence policy, the United States has time to help bring about a peaceful coexistence.
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Easing tensions Nations can often be caught in a vicious circle in which acts considered hostile by one state trigger similar moves by a rival, exacerbating resentment on both sides and prompting further such gestures and responses.4
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, is right to argue that the worst outcome for Asias long-term stability as well as for the AmericanChinese relationship would be a drift into escalating reciprocal demonization.5 Regrettably, this appears to be happening. A study by senior American and Chinese analysts Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi shows that such a cycle of distrust has deep roots in Sino-American history and has been intensifying since 2008.6 Given such feelings, it is, as Australian strategist Hugh White puts it, very difficult to accept an outcome to any contest, however minor, that can be portrayed as a defeat for one side or a win for the other, and thus it becomes almost impossible for either side to step off the escalator and start compromising.7 Various measures have been suggested to reverse this trend. Brzezinski proposes an informal G2, envisioning a comprehensive partnership, paralleling our relations with Europe and Japan that would involve personal in-depth discussions not just about our bilateral relations but about the world in general.8 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger calls for coevolution, a relationship in which the countries pursue vital domestic interests, cooperate where interests are shared and adjust policy to avoid conflict.9 White suggests accommodating Chinas regional influence by forming an Asian concert of powers comparable to the power-sharing arrangement

48 | Amitai Etzioni

in post-Napoleonic Europe. He argues that the United States, China, India and Japan should negotiate a new order on which Chinas authority and influence grow enough to satisfy the Chinese, and Americas role remains large enough to ensure that Chinas power is not misused.10 This would require China to acknowledge the legitimacy of the US presence in the Western Pacific, and the United States to allow its rival a sphere of influence that reflects regional realities. White acknowledges that reaching such a compromise would be politically difficult for leaders on both sides but may
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be possible given that the alternative could be a catastrophic war between nuclear powers.

Economic and diplomatic accommodation One may wonder what economic accommodations the United States could possibly make for China, given the widely held perception that the latter has the upper hand financially. Chinas economic success has led to demands that it allow its currency to freely adjust to market forces, liberalise access to its markets, show higher regard for intellectual property rights and curb industrial espionage. Nevertheless, the United States could respond to Chinas concern that its companies are often denied access to Western markets (an issue rarely discussed in the West). While some of these limitations stem from legitimate security concerns, the Chinese argue that their businesses routinely face a welter of federal, state and local regulations that hobble their efforts to invest or market products in the United States.11 Helping these businesses negotiate such regulations would be a
step towards accommodating China. Washington should also stop obstructing Chinese energy deals, as it did when the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Company made takeover bids for American firm Unocal in 200512 and Canadian firm Nexen in 2012. (While the Nexen bid was eventually approved, the process for the deal [was] more difficult than initially expected due in part to concerns raised by an influential US lawmaker.)13 China is eager for the United States to put its fiscal and monetary house in order. Washington does need to make adjustments to its financial policy but will do so in line with its internal needs, dynamics and timetable. Doing so will make the United States less dependent on Chinese financing of its

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debt and reduce concern about the trade imbalance between the countries. Washington can help Beijing secure the huge imports of energy and raw materials on which it relies by, firstly, reversing pressure on other nations to refrain from dealing with China bilaterally rather than through multilateral channels or groupings such as ASEAN. The United States should also continue to strongly support the resolution of territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas (largely driven by natural resources) through negotiation, arbitration, legal proceedings and other non-violent means, and
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discouraging all parties from escalating such disputes through acts such as the unilateral occupation of contested islands and features. Washington should welcome Chinas construction of transnational roads, railways and pipelines, as well as ports, in other countries. Despite claims by, among others, the Pentagons Office of Net Assessment and Robert Kaplan, there is every sign that ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan are intended as commercial hubs and are not currently configured for military use.14 Such accommodations would consolidate the United States credibility as a global power by putting it on a more sustainable course. This is crucial at a time when other nations have reason to doubt Washingtons commitment to international security (let alone the feasibility of it building major new weapons systems15) in the shadow of urgent domestic issues, such as deteriorating infrastructure and schools, and concern about excessive military spending.

