[1989V49] JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.1989 Jan 262nd DivisionG.R. No.

75256D E C I S I O N PARAS, J.: Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, Branch I, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which We are tasked to resolve, We impleaded the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein a resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo). The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows: Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his bestfriend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were targetshooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which narrated in part:

". . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment, did then and there, without taking the necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness and imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pallet, causing injuries which directly caused his untimely death; . . ." (p. 8, Rollo) On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds: I THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE. II THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.

III THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGES AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9, Rollo) This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon. However, the resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have been represented during trial. On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit: I WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND II WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON. (Petitioner, p. 3, Rollo) Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes "intent" (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that: "If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the accused acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception." (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo) If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC. On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused. The word "intent" has been defined as: "(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts." (46 CJS Intentp. 1103.)

It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise: "The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong . . ." (italics Ours) p. 583 From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence. In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert 2 has stated: "The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant 3 (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability." It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of age but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment." 4 The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes "intent" for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an offense. In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasioffense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a said

Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person . . ." without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos. In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the law, he cites the case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes, which reads: "That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the formation that she . . . 'with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of the Penaranda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and there.' This allegation clearly conveys the idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her unlawful act of publishing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and discernment." What We meant was that the combines effect of the words used in the information is to express a knowledge, on the part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not validly contend that since the information now in question alleged "discernment," it in effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity. Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner that the case against him should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2 (3). He submits that considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the penalty imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision correctional medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 415). The same principle applies in constructing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states: "xxx xxx xxx

(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00; . . ." Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said: "The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability." 5 The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the later should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must now considered.

The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol Vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur. [1990R433] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LIBERTAD LAGON AND HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.1990 May 183rd DivisionG.R. No. 45815R E S O L U T I O N FELICIANO, J.: On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced. The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence. However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the court dismissed the information without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court. Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case. Because the Petition for Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City as counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General for comment. Responding to the Court's resolution, the then acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General, having been previously consulted by the Assistant City

Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City Court had jurisdiction over the criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be given due course. After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed reversible error in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court. Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976, "[m]unicipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that time therefore, the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period. It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. 1 Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level in excess of the maximum penalty which a city court could impose. The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . ." We do not believe so. In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information. In People v. Purisima, 2 the Court stressed that: xxx xxx xxx

. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out

to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction. 3 (Citations omitted) The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, 4 in the following terms: xxx xxx xxx

. . . [i]n criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330)" 5 Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court. In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said: xxx xxx xxx

. . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the evidence would warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance would be acting without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of not more than six months of imprisonment, if said case, for the reason already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal court." 7 In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prision mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up to prision correccional in its minimum period). Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the (refiled)

case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

[1997V581] ROSA UY, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.1997 Jul 281st DivisionG.R. No. 119000D E C I S I O N BELLOSILLO, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 1 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, 2 finding the accused ROSA UY guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, inclusive, and acquitting her of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code in Crim. Case No. 84-32334. Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong. During Rosa's employment she was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. On 15 March 1982, a few months before she was to give birth, Rosa resigned. In the meantime, she helped her husband manage their lumber business. The friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion continued. The two later agreed to form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional capital for the expansion of Rosa's lumber business and the latter as industrial partner. Various sums of money amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to have been given by Consolacion for the business; however, because of the trust they had for each other, no receipt was ever issued. Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with the funds contributed by Consolacion evidence by various receipts. But, unfortunately, the friendship between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the partnership documents were never processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The preceding events prompted Consolacion to file a complaint for estafa and for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On 10 December 1984 an Information for estafa 3 and several other Informations 4 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner. The offenses were subsequently consolidated and tried jointly.

Through Consolacion Leong and Alexander D. Bangit the prosecution tried to establish that petitioner Rosa Uy employed deceit in obtaining the amount of P500,000.00 from complainant with respect to Crim. Case No. 84-32334. As regards Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, Alexander D. Bangit, manager of the Commercial Bank of Manila, Malabon Branch, where Rosa Uy maintained an account, testified on the following transactions with respect to the six (6) checks referred to in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32840 which were dishonored: CHECK NO. (1) 068604 DATE PRESENTED 16 December 1983 REASON FOR DISHONOR Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped(Exh. "G") (2) 068605 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "H") (3) 068603 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "F") (4) 068601 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "E") (5) 043122 3 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "A") (6) 068660 24 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "I") For her part, petitioner and her witnesses Fernando Abad and Antonio Sy maintained that no misrepresentation was committed and that the funds were utilized to construct the building in Bulacan, Bulacan. With respect to the issuance of the subject checks, petitioner did not deny their existence but averred that these were issued to evidence the investment of complainant in the proposed partnership between them. After a joint trial, the Manila Regional Trial Court acquitted petitioner of estafa but convicted her of the charges under B.P. Bldg. 22. 5 On appeal, respondent appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this petition for review on certiorari: (a) whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks Law, and (b) whether the checks had been issued on account or for value. 6

As regards the first issue, petitioner contends that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 and that assuming for the sake of argument that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal to respondent appellate court, still she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. 7 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 8 And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 9 In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various charges under B.P. Blg. 22 were jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. She maintains that the evidence presented established that (a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati. Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said evidence would only show that none of the essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. Respondent People of the Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one hand argues that even if there is no showing of any evidence that the essential ingredients took place or the offense was committed in Manila, what is critical is the fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because the same is the principal or main case and that the cases for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to the estafa case. We disagree with respondent. The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied. In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrantconviction. 10 For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 11 Hence, it is incorrect for respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction

over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied.

In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that the evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of Makati; that petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City; that the principal place of business of the alleged partnership is located in Malabon; that the drawee bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject checks were deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense. Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality whether the accused be within one territory or another, the same is still without merit. It may be true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. We note however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the records that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in Manila. As such, there would be no basis in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense. In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel. Respondent posits that it took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: . . . (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of . . . lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in paragraph . . . (b) . . . of Section 3 of this Rule. 12 After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum 13 before the Regional Trial Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot countenance the inadvertence committed by the court. Clearly, from the above-quoted law, we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he

may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. 14

Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question the jurisdiction of the court and hence, on the basis of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoycase 15 in which respondent seeks refuge, the petitioner should be estopped. We nonetheless find the jurisprudence of the Sibonghanoy case not in point. In Calimlim v. Ramirez, 16 the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said: A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. 17 In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 18 The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. As a matter of fact, as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower court. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, we hold that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court maybe raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioner is therefore not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. 19

WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, to have no jurisdiction over Crim. Case Nos. 84-32335 to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court dated 24 September 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the court of competent jurisdiction when warranted. SO ORDERED. [2002V815] LUTGARDA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF ESTANISLAWA C. REYES, represented by MIGUEL C. REYES, respondents.2002 Aug 293rd DivisionG.R. No. 123340D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 1995[1] and its Resolution dated December 1, 1995.[2] The Court of Appeals dismissed for being insufficient in substance the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which sought to nullify two orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53, dated April 18, 1994 and May 6, 1994. The Antecedent Facts The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of "Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document" before the Manila Regional Trial Court.[3] Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal case. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994 acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In the same decision, the trial court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan.[4] On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision. On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, assailing the trial courts ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a copy of the motion by registered mail. On April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration stating: Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, filed by the accused through counsel and considering that there is nothing to show that the Office of the City Prosecutor was actually

furnished or served with a copy of the said Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the accused on January 28, 1994 of a copy of the Courts decision dated January 17, 1994, so that the same is already final and executory, let the Motion for Reconsideration be Denied for lack of merit. [5] Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the trial courts order of April 18, 1994. The trial court denied the same in an order dated May 6, 1994, to wit: Under the Interim Rules, no party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment (Sec. 4). The motion of accused dated 22 April 1994 is a violation of this rule. WHEREFORE, said motion is DENIED. [6]

Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for reconsideration of the decision dated February 7, 1994. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and dismissed the case for being insufficient in substance. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts order of April 18, 1994 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals declared in part: Section 10, Rule 13, Rules of Court, provides as follows: SEC. 10. Proof of Service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 5 of this rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender, or in lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by registered mail, proof of service shall be made by (a) affidavit of the person mailing and (b) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Both must concur. In the case at bench, there was no such affidavit or registry receipt when the motion was considered. Thus, respondent Judge cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in ruling in the manner he did. [7] The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial courts order of May 6, 1994 denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration, as follows:

xxx, while there is merit in petitioners submission that the motion for reconsideration dated April 22, 1994 was not a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment, as contemplated in the Interim Rules because the motion sought to impugn the order dated 18 April 1994 not on the basis of the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the erroneous legal conclusion of the order dated May 6, 1994,[8] this is already academic. The decision dated January 7, 1994 had long become final when the second motion for reconsideration was filed on 03 May 1994. Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May 1994 had no more legal competence to promulgate the same. [9] Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial court on the civil aspect of the case, to wit:

x x x, the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. There was neither reservation nor waiver of the right to file the civil action separately nor has one been instituted to the criminal action. Hence, the civil action for the civil liability has been impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal case before respondent Judge. This is the law on the matter. The proposition submitted by petitioner that the court presided by respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the property because it is located in Bulacan - outside the territorial jurisdiction of said court -does not hold water. Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit. [10] In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared: WHEREFORE, the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and the case DISMISSED. [11] In a resolution dated December 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[12] Hence, this petition. The Issues In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: 1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS DULY FURNISHED WITH COPY OF THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-54773 (SIC) OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53.

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743 FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, INVOLVING A PROPERTY LOCATED IN BULACAN. 3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53, RENDERED DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743. [13] The Ruling of the Court We grant the petition. When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged civilly liable, his motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect must be served not only on the prosecution, also on the offended party if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. Moreover, if the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all matters that the law requires the court to resolve. This includes the power to order the restitution to the offended party of real property located in another province. Absence of Proof of Service The first issue is whether petitioners motion for reconsideration dated February 7, 1994 complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 6, Rule 15 on proof of service. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts finding that the City Prosecutor was not duly and timely furnished with petitioners motion for reconsideration of February 7, 1994. Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on February 10, 1994. Petitioner relies on jurisprudence that the date of mailing is the date of filing, arguing that the date of mailing of both motions was on February 10, 1994. Petitioner maintains that the motion was properly filed within the 15-day period, citing the registry return card which shows actual receipt on February 22, 1994 by the City Prosecutor of a copy of the motion. The Court of Appeals, noting that petitioner received a copy of the decision on January 28, 1994, stated that petitioner had until February 12, 1994 to appeal the decision or file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner, by filing a motion for reconsideration without any proof of service, merely filed a scrap of paper and not a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the reglementary period of petitioner to appeal continued to run and lapsed after the 15-day period, making the trial courts decision final and executory. We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner patently failed to comply with the mandatory requirements on proof of service insofar as the public prosecutor is concerned. The Court has stressed time and again that non-compliance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is a fatal defect. The well-settled rule is that a motion which fails to comply with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is a useless piece of paper.

If filed, such motion is not entitled to judicial cognizance and does not stop the running of the reglementary period for filing the requisite pleading.[14] Section 6 of Rule 15 reads: SEC. 6. - Proof of service to be filed with motions. No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof. [15] mphasis supplied) From the language of the rule, proof of service is mandatory. Without such proof of service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no judicial cognizance. Section 13 of Rule 13 further requires that: SEC. 13. Proof of Service. x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. [16] mphasis supplied) If service is by registered mail, proof of service consists of the affidavit of the person mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the motion. Absent one or the other, or worse both, there is no proof of service. In the instant case, an examination of the record shows that petitioner received a copy of the trial courts decision of January 17, 1994 on January 28, 1994. Within the reglementary period to appeal, petitioner filed on February 10, 1994, by registered mail, a motion for reconsideration. However, petitioner failed to attach both the affidavit and the registry receipt to the motion for reconsideration as required by the Rules. The defect of the motion is apparent on its face. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain the required proof of service. However, petitioner is contesting that part of the decision of the trial court finding him civilly liable even as he is acquitted from the criminal charge on reasonable doubt. This raises the issue of whether the public prosecutor is the only proper party to be served with petitioners motion for reconsideration. The present Rules do not require the accused to serve a copy of his motion for reconsideration on the offended party who may not be represented by a private counsel. The Rules require service only on the public prosecutor if the offended party is not represented by a private counsel. A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. However, either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.

The acquittal ends the work of the public prosecutor and the case is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. Thus, any appeal or motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect of a decision in a criminal case must be served on the other real party in interest. If the offended party appeals or moves for reconsideration, the accused is necessarily served a copy of the pleading through his counsel. If the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, a lacuna arises if the offended party is not represented by a private counsel. In such a situation, under the present Rules only the public prosecutor is served the notice of appeal or a copy of the motion for reconsideration. To fill in this lacuna in the present Rules, we require that henceforth if the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, he should serve a copy of his pleading on the offended party himself if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. This is in addition to service on the public prosecutor who is the counsel of record of the State. In the instant case, the Court notes that petitioner did not serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party who was not represented by a private counsel in the trial court. In the interest of justice, and considering that the present Rules are silent on the matter, it is only fair to give petitioner a period of five days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. Trial courts jurisdiction over the civil aspect. Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner asserts that the Manila trial court had no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in Bulacan which is outside the trial courts territorial jurisdiction. In upholding the trial courts jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held: Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit. [17] We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner asserts that the location of the subject property outside the courts territorial jurisdiction deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil aspect of the criminal case. This argument is contrary to the law and the rules. There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.[18] In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject

matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the courts authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Article 104 of the same Code states that civil liability x x x includes restitution. The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by the offended party.[19] In the instant case, the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action. Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability.[20] Thus, the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan. Consequently, while we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals as to proof of service and the trial courts jurisdiction on the civil aspect, we remand this case for further proceedings in the interest of justice. WHEREFORE, petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave. [1988V31] RIZALITO VELUNTA, petitioner, vs. THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY AND COLONEL SIMEON KEMPIS, JR., PRESIDENT GCM, Recom. VIII, Palo, Leyte, respondents.1988 Jan 203rd DivisionG.R. No. 71855D E C I S I O N GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the General Court Martial, RECOM VIII, from assuming jurisdiction over a criminal case for homicide wherein the petitioner is indicted for the death of one Romeo Lozano. The petitioner is a regular member of the Integrated National Police of Tacloban City with the rank of Patrolman.

On April 16, 1982 at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, while directing traffic at the intersection of Burgos Tarcela-Lucente Streets, Tacloban City, the petitioner tried to apprehend Romeo Lozano, a motorized tricycle driver, for violations of traffic rules and regulations. An altercation occurred between them which resulted in the shooting and death of Romeo Lozano. On October 30, 1982, Mrs. Anacorita Lozano, widow of Romeo Lozano, filed an administrative complaint against the petitioner with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Region VIII, Tacloban City for grave misconduct. After hearings on the merits, the Adjudication Board No. 8, NAPOLCOM, Manila rendered a decision dated August 9, 1984 finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and meted the penalty of "Dismissal from the Service." On a motion for reconsideration, the Adjudication Board modified its decision by finding the petitioner guilty only of Less Grave Misconduct and modified the penalty from dismissal to suspension from service for six months without pay. During the pendency of the administrative case, Mrs. Lozano also filed a complaint for homicide with the City Fiscal's Office of Tacloban. On May 14, 1982, the First Assistant City Fiscal of Tacloban City issued a resolution in I.S. No. 82-203 finding the existence of prima facie evidence that the petitioner, then a member of the Integrated National Police stationed in Tacloban City "with deliberate intent and with intent to kill," shot with his service pistol one Romeo Lozano, a tricycle driver at the left cheek causing the latter's death. Finding that the offense was committed during the performance of official duties, the City Fiscal recommended that the case be referred to the Tanodbayan for further investigation.

