National Intelligence

Reforms
Discussion Materials
Intelligence Community Structure is Outmoded
Our nation's basic approach to intelligence, set forth by President Truman
in 1947, is one of decentralized authority and very little accountability.
This has led to a "balkanized" community of highly independent national
agencies (i.e., FBI, CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, and other capabilities).
• Incremental change afforded by a balkanized community is not enough
to keep pace with the new generation of highly networked, tech-savvy,
suicidal transnational terrorist
• Current structure focuses separately overseas and within the United
States creating disincentives to share information between the foreign
intelligence agencies and the domestic agencies like the FBI
• Intelligence Community cannot reform itself, nor is an evolutionary
pace of reform sufficient against 21st Century threats
• President and Congress must be directly involved in a transformational
reform effort to remove the obstacles accumulated over decades and
established an intelligence and security establishment based on modern
technologies and modern realities
 Desired Characteristics of a New Structure
Reduces bureaucracy
Ensures competitive analysis
Fully protects civil rights and civil liberties
Operates globally with precision and agility
Organized around missions (outcomes) not inputs (stovepipes)
Holds individuals accountable for performance at all levels
Removes obstacles and creates incentives for sharing information
Responsibility, authority and accountability for national intelligence are
centralized; management an d analysis are decentralized
Facilitates global networking (common security, IT, personnel policies) to fully
integrate intelligence disciplines horizontally and bridge foreign/domestic field
structures
Maintains the independence of the senior intelligence advisor to the President
from influence by policy departments (i.e., DoD, State, WH)
Establishes a professional culture and environment that fosters intellectual
diversity and career flexibility; stifles "group thintf'
National Intelligence
Director
Authority National Intelligence
Small Executive Office
to support the DNI: CIO,
CFO, IG, lessons-learned,
1 aff security policy, personnel
1 policy, acquisition,
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Chief support to DOD, DHS etc.
Oversight National Intelligence

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Note: DIA, Military Service Intel Unites, JMIP, TIARA, State/INR,

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Treasury/OI, Energy/Inl remain in their respective departments to help

Operational Responsibilities
ensure competitive analysis.
Key Reform Efforts

Reorganize the national intelligence agencies around "missions" and not

collection "stovepipes" - change the "polarity" of the current organization
Fix the information sharing problems among the national intelligence
agencies and between the foreign and domestic fields
Strengthen competitive analysis by keeping the departmental intelligence
entities (DIA, INR, INI, etc.) within their respective departments with
complete access to collected intelligence
Strengthen financial controls by establishing a separate appropriation to the
DNI for national intelligence
Align responsibility, authority and accountability under one official - a
Director of National Intelligence
Ensure complete, non-political, timely provision of tasking to the collecting
agencies, and intelligence product from the collecting agencies to the
decision-makers by establishing a Chief of National Intelligence, and
Directors' Generals of National Intelligence for substantive mission areas.