2 13 13 0204 62337 ROA Digitized Versio of SBN's Bates 1373 to 1699 With 5 Transcript Pages Missing Taken Out Vol 7 to 9 0204 62337 11 14 12 Transcript and Formal Hearing Exhibits Bates 1373 to 1922 Hearing Transcript FHE1to16 Another

.
'
"
ORIGINAL
Reno
Carson City
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: THIS IS COUGHLIN'S VERSION OF THE SBN'S

VERSION OF THE ROA MADE USING THE DIGITAL COPY OF THE
TRANSCRIPT AND FORMAL HEARING EXHIBITS COUGHLIN OBTAINED FROM
SUNSHINE LITIGATION
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
NO WONDER CHAIR ECHEVERRIA ENTERED A NO CONTACT ORDER
NORTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD
PURPORTING TO BAR COUGHLIN FROM "CONTACTING" THE SBN OR
SUNSHINE LITIGATION. THIS VERSION DOES NOT UTILIZE THE TYPE OF
BATES STAMPING THE SBN USED,
STATE BAR OF NEVADA,
)
Complainant,
vs.
ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN,
Nevada Bar
ESQ.)
9473
Case Nos.
NG12-0204,
NG 12-0434,
NG12-0435
)
)
Respondent.
===================================================
THE TYPE OF BATES STAMPING THE SBN USED CONVENIENTLY OBSCURED

SOME REAL PROBLEMS IN THE SBN AND PANEL'S APPROACH HERE,
INCLUDING KING'S
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCING DOCUMENTS IN ALL OF HIS EXHIBITS THAT HAVE BATES
Wednesday, November 14th, 2012
STAMPING THAT KING KEPT REFERRING TO IN AN ATTEMPT TO BOLSTER
Reno, Nevada
HIS ASSERTION THAT HE DID NOT COMPLETELY VIOLATE SCR 105(2)(c)
IN OBSTRUCTING COUGHLIN'S ACCESS TO THOSE MATERIALS TO WHICH HE
WAS ENTITLED AND SIGNIFICANTLY SHORTENING THE TIME PERIDO TO
WHICH COUGHLIN WAS ENTITLED TO SUCH.
Job No.:
170008
Reported by:
CAROL HUMMEL,
RPR,
CCR
#340
t 7023147200
""''71\ u_ ......... u .. _'- __
,.. ...
,.,.
'. .
........
1373
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 2
1
2
3
DISCIPLINARY BOARD
4
5
6
John P. Echeverria, Esq., Chair

Michael K. Johnson, Esq.
Stephen Kent, Esq.
Clark V. Vellis, Esq.
Karen Pearl, Lay Member
7
8
ALSO PRESENT:
Patrick O. King
Deputy Bar Counsel
9
10
11
Zachary Coughlin, Esq.

Respondent
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: THE VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT

THE SBN FILED IS MISSING PAGES 7,9,31,32,59,60
AND PAGE 127 IS TOO FAINT TO BE AT ALL LEGIBLE,
AND, CONVENIENTLY, ALL OF THOSE PAGES CONTAIN
HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY MATERIALS THAT REVEAL
TREMENDOUS WEAKNESS TO THE SBN'S CASE AND
IMPROPRIETY IN AND OF THEMSELVES, OVER AND BEYOND
THE HEIGHTENED DEGREE THEREOF WHERE SUCH
"MULLIGAN" PAGES WERE REMOVED FROM THE ROA.
23
24
25
SUNSHINE REPORTING - 775-323-3411
1374
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
I N D E X
STATE BAR WITNESSES:
Bruce Beesley
Richard Hill
Paul Elcano
Dorothy Nash Holmes
Zachary Coughlin
DE
10
36
88
129
163
RESPONDENT WITNESS:
Mary Barker
Zachary Coughlin
CE
16
55
116
139
RDE
RCE
VOIR
DIRE
227
279
9
10
11
E X H I B I T S
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
STATE BAR EXHIBITS

MARKED
1 - Index of Documents
32
2 - Attorney Fees Order
45
3 - Order After Trial
87
4 - Contempt Order
129
5 - Order attached to complaint
132
6 - Letter dated February 14, 2012 to
Mr. Coughlin from Mr. King
159
7 - Two-page letter dated March 9, 2011
from Mr. Coughlin to State Bar
165
8 - Two page letter dated March 14, 2012
from Judge Holmes to Mr. Clark
171
9 - Affidavit of Poverty
179
10- Order in Case 11CR 22176
187
11- Order for Summary Punishment
191
12- Order Affirming Rules
197
13- Order Granting Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss Appeal
197
14- New Verified Response
262
15- Redacted and Verified Response with
two DVD discs
264
16- Emergency Ex Parte Motion
267
ADMITTED
35
48
114
132
137
165
169
175
187
188
193
268
268
-oOo-
1375
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 4
1
-oOo-
RENO, NEVADA; WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14TH, 2012; 9:00 A.M.
-oOo-
4
5
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
This is the date set for the
disciplinary hearing en re Zachary B. Coughlin.
is now 8:56.
o'clock.
The time
The hearing was originally noticed for 9:00
Last week on November 7th the panel met by
10
telephone conference, and given some issues to be dealt
11
with we issued an order requiring the hearing to start at
12
8:45.
13
have information that he did phone the State Bar office
14
and said that he would be late.
It is now 8:56.
Mr. Coughlin is not present.
We
15
The reason we're proceeding in the absence of
16
Mr. Coughlin is that one of the witnesses, Judge Beesley,
17
is in Las Vegas and can only testify between 9:00 and
18
9:30, and so we're commencing the hearing in the absence
19
of Mr. Coughlin, despite his absence, because the hearing
20
was noticed to commence at 8:45.
21
With that, does any panel member have any
22
other comments before we proceed with the testimony of
23
Judge Beesley?
24
Mr. King?
25
MR. KING:
Could I ask the chairman for the
1376
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 5
1
record to introduce the panel members in attendance, and
then I will --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Panel members for this
hearing are Mr. Steve Kent, Mr. Clark Vellis, Mr. Michael
Johnson, and Karen Pearl.
Echeverria.
7
8
MR. KING:
And I'm the chairman, John
My name is Patrick King on behalf
of the State Bar of Nevada.
With the chairman's permission, I would like
10
to take a witness.
11
Beesley, has information that I think the panel will find
12
relevant to Mr. Coughlin's hearing, and I would ask
13
permission to call him at this time.
14
15
The honorable federal Judge Bruce
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Has Mr. Coughlin been
notified that Judge Beesley is an expected witness?
16
MR. KING:
Yes, he has.
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
MR. KING:
Thank you.
In candor, Mr. Coughlin has sent
19
via e-mail many, many pages, and I'm not exaggerating when
20
I say hundreds of pages of e-mails.
21
e-mails he's protested my calling any witnesses,
22
proceeding with the hearing, and specifically protested
23
against having any judges not physically present testify
24
by phone.
25
And in many of those
I had noticed that these people would be
1377
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 6
1
testifying via phone, which is why he's aware of that.
And I would ask that the chair allow any judge to testify
by phone.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Unless any panel member has
an objection, that's so ordered.
MR. KING:
Thank you.
I will now try to reach
Judge Beesley.
(Placing call to Judge Beesley.)
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Let the record reflect that
10
it's now 9:02, and Mr. Coughlin has joined the hearing.
11
Mr. Coughlin, we're waiting to connect with
12
Judge Beesley who is the first scheduled witness to appear
13
between 9:00 and 9:30.
14
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
19
He
wasn't noticed until far too close in time --
16
17
I object to him appearing.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I didn't hear.
Can you speak
louder?
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
I don't believe he
was appropriately noticed of the hearing, this hearing.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. KING:
Mr. King?
As the record reflects,
22
Mr. Coughlin was served a copy of the complaint to the
23
address that he is mandated to provide to the State Bar.
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I don't believe that's correct.

Please don't interrupt,

NOTE
BY COUGHLIN, PAGES 7 AND 8 ARE MISSING FROM THE 2/13/13 ROA
1378
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 7
1
Mr. Coughlin.
Go ahead.
MR. KING:
Subsequently, Mr. Coughlin filed,
immediately after we mailed the complaint via certified
and regular mail, Mr. Coughlin filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I think his argument here is
that he wasn't notified that Judge Beesley would be a
potential witness.
10
11
12
13
MR. KING:
We sent a supplemental notice to
Mr. Coughlin that we intended to call Judge Beesley.

MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm sorry.
interject quickly.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
MR. KING:
21
22
If I can just
Mr. Coughlin.
-- before the proceeding -Mr. Coughlin.
Yes, sir.
Please don't interrupt.
May I record the proceedings?
I'm handing, with the chairman's
permission, a copy of the supplemental notice.

In addition, as I indicated, the purpose of
23
calling Mr. Beesley is to assist the panel to understand
24
Mr. Coughlin's conduct in his court, and also as a
25
potential rebuttal witness.
Unfortunately, Judge Beesley
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 8
1
is in Las Vegas and is only available between 9:00 and
9:30.
So what I would ask the panel to do is to
allow, as an offer of proof, allow Judge Beesley to
testify.
for some reason that it's not appropriate, rebuttal
testimony --
And then if the panel subsequently determines
8
9
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm sorry.
this is a special --
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
12
Mr. Coughlin.
-- I need to submit that for
the record.
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
I need to enter,

I need to submit that for the
record.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. KING:
You'll get your opportunity.
Judge Beesley, my name is Patrick
18
King.
I represent the State Bar of Nevada in a
19
disciplinary hearing involving Zach Coughlin.
20
understand that that was the matter in which you were
21
going to testify to this morning?
22
JUDGE BEESLEY:
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Did you
Yes.
Just a second, Mr. King.
24
me state on the record that because of the time
25
constraints, I'm going to rule that we can take the
Let
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 9
1
testimony of Judge Beesley, subject to Mr. Coughlin's
later objection.
time constraints, he has not had an opportunity to put on
the record his objection.
of Judge Beesley, and then listen to Mr. Coughlin's
objection.
He does have an objection.
Given the
I'd like to take the testimony
MR. COUGHLIN:
I did file a --
MR. KING:
Judge Beesley, the panel consists of John
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10
Echeverria -- I'm not pronouncing the name -- but there's
11
five panel members.
12
13
JUDGE BEESLEY:
You have not
spent enough time in Nevada.
14
15
John Echeverria.
MR. KING:
That is correct.
Thank you for
that.
16
Across from me is sitting Mr. Coughlin,
17
Zachary Coughlin.
18
reporter.
19
court security.
20
And in the room also is a court
There's no one else in the room other than some
So what I'm going to ask you, Judge Beesley,
21
if you could explain to the panel your knowledge of
22
Mr. Coughlin relative to the Nevada Rules of Professional
23
Conduct related to --
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Objection.
Relevancy.
Excuse me, Mr. King.
We
1379
Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 52
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 1 of 19
Note" this filing has been edited down for convenience much like Chairman Susich's SCR 117 Petition directed to
Coughlin contained mere allusions to or portions of purportedly suspect filings by Coughlin

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Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 52
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
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NOTE by Coughlin: what follows are Exhibits to this 3/30/12 filing:
Hotmail Print Message

Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 52-2
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 2 of 22
Page 2 of 22
To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna;

kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com; jamesandreboles@msn.com
Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Dear IA Supervisor Stuchell and DDA Kandaras,
I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am respectfully
requesting that you confirm with Deputy Machem that he did, in fact, "personally
serve" the Summary Eviction Order on me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on
November 1, 2011 at 4:30 pm, in connection with performing the lockout. It is my
position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure out whether
Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase "personally served" means something
other than what I believe it means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service
filed by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order
Granting Summary Eviction against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent
was not alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent escrow
deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of
eviction was not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he
"personally served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and
MERS fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys
in the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being
a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me
the Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served"
in compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom
and practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
WCSO? I hear a lot about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some
black letter law to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe Legal Services, the
people you guys had such trouble actually serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may
have actually helped improved legal services in this community, if they were not
dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even where the IFP required the
WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours"
phraseology: "
This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=084f5caf-5632-11e1-... 2/13/2012

Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 52-2
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 3 of 22
Page 3 of 22
Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found in situations
inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the
only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those
situations only apply where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b)
Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an
unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or
an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the
landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court
of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has
jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
of the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in
Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There
is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this
case. The above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language
are inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where
the Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen.
To require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like rendition, rendered,
notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the order
language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a
Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which
follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual
receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon
the days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In
Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
record did not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter
was issued on November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period
commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding
Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA,
a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of
a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)
(granting plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... ...

Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 52-2
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 4 of 22
Page 4 of 22
Dear Washoe County Sheriff's Office,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_of_process
"Substituted service
When an individual party to be served is unavailable for personal service, many
jurisdictions allow for substituted service. Substituted service allows the process
server to leave service documents with another responsible individual, called a
person of suitable age and discretion, such as a cohabiting adult or a teenager. Under
the Federal Rules, substituted service may only be made at the abode or dwelling of
the defendant.[4] California, New York,[5] Illinois, and many other United States
jurisdictions require that in addition to substituted service, the documents be mailed
to the recipient.[5] Substituted service often requires a serving party show that
ordinary service is impracticable, that due diligence has been made to attempt to
make personal service by delivery, and that substituted service will reach the party
and effect notice.[5]"
I am pretty sure "personally served" means you served the person in person, not that
a person named Machem went and posted a notice on a door, personally himself.
See, I think you guys are thinking of the "person" in the word personally as applying
to the server, when in all instances I have ever seen it used in the law, the "person"
part of "personally" applies to the person being served. Help me out here, Mary.
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!
1897&parid=root
Also, does the WCSO have a position on what type of service is required of eviction
orders prior to the WCSO or whoever does it, being able to conduct a lockout?
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/nrcp.html
NRCP RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER... (c) Default
Judgments: Defendant Not Personally Served. When a default judgment shall have
been taken against any party who was not personally served with summons and
complaint, either in the State of Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, and who has not
entered a general appearance in the action, the court, after notice to the adverse party,

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upon motion made within 6 months after the date of service of written notice of entry
of such judgment, may vacate such judgment and allow the party or the partys legal
representatives to answer to the merits of the original action. When, however, a party
has been personally served with summons and complaint, either in the State of
Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, the party must make application to be relieved
from a default, a judgment, an order, or other proceeding taken against the party, or
for permission to file an answer, in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (b)
of this rule.
Okay, so, really, you guys do this for a living, right...you serve people things....and
sign Affidavits under penalty of perjury and stuff, and you are telling me you believe
"personally served" can included situations where the person was not there?
Okay.....You do know that, like, a Summons and Complaint need to be "personally
served" in the sense that, say Machem, would need to see that person and serve it on
them (I don't think they have to take the paper, they don't need to agree to accept
service, but Machem does need to see that person, in person, personally when he is
swearing under penalty of perjury that he "personally served" somebody. Usually
"personally served" is only done in the case of the first thing filed (unless there is an
IFP) in a case, the Summons and Complaint. Thereafter, typically, people just effect
"substituted service" because its cheaper, less of a hassle, and "personal service" is
only required for serving the pleadings that start a case, the Summons and
Complaint. Wow....Okay, so this is my whole point, these state sponsored lockouts
under color of state law should not be being done so fast, unless you guys
"personally serve" the tenant, I feel the law is quite clear, you have to effect
"substituted service" which, under NRCP 6(a) and NRCP 6(e) and NRCP 5(b)(2)
(and NRCP, not JCRCP is applicable to eviction matters according to NRS 118A)
the tenant cannot be deemed to have received or constructively received the Order
until the 3 days for mailing has passed.
Personal service by process server

Personal service is service of process directly to the (or a) party named on the
summons, complaint or petition. In most lawsuits in the United States, personal
service is required to prove service. Most states allow substituted service in almost
all lawsuits unless you are serving a corporation, LLC, LLP, or other business entity;
in those cases, personal service must be achieved by serving (in hand) the documents
to the "Registered Agent" of a business entity. Some states (Florida) do not require
that the documents actually be handed to the individual. In California and most other
states, the documents must be visible to the person being served, i.e., not in a sealed
envelope. If the individual refuses to accept service, flees, closes the door, etc., and
the individual has been positively identified as the person to be served, documents

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may be "drop" served, and it is considered a valid service. Personal service of

process has been the hallmark for initialing litigation for nearly 100 years, primarily
because it guarantees actual notice to a defendant of a legal action against him or her.
Personal service of process remains the most reliable and efficacious way to both
ensure compliance with constitutionally imposed due process requirements of notice
to a defendant and the opportunity to be heard. [2]^ The National Law Review: The
Continuing Relevance of Personal Service of Process
And even if something indicates Coughlin "knew" about the Order, much like in the
case of Coughlin's that was dismissed where the Washoe County Sheriff's didn't
manage to get the "personal service" of the Summons and Complaint done in time, or
"sufficiently", opposing counsel in that matter could tell you that "actual notice" is
not a substitute for compliance with the service requirements.
Which is nice because folks like Richard G. Hill, Esq. have less of an opportunity to
game the system and swoop in with lockout then assert a bunch of hooey about NRS
118A.460 "reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying expenses" subjecting the
tenant's personal property to a lien. Richard G. Hill insisted on throwing away the
last thing my beloved grandmother gave me before she died 2 years ago in the town
dump. He and his contractor lied about so many things, including the fact that they
used my own damn plywood to board up the back porch of the property, then
submitted a bill to the court in an exhibit for $1,060 for "securing" the property
(which doesn't really apply to NRS 118A.460's "reasonable storage moving and
inventorying expenses" like it is required to...further, the charged me $900 a month
for storage and sent me a bill for such prior to my arrest for trespassing at the 121
River Rock location,...well if they charged me $900 to have a home law office there,
then how is it someone could be trespassing if they are being charged the full rental
value for "use and occupancy of the premises"? Further, even if it was a storage
situations, there are sections of NRS 118A devoted to evicting someone from a
storage facility, not arresting them for trespass, and certainly not a custodial arrest
where the RPD Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez admit they never issued a warning
to me or asked me to leave prior to conducting a custodial arrest (which required
$800 of bail, great!, and 3 days in jail, no less). This is especially poor form where
Officer Carter admitted to me that he takes bribes from Richard Hill. Hey, if Officer
Carter did not say that to me, go ahead and sue me, my man....I'm waiting.....that's
what I thought.
He can say he was joking all he wants, but it ain't no joking ass situation to me when
you are arresting me and causing a google search result for my name to show an
arrest....that's damaging the only thing I have of monetary value (my professional

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reputation and name). It ain't no stand up hour when you are putting me in cuffs, bro.
And Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to properly query Hill as to whether
he had sent me, prior to the trespassing arrest, a bill for the "full rental value" of the
property, a value that, at $900, was the same charge for the full "use and occupancy"
of the premises. And Richard G. HIll, Esq. was too busy chortling and filling out the
Criminal Complaint to bother setting them straight, despite my cues, I guess.
Now, add to that malfeasance the fact that Judge Sferrazza let Casey Baker, Esq.
prepare the Order, which means faithfully put to writing what the Judge announced,
not attempt to steal $2,275 for your Californian Beverly Hills High School graduate
neurosurgeon client by slipping in something the judge never said, ie, that the
neurosurgeon gets to keep the $2,275 that Judge Sferrazza order the tenant to pay
into the Reno Justice Court as a "rent escrow" deposit required to preserve the right
to litigate habitability issues. Now, nevermind the fact that Judge Sferrazza actually
did not have the jurisdiction to require that (there is not JCRLV 44 in Reno, that's a
Vegas rule, and if Reno wants a rule like that of its own JCRCP 83 requires the RJC
to publish it and get it approved by the Nevada Supreme Court first....period.). Okay,
so, to take it a step even further, Baker's order goes on to say "but the $2,275 won't
be released to the neurosurgeon yet, "instead that sum shall serve as security for
Coughlin's cost on appeal, pursuant to Nevada JCRCP 73...". But wait, doesn't that
mean Coughlin then gets a Stay of Eviction during the pendency of the Appeal? Isnt'
that was a security that large must be for? Because the "Appeal Bond" is set by
statute at only a mere $250....so holding on to 10 times that much of Coughlin's cash
must have been for the "Supersedeas Bond" mentioned a yielding one a Stay of
Eviction in NRS 40.380 and 40.385.
I know, I know, its confusing because actually those sections force the landlord, his
attorneys and the RJC to choose between viewing Coughlin as a residential tenant
whose rent is less than $1,000, and whom therefore is only required to post a measly
supersedeas bond of $250 (and remember, a supersedeas bond equals a stay of
eviction equals not trespassing) or the the other choice is to view Coughlin as a
commercial tenant, which would allow charging a higher supersedeas bond (except
for that pesky part about his rent being under the $1,000 required by the statute to do
so, his rent being only $900), except, darn it, old Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey
Baker, Esq. elected to pursue this summary eviction proceeding under a No Cause
Eviction Notice, which is not allowed against a commercial tenant (ie, you can't evict
a commercial tenant using the summary eviction procedures set forth in NRS 40.253
unless you alllege non payment of rent and serve a 30 Day Non Payment of Rent
Notice To Quit, which they didn't because they "are just taking the path of least
resistance here, Your Honor (insert their smug chuckling and obnoxious/pretentious
"can you believe this guy?" laughter and head shaking...).

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NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal
from the judgment rendered. But an appeal by the defendant shall not stay the
execution of the judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the defendant shall execute
and file with the court or justice the defendants undertaking to the plaintiff, with two
or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed by the court or justice, but which shall not
be less than twice the amount of the judgment and costs, to the effect that, if the
judgment appealed from be affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will
pay the judgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use and occupation of the
property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency of the
appeal. Upon taking the appeal and filing the undertaking, all further proceedings in
the case shall be stayed.
So, why on earth is the City Attorney's Office still trying to try Coughlin on the
trespass charge for which he endured a custodial arrest and for which old Richard
Hill is still filing Motion's to Show Cause on in the appeal of the summary eviction
matter in CV11-03628? Why, oh why? Does the Reno City Attorney's Office have
some sort of vested interest in keeping Coughlin down, busy, besotted, encumbered,
or otherwise? It, why, it couldn't be because Coughlin has a really good wrongful
arrest cause of action against the Reno Police Department, could it?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
And, well, yeah the Washoe County Sheriff's Office didn't quite get those Summons
and Complaints served in that one case Coughlin was suing his former employer in,
the one where Coughlin was granted an Order to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which
required the Washoe County Sheriff's Office to serve the Summons and
Complaints....But what does that have to to with the 6 days Coughlin spent in jail on
the arrest shown in the youtube video above? Its not like the Washoe County jailed
videotaped a scene where they were forcing Coughlin to get naked and put on a
green dress. What's that? It is? They did do that? Really? No...What? They also
forced him to simulate oral and anal sex with deputies, in the guise of some
ridiculous "procedure" necessary to insure Deputy safety? Oh, wow. And they
retaliated against him for failing to answer their religious preference interrogation
questions by placing him in an icy cold cell for hours at a time, refusing him medical
care despite his plaintive cries for help, while wearing a thin t-shirt? Wow. They
didn't jam a taser needle in his spine for extended periods of time, though, did they?
Your kidding! Whats next, your going tell me Sargent Sigfree of the Reno PD
ordered a custodial arrest on Coughlin for "jaywalking" while Coughlin was
peacefully filming, from a public spot, Richard G. Hill's fraudulent contractor Phil
Howard destroying and taking to the town dump items of enormous sentimental
value to Coughlin that he was prevented from retrieving from the property during the
scant time he was allowed to (after he paid $480 worth of a lien for what he knew

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not, because, despite, ol' Contractor Phil's fraudulent $1,060 bill for "securing" the
back porch (with screws facing the outside, inexplicably, and a window unit a/c left
in the window facing the sidewalk near the Lakemill Lodge, secured by nothing but
duct tape
It is kind of a combo neon sign that says "Burglarize this Place, Everybody!"),
Coughlin's former home law office was burglarized on December 12, 2011 while
Richard G. Hill was holding its contents (including, tackily, Coughlin's client's files,
like the ones for the foreclosure defense actions, etc.), asserting his "lien". A lien for
"storage" where the charge for storage, $900, was the same as the charge for "full use
and occupany" was. However, that $900 a month for "storage" also included another
$1,060 charge for "securing" (and that bill actually listed "fixing a leak in the
basement...neither of which seem to have much to do with the "reasonable storage,
moving, and inventorying" expenses such a lien is provided for under NRS
118A.460....). Jeez, your probably going to tell me Sargent Sigfree ordered another
custodial arrest on Coughlin just two days after the jaywalking arrest, for the same
fact pattern that Master Edmondson granted Coughlin's applications for Protections
Orders against based upon the battery and assaults that his former housemates
committed. Because, Sargent Sigfree thinks its "misuse of 911" for Coughlin to call
when he returns home at night and his dog has mysteriously disappeared, and his
housemates make menacing commentary about it. Surely, Coughlin, a former
domestic violence attorney would have nothing helpful to add to Sargnet Sigfree's
expert opinion that "animal abuse is not domestic violence" (tell that to NRS 33.010,
Sarge) and that its, rather, "a matter for animal control" and that Sargent Sigfree was
"trying to help" Coughlin by arresting him, again, and necessitating the $1,500 bail
associated with the gross misdemeanor charge, "Misuse of 911" because, as Sargent
Sigfree told Coughlin "you keep putting yourself in situations where you are
victimized" so it was necessary to arrest Coughlin in that regard.
But hey, at least NV Energy hasn't refused to let Coughlin get any electrical service
for the past week since those with the Protection Orders against them cancelled the
service and NV Energy shut it off, without providing any notice to Coughlin, right.
Nevermind. But...but surely when NV Energy shut of the power to Coughlin's home
law office on October 4th, 2011, just hours prior to the bad faith "inspection" with
videographer of Coughlin' s home law office that Casey Baker, Esq. thought so very
necessary one day before Coughlin's Tenant Answer was due...surely NV Energy did
not leave the back gate to Coughlin's home law office open and speed off, Coughlin's
beloved mountain bike suddenly missing (the one the parents of his girlfriend of 5
years gave him)? Well, NV Energy is probably not retaliating against Coughlin for
complaining about that by refusing him electric service for the past seven days, you
would have to assume....
NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of

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premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to
NRS 40.253:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be
obtained by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the
expected costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the
appellate court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of that court as the suretys agent
upon whom papers affecting the suretys liability upon the bond may be served.
Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion in the
appellate court without independent action. A tenant of commercial property may
obtain a stay of execution only upon the issuance of a stay pursuant to Rule 8 of the
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the posting of a supersedeas bond in the
amount of 100 percent of the unpaid rent claim of the landlord.
2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises that are the subject of the appeal
during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount
provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it
becomes due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new
proceedings for a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant
to NRS 40.253.
NRS 40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings for want of form. In
all cases of appeal under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, the appellate court shall
not dismiss or quash the proceedings for want of form, provided the proceedings
have been conducted substantially according to the provisions of NRS 40.220 to
40.420, inclusive; and amendments to the complaint, answer or summons, in matters
of form only, may be allowed by the court at any time before final judgment upon
such terms as may be just; and all matters of excuse, justification or avoidance of the
allegations in the complaint may be given in evidence under the answer.
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
But, back to the Sheriff's Office. And, I am not really buying the idea that you guys
don't know NRCP 4 through 6 like the back of your hand, but....hell, maybe you
don't. But, clearly the language in NRS 40 about how the Sheriff may "remove tenant
from the property within 24 hours of receipt of the Order" do not apply where the
Tenant filed a Tenant's Answer and showed up to the Hearing and litigated the
matter. Especially where, as here the lease had not terminated, by its terms, but was

