ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM AND FORMAL STRUCTURALISM IN ART

AND SoaOLOGY

Peter M. Blau
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY ABSTRACT Both art and science entail a high deeree of abstraction, though of entirely different kind. Yet there is a suggestive parallel between two contrasting forms of abstract an and two of social tneory. A dramatic contrast in abstract art is that between abstract expressionism and geometric structuralism. Abstract means for the former unfettered spontaneous expression of images and moods, as exemplified by Pollock or Kline; but it means for the latter abstracting from the welter of impressions pure geometric forms, as illusuated by Monian. The distinction between inteqH'etative and explanatory theories is soniewhat similar. Interpretation of social institutions involves providing a meaningful understanding of the nnderljing social values-Weber's Verste&n. Explanation accounts for empirical regularity, not in terms of implicit meanings, but oy discovering hypotheses from which they can be deduced.

Art and science are often juxtaposed in everyday usage. Art is the sphere of spontaneity and creativity, where imagination has a free reign and symbolic meanings find unfettered expression. Science is the realm of rigorous observation of empirical reality by proven research methods and the systematic explanation of the results in terms of general theoretical principles. Notwithstanding this contrast, which is perhaps exaggerated but not entirely incorrect, an and science also share important characteristics. A fundamental similarity of art and science is that both entail a high degree of abstraction. Moreover, although not everyone agrees how to classify the great variety of artistic styles and scientific theories, one contrast that can be drawn between form of abstract art is somewhat parallel to a distinction between two types of theories. I refer primarily to abstract visual artmodem art excluding recent reactions against it, such as pop art or photorealism--and to sociological theories, but some of the analysis applies more broadly to earlier styles and other forms of art, and to other disciplines, at least other social sciences. Before turning to the two major types of abstract an and the corresponding dichotomy of social theories, which is the main topic of my paper, I shall examine

70 / National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988 the abstract nature of art as well as of science and indicate the fundamental difference between the two forms of abstraction. ABSTRACnON IN ART AND SCIENCE Many art historians and philosophers have emphasized the abstract character of art. Meyer Schapiro (1978:185) points out that long before abstract art became an influential movement painters looked with envy to music and architecture "as examples of pure art which did not have to imitate objects but derived its effects from elements peculiar to itself." Even when a painting depicts objects more or less realistically, the artist's aim is not a photographic representation of these objects but an expression of her or his interpretation of them that inevitably goes beyond sense perceptions. Photography, too, is an art form, but an artistic photograph of a street scene or a tree differs from a snapshot of the same subject by communicating more than the eye originally saw. It conveys a mood or feeling or meaning that was not evident in the object itself but produced by its interpretation, by the use of light and shapes and shadings and colors to evdce responses that were not inherent in the content painted or photographed. Schapiro argues that art has traditionally endeavored to escape from the restraints of the objective content in order to liberate artistic creativity, but only modem abstract art achieved this goal by refusing to represent external objects and thus freeing painters to strive for pure form-shapes and colors-no longer masked by extraneous content. In traditional art, painters and sculptors were limited in giving expression to their aesthetic values by the requirement of having to present initially realistic images on which they had to superimpose their artistic interpretations; abstract art removes this limitation and thus enables artists directly to pursue their aesthetic aims. Impressionism, with its strong brushstrokes and wild colors, was a forerunner of such pure abstraction, as seen especially well in Monet's "Water Lilies," in which interst in subtle shadings and spatial forms clearly overshadows any concern with representation of the flowers or the pond or its banks. By excluding the real world, abstract artists hoped to be able to realize aesthetic values in purer form. But although abstract ait facilitates expressing aesthetic values without being constrained by needing to represent external objects, Schapiro (1978: 196-7) notes that it simultaneously

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 71 loses another aesthetic contribution that traditional artists make by transfonning "aspects of nature and human life" and giving them new meaning through aesthetic expression. The philosopher Susanne Langer (1957: 196-7) emphasizes that "the aim of art is insight, understanding of the essential life of feeling. But all understanding requires abstraction." Art, like language and like science, abstracts from human experience selected aspects. In the process, it creates new forms, for example, a picture out of pigment and canvas. The picture is a new creation, which did not exist in the paint and canvas. It differs from science (as well as from imitation) by the nature of the abstraction, lt transforms nameless feelings into symbolic expressions of these feelings, as illustrated perhaps in purest form by music, but also by other forms of art"by dance, poetry, and, indeed, all art because what makes something art is that it goes beyond mere representation of external objects. Art abstracts from reality by capturing its essence symbolically in a metaphor which simultaneously describes unique events and evokes prevalent if not universal experiences and feelings, like Hamlet, the Kreutzer Sonata, or, at least for our generation, Guernica. It creates a vision that is distinctive yet symbolizes generic feelings or moods. Thus, art expands our understanding of human experience by abstracting essential elements from it, and so does science, but the naure of their abstractions is basically different An abstracts the essence of a certain type of sense experience and distills it in a distinctive symbol, a figure of speech or metaphor presenting a unique image or constellation-of shapes and colors, tones and rhythms, events and actions, depending on the medium-yet this particular symbol conveys virtually universal emotions and tendencies with profound meaning to many or to all people. How could the silly story of the son of a king who kills his father in a quarrel on a road and then marries his mother by mistake have survived for more than two niillenia if it did not symbolize much more than it explicitly says and strike aresponsivechord in all of us, as Freud suggested? Scientific abstractions also involve the use of symbols, the scientific concepts under which many different observations are classified on the basis of their having one property in common, though they usually differ with respect to other properties. Whereas

