Cha vs CA Facts: Spouses Nilo Cha and Stella Uy-Cha and CKS Development Corporation entered a 1 year lease

e contract with a stipulation not to insure against fire the chattels, merchandise, textiles, goods and effects placed at any stall or store or space in the leased premises without first obtaining the written consent and approval of the lessor. But it insured against loss by fire their merchandise inside the leased premises for P500,000 with the United Insurance Co., Inc. without the written consent of CKS On the day the lease contract was to expire, fire broke out inside the leased premises and CKS learning that the spouses procured an insurance wrote to United to have the proceeds be paid directly to them. But United refused so CKS filed against Spouses Cha and United.

redemption insurance the mortgagorand not the mortgagee is the contracting party. The mortgagormerely assigns the proceeds to the mortgagee. Therefore, since by principle of succession the widow may claim.

Harvardian Colleges v. Country Bankers Insurance Corp

Facts: Harvardian is a family corporation, the stockholders of which are Ildefonso Yap, Virginia King Yap and their children. Prior to Aug. 9, 1979, an agent of Country Bankers proposed to Harvardian to insure its school building. Although at first reluctant, Harvardian agreed. Country Banks sent an inspector to inspect the school building and agreed to insure the same for P500,000 for which Harvardian paid an annual premium of P2,500. On Aug. 9, 1979, Country Bankers issued to Harvardian a fire insurance policy. On March 12, 1980, (39 days before I was born hehehehe )during the effectivity of said insurance policy, the insured property was totally burned rendering it a total loss. A claim was made by plaintiff upon defendant but defendant denied it contending that plaintiff had no insurable interest over the building constructed on the piece of land in the name of the late Ildefonso Yap as owner. It was contended that both the lot and the building were owned by Ildefonso Yap and NOT by the Harvardian Colleges.

Issue: Whether or not CKS can recover from the insurance policy. Held: No. Section 18 of the Insurance Code provides that: No contract or policy of insurance on property shall be enforceable except for the benefit of some person having an insurable interest in the property insured. In the present case, it cannot be denied that CKS has no insurable interest in the goods and merchandise inside the leased premises under the provisions of Section 17 of the Insurance Code: The measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might be damnified by loss or injury thereof. Therefore, CKS cannot be validly a beneficiary of the fire insurance policy taken by petitioner-spouses. The insurable interest remains with the Chaspouses. The stipulation in the lease contract is void for being contrary to law and public policy. This is in keeping with the provision under Sec. 25 of the Insurance Code that: Every stipulation in a policy of Insurance for the payment of loss, whether the person insured has or has not any interest in the property insured or that the policy shall be received as proof of such interest and every policy executed by way of gaming or wagering is void.

Issue: Whether or not Harvardian colleges has a right to the proceeds.

Held: Harvardian has a right to the proceeds. Regardless of the nature of the title of the insured or even if he did not have title to the property insured, the contract of fire insurance should still be upheld if his interest in or his relation to the property is such that he will be benefited in its continued existence or suffer a direct pecuniary loss from its destruction or injury. The test in determining insurable interest in property is whether one will derive pecuniary benefit or advantage from its preservation, or will suffer pecuniary loss or damage from its destruction, termination or injury by the happening of the event insured against. Here Harvardian was not only in possession of the building but was in fact using the same for several years with the knowledge and consent of Ildefonso Yap. It is reasonably fair to assume that had the building not been burned, Harvardian would have been allowed the continued use of the same as the site of its operation as an educational institution. Harvardian therefore would have been directly benefited by the preservation of the property, and certainly suffered a pecuniary loss by its being burned. Ang Ka Yu v. Phoenix Assurance - Insurable Interest 1 CARA 704 Facts: Ang Ka Yu had a piece of property in his possession. He insured it with Phoenix. The property was lost, so Ang Ka Yu sought to claim the proceeds. Phoenix denied liability on the ground that Ang was not the owner but a mere possessor and as such, had no insurable interest over the property.

Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp vs Court of Appeals Post under case digests, Commercial Law at Saturday, February 25, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: A contract of group life insurance was executed between Grepalife and DBP. The former agreed to insure the lives of eligiblehousing loan mortgagors of DBP. Dr. Leuterio applied membership in the group life insurance plan. He answered in the application formthat he has never consulted a physician for heart condition, high blood pressure, cancer, diabetes, lung, kidney, or stomach disorder or any other physical impairment, and that to the best of his knowledge he is in good condition. During the subsistence of the insurance he died from massive cerebral hemorrhage. Grepalife denied the claim because of concealment since it was discovered that he had high blood. His widow filed a claim. Issue: Whether or not there was misrepresentaion so as to warrant denial of claim; Whether or not the widow of Leuterio is a real party in interest Held: The Supreme Court ruled that there was no sufficient proof that the insured suffered from hypertension. It is a well-settled ruled that the fraudulent intent on the part of the insured must be established to entitle the insurer to rescind the contract. As regards the second issue, the widow can be regarded as real party in interest because in mortgage

Issue: Whether or not a mere possessor has insurable interest over the property.

Held: Yes. A person having a mere right or possession of property may insure it to its full value and in his own name, even when he is not responsible for its safekeeping. The reason is that even if a person is NOT interested in the safety and preservation of material in his rd possession because they belong to 3 parties, said person still has insurable interest, because he stands either to benefit from their continued existence or to be prejudiced by their destruction.

Held: NOPE. Section 26 of the Insurance Code is explicit in requiring a party to a contract of insurance to communicate to the other, in good faith, all facts within his knowledge which are material to the contract and as to which he makes no warranty, and which the other has no means of ascertaining.

Insular Life v. Feliciano - Concealment 73 PHIL 201 Facts: > Evaristo Feliciano filed an application with Insular Life upon the solicitation of one of its agents. It appears that during that time, Evaristo was already suffering from tuberculosis. Such fact appeared during the medical exam, but the examiner and the companys agent ignored it. After that, Evaristo was made to sign an application form and thereafter the blank spaces were filled by the medical examiner and the agent making it appear that Evaristo was a fit subject of insurance. (Evaristo could not read and understand English). When Evaristo died, Insular life refused to pay the proceeds because of concealment.

Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract or in making his inquiries (The Insurance Code, Sec 31)

The terms of the contract are clear. The insured is specifically required to disclose to the insurer matters relating to his health. The information which the insured failed to disclose were material and relevant to the approval and the issuance of the insurance policy. The matters concealed would have definitely affected petitioner's action on his application, either by approving it with the corresponding adjustment for a higher premium or rejecting the same. Moreover, a disclosure may have warranted a medical examination of the insured by petitioner in order for it to reasonably assess the risk involved in accepting the application.

Issue: Whether or not Insular Life was bound by their agents acts.

Held: Yes. The insurance business has grown so vast and lucrative within the past century. Nowadays, even people of modest means enter into insurance contracts. Agents who solicit contracts are paid large commissions on the policies secured by them. They act as general Vda. De Canilang v. CA - Concealment representatives of insurance companies. 223 SCRA 443 (1993) IN the case at bar, the true state of health of the insured was concealed by the agents of the insurer. The insurers medical examiner approved the application knowing fully well that the applicant was sick. The situation is one in which of two innocent parties must bear a loss for his reliance upon a third person. In this case, it is the one who drafted and accepted the policy and consummated the contract. It seems reasonable that as between the two of them, the one who employed and gave character to the third person as its agent should be the one to bear the loss. Hence, Insular is liable to the beneficiaries. Sun Life v. CA - Concealment in Insurance 245 SCRA 268 (1995) Facts: Bacani procured a life insurance contract for himself from Sunlife Assurance. Specifically, the policy included a double indemnity in case of accidental death, designating his mother as beneficiary. Later, Bacani died in a plane crash and so the mother filed a claim. After investigation, Sunlife rejected the claim on ground of non-disclosure of material facts. They said that Bacani did not mention that two weeks prior to his insurance application he was examined and confined at the Lung Center of the Philippines, where he was diagnosed for renal failure. The trial court ruled that the facts concealed by the insured were made in good faith and under the belief that they need not be disclosed. Also, it held that the health history of the insured was immaterial since the insurance policy was non-medical. The CA affirmed, stating that the cause of death was unrelated to the facts concealed by the insured.