Military strategy Careful military positioning is a crucial aspect of accommodating China, and involves combining strategic and symbolic changes in policy. Washington would be wise in the first instance to stop the frequent surveillance patrols of Chinese coastlines by US planes and ships, as suggested by Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.16 Such patrols are as
provocative to Beijing as regular Chinese patrols close to the US coast would be to Washington. Moreover, they produce little strategic added value above the intelligence gathered by satellite, cyber operations and human agents; their main utility would be tactical in the event of imminent hostilities. At best, they hint that the United States views itself as the guardian of

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the worlds oceans and, at worst, reflect an assertive and provocative attitude on the part of the US Navy, observable in off-the-record discussions. They also increase the risk of accidents that compound tensions between the countries, such as the April 2001 collision of a US EP-3 reconnaissance plane with a Chinese F-8 fighter, which left the latters pilot dead and caused the 11-day detention of 24 US crew members.17 More crucially, the United States should stop the forward positioning of military assets in the region, the formation of military alliances with Chinas
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neighbours and the conduct of joint exercises with nations

China perceives such acts as hostile encirclement

such as Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia and India. These military commitments have been extended since the Obama administrations announcement in 2011 of a pivot or rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific, which included the deployment of up to 2,500 marines to Australia (initially redeployed from Okinawa), an increase in the proportion of the US fleet stationed in the Pacific to 60%18 and the deployment of four of its new Littoral

Combat Ships to Singapore beginning in 2013.19 China perceives such acts as hostile encirclement. A new strategic concept, AirSea Battle, included in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, represents an intellectual pivot in the priority of US strategic thinking from land-based operations and strategies to air- and sea-based ones.20 This doctrine appears to mark a shift from a focus on combating insurgents and terrorist groups in the Near East to more conventional warfare in the Far East. While it is not ostensibly aimed at any particular country, it is clearly a response to an ascendant China.21 American strategists argue about whether the shift in strategy could lead the United States to impose a debilitating blockade on China or strike the mainland.22 One scenario would involve US forces launching long-range strikes against Chinese area-denial assets, prompting China to respond with every option available and leading inevitably to full-scale, even nuclear, war.23 Making preparations for an air-sea battle might make sense if the US government believes it cannot resolve its differences with China peacefully. But there is

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no evidence that such a conclusion is the product of careful strategic review. Only the failure of attempts to accommodate China could provide reasonable justification for such preparations for war. The departure of US forces from Iraq in 2011 and the impending drawdown in Afghanistan have left many East Asian states concerned that US commitments to defend them may not be honoured.24 They doubt the United States would engage in a war with China to prevent the integration of Taiwan with the mainland, or come to the aid of Japan in the event
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of a Sino-Japanese conflict over control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Washingtons treaties with many nations in the region are ambiguous, and agreements with countries such as Singapore and Indonesia provide no defence guarantees but simply promote strategic cooperation.25 The United States should re-examine the reasoning behind such commitments and its engagement in joint military exercises. If Washington in fact does not expect to be called on to honour its commitments, or to honour them if called, they may well be counterproductive. If they are not strategically useful (many of them, made in a different time, may now be obsolete), scaling them back could go some way to accommodate a China that perceives it is being deliberately encircled. Washington has also encouraged Japan to take on an increasing share of the costs of its defence, including increasing its military forces. This could, to be sure, help ease the burden on the Pentagon budget. But such encouragement is highly provocative, given Chinese memories of its treatment by Imperial Japanese forces in the Second World War and rising nationalism in Japan. If Washington were to abandon this policy, it would signal that the United States is committed to peaceful accommodation. The imminent threats to US security lie not in the Asia-Pacific but in the greater Middle East, and include the possibility of terrorist access to Pakistans nuclear weapons; Iranian aggression towards Saudi Arabia and Israel; the Talibans efforts to regain power in Afghanistan; and the resurgence of al-Qaeda and its affiliates in North Africa.26 Dealing with such threats calls for a different force structure than AirSea Battle, including greater roles for drones, special forces and covert operations. The United States should not re-pivot to this region because it would accommodate