72 / National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988

artistic symbols refer to distinct particular experiences or events, scientific symbols (concepts) are the basis for making generalizations. This is the case in empirical research, and it is a fortiori the case in theorizing. Systematic research involves classifying people or communities on the basis of having some characteristic in common-persons' marital status or communities' ethnic heterogeneity-in order to establish empirical generalizations; and theories reclassify empirical variables into more abstract concepts--for example, Durkheim's anomie or Marx's productive forces-to establish theoretical generalizations which can be tested in further research. In brief, the fundamental distinction Langer makes is that both art and science require abstractions, but abstraction in art is qualitative, involving unique symbols that serve as metaphors for widely shared meaningful experiences, while abstraction in science is quantitative and entails generalizations that can explain empirical observations. Both Schapiro and Langer stress that art is not merely a representation of objects but necessarily transforms them. The aesthetician Danto makes this principle the core of his book The Transfiguration ofthe Commonplace (1981). Any object can be a piece of art, but for it to be so the artist who produced it must communicate something more than is immediately apparent to the senses. Art is not a property of objects but a set of relationships of their properties that symbolizes the object and thereby transfonns it By providing an artistic interpretation of an object-in words or paint or steel and glass-the object is transformed into an art object even if it is originally a very commonplace object. This transfiguration of everyday reality is the result of the artist's distinctive style and of the rhetoric through which the art is conununicated to the audience. A DICHOTOMY OF ABSTRACT ART Abstract art has dominated artistic work most of this century, particularly painting and sculpture but also other art forms. Only in the last two decades or so have new movements in opposition to abstract art developed, such as op art, pop art, photorealism, minimalism, and graffiti art This paper is not concemed with these recent reactions against abstract art but with the dominant abstract trends, primarily in the visual arts, during most of this century.

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 73

DIVERSITY OF ABSTRACT STYLES

Three early movements in painting may be considered transitions from impressionism to abstract forms of painting. One was Fauvism, with its wild colors, which are already evident in the works by Vincent van Gogh but developed into more extreme juxtapositions of strong colors, as illustrated by the pictures of Maurice Vlaminck and the early Henri Matisse. A most important departure from impressionism which influenced the emerging abstract art is Cubism, with its rectangular distortions ofthe human figure and other rounded objects, such as guitars or jugs. Georges Braque, Pablo Picasso (for a short period), and Juan Gris are major representative of Cubism. Third, an early abstract movement in Russia was Suprematism, major examples of which are Kasimir Malevich and die brothers Anton Pevsner and Naum Gabo. The Soviet government initially welcomed this revolutionary departure from traditional art before violently suppressing it, which led to the emigration of Gabo, Pevsner, and Kandinsky. The earliest phases of expressionism occurred at least as early if not earlier than the three styles just discussed, notably in Germany, but expressionism blossomed later, lasted longer, and exerted more influence on the subsequent forms of abstract art. The painter who is sometimes called "the father of German expressionism" (Amason 1969: 154) is. strangely enough, not a German but a Norwegian, Edvard Munch, whose famous oil "The Scream" is a haunting image of fear and loneliness. Two groups of German painters established associations to further expressionism. One was Die Bruecke, two important member of which were Emil Nolde and Ernst Ludwig Kirchner. The other was Der Blaue Reiter, which became the most influential expressionist association in Germany, in part because of the outstanding artistic importance of one of its founders and dominant members, Vasily Kandinsky. Of course, expressionism was not confined to Germany. A famous representative is Georges Rouault, whose dramatic, often religious, paintings have been endlessly reproduced Probably the most influential an institution of the twentieth century has been the BauhauSy founded by Walter Gropius in Weimar in 1919. Gropius himself was an architect, but his intention in establishing the Bauhaus was to create a school where architects.