With the approval of Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez, Second Assistant Fiscal Jose B. Sano of Tacloban City, as deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor, endorsed the filing of an information for homicide against the petitioner. The case was referred to the military authorities pursuant to P.D. 1850 which authorizes the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to convene court martials to try, hear, and decide cases for criminal acts committed by members of the Integrated National Police. As stated at the outset, the petitioner challenges the assumption of jurisdiction by the General Court Martial over the criminal case for homicide against him. According to the petitioner, the General Court Martial has no more jurisdiction to continue the hearing against him as a result of the provisions of Executive Order No. 1040, in relation to Executive Order No. 1012, which became effective last July 10, 1985 whereby supervision and control over all units and members of the Integrated National Police have been transferred to NAPOLCOM and placed directly under the Office of the President of the Philippines, thereby removing police officers from the supervision and control of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary under the Department of National Defense. It is further argued by the petitioner that P.D. 1850 which authorized the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to convene courts martial to hear and try cases against members of the Integrated National Police for offenses committed while in the performance of their duties has been expressly repealed by Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 as of July 10, 1985.

We find the contention of the petitioner to be unmeritorious. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. (Conchada v. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 94). As early as 1914, it was declared that the courts of the Philippine Islands have no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes and those necessarily implied to make the express powers effective. (West Coast Life Insurance Co. v. Hurd, 27 Phil. 401.) We have to look for an express provision of law to resolve the issue raised by the petitioner. In the instant case, P.D. No, 1850 which vests jurisdiction on courts-martial over criminal cases involving the members of the Integrated National Police, provides: "SECTION 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ---- (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached before hand unless otherwise provided by law. "As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards." Executive Order Nos. 1012 and 1040, on the other hand, are invoked by the petitioner. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 1012 states: "The provision of special or general laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the operational supervision and direction exercised by the Philippine Constabulary over all units of the Integrated National Police (INP) force stationed or assigned in the different cities and municipalities all over the country, is hereby transferred to the city or municipal government concerned until further orders from the President of the Philippines. The term 'operational control and direction' shall, be as defined in Section 1 (e) of Presidential Decree No. 1162. "Whenever the power of operational supervision and direction is abused, such that the effectiveness of the overall peace and order campaign is negated, the President of the Philippines motu proprio, or upon recommendation of the provincial commander, provincial superintendent with the concurrence of the Regional Unified Commander, may terminate the authority of the local executive(s) to exercise

operational supervision and direction over units of the Integrated National Police, however the judgment of the President the exigencies as require. (sic)" Section 1 of Executive Order No. 1040 provides: "The National Police Commission shall henceforth be under the Office of the President of the Philippines as may be directed by and under the control of the President of the Philippines, it shall exercise administrative control and supervision over all units of the Integrated National Police (INP) force throughout the country." It is specifically stated under Executive Order No. 1012 that it is only the "operational supervision and direction" over all units of the Integrated National Police force stationed or assigned in the different cities and municipalities that was transferred from the Philippine Constabulary to the city or municipal government concerned. Likewise, under Executive Order No. 1040 it is the exercise of "administrative control and supervision" over all units of the Integrated National Police forces throughout the country that was transferred to the President of the Philippines. The latter executive order also defines operational supervision and direction in P.D. No. 1160, 1 (e) as follows: "(e) Operational Supervision and Direction. It is the power to see to it that the units or elements of the Integrated National Police perform their duties properly according to existing laws and the rules, regulations and policies promulgated by competent authority, and the power to employ or deploy such units or elements, in coordination with the Provincial or District Police Superintendent, Station Commander or Officer-in-Charge to insure public safety and the effective maintenance of peace and order within the locality." The distinction between operational supervision and direction over the Integrated National Police and jurisdiction or authority of a court-martial to hear, try and decide a criminal proceeding against a police officer so that the appropriate penalty for the commission of a crime or offense may be imposed is easily discernible. One refers to how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance while the other refers to the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them. The allegation of the petitioner that P.D. 1850 has been expressly repealed by the clear and precise provision of Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 is inaccurate, Section 3 of the executive order provides: "All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other enactments, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order are hereby repealed, amended and modified accordingly." The aforecited provision does not repeal in express terms, P.D. No. 1850. Neither is there any inconsistency between P.D. No. 1850, which confers upon courts-martial, jurisdiction over crimes and offenses involving members of the Integrated National Police, and Executive Order No. 1040 which gives the city and municipal governments, (as the case may be), operational supervision and direction over

members of the Integrated National Police. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. (PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 72 SCRA 396; Jalandoni v. Endaya, 85 SCRA 261; Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA 10; and The Philippine American Management Co., Inc., v. The Philippine American Management Employees Asso. (49 SCRA 149). When the case was filed in 1982, there can be no question that the respondent General Court Martial had jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction had properly been exercised from the start, it remains with the military court martial unless a law expressly divests it of that jurisdiction. It is an established rule that jurisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law. The provision of the Constitution, Article XVI, Section 6, on the State maintaining a police force national and civilian in character is still in the process of being implemented. Police forces continue to remain part of the PC-INP until the civilian police force is finally set-up as contemplated by the fundamental law. (Barcellano v. Major General Renato de Villa, et al., G.R. No. 75952, October 20, 1987). WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. [1988V349] RODOLFO DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. Hon. FELIX L. MOYA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Davao, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.1988 Apr 273rd DivisionG.R. No. L-65192D E C I S I O N CORTES, J.: Involving as it does a purely legal question, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus was certified to this Court by the then Intermediate Appellate Court in its resolution dated August 30, 1983. On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned to the Intelligence and Operations Section of the 432nd PC Company, together with other PC men, received a mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. In compliance with said mission order, Dela Cruz and company proceeded to Maco, Davao del Norte and caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting, but said operators resisted arrest. The soldiers left the place but they brought with them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the crime, such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfights, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto, followed the soldiers on their way back to the PC Headquarters, catching up with them on the TagumMati National Highway. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao, in an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 40080.

While the case was pending trial, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President of the Philippines on January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in performance of their duties. Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed in relation to the performance of his duties, Dela Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the military authorities so he could be tried by court martial. The motion was denied. Hence, the present petition. At issue is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 40080. One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. If the court is acting without jurisdiction, then the entire proceedings are null and void. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. [Silvestre v. Military Commission, L-48366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 10; People v. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739 (1952); Rilloraza v. Arciaga, 128 Phil. 799 (1967), 21 SCRA 717.] And once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. [Pamintuan v. Tiglao, 53 Phil. 1, (929); Phil. Land Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Inc. v. CIR, 93 Phil. 747 (1953), Tuvera v. De Guzman, 121 Phil. 706 (1965), 13 SCRA 729; Rilloraza v. Arciaga, supra: Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., 123 Phil. 766 (1966), 16 SCRA 908). In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, by virtue of General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977, published in 73 Official Gazette (Supplement) #28, pages 6373-1 to 6378-3. (July 11, 1977), military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by the President . . . "(Section 1.) As no amendatory law was ever published in the Official Gazette between the time G.O. No. 59 was published until the information in Criminal Case No. 40080 was filed on August 2, 1979, then said General Order No. 59 remained in force on said date. In the case at bar, it is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, petitioner dela Cruz was a member of the Philippine Constabulary, and that the shooting of the deceased Cabilto was committed while petitioner was executing the Mission Order. But what is the significance of the proviso regarding the certificate to be issued by the Secretary of National Defense?

The proviso merely states that the certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense is conclusive for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty, or arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty. It does not in any way preclude the courts from making any finding as to whether an offense is duty-connected. Nor does it make the certificate a condition precedent for the exercise by either civilian courts or military tribunals of their jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP. In the instant case, even as no certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense was presented in court, the record contains a copy of Mission Order No. 7, signed by a certain Lieutenant Huerta, directing Dela Cruz, among others, to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao to verify and apprehend persons reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. The evidence of the prosecution presented in court likewise shows that Cabilto was shot while petitioner was executing the mission order. These undisputed facts compel this Court to declare that respondent court was without jurisdiction to try the case against petitioner Dela Cruz. The Solicitor General points out that at the time the information was filed, Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822 and 1822-A which vest in the courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP in the performance of their duties were not yet in effect, the same having been promulgated only in 1981. Truly, PD 1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable to the case at bar. However, General Order No. 59 cited above applies. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The proceedings in Criminal Case No. 4008 are declared null and void but without prejudice to the filing of another action in the proper forum. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for appropriate action. Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur. [1997V455] ALBERTO S. SILVA, EDILBERTO VIRAY ANGELES BARON, CEFERINO ROMERO, JAIME ACEVEDO, RODOLFO JUAN, ANDREW DE LA ISLA, BAYANI PILAR, ULDARICO GARCIA, ANANIAS HERMOCILLA, WALLY LEONES, PABLO ALULOD, RODOLFO MARIANO, HERNANI ABOROT, CARLITO CHOSAS, VALERIANO MAUBAN, RENAN HALILI, MANOLITO CUSTODIO, NONILON DAWAL, RICARDO ESCUETA, SEVERINO ROSETE, ERNESTO LITADA, ERNESTO BARENG, BONIFACIO URBANO, VICENTE SANTOS, MARIO CREDO, BERNABE GERONIMO, ERNESTO BANAY, PASTOR VELUZ, RICARDO CUEVAS, FELOMENO BALLON, ORLANDO MENDOZA, ANICETO ARBAN, GERONIMO ESPLANA, VICENTE CHAVEZ, STEVE VELECINA, and RICARDO B. VENTURA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILTREAD (FIRESTONE) TIRE AND RUBBER CORPORATION, respondents.1997 Jun 192nd DivisionG.R. No. 110226D E C I S I O N ROMERO, J:

Petitioners, all former employees of private respondent Philtread (Firestone) Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread, for brevity), impute grave abuse of discretion on the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) 1 for issuing two resolutions, dated April 7, 1993, and November 18, 1992, which reconsidered a resolution it rendered on April 15, 1992. They allege that its resolution of April 15, 1992 became final and executory when Philtread failed to seasonably file a motion for reconsideration within the ten-day reglementary period required by Article 223 of the Labor Code. The record unfolds the following facts: Sometime in 1985, petitioners, then rank-and-file employees and members of Philtread Workers Union (PWU), volunteered for, and availed of, the retrenchment program instituted by Philtread with the understanding that they would have priority in re-employment in the event that the company recovers from its financial crisis, in accordance with Section 4, Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement concluded on July 5, 1983. 2 In November 1986, Philtread, apparently having recovered from its financial reverses, expanded its operations and hired new personnel. Upon discovery of this development, petitioners filed their respective applications for employment with Philtread, which however, merely agreed to consider them for future vacancies. Subsequent demands for re-employment made by petitioners were ignored. Even the request of the incumbent union for Philtread to stop hiring new personnel until petitioners were first hired failed to elicit any favorable response. Thus, on December 5, 1988, petitioners lodged a complaint 3 with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for unfair labor practice (ULP), damages and attorney's fees against Philtread. Both parties submitted their respective position papers. On its part, Philtread moved for the dismissal of the complaint based on two grounds, namely: (1) that the NLRC lacked jurisdiction, there being no employer-employee relationship between it and petitioners and that the basic issue involved was the interpretation of a contract, the CBA, which was cognizable by the regular courts; and (2) that petitioners had no locus standi, not being privy to the CBA executed between the union and Philtread. Petitioners, however, challenging Philtread's motion to dismiss, stressed that the complaint was one for unfair labor practice precipitated by the unjust and unreasonable refusal of Philtread to re-employ them, as mandated by the provisions of Section 4, Article III of the 1986 and 1983 CBAs. Being one for unfair labor practice, petitioners concluded that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Article 217 (a) (1) of the Labor Code. On August 31, 1989, Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga rendered a decision dismissing the complaint but directing Philtread to give petitioners priority in hiring, as well as those former employees similarly situated for available positions provided they meet the necessary current qualifications. 4 In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter, however, did not tackle the jurisdictional issue posed by Philtread in its position paper. Instead, he dwelt solely on the question whether the petitioners were entitled to priority in re-employment on the basis of the CBA.

Petitioners duly appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. Philtread opted not to interpose an appeal despite the Labor Arbiter's failure to rule squarely on the question of jurisdiction. On April 15, 1992, the NLRC issued a resolution reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It directed Philtread to re-employ petitioners and other employees similarly situated, regardless of age qualifications and other pre-employment conditions, subject only to existing vacancies and a finding of good physical condition. This resolution was received by Atty. Abraham B. Borreta of the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo on May 5, 1992, as shown by the bailiff's return. Subsequently, Atty. Borreta filed with the NLRC on May 20, 1992, an ex parte manifestation explaining that he was returning the copy of the resolution rendered on April 15, 1992, which, according to him, was erroneously served on him by the process server of the NLRC. He alleged that in the several conciliation conferences held, it was Atty. Daniel C. Gutierrez who exclusively handled the case on behalf of Philtread and informed the Labor Arbiter and petitioners that the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo had already been dissolved. Being of the impression that the April 15, 1992 resolution of the NLRC had been properly served at the address of the law firm of Atty. Gutierrez and that no seasonable motion for reconsideration was ever filed by Philtread, petitioners moved for its execution. On November 18, 1992, the NLRC, acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Gutierrez, promulgated one of its challenged resolutions dismissing the complaint of petitioners. It ruled that while petitioners had standing to sue, the complaint should have been filed with the voluntary arbitrator, pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code, since the primary issue was the implementation and interpretation of the CBA. Dismayed by the NLRC's sudden change of position, petitioners immediately moved for reconsideration. They pointed out that the NLRC's reliance on Article 261 of the Labor Code was patently erroneous because it was the amended provision which was being cited by the NLRC. They added that the amendment of Article 261 introduced by Republic Act No. 6715 took effect only on March 21, 1989, or after the filing of the complaint on December 5, 1988. This being the case, petitioners argued that the subsequent amendment cannot retroactively divest the Labor Arbiter of the jurisdiction already acquired in accordance with Articles 217 and 248 of the Labor Code. Petitioners further stressed that the resolution of April 15, 1992, had already become final and executory since Philtread's counsel of record did not file any motion for reconsideration within the period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on May 5, 1992. The NLRC, however, was not convinced by petitioners' assertions. In another resolution issued on April 7, 1993, it affirmed its earlier resolution dated November 18, 1992, ruling that even before the amendatory law took effect, matters involving t bargaining agreements were already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, as set forth in Article 262 of the Labor Code. Hence, this petition.

