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EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN

3517 International Court, N.W.


WASHINGTON, D,C. 20008

AMBASSADOR OP PAKISTAN
cc i>
NO. MW6/04 June 22 2004.

Dear Mr. Chairman, JrC #>*> 7^ +


if".
I am addressing this letter to you with reference to the recent Staff
Statements that contain following unwarranted remarks on the nature of the
relationship that existed between Pakistan and the then Taliban regime in
Afghanistan:

(T) "Pakistan did not break with the Taliban until after 9/11, although it
was well aware that the Taliban were harbouring Bin Laden,"
• "The Taliban's ability to provide Bin Laden a haven in the face of
international pressure and UN sanctions was sufficiently facilitated by
Pakistani support."
• "Pakistan benefited from the Taliban-Al Qaeda relationship as Bin
Laden' s camps trained and equipped fighters for Pakistan's ongoing
struggle with India over Kashmir."

2. Moreover, several newspapers have carried a statement attributed to


you, alleging that "there were a lot more active (Al Qaeda) contacts, frankly,
with Iran and with Pakistan than there were with Iraq". Los Angeles Times
of 21 June 2004, has carried an article, allegedly based on statements
attributed to the Commission members and staff that:

"Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped set the stage for the September 1 1
attacks by cutting deals with the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden."
"Pakistan provided even more direct assistance, its military and
intelligence agencies often coordinating efforts with the Taliban and
Al Qaeda."
"Such efforts allowed Al Qaeda' s network of cells to burrow deeply
into the social and religious fabric of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,
enabling the organization to survive the U.S. led demolition of its
headquarters in Afghanistan in 2001, to regroup and to launch new
waves of attacks—including the kidnapping and beheading of an
American engineer in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, last week."
"TJie governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia intentionally ignored
Bin Laden's efforts in their countries or even cut deals with him,
either out of sympathy with his efforts or to protect themselves from
attack."
"Saudi and Pakistani governments played important roles in the
growth of Al Qaeda."
"Many US officials believe that both governments have been slow to
purge their ranks of pro Al Qaeda, pro Taliban elements."
"Pakistanis, meanwhile, were in with the Taliban and Al Qaeda up to
their eyeballs",
"Bin Laden, for instance, negotiated his 1996 move to Afghanistan
through Pakistan's powerful military intelligence leadership". "He
wouldn't go back there without Pakistan's approval."
"Pakistani intelligence officers also allegedly brought Bin Laden to
meet Mullah Omar soon after his arrival in Afghanistan and then
helped forge an alliance between the men that enabled the Taliban to
trample competing factions and take over much of Afghanistan."
"ISI also was instrumental in helping Al Qaeda set up an
infrastructure in its own country and in Afghanistan and the two
outfits jointly operated training camps along the border where
militants were taught guerilla warfare."
"Bin Laden has had personal relationships with top intelligence
officials from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, dating to the early 1980s,
when they became involved in the decade long war that expelled the
Soviet occupying army from Afghanistan."

3. First of all, let me clarify the reasons for Pakistan's recognition of the
Taliban regime. As a matter of policy, Pakistan has always maintained
diplomatic relations with the sitting government in Kabul, irrespective of its
political and ideological inclinations, including its policies towards
Pakistan. This has been a geopolitical necessity because the two countries
have a common border that is inhabited by populations with close links on
either side of it. Accordingly, it was not practicable for Pakistan to eschew
ties with any government in Kabul. Pakistan maintained diplomatic relations
even with hostile regimes in Kabul, including the Communist regimes of
Tarakai and Hafizullah Arnin, and the Soviet imposed regimes of Babrak
Karmal and Najibullah.
4. Maintaining diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime did not
imply Pakistan's approval or endorsement of its policies. On the contrary,
Pakistan tried its best to persuade the Taliban regime to take account of
international opinion and to comply with UN Security Council resolutions,
including the handing over of Osama Bin Laden to an appropriate tribunal to
answer charges against him.

5. It is simply inaccurate to state that Pakistan in any way enabled the


Taliban to harbour Osama Bin Laden. The Taliban were not open to
discussion on this matter. As the international isolation of the Taliban grew
their dependence on Osama Bin Laden also developed. That was why we did
not support the isolation of the Taliban regime despite our distaste for its
policies. Whatever influence we were able to wield with the Taliban was,
contrary to the allegations cited above, an influence on behalf of moderation
and reason and not extremism and violence. Unfortunately, our influence
was always limited and as the Taliban felt increasingly isolated and
besieged, our influence with them declined.

6. The allegation that "Osama Bin Laden trained fighters for Pakistan's
struggle with India over Kashmir" is both inaccurate and misleading. The
Kashmiris' struggle for freedom predates the arrival of Osama Bin Laden in
Afghanistan and is rooted in the alienation of the Kashmiri people and their
determination to resist military occupation and repression. To imply that the
freedom struggle in occupied Kashmir owes anything to Osama Bin Laden is
just about as unfair as one can get.

7. Similarly, there is no basis to the several allegations to the effect that


the Government of Pakistan facilitated Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan. On the contrary, we saw the growing influence of Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan as a threat to our own security and a recipe for disaster in
Afghanistan. In cooperation with the UN, the US and otner neighbours of
Afghanistan, we sought to minimize external influences in Afghanistan and
we sought to apprise the Taliban of the dangers their association with Al
Qaeda spelled for Afghanistan.

8. It is particularly disappointing to read these allegations at a time when


Pakistani soldiers are sacrificing their lives and President Musharraf has
risked his personal safety in the good fight against Al Qaeda, Taliban and
other extremist elements. It is no exaggeration to say that as a result of the
cooperation between Pakistan and the US the back of Al Qaeda has been
broken and, we trust, a re-visitation of the awful tragedy of September 11,
2001 has been rendered extremely unlikely.

Yours sincerely,

(Ashraf JehangirQ;

Mr. Thomas H. Kean,


Chairman,
NationAlCommission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW
Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407
Washington Office*
Tel: (202) 331-4060
Fax: (202) 296-5545

TOTflL P.04

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