74 / National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988 painters, sculptors, and artists in several other media would work together on developing new forms of modem art and where students would be taught contemporary styles. To mention only a few of the most famous painters assembled there in the twenties: Kandinsky, Paul Klee, Lyonel Feininger, and Joseph Albers, The influence of" the Bauhaus has been greatest in architecture. The Intemational Style, which emanated there, virtually dominated architecture for half a century. Most major architects of this century were strongly influenced by it, including such dominant figures as Eero Saarinen, Le dtorbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Marcel Breuer, I. M. Pei, Philip Johnson, and Richard Neutra. The influence of the Bauhaus was worldwide but it was particularly pronounced in the United States, and it niay well have contributed to the emergence of New York as the center of modem art. Abstract art encompasses many other styles and admixtures of several of them, particularly inasmuch as artists prize originality and endeavor to be innovative by developing a distinctive personal style. Let me merely mention some of the best-known styles that have not yet been noted. One is primitivism, with its naive, deliberately childlike pictures, often involving fantasy subjects of wild life, as exemplified by Henri Rousseau. Another is futurism, the Italian art movement rebelling against the dead weight of the past and fascinated by modern technology, which later supported Mussolini. Some forms of art encompass under a single label quite a variety of different styles. One is dadaism, which includes Marcel Duchamp's "Nude Descending a Staircase" and his Mona Lisa with mustache and beard, deliberately affronting the traditionalists; as well as George Grosz's quite different political caricatures, though they, too, were designed to shock the bourgeois mentality. Surrealism is another art form that includes rather diverse abstract styles: undoubtedly the most important is the dramatic distortion of the human figure outstandingly illustrated by many of Picasso's paintings, such as "The Three Musicians"; a very different style involves imaginative compositions of a variety of small figures, designs, and shapes, as best exemplified by Joan Miro; basically different from both (as well as from one another) are the strangely irrationally though outwardly realistic images of Dali, Magritte, and Tanguy.

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 75

THE UNDERLYING DICHOTOMY

The welter of diverse forms of abstract art, which is further confounded by the distinctive imprint every original artist seeks to achieve, makes it difficult to see the forest for the trees and discover any fundamental distinction. However, in a magazine article Hilton Kramer (1985) has drawn a basic contrast between two opposite poles of abstract art in terms of which most styles can be classified, although there are some stylesand certainly some individual artists and individual pictures and sculptures-which would be borderline cases that do not fit into either polar type. The contrast Kramer draws is not entirely original. As a matter of fact, it is implicit in many discussions of various styles of abstract art, but disscussions of specific styles, although they may refer to the polar types, do not, in my opinion, bring out as clearly as Kramer's essay does that there is a generic distinction that is applicable to most abstract art. Kramer's two fundamental opposite types of abstract art, which subsume most of its specific forms and styles, are abstract expressionism and geometric abstraction, the latter being also called constructivism or structural formalism or formal structuralism. These two types are not merely different styles, varying in relatively minor preferences or manners, but manifest completely different interpretations-entirely different understandings-of what abstraction in art involves. In one instance, abstraction means not only liberation from the requirement torepresenta subject matter but also liberation from confinement by explicit artistic procedures and aesthetic conventions, which permits spontaneous expression fully to reign. In the other case, abstraction means being freed from having to imitate external objects to make it possible to design pure forms and structures in strict accordance with rigorous artistic standards, without the concentration on strict aesthetic forms being distracted by any concern with content. To be sure, this dichotomy reflects a perennial conflict in an and in life. In art, it is the difference between romanticism and classicism, between spontaneous expression of feelings and strict adherence to established criteria of beauty. In social life, it is the contrast between freedom and order, or between democracy and oligarchy, and in the extreme case between anarchy and tyranny. However, these analogies do not fully capture the interesting

76 / National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988 distinction between abstract expressionism and geometric abstraction in art.
ABSTOACT EXPRESSIONISM

Reproduction-whether making a Xerox copy or a snapshot-is not an artistic creation. All an, traditional as well as modem, seeks to express aesthetic values of one kind or another by going beyond the content of the subject matter being depicted and transforming it into a piece of art with aesthetic meaning. At the end of the last century, there developed the increasing feeling and conviction among painters and sculptors that the requirement to represent-to imitatethe content of some external subject matter imposes undue fetters on the artistic imagination and the artist's freedom to express aesthetic values in pure form. Painters wanted to escape from the conventional practice in academic art to communicate moods through the interpretation of a given external subject-say, a sunset-for the content of the subject to be depicted necessarily influences and restricts the mood that can be expressed. Abstract expressionism wanted to be free of these aesthetically irrelevant limitations in order to create art that is an uncontaminated expression of moods and feelings. The pioneers of abstract expressionism thought of it as the final full resJization of the aesthetic ideals of art's age-old mission. The emphasis is on spontaneity, improvisation, and the creation of moods or meanings through shapes, colors, and wild brushstrokes (or paint drippings) without representing realistic objects or any recognizable subject matter. Malevich's definition of suprematism, the pioneering abstract movement in Russia, illustrates this emphasis: "By Suprematism I mean the supremacy of pure feeling or sensation in the pictorial art." He goes on to note his "desperate struggle to free artfromthe ballast of the objective world" (quoted in Schapiro 1985: 202). Abstract expressionism is the first form of art that does not present ordered elements but apparently entirely unordered juxtapositions of shapes and colors. Randomness, variability, disorder, and loose techniques are not condemned, as in academic art, but positively valued, which makes the pictures complicated and difficult to understand, as there are neither recognizable objects nor a