Thus, "good faith" is no defense in concealment. The insured's failure to disclose the fact that he was hospitalized for two weeks prior to filing his application for insurance, raises grave doubts about his bonafides. It appears that such concealment was deliberate on his part.

Facts: > Canilang consulted Dr. Claudio and was diagnosed as suffering from "sinus tachycardia." Mr. Canilang consulted the same doctor again on 3 August 1982 and this time was found to have "acute bronchitis." > On the next day, 4 August 1982, Canilang applied for a "non-medical" insurance policy with Grepalife naming his wife, as his beneficiary. Canilang was issued ordinary life insurance with the face value of P19,700. > On 5 August 1983, Canilang died of "congestive heart failure," "anemia," and "chronic anemia." The wife as beneficiary, filed a claim with Grepalife which the insurer denied on the ground that the insured had concealed material information from it. > Vda Canilang filed a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner against Grepalife contending that as far as she knows her husband was not suffering from any disorder and that he died of kidney disorder. > Grepalife was ordered to pay the widow by the Insurance Commissioner holding that there was no intentional concealment on the Part of Canilang and that Grepalife had waived its right to inquire into the health condition of the applicant by the issuance of the policy despite the lack of answers to "some of the pertinent questions" in the insurance application. CA reversed.

Issue: Whether or not the beneficiary can claim despite the concealment.

Issue: Whether or not Grepalife is liable. Held:

SC took note of the fact that Canilang failed to disclose that hat he had twice consulted Dr. Wilfredo B. Claudio who had found him to be suffering from "sinus tachycardia" and "acute bronchitis. Under the relevant provisions of the Insurance Code, the information concealed must be information which the concealing party knew and "ought to [have] communicate[d]," that is to say, information which was "material to the contract.

The information which Canilang failed to disclose was material to the ability of Grepalife to estimate the probable risk he presented as a subject of life insurance. Had Canilang disclosed his visits to his doctor, the diagnosis made and the medicines prescribed by such doctor, in the insurance application, it may be reasonably assumed that Grepalife would have made further inquiries and would have probably refused to issue a non-medical insurance policy or, at the very least, required a higher premium for the same coverage.

HELD: No. The health coverage agreement entered upon by Ernani with Philamcare is a non-life insurance contract and is covered by the Insurance Law. It is primarily a contract of indemnity. Once the member incurs hospital, medical or any other expense arising from sickness, injury or other stipulated contingent, the health care provider must pay for the same to the extent agreed upon under the contract. There is no concealment on the part of Ernani. He answered the question with good faith. He was not a medical doctor hence his statement in answering the question asked of him when he was applying is an opinion rather than a fact. Answers made in good faith will not void the policy. Further, Philamcare, in believing there was concealment, should have taken the necessary steps to void the health coverage agreement prior to the filing of the suit by Julita. Philamcare never gave notice to Julita of the fact that they are voiding the agreement. Therefore, Philamcare should pay the expenses paid by Julita. Bonifacio Brothers vs. Mora

The materiality of the information withheld by Canilang from Grepalife did not depend upon the state of mind of Jaime Canilang. A man's state of mind or subjective belief is not capable of proof in our judicial process, except through proof of external acts or failure to act from which inferences as to his subjective belief may be reasonably drawn. Neither does materiality depend upon the actual or physical events which ensue. Materiality relates rather to the "probable and reasonable influence of the facts" upon the party to whom the communication should have been made, in assessing the risk involved in making or omitting to make further inquiries and in accepting the application for insurance; that "probable and reasonable influence of the facts" concealed must, of course, be determined objectively, by the judge ultimately.