As stated at the outset, petitioners fault the NLRC for issuing the assailed resolutions even when the resolution sought to be reconsidered had already attained finality upon Philtread's failure to timely move for its reconsideration. They posit that since the bailiff's return indicated May 5, 1992, as the date of receipt of the April 15, 1992 resolution by the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo, Philtread's counsel of record, then Philtread only had ten (10) calendar days or until May 15, 1992, within which to file a motion for reconsideration. Since Philtread indisputably failed to file any such motion within said period, petitioners deemed it highly irregular and capricious for the NLRC to still allow reconsideration of its April 15, 1992 resolution. The petition is impressed with merit. Time and again, this Court has been emphatic in ruling that the seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration within the 10-day reglementary period following the receipt by a party of any order, resolution or decision of the NLRC, is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such order, resolution or decision. 5 The statutory bases for this is found in Article 223 of the Labor Code 6 and Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. 7 In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that Philtread's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 15, 1992 resolution only on June 5, 1992, 8 or 31 days after receipt of said resolution. 9 It was thus incumbent upon the NLRC to have dismissed outright Philtread's late motion for reconsideration. By doing exactly the opposite its actuation was not only whimsical and capricious but also a demonstration of its utter disregard for its very own rules. Certiorari, therefore, lies. To be sure, it is settled doctrine that the NLRC, as an administrative and quasi-judicial body, is not bound by the rigid application of technical rules of procedure in the conduct of its proceedings. 10 However, the filing of a motion for reconsideration and filing it ON TIME are not mere technicalities of procedure. These are jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied with. Although there are exceptions to said rule, the case at bar presents no peculiar circumstances warranting a departure therefrom. The Court is aware of Philtread's obvious attempt to skirt the requirement for seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration by persuading us that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint. Jurisdiction, Philtread claims, lies instead with the voluntary arbitrator so that when the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC took cognizance of the case, their decisions thereon were null and void and, therefore, incapable of attaining finality. In short, Philtread maintains that the ten-day reglementary period could not have started running and, therefore, its motion could not be considered late The argument is not tenable. While we agree with the dictum that a void judgment cannot attain finality, said rule, however, is only relevant if the tribunal or body which takes cognizance of a particular subject matter indeed lacks jurisdiction over the same. In this case, the rule adverted to is misapplied for it is actually the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which possess jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint and NOT the voluntary arbitrator, as erroneously contended by Philtread.

In this regard, we observe that there is a confusion in the minds of both Philtread and the NLRC with respect to the proper jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. They appear to share the view that once the question involved is an interpretation or implementation of CBA provisions, which in this case is the re-employment clause, then the same necessarily falls within the competence of the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code. Respondents' posture is too simplistic and finds no support in law or in jurisprudence. When the issue concerns an interpretation or implementation of the CBA, one cannot immediately jump to the conclusion that jurisdiction is with the voluntary arbitrator. There is an equally important need to inquire further if the disputants involved are the union and the employer; otherwise, the voluntary arbitrator cannot assume jurisdiction. To this effect was the ruling of the Court in Sanyo Philippines Workers Union-PSSLU v. Canizares, 11 where we clarified the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator in this manner: "In the instant case, however, We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA, We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase 'grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies,' the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that '(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.' It is further provided in said article that the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties. It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators." Emphasis supplied) Since the contending parties in the instant case are not the union and Philtread, then pursuant to the Sanyo doctrine, it is not the voluntary arbitrator who can take cognizance of the complaint, notwithstanding Philtread's claim that the real issue is the interpretation of the CBA provision on reemployment. The Court, however, does not write finis to the discussion. A more important question arises: If the voluntary arbitrator could not have assumed jurisdiction over the case, did the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC validly acquire jurisdiction when both of them entertained the complaint?

A brief review of relevant statutory provisions is in order. We note that at the time petitioners filed their complaint for unfair labor practice, damages and attorney's fees on December 5, 1988, the governing provision of the Labor Code with respect to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC was Article 217 which states: "ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non- payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters." Articles 261 and 262, on the other hand, defined the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, viz.: "ART. 261. Grievance machinery. Whenever a grievance arises from the interpretation or implementation of a collective agreement, including disciplinary actions imposed on members of the bargaining unit, the employer and the bargaining representative shall meet to adjust the grievance. Where there is no collective agreement and in cases where the grievance procedure as provided herein does not apply, grievances shall be subject to negotiation, conciliation or arbitration as provided elsewhere in this Code. ART. 262. Voluntary arbitration. All grievances referred to in the immediately preceding Article which are not settled through the grievance procedure provided in the collective agreement shall be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in said agreement: Provided, That termination disputes shall be governed by Article 278 of this Code, as amended, unless the parties agree to submit them to voluntary arbitration." Under the above provisions then prevailing, one can understand why petitioners lodged their complaint for ULP with the Labor Arbiter. To their mind, Philtread's refusal to re-employ them was tantamount to a violation of the re-employment clause in the 1983 CBA which was also substantially reproduced in the

1986 CBA. At the time, any violation of the CBA was unqualifiedly treated as ULP of the employer falling within the competence of the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide. Thus: "ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: xxx xxx xxx

(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement." On March 21, 1989, however, Republic Act 6715, 12 or the so-called "Herrera-Veloso Amendments," took effect, amending several provisions of the Labor Code, including the respective jurisdictions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the voluntary arbitrator. As a result, the present jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is as follows: "ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non- agricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations; 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. (c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements." while that of the voluntary arbitrator is defined in this wise:

"ART. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. . . ." Emphasis supplied) "ART. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks." With the amendments introduced by RA 6715, it can be gleaned that the Labor Arbiter still retains jurisdiction over ULP cases. There is, however, a significant change: The unqualified jurisdiction conferred upon the Labor Arbiter prior to the amendment by RA 6715 has been narrowed down so that "violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice but as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. It is further stated that "gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement." Hence, for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie the concurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; and (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA.. In several instances prior to the instant case, the Court already made its pronouncement that RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. As such, we declared that it can be applied retroactively to pending cases. Thus in Briad Agro Development Corporation v. Dela Cerna, 13 we held: "Republic Act No. 6715, like its predecessors, Executive Order No. 111 and Article 217, as amended, has retroactive application. Thus, when this new law divested Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims, the divestment affected pending litigations. It also affected this particular case. (Note that under par. 6, where the claim does not exceed P5,000.00, regional directors have jurisdiction). In Garcia v. Martinez, we categorically held that amendments relative to the jurisdiction of labor arbiters (under Presidential Decree No. 1367, divesting the labor arbiter of jurisdiction) partake of the nature of curative statutes, thus: It now appears that at the time this case was decided the lower court had jurisdiction over Velasco's complaint although at the time it was filed said court was not clothed with such jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was cured by the issuance of the amendatory decree which is in the nature of a curative

statute with retrospective application to a pending proceeding, like Civil Case No. 9657 (See 82 C.J.S. 1004). Garcia has since been uniformly applied in subsequent cases. Thus, in Calderon v. Court of Appeals, reiterated that PD No. 1367 [is] curative and retrospective in nature. The Decision of this case, finally, acknowledged the retrospective characteristics of Executive Order No. 111. . . ." With the Briad ruling in place, the implication is that the qualified jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have been applied when the ULP complaint was still pending. This means that petitioners should have been required to show in their complaint the gross nature of the CBA violation, as well as the economic provision violated, without which the complaint would be dismissible. Herein lies the problem. The Court's appreciation of petitioners' cause of action is that, while it would make out a case for ULP, under present law, however, the same falls short of the special requirements necessary to make it cognizable by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Unsubstantiated conclusions of bad faith and unjustified refusal to re- employ petitioners, to our mind, do not constitute gross violation of the CBA for purposes of lodging jurisdiction with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Although evidentiary matters are not required (and even discouraged) to be alleged in a complaint, still, sufficient details supporting the conclusion of bad faith and unjust refusal to re-employ petitioners must be indicated. Furthermore, it is even doubtful if the CBA provision on re-employment fits into the accepted notion of an economic provision of the CBA. Thus, given the foregoing considerations, may the Briad doctrine be applied to the instant case and cause its dismissal for want of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC? Upon a careful and meticulous study of Briad, the Court holds that the rationale behind it does not apply to the present case. We adopt instead the more recent case of Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 14 where we refused to give retroactive application to Executive Order No. 797 which created the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Under said law, POEA was vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment," 15 which jurisdiction was originally conferred upon the Labor Arbiter. As in the instant case, the Labor Arbiter's assumption of jurisdiction therein was likewise questioned in view of the subsequent enactment of E.O. 797. In ruling against the retroactive application of the law, the Court explained its position as follows: "The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with 'original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment.' At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.

E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect. The case of Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela Cerna cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the case at bar. In Briad, the Court applied the exception rather than the general rule. In this case, Briad Agro Development Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment over cases involving workers' money claims, since Article 217 of the Labor Code, the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint, vested in the Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. The Court dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June 29, 1989. It ruled that the enactment of E.O. No. 111, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code, cured the Regional Director's lack of jurisdiction by giving the Labor Arbiter and the Regional Director concurrent jurisdiction over all cases involving money claims. However, on November 9, 1989, the Court, in a Resolution, reconsidered and set aside its June 29 Decision and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings, in view of the promulgation of Republic Act (R.A.) 6715 which divested the Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims. It bears emphasis that the Court accorded E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 a retroactive application because as curative statutes, they fall under the exceptions to the rule on prospectivity of laws. E.O. No. 111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the worker's access to the government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. This amendment, however, created a situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 6715 further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. Under R.A. 6715, the Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00. All other cases within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 are therefore curative statutes. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements. The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. . . ." We do not find any reason why the Court should not apply the above ruling to the case at bar, notwithstanding the fact that a different law is involved. Actually, this is not the first time that the Court refused to apply RA 6715 retroactively. 16 Our previous decisions on whether to give it retroactive application or not depended to a great extent on what amended provisions were under consideration, as well as the factual circumstances to which they were made to apply. In Briad, the underlying reason for applying RA 6715 retroactively was the fact that prior to its amendment, Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by then Executive Order No. 111, created a scenario where the Labor Arbiters and

the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) had overlapping jurisdiction over money claims. This situation was viewed as a defect in the law so that when RA No. 6715 was passed and delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and Regional Directors, the Court deemed it a rectification of such defect; hence, the conclusion that it was curative in nature and, therefore, must be applied retroactively. The same thing cannot be said of the case at bar. Like in Erectors, the instant case presents no defect in the law requiring a remedy insofar as the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator is concerned. There is here no overlapping of jurisdiction to speak of because matters involving interpretation and implementation of CBA provisions, as well as interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies, have always been determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator even prior to RA 6715. Similarly, all ULP cases were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. What RA 6715 merely did was to re-apportion the jurisdiction over ULP cases by conferring exclusive jurisdiction over such ULP cases that do not involve gross violation of a CBA's economic provision upon the voluntary arbitrator. We do not see anything in the act of re-apportioning jurisdiction curative of any defect in the law as it stood prior to the enactment of RA 6715. The Court view it as merely a matter of change in policy of the lawmakers, especially since the 1987 Constitution adheres to the preferential use of voluntary modes of dispute settlement. 17 This, instead of the inherent defect in the law, must be the rationale that prompted the amendment. Hence, we uphold the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter which attached to this case at the time of its filing on December 5, 1988. Finally, the contention that it was Atty. Gutierrez who exclusively represented Philtread and that the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo had been dissolved, are lame excuses to cast doubt on the propriety of service to Atty. Borreta. It must be noted that the complaint of petitioners was filed on December 5, 1988. Presumably, the preliminary conferences adverted to by Atty. Borreta, where Atty. Gutierrez supposedly declared that he was exclusively representing Philtread, transpired at around that date. The Court, however, is surprised to discover that the record bears a Notice of Change of Address dated March 12, 1990, filed by Atty. Gutierrez, indicating therein that the counsel for respondent (Philtread) was "Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo" whose address could be found at the "3rd Floor, Commodore Condominium Arquiza corner M. Guerrero Streets, Ermita, Manila." If, indeed, Atty. Gutierrez declared during the Labor Arbiter's proceedings that he was exclusively representing Philtread, why then did he use the firm's name, and its new address at that, in the aforementioned notice to the NLRC? Moreover, why did Atty. Borreta take fifteen days to file his Manifestation and inform the NLRC of the "improper" service of the resolution to him? Why did he not object immediately to the service by the bailiff? Considering that Atty. Gutierrez and Atty. Borreta were once partners in their law firm, it behooves Atty. Borreta to have at least advised his former partner of the receipt of the resolution. As a lawyer, his receipt of the adverse resolution should have alerted him of the adverse consequences which might follow if the same were not acted upon promptly, as what in fact happened here. As for Atty. Gutierrez, if the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez, and Leogardo were really dissolved, it was incumbent upon him not to have used the firm's name in the first place, or he should have withdrawn the appearance of the firm and entered his own appearance, in case the dissolution took place midstream. By failing to exercise either option, Atty. Gutierrez cannot now blame the NLRC for serving

its resolution at the address of the firm still on record. 18 To our mind, these excuses cannot camouflage the clever ploy of Philtread's counsel to earn a last chance to move for reconsideration. This Court, it bears emphasizing, is not impressed, but looks incredulously at such superficial moves. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the NLRC dated November 18, 1992, and April 7, 1993, are SET ASIDE, while its resolution dated April 15, 1992, is REINSTATED for immediate execution. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur. [1964V102E] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE L. CHUPECO, defendantappellant.1964 Mar 31En BancG.R. No. L-19568D E C I S I O N REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in its Crim. Case No. 14786) to the Court of Appeals, but which the latter court, pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, had certified to the Supreme Court as a case in which the jurisdiction of an inferior court is in issue. The accused-appellant, Jose L. Chupeco, was charged on 2 February 1951 before the Court of First Instance of Manila under the following information: "That on or about the 28th day of November, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being the owner of, and, having previously on the 24th day of July, 1946, executed a Chattel Mortgage on the following properties: "An open shed under construction to be used as sawmill building, containing an area of 350 sq. m. more or less, located at Sitio Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataan. SAWMILL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT: One 'Wheland' Circular sawmill No. 3 complete with carriage and w/60" inserted circular saw (new); One Gray Marine Full Diesel Engine 225 H.P. Serial No. 13835, Engine No. C-17040; One RD-14 Tractor with Bulldozer, motor No. 6719028; One D-6 Caterpillar tractor motor 626-134; One Clitract International Caterpilar Motor No. 2398-D; One Air compressor (Aray type); One complete set of welding instruments (local made); One Lathe machine F.E. Reed Co. Length 8' swing 8";