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 77 clear design. Unless the viewer is seeking to understand the artist's vision and empathize with the feelings expressed, the pictures of abstract expressionism appear to be meaningless jumbles, which is probably the source of the remaric, intended to denigrate such visual art, that any small child can do as well. Interestingly enough, people's political orientations, secular Weltanschauugen, and religious convictions seem to have little to do with their attitudes to abstract expressionsim. Truman, Eisenhower, Stalin, and Khrushchev had widely different political values and were in agreement on little except that they apparently shared a strongly negative opinion of abstract art. Perhaps the three most famous contemporary representatives of abstract expresslonism-I do not include the undisputed giant of twentieth century art, Picasso, who pioneered in virtually every form of painting and sculpture-:ire Jackson Pollock, Willem de Kooning, and Franz Kline, Other major abstract expressionists are Joan Miro (although his surrealist style is not a pure form of abstract expressionism), Helen Frankenthaler, Morris Louis, and Hans Hofmann.
GEOMETRIC FORMALISM

The firee-wheeling combinations of diverse shapes, and often violent, colors in abstract expressionism and the rigid formal structures of geometric construction appear to differ more sharply from each other-except for both being non-representational-than either differs from preceding forms of visual art. One can hardly imagine a sharper contrast than that between Frankenthaler and Joseph Albers. Abstraction from the sense perception of reality is the aim of structural formalism, just as it is the aim of abstract expressionism. Abstraction for the former, however, does not mean wild abandonment to escape the discipline imposed by having to represent external objects but, on the contrary, getting away from the jumble of sense impressions by simplifying visual art and rigorously confining it to designs of geomttiic shapes, usually mere combinations of straight lines, squares, and rectangles, though sometimes curves and circles. A picture or sculpture is a geometric construction or fomud structure, and the objective often is to achieve

78 / National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988 aesthetic effects-a beautiful and interesting image-with a minimum of lines and colors. Many modem artists are radical in politics as well as art and aim to envisage a Utopian order by conveying the harmony of geometric forms. The clean lines increasingly used by geometric abstraction have given a major form of it the name hardedged style. To be sure. Cubist paintings are not characterized by such simple lines and shapes but by very intricate designs of interwoven lines. But Cubism is a forerunner of abstract formalism, not a typical representative of its advanced stages. Mondrian's remark to this effect has been frequently cited (for example, Russell 1981: 232): Cubism failed to accept the logical consequences of its own discoveries; it failed to develop toward the fulfillment of its own ambition, the expression oi pure plasticity. Plasticity meant to Mondrian the quality of a picture's geometric structure that needs neither descriptive title nor pictorial rcpresentation to communicated a meaningful experience to the viewer. Mondrian is probably the outstanding example of formal structuralism, whose paintings represent geometric abstraction in purest form. Perhaps the prototype is a picture consisting in its entirety of a square of four black lines painted on a diagonal white canvas. At least, one's first impression is that this is all it is, but closer scrutiny reveals unsuspected subtleties, as Schapiro (1978: 233-58), who devotes several pages of his essay on Mondrian to this apparently simple design, points out. He notes that the square is incomplete, three of its comers extending into an imaginary space beyond the canvas; that the lines at the fourth comer cross, which suggests that the visible squarc is actually part of a larger grid; that the lines differ in width, as is obvious as soon as attention is called to it; and he makes numerous other observations disclosing various nuances that make the apparently simplistic shape a complex fomial structure of substantial interest. Many other pictures of Mondrian are a few black lines on a white background, frequently enlivened by one or a couple of brightly colored spots in some of the rectangles made by the lines. His aim in these picturcs clearly is to crcate with a minimum of lines and colors images of pure aesthetic

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 79 forms unencumbered by any familiar content. But Mondrian shows that he can be clolrful and exuberant in his "Broadway BoogieWoogie" and several other pictures, in which he used dramatic contrasts of colors without abandoning the straight lines of a geometric structure. Mondrian's work is the prototype of formal structuralism. Other major representatives of geometric abstraction, whose styles are not in all respects alike, are Malevich, Kandinsky, Paul IQee, Mark Rothko, Frank Stella, and Ellsworth Kelly. INTERPRETATIVE SOCIAL THEORIES In the remainder of the paper, I shall examine the contrast between two types of social theory which I consider to be somewhat analogous to the two contrasting types of abstract art I have discussed. Social theory refers to more or less systematic interpretations or explanations of empirical observations of social relations and social structures, usually not of single events but of recurrent social phenomena. The rigorous philosopher of science Richard Braithwaite (1953: 348-49) defines theoretical explanation in quite simple, down-to-earth terms: It "is an answer to a 'Why?' question which gives some intellectual satisfaction." He continues by indicating why his abstract conception of theoretical explanation satisfies this simple definition in terms of giving intellectual satisfaction. I shall have more to say about this type of theory presently. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN INTERPRETATIVE AND EXPLANATORY THEORIES There is a great variety of social theories, and these can be classified into two or a few underlying categories in numerous different ways. Let me illustrate a few dichotomous classifications: theories rooted in individual behiivior, like Homans' or rationalchoice models, contrast with those that can be classified under social realism, like Durkheim's or urban ecology. The analysis and refinement of conceptual distinctions (Toennies, Wiese, Parsons) contrast with those comprising propositions (Blalock, Homans). A frequent contrast is drawn between theories of order (Hobbes,