FACTS: Enrique Mora, owner of Oldsmobile sedan model 1956, mortgaged it to H.S. Reyes, Inc., with the condition that they would be the beneficiary of its insurance June 23, 1959: The sedan was insured with State Bonding & Insurance Co., Inc During the period of effectivity, the sedan met an accident and it was appraised by Bayne Adjustment Co. and repaired it with Bonifacio Bros. and the parts were supplied by Ayala Auto Parts Co. This was all done without the knowledge of H.S. Reyes. Enrique was billed P2,102.73 through Bayne. The insurance company drew a check deducting P100 for franchise and entrusted it to Bayne payable to Enrique or H.S. Reyes. Still unpaid, the sedan was delivered to Enrique without the Knowledge of H.S. Reyes Bonifacio Bros and Ayala Auto filed in the MTC on the theory that the insurance proceeds should be paid directly to them ISSUE: W/N there is privity between Bonifacio Bro and Ayala Auto against the insurance company

SC found it difficult to take seriously the argument that Grepalife had waived inquiry into the concealment by issuing the insurance policy notwithstanding Canilang's failure to set out answers to some of the questions in the insurance application. Such failure precisely constituted concealment on the part of Canilang. Petitioner's argument, if accepted, would obviously erase Section 27 from the Insurance Code of 1978.

Philamcare Health Systems Inc. vs Court of Appeals On January 15, 2012 In 1988, Ernani Trinos applied for a health care insurance under the Philamcare Health Systems. He was asked if he was ever treated for high blood, heart trouble, diabetes, cancer, liver disease, asthma, or peptic ulcer; he answered no. His application was approved and it was effective for one year. His coverage was subsequently renewed twice for one year each. While the coverage was still in force in 1990, Ernani suffered a heart attack for which he was hospitalized. The cost of the hospitalization amounted to P76,000.00. Julita Trinos, wife of Ernani, filed a claim before Philamcare for them to pay the hospitalization cost. Philamcare refused to pay as it alleged that Ernani failed to disclose the fact that he was diabetic, hypertensive, and asthmatic. Julita ended up paying the hospital expenses. Ernani eventually died. In July 1990, Julita sued Philamcare for damages. Philamcare alleged that the health coverage is not an insurance contract; that the concealment made by Ernani voided the agreement. ISSUE: Whether or not Philamcare can avoid the health coverage agreement.

HELD: NO. Judgment affirmed GR: contracts take effect only between the parties thereto EX: some specific instances provided by law where the contract contains some stipulation in favor of a third person - stipulation pour autrui provision in favor of a third person not a party to the contract third person is allowed to avail himself of a benefit granted to him by the terms of the contract, provided that the contracting parties have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon such person stipulation pour autrui must be clearly expressed - none here

"loss payable" clause of the insurance policy stipulates that "Loss, if any, is payable to H.S. Reyes, Inc." indicating that it was only the H.S. Reyes, Inc. which they intended to benefit. stipulation merely establishes the procedure that the insured has to follow in order to be entitled to indemnity for repair a policy of insurance is a distinct and independent contract between the insured and insurer, and third persons have no right either in a court of equity, or in a court of law, to the proceeds of it, unless there be some contract of trust, expressed or implied between the insured and third person "loss" in insurance law embraces injury or damage The injury or damage sustained by the insured in consequence of the happening of one or more of the accidents or misfortune against which the insurer, in consideration of the premium, has undertaken to indemnify the insured SHERMAN SHAFER VS HON. JUDGE OF RTC-OLONGAPO CITY FACTS: On 2 January 1985, petitioner Sherman Shafer obtained a private 2 car policy, GA No. 0889, over his Ford Laser car with Plate No. CFN-361 from Makati Insurance Company, Inc., for third party liability (TPL). During the effectivity of the policy, the car hit a Volkswagen owned by FelinoIlino Y Legazpi, and causing physical injuries to its passenger named JovencioPoblete Sr. Shafer filed a third party complaint against Makati Insurance Company but the latter moved to dismiss the same and the. The RTC granted said motion, hence, this petition. It is the contention of herein petitioner that the dismissal of the third party complaint amounts to a denial or curtailment of his right to defend himself in the civil aspect of the case. Petitioner further raises the legal question of whether the accused in a criminal action for reckless imprudence, where the civil action is jointly prosecuted, can legally implead the insurance company as third party defendant under its private car insurance policy, as one of his modes of defense in the civil aspect of said proceedings.On the other hand, the insurance company submits that a third party complaint is, under the rules, available only if the defendant has a right to demand contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect of plaintiff's claim, to minimize the number of lawsuits and avoid the necessity of bringing two (2) or more suits involving the same subject matter. The insurance company further contends that the contract of motor vehicle insurance, the damages and attorney's fees claimed by accused/third party plaintiff are matters entirely different from his criminal liability in the reckless imprudence case, and that petitioner has no cause of action against the insurer until petitioner's liability shall have been determined by final judgment, as stipulated in the contract of insurance. ISSUE: whether or not the insured can file a third party complaint in the criminal case filed against him. DECISION: Yes. A third party complaint is a device allowed by the rules of procedure by which the defendant can bring into the original suit a party against whom he will have a claim for indemnity or remuneration as a result of a liability established against him in the original suit. The injured party did not reserve his right to file a separate civil action, thus, the