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China, but if such a move is justified by US and allied security interests anyway, the opportunity to test a policy of accommodation would be a bonus. Abandoning its focus on the Pacific in favour of these more pressing concerns might allow the United States to test the accommodation of China as viable policy. (This need not to be formally announced. Budget cuts will justify reducing the number of US troops in Asia, which exceed 300,000, and, considering the situation in Syria and Iran, few would object to relocating naval vessels from Singapore to Naples.)
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New domains Current USChina tensions extend to outer space and cyberspace. Cyber capabilities are becoming dangerous on a strategic level. In 2012 US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned that the next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a cyber attack.27 Such military options are particularly alarming in that they greatly favour the nation that strikes first a dangerous and destabilising condition. It follows that the United States and its allies ought to seek ways to limit their proliferation. Some of Chinas emerging anti-access and area-denial capabilities involve these domains and are perceived in the United States as threats to the global commons.28 China, for its part, sees them as responses to US aggression. Under such circumstances, as Li Yan of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations put it, any potential investment by one side is probably viewed as new threats by the other side.29 In 2007 the Chinese successfully launched a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, an action the White House described as inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area.30 To be sure, both Washington and Beijing have acknowledged the need for co operative frameworks in both cyber and outer space. In May 2012, Panetta said that because the United States and China have developed technological capabilities in [cyberspace], its extremely important that we work together to develop ways to avoid any miscalculation or misperception that could lead to crisis.31 Working alongside Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in September 2011 China proposed an international code for the regulation of cyberspace.32 Washington, however, rejected the proposed code because it

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would limit the free flow of information on the World Wide Web and benefit authoritarian regimes seeking to stamp out dissent.33 In 2008 the United States rejected a draft UN treaty co-sponsored by China and Russia that would ban weapons in space. The White House said the treaty would be impossible to verify or enforce, and while Washington was open to discussions aimed at promoting transparency and confidence-building measures, it opposed efforts to prohibit or limit [its] access to or use of space.34 After the accidental collision of a defunct Russian satellite with a US communiDownloaded by [George Washington University] at 12:08 09 April 2013

cations satellite in 2009, the Pentagon stated that new rules are needed in space to enhance U.S. national security by encouraging responsible space behavior by reducing the risk of mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust.35 Observers such as David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders argue that, since disarmament in outer space or cyberspace is impractical and unverifiable, the way forward is for Washington and Beijing to exercise mutual restraint in the use of strategic offensive capabilities.36 In other words, both countries should pledge not to be the first to launch attacks against assets in outer space or cyber attacks against critical infrastructure. Such an understanding may be difficult to achieve, but it has a better chance in the context of a general policy of accommodation.

International law and the South China Sea Accommodating a rising regional power should never entail tolerating violations of international laws and norms. China should be expected to adhere to World Trade Organisation agreements and the United States should continue, as it has already done over tyre and steel disputes, to take appropriate action when it violates them. Washington should also continue to pressure Beijing to respect intellectual property rights. Above all, attempts to expand territorial control by military means should be considered gross violations of international law and beyond the limits of what can be accommodated. (It is too late, to be sure, to apply this rule to Tibet or, arguably, Taiwan, in light of the United States One China policy.37)
Beijings claims to islands and features in the South China Sea are not an inherent violation of international order; such positioning is a common bargaining tactic. Canada, Russia, Denmark and Norway, for example, have

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made overlapping claims to the North Pole and parts of the Arctic Ocean, and have conducted exploratory expeditions and military exercises in the region to strengthen their positions.38 Despite aggressive rhetoric from both China and its regional rivals, Beijings claims in the South China Sea may yet be resolved in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China has, moreover, recently exhibited a generally positive attitude towards international organisations and law. This is a marked improveDownloaded by [George Washington University] at 12:08 09 April 2013

ment on past decades, when, as legal scholars Jerome A. Cohen and Jon M. Van Dyke put it, Beijing rejected what it called the bourgeois rules and institutions that dominated the world community and silenced its international law experts.39 They note that China plays a responsible role in international maritime organisations, attempting to resolve its many disputes in accordance with at least its own understanding of international law. China also participated in the drafting of UNCLOS, ratifying it in 1996 (in contrast to the United States, which has yet to do so), and has joined regional organisations protecting