80 / National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988 Parsons) and theories of conflict (Marx, Coser). Some theories analyze a historical development and social change (Sorokin, Lenski, Skocpol), whereas many compare phenomena at one point in time (dual-labor-market models, most organizational analysis, including Blau's). Some are philosophical and speculative (Spengler, Bell), others closely based on empirical research (relative deprivation, status attainment). There are cultural theories of social life (Weber, Geertz) and structural ones (Simmel, Nadel). The contrast I am trying to draw differs from these, though it is, of course, not entirely unrelated to all of them. It is more closely related to Windelband's famous distinction between idiographic and nomothetic knowledge, though it is not identical with this dichotomy either, because it does notreferto the difference between description of unique historical events and explanation of general natural pattems, as Windelband's dichotomy does, at least by implication. In my terms, both theoretical interpretation and theoretical explanation seek to provide new and better understanding of the real world by going beyond sheer description of it. Empirical description-whether qualitative or quantitative, historical or crosssectional, cultural or structural-only raises the questions both interpretation and explanation are designed to answer, but the way they answer them and thereby clarify the empirical observations differ. Interpretation involves a search for the deeper meaning that can make sense out of the observed complex constellation of social life and institutions, the underlying social forces that make the, initially often incomprehensible, empirical social world understandable. Interpretation does on a theoretical level what factor analysis does on an empirical level, namely, trying to discover beneath the diverse empirical phenomena a few latent conditions or principles that can account for them. Explanation proceeds in an entirely different manner to account for empirical observations, not by providing a meaningful account that makes them understandiable but by creating a formal system of interrelated theoretical genersdizations that logically implies the empirical observations and in this sense accounts for them. Explanation involves constructing a hypothetico-deductive or axiomatic theory. Such a theory does not creat original meaningful understanding, as interpretation does, but it logically implies new predictions that make it empirically testable.

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 81 whereas it is often impossible to determine which one of two or more meaningful but contradictory interpretations is correct. Having briefly outlined the basic dichotomy, we shall next examine several interpretative theories before returning to a fuller discussion of explanatory theory.
IULUSTRATIONS OF lNTERPl^TAlTVE THEORIES

The prototype of an interpretative social theorist is one of the great pioneers of sociology-Max Weber. His concept of Verstehen and his principle that sociological theories must not only be kausaladequat but also sinnadequat can be considered the core of interpretative sociology as I understand it Since social life is human life, Weber emphasized that it cannot be interpreted without taking the subjective meaning that social phenomena have for people into account. But in contrast to Dilthey and Rickert, he did not employ the concept of Verstehen to conceive of the study of social phenomena as social philosophy, nor did he consider it, like Windelband, an idiographic discipline concerned with unique historical condidions and not interested in generalizing, but he tried to integrate the two principles juxtaposed by Windelband in order to circumscribe the newly emerging field of sociology. To be sure, sociology seeks to establish general principles about historical and social conditions. However, demonstrating that such a generalizations is causally adequate is never sufficient in sociology but always must be supplemented by showing that it also meaningfully adequate-that it makes sense in tenns of the subjective experiences of the people involved. To let Webw (1978:12 [1922]) speak for himself: A correct causal interpretation of typical action means that the process which is claimed to be typical is shown to be both adequately grasped on the level of meaning and at the same time the interpretation is to some degree causally adequate. If adequacy in respect to meaning is lacking, then no matter how high the degree of uniformity and how precisely its probability can be numerically determined, it is stiU an incomprehensible statistical probability, whether we deal with overt or subjective processes. On the other hand, even the most pof ect adequacy on the level of meaning has causal