One planer for iron and steel F.E. Reed & Co.; One tracing machine and one vise (local made); TRANSPORTATION UNITS: One Chevrolet truck Model 1941 Motor No. KR-214658 1946 Plate No. 9794; One International Baby truck Model 1938 Motor No. ND-13-6470; One G.M.C. Army truck 6 x 6 Motor No. 70485739 Plate No. 10239; One Willys jeep Motor No. DP 2977 Plate No. 1512"; located at sitio Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataan, in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and choses in action were subsequently transferred to the herein complainant Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, an institution created and operating pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 85, with principal office at the City of Manila, Philippines, to secure a loan of P20,000.00 from said Agricultural and Industrial Bank, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (on the aforesaid date of 28th day of November, 1947, with intent to defraud the said Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and incumber, or cause to be pledged and incumbered the same personal properties to one Mateo B. Pinile without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term thereof and without the consent of the mortgagee bank written on the back of the mortgage, and, thereafter) knowingly transfer and remove, or cause to be transferred and removed the said properties to the municipality of Subic, Zambales, also without the written consent of the mortgagee bank, to the damage and prejudice of the said Rehabilitation Finance Corporation in the sum of P15,935.80, Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the aforesaid mortgage." The accused moved to quash the foregoing information on the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no jurisdiction. Upon denial of the motion, the accused was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty. After the case was partly tried, the defense counsel and the fiscal entered into an agreement to have the information amended to the effect that the charge be only for removal of properties mortgaged, eliminating the portion referring to pledging already pledged property. The information, however, remained un-amended. The accused then filed a motion to dismiss invoking the agreement, but the court denied it, and ordered that the case be tried on the charge "of having pledged property which had been previously pledged or mortgaged". After trial, the court found the accused guilty of the said offense, and imposed a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. Not satisfied, the accused interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, but the said court certified the case to the Supreme Court, as formerly stated. The accused attacks the jurisdiction of the trial court on the strength of the agreement with the fiscal to discard the charge of repledging or reincumbering the chattels already mortgaged to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, thus leaving in force only the accusation of having transferred the encumbered

property from Bataan to Zambales without the consent of the mortgagee. It is argued that since the place where the chattels were, as well as the site to which they were moved, are both outside of Manila, the courts of the latter acquired no jurisdiction to try the case, because the offense was not committed within the Manila territory. We find this stand without merit. The original terms of the charge averred (and it is not disputed) the crime of repledging already encumbered property without the creditor's consent, and one of the essential ingredients of the offense (the execution of the first mortgage) having been alleged to have taken place in Manila, the court of first instance of that city acquired jurisdiction over the offense under the Rules of Court (People vs. Mission, 48 O.G., 1331; Rule 110, section 9). It is well-established that once vested, the jurisdiction is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation (McClain vs. Kansas City Bridge Co., 83 SW, 2d, 132; Shankle vs. Ingram, 45 S.E. 578; Walton vs. Mardeville Dowling & Co., 5 NW. 776), which in this case amounted to no more than an avowal by the prosecution that it could not establish the other elements of the offense. Furthermore, the court actually rejected the defense motion to dismiss, and directed that the case be tried on the original charge of repledging property already encumbered. The accused obeyed that directive, and by so doing it renounced the claim that the information had been so amended as to discard that particular averment. But the fatal error in the decision appealed from is its disregard of the fact that the evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the Bank are the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinili. In fact, the Office of the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the accused on this very ground (Brief, pp. 10-11). There is no question that the herein accused executed in the City of Manila a Chattel Mortgage, Exhibit "D", on the properties located in Bataan and listed in the information in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank on 24 July 1946; and that the accused pledged or encumbered, in the City of Manila, on 28 November 1947 the properties listed in Exhibit "E", which are as follows: "One (1) sawmill with gray marine engine 125 H.P. circular saw and all appurtenances, implements and parts, also building, camarin and housing improvements under Tax No. 1260-V for 1947, assessed at P8,000.00 paid under O.R. No. 59318, dated May 14, 1947, Dinalupihan, Bataan; "One (1) bulldozer H.D.-14, with dozer, Make: Allis-Chalmers, Eng. No. 3251541; "Two (2) cargo trucks (6 x 6), Eng. No. 220314218-Reg. No. 17094 and Eng. 220359225-Reg. No. 17093." However, there is nothing in the evidence to show that the properties listed in Exhibit "D" and in the information are the same properties listed in Exhibit "E". The descriptions are materially different. An essential element common to the two acts punished under Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or repledged, as the case may be, should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged or pledged before such removal or repledging. Therefore, even if the Court of First

Instance of Manila had jurisdiction over the case, the accused cannot be found guilty on the evidence on record of the crime for which he stands indicted. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decisions is hereby reversed, and another one entered acquitting the accused Jose L. Chupeco. No pronouncement as to costs. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

[2004V974] AMANDO G. SUMAWANG, Petitioner, versus ENGR. ERIC D. DE GUZMAN, Respondent.2004 Sept 82nd DivisionG.R. No. 150106D E C I S I O N CALLEJO, SR., J.: On June 8, 1999, Engineer Eric de Guzman, as plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, against Amando G. Sumawang, for unlawful detainer with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3778. The plaintiff alleged therein that the President of the Philippines issued, on August 19, 1988, Emancipation Patent No. 288843 in his favor, over a parcel of agricultural land, designated as Lot 33, with an area of 9,970 square meters, located in Macatcatuit, Guimba, Nueva Ecija; on December 12, 1988, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) EP No. 31683 over the landholding; thereafter, he leased a portion of the property to the defendant where the latter constructed a small hut, and remitted the rentals therefor; in the early part of 1999, the defendant failed to pay the agreed rentals for the landholding based on said patent; despite his demand on March 10, 1999, the defendant failed to vacate the property; and no amicable settlement of the matter was arrived at by the parties in the Office of the Barangay Captain. The plaintiff prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to vacate the property and to pay damages and attorneys fees. In his answer to the complaint, the defendant alleged that Gloria Zulueta Rominquit was the owner of a large tract of agricultural land, designated as Lot 1402, which was placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; he cultivated a portion of the property and was one of the farmers-beneficiaries of the landholding, as listed in the Office of the Municipal Agrarian Reform; sometime in 1965, he swapped the portion of the property he was cultivating with Lot 33 which was cultivated by Antonio Ferrer and, thenceforth, he had been cultivating the same lot; in 1994, he built a house of strong materials in the property where he and his family resided; he sought the assistance of his first cousin, Judge Felix de Guzman, the father of the plaintiff, to secure a patent and title over the property in his name but the plaintiff, who was the son of Judge De Guzman and an engineer by profession and a non-resident of Guimba, secured through fraud an emancipation patent and title over the property in his name. The defendant interposed the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the action and the subject matter thereof, and prayed that the complaint be dismissed on those grounds; and that he be awarded damages and attorneys fees.

The plaintiff adduced evidence that per Parcellary Mapping Survey (PMS) No. 067, the subject property owned by Rominquit was designated Lot 12011, with an area of 9,100 square meters, covered by Certificate of Land Title (CLT) No. 0114427 issued to Antonio Ferrer, the farmer-beneficiary thereof; but per final survey, the property was designated as Lot 33, with an area of 9,970 square meters; he was granted Emancipation Patent No. 288843 over Lot 33 and on the basis of said patent, TCT EP No. 31683 was issued by the Register of Deeds. He declared the property under his name under Tax Declaration No. 94-10032-00515, free of any encumbrance, after paying the amortizations due to the Land Bank of the Philippines; and that, during the period from 1991 to 1997, he employed the plaintiff as farmerworker to whom he remitted sums of money for the expenses for the cultivation of the property such as soil, fertilizer, seedlings, rentals for a rotorator, etc. The defendant, for his part, presented certifications from the former barangay captains that, since 1969, he had been the tenant on the farmland covered by CLT No. 0114427 under the name of Antonio Ferrer, the beneficiary of the property; and that, in 1987, he built a house of strong materials thereon; in 1991, the plaintiff, through his father, Judge Felix de Guzman, suggested a sharing system between the plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the plaintiff will provide monetary assistance for the expenses for the cultivation of the property by the defendant and would share in the produce thereof and net of expenses. On June 27, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter to: 1. Vacate the property and to remove his hut/house erected thereon;

2. Pay plaintiff reasonable rental for the use of the property at the rate of P500.00 per month from March 12, 1999 until he finally vacates the same; 3. 4. Reimburse plaintiff P170.00 representing the amount spent for filing fees; and Pay the costs of suit.[1]

The trial court ruled that the defendant was not the legitimate tenant-beneficiary over the property, as certified by the Office of the Municipal Agrarian Reform, but Antonio Ferrer, who transferred the property to the plaintiff; and that there was no landlord-tenant relationship over the property between the plaintiff and the defendant; hence, it had jurisdiction over the action. The defendant appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which rendered judgment on October 9, 2000, reversing the decision of the MTC. The RTC ruled that, based on the facts on record, the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant was an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB).

The plaintiff, then the petitioner, filed a petition for review of the decision with the Court of Appeals (CA), which rendered judgment on September 25, 2001, reversing the decision of the RTC and reinstating the decision of the MTC. The appellate court held that it was not prepared, based on the record, to hold that the petitioner was the agricultural tenant of the respondent therein. The respondent therein, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court contending that: 1. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion, that it is not prepared to declare petitioner-appellant not (sic) a tenant (p. 128, Records), concluding that petitioners occupation of subject land is by mere tolerance of private respondent and without any contract between them, petitioner-appellant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand (p. 129, Records) (italics, ours); 2. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not taking cognizance of the doctrine of estoppel, as against the private respondent-appellee (pp. 7-8, Comments to Petition for Review); 3. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not applying the provisions of R.A. 6657 (New CARP Law), as applied by the court ad quem, considering that the petitioner-appellant has met the six (6) requirements that concur to make a tenancy relationship (pp. 6-8, Comments to Petition for Review).[2] The petitioner asserts that he had been a farmer-beneficiary of the land since 1965 and even after the respondent fraudulently secured title over the property, the latter allowed him to cultivate the property and supplied him with farm inputs and implements; the respondent also shared with him the harvests therefrom on a 50-50 basis, net of costs of production. The petitioner asserts that, under the factual milieu, he was the agricultural tenant of the respondent and not merely his farm worker. Hence, the dispute between them is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB as held by the RTC, and not the MTC, as ruled by the CA. The threshold issue is whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. The resolution of the issue is anchored on our resolution of the issue of whether or not the petitioner was the agricultural tenant of the respondent or merely the latters farm worker. The petition has no merit. The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter on the existence of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.[3] In Basco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation,[4] we had ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.[5] Once jurisdiction is vested,

the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.[6] The Municipal Trial Court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.[7] But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy.[8] If, after hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.[9] In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[10] we held that: Indeed, a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. As we ruled in Chico v. Court of Appeals: "Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is essential to create a de jure leasehold or tenancy relationship between the parties. This de jure relationship, in turn, is the terra firma for a security of tenure between the landlord and the tenant. The leasehold relationship is not brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial." Thus, the intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important. The requisites of a tenancy relationship are as follows: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.[11] In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his claim that he had been installed by the respondent as agricultural tenant on the landholding. He relied solely on his bare claim that he and the respondent, through the latters father, Judge Felix de Guzman, had agreed for the petitioner to be the agricultural tenant of the respondent, sharing the produce therefrom on a 50-50 basis, net of costs of production. There is no evidence on record that, indeed, the respondent had authorized his father to enter into such an agreement with the petitioner. In Valencia v. Court of Appeals,[12] we held that the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner. For Judge de Guzman to be able to install the petitioner as agricultural tenant, he must be specifically authorized by the respondent. The petitioner failed to adduce a morsel of evidence that he received a share of the produce of the property from the respondent.

The petitioners reliance on the lists of expenses, incurred by the respondent for the cultivation of the property, is misplaced. In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[13] citing Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[14] we emphasized that: The respondents self-serving statements regarding tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working on anothers landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. There must be substantial evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. Thus: Nor is there any basis for petitioners claim that he is an agricultural tenant. One of the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship is sharing, by the landowner and tenant, of the produce and no proof of this fact has been shown in this case. As we have held: All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites does not make the alleged tenant a de jure tenant as contradistinguished from a de facto tenant. To prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented. Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced.[15] IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED. WE CONCUR: [2005V1304] YUSUKE FUKUZUME,* Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.2005 Nov 112nd DivisionG.R. No. 143647D E C I S I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 146 dated October 21, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-083, finding herein accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years and to pay private complainant the sum of P424,000.00; and the CA Resolution dated June 16, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.*2+ The facts of the case are as follows: Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires.[3] Sometime in July 1991, Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate,[4] who was the vicepresident of Manila Electric Company, went to the house of herein accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in Paraaque.[5] Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation (Furukawa) and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires.[6]

Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).*7+ Believing Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume.[8] The initial agreed purchase price was P200,000.00.[9] Yu gave Fukuzume sums of money on various dates which eventually totaled P290,000.00, broken down as follows: P50,000.00, given on July 12, 1991; P20,000.00, given on July 22, 1991; P50,000.00, given on October 14, 1991; and, P170,000.00, given on October 18, 1991.[10] Fukuzume admitted that he received the same from Yu and that he still owes him the amount of P290,000.00.[11] To support his claim that the aluminum scrap wires being sold are indeed owned by Furukawa, that these scrap wires are with NAPOCOR, and that Furukawas authorized representatives are allowed to withdraw and dispose of said scrap wires, Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991 purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel by the name of R. Y. Rodriguez.[12] At the time that Fukuzume gave Yu the second certification, he asked money from the latter telling him that it shall be given as gifts to some of the people in NAPOCOR. Yu gave Fukuzume money and, in exchange, the latter issued two checks, one for P100,000.00 and the other for P34,000.00.[13] However, when Yu deposited the checks, they were dishonored on the ground that the account from which the checks should have been drawn is already closed.[14] Subsequently, Yu called up Fukuzume to inform him that the checks bounced.[15] Fukuzume instead told him not to worry because in one or two weeks he will give Yu the necessary authorization to enable him to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires from NAPOCOR.[16] On January 17, 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter of even date, signed by the Director of the Overseas Operation and Power Transmission Project Divisions of Furukawa, authorizing Fukuzume to dispose of excess aluminum conductor materials which are stored in their depots in Tanay and Bulacan.[17] Thereafter, Fukuzume agreed to accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound.[18] When Yu arrived at the NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date, Fukuzume was nowhere to be found.[19] Hence, Yu proceeded to show the documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. However, the people from NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter issued by Furukawa dated January 17, 1992.[20] NAPOCOR also refused to acknowledge the certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991 claiming that these are spurious as the person who signed these documents is no longer connected with NAPOCOR as of December 1991.[21] Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to Fukuzume and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid him.*22+ Fukuzume promised to return Yus money.*23+ When Fukuzume failed to comply with his undertaking, Yu sent him a demand letter asking for the refund of P424,000.00 plus loss of profits.[24] Subsequently, Yu filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).[25] In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as follows: That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make false representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the duly authorized

representative of Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., in the Philippines, and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used by Napocor and Furukawa, the accused knowing full well that those representations were false and were only made to induce and convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy said materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave and delivered the total amount of P424,000.00 but the accused once in possession of the money, far from complying with his obligation to deliver said aluminum conductor materials to herein complainant, with intent of gain, unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, applied and used for his own personal use and benefit the said amount and despite repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y Ng in the aforementioned amount of P424,000.00. CONTRARY TO LAW.[26] Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty.[27] Trial ensued. In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and hereby orders him to suffer the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years. With respect to his civil liability, accused is hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount of P424,000.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid. SO ORDERED.[28] Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, Fukuzume filed an appeal with the CA. On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court but modifying the penalty imposed, thus: although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years, it failed to determine the minimum penalty for the offense committed (prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period but imposed in the maximum period), hence, the penalty is modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as the minimum, to not more than twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.[29] Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, except for the aforementioned modification in the prison term of appellant, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.[30] Hence, herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE WAS EXECUTED PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN NOVATED AND CONVERTED INTO A MERE DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP, THEREBY EXTINGUISHING THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY THEREOF, IF ANY.[31] We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged. The CA ruled: The trial court of Makati has jurisdiction. Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (Rule 110, Sec. 15, Rules of Court). Although the false representation and verbal contract of sale of the aluminum scrap wires took place at appellants residence in Paraaque, appellant and private complainant nevertheless admitted that the initial payment of P50,000.00 for said transaction was made at the Hotel Intercontinental in Makati City (Record, pp. 15, 68). Hence, an element of the crime that the offended party was induced to part with his money because of the false pretense occurred within the jurisdiction of the lower court giving it jurisdiction over the instant case. The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI on April 19, 1994[32] and the affidavit of Fukuzume which was subscribed on July 20, 1994.[33] With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged therein that on July 12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in Paraaque. Yu testified thus: Q Mr. Witness, you testified the last time that you know the accused in this case, Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume? A Q A Yes, sir. Now, would you enlighten us under what circumstance you came to know the accused? I know the accused Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume through Mr. Hubati.

Q A

And why or how did Mr. Hubati come to know the accused, if you know? Mr. Hubati came to my place dealing with the aluminum scrap wires.

