382

Canadian Journal of History/Annales canadiennes dhistoire XI,I, autumniautomne 2006

The First Domino: International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956, by Johanna Granville. Eastern European Studies, number 26. College Station, Texas, Texas A & M Press, 2004. xx, 323 pp. $49.95 US (cloth).
In the years since the end of communism in eastern Europe, an avalanche of research has been carried out on the most important crises the system faced. We now know much about the causes, courses, and aftermaths of the crises in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980 -81. For the Hungarian crisis, much valuable work has been done, and continues to be d one, by the Institute for the History of the Hungarian Revolution in Budapest. In her new book, a logical extension of her dissertation, "Soviet Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of the Interventions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979)" (Tufts University, 1992). Johanna Granville looks at the Hungarian revolution from the perspective of international diploma cy under the conditions imposed by the Cold War. Granville attempts to under stand both the decision-making process, especially on the Soviet side, and how misperceptions affected that process. Although the book largely confirms what the scholarship has already demonstrated, she is convincing in her portrayal of the leading actors' motivations and often mistaken readings of the situation, and adds important detail that will serve future scholars. Granville draws on documents culled primarily from Hungarian, Russian, American, and Polish archives, organizing her materials clearly and cogently. Her first chapter is an examination of the Rakosi regime and the Soviet attitude toward Hungary from 1953-56, in which she rightly points out that the Soviets were initially resistant to replacing Rakosi and were spurred on by their rap prochement with Tito. She then moves on to discuss the role of Poland and Yugoslavia in the heightening tensions of the summer of 1956. Chapters four and five detail the Soviet and Hungarian leaderships' discussions in the days sur rounding the two military interventions of late October and early November. Here, Granville relies heavily on her archival sources, in particular on the notes taken by Vladimir Malin at the emergency sessions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Presidium between 23 October and 4 November. She clearly demonstrates both the "utter confusion in Nagy's Parliament" (p. 80) in the peri od between the two invasions, and the Soviets' lack of a clear policy. The final chapter explores the role of the United States, devoting space to Radio Free Europe's misdeeds during Nagy's rule (and criticizing the service for undermining his popularity) and other, more shadowy activities, including those of the abortive Volunteer Freedom Corps, a military force to be composed of refugees from east ern Europe. Throughout, Granville does an excellent job of showing how the Cold War constrained the actions of all of the actors in the drama of the Hungarian revolu tion, most of all the Soviets and the Hungarians themselves. She marshals con siderable evidence that conclusively shows that the Soviet Union did not follow

Canadian Journal of ilistoryMnnales canadiennes d'hismire XI,I, autumn/automne 2006

383

a unified and coherent policy toward the Hungarian regime. Rather, the Soviet leadership found itself divided, and waffled between various courses of action. Perhaps the best parts of the book, however, concern the responses of the Polish and Yugoslav regimes to the crisis. Granville's truly original research shows that neither Gomulka nor Tito was as supportive of Nagy as they have traditionally been portrayed. Tito, particularly, occupied a complicated position throughout. Nowhere was this more clear than when the fate of Nagy, who had taken refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, was concerned. In a captivating section, Granville shows how reluctant the Yugosla y s were, especially after the international press learned he was under Yugoslav control, to relinquish the deposed Hungarian leader, and how indignant they were when the Soviets abducted him, sparking a Cold War in miniature between the Soviets and the Kadar regime on the one hand, and Tito's Yugoslavia on the other. In short, The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis is a valuable contribution to the literature on the revolution of 1956 and Soviet decision making. Abrams, Bradley F. Columbia University