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rather renewed. This is particularly true where NRS 118A prevents so terminating a
holdover tenant's lease for a retaliatory or discriminatory purpose.
I would hate to see people start to think the Washoe County Sheriff's Office is
cutting corners on the whole "personally served" thing (just so a landlord could get
what they want quicker), just like I would hate for people to think the Reno
Municipal Court is letting the bottom line get in the way of providing that whole
Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel where jail time is even a possibility thing. And,
hey, if the RMC denies an indigent attorney the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel,
the finds him guilty of NRS 22.030, Summary Contempt Commited in the Presence
of the Court, and the puts him in cuffs when the Trial ends, summarily sentencing
him to 3 days in jail for violating NRS 22.030, well....that's no big deal, right, I
mean, the RMC technically kept its promise that the underyling charge, though
technically it could result in incarceration would not...because the incarceration was
for a whole dang different charge, ie, Summary Contempt in the presence of the
Court....and so what if the whole zealous advocate thing and the denying the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel thing and the Summary Contempt thing don't go so
well together....Or if 6 court employees had to stay til 9pm getting paid overtime at
the RMC to get 'r done...
NRCP 4: "(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be
served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such
copies as are necessary. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the summons
attached to a copy of the complaint as follows:...(6) Service Upon Individuals. In all
other cases to the defendant personally, or by leaving copies thereof at the
defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process. [As amended; effective January 1, 2005.] (e) Same: Other Service. (1)
Service by Publication. (i) General. In addition to methods of personal service, when
the person on whom service is to be made resides out of the state, or has departed
from the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or by
concealment seeks to avoid the service of summons, and the fact shall appear, by
affidavit, to the satisfaction of the court or judge thereof, and it shall appear, either
by affidavit or by a verified complaint on file, that a cause of action exists against the
defendant in respect to whom the service is to be made, and that the defendant is a
necessary or proper party to the action, such court or judge may grant an order that
the service be made by the publication of summons. Provided, when said affidavit is
based on the fact that the party on whom service is to be made resides out of the
state, and the present address of the party is unknown, it shall be a sufficient showing
of such fact if the affiant shall state generally in such affidavit that at a previous time
such person resided out of this state in a certain place (naming the place and stating
the latest date known to affiant when such party so resided there); that such place is

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the last place in which such party resided to the knowledge of affiant; that such party
no longer resides at such place; that affiant does not know the present place of
residence of such party or where such party can be found; and that affiant does not
know and has never been informed and has no reason to believe that such party now
resides in this state; and, in such case, it shall be presumed that such party still
resides and remains out of the state, and such affidavit shall be deemed to be a
sufficient showing of due diligence to find the defendant. This rule shall apply to all
manner of civil actions, including those for divorce"
I guess it don't matter much to me which one of you pays me my damages for the
wrongful eviction, illegal lockout, whether its the landlord, his attorney, or the
Sheriff's Office. Your money is always good with me.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Subject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
From: LStuchell@washoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
Mr. Coughlin,
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served
by Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence
was unoccupied at the time.
Liz Stuchell, Supervisor
WCSO Civil Section
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]

Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:58 AM

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To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna;

kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com; jamesandreboles@msn.com
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service
filed by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order
Granting Summary Eviction against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent
was not alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent escrow
deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of
eviction was not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
"personally served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and
MERS fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys
in the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being
a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me
the Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served"
in compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom
and practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
phraseology: "
of the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary

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Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found in situations
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b)
Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an
unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or
an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order
and,
of the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in
Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There
is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this
case. The above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language
are inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where
the Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen.
To require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a
Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which
follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual
receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon
the days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In
Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
record did not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter
was issued on November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period
commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding
Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA,
a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of
a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)
(granting plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).

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Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services may say
about this 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like these, NRS
40.400 Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such
NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy
Machem alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on
November 1, 2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem, unless "personally served" is
defined in a rather impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally different
understanding of the definition of "personally served", which may be the case. Or,
perhaps the Sheriff's Office is busy and doesn't want to wait around to "personally
serve" every tenant it wishes to evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three
days" rule in NRCP 6(e)...the landlord's might not like it, but they can use that
frustration as an incentive not to jump to litigating every disagreement about
habitability that a tenant brings to them. You may not realize how ridiculous some
landlord's get. In my case, I offered to fix basic things that clearly implicated the
habitability rules in NRS 118A.290 and the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly Hill
High School graduate landlord balked and complained then hired and attorney four
days into a dispute.....at which point the rules against contacting represented parties
prevented much in the way of real settlement discussion, particularly where opposing
counsel has continuously demonstrated a complete indifference to pursuing
settlement (why would he at the rates he bills hours at?). I just don't think the
Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or damage the citizen tenants of Washoe
County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss or Richard G. Hill, Esq.
I AM REQUESTING, IN WRITING, THAT BOTH OF YOUR OFFICES
INVESTIGATE THIS AND PROVIDE A SWORN AFFIDAVIT FROM MR.
MACHEM THAT ADMITS THAT I WAS NOT PERSONALLY PRESENT
WHEN HE SERVED THE ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION IN RJC
REV2011-001708 ON 11/1/12 AT 4:30 PM (ACCORDING TO HIS AFFIDAVIT
OF SERVICE). YOU NEVER KNOW, I MIGHT HAVE IRREFUTABLE PROOF
THAT I WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THAT TIME, SO, BE CAREFUL. There
simply is not anything specific in Nevada law addressing how such Summary
Eviction Orders are to be served and carried out. The sections dealing with
NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and
exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent....
6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless
of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the
affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a
hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the

Case 10-05104-gwz
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Page 16 of 22
Page 16 of 22
truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in this section. If
the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer
and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order
for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant....
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and
service of a motion, file a motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of
the court, to dispute the amount of the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant
to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory, moving and storage of personal
property left on the premises. The motion must be filed within 20 days after the
summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises by the
tenant, or within 20 days after:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and
(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a
hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the
motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy
served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other process server. At the
hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460
or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges
determined to be due or if no charges are determined to be due...."
I also want to know why NRS 40. 253(8) was not followed with respect to my
November 17th, 2011 filing of a Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien. Why
didn't the WCSO serve notice, as required by NRS 40.253(8) upon the landlord's
attorney Richard Hill? Why didn't I get a hearing within the 10 days called called for
by that section (to get back my client's files no less), but rather, I had to wait a full 33
days to get a hearing, and service of notice of the hearing was not effectuated, as
required by NRS 40.235(8), by the WCSO. Why?
Please provide an indication, in writing, of the names and case numbers for the last
20 incidences when the WCSO has served notice of a hearing set pursuant to NRS
40.253(8). What's that? The WCSO has NEVER served such notice? Yet the WCSO
is there with bells on (or Machem is) to lie in Affidavits of Service to lock out the
citizen tenants of Washoe County impermissilby early vis a vis NRCP 5(b)(2) and
NRCP 6(e)? Why is that? Is it a conspiracy? Does money talk? When I was arrested
for trespassing on November 12th, 2011 by RPD Officer Chris Carter and Sargent

Case 10-05104-gwz
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Page 17 of 22
Page 17 of 22
Lopez, Carter admitted to me that "Richard Hill pays him a lot of money and
therefore he arrests whom Richard Hill says to and does what Richard Hill says to
do...." Both Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to investigate, despite prompting,
whether Richard Hill has sent the tenant/arrestee a bill or demand letter in bill for the
full rental value of the property, $900 per month, under some interpretation of the
"reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying expenses" collectable by a landlord
under a personal property line set forth in NRS 118A.460 (one could also interpret
such a bill as Hill's withdrawing or eradicating the Order of Summary Eviction itself,
which was not "personally served" by the Washoe County Sheriff (despite what their
Affidavit of Service says...I wasn't even there at the time they changed the
locks...and so the Summary Eviction Order was not properly served under NRCP 6,
and despite the Reno Justice Court impermissibly converting $2300 of my money
under a "rent escrow" Order its required I comply with in order to litigate habitability
issues in a summary eviction proceeding under NRS 40.253, despite NRS 40.253
(6)'s express dicate against such an Order (unless, pursuant to JCRCP 83, a justice
court gets such a rule, like Justice Court Rule of Las Vegas (JCRLV) Rule 44,
published and approved by the Nevada Supreme Court, which the RJC has not,
rather, the RJC applies all these insidious secret "house rules" (like forcing tenants to
deliver themselves to the filing office to submit to personal service notice of a
summary eviction hearing within, like, 12 hours of the Tenant filing a Tenant's
Answer or Affidavit in response to an eviction Notice, rather than the service
requirements of such notice following NRCP 6 (days for mailing, etc., etc., in other
words, in the RJC everything is sped up imperissilby to help landlord's out, and the
NV. S. Ct ruling in Glazier and Lippis clearly contemplate personal liability against
the Court and or Judges themselves for so doing)....A Qui Tam action or something a
la Mausert's in Solano County, I believe, in California, would be very
interesting...Still haven't heard anything from the Reno PD about the various
complaints I have filed with them in writing related to the wrongful arrests,
excessive force and other misconduct committed against me, though they did arrest
me the other day for calling 911incident to some domestic violence for which I was
granted to Extended Protection Orders against my former housemates....old Sargent
Sigfree ordered that arrest, as he did two days prior when he ordered a custodial
arrest of me for "jaywalking".
Funny thing, I never heard anything back from the RPD about complaints like the
following one:
From:
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:

Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 52-2
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 18 of 22
Page 18 of 22
Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM

****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
We're sorry the following problem was found during review
of your submitted report T11005956:
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER
THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S
SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE ADDRESSED.
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
Reno Police Department
What is interesting there is that at least I was provided the name of an officer, a
"Wozniak" (though I have been unable to confirm the existence of
such an RPD Officer...
or whether " THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT
HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE
OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE
ADDRESSED."
What is more strange is that I submitted several online police reports to the Reno PD
(a couple of which asserted complaints against various Reno PD officers, or asked
why RDP Officer Carter, whom admitted taking bribes from Richard G. Hill, Esq. at
the time of my custodial arrest for trespassing (the one where Richard Hill signed a
Criminal Complaint for trespass, then Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to
follow up on my imploring them to ask Hill whether he has recently sent me a bill
for the "full rental value" of the property, the same amount that had been charged for
the "use and enjoyment" of the premises, $900, in comparision to what NRS
118A.460 may deem "reasonable storage" expenses for which a lien is available to a
landlord, though NRS 118A.520 has outlawed rent distraints upon tenant's personal
property....Regardless, between January 8 - 12th, 2012, and was arrested twice by the
Reno PD shortly after submitting these written complaints to the Reno PD.

Case 10-05104-gwz
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Page 19 of 22
Actually, upon being released from jail on November 15th, 2011, incident to the
custodial trespass arrest, I went to Richard HIll's office to get my wallet and driver's
license. He refused to provide it to me until late November 22nd, 2011. Hill called
the Reno PD on the 15th (or maybe I did because he was withholding my state issued
ID, the one I would need to rent a room, drive my car, and my wallet, which is kind
of useful in such situations....). Anyways, Sargent Tarter of the Reno PD showed up,
he went inside Hill's office with Hill for quite some time and the result was Tarter
telling me to leave. I did, but while driving down St. Laurence towards S. Virginia
(Hill's office is at 652 Forrest St. 89503 and would have required turning down the
wrong way of a one way street, Forrest, to go back to Hill's Office (so clearly I was
not headed to Hill's office) Sargent Tarter began tailing me, then he pulled me over,
then he gave me a ticket, in retaliation if you ask me for reporting RPD Officer
Carter admitting that he takes bribes from Hill to Sargent Tarter minutes earlier. Uh,
well, anyways, another Sargent calls me later that night, taking the "good cop" role.
But upon informing him of what RPD Officer Carter told me about Hill paying him
money to arrest people during the 11/12/11 trespassing arrest, that Sargent
immediately informed me that, despite this being the first he heard of that, he was
sure that was not happening....I guess RPD Officer Carter is trying to explain away
his comments about Richard Hill paying him money to arrest people by dismissing
them as sarcasm, a joke, said in jest, whatever....but I don't see how that situation (a
license attorney getting arrested for a crime, a conviction for which would result in
that attorney being required to report said conviction to the State Bar of Nevada
under SCR 111, etc., and possibly resulting in a suspension of that attorney's license
to practice law, or worse...) is all that jocular of a situation. Combine that with the
too quick to dismiss my reports of bribery by Richard Hill to officer Carter to the
RPD Sargent who called me on 11/15/11 regarding the retaliation by Sargent Tarter
that I complained of, and I don't think it is all that unreasonable for anyone to take
RPD Officer Carter at his word regarding Richard G. Hill, Esq. paying him money to
arrest whom Hill says to arrest. Add to that Sargent Sigfree ordering my arrest for
jaywalking (by a trainee RPD Officer) on January 12th, 2011 (custodial arrest, bail
of $160 emptied my bank account out, or pretty close to it) while I was peacefully
filming from a public spot Richard G. Hill, Esq's contractor Phil Howard, whom had
submitted bills in courts records and filings under the lien for "reasonable storage
moving and inventorying" found in NRS 118A.460, even where old Phil used my
own plywood at the property to board up the back porch (curiously leaving the
screws holding up the plywood exposed to exterior of the property where anyone
could easily unscrew them, and also leaving in a window unit ac secured only by
ducttape in a window facing a sidewalk by the LakeMill Lodge....which resulted in
$8,000 at least of my personal property being burglarized from my former home law
office on Decmeber 12th, 2011 while Hill was asserting a lien on all my personal
property found therein (and my client's files, which arguably are not even my
property, but rather, the client's property). Hill went on to place what he believes to
be my social security number in court records, on purpose, despite his signing an
Affirmation pursuant to NRS 239B.030 that that was not the case (attaching a two