same was deemed instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner may thus raise all defenses available to him insofar as the criminal and civil aspects of the case are concerned. The injured for whom the contract of insurance is intended can sue directly the insurer.In the event that the injured fails or refuses to include the insurer as party defendant in his claim for indemnity against the insured, the latter is not prevented by law to avail of the procedural rules intended to avoid multiplicity of suits. Not even a "no action" clause under the policy-which requires that a final judgment be first obtained against the insured and that only thereafter can the person insured recover on the policy can prevail over the Rules of Court provisions aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits. Tan v. CA - Rescission of the contract of insurance 174 SCRA 403 Facts: > Tan Lee Siong was issued a policy by Philamlife on Nov. 6, 1973. > On Aprl 26, 1975, Tan died of hepatoma. His beneficiaries then filed a claim with Philamlife for the proceeds of the insurance. > Philamlife wrote the beneficiaries in Sep. 1975 denying their claim and rescinding the contract on the ground of misrepresentation. The beneficiaries contend that Philamlife can no longer rescind the contract on the ground of misrepresentation as rescission must allegedly be done during the lifetime of the insured within two years and prior to the commencement of the action following the wording of Sec. 48, par. 2.

Issue: Whether or not Philamlife can rescind the contract.

Held: YES. The phrase during the lifetime found in Sec. 48 simply means that the policy is no longer in force after the insured has died. The key phrase in the second paragraph is for a period of two years. What is a simpler illustration of the ruling in Tan v. CA? The period to consider in a life insurance poiicy is two years from the date of issue or of the last reinstatement. So if for example the policy was issued/reinstated on Jan 1, 2000, the insurer can still exercise his right to rescind up to Jan. 1, 2003 or two years from the date of issue/reinstatement, REGARDLESS of whether the insured died before or after Jan. 1, 2003.

DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE CORPORATION VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 143 SCRA 62 (G.R. NO. L-71360)

J. Cruz: FACTS: This case will require an examination of Policy No. RY/F-082, as renewed, by virtue of which the petitioner Development Insurance insured Philippine Union Realty Development Corporations building against fire for 2,500,000.00. The petitioner claims that the insurance covered only the building but not the elevators. The petitioner also argues that since at the time of the fire the building insured was worth 5,800,000.00, the private respondent should be considered its own insurer for the difference

between that amount and the face value of the policy and should share pro rata in the loss sustained. Accordingly, the respondent is entitled to an indemnity of only 67,629.31, the rest of the loss to be shouldered by it alone. In support of this contention, the petitioner cites Condition 17 of the policy which provides: If the property hereby insured shall, at the breaking out of any fire, be collectively of greater value than the sum insured thereon then the insured shall be considered as being his own insurer for the difference, and shall bear a ratable proportion of the loss accordingly. Every item, if more than one, of the policy shall be separately subject to this condition. ISSUE: Whether the claim of the insurance company that insurance of building does not cover the elevator is incorrect. HELD: The petitioners claim that the insurance covered only the building and not the elevators is absurd, to say the least. This Court has little patience with puerile arguments that affront common sense, let alone basic legal principles with which even law students are familiar. The circumstance that the building insured is seven stories high and so had to be provided with elevatorsa legal requirement known to the petitioner as an insurance companymakes its contention all the more ridiculous. No less preposterous is the petitioners claim that the elevators were insured after the occurrence of the fire, a case of shutting the barn door after the horse had escaped, so to speak. This pretense merits scant attention. Equally undeserving of serious consideration is its submission that the elevators were not damaged by the fire, against the report of the arson investigators of the INP and, indeed, its own expressed admission in its answer where it affirmed that the fire damaged or destroyed a portion of the 7th floor of the insured building and more particularly a Hitachi elevator control panel. SUN INSURANCE OFFICE LTD. V CA (TAN) 195 SCRA 193 PARAS; March 13, 1991