Washington is in a perilous position

maritime environments in East Asia. Other cooperative initiatives Beijing has participated in include an agreement with Vietnam over their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin, dividing the disputed territory equally, and the development of a joint hydrocarbon project in waterways disputed with Japan (though this enterprise did not make it past the initial stages).40 China also peacefully settled a decades-old border dispute with Russia in 2004, renouncing its claim to large swathes of Siberia that had been annexed by the tsars in the nineteenth century.41 But there is a possibility that China will attempt to settle its territorial disputes by force, as it did when the PLA ejected Vietnamese forces from the Paracel Islands in 1974.42 Acts such as the dispatch of patrol ships to the Senkakus/Diaoyus (in the wake of the Japanese governments purchase of three of the islands from their private owner) to show its undisputable sovereignty over them come close to crossing a dangerous line.43 Is the territory Beijing disputes in the East and South China Seas worth the risk of creating a conflict that could wreak havoc on the global economy and even involve

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nuclear weapons? While Senkakus/Diaoyus are currently controlled by the Japanese and their protection seems to be covered by Japans defence treaty with the United States, there is historical evidence supporting Chinas claim. This ambiguity puts Washington in a perilous position, and it needs to either find a way to clarify the legal status of the islands or facilitate a long-term negotiated solution between the two sides. If it cannot, it may have to choose between ignoring military action that flouts international law (and damaging the credibility of its defence commitments) or going to
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war over a handful of small, uninhabited islands.

* * *

For many, the idea of cooperating with a regime that routinely violates human rights runs, as White puts it, counter to their deeply held convictions about the ways values should underpin foreign policy.44 Such commentators should note that accommodation does not preclude the promotion of human rights and democracy through education and cultural exchange programmes. It does, to be sure, militate against the notion of attempting to instigate regime change in China. Even were the United States to succeed in such an attempt, there is no guarantee that a liberal democracy would rise out of the ashes, as shown by recent interventions in the Middle East. But the promotion of liberal democracy through non-violent means would not be hindered by a policy of accommodation. Avoiding the use of force across borders is one of the major foundations of global order (with the noted exceptions of breaching territorial sovereignty to prevent genocide or, arguably, the spread of nuclear arms).45 Abiding by this principle should be considered the litmus test of a states conduct. But it is unreasonable to deny a nation the status of responsible member of the international community for insufficiently contributing to peacekeeping forces or humanitarian aid efforts, or for seeking to secure favourable terms of trade.46 One should distinguish between law-abiding members of the international community and those who voluntarily do more than required. Countries that otherwise abide by international law should not be coerced by other states, though nations that voluntarily take on such roles should

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be applauded. As a primarily regional power, Chinas adherence to international law to the extent it exists should be basis enough for a policy of accommodation. A considerable array of options are available to the United States and its allies to avoid a collision with China. But the West must first acknowledge that there is currently no reason to contain or balance China, as it has few, if any, global ambitions or capabilities. The West should also allow China to gain regional influence commensurate with its growing
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power, as long as such expansion does not violate the precepts of global order. The West should follow what might be called, lacking a better term, a multi-track approach. A red light that warns against the use of force by China to change the status quo; a yellow light for tolerating its increased influence in the region, and a green light for Chinas drive to secure the flow of energy and raw materials it needs. Such an approach may provide substantive content to the new type of great power relationship47 China says it seeks.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Ashley McKinless for providing research assistance for this essay, and Weiming Tu, Charles Glaser and the participants of the Beijing Forum for valuable discussions on USChina relations.

Notes
1

Zheng Bijian, Chinas Peaceful Rise to Great-Power Status, Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5, SeptemberOctober 2005, pp. 1824. 2 M. Taylor Fravel, Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining Chinas Compromises in Territorial Disputes, International Security, vol. 30, no. 2, Fall 2005, p. 46; Malcolm Turnbull, Power Shift: High Whites The China Choice, The Monthly, August 2012, http://www.themonthly.com.au/

hugh-white-s-china-choice-powershift-malcolm-turnbull-5847. 3 See John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). 4 Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Champaign-Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962) and Amitai Etzioni, The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