Case 10-05104-gwz
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Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 20 of 22
Page 20 of 22
page report to the RPD as an Exhibit). Then Hill and his contractor Phil Howard both
committed perjury when the signed Declarations attesting that I had climbed on the
contractors truck or ever touched Hill. Hill lies constantly, whether under penalty of
perjury or now, so I don't have time to rebut every little lie he makes (he makes me
out to comes across as a Yosemite Sam caricature of a human being in his filings
when he describes me...).
Further, why am I arrested for trespassing and not those from Nevada Court Services
where they went behind closed gate the the backyard of my home law office and
banged on window extremely loudly for 40 minutes at a time 3 times a day, one guy
ringing the doorbell, one guy moving around all other sides of the property banging
on the windows, peering in closed blinds, and affecting a phony "color of law" tone,
resemblance, and verbal communications, misleadingly announcing that they were
"Court Services, come out now!", wearing their pretend Sheriff outfits, big
equipment saddled belts (including firearms, I believe, and radios), etc. ,etc.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQ132q2O7DY
Add to that that Nevada Court Services Jeff Chandler drives by in his Monster Truck
baring his personalized "NCS" license plate while I am in the RPD squad car,
handcuffed, outside my former law office at 121 River Rock, at the time of the
1/12/12 jaywalking arrest and the appearances are troubling. Now, add to that that
Lew Taitel, Esq. was my court appointed public defender in the Reno Municipal
Court in the trespass case, and that Judge Gardner had refused to provide me the
names of prospective appointed defense counsel (I wanted to run a conflicts check)
at my arraignment (where Marshal Mentzel barked at me in a threatening tone, using
menacing language), whereupon Taitel was appointed as my defense attorney and
filed a notice of appearance, and received my confidential file, pc sheet, arrest
reports, ssn, etc....only its turns out that Taitel shares and office and a receptionist
with Nevada Court Services and they list him and his picture on their website as
"associated with" their Process Server corporation, despite the prohibition lawyers
face against fee sharing with non-lawyers. Then, Taitel somehow manages to get out
of defending my case without filing a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, despite that
being required by the Reno Municipal Court Rule 3(B):
RMCR Rule 3(B): Authorization to Represent (B): An attorney desiring to withdraw
from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the
same. The court may rule on the motion or set a hearing.
But, perhaps most troubling of all is the implication that the Reno City Attorney's
Office, which defends actions against the City of Reno Police Department and its
Officers, has a vested interest in discrediting me in advance of the wrongful arrest
lawsuit that the Reno City Attorney's office knew was imminent at the time of all of

Case 10-05104-gwz
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Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 21 of 22
Page 21 of 22
the above incidents, relating to the following August 20th, 2011 wrongful arrest by
RPD Officer's Duralde and Rosa. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
So, that's what attempting to coerce a suspect's consent to an impermissible search
sounds like? Add to that that the trespassing case is before Judge Gardner, whom
most recently was employed with the Reno City Attorney's Office.
And, you know what is funny? Officer Del Vecchio cuffed me and placed me in his
squad car last summer after he terrified me and another gentleman who had bicycles.
He veered across the road and screeched his squad car to a halt, jumped out, and did
some other stuff, then demanded my name and ID...and the lawyer in me didn't like
that that much, and he didn't like me not wanting to give it to him. This occurred
right in front of my home law office in the summer of 2011. He cuffed me and told
me I was going to jail for something about a light on the front of my bicycle (the one
NV Energy likely stole when the shut off my power, unnoticed, on October 4, 2011)
despite my bike actually having such a light....but then Del Vecchio's partner did him
a solid and talked some sense into him, and I humbled it up for Del Vecchio and we
both let it go, and I didn't go to jail....Until Del Vecchio was present supervising
some Officer's training at the scene of my custodial (9 hour) jaywalking arrest) on
1/12/12. But Del Vecchio, I guess either didn't want to or wasn't able to talk some
sense into Sargent Sigfree.....and then Sargent Sigfree (the spelling is likely off) had
me arrested and charged with a gross misdemeanor, "Misuse of 911" just two days
later, on January 14th, 2011 when I called 911 to report that my roommates were
laughing menacingly when I asked them why my dog was missing (I had also been
chased up to my room numerous times since moving in with these people, something
I had to do because so much of my money had been taken up with bail or lost
earnings due to all these wrongful arrests and abuse of processes mentioned
above...also these housemates had chased me with a ten inch butcher knife, two of
my tires were slashed, I was locked out all night on New Years Even when these
changed the locks at around midnight, had my furniture thrown in the street, property
stolen, coffee thrown on me, destroying my smart phone in the process, etc.,
etc...And despite the housemate having an outstanding arrest warrant, and animal
abuse being listed amongst the elements of domestic violence, Sargent Sigfree told
me he was arresting me because I "keep putting yourself in these situations", like,
where I am a victim, and that he was "trying to help you", he said with a smirk and a
laugh to his fellow RPD Officers, whom then proceeded to use excessive force
against me. I guess he was helping me by saddling me with a gross misdemeanor
with a $1,500 bail, especially where its been arranged for Court Services, or preTrial Services to forever deny me an OR, despite my meeting the factors for such set
forth in statute (30 year resident, entire immediate family lives here, licensed to
practice law in Nevada, etc., etc)...I guess it should not be too much of a surprise to
me that Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts failed to address the perjury of all three of
her witnesses or that her fellow Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens lied
to me about whether or not the Reno City Attorney's Office even had any
documentation related to my arrest or whether it would in the month before my

Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 52-2
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 22 of 22
Page 22 of 22
arraignment, despite that fact that subsequent productions of discovery tend to

indicate that the Reno City Attorney's Office did have those materials at the time. I
could be wrong about some of this...But that would require and awful lot of
coincidences.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the
electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain
confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not
the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended
recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and
that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the
contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential,
intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is
privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If
you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying,
distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of
this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in
error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail
from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by
anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work
product, or other applicable privilege.
NOTE BY Coughlin: this page was not included amongst the Exhibits to Coughlin's 3/30/12 filing in
NVB-10-05104, but this note was provided to Coughlin by WCSO employee Patricia Beckman at the
Washoe County jail at the time on 3/19/12 that WCSO Deputy Jason Hodge admitted to Coughlin that
the Reno Municipal Court's Marshals had returned to the jail on 2/28/12 after transporting
Coughlin there incident to his 2/27/12 five day summary incaration incident to FHE4, at which at
5:00 on 2/27/12, Coughlin's property (including his smart phone, a micro sd card that was separate
from the phone, but inserted into the phone upon it being returned to Coughlin with the data wiped
from both some 37 days later, a regular flip style cell phone, and an electric shaver) was booked
into his personal property at the jail (see next page). Not within the confines of a search
incident to arrest, and without a warrant or any court order, the RMC Marshals retrieved
Coughlin's property from the
jail a day later, on
2/28/12.
Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 52-3
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 1 of 2

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@
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=5d21298f-6529-475... Page 1 of 2
Case 10-05104-gwz Doc 52-4 Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22 Page 1 of 2
FW: wrongful eviction service procedures and curious

evidentiary release to Reno Marshals and inconsistent
statements related thereto
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 3:29 PM
To:
mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
8 attachments
3 16 12 fax to wcso re eviction park terrace hill etc.pdf (1761.7 KB) , CV11-03628-2633891
(Reply...).pdf (164.9 KB) , CV11-03628-2625640 (Mtn for TRO).pdf (153.5 KB) , stay eviction 31
thru 36 zc park terrace HOA package fill out reprinted.pdf (78.3 KB) , CV11-03628_2750229
Machem up to his old tricks again.pdf (26.9 KB) , CV11-03628 MOTION FOR EXTENSION FO
TIME.pdf (320.2 KB) , cv11-03628 Motion to Set Aside ORder to Show Cause, etc.odt_0.pdf
(318.3 KB) , ifp11 tr 26800 city of reno coughlin traffic Nash Holmes Tarter.pdf (314.5 KB)
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.... http://by148w.bay148.mail.live....
3/16/2012
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=5d21298f-6529-475... Page 2 of 2
Case 10-05104-gwz Doc 52-4 Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22 Page 2 of 2
Dear Ms. Kandaras,
Regarding the two recent stays in the jail and the demands for $30 per day, I am indigent, please retract
those demands. Its possible I don't want much more than to be left alone to practice law.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: mhaley@washoecounty.us; tvinger@washoecounty.us; lstuchell@washoecounty.us;
rsilva@washoecounty.us; tdarlington@washoecounty.us
Subject: wrongful eviction service procedures and curious evidentiary release to Reno Marshals and
inconsistent statements related thereto
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 15:27:27 -0700
Dear Sheriff Haley et al,
I respectfully submit these materials to you, Sir.
Sincerely,
Please also accept this correspondence as a LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE REQUIRING YOU TO MAINTAIN
AND PRODUCE TO ME COPIES OF ANY AND ALL RECORDINGS OR DOCUMENTATION OF ANYSORT
CAPTURED OR EVER POSSESSED BY YOUR OFFICE OR ORGANIZATION INCLUDING THOSE MADE
DURING MY RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH DEPUTY DODGE, TRUDY DARLINGTON, LOCAL ATTORNEY
PAM WILLMORE, AND THOSE TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AND EMAILS OF LATE, BUT NOT LIMITED
TO THOSE, BETWEEN MYSELF AND VARIOUS SECURED PROPERTY PERSONNEL AND SUPERVISORS.
Zach Coughlin
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.... http://by148w.bay148.mail.live....
3/16/2012
Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 52-5
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 1 of 2

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NOTE:COUGHLIN EDITED OUT PAGES 10-22 HERE, and to be fair to Judge Nash Holmes, those pages
are somewhat irrelevant to the traffic citation Trial given the citations therein almost all
relate to civil lawsuits against law enforcement, however, Coughlin was at least trying to put
forward authority involving a key disputed issue in RMC 11TR26800, ie, the relevancy of a

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retaliatory motive by law enforcement (and evidence related thereto can be elicted for more
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NOTE: ON 3/23/12 at the Order to Show Cause hearing in CV11-03628 before Judge Flanagan in the appeal of the

summary eviction matter that RMC Marshal Harley served Coughlin Notice of on 2/27/12 just before the RMC
11TR26800 Trial before Judge Holmes, Judge Flanagan quoted this section and characterized it as poignant. His
2/27/12 Order denied HIll's Motion for ORder to sanction or hold Coughlin in contempt. courthouse sanctuary do
ctrine as to wcso Machen having Harley serve Coguhlin on 2/27/12,
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Holmes held him in contempt.
Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 52-7
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 30 of 224
NOTE: Judge Holmes made some findings verbally on the record at after holding Coughlin in
contempt on 2/27/12, mentioning "continuing lines of inquiry"...Coughlin never did receive the
2/28/12 Order, or even become aware of it, until months after it allegedly was entered.
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Doc 52-7
Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
Page 31 of 224
This reference to "laughter" is likely due to a copying and pasting by Coughlin from the Motion for New
Trial following RMC Judge Howard's cursory, conclusory summary contempt Order, that he attempted to
mislead Coughlin into believing was not appealable.
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Doc 52-7
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Prison Talk > U.S. REGIONAL FORUMS > COLORADO > Colorado News & Events > Owens
judge picks were many, male and often DAs
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09-09-2007, 01:08 PM
Owens judge picks were many, male and often DAs

By DENNIS HUSPENI (dennis.huspeni@gazette.com)
THE GAZETTE
September 9, 2007 - 8:25AM
Former Republican Gov. Bill Owens appointed more judges in his two terms in office than
any other governor in Colorados history.
Owens 174 appointments, from County Court judge up to Supreme Court justice,
outnumbered both governors before him combined: Roy Romer appointed 114 and Dick
Lamm named 59. Each served three terms.
Owens first pick for the Colorado Supreme Court, Denver Deputy District Attorney Nathan
Ben Coats in 2000, showed early the type of judge Owens preferred.
Almost half of Owens judges were prosecutors or former prosecutors, and 70 percent were
men.
A Gazette review of Owens judicial appointments during his eight years in office shows at
least 72 had served multiple years as prosecutors. In that same period, Owens appointed
only four judges with public defender experience.
Though not even a full year into his first term, Gov. Bill Ritter has appointed more judges
five with public defender experience. One attorney, former Deputy Public Defender
Jonathan Walker, is thought to be the first active public defender named to a judgeship in
nearly a decade. Walker was appointed by Ritter as an El Paso County Court judge in May.
Of Ritters first 22 appointments, five have public defender experience, seven were former
prosecutors and 10 were from private practice or already judges. Nearly 40 percent were
women.
I absolutely think its one of the most important things a governor does, said Ritter,
former Denver District Attorney from 1993 through 2004 and a Democrat.
As of July 1, there were 285 judges in the state: county, district, court of appeals and
Supreme Court justices. That means Owens appointed more than 60 percent of the states
judges in his two terms.
While more recent appointments are bringing judges with diverse backgrounds to the
bench, most legal experts say they dont think the change will have a significant impact on
what happens in most courtrooms.
Its only in the states highest courts that judges rule as a group.
During his tenure, Owens appointed 14 of the 19 Court of Appeals judges, or 73 percent.
Among the seven Colorado Supreme Court Justices, Owens appointed two judges, both
considered conservative.
Still, most of the justices were put on the bench by Romer, a Democrat, and legal experts
say it leans left politically.
Owens declined to comment for this story.
A MATTER OF IDEOLOGY?
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Political and legal experts say its natural for a governor to appoint judges who share his or
her ideology.
Owens made no secret he wanted tough judges to hand out stiff sentences.
There werent a lot of prosecutors appointed to the bench in recent years, Owens told the
House Republican Caucus shortly after taking office in 1999.
I think Ive done exactly what I said I would do: I said I would appoint a different type of
judge, Owens said in 2002. I said I would, in fact, put judges on the bench who
understand the impact of crime and understand the importance of the criminal justice
system. A major function of government is to provide for public safety. So I plead guilty to
that charge.
A judges leanings toward prosecutors or defense attorneys is important: its one of the
things the states Commissions on Judicial Performance looks at when evaluating judges for
retention recommendations.
Will those judges affect Colorados crowded prison system and county jails?
Many Colorado legal experts dont see a need for alarm.
The impact is not going to be as great as some people might fear, said David Getches,
dean of the University of Colorado at Boulders Law School.
The nominating commissions from each of Colorados 22 Judicial Districts send the
governor three candidates. The governor then has 15 days to make a choice, or it falls to
the states chief justice.
Frankly, they dont send up people who are incompetent, Getches said. Id be very
surprised to see a politicalization of the bench in either direction. ... You dont see any
swerves in the road.
Getches concurs picking judges is a key duty of Colorados governor.
It leaves a lasting legacy, Getches said. When you appoint a couple hundred judges,
theyll be around for 10, 20 or 30 years beyond that governors term. Thats a profound
kind of impact to have.
A QUESTION OF BALANCE
University of Denver law professor Robert Hardaway, an expert in politics and the law,
said Owens reliance on prosecutors for judges didnt bother him.
Many of those prosecutors have private practice experience, which would usually include
criminal defense work, he said.
I have always thought it was a terrible idea to appoint a judge who has only been on one
side of the fence, Hardaway said. If I were governor, I would never appoint someone
who was a lifetime prosecutor. By the same token, I wouldnt appoint someone who had
been a lifetime public defender, either.
Former Colorado Supreme Court Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis, who founded DUs Institute
for the Advancement of the American Legal System, said theres a difference between an
ideal group of judicial candidates, and reality.
Ideally, the judiciary should be balanced between civil attorneys, criminal attorneys, men,
women and people of all color and backgrounds, Love Kourlis said. On the other hand,
with the exception of the Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme Court, each judge
sits alone. So the balance of the whole system is probably less important than each
individual judges ability to set aside personal bias and be fair.
Ritter, a Democrat, said he doesnt look at a judicial candidates political leanings.
Certainly, people will have their own ideologies when coming on the bench, Ritter said. I
always strive for candidates who will check that advocacy role, that part of their political
3/7/2012 10:18 AM
Are We Becoming a Police State?
http://www.freeexistence.org/police_state.html
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NOte by Coughlin on 12/25/12: in her 3/12/12 Order in 11tr26800 Judge Nash Holmes only mentions "an article about
a police state", failing to point out the additional relevant to that traffic citation matter where this article
traffic enforcement, and revenue considerations by the municipalities in charge thereof.
1 of 5
Home

