The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century Author(s): Martha Crenshaw Reviewed work(s): Source: Political

Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 405-420 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791798 . Accessed: 30/11/2012 16:14
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Vol.21,No. 2, 2000 PoliticalPsychology,

The Psychology ofTerrorism: An Agendaforthe21stCentury

Martha Crenshaw ofGovernment Department Wesleyan University

which Researchon politicalterrorism, began in theearly1970s,faces somepersistent Theseinvolve the data,building integrative problems. defining concept, collecting empirical " or "irrationality. andavoiding the attribution topersonality disorders theory, ofterrorism Furthermore, analysis risksbeing drivenby eventsor the concernsof policymakers. itis generally that must take Nevertheless, accepted psychological ofterrorism explanations the levels into the individual to and to account, ofanalysis society. multiple linking group Futureresearchshouldcritically examinetheassumption thata "new terrorism" has should also takeadvantage Analysts of30 yearsof appearedat theendofthe20thcentury. todevelop studies and developmental that looknotonly at thecauses history comparisons in terrorism but at terrorist the termination terrorist changes of of strategy, campaigns, andpolicyeffectiveness. government decision-making,
KEY WORDS: terrorism, research, public policy.

of research on political terrorism is mixed.Despiteprogress in The record an model links that and levels societal individual, developing explanatory group, ofanalysis, someissuesarepersistently troublesome. involve Enduring questions thedefinition of terrorism, theuse of research forpublicpolicypurposes, the collection ofempirical the of attribution terrorism to or disorders data, personality "irrational" the need for and cumulative and the thinking, integrative theory, event-driven character of muchresearch. is apparent in all of Although progress these more work to In needs be done. on research terrorism hasnot areas, addition, considered the of recent claims that a "new" terrorism has yetfully implications it is However, developedin recent yearsand will prevailin the nearfuture. tonote more ofhistorical that than 30 years with terrorism encouraging experience for has openedinteresting and depossibilities research programs. Comparisons howpatterns studies cananalyze ofterrorism havechanged overtime, velopmental
405
0162-895X? 2000 International of Political Society Psychology Published 350 Main Street, OX4 1JF, UK. MaIden,MA 02148, USA, and 108 CowleyRoad,Oxford, by BlackwellPublishers,

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of terrorism come to an end,government how campaigns decision-making proofdifferent counterterrorist cesses,andtheeffectiveness options. policy Persistent Issues In 1990,a volume on thepsychology ofterrorism concluded with twoessays ontheopportunities for andlimitations onfuture research 1990;Reich, (Crenshaw, then remain on today's research 1990).Manyoftheissuesnoted agenda, although in thepolitical there havebeensubstantial environment forthestudy of changes terrorism andin thedepth ofknowledge acquired. of defining The problem terrorism has hindered sincetheinception analysis ofstudies ofterrorism intheearly1970s.One setofproblems is duetothefact that theconcept is deeply ofterrorism contested. Theuse oftheterm is often polemical andrhetorical. Itcanbe a pejorative tocondemn an opponent's cause label,meant as illegitimate rather thandescribe behavior. if even the is term used Moreover, as an it is still difficult to a arrive at tool, objectively analytical satisfactory definition that terrorism from other violent In principle, distinguishes phenomena. is deliberate terrorism and systematic violenceperformed of by smallnumbers communal whereas violence is and mass people, spontaneous, sporadic, requires Thepurpose ofterrorism is tointimidate a watching audience participation. popular a whereas is the of elimination entire communities. byharming only few, genocide is meant Terrorism tohurt, nottodestroy. Terrorism is preeminently and political whereas warfare is a "terror" from symbolic, guerrilla military activity. Repressive aboveis theaction ofthose inpower, whereas terrorism is a clandestine resistance to authority. Yet inpractice, events cannot alwaysbe precisely categorized. evenwithin theterms ofthis thepractice ofterrorism Furthermore, definition, is highly diverse. The conceptual of "terrorism" a wide category encompasses of phenomena, fromkidnappings of individuals variety ranging (in orderto to accede to specific to indiscriminate pressure governments demands) political of high-profile Terrorism occursin mass-casualty bombings symbolic targets. cultural coercion and widelydifferent settings. Non-governments maypractice in areasunder their control. Statesmaysponsor violence repression surreptitious thecivilian oftheir enemies. eventhough thescope Moreover, against populations of theterm is already are tempted to stretch theconcept even broad,observers One often further. seesreferences tocrime, and"cyberterrorism," "narcoterrorism," forexample, notto mention "ecoterrorism" or cultural, or nutritional olfactory, terrorism. In addition, is a deeply terrorism contested Its use tends tobe concept. and subjective. It is a pejorative label as muchas an analytical politicized tool, inpopular discourse. especially Theseconceptual confusions remain after more than 25 years ofresearch, but theideological contentiousness oftheterm hasdiminished with theendofthe Cold War.The disappearance oftheleft-wing andanti-imperialist moverevolutionary ments that much of the and nationalist terrorism of the 1970s inspired ideological