ATTY. N. SERING Your Honor, may I move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive to the question. COURT Please wait until the answer is completed. Q A Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How? He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires. FISCAL E. HIRANG Q A When was that, Mr. Witness? That was in 1991, sir. COURT When? FISCAL E. HIRANG Your Honor please, may the witness be allowed to consult his memorandum. A Q A July 12, 1991, sir. And what transpired during that time you met Mr. Hubati? We went to the house of Mr. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some amount of money.

Q Now, would you tell the Court the reason why you parted to the accused in this case the amount of money? A In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents to that effect.

Q Now, please tell us what really was that transaction that took place at the house of Mr. Fukuzume on that particular date? A Our agreement with Mr. Hubati and with Mr. Fukuzume is that, I am going to give money in payment of the aluminum scrap wires coming from Furukawa Eletric Company. Q A How much is the amount of money which you agreed to give to the accused? Our first agreement was for P200,000.

Where is that aluminum scrap located?

A The electric aluminum scrap wires was or were under the care of the National Power Corporation but according to Mr. Fukuzume it belongs to Furukawa Electric Company. Q In short, Mr. Witness, on July 12, 1991, you only gave to the accused the amount of P50,000?

ATTY. N. SERING Objection, Your Honor. FISCAL E. HIRANG The complainant testified he gave P50,000. I am asking how much the complainant gave to the accused on that particular date. A Q A On July 12, I gave him P50,000 on that date. Not P200,000? No, sir.[34]

Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.[35] More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.[36] Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals,[37] we held in the fairly recent case of Macasaet vs. People[38] that: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[39] mphasis supplied) Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it to take jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment.[40]

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: 1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. 2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. 3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means. 4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[41] The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yus sworn statement or to prove that any of the aboveenumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latters house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money. The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself alleged in his affidavit dated July 20, 1994 that in an unspecified date, he received P50,000.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we cannot rely on this affidavit for the reason that it forms part of the records of the preliminary investigation and, therefore, may not be considered evidence. It is settled that the record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case in the RTC.[42] In People vs. Crispin,[43] this Court held that the fact that the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to

take judicial notice of the same.[44] Since neither prosecution nor defense presented in evidence Fukuzumes affidavit, the same may not be considered part of the records, much less evidence. From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.[45] Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.[46] While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,[47] wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case. Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised in the present petition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888 are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146. Criminal Case No. 95-083 is DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED. [1995V655] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/Col. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO, respondents.1995 Oct 111st DivisionG.R. Nos. 118013-14D E C I S I ON DAVIDE, JR., J.: At issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether it is the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City or the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom

with murder wherein some of the accused implicated as principals are members of the Philippine National Police (PNP). On 13 January 1994 two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of the PNP, namely, P/Col. Nicolas m. Torres, P/Insp. Adonis C. Abeto, Police officers Mario Lamis, Jose Pahayupan, and Vicente Canuday, Jr.; the other nine are civilians. The informations, later docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in Branch 47 of the said court, are similarly worded, except as to the names of the victims, who are Rufino Gargar, Jr. in the first case and Danilo Lumangyao in the second, thus: The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANGAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION), POLICE COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECTION AND/OR INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA AND EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER, committed as follows: That during the period beginning in the late afternoon of August 6, 1992 and ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and concurring in a common criminal intent and execution thereof with one another, save for the accessories for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353, 000.00, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously to wit: Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking advantage of his position as Station Commander of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City Station, with the direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian (police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime Gargallano, also taking advantage of their respective positions, and Dominador Geroche, concurring and affirming in the said criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain one RUFINO GANGAR, JR. (Criminal Case No. 94-15562) and DANILO LUMANGYAO (Criminal Case No. 94-15563), shortly thereafter at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of August 7, 1992, failing in their aforesaid common purpose to extort money and in furtherance of said conspiracy, evident premeditation and treachery nocturnity and the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victims, while being handcuffed and blindfolded; that accused Cesar Pecha and Edgar Hilado, with knowledge that the said Gangar [and Lumangyao, in Crime. Case No. 94-15563 were victims] of violence, did then and there secretly bury the corpses in a makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the crime of murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00 each; aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to the heirs of said victims, to wit: P 50,000.00 - as indemnity for death;

50,000.00 - actual damages; 300,000.00 - compensatory damages (lost income); 100,000.00 - moral damages; 50,000.00 - exemplary damages. CONTRARY TO LAW (Articles 268 and 248 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code). 1 These cases were consolidated. Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Later, they filed their respective motions for bail. At the hearings thereof, the prosecution presented state witness Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the commission of the complex crimes. After the completion of his testimony, the trial court, per Judge Edgar G. Garvilles, granted bail in favor of only six of the accused, namely, P/Insp. Adonis Abeto, Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr., Charles Dumancas, Edgar Hilado, and Cesar Pecha. The other eight accused who were denied bail are now detained at the City Jail of Bacolod City. 2 Through the testimony of Grandeza, the prosecution established that in response to the complaint of spouses Charles and Jeanette Dumancas, P/Col. Nicolas Torres instructed his men to look for Rufino Gangar and Danilo Lumangyao who were allegedly members of the group that had swindled the Dumancas spouses On 6 August 1992, police Officer Mario Lamis, together with civilian agents, namely, Teody Delgado, Edwin Divinagracia, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando Fernandez, and Moises Grandeza, arrested and abducted the two swindling suspects. Conformably with Torres's order, the two suspects were brought to Dragon Lodge Motel. There, they were investigated by Police Inspector Adonis Abeto and Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr. They were then taken to the Ceres Compound, where Jeanette Dumancas identified Lumangyao as a member of the group that had swindled her. She then asked about the money that the group had received from her. Upon being told by Lumangyao that the money had already been divided among his partners long time ago, she said to the accused, specifically to Dominador Geroche: "Doming, bring these two to the PC or police and I will call Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could be filed against them." Thereafter, the two suspects were transferred to D' Hacienda Motel, then to Moonlit Inn, then to Casa Mel Lodge, and back to D' Hacienda Motel, where the two were shot and killed. The team forthwith went to the office of P/Col. Torres and reported that the killing had been done. The latter told them: "You who are here inside, nobody knows what you have done, but you have to hide because the NBI's are after you." 3 Thereafter, the prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to receive the evidence for the accused. Accused Torres and Abeto presented their respective evidence. Presentation of evidence by the other accused was, however, suspended because of the motions of several accused for the inhibition of judge Garvilles . Despite opposition by the prosecution, Judge Garvilles voluntarily inhibited

himself from further hearing both cases, which were thereafter re-raffled to Branch 54, presided by herein public respondent Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes. On 24 June 1994, the private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that, pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994 in Republic of the Philippines vs. Asuncion 4 the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. In his Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Transmit Records, the State Prosecutor adopted the motion of the private prosecutors. 5 In its order of 15 August 1994, 6 the trial court, thru the respondent Judge, ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject cases because the informations do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. Citing People vs. Montilla, 7 it held that the allegation in the informations that the accused PNP officers took advantage of their office in the commission of the offense charged is merely an allegation of an aggravating circumstance. It further stated that a public office is not a constituent element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense intimately connected with the office. It then denied the motion for transfer of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the case should continue. Relying on People vs . Montejo, 8 the prosecution moved to reconsider the said order. 9 On 7 September 1994, 10 the trial court issued an order denying the motion because People vs. Montejo is not applicable, since in that case there was (a) an intimate connection between the offense charged and the public position of the accused and (b) a total absence of personal motive; whereas, in these cases, no such intimate connection exists and the informations emphasize that the accused were moved by selfish motives of ransom and extortion. The respondent Judge then resumed the reception of the evidence for the other accused. Accused Gargallano, Fernandez, Lamis, Delgado, and Geroche, as well as his three witnesses, had already completed their respective testimonies when, upon motion of the prosecution, the respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself on 15 September 1994. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of the RTC of Bacolod City. On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the office of the Solicitor General, filed with us a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. On 12 December 1994, we required the respondents to comment on petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the public respondent or his successor to desist from proceeding with the trial of the subject cases. 11 On 27 February 1995, after considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the petition as well as in the comments of the private respondents, we gave due course to the petition and required

the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Most of them submitted their memoranda, while the petitioner and some of the private respondents adopted their initiatory pleadings as their memoranda. On 22 March 1995, private respondent Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas filed an urgent motion for the grant of bail, 12 which we noted on 15 May 1995. 13 Deliberating on the arguments adduced by the parties, we are convinced that public respondent Judge Magallanes committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that it is his court and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the two cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder. At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was Section 4 of P.D. No. 16O6, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which pertinently provides as follows: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code: (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses, or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction: (1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction. (2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, in their respective jurisdiction. xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees. Applying this section, we held in Aguinaldo vs. Domagas 14 that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees under

Section 4 (a) (2) above it is not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their office. We reiterated this pronouncement in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 15 Natividad vs. Felix, 16 and Republic vs. Asuncion. 17 In Sanchez, we restated the principle laid down in Montilla vs. Hilario 18 that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office, or if the office is a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. We also reiterated the principle in People vs. Montejo 19 that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and we further intimated that the fact that the offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information. 20 There is no dispute that the prescribed penalties for the offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 before the court below are higher than prision correcional or imprisonment for more than six years. The only question that remains to be resolved then is whether the said offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. Relying on its evidence and on the Montejo case, the petitioner submits that the crimes charged in the subject cases were connected with public office because the accused PNP officers, together with the civilian agents, arrested the two swindling suspects in the course of the performance of their duty and not out of personal motive, and if they demanded from the two suspects the production of the money of the Dumancas spouses and later killed the two, they did so in the course of the investigation conducted by them as policemen. The petitioner further asserts that the allegations in the informations reading "taking advantage of his position as Station Commander of the Philippine National Police" and "taking advantage of their respective positions" presuppose the exercise of the functions attached to the office of the accused PNP officers and are sufficient to show that the offenses charged were committed in relation to their office. The petitioner then concludes that the cases below fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, 21 and not by the result of evidence after trial. 22 In Montejo 23 where the amended information alleged: Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and . . . special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo, which is under his command . . . supervision and control, where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office; besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime; thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused. Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped, and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial. The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective positions" incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses committed in relation to public office." In Montilla vs. Hilario, 24 such an allegation was considered merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance, 25 and not as one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. It says: But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime. Also, in Bartolome vs. People of the Philippines, 26 despite the allegation that the accused public officers committed the crime of falsification of official document by "taking advantage of their official positions," this Court held that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because "[t]he information [did] not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense." Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court 27 and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner. In Dumancas's and Torres's motions for the early resolution of this case and in Abeto's Supplement to Comment with Motion to Dismiss all filed in July 1995, it is contended that even assuming that the informations do charge the accused PNP officers with crimes committed in relation to their office, still the Regional Trial Court would have jurisdiction over the subject cases in view of the amendments to Section 4 of P.D. No. 16O6, as amended, introduced by R.A. No. 7975, which was approved on 3O March 1995, whose Section 2 provides: SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4.

Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (l) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sanggunian panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the Sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the office of the Ombudsman special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or - controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them. mphasis supplied). As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, 28 as amended; R.A. No. 1379; 29 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; 30 it retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally, national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758). Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty, viz., that which is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above. However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 31 2, 32 14, 33 and 14-A. 34 The respondents maintain that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 because none of the five PNP officers involved therein occupy the rank of chief superintendent or higher, or are classified as Grade "27" or higher under R.A. No. 6758 and of the five, P/Col. Nicolas Torres has the highest rank, viz., Senior Superintendent whose salary grade under the said Act is Grade "18." Assuming then for the sake of argument that the informations in the said cases allege that the crimes charged were committed by the five PNP officers in relation to their office, it would appear indubitable that the cases would fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 7975: In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent 35 or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial

Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129." However, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 36 Under the above assumption then, the cases should have been filed with the Sandiganbayan since at the time the informations were filed, the governing law was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861. But, would that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan be affected by R.A. No. 7975? Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. 37 Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation. In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed not before it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing assumption that the informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet, the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. That section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan. It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to the Regional trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section 2 thereof. As regards the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette Dumancas and Nicolas Torres, the same must fail. Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. - (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein. (b) Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the application therefor may be filed only in the particular court where the case is pending, whether for preliminary investigation, trial, or on appeal.

(c ) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held. In the instant case, the motions for bail filed by the said accused-respondents with the Regional Trial Court where the cases against them are pending were denied sometime in February, 1994. In Enrile vs. Salazar, 38 as reiterated in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 39 this Court said: "only after that remedy [petition to be admitted to bail] was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court [be] invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there." There is no showing that the said accused-respondents have question the denial of their applications for bail in a petition for certiorari either before the Court of Appeals or this Court. It was only on 26 December 1994, when they filed their respective comments on the instant petition, that they challenged the denial premised on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was not strong. Even if their respective Comment and Reiteration of Motion for Bail 40 and respondent Dumancas's Motion for Bail 41 filed on 22 March 1995, were treated as petitions for certiorari, still the same would not prosper for not having been seasonably filed. While the Rules of Court does not fix a time - frame for the filing of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, existing jurisprudence requires that the same be filed within a reasonable period of time from receipt of the questioned judgment or order. 42 And, in Philec Workers' Union vs. Hon. Romeo A. Young 43 it was held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should be filed within a reasonable period of three months from notice of the decision or order. Here, about nine to ten months had already elapsed before the respondents assailed the denial of their motions for bail. In any event, the private respondents who were denied bail are not precluded from reiterating before the trial court their plea for admission to bail. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged orders are AFFIRMED, and the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette Dumancas and Nicolas Torres are DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued on 12 December 1994 is LIFTED, and the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City is directed to immediately resume the hearings of Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 and to thereafter resolve them with reasonable and purposeful dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur. Separate Opinions PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