82 / National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988 significance from a sociological point of view only insofar as there is some kind of proof for the existence of a probability that action in fact takes the course which has been held to be meaningful. This quotation illustrated Weber's significance as a founder of modem sociology by cutting through Windelband's distinctions between natural and historical disciplines and emphasi2dng that sociology must be both based on empirically demonstrable causal generalizations, like the natural sicences and unlike history, and also interpret the observed regularities in terms of the underlying historical meaning, unlike die natural sciences and like history. His stress on subjective meaning has sometimes been misinterpreted as psychological reductionism, which I consider incorrect given Weber's strong sociological orientation, as illustrated by his attributing a primary influence on the development of capitalism to the Reformation, a revolutionary transformation of cultural values, and not to the religious attitudes of individuals. Generally, Weber considers the expressive significance of cultural values orientations of prime importance in interpreting overt social institutions and historical developments. This is not entirely different from the assumption of abstract expressionism that the best way to communicate fundamental experiences and values is not by explicitly representing them in realistic scenes but by communicating the underlying implicit meanings, feelings, and moods presumably shared by artist and viewers. Typically, an interpretation of social institutions in terms of underlying cultural values that find expression in them and give them meaning is somewhat analogous to abstract expressionism, which also assumes that common moods and feelings are given expression and meaning in abstract combinations of shapes and colors. But there are exceptions; it is not necessarily the underlying cultural values and meanings in terms of which overt institutions are interpreted. A notable exception is Spencer's theory, which interprets cultural values and other institutions in terms of inevitable evolutionary processes of social selection. Many theories in the social sciences interpret empirical regularities in terms of the cultural values and norms which give social relations and institutions their meaning and-can be understood

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 83 to guide their developments. An important illustration is a theory from a neighboring discipline, psychology. In analyzing human behavior, Freud largely dismisses the reasons to which people attribute their own conduct or that of others and interprets it on the basis of underlying unconscious motives-rooted in repressed childhood experiences-that induced the behavior without the acting individuals being aware of it. Apparently entirely senseless experiences, like dreams and slips of the tongue, can be made meaningful by discovering the unconscious motives accounting for them. Several sociological theories are based on a formally similar scheme of interpreting overt action in terms of underlying driving forces of which the actors are not aware. Thus, the well-known Italian economist Pareto raised the question why people so often fail to act in terms of strictly rational economic considerations. He developed a sociologicaltfieory(1935 [1916]) essentially to answer this question. He first divided all human conduct in to logical and non-logical action, and then discussed a great variety of non-logical action, which he called derivations. The reason for this term indicates the gist of his sociological theory. Pareto assumes that all non-rational action derives from six basic drives of people, which he calls the residues. The two most important ones are the "instinct of innovation" and the "persistance of agreggates," roughly coiTesponding to a progressive and a conservative disposition. The best known aspect of his theory is his conception of the circulation of the elite, which assumes that the ruling group in a country alternates between people with innovative and people with conservative residues. Sorokin's theory of Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937-41) also interprets overt social and cultural phenomena in terms of deeply underlying social forces. There are two polar extremes (with a third intermediate type), and the fluctuations back and forth between them govern the developments characterizing entire civilizations. Sorokin criticizes Marx for considering econoniic conditions to determine society's other institutions and culture, but he also criticizes Weber for considering the religious culture to exert a major influence on society's economic and political organization. For all social institutions, all forms of organization, and all aspects of culture in an age are the product a much more fundamental supersystem which reflect dominant tendencies in all spheres of

84 / National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988 sociO'Cultural life. One supersystem typically lasts for centuries, becoming increasing extreme, before a reaction against it occurs, gradually leading to changes toward the opposite type. The ideational supersystem, which prevailed in the Medieval period, is characterized by faith in the supernatural;revelationand intuition as criteria of truth; theology as the queen of science; mystery and symbolism in the fine arts; idealism, mysticism, and transcendentalism in philosophy. In contrast, the sensate system, which has dominated recent periods, emphasizes sense experiences, empiricism, science, technology, utilitarian and hedonistic ethics. Here again, social life and institutions are interpreted on the basis of underlying factors that govern their meaning. Theories that consist essentially of conceptual analysis and refinements of conceptual schemes are also interpretative theories. This is the case wheUier the scheme is a dichotomy or a complex system with numerous categories, subdivisions, and crossclassifications. Thereasonis that in the absence of propositions that clarify phenomena by indicating their interconnections, one must clarify them by explicating the fuller meaning of the underlying concepts. Thus Toennies seemingly simple dichotomy, Gemeinschaft and Geselleschafty continues to stimulate social scientists because he, as well as others using a similar dichotomy, has provided such a rich interpretation of these contrasting social systems. Parsons' scheme of pattern variables and his theory of four functional systems and subsystems are highly complex conceptual analyses, with multiple subcategories and intricate combinations based on conceptual cross-tabulations. But whereas Wiese's detalied conceptual categories are an arid taxonomy which has given formal sociology a bad name. Parsons' complicated conceptual schemes are full of stimulating ideas, even for those of us who are not his followers, because his profound interpretations often supply new meanings and original insights.
EXPLANATORY THEORIES

The difference between interpretative and explanatory theories is, in essence, between imaginative insights that are difficult to test empirically and precise testable generalizations that are so

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 85 formal that they do not challenge the imagination. The original concepts of theoretical interpretations give new meaning to familiar things that evoke the "aha" experience, and they are rich in connotations which makes them applicable in diverse ways and situations. The concepts of explanatory theory, on the other hand, are analytical formal properties abstracted from various contents which have no existence of their own without these contents, such as Newton's time, distance, and mass, or Simmel's size, triad, or competition. In short, the contrast is between meaningful expression of original insights and rigorous construction of formal structures.
FOUR PRINCIPLES OF H Y P O T H E T I C O - D E D U C I T V E THEORIES