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andearly 1980shasledtoa change oftone. in 1999, the heated Nevertheless, public debateoverPresident Clinton'soffer of clemency to Puerto Rican nationalists sentences a pro-independence foractions associated with terrorist serving prison demonstrates that the term still carries emotional of campaign weight. Perceptions therightness of themeansare altered about the of the byjudgments legitimacy cause. A secondissue from thepossibleuses of psychological thepast concerns research on terrorism. counterterrorism is a majorconcern of governObviously thecontemporary American which has at least30 ments, especially government, different bureaucracies with theissue,including notonlyintelligence and dealing law enforcement buttheDepartments ofHealth andHuman Services and agencies In the1990sterrorism Defense. cametobe seenas a major national threat security and thusa subjectof intense In 1998,forexample, interest. President Clinton a NationalCoordinator forSecurity, and Infrastructure, Protection, appointed Counterterrorism. Alexander thegap" to George(1993) has calledfor"bridging aboutclosercollaboration between academics andpolicymakers inthefield bring offoreign buthe also cautioned that thetaskoftheacademic is todiagnose affairs, rather thanprescribe solutions. The scholarshouldproduce"generic problems rather thanspecific recommendations. Before theend of the knowledge" policy Cold War,academicswerelikelyto be extremely sensitive to potential ethical dilemmas causedbygovernment use oftheir eveniftheir contributions research, werelimited todiagnosis rather than with thedevelopment However, prescription. ofa post-Cold WarAmerican aimed at rather foreign policy spreading democracy than and with the of from terrorism the radical communism, containing emergence intheUnited scholars less apprehensive abouttheusesoftheir States, right appear of terrorism. Concern with terrorism is no seen as fundamentally knowledge longer illiberal orreactionary see Zulaika & (but Douglass,1996). One sourceof tension, is some policymakers' insistence on the however, of a fixed and "terrorist a list of characteristics possibility unambiguous profile," that identification of actualor potential terrorists. This debateis closely permit related totheissueofpersonality theories ofterrorism andparticularly totheidea thatthereis a specific of terrorism. Silke (1998) deplored a psychopathology at a distance" to see terrorists as motivated "diagnosis tendency by personality disorders suchas narcissism or paranoia.He suggested thatalthough mostobservers thethesis of"blatant" there remains a pervasive reject abnormality, perceptionthat terrorists areabnormal in moresubtle ways.SilkecitedPost(1990) and Pearlstein ofsuchattempts todistinguish terrorists (1991) as examples psychologithegeneral forexample, concluded that"the Pearlstein, cally from population. individual whobecomesand remains a political terrorist to be generally appears moldedby certain narcissistic disturbances" psychologically (1991, personality that this trend is a result ofattribution biasandthat p. ix). Silkeargued misleading ithas donelittle but"taint terrorism with a pathology aura"(1998,p. 67).