While I agree with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that the two (2) informations subject of the present petition should remain in the Regional Trial Court, I arrive at this conclusion based solely on the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7975. It is my considered opinion, unlike the majority, that the accused PNP personnel committed the crime alleged in the two (2) informations in relation to their office. The wording of the two (2) informations clearly shows that P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres used his authority over his subordinate officers when he ordered them to arrest the two (2) swindling suspects/victims in connection with the complaint of the Dumancas spouses. This act of Torres is undoubtedly "intimately connected" with his position as Station Commander of the PNP, Bacolod Station. In turn, the other accused PNP personnel who detained the two (2) victims were performing their functions as law enforcers under orders from, their direct superior. Under such circumstances, the two (2) informations would have been properly filed with the Sandiganbayan since the law in force at the time was P.D. No. 1606 which gave the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction cover offenses committed by law is higher than prision correctional or imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00. The above view notwithstanding, Rep. Act No. 7975 has revised the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under said revised jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Courts now have jurisdiction over offenses committed by PNP officers with ranks below that of superintendent or its equivalent, whether or not the offenses are committed in relation to their office. In the present case, none of the accused PNP officers has the rank of superintendent or higher. Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 7975 also provides that upon effectivity of said Act, all criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606 where trial has not begun in said court, shall be referred to the proper courts. In the present case, even if the criminal cases were then within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offenses having been committed in relation to the accuseds' office, as earlier discussed, yet, the cases were not filed in said court. Since the cases now fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the express provisions of Rep. Act No. 7975, they can remain in said regional trial court. On the issue of whether accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should be granted bail, I agree with Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan that the Court should exercise its discretion, disregard technicalities and rule on the motion for bail filed with this Court. Accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should, in my view, be released on bail for the following reasons: 1. The spouses Dumancas were included in the informations as accused merely because they were the ones who complained to the police that the two (2) victims had swindled them. There is no showing that the spouses knew, much less instigated, the kidnapping and murder of the victims. Of note is a portion of the testimony of the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator turned state witness, Moises Grandeza, where he declared that Jeanette Dumancas told accused Dominador Geroche to bring the two (2) swindling suspects to the police station and that she would call a certain Atty. Geocadin so the

proper cases could be filed against them. Such statements of Dumancas indicate lack of any criminal intent unless the contrary is later proven during the trial. 2. The situation of Jeanette Dumancas is no different from that of her husband who was granted bail by the trial court. 3. Jeanette Dumancas came back from abroad even after the charges against her had been filed. Certainly, this is not indicative of a probability of her later jumping bail should she be released on bail. 4. To deny bail to a mother of two (2) minor children in the absence of direct evidence that she was indeed a principal by inducement as alleged in the two (2) informations, is antagonistic not only to her constitutional right to bail but also to the ideals and demands of a just and humane society. <b>KAPUNAN, J., concurring and dissenting:</b> I fully agree with much of what my esteemed colleague, Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. has written in this case. However, at least with respect to petitioner Jeanette Dumancas, I think this Court, mainly for humanitarian reasons, should exercise its discretion to grant said petitioner her constitutional right to bail, pending the determination of her guilt or innocence in the trial court. The facts so far established in the case at bench with respect to the spouses Dumancas as narrated in the court's opinion simply show that they were civilians who complained to the authorities (respondents herein) to the effect that they were swindled by Rufino Gangar and Danilo Lumangyao, the alleged murder-kidnapping victims. After respondent Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas identified them, the lone witness for the prosecution in this case testified that she requested the accused, specifically Domingo Geroche to "bring (the two men) to the PC or police" so that she could in the meantime locate her attorney for the purpose of filing the proper charges against them. Possibly out of sheer over zealouseness, or for reasons not yet established in the trial court, both men were brought elsewhere and shot. Thus, apparently, the only reason why the spouses were charged as principals by inducement was because, as possible victims of a group of alleged swindlers, they initiated-through their apparently legitimate complaint - the chain of events which led to the death of the victims in the case at bench. This narration clearly casts enough doubt regarding the strength of the evidence of guilt against Mrs. Dumancas, which ought to be sufficient, for us to exercise our discretion to grant bail in her case. The trial court has already refused to grant her petition for bail, which under the facts and circumstances so far available to the lower court, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion, subject to this court's action. While I agree that normally, a motion for reconsideration should be addressed to the trial court or to the Court of Appeals (if the said motion were denied by the lower court), I see no reason why, here and now, we should not exercise our discretion, for compelling humanitarian reasons, to grant Mrs. Dumancas her constitutional right to bail. Firstly, she is the mother of two minor children, aged seven (7) and one (1) years old, who have been deprived of her care for over a year. Second, even with the knowledge that she would face possible arrest, she came back to the country from abroad, risking incarceration in order to face the charges against her.

Without prejudice to whatever the lower court would in the course of hearing the case, deem appropriate, I vote to grant Mrs. Dumancas petition for bail.

[2005V861] [1/2] ISIDRO OLIVAREZ,Petitioner, versus COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.2005 Jul 291st DivisionG.R. No. 163866D E C I S I O N YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: For review is the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 22860[1] which affirmed the judgment[2] rendered by the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93,[3] in Crim. Case No. 0505-SPL finding petitioner Isidro Olivarez guilty of violating Section 5, Republic Act No. 7610;[4] and its resolution denying reconsideration thereof.[5] The case originated from a complaint filed by the offended party with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna which was the basis upon which an information for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against Isidro Olivarez, to wit: The undersigned 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecution (sic) of Laguna upon a sworn complaint filed by the private complainant, CRISTINA B. ELITIONG, hereby accuses ISIDRO OLIVAREZ of the crime of VIOLATION OF RA 7610, committed as follows: That on or about July 20, 1997, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused actuated by lewd design did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation commit acts of lasciviousness on the person of one CRISTINA B. ELITIONG, by touching her breasts and kissing her lips, against her will, to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW.[6] The established facts of this case are as follows: ... The offended party Cristina Elitiong was a 16-year old high school student who with her brothers were employed by the accused, 64-year old Isidro Olivarez, in the making of sampaguita garlands. For one year she had been reporting for work during weekends at the residence of the accused. Within the compound and at about three armslength from the main door of the house was her workplace. At about 11:30 oclock in the morning of July 20, 1997, Cristina, her two brothers Macoy and Dodong, and one named Liezel were at their work when the accused who was near the main door called for her. She dutifully approached him. The accused asked her if she had told her mother that he gave her money, and when she said that she did not, he embraced her and held her breast. The workers were facing the street so that the two were not seen. He pulled her to the kitchen and, closing the kitchen door, kissed her on the lips. She pushed him away and went back to her station. Her brother

Macoy saw her crying when she came out of the house. She did not say a word, but went to the faucet and washed her face. The offended party continued to finish the garlands she was working on, and waited until the afternoon for her wages. When she arrived at her home, she first told her mother that she no longer wished to go back. When pressed for a reason, she said basta po mama ayaw ko ng magtuhog. Finally, she told her mother what happened. Aurora Elitiong, the mother, accompanied the offended party to the San Vicente Barangay Hall on July 26 to report the incident and give a statement. Days later, Cristina gave another statement to the local police. In the defense version, the offended party and her brothers had slept overnight in the house of the accused. When Isidro woke up in the early morning to relieve himself, he saw the girl sleeping on the sofa. He admonished her to join her brothers in the basement. He went back to his room and slept until 8 A.M. Two hours later, at 10 A.M., he left for the Caltex Service Station which was only a five minute ride from his home by tricycle. His daughter Analee Olivarez was staying in another house in the compound and attended a morning mass. When she returned at 10:30 A.M., she no longer saw her father. Maritess Buen, the laundrywoman, who was washing clothes outside the kitchen, saw the accused earlier. By 10 A.M., when she entered the house, he already left. He returned by noontime. The accused testified that he was at the Caltex station for two and a half hours waiting for the shipment of flowers from Pampanga. The goods arrived at 12:15 P.M. He left shortly thereafter and passed by the market before going home. He arrived at 12:30 P.M. The next several days were uneventful for him until his laundrywoman Maritess told him that there was a complaint against him at the barangay office. A meeting took place between him and the girls family in the presence of the barangay authorities. The girls mother was demanding P30,000 for the settlement of the case, but he refused to cave in and told a barangay official Jaime Ramos that he would rather see his accusers in court than give a centavo because he did not commit the crime.[7] The trial court found Olivarez guilty of violating Section 5 of R.A. 7610 and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the minor Cristina Elitiong in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs. On appeal, the decision of the trial court[8] was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The motion for reconsideration[9] filed by the accused was denied.[10] Hence, this petition for review[11] on the following grounds: I. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that the essential elements in Violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act 7610, which are age of the offended party and that she is an abused or exploited child as defined in the law, not having been

alleged in the Information, petitioner/accused cannot be found guilty of said offense and must be acquitted. II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the Information charging petitioner/accused of Violation of Section 5, Republic Act 7610, but failing to allege the essential elements of said offense, had substantially complied with the requirements of due process for the accused. III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred and gravely abused its discretion in not reversing the judgment of the trial court convicting the accused/petitioner and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for alleged Violation of Section 5, Republic Act 7610, which was not alleged in the Information.[12] Petitioner alleges that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated for failure to allege in the information the essential elements of the offense for which he is being charged. Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 states: SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: ... (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; ... talics supplied) The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows: 1. 2. 3. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[13]

Section 32, Article XIII, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.[14] mphasis supplied) The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.[15] The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin:[16] A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. ... It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct. mphasis supplied) We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:[17] ... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation... Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse because Congress really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse. This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate: Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, who for money or profit. I would like to amend this, Mr. President, to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover those situations and not leave loophole in this section. The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.

The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer be child prostitution? Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still talking of the child who is being misused for sexual purposes either for money or for consideration. What I am trying to cover is the other consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the child being abused or misused for sexual purposes, only for money or profit. I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child may not have been used for profit or ... The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is profit. Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought to be expanded. But, still, the President will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse. The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the amendment? ANGARA AMENDMENT Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera. Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President. The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved. How about the title, Child Prostitution, shall we change that too? Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope. The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call probable child abuse? Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President. The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved. x x x. (Italicization supplied)[18] Petitioner makes much of the failure to allege in the information that Cristina was a child below 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed. He insists that the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on the case of People v. Rosare*19+ because unlike in Rosare, he had no personal knowledge of Cristinas age, which he claims was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[20] A complaint is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.[21] The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.[22] The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.[23] In the present case, the Court of Appeals found the information to be sufficient. Relying on the principle laid down in People v. Rosare, it held: Before us is an information for violation of RA 7610 that, as in Rosare, fails to mention an indispensable element of the offense, the age of the offended party, but makes allusion to another document, the sworn complaint of the offended party, and declares it to be the basis upon which the information was filed. This instrument is the complaint filed by the offended party with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in which she stated that she was 16 years old at the time of the offense. It forms part of the initial records of the case and comes before the posting of bail and entry of the plea of not guilty before the RTC. It appears that after the charge was filed with the MTC, and as the preliminary investigation went underway, the accused filed a manifestation stating that he had filed a counter-affidavit to the charge and reserved the right to file a motion to quash the information if it was filed. The MTC found probable cause against him and elevated the records to the provincial prosecutor for filing of the information. A complaint is under the Rules one of the two charging instruments for the offense of which the accused was tried and convicted here. While the criminal action was instituted by the complaint of the offended party, the information signed only by the fiscal ushered in the formal trial process. But both are accusations in writing against the accused and serve the purpose of enabling him to take the necessary legal steps for his defense. What is important is that the information states that the accused is being charged of an offense under RA 7610 based on the complaint of the offended party, to which the accused had adequately responded. Under these conditions, the accused was fully apprised of the accusation against him. The purpose and objective of the constitutional mandate are discharged and satisfied. The accused may not be said to be taken by surprise by the failure of the information to state the age of the offended party, when he had received the initiatory complaint where he was told how old the offended party was.[24]

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In People v. Rosare, the information did not allege that the victim was a mental retardate which is an essential element of the crime of statutory rape. This Court however sustained the trial courts judgment of conviction holding that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor which formed the basis of the information, a copy of which is attached thereto, stated that the offended party is suffering from mental retardation. It ruled that there was substantial compliance with the mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. Thus: Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of statutory rape because the fact that the victim was a mental retardate was never alleged in the information and, absent this element, the acts charged negate the commission of the offense for which he was convicted by the lower court. Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, we have decided to motu proprio take cognizance of the resolution issued by the investigating prosecutor in I.S. No. 92-0197 dated June 2, 1992, which formed the basis of and a copy of which was attached to the information for rape filed against herein appellant. Therein, it is clearly stated that the offended party is suffering from mental retardation. We hold, therefore, that this should be deemed a substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. ...[25] In People v. Villamor,[26] the information failed to allege the age of the offended party but since a copy of the order issued by the investigating judge was attached in the record of the preliminary investigation clearly stating that the complainant was nine years old, it was held that there was substantial compliance with the mandate to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation. It was also declared that the defense cannot invoke the element of surprise as to deprive it of the opportunity to suitably prepare for the accuseds defense, thus: ... Furthermore, even if the information filed did not allege that the complainant was nine years old, there was substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him when the Order issued by the investigating judge, a copy of which was attached in the record of the preliminary investigation, clearly stated that the complainant was nine years old. Consequently, the defense cannot invoke the element of surprise as to deprive it of the opportunity to suitably prepare for the accuseds defense.*27+ In People v. Galido,[28] the information for rape failed to allege the element of force or intimidation. The Court ruled that this omission is not fatal since the complaint specifically charged the accused with three counts of rape committed by means of force and intimidation. Thus: Appellant avers that because the Informations on which he was arraigned and convicted did not allege the element of force or intimidation, he was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He insists that such failure was a fatal defect that rendered the Informations void.

As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them would be violated. In the present case, appellant correctly pointed out that the element of force or intimidation should have been expressly alleged in the Informations. This omission is not fatal, however, because the Complaint specifically accused him of three counts of rape committed by means of force and intimidation...[29] The same ground was adopted in People v. Mendez[30] which involved an information for rape that failed to allege force or intimidation. We ruled therein that it was not a fatal omission because it was stated in the complaint that accused Rosendo raped Virginita by means of force. In People v. Torellos,[31] the Court treated the information for rape which failed to allege force and intimidation as merely defective and that the deficiency was cured by the failure of the accused to assail the insufficiency of the allegations in the Information and by competent evidence presented during trial. Thus, while it is necessary to allege the essential elements of the crime in the information, the failure to do so is not an irremediable vice. When the complaint or the resolution by the public prosecutor which contain the missing averments is attached to the information and form part of the records, the defect in the latter is effectively cured, and the accused cannot successfully invoke the defense that his right to be informed is violated. In the instant case, the missing averment in the information is supplied by the Complaint which reads in full: COMPLAINT The undersigned complainant, accuses ISIDRO OLIVAREZ, of the crime of VIOLATION OF RA 7610, committed as follows: That on or about 11:30 A.M. of July 20, 1997 at Brgy. San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of lasciviousness against one CRISTINA ELITIONG Y BALDONO, 16 years old, by kissing and touching her private parts and embracing her against her will. CONTRARY TO LAW.[32] Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the information, hence he was adequately informed of the age of the complainant. The prosecution has also established the minority of the offended party through competent evidence. Cristina testified that she was 16 years old and a certification from the Office of the Local Registrar of San Pedro, Laguna was presented showing that she was born on October 17, 1980.[33] The third element of sexual abuse is therefore present.

The information merely states that petitioner was being charged for the crime of violation of R.A. 7610 without citing the specific sections alleged to have been violated by petitioner. Nonetheless, we do not find this omission sufficient to invalidate the information. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.[34] The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. True, the information herein may not refer to specific section/s of R.A. 7610 alleged to have been violated by the petitioner, but it is all to evident that the body of the information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have been performed by petitioner which unmistakably refers to acts punishable under Section 5 of R.A. 7610. As to which section of R.A. 7610 is being violated by petitioner is inconsequential. What is determinative of the offense is the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. The prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner committed acts of sexual abuse against Cristina. The trial court found Cristinas testimony to be clear, candid, and straightforward.*35+ Her testimony, given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner, is worthy of faith and belief.[36] In the face of the accusations against him, petitioner could only interpose uncorroborated alibi and denial. Denial, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and categorical identification provided by eyewitnesses.[37] Not only did Cristina identify the petitioner as her assailant but no ill-motive was adduced why she would impute against him so grave a charge. This Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses, absent any indication that some material fact was overlooked or a grave abuse of discretion committed. None of the exceptions obtain in the instant case.[38] In addition to moral damages, a fine in the amount of P15,000.00 should likewise be imposed pursuant to our ruling in Amployo v. People:[39] It does not end there. In People v. Abadies, and with respect specifically to lascivious conduct amounting to child abuse under Section 5(b) of Rep. Act No. 7610, we imposed a fine of P30,000 for each count of lascivious conduct in addition to the award of moral damages on the justification that It will be noted that Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 7610 provides for the penalty of imprisonment. Nevertheless, Section 31(f), Article XII (Common Penal Provisions) thereof allows the imposition of a fine subject to the discretion of the court, provided that the same is to be administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense. This provision is in accord with Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the Philippines became a party on August 21, 1990, which stresses the duty of states parties to

ensure the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of abused and exploited children in an environment which fosters their self-respect and human dignity. With the case of Abadies as guidepost, we impose a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) on petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2004 in CAG.R. CR No. 22860 and its resolution dated June 4, 2004, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In addition to the award of P15,000.00 as moral damages, petitioner Isidro Olivarez is also ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P15,000.00. SO ORDERED. [1988V473] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner, vs. HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA and JOSE ANADILLA, respondents.1988 Jun 202nd DivisionG.R. No. L-38634D E C I S I O N PADILLA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order . . of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, 10th Judicial District, Branch I, dated 20 March 1974, dismissing motu proprio Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled "People of the Philippines, Complainant versus Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, Accused," as well as of the order dated 22 April 1974 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration of said earlier order. The facts are not disputed. On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12 March 1974. The hearing set on 11 March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused, respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been arrested by the police authorities. On the same date, the court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974. On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads: "Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio. "Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect. "The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled.