another letter to the insurance company inquiring about the April 3 letter which sought for a reconsideration of the denial. In its reply to the lawyers letter, Sun Insurance reiterated its denial of the claim and enclosed therein copies of the two previous denials dated February 29, 1984 and May 17, 1985. - On November 20, 1985, Tan filed a civil case with the RTC. Petition filed a motion to dismiss on the alleged ground that the action has already prescribed based on Condition 27 of the Insurance Policy which stated that the window to file the appropriate action with either the Insurance Commission or in any court of competent jurisdiction is twelve months from the rejection of the claim. RTC denied the motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. The CA likewise denied the petition of Sun Insurance.

ISSUE 1. WON the court the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the 12 months prescription period to contest the denial of the insurance claim 2. WON the rejection of the claim shall be deemed final only if it contains words to the effect that the denial is final

HELD 1. NO - The SC held that Condition 27 of the Insurance policy is very clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity. It has to be taken in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. The rejection letter of February 29, 1984 was clear and plain. The Court noted that the one year period is likewise in accord with Section 23 of the Insurance Code which states that any condition which limits the time for commencing an action to a period of less than one year when the cause of action accrues is void. The right of action, according to the SC, accrues at the time that the claim is rejected at the first instance. A request for reconsideration of the denial cannot suspend the running of the prescriptive period. The Court noted that the rationale for the one year period is to ensure that the evidence as to the origin and cause of the destruction have not yet disappeared. 2. NO

NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA

FACTS - Private respondent Emilio Tan took from the petitioner a Peso 300,000 property insurance policy to cover his interest in the electrical insurance store of his brother housed in a building in Iloilo City on August 15, 1983. Four days after the issuance of the policy, the building including the insured store burned. - On August 20, 1983, Tan filed his claim for fire loss. Sun Insurance, on February 29, 1984, wrote the private respondent denying the claim. On April 3, 1984, private respondent wrote another letter to the insurance company requesting reconsideration of the denial. Tans lawyer wrote

- The Court clarified its ruling in Eagle Star Insurance Co. vs Chia Yu where it ruled that the cause of action in an insurance contract does not accrue until the Insureds claim is finally rejected by the Insurer by stating the use of the word finally cannot be construed to mean the rejection of a petition for reconsideration. What the court referred to in effect is the rejection in the first instance as claimed by Sun Insurance Disposition The decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. The case is dismissed

VDA DE AVILES v CA November 21, 1996 FACTS: Petitioners: Anastacia Vda. De Aviles et. al. Respondents: Court of Appeals and Camilo Aviles Eduardo Aviles family has been in actual possession of a parcel of land described as a fishpond, cogonal, unirrigated rice and residential land, situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan since 1957. This property is his share in the estate of his deceased parents. The respective areas allotted to them had been agreed upon and were measured before the execution of the agreement. Because he had several children to support, Eduardo asked for a bigger share and Camilo agreed to have a smaller area. Eduardo mortgaged the property with the Rural Bank and Phil. National Bank branch in Lingayen. When the property was inspected by a bank representative, Eduardo, in the presence of the boundary owners (defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin) pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the property and nobody objected. The real estate mortgage was foreclosed and the property was sold at public auction, but it was redeemed by plaintiffs mother and the land was subsequently transferred and declared in her name. In 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles moved the earthen dikes and constructed a bamboo fence on the northern portion of Eduardos property, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion. Petitioners filed this special civil action for quieting of title TC: dismissed the complaint CA: affirmed TC decision, reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. ISSUE/HELD: WON a complaint for quieting of title is not the proper remedy but rather it should be a case for ejectment - YES The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title. To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real property. In this case, the only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant which constitutes a cloud thereon. Documents (those executed by private respondent and his brothers, as well as the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia of the subject property in a foreclosure sale) in no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties. Petition DENIED and decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.