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ofa distinctive orpsychopathology A related issueis thequestion psychology ofwomen in terrorism. included female terrorists as Pearlstein (1991) participants in cases his For he that Ulrike a Meinhof, prominent analysis. example, argued of the German Red suffered numerous traumatic member Faction, Army founding eventsin her life thatdamagedher self-esteem and led to an obsessionwith Profound narcissistic failure tolive and belonging approval. disappointment-her to the standards of behavior her ideal-led her to a terrorist required by ego up intheWeathermen, twowomen activists Pearlstein (1991) also analyzed identity. In bothcases, he identified childhood Susan Sternand Diana Oughton. and that led to low adolescent self-esteem. Radical action psychic injuries political suchas the ofa newpositive rewards, provided powerful psychological acquisition identity. in an analysis inJapanese ofwomen terrorist SteinHowever, organizations, hoff noted that the and alike tend to attribute mental (1996) public psychiatrists illness tofemale whostand as "thenegative women terrorists, imageofeverything are notsupposed to be" (p. 319). She citedtheexample ofHiroka Nagataofthe UnitedRed Armyand the notoriously within the bloodypurgethatoccurred inthespring ranks of 1972.Whereas themaleleader ofthepurging organization's faction wasdescribed andpsychiatrists as aninstrumentally motivated bythepress whohad merely thefemale leader(Nagata)was saidto be miscalculated, person and mentally unbalanced. Steinpurely emotional-spiteful, jealous, menacing, hoffquoted thejudge's trialopinion:"[Nagata] has a flourishing desirefor and alongwithan emotional, she is suspiself-exposure aggressive personality, cious andjealous,and to theseareaddedthefemale characteristics of obstinacy, and cruelsadism;sheharbors a variety in hertemperaofproblems spitefulness, ment" (1996,p. 311). De CataldoNeuberger andValentini that female terrorism (1996) suggested is linked tochildhood from an father maladjustment resulting unfeeling, tyrannical and a weakmother. Theirfindings, basedon interviews with female terrorists in indicate that in in women results a adolescent Italy, greater passivity longer identification than that needto bondwith their period experienced byboys;girls mothers for an extended of in time order to and this period develop adapt.During occur that later lead to into terrorist stage,developmental problems may entry Such maladjusted who identify with their weakmothers, are more groups. girls, inclined toengagein splitting, in their bifurcated view of the and, world, compassionandtolerance ofothers arelost.Youngwomen then shift their identifications outsidethefamily and searchfora "weak person" to love and save. Theyare, to the of a terrorist that the consequently, susceptible appeals organization pursues destruction ofthestrong whooppress theweak.The female terrorist thus demonstrates herfather's as wellas thesacrificial attitude ofthemother. strength These authors also suggested thata "maternal-sacrificial code" is highly in women because of their childhood thepatriarchal developed development, ofsociety, andtheir toprotect andsacrifice for their pressures genetic disposition

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children & Valentini, 1996,pp. 78-81). This "feminine (de CataldoNeuberger women inaccordance to their with 'wayofliving' experience develop " predisposes forothers. This maternal code is apparently the"something sacrifice and caring extra" that female terrorists more tosacrifice their livesinthename makes willing ofthegroup. mostanalysts ofterrorism do notthink that factors Nevertheless, personality nordo they see significant account for terrorist differences. One behavior, gender is of thebasic research of the field that terrorism is a findings primarily group It is typically nottheresult of psychopathology or a singlepersonality activity. Shared andgroup commitment aremuch more type. solidarity ideological importantdeterminants of terrorist behavior thanindividual characteristics. After an extensive reviewof the literature, Ross (1994) concludedthatpsychological ofterrorism werestill buthesuggested anintegrated immature, explanations theory in which whoarepredisposed individuals to engagein terrorism due to developmental findcertain factors needs satisfied For byjoiningunderground groups. andBraungart that thedevelopmental (1992) concluded example, Braungart processes of youth theWeathermen better thanindividual explained psychological attributes. Once inthegroup, socialization andlearning further experiences shape thebehavior ofterrorists. with rival andthe constituents, Theyalso interact groups, on group identi1990,whofocused government they oppose.(See also Sprinzak, fication must be seen as an interactive and dynamic Thus,terrorism processes.) as Rabbie(1991) effectively inproposing a preliminary process, argued descriptive modelthat links andsocietal levelsofanalysis. individual, group, Della Porta(1992, 1995a,1995b)also proposed a more framework complex that links individual lifehistories topolitical andsocialenvironments. Shefocused on individual ofexternal perceptions opportunities presented bytheenvironment. In this thecritical She also noted the approach, stepis thechoiceofclandestinity. of individual commitment to underground a commitpersistence organizations, ment that is bestexplained identification with thegroup. Commitment byintense is also motivated Individuals seekto maintain by ego-involvement. self-respect, thesupport ofthepeergroup, and thesenseofbelonging that is heightened bya senseofshared risk. Della Porta's research showsnotonly that individual motivationsand structural conditions must be analyzed butalso that theinditogether, viduals in questionpossessed well-established identities and had political socialization into the use of violence. Their commitment to experienced prior terrorism wasthe result ofa gradual not a sudden In conversion. process, particular, theimageof a violent stateand participation in semi-legal theyshared protest movements. see also Passerini, movements, (On Italian 1992.) Bandura totheanalysis ofindividual behav(1990) tooka different approach ior.He argued that terrorism was theresult ofa "principled resort todestructiveness"(p. 191)rather than unrestrained a factor that impulse, psychological analyses of violence he had ignored. thepsychological Consequently, examined processes individuals candisengage the internal mechanisms that bywhich regulatory usually