"In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order. "SO ORDERED." 1 The affidavit of desistance, relied upon by the aforequoted order, was executed by the offended party on 20 March 1974 and subscribed and sworn to before the branch clerk of court Atty. R.B. Torrecampo. It alleged, among others, that: "That he was the complainant in Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled, People vs. Ariston Anadilla, et al., for Attempted Homicide, which case is pending before the first branch of this Court; that he is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and that he has already forgiven the accused for their acts; that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted and that without their testimonies the guilt of the accused cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that in view of these circumstances, he requests the Prosecuting Fiscal for the dismissal of the said case." 2 The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by the court a quo in an order dated 22 April 1974. 3 This petition was thereupon filed before this Court. The issue in this petition is whether the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal. The issue presented is not novel. In Crespo v. Mogul, 4 promulgated on 30 June 1987, the Court had occasion to state the rule in regard to the respective powers of the prosecuting fiscal and the court, after the complaint or information has been filed in court. In said case, the issue raised was whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial of the case on the merits. In the Crespo case, an information for Estafa had already been filed by the Assistant Fiscal before the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. Arraignment of the accused and trial of the case were, however, deferred because of a pending appeal by the accused/respondent to the Secretary of Justice. Reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, the Undersecretary of Justice directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Upon such instructions, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. On a certiorari recourse to the Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed. Review of the Court of Appeals decision was then sought by the accused with this Court, raising the issue previously stated herein. Resolving, the Court held: xxx xxx xxx

"The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the

accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. "The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not [sic], once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. xxx xxx xxx

"The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court and disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation." 5 In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial, almost ten (10) years had elapsed from the date of filing of the information. It was not, therefore, unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his affidavit of desistance, manifested that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted, but, without their testimony, the guilt of the accused could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case, obviously believed that despite such manifestation of the complainant, he (fiscal) could prove the prosecution's case. To avoid similar situations, the Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in court), still, any move on the part of the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his own view on the matter. He is, after all, in control of the prosecution of the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be dismissed. It is only after hearing the

prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs. SO ORDERED. Yap (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

[1987V317E] MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.1987 Jun 30En BancG.R. No. L-53373D E C I S I O N GANCAYCO, J.: The issue raised in this case is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77. 1 When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3 A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7 On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching

thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. 10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment stating: "ORDER For resolution is a motion to dismiss this case filed by the prosecuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the liability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal. The motion's trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED. WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. SO ORDERED." 11 The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15 Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16 In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate comment to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.

Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information. It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22 It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner. 30 However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31 The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court

and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33 The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of law. 36a Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possible designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice. The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38 The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should

be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Teehankee, C.J., reserving the filing of a separate opinion.

[2006V387] ARNOLD ALVA, Petitioner, versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.2006 Apr 121st DivisionG.R. No. 157331D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the twin Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated 18 October 2002[1] and 19 February 2003,[2] respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077, entitled People of the Philippines v. Arnold Alva. The CA, in the assailed resolutions, dismissed petitioners appeal of the trial courts judgment of conviction for failing to post a new bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal. The Facts The present petition stemmed from an Information[3] charging petitioner with having committed the crime of estafa defined under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, alleging as follows: The undersigned accuses ARNOLD ALVA of the crime of ESTAFA, committed as follows: That in or about and during the period covered between October 18, 1993 up to December 18, 1993, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously defraud YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation which he made to said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to the effect that he could process the latters application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00, and by means of other similar deceit, induced and succeeded in inducing said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said

accused the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said manifestation and representation said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount of P120,000.00 which amount once in his possession with intent to defraud, he wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the aforesaid amount of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW. The resultant criminal case was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-143803 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, presided by Judge Manuel T. Muro. On 5 September 1995, the RTC issued a Recall Order[4] of the Warrant of Arrest issued on 18 July 1995 against petitioner in view of the approval of his bail bond by Hon. William Bayhon, then Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila. Upon arraignment on 7 December 1995, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel,[5] pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the trial on the merits, in an Order[6] dated 6 April 1998, the RTC considered the case submitted for decision. On 4 May 1999, petitioners counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation*7+ praying for the resetting of the 5 May 1999 schedule of promulgation of the RTCs decision to 17 June 1999 in view of the fact that said counsel already had a prior commitment on subject date. The RTC granted the motion. The promulgation, however, was deferred only until 19 May 1999. A day before the rescheduled date of promulgation, or on 18 May 1999, petitioners counsel again moved for the deferment of the promulgation, due to prior undertakings of similar importance.*8+ On 19 May 1999, petitioner and counsel both failed to appear in court despite due notice. In his stead, claiming to be petitioners representative, a certain Joey Perez personally delivered to the RTC a hand written medical certificate*9+ expressing petitioners inability to attend the days hearing due to hypertension. In response to the aforestated acts of petitioner and counsel, the RTC issued an Order[10] directing the promulgation of its decision in absentia and the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner for his failure to appear before it despite due notice. In its decision dated 25 March 1999,[11] the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the decretal part of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 2(a) of the RPC and sentences him to an indeterminate term of

imprisonment of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal in accordance with the provisions of Article 315, first, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and further for the accused to return the P120,000.00 to the complainant with an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1994 (the amount has been given to the accused in October and December 1993). Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the RTC, immediately following an original duplicate copy of the aforequoted decision, a document entitled Personal Bail Bond[12] dated 21 May 1999 issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, seemed to have been filed before and approved by the RTC as evidenced by the signature of Judge Muro on the face of said bail bond.[13] For such reason, petitioner appeared to have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction. Incongruous to the above inference, however, in an Order[14] dated 25 May 1999, judgment was rendered against Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation, the bonding company that issued petitioners original bail bond, in the amount of P17,000.00, for failure to produce the person of petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and to explain why the amount of its undertaking should not be forfeited. In the interregnum, Police Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section,[15] manifested to the RTC the return of the unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on 19 May 1999 for the reason that the address of the accused (petitioner) is not within our area of responsibility. x x x Nevertheless, De Jesus reassured the RTC that the name of the accused will be included in our list of wanted persons for our future reference. Examination of the records of the case revealed that petitioner already moved out of his address on record without informing the RTC. On 15 July 1999, hand delivered by a certain Remedios Caneda, petitioner wrote[16] the RTC requesting for a certified photocopy of his exhibits submitted to it during trial. On 21 July 1999, a Termination of Legal Services was filed by petitioner before the RTC informing it of his decision to terminate the services of his counsel and that he was currently in the process of hiring a new one. On 26 July 1999,[17] petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC. In an Order[18] dated 30 August 1999, the RTC declined to give due course to said motion for failure to set it for hearing; thus, treating it as a mere scrap of paper. On 2 September 1999, petitioner received the above Order. The next day, or on 3 September 1999, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[19] before the RTC. In an Order[20] dated 20 September 1999, the RTC again declined to give due course to the Notice of Appeal, ratiocinating thus: The Notice of Appeal filed by accused cannot be given due course as it was filed out of time. Although accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 July 1999, the Court considered it as a mere scrap

of paper and was not acted upon as the same was not set for hearing, hence, it did not stop the reglementary period to file appeal. On 25 November 1999, petitioner filed anew a motion praying for the RTCs categorical resolution of his 23 July 1999 Motion for Reconsideration. In an Order dated 7 December 1999, the RTC granted the abovestated motion, the full text of which states: The Motion to Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of the accused, dated November 20, 1999 is granted in the interest of justice, considering that the one who prepared the Motion for Reconsideration appears to be the accused himself, who may not appear to be a lawyer and may not be conversant with the rules, among others, governing motions. Acting on the said Motion for Reconsideration itself, same is denied for lack of merit. The Decision has examined and discussed the evidence presented and the merits of the case. Because of the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration, the appeal is deemed filed on time, and the appeal is given due course. Let the records of the case, together with three (3) copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes be transmitted to the Hon. Court of Appeals. On appeal before the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution[21] dated 16 October 2001, the appellate court required petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed it appearing that no new bail bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been posted, to wit: Considering the arrest warrant issued by the trial court against the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment, and it appearing from the record that no new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal has been posted, appellant is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why his appeal should not be dismissed outright. On 29 October 2001, petitioner, through new counsel, filed a Compliance[22] essentially stating therein that: xxxx 3. Upon learning of the course of action taken by the presiding judge, and for purposes of appealing the decision subject of the instant case, on May 21, 1999, accused immediately posted a new bond for his provisional liberty. The presiding judge of the lower court, which issued the questioned decision, duly approved the new bond. Certified true copy of the bond is hereto attached as Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof;

x x x x.

In a Resolution[23] dated 18 October 2002, the Court of Appeals, nonetheless dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for appellants failure to post a new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal despite our directive as contained in our Resolution dated October 16, 2001, and in view of the fact that his personal bail bond posted in the lower court had already expired, x x x. Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] thereto seeking its reversal. According to petitioners counsel, he was of the understanding that the Show Cause Resolution of 16 October 2001 merely sought an explanation vis--vis the absence of a bail bond guaranteeing petitioners provisional liberty while his conviction was on appeal. All the same, petitioners counsel manifested that Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, had already extended the period covered by its 21 May 1999 bail bond. Attached to said motion was a Bond Endorsement[25] extending the coverage of the bail bond from 21 May 1999 to 21 May 2003. Asked to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent People of the Philippines (People), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed objections. In its Comment,[26] respondent People raised two arguments: 1) that an application for bail can only be availed of by a person who is in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty; and 2) that bail on appeal is a matter of discretion when the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. On 19 February 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the second assailed Resolution,[27] disposing of petitioners motion as follows: Finding no merit in appellants motion for reconsideration (citation omitted) filed on November 12, 2002, the same is hereby DENIED. We agree with the appellee that appellant has failed to submit himself under the jurisdiction of the court or under the custody of the law since his conviction in 1999 and that there was no valid bail bond in place when appellant took his appeal. WHEREFORE, appellants motion for reconsideration is DENIED. * mphasis supplied.+ Hence, this petition. The Issues Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging the following errors:[28] I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA G.R. CR NO. 24077 ON THE GROUND OF ALLEGED FAILURE TO POST A NEW BOND FOR PETITIONERS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY AND THAT THE PERSONAL BAIL BOND POSTED IN THE LOWER COURT HAD ALLEGEDLY ALREADY EXPIRED; III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER AS SUBSTANTIAL, THE COMPLAINCE FILED BY THE PETITIONER WHICH SHOWED THE FACT THAT INDEED THERE WAS A BAIL BOND FILED FOR THE PROVISIONAL LIBERTY OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL; IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED THE RECENT BAIL BOND EXTENSION ATTACHED TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER; V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OR TO THE CUSTODY OF LAW DESPITE THE BAIL BOND POSTED ON MAY 21, 1999; and VI. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID BAIL BOND IN PLACE WHEN THE PETITIONER TOOK HIS APPEAL. The bombardment of errors notwithstanding, only two issues are raised in this petition: 1) with the exception of the fifth assignment of error, all six can be encapsulated in one solitary question, that is, whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in view of petitioners alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal; and 2) whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law despite the posting of the subject bail bond.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioner faults the appellate court for expressing x x x in its questioned resolutions that herein petitioner did not submit to the jurisdiction of the court or custody of the law, or that there was no valid bail bond when the appeal was taken when the records of the case would readily prove the contrary.*29+ In issuing said resolution, petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals made x x x no careful examination of the records x x x. Petitioner rationalizes his deduction in the following manner: x x x [T]he records of the case readily reveals (sic) that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the promulgation of the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to the court and posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then the respondent Hon. Court of Appeals must have been thinking of another matter beyond the comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and the Rules of Court. Equally, petitioner further posits that: x x x Although it is respectfully submitted that an accused shall be denied bail or his bail shall be cancelled if sentenced to an imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as provided in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, just the same, there must be a showing by the prosecution with notice to the accused of the fact that, the accused is a recidivist, has previously escaped from confinement, evaded sentence, has committed an offense while under probation, there are circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail, etc. But there was none of the said instances that may be attributable to herein petitioner.[30] Respondent People, in contrast, counters that x x x *a+lthough a personal bail bond dated May 21, 1999 was executed in favor of petitioner by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation two days after the promulgation of the Decision, there is nothing on record which shows that petitioner had surrendered, was arrested or otherwise deprived of his liberty after the promulgation of the judgment of his conviction in his absence. x x x. To illustrate its point, respondent People cites the following facts: 1) the return of the Warrant of Arrest issued on May 19, 1999 signed by P/Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section, which states in full: Respectfully returned this unexecuted Warrant of Arrest for the reason that the address of the accused is not within our area of responsibility. Further request that the warrant of Arrest be forwarded to the Police Station which has Jurisdiction over the address of the accused. However, the name of the accused will be included in our list of wanted persons for our future reference. 2) the fact that six days after the decision of the RTC was promulgated, or on 25 May 1999, said court rendered judgment against the bail bond issued by Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation executed to secure petitioners provisional liberty during the trial, for the bondsmans failure to produce petitioner before the court, to wit:

In view of the failure of Eastern Insurance & Surety Corporation, bondsman of herein accused, to produce the herein accused within the period granted it by this Court, judgment is hereby rendered against said bond in the amount of Seventeen Thousand (P17,000.00) Pesos.[31] Respondent People explains that the first two facts make it improbable to conclude that there existed a valid bail bond securing petitioners provisional liberty even after conviction. Stated in another way, petitioners admission to bail presumes that the latter surrendered, was arrested or he had otherwise submitted himself under the custody of the law. And, 3) that petitioner belatedly attached a bond endorsement to his motion for reconsideration dated November 7, 2002 submitted before the Court of Appeals, purportedly to extend the expired personal bond dated May 21, 1999 x x x, did not automatically confer on petitioner the benefits of an effective bail bond,*32+ as petitioner made no extension of the previous personal bond before the same expired. We disagree in petitioners assertions; hence, the petition must fail. A definitive disposition of the issue relating to the existence and validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal presupposes that the latter was allowed by law to post bail notwithstanding the RTCs judgment of conviction and the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, intrinsically addresses the foregoing prefatory matter viz: SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail. The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration; (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime. The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party. [ mphasis supplied.] From the preceding quoted provision, the RTC is given the discretion to admit to bail an accused even after the latter has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of more than six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years. However, the same also provides for the cancellation of bail bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application upon the concurrence of two points: 1) if the judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years; and 2) upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the presence of any of the five circumstances therein enumerated or other similar circumstances. In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Quite clearly, the approval of petitioners application for bail was discretionary upon the RTC. It is incongruous, to say the least, that the posting of a bail presupposes that the accused and/ or accused-appellant is detained or in the custody of the law.[33] In the case at bar, the bench warrant issued by the RTC on 19 May 1999 still remains unserved. Nothing in the records of the case, neither in the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, demonstrates that petitioner was ever arrested, as there has been no related Order of Release issued by any court, or that he voluntarily surrendered or at the very least placed himself under the custody of the law. Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, x x x, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.[34] All told, no bail should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond dispute that the subject bail bond issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation was irregularly approved. Worth noting is the fact that nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that petitioner applied for bail through a motion duly filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the RTC issued an Order of Approval or any other court process acknowledging such document. Be that as it may, even granting for the sake of argument that it was indeed approved by Judge Muro, such approval did not render the subject bail bond valid and binding for it has been established that petitioner was not entitled to bail on appeal.