Traffic enforcement has become a major industry in the United States. This essay
presents a look at some of the social, psychological, and economic trends behind the
emergence of this big business.
Are we becoming a police state? That is a difficult question, but it can certainly be
argued that in some places in the United States, yes, we definitely are. Let's take a look
at some trends that have emerged since the late 1970's.
But first, let's go back in history. Public police forces did not exist in the United States
until the middle of nineteenth century, when their introduction met with significant
resistance from the populace.1 By the 1950's, excluding the largest cities (many of which
have had problems with corrupt law enforcement officers dating well back into the 19th
century), citizens generally had a highly favorable opinion of law enforcement
officers. Good people had little to fear from the police, and the moral person's
encounters with police were generally favorable. The sheriff was a "good guy," the
"white hat" celebrated in so many of the Old West movies and television programs of that
era. Children at play fought over who got to be the sheriff, and this esteem for law
enforcement could be seen in many other places in our culture.
Contrast this with the present. Good people now become uneasy when a police car pulls
out behind them. The average encounter with police is often stressful and ends with the
citizen having to divert a bunch of his income to the local powers-that-be (perhaps more
like the bands of outlaws, or "black-hats" of those same Old West movies).
What happened? There are a several different phenomena that I believe explain this
cultural shift.
"Us vs. Them" Mentality
Let's go back 40 years. Most places had "beat cops," patrolmen who would travel
around their jurisdiction on foot. These patrolmen would regularly encounter the
merchants and residents in their jurisiction, greet them, exchange some pleasantries or
family news, and maybe even be treated to a free cup of coffee at the corner
store. These cops knew the people they were protecting, and they were reminded several
times a day of the community values they were protecting, and of the people they were
protecting. I attribute much of this to the unofficial face-to-face encounters that were
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inherent to the job.

Fast forward to the present. John Q. Suburbia no longer has a single, friendly officer
patrolling his neighborhood on foot. In the interest of police efficiency, a much more
anonymous team of people in cruisers takes turns driving through that same
neighborhood. The community interactions of the average patrolman are now only a
narrow subset of what they once were. Now, for many patrolmen, these on-duty
encounters are typically limited to: 1. getting out of their car to respond to a call (often
because someone is acting irrationally or violently), and 2. pulling people over for traffic
infractions, said people thus being inherently disagreeable. Many of the favorable
interactions are now gone. Good people now see less of the police except in unfavorable
circumstances. And conversely, the police now see less of the citizenry except in
unfavorable circumstances. It's only natural that, in this situation, police officers will
begin to perceive their community as little more than a giant playground of dysfunctional
children who really need to be kept in line. Perhaps I am overstating things with this
metaphor, but the stated situation will, at a minimum, greatly increase the cynicism of our
patrolman.
Now, add to this mix officers who spend the majority of their time enforcing traffic
laws. These patrolmen make their living hunting for speeders, or waiting for drivers to
slip up and make some kind of fine-worthy mistake. The citizens these patrolmen
encounter are quite reasonably regarded by them as prey; the typical citizen who is pulled
over is going to react to the officer with some combination of fear and anger. Obviously,
the bond between the citizen and the patrolman is not exactly strengthened (in either
direction) by this state of affairs. This trend has been exacerbated by the growing power
and budget of state patrols, law enforcement organizations chartered exclusively for
traffic enforcement (and thus, revenue generation; see "Critical Mass," below). State
Troopers are often little more than roving "meter maids" looking to issue tickets for the
most trivial of infractions. Further, they generally lack many of the powers granted to
police officers. As a result of these factors, they are held in much the same public
contempt as meter maids.
This "Us vs. Them" attitude can emerge anywhere, even in the smallest of towns, given
the growing influence of state patrols whose troopers have jurisdiction on any public road
in your state. State patrols typically have very little citizen oversight. Unlike a sheriff's
office where the sheriff must periodically be re-elected (albeit by a populous often
apathetic to such less prominent offices), state troopers have no such motivation to keep
from angering or frustrating the commuting public.
Decreasing Public Confidence
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The 1982 Figgie Report on Fear of Crime revealed a growing belief that police are not
effective in controlling crime. This sentiment has been echoed in the free market: by
1990, there were over twice as many private police (watchmen, guards, security experts)
as public police in the United States. Between 1964 and 1981, employment at firms
providing these private police services increased over 400 percent as more individuals
and companies sought a more effective solution in the private sector.1
Police Patrol Resource Critical Mass
This is a simple issue of economics. Note that this example does not rely on any
assumption of community growth. Now, let's assume you live in a a rural county or
small town with few police officers. The duties of the patrolman are going to be
primarily responding to calls, and generally trying to keep their community safe. Now,
add some more officers into our mix. At some point, you'll hit critical mass, that is, you'll
reach a point where, on the average day, you've got more police officers on the clock
than you have work for them to do. What do you do with these extra patrolmen? You
inevitably send some of them out to do traffic patrols (ticketing the out-of-staters and
whatnot). These tickets then bring in additional revenue to our town or county that
would not have existed without the additional traffic patrols. A couple of years pass, and
the local government takes notice of the revenue brought in by our police department or
sheriff's office, and starts directing some of that money back into the police
department. After upgrading some equipment and possibly their facility, they begin
hiring additional police. After all, the sheriff figures, if their current staffing lets them do
a good job at minimizing crime and bringing in revenue, then adding patrolmen will let
them do a great job at those things. What do these additional patrolmen do? In terms of
protecting and serving you, the police department is now even more overstaffed than
before. As such, a significant percentage of the new patrolmen are sent out to do
additional traffic enforcement. This cycle continues, and with each new iteration, the
community ends up with even more officers on the streets. Maybe the crime rate drops
by a couple of percent, and few complain about the cost of all the officers since the
police department is now a significant source of revenue. It is now standard practice for
many police agencies to staff additional officers exclusively for traffic enforcement
duties, under the assumption that these officers will pay their own salaries with income
from traffic citations. Law enforcement agencies refer to such officers as "self-paid".
Also exacerbating things is the way public budgeting works, wherein the failure of an
agency to spend all its annual budget may result in a reduction of budget allocation next
year. This parallels public road construction, wherein construction crews are assigned to
resurface a perfectly good road just to consume and conceal a budgetary
surplus. Likewise, once the agency and local government become dependent on traffic
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enforcement revenue, this reliance will prevent any reduction in traffic enforcement later
on.
This phenomenon is probably most likely in growing communities, since it's easier to
justify more patrolmen when you're regularly adding to your staff to compensate for
growth. It is not hard to imagine officers in these communities being rewarded (the old
notion of "quotas" for a period of time, or less officially in some law enforcement
organizations, with an award at the end of the period for most citations issued). Such a
reward is just the institutionalization of the organization's desire for more traffic
enforcement revenue.
Big Profits from Enforcement
One particularly alarming trend relating to traffic ticket revenue is the increasing
percentage that police agencies get to keep. Traditionally, only a small amount of the
revenue collected from a given traffic ticket actually went to the police agency issuing the
citation; the rest went into a general fund for the state, county, or municipality in which
the cited offense occurred. This has changed dramatically; some police agencies (such as
the Larimer County Sheriff's Department in Colorado) actually keep 75 percent of
collected revenue from traffic tickets! It doesn't take much imagination (unless you're a
Colorado legislator, evidently) to realize that exploitive levels of enforcement of minor
traffic laws will result, which is exactly what has happened in Larimer County. Such
police agencies are happy to share the wealth with their enforcers: one half of the highest
paid Larimer County officials are officers in the Larimer County Sheriff's
Department! It's hard to imagine a police agency that perpetually complains about having
too low a budget to function paying someone over $100,000 to drive around a rural area
and issue speeding citations to motorists -- a job any high school graduate is qualified to
perform.
Conclusion
It's not hard to see that if either of the above phenomena happen in the community, the
most fundamental values of your local law enforcement organizations have changed
significantly. Overshadowing all of this is the growing profit motive of law enforcement
agencies (mirrored in the "War on Drugs," wherein law enforcement agencies and local
municipalities regularly make a great deal of money through the confiscation of property
loosely attached to a drug transaction). This business model is parasitical by nature, and
this cannot help but color the activities of the law enforcement agency. The motto on the
police cruiser remains "To Protect and Serve," but in many jurisdictions it would more
accurately read "To Raise Revenue off the Backs of the Citizens."
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Without a doubt, there are still a lot of good people in the field of law
enforcement. Unfortunately, these people are outnumbered at least 2-1 (according to
one law enforcement officer I spoke with) by the glorified hall monitor type figure we
have all come to fear. And perhaps that is the most important difference between the
America of now versus the America of 40 years past.
Recent Updates
April 2011: Corrupt local governments have begun balancing their budgets on the backs
of drivers as states across the US triple speeding fines and add ridiculous surcharges to
moving violations. The City of Los Angeles now makes $1.5 million a year from
cameras at a single intersection in the San Fernando Valley.
November 2010: Many states have a disproportionately large number of judges who
were former prosecutors, but almost no judges who were former public defenders. See,
e.g., this article regarding trends in recent judicial appointments in Colorado.
January 2007: Check out Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America on
the CATO Institute website. This article also has an interactive US map showing recent
botches paramilitary police raids.
December 2006: Do police departments turn away applicants for being too
intelligent? Click here to find out.
Bibliography
1 Benson, Bruce. The Enterprise of Law. San Francisco, CA: Pacific Research Institute
for Public Policy, 1990.
Reminder: All content on this site is automatically copyrighted by virtue of the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
IT important to note that RPD Sargent Tarter at first testified on 2/27/12 that he "issues
warnings" to people when he pulls them over...then Tarter had to admit that he didn't issue any
warning to Coughlin, further, Judge Nash Holme's Order mentions, in a footnote, how Sargent
Tarter "gave a break" to Coughlin in not citing him for an "expired driver's
license" (actually, and Tarter was told this by a complaining Coughlin, Richard G. Hill, Esq.
was wrongfully withholding Coughlin's then current Nevada drivers license, and it was an old
driver's license Coughlin was forced to show Tarter...so, not exactly a "break" being given.
Regardless, Judge Holmes ruled it as "irrelevant" the extent to which Hill was wrongfully
withholding Coughlin's driver's license, yet, managed to footnote this "break" related to the
driver's license in her Order?
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109 CLMLR 755

109 Colum. L. Rev. 755
Page 1
Columbia Law Review

May, 2009
Note
*755 BETWEEN HEALTHY AND HARTMAN: PROBABLE CAUSE IN RETALIATORY
ARREST CASES
John Koerner
Copyright (c) 2009 Directors of The Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.; John Koerner
This Note addresses a circuit split concerning retaliatory arrest claims. In most circuits, a defendant police officer cannot be held liable for retaliatory arrest if the arrest
was made with probable cause. This is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, which requires defendants in retaliation claims to show that they would have taken the same action in the absence of a retaliatory motive. But there are a number of exceptions to the Mt. Healthy
rule, including the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hartman v. Moore. In Hartman,
the Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff in a retaliatory prosecution claim must prove
that the prosecutor brought charges without probable cause. This Note argues that courts
should follow Hartman and require a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause
only in a subset of retaliatory arrest cases: cases involving complex causation and cases
where the officer had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had committed a felony
offense. In all other retaliatory arrest cases, courts should follow Mt. Healthy and permit
plaintiffs to bring suit even if the officer had probable cause. This nuanced approach
strikes the appropriate balance between free speech rights and the needs of law enforcement.
Introduction
On March 12, 1997, Anthony Greene walked into the Grand Rapids police department to
retrieve his car, which had been towed from a no parking zone. [FN1] When he was told that
he would have to pay a storage fee for the car, Mr. Greene started arguing loudly with Lieutenant Jack Barber and cursing at him. [FN2] The argument was loud enough that interns answering telephones nearby had to put their callers on hold. [FN3] Lieutenant Barber told Mr.
Greene, You can't talk to me like that in my building. [FN4] Greene responded that he was
simply exercising his freedom of speech. [FN5] Barber replied, Well, not in my building.
[FN6] Greene said, Well, if that's how you feel, you're really stupid. [FN7] At that point,
Barber told Greene that he was under arrest. [FN8] Greene protested that the arrest *756 was
illegal; as the officers struggled to subdue him, he was pepper sprayed. [FN9] Greene was
charged with creating a disturbance and with hindering and opposing a police officer, but was
acquitted of both charges. [FN10] He sued for retaliatory arrest. [FN11]
2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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POLICEMISC 2:16
Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation 2:16
Page 1
Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation

Database updated October 2011
Michael Avery, David Rudovsky, Karen Blum
Chapter
2. Actionable Conduct Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts
References
2:16. Retaliatory prosecution
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Civil Rights
1088(5)
Treatises and Practice Aids

Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts 3:9
Bodensteiner and Levinson, State and Local Government Civil Rights Liability 1:11
Law Reviews and Other Periodicals
Watson, Limiting a Constitutional Tort Without Probable Cause: First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest After Hartman, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 111 (October, 2008)
Retaliatory prosecutions may be subject to remedy under 1983. In order to establish a
prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the
plaintiff's conduct was constitutionally protected; and (2) the plaintiff's conduct was a "substantial factor" or "motivating factor" in the defendant's challenged actions.[1] Where an officer attempts to punish a person for the exercise of First Amendment rights by filing a criminal charge against him, there is a potential cause of action under the Fourth and First Amendments.[2]
In Hartman v. Moore,[3] the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in a retaliatory prosecution claim must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the prosecution in order to
have a cause of action. Justice Souter's opinion for the Court argued that it is difficult to prove
that retaliatory animus caused a criminal charge to be brought, because the charge is actually
filed by a prosecutor, not the officer who is alleged to be engaged in retaliation. The absence
of any probable cause may help prove the link between the retaliatory animus of the officer
and the filing of the charge by the prosecutor, and so the Court held it is a required element of
a prima facie case. Justice Souter reached this conclusion even though he acknowledged that
the presence or absence of probable cause is actually not dispositive of whether a prosecution
Case 10-05104-gwz Doc 52-7 Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22

POLICEMISC 2:16
Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation 2:16
Page 166 of 224 2

Page
was initiated for the purpose of retaliation. He reasoned that since probable cause will be relevant to proof of causation in most cases, the law should make it a requirement in all cases.[4]
The decision will make it very difficult for protestors who are prosecuted only because the
authorities do not like their message to bring civil rights actions to vindicate their First
Amendment rights, if they were arguably violating some minor law during the protest. The
ruling may well bar their claims, even if the law in question was seldom enforced and would
not have been enforced against protestors whose message was acceptable to the authorities.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the absence of probable cause is an element
of a wrongful arrest claim. An argument can be made that where multi-level causation is not a
factor, it is not necessary to prove an absence of probable cause to demonstrate a retaliatory
motive by an officer. The lower federal courts are split on whether a claim for retaliatory arrest requires an absence of probable cause.[5]
[FN1] Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2002) (abrogated on other
grounds by, Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 21 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 577, 150 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) P 59878 (7th Cir. 2004)), citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471, 1 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 76
(1977).
[FN2] See cases cited in 2:28.
[FN3] Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S. Ct. 1695, 164 L. Ed. 2d 441 (2006).
[FN4] See, Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2010), cert granted on other
grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1678, 179 L. Ed. 2d 645 (2011) (plaintiff properly pleaded retaliatory prosecution claim by alleging retaliatory motive and no probable cause; court notes
question of whether there is a constitutional claim for retaliatory investigation, but
grants qualified immunity because no such claim was clearly established); Beck v. City
of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2008) (with respect to First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claims, previous case law describing factors that could rebut presumption of independent judgment by prosecutor are overruled in light of Hartman,
plaintiff need only show retaliatory motive on part of official urging prosecution and
absence of probable cause to rebut presumption of regularity and overcome defense of
independent intervening cause; with respect to Fourth Amendment claims, court notes
that Hartman may be inconsistent with previous law but does not overrule the latter in
this case because plaintiff overcame presumption of independent judgment by prosecutor under previous case law); Williams v. City of Carl Junction, Missouri, 480 F.3d
871 (8th Cir. 2007) (no showing of lack of probable cause for challenged traffic citations alleged to be retaliatory); Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 36 Envtl. L. Rep.
20100, 2006 FED App. 0187P (6th Cir. 2006) (applying Hartman).
[FN5] See Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2011), petition for cert.
filed (U.S. Aug. 25, 2011) (declining to extend Hartman's absence of probable cause
Fighting Speeding and Other Traffic Tickets
http://www.freeexistence.org/tickets.html
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Home
by Coughlin on 12/25/12: Judge Nash Holme's 3/12/12 Order mentions Coughlin's 3/7, 3/9/12 filings contain
ials "from a prisoner's online site", though there is no indication of that in any of the materials, though the
apable condescension attendant to the verbalized and written use of the phrase "prisoner's online site" is
ative of a
of respect for
ner's and their rights comign from a former Nevada Department of Corrections Administrator.
1 of 35
Fighting Speeding and Other Traffic

Tickets
(Created 6/27/06; last updated 8/23/11)
Introduction
First of all, let me say right up front that I am not an attorney, and thus could not give
you legal advice even if I wanted to. It is recommended that you consult a competent
attorney before any court appearance. This page is intended as a resource that citizens
and attorneys alike may use to find sample motions, get ideas for strategies to fight traffic
and vehicular equipment tickets, and generally fight back against a system that has
become self-serving and abusive to its citizens. This site is not an authoritative source,
but rather a growing respository of approaches, strategies and motion documents with
empirical results. Your own state/county/city could have different laws, and will
definitely have different judges and motion forms as compared with those discussed
here. Keep this in mind; it is one reason why it's a good idea to retain competent legal
counsel before trying to fight your own traffic tickets. Likewise, be aware that if you use
this web site to advise another party, this may be considered the authorized practice of
law. In any case, the author of this web site shall have neither liability nor responsibility
to any party for any loss or damage caused or alleged to be caused by the use of the
information provided herein. Let me reiterate that, by providing this information, I am
not engaged in rendering legal services.
Why This Page?
3/7/2012 10:11 AM
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When I was 16, I fought a ticket in New York using the principles laid out in a "How to
Get Out of Speeding Tickets" article that appeared in a 1980's edition of the online
magazine Phrack. The strategies failed miserably, and I lost. I later learned that the
small town Claverack, New York court (led by a Justice Gibbon, the "Gibbon" part being
far more representative of the man than the "Justice" part) had abused its discretion in a
number of areas, including the judge writing in a corrected name, vehicle color, speed,
and license plate number on the ticket at the time of trial! All were initially incorrect;
years later, an attorney advised me the best strategy would have been to ignore the
summons that was mailed to me, since my name did not equal the misspelled name on
the summons, and my car was not the one described in the ticket; oh well, live and
learn). Anyhow, this site is an attempt to provide tried strategies along with their
outcomes. If there is a formulaic way to get out of any ticket, I have not found it, and I
suspect anyone who says they have is trying to sell you something. There is no magic
phrase that, when uttered to a traffic judge, will get you out of any traffic ticket. Each
state has its own loopholes and technicalities that may be taken advantage of, and it will
take some work to identify these. The strength of your case is up to you, and will
depend on how much work you put into it (although this is not to say that you cannot
win with a weak case that you did not have much time to prepare!) I am merely
providing the tools and assistance so that you may work more effectively, whether you
only have a couple of hours to spare fighting a ticket, or have many days to devote to the
effort. All I ask from visitors is that if they use the information here to successfully get
out of a traffic ticket, email me and let me know of your success. Likewise, if you filed
your own motion with good results, send me a copy with your name/address/case
number blanked out. This site will grow with member support, and hopefully we will all
learn how to more effectively fight traffic tickets. Information on this site is catered to
United States jurisdictions, but may have some relevance to other countries with legal
systems based on common law.
Note that many of my examples here relate to Colorado. I chose this state because its
state troopers are particularly abusive with regard to issuing massive numbers of speeding
tickets, and because Colorado court rules are very unfriendly to motorists making it one
of the most challenging places to fight a speeding ticket. If you can beat a speeding ticket
in Colorado, fighting an identical ticket in a state like New York is a breeze.
Be Proactive
The best way to get out of a traffic ticket is not to get it in the first place. If you get
pulled over, be courteous to the police officer. He might be pulling you over because
he's looking for a missing kid or because a vehicle similar to yours was just involved in a
hit-and-run accident, and he is using a trivial infraction (e.g., driving 8 mph over the
speed limit, too much window tint, etc.) Be nice and he may let you go once he sees
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on the law. Nevertheless, whenever a clerk informs you of a deadline or a procedure,

make notes on what you were told, by whom, and the time and date. Judges will often
be more forgiving of a procedural error on your part if you can point to misinformation
given to you by the clerk's office (I once had a motion to set aside a default judgement
granted after the statutory limit for such a motion had passed because I was able to point
to misinformation given to me by the clerk's office, and an unreturned phone call to the
same office). If you need something from the clerk, and just aren't getting any
cooperation, see if there is a Judicial Administration office to which the clerk's office is
ultimately accountable, and consider seeking assistance there.
Whenever you file any document with the clerk's office, bring an extra copy of the
document with you, and ask the clerk to stamp it. This stamped copy serves as your
proof that you filed the document. If you file a document and do not get this proof, and
the document is lost, so are your legal rights associated with that document!
PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS, AND IDENTIFYING YOUR OPPONENT

A motion is simply a request (usually written in the case of pre-trial motions, or oral if
you're already before the judge) for the court to decide on something. There are a few
important things you should know about motions. First, expect lots of back-and-forth on
any motion you file. Your traffic court judge will probably resist any but the most
customary motions you make. Unfortunately, your typical traffic court judge is more
interested in facilitating the transfer of your hard-earned money to the local government
than in justice or objectivity. In jurisdictions where the police officer who wrote the
ticket represents the prosecution (instead of, say, an assistant district attorney), your
opponent is probably the judge. The officer will likely know very little about judicial
rules, important cases, and traffic case jurisprudence. You might think this would present
a strategic advantage for you, but chances are, the judge will step in and do the cop's
legal research for him. Try making a motion of any kind, and watch as the officer stands
idly by; the judge will be left to come up with reasons why your motion should be denied
on behalf of the cop, and then will proceed to rule on the objections the cop never
made. As you might imagine, any justifications the judge comes up with on his own are
probably more compelling to him than whatever you came up with!
If your motion gets denied and you think it unfair, or think the judge missed something,
then file a Motion to Reconsider Defendant's Motion for X, where X what you
motioned for initially. If the prosecution files a motion, you argue with it by filing a
Reply to Peoples' Motion. You can argue with the prosecution's reply to your motion by
filing a Surreply to the Prosecution's Reply, a Surreply to Prosecution's Surreply, and so
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tremendously useful when fighting the government in any court case. In many states,
filing an FOIA request may be more fruitful than filing a motion for
discovery. Why? With discovery, the opposition can refuse to furnish evidence by
arguing that it is irrelevant, unduly burdensome to produce, or other such
reasons. Perhaps even worse, the government can agree to the request but then furnish
only a small, irrelevant subset of evidence you request. Either way, you've got to fight to
convince the judge to grant you access to the evidence. In contrast, government agencies
usually do not have these "outs" when responding to FOIA requests. You'll want to
check your state's FOIA laws, but some states give FOIA requesters an amazing amount
of latitude when requesting government documents. For example, in California, the
courts have established that "idle curiosity" is sufficient grounds for any citizen to make a
request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). Further, if a government
agency turns down your request and you successfully sue to force compliance, the
agency must reimburse your legal expenses! The CPRA is not unique in the latitude that
it grants its citizens; check your state's FOIA-equivalent and you may be surprised to find
out just how much power you have to access government records.
The easiest way to file an FOIA request is using this automatic request generator on the
RFCP site. Simply select your state (or use the federal form if you are fighting a ticket
from a National Park or other federal jurisdiction), fill in the form, and paste in the
evidence you wish to see (see the exemplary discovery request items, above, for some
suggestions). Remember that an FOIA request is technically not connected to your trial;
as such, do not mention "discovery" in your request or it will just cause confusion. Also,
file your FOIA request as early as possible since the police agency may, by law, take a
considerable amount of time to get back to you -- check your local FOIA law to learn
more about the possible timeline -- and the court may be unwilling to grant you a
continuance while you wait for the FOIA request to be processed.
Worst case, if your local FOIA laws are limited in scope (see the RCFP Open
Government Guide for state-by-state FOIA rights and restrictions), you can subpoena the
officer who issued your ticket and make him bring the evidence you seek with him on
your court date! This has some obvious disadvantages over pre-trial discovery, namely
that A) you won't get to see the evidence until your trial, B) the officer may be more
likely to show up to court since you subpoenaed him, making a dismissal for failure to
show up less likely, and C) you will probably have to pay for the officer to be served
with your subpoena.
The reason for C) above is that, while process serving requirements vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, one common denominator is that the person who serves the
document must be an adult who does not stand to gain regardless of how the trial
goes. So barring additional restrictions in your jurisdiction, you can have a friend serve
3/7/2012 10:11 AM
JOHN TARTER TransparentNevada
1 of 1
http://www.transparentnevada.com/salaries/2010/reno/john-tarter/
Case 10-05104-gwz
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Entered 03/30/12 15:03:22
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Detail page for JOHN TARTER