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three ofdevelopment in the He identified violence. serveto restrain major points when conduct can be reconstrued as justifireprehensible self-regulatory process: minimized or distorted, and the victim blamedor effects able, its detrimental In terms ofcausalagency, he also noted a tendency todisplacerespondevalued. or diffuse it within the the onto enemy group. sibility research a mature As Ross andRabbieboth noted, empirical program requires It is notenough theories. to propose of integrative simply psychological testing ofextensive ofterrorism stilllacksthefoundation The study primary hypotheses. interrorism. Far andlifehistories ofindividuals databasedon interviews engaged or arederived from arebasedon speculation toooften, hypotheses psychological cannotbe considered reliable of cases thatthe findings such a small number sourcesto analyzenine used mostly 1991,forexample, (Pearlstein, secondary theworks ofsociologists However, (2000) anddella individuals). Juergensmeyer that it is that demonstrate Porta(1992, 1995a, 1995b)arenoteworthy exceptions ofclandestine information aboutthesources notimpossible toacquire meaningful for Italianand German violence.Della Porta's studiesof left-wing terrorists, collection of lifehistories, and are based on an extensive biographies, example, autobiographies. of terrorism often focuson the ways in which Studiesof thepsychology and misperceptions limit or boundrationality beliefs (e.g.,Crenshaw, particular toremember that terrorism hasan autonomous 1992).Yet itis important logicthat are typically however unconventional. These beliefsystems is comprehensible, than be acute. itisessential derivative rather However, original. may Misperception on their ofpractitioners ofterrorism to understand theideologies or worldviews them from ownterms, andnottoexclude because "irrational" they analysis appear in a conventional sense(see Reich,1990).Forexample, (1990, 1991, Sprinzak's of focuses on the of 1995)theory split delegitimization directly images theenemy He argued heldby terrorists. that certain are thebelief around groups organized and thusnothuman. that theenemy is illegitimate Violenceandterrorism result whenthegroup feelsthreatened. thattheconditions thatpromote (1990) also stressed Sprinzak ideological the terrorism from left in arenotidentical tothe terrorism, democracies, especially causesofprotest orunconventional in behavior political general. Extraparliamenactionis an accepted Terrorism tary political partof thedemocratic repertoire. the of an harsh disillusionment requires perception unjustly government, profound withtheexisting and theavailability of appropriate external rolemodels. order, Mostradicals do notbecometerrorists. modelwas thecritical focus ofa collection ofcomparaSprinzak's analytical tive case studies ofright-wing terrorism claims tobe the first 1995),which (BjOrgo, of itskind.Thisrelatively in right-wing recent interest terrorism the exemplifies of terrorism studies to be event-driven. In the 1970sand early1980s, tendency terrorism associatedwiththefarleftor nationalist resistance was thecenter of attention. In thelate 1980sand 1990s,interest interrorism from theextreme right

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attracted notice. In theUnited concern intensified as a result of the1995 States, and the activities Oklahoma of the and Christian militia, survivalist, City bombing in Jewish terrorism movements Barkun, 1995, (see 1996). Internationally, Identity in violence also drew attention. This Israelandright-wing anti-immigrant Europe from and political focuson current whileunderstandable events, psychological from studies that focus on of can distract researchers historical view, points over time. This reactive has also tended somewhat to disquality developments which is seenas trendy andfashionable. credit thestudy ofterrorism, A "New" Terrorism? theprospect ofterrorism from theright hadbeenneglected, Although analysts couldbuildon a preexisting framework ofresearch on right-wing movements and not The was as unfamiliar, ideologies. phenomenon perceived entirely although to be growing morevirulent anddestructive. violenceseemed However, far-right the ofwhois a terrorist haslately taken ona newdimension. Several recent question works focuson a "new"terrorism that is motivated belief and is more byreligious and than the older and more instrumental forms of fanatical, deadly, pervasive terrorism theworld hadgrown accustomed to(e.g.,Laqueur, This 1999). emerging is thought to differ from the"old" terrorism in terms of goals, "new" terrorism andorganization methods, (see Hoffman, 1999). The comparison as follows. Whereas the"old" terrorists goes roughly sought short-term national orsecession, the revolution, liberation, political power through "new"terrorists seekto transform theworld. Motivated byreligious imperatives, arethought to lackan earthly andthus to feelaccountable they constituency only to a deityor to some transcendental or mystical idea. Conventional left-right are not applicable.Because theydo not wantpopular ideologicaldistinctions to claimpubliccredit fortheir actions.Also, "new" support, theyare unlikely terrorists arethought tobe moreinclined to use highly lethal methods in order to animpure world andbring about theapocalypse. Thestrategies ofthe "old" destroy terrorists werediscriminating; terrorism was a form ofcommunicating a specific toan audience. Results wereanticipated inthe here andnow.Inthe"new" message unlimited endslead to unlimited means. Thusthe"new"terrorists seek terrorism, to cause highnumbers of casualtiesand are willingto commit suicideor use ofmassdestruction inorder todo so. Finally, whereas traditional militants weapons werelinked in tight, structured the of the centralized, conspiracies, organization "new" terrorists is decentralized and diffuse. Adherents are united common by or inspiration rather thanby direct withother experience personalinteraction members of the groupand its leaders.Institutions and organizations are less than beliefs. important One empirical sourceoftheconception of a "new"terrorism is radical right in the United States. The shock of the 1995 Oklahoma violence, particularly City the unknown world ofthe militia movement tointernational bombing brought largely