That the prosecution appears not to have been given the chance to object, as evidently required under the quoted rule, to the application or approval of the subject bail bond (with notice to the accused),

fortifies the declaration as to its invalidity. Nowhere in the original records of the RTC does it even show that the prosecution was informed of petitioners application for bail, much less the approval of such application. Noting that the raison d'tre for such requirement is the discretionary nature of the admission to bail of an accused after conviction, though discretionary, such assessment must be exercised in accordance with applicable legal principles. As when there is a concurrence of the enumerated circumstances and the range of penalty imposed, the prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to object and present evidence, if necessary, with notice to the accused. It is on this basis that judicial discretion is balanced in determining whether or not an accused-appellant should be admitted to bail pending appeal of his conviction vis--vis the increased possibility or likelihood of flight. Approval of an application for bail on appeal, absent the knowledge of the prosecution of such application or, at the very least, failing to allow it to object, is not the product of sound judicial discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness, not to mention violative of respondent Peoples right of procedural due process. This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the original records of the case at bar reveals that petitioner violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification his failure to appear before the RTC, despite due notice, on the day of the promulgation of the latters judgment, absent any justifiable reason. His absence was a clear contravention of the conditions of his bail bond to say the least. As evidenced by the undertaking printed on the face of the bond issued by Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation and likewise required under Section 6[35] of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must present himself before the court for the reading of the judgment of the RTC in order to render himself to the execution thereof. While, indeed, a medical certificate was hand delivered and filed by a certain Joey Perez, allegedly a representative of petitioner, stating therein the reason for the latters absence, the RTC found insubstantial the explanation proffered. Appropriately, it ordered the promulgation of its judgment in absentia. It also issued a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner. Upon examination, the subject medical certificate[36] merely states that petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension. It failed to elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating petitioners physical incapability to present himself before the court even for an hour or two; thus, it considered the absence of petitioner unjustified. What's more, though notarized, the subject document failed to indicate evidence of affiants*37+ identity making its due execution doubtful. Further, it should be recalled as well, that as early as 4 May 1999, petitioner and counsel had already been notified of the 19 May 1999 schedule of promulgation. The first having been postponed in view of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation (on 5 May 1999) filed by petitioners counsel. Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioners original bail bond is revealed by the Process Servers Return,*38+ indicated at the dorsal portion of the RTCs Produce Order, indicating petitioners change of address without prior notice to the RTC, it states:

PROCESS SERVERS RETURN This certifies that on the 17th day of May, (sic) 1999, undersigned return (sic) again to Fersal Apartelle located at 130 Kalayaan Ave. (sic) Diliman, Quezon City for confirmation and indeed the addressee, Arnold Alva, had no (sic) longer been residing nor holding office at the aforementioned address. By failing to inform the RTC of his change of address, petitioner failed to hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the RTC. It was an unmistakable arrant breach of the conditions of his bail bond. Prescinding from the above discussion, the conviction of petitioner to a period beyond six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years in tandem with attendant circumstances effectively violating his bail without valid justification should have effectively precluded him from being admitted to bail on appeal. The issue of the validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal having been laid to rest by Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, petitioners alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is, therefore, inconsequential as, under the circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. Thus, for all legal intents and purposes, there can be no other conclusion than that at the time petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal even until now he remains at large, placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law. Inexorably, having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether or not petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction now ensues. The manner of review of petitioners conviction is governed by the Rules of Court. Appropriately, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court presents the procedural requirements regarding appeals taken to the Court of Appeals. Section 8 of said Rule finds application to the case at bar, viz: SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio. The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. [ mphasis supplied.] By virtue of the second paragraph of the abovequoted provision, the act of jumping bail, among otherthings, will result in the outright dismissal of petitioners appeal. As pointed out by the Court in the case of People v. Mapalao,[39] the reason for said rule is that: [O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he losses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioners appeal. Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final and executory.[40] By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, petitioner revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his chances for a reversal. This, we cannot condone. Once more, by jumping bail, petitioner has waived his right to appeal. In the case of People v. Ang Gioc,[41] we enunciated that: There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x. Coming now to the second issue of whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law, despite the posting of the subject bail bond, petitioner argues that his act of filing several pleadings after the promulgation of the RTCs judgment plus his filing of the application for his admission to bail should be considered a submission to the courts jurisdiction. He rationalizes that: [T]he records of the case readily reveals that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the promulgation of the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to the court and posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then the respondent Hon. Court of Appeals must have been thinking of another matter beyond the comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and the Rules of Court. For the resolution of the second issue, it should have been sufficient to state that for reasons stated in the foregoing discussion, the question posed has now become academic. However, to diminish the confusion brought about by ostensibly equating the term jurisdiction of the court (over the person of the accused) with that of custody of the law, it is fundamental to differentiate the two. The term: Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender (citation omitted); while (the term) jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance (citation omitted). One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced (citation omitted).[42] Moreover, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an accused escapes from the custody of the law, but continues until the case is terminated.[43] Evidently, petitioner is

correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused petitioner when he appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive. As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself under the custody of the CA, alas, we cannot say the same for *b+eing in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law (citation omitted). Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.*44+ In the case at bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and unless he submits himself to the custody of the law, in the manner of being under the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted any relief by the CA. Parenthetically, we cannot end this ponencia without calling attention to a very disturbing fact that petitioner admits of being the author of a falsified public document was treated nonchalantly by authorities. In fine, the petitioner has remained at large even as he hopes that his appeal, and consequently, this petition, will succeed and he can then appear before the Court to claim his victory. He hopes in vain. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077, which dismissed petitioners appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED. In this connection, Judge Manuel Muro is DIRECTED to issue forthwith a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of Petitioner Arnold Alva and for proper disposition of the case in line with the foregoing discussion. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

[2006V472] JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners, versus VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.2006 Mar 311st DivisionG.R. No. 158763D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan; 2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and 3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose Pempe Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.[2] The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows: On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program. Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt. Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire

jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice. On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001. On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001. On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits. Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder. On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003. Hence, this petition. The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments of error: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in

upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused. The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals ruling that: [A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.[3] Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest.*4+ Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.

In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera: Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 102[5]), the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.[6] In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez[7]: The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.[8] Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,[9] while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.[10] One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.[11] Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law.[12] Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr.,[13] cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail.[14] While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.[15] As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan,*16+ we held that *t+he purpose of bail is to secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law. The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.[17] There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included;[18] (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law. In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody

of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest: 1. In Allado v. Diokno,[19] on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. 2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,*20+ upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused. 3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,[21] on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest. We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to enswer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case. Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night.[22] Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt. In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,[23] demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after. Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion. We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the

Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case. After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper.*24+ Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest. In Webb v. de Leon,[25] we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground. The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question: In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accusedmovant, Jose Pempe Miranda.*26+ Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.[27]

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion. According to petitioners: In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification.*28+ Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary: Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29] The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix[30] and People v. Inting.[31] The supporting documents are the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes; Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez; Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon; Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz; Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;

6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355; 7. 8. 9. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal; Information dated 22 June 2001; Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and

10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon. Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost

two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a politically charged scenario where Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other.*32+ We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan. It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb[33]: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x. Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following explanation: Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a narration of falsehood and lies and that because of the decision acquitting said officers who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value. This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.

xxxx This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.[34] This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value.*35+ On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause. We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad. Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding. In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.[36] According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause. We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a

matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,[37] which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed. Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners: It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit: 1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001; 2.) Order dated September 21, 2001; 3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and 4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001. Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.[38]

Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder. On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion. Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005. While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,[39] the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order. In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.[40] As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao,[41] by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,

1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof; 2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases; 3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer; 4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and 5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch. 6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners. SO ORDERED.

[2009V437E] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioners, versus ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.2009 Apr 24En BancG.R. No. 154473DECISION NACHURA, J.: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 2002[1] and the June 23, 2002[2] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25, 2002[3] and the September 18, 2002[4] Orders of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406. The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different factual settings, thus: G.R. No. 154473 On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, Quezon City.[5] The speech was subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin.[6]

Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he stated in his speech that Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isnt even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.[7] filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint[8] for libel. Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).[9] Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information[10] for libel against the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407, with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102. Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation,[11] contending that Judge Jaime N. Salazar of Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case because his appointment to the judiciary was made possible through the recommendation of respondents father-in-law. Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal Case No. Q-02103406, which is the subject of G.R. No. 155573] pending with Branch 101 of the RTC. While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.[12] On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order[13] dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02109407 and considering as moot and academic petitioners motion to inhibit. While the RTC found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his officehe delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case.[14] Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure questions of law, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[15] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds: I.THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS;

II.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE; AND III.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.[16] G.R. No. 155573 On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco were guests of the talk show Point Blank, hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television shows episode that day was entitled COMELEC Wars.*17+ In that episode, the following conversation transpired: Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used for a PR campaign against you? Is that what you are saying? Benipayo: No, I think *its+ not COMELEC funds, *its+ Photokina funds. You know, admittedly, according to *c+harg d*a+ffaires of the U.S. Embassy*,+ in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it is whats been *so+ happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess of 2.4 [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time*,+ thats about 120 *m+illion pesos and I said, what for*?+ *T+hey wouldnt tell me, you see. Now you asked me, [who is+ funding this? I think its pretty obvious.*18+ Petitioner considered respondents statement as defamatory, and, through its authorized representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit[19] for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.[20] The City Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal Case No. Q-02109406 by filing the corresponding Information[21] with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101. Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan.[22] On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Order[23] dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, in the further assailed September 18, 2002 Order,*24+ denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.*25+ Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably filed before this Court, on pure questions of law, another Petition for Review on Certiorari[26] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE; AND II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.

III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT.[27] Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same issues and the same parties, the Court, upon the recommendation of the Clerk of Court,[28] consolidated the cases.[29] The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts. The Ruling of the Court The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are of the conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately determine which courtthe RTC or the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to still determine whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[30] Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),[31] as amended by Republic Act No. 4363,[32] is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus: The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense xxx.[33] [Underscoring and italics ours.] More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya,[34] acknowledged the unmistakable import of the said provision: There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be followed.[35] This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao,[36] where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is committed by similar means,*37+ and despite the fact that the phrase by similar

means is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360.*38+ In these cases, and in those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,[39] we explained at length that: The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent judges orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Courts Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition. Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter: Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Courts jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases. Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued. For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law. A later enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special

law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC. Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened the jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from taking cognizance of certain cases over which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal libel. Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality: RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES. xxxx C LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS. nderscoring supplied)*40+ As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,[41] Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar means.[42] The grant to the Sandiganbayan[43] of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act

No. 8249,[44] cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.[45] Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court, therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: [1984V134E] MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.1984 Mar 22En BancG.R. No. L-56384D E C I S I O N RELOVA, J.: On October 21, 1980, petitioner was charged with the crime of grave coercion in an information filed before the respondent court, which reads: "That on or about July 2, 1979, in the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, taking advantage of his public position and which offense was committed in relation to his office, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take over the operation and control of the gasoline station owned by Pedro Par, sell the gasoline therein to the public issuing the invoices of said gasoline station and some pieces of yellow pad paper for the purpose, and padlock dispensing pump thereof without authority of law, depriving Pedro Par of the possession and exercise of a lawful trade or occupation, by means of threat, force and/or violence, thereby preventing said Pedro Par from doing something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong. "CONTRARY TO LAW." (p. 10, Rollo)

On November 27, 1980, the information was amended with the insertion of the phrase "by ordering his policemen companions" between the words "Pedro Par" and "to sell the gasoline." Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information principally on the ground that the respondent court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case and that it should have been filed with the ordinary courts in Marinduque where the alleged crime was committed. Respondent court denied the motion. Hence, petitioner instituted this proceeding for certiorari seeking the same relief, alleging that 1. The offense for which he was charged is not related to his office as mayor; 2. The offense of grave coercion is not among those mentioned or determined by Section 4(c), Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended; and 3. Assuming that respondent has jurisdiction to try this case, it committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the transfer of the hearing of the case to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque because all witnesses of both the prosecution and defense will have to come from Marinduque, a far away island. Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, provides for the creation of a special court known as the Sandiganbayan and defines the jurisdiction thereof. It states: "SEC. 5. The National Assembly shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law." It is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that respondent court has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as may be determined by law. The intention of the framers of the New Constitution is patent from the explicit language thereof as well as from Section 1 of the same Article XIII titled "Accountability of Public Officers," which provides:. "SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people." There is no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative of the provision of Section 5 of Article XIII of the New Constitution because the former enlarges what the latter limited. Said constitutional provision delegates to the lawmaking body the determination of "such other offenses" committed by public officers over which the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the President of the Philippines, exercising his lawmaking authority and prerogative vested in him by the Constitution, issued Presidential Decree No. 1486 which mandates in Section 4(c) thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or

controlled corporation, in relation to their office." mphasis supplied) When the lawmaking authority chose to include all public office-related offenses over which respondent court shall have jurisdiction, the courts will not review questions of legislative policy. It is enough that the act is within the constitutional power of the lawmaking body or authority and, if it is, the courts are bound to follow and apply. The original and amended information clearly alleged that petitioner took advantage of his position as mayor when he intimidated the gasoline station's owner in taking over the operation and control of the establishment, ordering his policemen to sell the gasoline therein and padlocking the dispensing pump thereof without legal authority. Stated differently, if petitioner were not the mayor he would not have allegedly directed the policeman and the latter would not have followed his orders and instructions to sell Pedro Par's gasoline and padlocked the station. The fact that he is the mayor did not vest him with legal authority to take over the operations and control of complainant's gasoline station and padlock the same without observing due process. The crime for which petitioner is charged, grave coercion, is penalized by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500.00 under the first paragraph of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Respondent court, pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, has concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. Well established is the rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction in a case where said jurisdiction is concurrent with another court, it must continue exercising the same to the exclusion of all other courts. In Laquian vs. Baltazar, 31 SCRA 551, We ruled that "in case of concurrent jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts." Thus, respondent's denial of petitioner's request for the transfer of the case to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque was well-grounded and certainly not a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that on March 23, 1983, Presidential Decree No. 1861 amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, and it provides, among others, that where the penalty for offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six(6) years, or fine of P6,000.00, they are no longer within the concurrent jurisdiction of respondent court and the regular courts but are now vested in the latter. However, Section 2 of said Presidential Decree No. 1861 states: "SECTION 2. All cases pending in the Sandiganbayan or in the appropriate courts as of the date of the effectivity of this Decree shall remain with and be disposed of by the courts where they are pending." mphasis supplied) The information against petitioner was filed in 1980; therefore, respondent court retains jurisdiction over the case subject of instant petition. The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions, however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:

"SEC. 2. The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption." Thus, the provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution, states that "judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold ANY office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the above provision that the, effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party thus convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the impeachment process (The Constitution of the Philippines, pp. 465-466)." The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not hereby removed, the filing of a criminal action "in accordance with law" may not prosper. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 1982 is hereby DISSOLVED. SO ORDERED