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5

10 11

12

Zbigniew Brzezinski, How To Stay Friends With China, New York Times, 2 January 2011, http://www.nytimes. com/2011/01/03/opinion/03brzezinski. html Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.China Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series, no. 4 (Washington DC: Brookings, March 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/~/ media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30 us china lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf. Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2012), pp. 11819. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Group of Two that could Change the World, Financial Times, 13 January 2009, http:// www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d99369b8e178-11dd-afa0-0000779fd2ac. html#axzz2AzHiT8ac. Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Group, 2011); Michiko Kakutani, An Insider Views China, Past and Future, New York Times, 9 May 2011, http://www.nytimes. com/2011/05/10/books/on-china-byhenry-kissinger-review.html. White, The China Choice. Shahien Nasiripour and Paul Taylor, Huawei and ZTE face Congressional Grilling, Financial Times, 14 September 2012, http://www.ft.com/ intl/cms/s/0/3656bf26-fdc5-11e1-990100144feabdc0.html#axzz2C2QZmU6b. David Barboza, China Backs Away from Unocal Bid, New York Times, 3 August 2005, http://www. nytimes.com/2005/08/02/business/ worldbusiness/02iht-unocal.html.

13

Senator Urges U.S. To Block Chinas Nexen Deal, CBC News, 27 July 2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/ story/2012/07/27/nexen-cnooc-us. html; David Ljuggren, SIS Warning on China Security Threat dogged CNOOCNexen Debate in Canada, Financial Post, 24 December 2012, http://business.financialpost.com /2012/12/24/csis-warning-on-chinasecurity-threat-dogged-cnoocnexen-debate-in-canada/?__lsa=d9317957. 14 See China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes, Washington Times, 17 January 2005, http://www.washingtontimes. com/news/2005/jan/17/20050117115550-1929r/; Robert D. Kaplan, Chinas Port in Pakistan?, Foreign Policy, 27 May 2011, http://www. foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/27/ chinas_port_in_pakistan; Robert D. Kaplan, Center Stage for the 21st Century, Foreign Affairs, MarchApril 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/64832/robert-d-kaplan/ center-stage-for-the-21st-century; Ashley S. Townshend, Unraveling Chinas String of Pearls, YaleGlobal Online, 16 September 2011, http:// yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/ unraveling-chinas-string-pearls. 15 Tim Huxley, Response to PacNet #35 US 1, China 0, Center for Strategic and International Studies: Pacific Forum, 12 June 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1235R.pdf. 16 Bonnie S. Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea, Council on Foreign Relations Contingency Planning Memorandum, no. 14 (New York: CFR, April 2012), http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/ armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883.

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17

18

19

20

21

22

Shirley A. Kan, ChinaU.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications, CRS Report RL30946, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 October 2001), available at http:// www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946. pdf. Matt Siegel, As Part of Pact, U.S. Marines Arrive in Australia, in Chinas Strategic Backyard, New York Times, 4 April 2012, http://www.nytimes. com/2012/04/05/world/asia/usmarines-arrive-darwin-australia.html. Agreement Calls for 4 U.S. Littoral Combat Ships to Rotate Through Singapore, Defense News, 2 June 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120602/DEFREG03/306020001/ Agreement-Calls-4-U-S-LittoralCombat-Ships-Rotate-ThroughSingapore. The China Syndrome, Economist, 9 June 2012, http://www.economist. com/node/21556587. US Department of Defense, Background Briefing on AirSea Battle by Defense Officials from the Pentagon, transcript, 9 November 2011, http://www. defense.gov/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=4923. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Asymmetric Warfare, American Style, Proceeding Magazine, vol. 138, no. 4, April 2012, http://www.usni.org/ magazines/proceedings/2012-04/asymmetric-warfare-american-style; Geoff Dyer, US Strategic Battle Guidelines under Attack, Financial Times, 31 May 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/ cms/s/0/5e476ed4-ab38-11e1-a2ed00144feabdc0.html#axzz2KDpUo8DB.