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is a ina generic that belief Barkun attention. (1996) has argued theory conspiracy world ofAmerican radical inthediffuse andsplintered common denominator right what newinAmerican beliefs arenot suchconspiratorial politics, Although groups. with and the ease framework is its the doctrinal 1990s specificity distinguishes The also whichit can be givena religious (see 1995). Kaplan, interpretation "New cabal is a not that a believes only promotingtyrannical conspiratorial right itis closetovictory, United Nations but that the direction ofthe World Order" under The violent encounters at RubyRidge defense. an immediate thusnecessitating sinister as confirmation of the are and Waco (1992) (1993) interpreted conspiracy's anintense senseofmartyrdom. Thesebelief alsodrive intent. Theincidents systems Order" is often the"New World contain elements; depicted religious apocalyptic of the Antichrist. as the creation right groupsand leadersare Many extreme beliefs secular andreligious movement. with theChristian affiliated Thus, Identity that visions. The fact and reinforcing two intersecting constitute conspiratorial makes all of them established institutions ideas are these society only rejected by are validated their to conspiratorialists; themorecredible (It by rejection. they in Europe, has also occurred from theradical be noted that violence should right it tends to lack theapocalyptic violenceagainst However, foreigners. especially to remember, of theAmerican It is important overtones subculture.) religious is the only act of mass-casualty thatthe OklahomaCity bombing however, extreme terrorism bytheAmerican right. perpetrated Anearlier violent oftheconception ofa "new" andmore historical antecedent intheMiddleEastthat terrorism is linked to terrorism is anti-Western originating from or"fundamentalist" Islam.Thisconcern dates the1980sandterrorism radical inLebanon. Inthe1990s, attributed totheShi'iteHezbollah faction terrorism using from inIsrael, anddiscourse ofIslamsprang HamasandIslamic Jihad therhetoric inAlgeria, inEgypt, the Armed Islamic andmost theIslamic Group Group recently suchas theSudanandAfghanistan theOsama Bin Ladinnetwork. Governments Alarm overtheemergence ofradical Islam(which is seemed to support thetrend. washeightened offactors: a smallminority oftheMuslim world) bya combination inLebanon theresort to suicide andIsrael(see Merari, 1990),a general bombings toinflict masscivilian andanti-American andanti-Western casualties, willingness in 1993as wellas the Thebombing oftheWorld TradeCenter targeting patterns. of in the American embassies and Tanzania in 1998 further Kenya bombings increased theAmerican senseofvulnerability. ofreligious Ofcourse, thegeneral terrorism is notrestricted toIslam, concept is in the popularpress.It includesJewish, howevercommonthe association inthe1980s andSikhfaiths as well,all ofwhich haveinspired terrorism Christian, For and 1990s(see Juergensmeyer, 1991,2000). instance, (2000) Juergensmeyer a cultural toexplaining violence, Christian, approach religious employs comparing SikhandBuddhist activists whoeither useorespouseviolence. Muslim, Focusing on their shared worldviews ormindsets, common finds of Juergensmeyer patterns ofcosmic andjustification. An image for imagery givesmeaning struggle, example,