Name
JOHN TARTER
Position
7555 Sergeant
Reno
Year
2010
Base Pay
$109,225.10
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$7,733.14
Other Pay
$17,535.81
Total Pay
$134,494.05
Benefits Accumulated
N/A
Total Pay & Benefits
$174,907.34
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
3/7/2012 10:22 AM
REC EIVED
I
Case No. II TR 2680021
Dept. No. 3
APR 13 2012
By
~_~~! Court
Deputy Clerk
FILED
1
;<>:] i1U:11CIPAL COUR T
'-I,," n " o AM 1 ' II

t U ~ , Iall J
n 0'
CU: :~i\
BY
:JF
'i{ i r~
CCURT
IN THE MUNTCIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENODEPUTY
COUNTY OF WASHOE STATE OF NEVADA
6
7
8
CITY OF RENO,
10
ORDER RELEASING PROPERTY
Plaintiff,
vs.
II
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN,
12
13
14
IS
Defendant.
I
IT IS ORDERED that the Washoe County Sheriff's Office shall release to the
Defendaot, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, three items taken from him on February 27,
16
2012, at the Washoe County Regional Detention Facility, dwing his booking for incarceration
17
18
pursuant to imposition of a 5-day jail sentence for Contempt of Court in the above-entitled
19
case, to wit: one Samsung Cell Phone; one T-Mobile Cell Phone; and one Braun Electric
20
Razor, as identified in Case Number WC 12-1805 and referred to under Control # C4795 I.
21
22
Dated this 29- day of March, 2012.
~rz~~
23
24
Reno Municipal Judge
25
26
27
28
o.M'fICII' .... COUIlT

' .0 . Il00<1900
'JOl)JlN;IID
-~-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certifY that I am an employee of the Reno Municipal Court, Reno,
Nevada, that I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the above action, and that on this date,
served a true and correct copy of the attached document to the following as set forth below:
Washoe County Detention Facility

911 Parr Blvd.
Reno, NV 89512
8
9
Allison Onnaas
Deputy City Attorney
P.O. Box 1900
10
Reno, Nevada 89505
11
Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.

1422 E. 9111 Street #2
Reno, Nevada 89512
Fax: (949) 667-7402
12
13
15
16
17
X
By placing said document in a sealed envelope and placed for collecting and mailing by United
States mail in Reno, Nevada, postage prepaid following ordinary business practices.
18 II _-"X~
19
Facsimile (FAX)
Electronic Mail (E-mail)
_ _ _ Inner-Office mail following ordinary business practices
20
_ _ _ Personal Delivery
21
22
DATED this 30th day of March, 2012.
23
"
25
Court Office Manager

26
27
28
From:Washoe County Crime Lab
775 328 2831
03/20/2012 07:45
#344 P.001/00l
Michael Haley
Sheriff
Dedicated Service in Partnership with our Community
March 19,2012
TO:
Zack Coughlin
Fax Number 949-667-7402
FROM: Trish Beckman, Admin Secretary Supervisor

Washoe County Sheriff's Office
Forensic Science Division
RE: WCSO 12-1805; C-47951
Per our telephone conversation this afternoon, attached is a list of items submitted to the Washoe
County Sheriff's Office Evidence/Property Room. The following items as described by Deputy Yonker
who submitted them are the only items in evidence listed under Washoe County Sheriffs Office Case
Number 12-1805. These items were received by our secured evidence/property room clerk on February
29,2012. Since receiving them into our custody, they have not been released to anyone and remain in
secure evidence.
SAMSUNG CELL PHONE, T-MOBIL CELL PHONE; BRAUN ELECTRIC RAZOR
I can only respond to your inquiry for the items listed above and as of the date the items were received
by our division. The incidents prior to our receiving the items as you describe them in your email dated
th
March 19, 2012 are unknown to this division. The incident on March 14 as you described it did not
take place; as these items have not been out of our custody.
It is my understanding that these items were submitted to evidence at the behest of Judge Nash
Holmes. To release these items we will need a written release from Judge Nash-Holmes.
The rest of your inquiries are outside the purview of this Division. Please contact the court and request
Judge Nash-Holmes authorize the release of these items. The release may be submitted to the Washoe
County Sheriffs Office Forensic Science Division via fax at 775-328-2831.
Any future Inquiries regarding these items need to be made in writing. They may be submitted to me
via the email address tb eckman@washoecountv.us or to the US Postal Address of Washoe County
Sheriffs Office, Forensic Science Division, 911 E Parr Blvd, Reno, NV 89512.
1 of 17
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=ce3...
RE: Missing property

From: Campbell, Debra (DCampbell@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Tue 3/13/12 10:49 AM
To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
No, a micro sd card is not listed on the evidence envelope.
Debi Campbell, Detention Operations Manager

911 Parr Blvd
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)
dcampbell@washoecounty.us
WCSO MISSION STATEMENT
To serve the residents of Washoe County, consistently earning the public's confidence by providing a
safe and secure community using the highest quality law enforcement, detention, and support services
possible within the resources entrusted to us.
CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND WORK PRODUCT: This communication, including
attachments, is for the exclusive use of addressee and may contain proprietary, confidential and/or privileged
information. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, copying, disclosure, dissemination or distribution is
strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return email,
delete this communication and destroy all copies.

Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 10:29 AM
To: Campbell, Debra
Subject: RE: Missing property
Did these items that were placed into evidence include a micro sd card?
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
2 of 17
Subject: Missing property

Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2012 10:14:59 -0700
From: DCampbell@washoecounty.us
Mr. Coughlin:
Your email regarding your missing secure property was forwarded to me for response. I apologize for the delay
in responding to you but it took me a little while to figure out the issue.
Your two cell phones and electric razor were put into evidence at the request of Judge Nash-Holmes on
February 28, 2012. In order for us to release them to you, we will need an order from Judge Nash-Holmes that
the evidence can be released to you.
To make this matter smoother for you all documentation should reflect Washoe County Sheriffs Office case
number 12-1805 and evidence number C-47591. The court case number corresponding to this issue is
11TR26800.
If you have any questions all of my contact information is listed below.

911 Parr Blvd
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
3 of 17
FW: missing property from my secured property

From: Cummings, Tami (TCummings@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Mon 3/05/12 8:43 AM
To:
Cc:
Sheriff - Bkg_CC Supervisors (SO-BKG-CC-SUPV@washoecounty.us)
Dear Mr. Coughlin:
Thank you for your email. We are forwarding your email to our Detenon Booking Supervisors for their
review and response. Should you need to contact them by phone, you can call Detenon Administraon at
328-2971.
Regards,
Community Relations| Washoe County Sheriff's Office

Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 9:40 PM
To: SheriffWeb
Subject: missing property from my secured property
Dear Washoe County Sheriff's Office and Jail,

The secured property returned to me today did not include either of my cell
phones or the micro sd card that were listed on my check in sheet. My agent,
name redacted
did come and retrieve my keys and wallet, etc. (to help make
sure my dog would not starve to death, and I am so thankful to you for letting
him do that as animal control would have likely cost much money and I already
had a $300 towing bill for my car upon being release from jail and I am
literally flat broke, and just had to pay my $450 per year bar dues and pay for
twelve credits of continuing legal education and my yearly CLE dues....so it
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
4 of 17
really helped that the Sheriff's Office let name

dog, thank you!).
redacted
get my keys to feed my
However, name redacted indicates to me that he did not receive either cell phone
or the micro sd card upon picking up my secured property.
If possible please reply by fax or email as I, obviously, do not have my phones
and there is a problem right now with my usps mailbox.

Sent: Tue 3/13/12 1:57 PM
To:
Yes, a micro sd card was listed on the inventory at intake and was released with the rest of your property on
2-29-12 to redacted
I will scan and email you a copy of the intake property form and the release form
redacted
signed by

911 Parr Blvd
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
5 of 17

To: Campbell, Debra
Is a micro sd card listed on the property sheet at intake?


Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2012 10:48:59 -0700

911 Parr Blvd
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
6 of 17

To: Campbell, Debra
Did these items that were placed into evidence include a micro sd
card?

Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2012 10:14:59 -0700
Mr. Coughlin:
11TR26800.

911 Parr Blvd
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
7 of 17
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)

Sent: Tue 3/13/12 2:50 PM
To:
1 attachment
Coughlin Property Docs 0312.doc (2.6 MB)
The two documents I referred to in my last email are aached.

911 Parr Blvd
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
8 of 17

To: Campbell, Debra
Is a micro sd card listed on the property sheet at intake?


Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2012 10:48:59 -0700

911 Parr Blvd
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
9 of 17

To: Campbell, Debra
card?

Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2012 10:14:59 -0700
Mr. Coughlin:
11TR26800.
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
10 of 17

911 Parr Blvd
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)

Sent: Wed 3/14/12 6:52 AM
To:
I am saying that two cell phones and an electric razor were placed into evidence at the instrucon of Judge
Nash-Holmes and the evidence envelope states that is what is in the envelope. As I do not work in or have
access to the evidence unit, I am relaying what they told me when they checked the envelope.
In response to your prior email, the property record form stated that there was a micro sd card. The
Authorizaon for Release of Property/Money was dated 2-29-12 and signed by Mr. Eastman. The statement
he signed states that he acknowledged that he received the items listed on the property record form. I can
only assume that is the case as he signed the form and you authorized him to pick up the property.
Since I am not an aorney I will send your last two emails to the Assistant District Aorney assigned to the
Sheris Oce for response.
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
11 of 17

911 Parr Blvd
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)

Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 9:23 PM
To: Campbell, Debra; Kandaras, Mary
So, are you saying you or your office currently have an "evidence envelope" that contains
these items placed into "evidence" . Do you whether that comprots with previous
assertions made by your office or agents, or, if, in fact, it contradicts representations as to
whom came and took what? If you still have any of this property in your possession,
please consider whether it is legal for you to allow the RMC or the Reno Marshal to come
check it out like a book from the library, or whether you have some liability if, oopsie,
something "disappears". Please ask Deputy Cheung about all of these circumstances
detailed in our correspondences and provide written documentation detailing his
responses. Further, please provide pictures of the evidence envelope and all the "evidence"
within such an envelope, including whether a micro sd card in within such materials or
whether such a card is somehow contained in one of the phones or otherwise instereted
into the same. Additionally, please indicate whether a phone battery or two is present.
Please ask yourself who is running what and whether that is appropriate.
Sincerely,
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
12 of 17

Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2012 10:48:59 -0700

911 Parr Blvd
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)

To: Campbell, Debra
card?
3/29/2012 2:18 PM

Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2012 10:14:59 -0700
Mr. Coughlin:
11TR26800.

911 Parr Blvd
Reno, NV 89512-1000
(775) 328-2893 (Office)
(775) 328-6305 (FAX)
13 of 17
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
14 of 17
RE: request for written response regarding property being

held in evidence
From: Beckman, Trish (TBeckman@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Tue 3/20/12 8:49 AM
To:
Mr. Coughlin, Aached is the wrien response to your email. Per our phone conversaon a copy of this
response has been sent to the fax number you gave me (949-667-7402).
Trish

Sent: Monday, March 19, 2012 4:58 PM
To: Beckman, Trish
Subject: request for written response regarding property being held in evidence
Dear Ms. Beckman,

A WCSO Deputy informed me that my property was being held in evidence, including a
flip phone style cell phone, and an HTC g2 smartphone in addition to a micro sd memory
card, and an electric shaved. He indicated the items were booked into evidence on
2/27/12, then taken by the City of Reno Marshal Division on 2/28/12. A WCSO Deputy
also indicated these items in evidence were release again to the City of Reno Marshal
Division on 3/14/12 because "its just easier to get it back to you that way"....However, now
it appears once again your office has the property.
I would like a written response detailing the chain of custody of all the property for all
times since the arrest, and itemized listing of the property, and an indication of when, if
ever, I will be informed of why it is being held and when, if ever, it will be returned to me,
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
15 of 17
and and indication of what exactly has been done with this property, including whether an
viewing or copying of the contents has been undertaken or will remain in anyone's
possession other than mine.
Sincerely,
RE: request for written response regarding property being

held in evidence
From: Beckman, Trish (TBeckman@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Tue 3/20/12 11:12 AM
To:
1 attachment
COUGHLIN.docx (145.4 KB)

To: Beckman, Trish
Subject: RE: request for written response regarding property being held in evidence
Dear Ms. Beckman,

There was nothing attached to your email. Would you please resend and attach the file
you referenced below?
Thanks,
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
16 of 17
Subject: RE: request for written response regarding property being held in evidence
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2012 08:49:52 -0700
From: TBeckman@washoecounty.us
Mr. Coughlin, Aached is the wrien response to your email. Per our phone conversaon a copy of this
response has been sent to the fax number you gave me (949-667-7402).
Trish

To: Beckman, Trish
Subject: request for written response regarding property being held in evidence
Dear Ms. Beckman,

A WCSO Deputy informed me that my property was being held in evidence,
including a flip phone style cell phone, and an HTC g2 smartphone in addition to a
micro sd memory card, and an electric shaved. He indicated the items were booked
into evidence on 2/27/12, then taken by the City of Reno Marshal Division on
2/28/12. A WCSO Deputy also indicated these items in evidence were release again
to the City of Reno Marshal Division on 3/14/12 because "its just easier to get it
back to you that way"....However, now it appears once again your office has the
property.
I would like a written response detailing the chain of custody of all the property for
all times since the arrest, and itemized listing of the property, and an indication of
when, if ever, I will be informed of why it is being held and when, if ever, it will be
returned to me, and and indication of what exactly has been done with this
property, including whether an viewing or copying of the contents has been
undertaken or will remain in anyone's possession other than mine.
Sincerely,
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
17 of 17
3/29/2012 2:18 PM
Case 11-05078-btb
Doc 7
Entered 09/07/11 15:37:52
Page 1 of 7
NOTE by Coughlin: this was Coughlin's first filing ever in a bankruptcy case.
2
3
RECE/VEO
fNDROP BOX
Document Code:
Zach Coughlin,Esq.
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 8950 I
Tele: 775-338-8118
Attorney for Gessin
unbundled service, one motion
/1 SEP -6 PM l,; 56
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA
7
B
9
10
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15
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N RE JOHN D. GESSIN;
DEBTOR
vs.
) BK CASE NO: 11-51818-btb