Explanatory theories are often referred to as hypotheticodeductive theories or as axiomatic theories. The method of such theorizing has been developed by philosophers of science, typically on the basis of theories in the natural sciences, although a few sociologists have developed models of axiomatic theories (for example, Zetterberg, 1963; Homans, 1967; and, more ambivalently, Blalock, 1969), My conception of this method of theorizing is largely based on Braithwaite (1953), Popper (1959 [1934]), and Hempel (1965). These authors discuss the method of theorizing in great detail and often in highly technical terms, and I shall here merely outline the gist of it. The central idea is that a rigorous theory is a system of logically interrelated propositions which are empirically testable, that is, falsifiable. I fmd it a useful device to think of four criteria that such a theory must meet. First, the elements of the theory are contingent (or synthetic) propositions (not conceptual schemes) which specify relationships between two or more independently defined concepts or variables; for instance, social integration reduces suicide rates. Second, the propositions compose a logically interrelated system in which all but those on the highest level of generality (the assumptions, axioms, or postulates) can be deduced in strict logic from more general ones above them. Third, some of the terms on high levels of generalizations cannot be operationally defined, because if even the most general propositions involve only

observable variables the so-called theory merely summarizes

86 / National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988 empirical observations and fails to go beyond them to explain them. As Braithwaite (1953:76) puts it: A theory which is hoped may be expanded in the future to explain more generalizations than it was originally designed to explain must allow more freedom to its theoretical terms than would be given them were they to be logical constructions out of observable entities. In short, no new predictions for testing are possible if all statements involve merely empirical observations. Fourth, the lowest-level generalizations, which are logically implied by higher-level ones, must contain only variables that can be empirically measured lest they cannot be tested in research, and only testing them makes the theory falsiflable. Hypothetico-deductive theories explain empirical results in the strictly logical sense that the theorems logically imply the empirical observations, which means that the empirical findings can be subsumed under the theoretical generalizations and are, in effect, relatively specific manifestations of the theoretical generalizations. For the interpretative theorist, such demonstration that several empirical generalizations-the research findings-are instances of the same theoretical principles does not explain the empirical findings by making them understandable but needs to be supplemented by an insightful interpretation that expresses a deeper understanding of the purely quantitative relationships between observed variables, thereby endowing the empirical finding with meaning. For the explanatory theorist, in sharp contrast, explaining always means nothing but that a lower-level generalization-whether empirical correlation or itself a theoremcan be subsumed underthat is, can be logically deduced from-one or several more general principles. For such a theorist, insightful conjectures do not explain observations, because it is always possible to suggest alternative speculations that also provide plausible reasons for the empirical results. Of prime importance for explanatory theory is the criterion mentioned above that its highly general theoretical terms and generalizations do not merely summarize existing empirical knowledge but go beyond it. Their going beyond any already demonstrated empirical results is what niakes it possible for the theory to make new predictions (for if it were merely to subsume

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 87 known data it could not make predictions about not yet known data), and a theory's ability to logically imply new predictions is what makes it falsifiable, testable, and grounded in empirical research.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF EXPLANATORY THEORY

Except for economies, rigorous explanatory theory is rare in the sociai sciences. However, rudiments of it can be discovered even among the pioneers of sociology nearly a century ago. and some contemporary sociologists have moved toward this model of theorizing. The best example fo an early explanatory theory in sociology is Durkheim's Suicide. He seeks to explain empirical regularities about differences in suicide rates among groups by developing two abstract concepts-social integration and anomie-and four generalizations involving these concepts as well as several subsidiary propositions. The great innovation is the next step, which he repeats again and again with different particular explanations. He argues that if the explanation of the difference between, for example, Catholic and Protestant suicide rates is conect, it follows that one should observe a similar difference between single and married people, because, although religion and marital status are, of course, not at all the same, in terms of the abstract concept of social integration the difference in marital status is equivalent to that in religion. Indeed, the data confirm the prediction, and they do as well for numerous other predictions derivable from Durkheim's theory. Naturally, we do not know whether Durkheim actually developed his explanations and made his predictions before he had looked at all the data, which is a general problem when a given monograph both advances and tests a theory. The advancement of science is a collective enterprise. Genuine tests of explanatory theories require that the theories have been demonstrably formulated prior to the research testing them. Simmel certainly was not a rigorous theorist. Yet his conception of a formal sociology and his astute realization that a distinct discipline of sociology must analyze formal social properties abstracted from any content make him an important forerunner of explanatory social tiieory. For his analysis of abstract formal social processes and structures lays the conceptual groundwork on which