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thatare marginalized movements in of deprivation and militant to experiences terms ofmainstream religion. the1995 sarin of anxiety aboutreligious thisbackground terrorism, Against Aum cult was on the attack the by Shinrikyo exceptionally Tokyosubways gas tobring ofcatastrophic terrorism intended about Itbolstered alarming. anticipation theprospect ofreligious cults as terrorist theapocalypse. Italso introduced actors, Lifton as opposedto movements that linked nationalism andreligion. Robert Jay of link between cults and the use of concluded that the (1999) religious weapons of terrorism and escalation to unprecedented massdestruction indicated a future of fanaticism a and theultimate fearsome levels.Withthecombination weapon, theliterature. threshold was crossed. Thisanticipation nowpervades Since 1995, Inthe ofthe for such"WMD" terrorism haveproliferated. absence studies potential on on possiblemotivations, moststudies focusinstead of concrete information and & Newman, Thayer, 1998; Laqueur, (see Falkenrath, opportunity capability hasbecomenear 1999;Stern, circles, 1999).In government anticipation certainty. evidenceexiststo support theprediction that Whatpsychological religious terrorists willseektocausecatastrophic destruction, using biological, particularly ornuclear means? So far theonlyexplicitly chemical, radiological, psychological ofLifton is that arebasedprimarily on interviews (1999),whosefindings analysis with lowerlevelmembers of AumShinrikyo as wellas pressandother observer accounts. The members of Aumtended to be peoplewhohad longsearched for ofa NewAge sort. beenrestless commitment, spiritual particularly Theyhadoften members ofother not Thebelief ofthegroup activists. cults, fringe political system was wildly to thepoint ofincoherence. was Lifton's eclectic, Although approach he interpreted in terms theircommitment of social basicallypsychoanalytic, within thecultand theleader'scharismatic Once in the relationships authority. tothe obedience charismatic leader became and (ShokoAsahara) group, obligatory If obedience absolute. was notvoluntary, it was coerced.Lifton Aum compared to other suchas Heaven'sGate,theBranch cults, Davidians, Shinrikyo religious and thePeople's Templein Jonestown, all of whichalso turned to whatLifton called"revolutionary suicide." Yet Lifton concluded that eventhough Aum'swas thestrangest and mostbizarre behavior he had everstudied, stilltheculthad a ordinariness" ofmost prosaicside (1999,p. 341). He was struck bythe"familiar ofitsmembers andtheir life. everyday The emphasis on a "new"terrorism a number of issues.Is theAum suggests cult of a of terrorists about whom about Shinrikyo typical genre generalizations motivation can be offered? Is it reallyrepresentative of the"new"terrorism, as Lifton andmany others Or is it in unusual terms of resources, suggest? leadership, andhistorical andsocialcontext? It does notfit the"new"terrorism criterion ofa decentralized and cult the was a an not movement, legal organization, illegal underground. within the ofthe"new"terrorism, evenifa common motivation Thus, category is assumed, different structures arepresent. Whatimpact willthey organizational

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radical thatin poorlyorganized have on behavior? (1995) suggested Sprinzak characteristics of the "new" the terrorism, (parsubcultures, epitome personality But factors. than becomemore ofleaders) those sociopolitical important ticularly a over decentralized toexert leader for a charismatic is itpossible group, authority Charismatic leadersand followers? between contact in theabsenceof personal of closedorganizamorecharacteristic in Aum,is probably as found leadership, from clandestine on data are based Mostpastresearch tions. undergrounds: findings whosemembers with each other, in competition aretypically that closedgroups feelintense andpeerpressure, loyalty personal solidarity strong group experience distorted and in the individual toeachother, percepgroup, display identity merge see evenifthey world. tions oftheoutside political, Theyarealso fundamentally such togroups willapply oftheold findings Which as illegitimate. theauthorities in training interact somemilitants as theOsama Bin Ladin network? Although mostseemto be boundmorebypastexperience (fighting campsin Afghanistan, contact beliefs than andshared theSovietUnioninAfghanistan) bydirect against who operate of militants aboutthepsychology Littleis known witheach other. andwhoseemtobe motivated ofa group inspiration byideological independently orders. than direct rather beliefsystems as possessing Moreover, religious groupsclassed together from areisolated Somegroups different levelsofsocialrootedness. society, display and withsubstantial are partof social movements but others popularsupport motivation individual outreach (such as Hamas). Nor can one infer programs from ideology. group directly the and social context, structure in organizational Giventhesedifferences The mechanisms should be of imitation of the questioned. inevitability assumption understood. The 1995 Tokyo of violenceare notfully of methods of contagion the desire tocause a Is to have established not attack does precedent. appear subway or do have of mass linked to masscasualties destruction, they weapons necessarily the use norms or taboos that the violation of What causes a unique prohibit appeal? moral of "WMD" Would the use ofthese disengagement require greater weapons? of greater thantheuse of conventional psychological weapons?Are bombings orchemical valuethan (see Stem,1999)? "poisonings" biological to cause mass casualties is suicidalviolenceor thewillingness Similarly, The Liberation linked to Tigersof Tamil Eelam religious goals? necessarily thehuman bomb nationalist has secular a (LTTE), resolutely group, practiced a In December for for more than 20 1999, example,during years. technique LTTE simultanetwo different election campaign, squadsattempted presidential thepresident of Sri Lanka and theleaderof a competing ouslyto assassinate ofcivilian casualties. bombs haveoften causedlarge numbers Their party. political LTTE as of a new trend toward a "profesHoffman sees the (1999) representative whereasreligious terrorists are morelikelyto be sionalization" of terrorism, amateur.