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, Barry Watts and Robert Work, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2003); White, The China Choice, p. 74. Tim Huxley, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic StudiesAsia, told a Taiwanese newspaper that I dont think countries in the region will ever be convinced [by the pivot] because everybody knows the US is a declining power in relative terms. Quoted in Ralph A. Cossa, US 1, China 0, PacNet Newsletter, no. 35, 6 June 2012. Bruce Vaughn, U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region, CRS Report no. RL33821 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 22 January 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/row/RL33821.pdf. Amitai Etzioni, Hot Spots: American Foreign Policy in a Post-Human Rights World (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012). David E. Sanger, Mutually Assured Cyberdestruction?, New York Times, 2 June 2012, http://www.nytimes. com/2012/06/03/sunday-review/mutually-assured-cyberdestruction.html. The Dragons New Teeth: A Rare Look inside the Worlds Biggest Military Expansion, Economist, 7 April 2012, http://www.economist.com/ node/21552193. Li Yan, Securing the Global Commons, a New Foundation for the Sino-US Relationship, ChinaUS Focus, 19 March 2012, http://www. chinausfocus.com/peace-security/ securing-the-global-commonsa-new-

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foundation-for-the-sino-us-relationship/. Shirley Kan, Chinas Anti-Satellite Weapon Test, CRS Report no. RS22652 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 23 April 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ row/RS22652.pdf. Cheryl Pellerin, U.S., China Must Work Together on Cyber, Panetta Says, American Forces Press Service, 7 May 2012, http://www.defense.gov/ news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116235. China, Russia and Other Countries Submit the Document of International Code of Conduct for Information Security to the United Nations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 13 September 2011, http://www.fmprc. gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t858978.htm. Adam Segal, China and Information vs. Cyber Security, Asia Unbound, CFR blog, 15 September 2012, http:// blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/09/15/chinaand-information-vs-cybersecurity/. Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Weighs a Ban on Weapons in Space, but U.S. Still Objects, New York Times, 13 February 2008, http://www.nytimes. com/2008/02/13/world/europe/13arms. html. Lisa Daniel, Defense, State Agree to Pursue Conduct Code for Outer Space, US Department of Defense, 18 January 2012, http://www.defense. gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66833. David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2011).

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US Department of State, U.S. Relations With Taiwan, updated 20 August 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm. In 2010, Russia and Norway were able to peacefully settle their 40-year maritime border dispute, splitting the contested area equally and allowing for new gas and oil exploration. The Kremlin told a Russian news agency this is a practical illustration of the principle that all disputes in the Arctic must be tackled by the Arctic nations themselves by way of talks and on the basis of international law. Luke Harding, Russia and Norway Resolve Arctic Border Dispute, Guardian, 15 September 2010, http://www. guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/15/ russia-norway-arctic-border-dispute. Jerome A. Cohen and Jon M. Van Dyke, Finding its Sea Legs, South China Morning Post, 22 October 2010. Ibid. See also David Shambaugh, Return to the Middle Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-first Century, in David Shambaugh (ed.), Power Shift (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), p. 24. Malcolm Turnbull, Power Shift: Hugh Whites The China Choice, The Monthly, August 2012, http:// www.themonthly.com.au/ hugh-white-s-china-choice-powershift-malcolm-turnbull-5847. The Bully of the South China Sea, Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008 723963904435374045775789535758912 64.html. Chico Harlan and Jia Lynn Yang, China Sends Patrol Ships to Contested Islands after Japan Buys

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Them, Washington Post, 11 September 2011, http://www.washingtonpost. com/world/china-sends-patrol-boatsto-contested-islands-chinese-statemedia-says/2012/09/11/83f491bafbf2-11e1-8adc-499661afe377_story. html. The Japanese move was in fact intended to pre-empt the intentionally provocative purchase of the islands by the far-right governor of Tokyo. 44 White, The China Choice, p. 166. 45 Amitai Etzioni, Point of Order, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 6, NovemberDecember 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136548/ amitai-etzioni-g-john-ikenberry/ point-of-order.

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See Robert Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?, Remarks to National Committee on USChina Relations, New York City, 21 September 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/ former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. For response, see Amitai Etzioni, Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?, International Affairs, vol. 87, no. 3, May 2011, pp. 53993. 47 Michael S. Chase, Chinas Search for a New Type of Great Power Relationship, China Brief, vol. 12, no. 17, 7 September 2012, available at http://www.jamestown.org/ single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_ news]=39820.