/ National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988 an explanatory sociological theory can be built. For example, his penetrating discussion of triads led to Caplow's (1956, 1968) pioneering explanatory social theory of coalition formation in triads and Gamson's (1961) refinement of it. Another illustration is that Simmel's concept and analysis of crosscutting social circles was a major inspiration for my theory on social structure and intergroup relations (1977; Blau and Schwartz, 1984). The first systematic attempt to develop a comprehensive explanatory social theory in deductive terms was Homans* Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (1974 [1961]), which is often criticized for its psychologicalrcducdonism(a criticism with which I agree). Consistent with his metatheoretical assumption that social theories are "open at the top," Homans starts his theory with five psychological axioms, from which he dervies in more or less strict logic many theoretical generalization and empirical predictions about social behavior. Blalock's (1967) monograph on minority-group relations and Collins' (1975) treatise on conflict illustrate two different attempts to start with a general analysis of a particular subject and then try to formulate the conclusions as a series of propositions on different levels of generality, thereby constructing a social theory that approximates a deductive system, though its lower-level generalizations do not follow in strict logic from its higher-level ones.
CONCLUSIONS

My thesis has been that modem an and social theory have in common not only that both entail abstractions from observed reality but also that both involve two diametrically opposed forms of abstraction, with the opposite poles not being entirely dissimilar in abstract art and in social theory. Abstract expressionism--one form of abstract art-emphasizes spontaneity, improvisation, free expression of moods and feelings through shapes and colors, unhampered by any need to represent external objects. Geometric construction-another form of abstract art-emphasizes, on the contrary, that the new freedom from having to represent external objects liberates artists to adhere strictly to explicit aesthetic standards and conform to fonnal aesthetic canons based on clarity of clean lines and shapes, possibly visualizing a Utopia of a more harmonious future through perfect geonietric forms and structures.

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 89 The difference between theoretical interpretation and theoretical explanation is somewhat similar. All theory must abstract from empirical contents to generalize, but interpretation and explanation abstract in opposite ways. Interpretation seeks to delve beneath the surface of empirical observations to capture the deeper meaning that can make social life understandable. The concepts of theoretical interpretations are rich in meaning and pregnant with connotations. But the concept of theoretical explanations are narrow analytical properties abstracted from their substantive contents, though contentless abstraction are devoid of substantive meaning. The purpose of such apparendy meaningless abstract concepts is to derive a system of general propositions that logically imply and thereby can account for a great variety of substantive observations in different areas. Interpretation accounts for social life and institutions from below, so to speak, by searching for their underlying meaning, whereas explanation accounts for social relations and structures from above, to use the same simile, by advancing generalizations that subsume empirical observations as special instances of the higher-order general concepts and principles. Both interpretation and explanation are applicable to either microsociological or macrosociological studies. Symbolic interactionism and exchange analysis employ interpretation to clarify microsociological data, while network analysis analyzes microsociological data in terms of an explanatory scheme. Parsons' analysis of macrosociological phenomena in terms of cultural values involves interpretation, but my analysis of macrosociological differences in terms of structural conditions involves explanation. However, I think that the formal theoretical structure that is essential for explanatory theory makes this type of theory particularly well suited for studying formal structures, which are the social systems that pose the major macrosociological issues.
REFERENCES

Amason, H. H. 1969. History of Modern Art. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Blalock, Robert M., Jr. 1967. Toward a Theory of MinorityGroup Relations. New York: Capricorn Books.

90 / National Journal of Sociology I Spring 1988 . 1969. Theory Construction. Englewood Cliffs: PrenticeHall. Blau, Peter M. 1977. Inequality and Heterogeneity. New York: Free Press. and Joseph E. Schwartz. 1984. Crosscutting Social Circles, Orlando, FL: Acadenuc Press. Braithwaite, Richard B. 1953. Scientific Explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Caplow, Theodore. 1956. "A Theory of Coalitions in Triads." American Sociological Review 21: 489-93. . 1968. Two Against One. Englewood Cliffs: PrenticeHall. Collins. Randall. 1975. Academic Press. Conflict Sociology. New York:

Danto, Arthur C. 1981. The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Gamson, William A. 1961. "A Theory of Coalition Formation." American Sociological Review 26: 565-73. Homans, George C. 1967. The Nature of Social Science. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. . 1974 (1961). Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Hempel, Carl G. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: Free Press. Kramer, Hilton. 1985. "What Abstract Art Achieved." New York: New York Times Magazine, September 29, 1985: 36-41, 82, 86.

Blau / Abstract Expressionism / 91 Langer, Susanne K. Scribner's. 1957. Problems of Art, New York:

Pareto, Vilfredo. 1935(1916). The Mind and Society. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Popper, Karl R. 1959 (1934). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books. Russel, John. 1981. The Meanings of Modern Art. New York: Harper and Row. Schapiro, Meyer. 1978. Modern Art: 19th and 20th Centuries. New York: Braziller. Sorokin, Pitrim A. 1937-41. Social and Cultural Dynamics. New York: American Book. Weber, Max. 1978(1922). Economy and Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Zetterberg, Hans L. 1963. On Theory and Verification in Sociology. Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press.