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The absenceofempirical evidence for claimsabouta "new"terrorism, many of the likelihood of the use of raisesmore particularly weapons massdestruction, of terrorism Both the study and counterterrorism policyhave been questions. event-driven. and uncontrollable Why has the notionof a "new," dangerous, Is theperception driven ofa series terrorism becomeso compelling? bytheshock intime butnotnecessarily ofevents related causedbythesamefactors? Is closely thenewsmedia, orelitesin the theperception ofthreat driven bypublicopinion, Stern and scientific communities? that (1999) suggested peoplefear government a specialsenseof"dread"at theprospect death of bypoisonandthus experience Johnson that ofthreats chemical orbiological attack. (1994) argued exaggeration when lossoforder andcontrol, becauseofa needfor is likely certainty peoplefear The perception of particularly vividor salient and predictability. threats maybe whenthere is little information aboutthem. The assumed exaggerated, especially orbiological terrorism is actually the destructiveness ofchemical (which potential of scientific of itslikelihood. Fursubject dispute) maycause an overestimation there hasbeenlittle ofpublicreactions to"conventhermore, psychological study tional"terrorism, of someworkon theIsraelicase (see Kaufman, outside 1991, whofound that thepublictends tomisperceive intentions). adversary New Possibilities forResearch The study ofterrorism a concentration should oncurrent or events go beyond about future to the of the of speculation developsystematic analyses development the over now a time. Researchers have wealth the of evidence on basis phenomenon of whichgeneralizations can be constructed. could contribute to Psychology of a number most of which have been answering important questions, onlyrarely addressed directly. is knownaboutwhytheusersof terrorism little wouldabandonthe First, Research has focused on thepsychological motivations forengaging in strategy. terrorism rather thanmotivations forrenouncing terrorism. Yet a number of terrorist haveended deliberate decision ofparticipants protracted campaigns bythe theProvisional Irish orthePopular Front forthe (forexample, Republican Army Liberation of Palestine, in the context of widerpeacemaking processes).It is that terrorists do not"win"in an objective or material sense. generally accepted shouldfocuson terrorist of goals and of the however, Analysis, perceptions effectiveness ofterrorism as a strategy. Research should toidentify thepsychotry forgiving For example, do groups that abandon logicalincentives up violence. violence that terrorism hasfailed incausing thewithdrawal (for perceive example, of popularsupport or theonsetof demoralization within thegroup), or do they newopportunities notice for their What arethe achieving objectives? psychological costs of participating in terrorism? Whatleads individuals to acceptoffers of reduced sentences inItaly)oramnesties? Is thedecision (suchas the prison pentiti torenounce terrorism theresult ofanindividual ora group Does itinvolve process?

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a reversal of themoraldisengagement of moralself-evaluation, a reactivation terrorthat Bandura identified? often assumethat Governments (1990) processes butin ismcan be decisively a forceful and defeated through punitive response, How terrorist beliefs. do ofdeterrence seems to reinforce somecases a policy only actions? terrorists perceive government of A secondareaforfruitful concerns thedevelopment ofstrategies research in terrorist In particular, whatleads to innovation such as terrorism. behavior, to mass or the resort of destruction? theory Psychological hostage-takings weapons arenot arise from newways that innovations the unknown; leapsinto they proposes of associating knownideas or reconstructing familiar methods (see previously is the & Innovation Gardner, 1994;Sternberg, Feldman, 1988). Csikszentmihalyi, nota sudden burst ofenlightenment. Whatis result ofa gradual learning process, of an old problem, is a redefinition or reconceptualization based on required and experience. to Holyoakand Thagard (1995), "mental knowledge According the is confronted when an individual situation, byan unfamiliar leaps"occurwhen Pressed towork thedecisionenvironment seemsdisordered andconfused. quickly, a "source andfamiliar domain of maker must movebetween analog,"theknown a and knowledge, and a "target analog,"thenew puzzle. Selecting experience is notsimple; ofanalogies source sources however, specific analog, many potential andtheir connection tothepresent is notautomatic. lie inmemory andexperience, whentheyare "noticed" Some sourcesoriginate by a decision-maker through or accident ofpsycho1995,p. 192).A variety (Holyoak& Thagard, serendipity suchas events maymakean availablesourcesalient, logicalfactors personally orincidents Anevent that areemotionally that stimulated experienced compelling. a desireforrevenge be a significant cue forinnovation, forexample. It is might ofleadership also likely tobe linked tothefactor andthedetermination tosolvea particular problem. Another research areathat hasbeenneglected is thestudy ofdecision-making intheareaofcounterterrorism also Hermann andHermann Crenshaw, (see 1990). in studied the between and stress (1990) relationship hostage-takings presidential The question ofthepsychology ofgovernmental takes decision-making. response on special urgency whenthe use of military forceis an option.In particular, research should inconsistencies incounterterrorist andreactions investigate policy to thethreat ofcatastrophic terrorism. Forexample, before the1998bombings in East Africa, theClinton administration had takena low-key, even minimalist, to terrorism. The issuewas typically mentioned as one itemin a listof approach "transnational" or "border-crossing" of policyproblems, including epidemics and disasters. The adminidisease,globalorganized crime, drugs, environmental stration hadalso beenphilosophically aversetotheuse offorce in foreign policy. Yet itsresponse to thebombings was to launchcruisemissilesagainst training andagainst a pharmaceuticals intheSudansuspected campsin Afghanistan plant ofmanufacturing chemical for thedevelopment ofchemical precursors weapons.

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thepharmaceuticals was highly controversial The decision to strike within plant theadministration. andoutside remain aboutthecognitive andemotional biasesthat might Manyquestions future How do have affected thisdecisionand will likelyinfluence reactions. in dealing learn from with Whatdidthe terrorism? governments pastexperiences Clinton administration from the for administration's bomblearn, example, Reagan in How of 1986? inclusive was the Was dissent ing Libya decision-making process? or discouraged? If terrorist adversaries are perceived as irrational encouraged their motives not be examined Do fanatics, may closely. policymakers anticipate of their on terrorist theeffects actions beliefsand perceptions or appreciate the of construction reality? adversary's abouthow terrorism endsand thepolicymaking Questions processareboth related to the the issue of effectiveness of counterterrorism generally government In a psychological ofpolicy effectiveness, (1997) argued policies. analysis Ginges that a strategy ofdenialandpunishment tends tooversimplify terrorist motivations andcontribute toa hardening oftheir whereas a reintegrative takes resolve, strategy intoaccount theterrorists' ofrejection andalienation. Like moststudies feelings of motivation, his argument is based on familiar of thepast,suchas the groups Italian Red Brigades. Whatis neededis an investigation oftheeffects ofdifferent ofgroups with different motivations, structures, policieson a range organizational andsocialrelationships. Anadditional research concern is the reaction toterrorism. Forexample, public if the UnitedStatesshouldexperience an incident of chemicalor biological terrorism that are considered mostlikely), how wouldthepublic (thescenarios A common inthe is that respond? assumption government widespread panicwould andcopingmeasures, butthis is result, necessitating costly preventive projection notbasedexplicitly onpsychological oronempirical evidence. Studies of findings thepsychological effects of pastmass-casualty wouldbe instructive. bombings Would thereaction to terrorism be moreseverethantheresponse to a natural disaster? Conclusions A focuson theprospect of a "new" catastrophic terrorism shouldnotbe allowedtodistract researchers from basicquestions ortoobscure the fact that much terrorism is stillofthefamiliar with and aims. variety, pragmatic comprehensible the to the can research determine Furthermore, onlyby comparing present past what is new.Researchers should also be cautious aboutdrawing inferences about of terrorism from small numbers of cases or patterns constructing general categories of terrorist actorsthatlumptogether dissimilar motivations, organizations, and contexts. there is stillmuchmoreto learnaboutthe resources, Although motivations forterrorism, the of escalation, research should particularly sources notneglect thequestions ofhowterrorism endsorhowgovernments andpublics

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ofpsychological for motivations as wellas for Last,thestudy terrorism, respond. shouldcontinue to be based on a modelthatintegrates the endingterrorism, thegroup, and society. "Terrorists" cannot be considered in isolation individual, from their socialandpolitical context. AUTHOR'S ADDRESS thisarticle should be sentto Martha Crenshaw, Correspondence concerning ofGovernment, CT 06459.E-mail: Middletown, Department Wesleyan University, mcrenshaw@wesleyan.edu REFERENCES
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