)
) DEPT. NO: 11-05078-btb
LLISON TATIANO MOORE ET AL;

PLAINTIFF;
OHN D GESSIN, ET AL
DEFENDANT
)
)
) ANSWER AND MOTION TO DISMISS;

) REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS
)
)
)
)
)
)
17
ANSWER AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

18
COMES NOW. Defendant/Debtor and moves this court to dismiss this Complaint based on insufficient service based on
19
the foregoing authorities. The Complaint received from Glade Hall. Esq. bares an issuance date on the summons of
20
August 2 od 20 II. However. the envelope in which the Complaint was received is postmarked August 18th 20 II, well
21
past the deadline for service on Mr. Gessin. Mr. Gessin has incurred attorney's fees in defending that which should prove
22
unnecessary and unground in fact and law. based on the postmark date and BR 7012. Pursuant to NRCP Rule II and
23
FRCP Rule II. and notwithstanding the 21 day safe harbor provisions contained therein (which have not been met by the
24
undersigned) the undersigned moves this court to award sanctions. attorney's fees and costs against Mr. Hall. especially in
25
light of the fact that he has previously been adjudged to have vexatiously harrassed Mr. Gessin. Further. particularly
26
where there may have been a Settlement Agreement that expressly stated neither fault. guilt. or culpability was being
27
admitted. a finding on nondischargeability would be truly impudent. See, Rosemary E. Williams, J.D,
28
1 -
Answer, Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Sanctions
Case 11-05078-btb
Doc 7
Entered 09/07/11 15:37:52
Page 2 of 7
Nondischargeability of Debt Based on False Pretenses or Representations, Actual Fraud, or False Financial Statement
Under Bankruptcy Code 523(a)(2), 43 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d I (2009).
Rule 7012. Defenses and Objections:
Page I 6A Bankr. Service L. Ed. 57: 115
BKRSERVICE 57: 115
5
Chapter 57. Bankruptcy Rules 700 I to 7087 Rule 7004. Process; Service of Summons, Complaint Part Two. Digest of
6
Decisions III. Manner and Sufficiency of Service B. Time of Service Summary References 57: 115. Within 10 days of
7
issuance of summons Under the bankruptcy rules, if a complaint is not served within ten days, but the court
8
grants additional time for service, then the complaint is deemed to have been timely served and receives the
9
benefit of its original filing date. In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 250 B.R. 168 (D. Del. 2000). Summons must be hand10
delivered or deposited into a mailbox within ten days after the summons is issued. Fed.Rules Bankr.Proc.Rule
11
7004(e), II U.S.C.A. In re Rodriguez Gonza- lez, 396 B.R. 790 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008). Chapter 7 debtor was properly
12
served with state's adversary complaint where, although state acknowledged that its first attempt to serve debtor
13
was inadequate, its second attempt was in full compliance with the applicable rules, as the second summons was issued
14
41 days after the complaint was filed, and the complaint and summons were served on debtor on the day after the
15
second summons was issued. Fed.Rules Bankr.Proc.Rule 7004(a)(I), (e), II U.S.C.A.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
16
4(m), 28 U.S.C.A. In re Moretto, 440 B.R. 534,64 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1419 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010). Ten-day
17
rule set forth in FRCP 4, incorporated by Bankruptcy Rule 7004 which governs service of process in bankruptcy
18
adversary proceedings, is plainly and logically crafted with view toward alleviating prejudice which may arise if
19
defendant's responsive pleading window, i.e., thirty days from summons' issuance, is unduly narrowed or eliminated by
20
late service of process; intent of Rule 7004 is confirmed by nature of remedy prescribed for noncompliance with rule:
21
issuance of new summons so as to schedule new and adequate time for responsive pleading. In re Anderson, 179 B.R.
22
401,33 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 125 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995). Creditors' service of process of II USCA 523
23
nondischargeability complaint was incomplete by not serving Chapter 7 debtor and invalid because it was served
24
more than 10 days after summons was issued. In re Sciarretto, 170 B.R. 33 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
25
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RULE II. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS (a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be
27
signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise
28
Answer,
- 2 Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Sanctions
Case 11-05078-btb
Doc 7
Entered 09/07/11 15:37:52
Page 3 of 7
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper
shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney
or party. [As amended; effective January 1,2005.] (b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented
paliy is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief. formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances,- (I) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or,
10
if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation
11
or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are
12
reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. [As amended; effective January 1,2005.] (c) Sanctions. If, after
13
notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may,
14
subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have
15
violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. (I) How initiated. (A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions
16
under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to
17
violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless,
18
within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim,
19
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award
20
to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the
21
motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its
22
partners, associates, and employees. (B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
23
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show
24
cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. (2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction
25
imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable
26
conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of,
27
or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and
28
warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney's
3 -
Case 11-05078-btb
Doc 7
Entered 09/07/11 15:37:52
Page 4 of 7
fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. (A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a
represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). (B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's
initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by
or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. (3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court
shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
[As amended; effective January 1,2005.] (d) Applicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not
apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules
16.1, 16.2, and 26 through 37. Sanctions for refusal to make discovery are governed by Rules 26(g) and 37. [As amended;
effectiv
10
Rule 7012. Defenses and Objections-When and How Presented-By Pleading or Motion-Motion for Judgment on the
11
Pleadings
12
(a) When Presented

13
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16
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If a complaint is duly served, the defendant shall serve an answer within 30 days after the issuance of the summons,
except when a different time is prescribed by the court. The court shall prescribe the time for service of the answer when
service ofa complaint is made by publication or upon a party in a foreign country. A party served with a pleading stating
a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within 20 days after service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim
in the answer within 20 days after of the ... "
19
20
Jurisdiction
21
A determination of nondischargeability of a particular debt under II U.S.c. 523 is a "core"

22
23
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25
proceeding. As such, bankruptcy courts have the authority to enter final orders and judgments.
Bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of debts under
four of the sixteen categories of non discharge ability actions: paragraphs (a)(2) (fraud claims),
26
(a)(4) (embezzlement, larceny, and breaches of fiduciary duty claims), (a)(6) (willful and
27
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malicious injury claims), and (a)(I5) (certain familial obligation claims). By contrast, bankruptcy
- 4 Answer,
Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Sanctions
Case 11-05078-btb
Doc 7
Entered 09/07/11 15:37:52
Page 5 of 7
courts and non bankruptcy courts have original and concurrent jurisdiction to determine the issue
of dischargeability over the remaining twelve categories of nondischargeable debts.28
Time Limit
4
5
6
"I
The complaint has to be brought within sixty days of the first meeting of the creditors.
Standard of Proof
Grogan v. Gamer29, the United States Supreme Court held that the standard for burden of proof
in nondischargeability cases was by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the higher
9
10
11
12
standard of "clear and convincing" evidence. While no Supreme Court decision has determined
that a preponderance of evidence standard, rather than clear and convincing evidence standard,
also applies to objections to the discharge, courts considering the issue have referred to Grogan
13
v. Garner and applied the same standard of preponderance standard to cases concerning the
14
15
16
l7
issuance of the discharge.
suWHEREFORE, tenant prays that the court exercise its discretion pursuant to NRCP II and impose
significant monetary and/or merit based sanctions against both plaintiff and his counsel; for an award
18
of attorney's fees and costs incurred by defendant, who has sought counsel with a local attorney other
19
20
than himself on this matter, as a result of plaintiffs and her counsel's violation; and for such other,
21
further and additional relief as seems just to the court in the premises, and damages and other relief
22
requested by Tenant herein.
23
[ declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the
24
25
26
foregoing is true and correct and that this document does not contain any social security
numbers, pursuant to NRS 2398.030, an affirmation to that effect this hereby is.
27
28
Dated this 6th, day of September, 2011

-
5 -
Case 11-05078-btb
Doc 7
Entered 09/07/11 15:37:52
Page 6 of 7
1
2
3
Zach
ughlin, Esq.
Attor ey for Gessin, unbundled services
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15
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Answer,
- 6 Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Sanctions
Case 11-05078-btb
Doc 7
Entered 09/07/11 15:37:52
Page 7 of 7
Case 10-05104-gwz
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RECEIVED AND FILED
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Entered 11/28/11 09:27:44

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" , ffil'
ch:
ghlin,Esq.
' ada Bar No: 9473
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Tele: 775-33 8-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Doc 36
u.s. BIINKfWF I"; ( CU

Ur;
MARY A. SCHOn. CLE [
RK
'
Attorney for Defendant Robert Keller
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
n Re:
ROBERT KELLER
Debtor.
HE CADLE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
14
15
16
OBERT KELLER,
Defendant.
)
) Case No.: BK 10-52639-gwz
Chapter 7
) Adversary Proceeding
) No. 10-05104-gwz
)
) OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND

) COMPLAINT IN ADVERSARY
)
PROCEEDING
)
)
Hearing Date: 12/7/10
Hearing Time: 10:00 AM
17
18
19
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT IN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING
20
This Motion is based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities as well
21
22
as Rule 7015 Fed. R. Bankr. P. and Rule 15(2) Fed. R. Civ. P.
23
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1.
24
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
25
On July 2, 20 I 0, Debtor/Defendant ROBERT KELLER (hereinafter "Keller" or "Defendant")
26
filed a Voluntary Petition for Relief under Chapter 7 of Title 11, U .S.C. The 341 Meeting was held
27
28
on August 12, 2010 and Plaintiff filed its adversary complaint against Defendant Keller on October
1 -
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
IN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING
Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 36
Entered 11/28/11 09:27:44
Page 2 of 14
12, 2010 with causes of action for nondischargeability under 11 U.S.c. 523(a)(2)(A), 523(a)(4)
and res judicata. After thoroughly failing to even begin completely litigating the issues (so much so
that no Stipulated Findings of Fact is to be found anywhere) and without a second of trial taking
4
5
place, many assurances being made by the Texas prosecutors Bitting et al to Keller and Keller's then
attorney Chester Brown (who died suddenly in 1998 and left his widow to attempt the task of
dispensing his massive collection of files held only in hard copy format to Brown's clients, including
Keller, in a very haphazard way) that the State of Texas did not intend to collect on or execute the
Judgement against Keller. This is evinced by the lack of any language in the Judgment purporting to
10
incorporate by reference anything in the Complaint and by the lack of any language purporting to
11
12
find fraudulent conduct on Keller's part of that Keller was adjudged to be either a fiduciary or in a
13
"trust" relationship with any of the involved parties or individuals. Keller sent the Defendant Keller
14
consented to the entry of judgment in the amount of $500,000.00 (in May, 1995), and the judgment
15
entered is very short, containing no mention of incorporating by reference anything in the typically
16
overcharged Complaint, no citation to any Stipulated Findings of Fact, no language speaking to any
17
18
admission of wrongdoing or fraudulent conduct of any kind, nor any language purporting to establish
19
either a fiduciary or trust relationship between Keller and anyone. Further, the judgement lacks any
20
language finding Keller an officer or director of either entity. It is really not at all clear how
21
opposing counsel O'Rourke can sign a declaration that purports to have non-hearsay, first hand
22
knowledge, as required by LR 9014(C), that swears, under penalty of perjury, that: "6. After
23
24
25
thoroughly litigating the issues but prior to trial, Defendant Keller consented to the entry of judgment
in the amount of $500,000.00 (in May, 1995) based on causes of action for: fraud in real estate
26
transactions, common law fraud, a Texas Insurance Code violation for the improper pledge or
27
hypothecation of AGULIC's assets, corporate alter ego, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices -
28
- 2 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT IN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING
Case 10-05104-gwz
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Page 3 of 14
Consumer Protection Act violations, fraudulent conveyance, conspiracy to fraudulently convey, and
violations of 18 U.S.c. 1962 (Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act)." How in
the world would opposing counsel O'Rourke, all the way up there in Seattle, representing some Ohio
4
5
corporation that bought a Judgment from a Receiver in Texas dating back almost 17 years, involving
an opposing party whose attorney died in 1998, possibly be able to sign a declaration that states, with
any credibility, that "After thoroughly litigating the issues but prior to trial, Defendant Keller
consented to the entry of judgment in the amount of $500,000.00 (in May, 1995) based on causes of
action for.... "? Certainly, opposing counsel O'Rourke isn't finding a basis for declaring whether the
10
11
issues were "thoroughly litigated" and upon what any consent to entry of judgment by Keller was
12
"based on" by anything in the Judgment, as it is blissfully short and sweet and devoid of any
13
admission of fraud or misconduct by Keller, any incorporating language for other documents, such as
14
the Complaint, any Stipulated Findings of Fact, etc ... All the Judgment contains, pretty much, is a
15
sentence saying Keller agreed to be adjudged owing the Receive damages of $500,000. That is like
16
saying a criminal defendant charged with treason, smuggling nuclear weapons, serial murder, and
17
18
jaywalking thoroughly litigated the issues and cannot later say he never admitted to nor was found
19
guilty of the charges other than jaywalking where he signed a Stipulated Judgment finding him guilty
20
for the jaywalking fine ....Remember, over $20,000,000 worth of equity was curioulsy confiscated by
21
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the Texa Receiver, despite approximately 95% of the liability being allocated to a
megaconglomerate reinsurer. How AGL and AGUILA were "insolvent" when they had $20 million
23
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for the Texas Receiver to confiscate is pretty unclear, but its not anywhere near as unclear as the
25
contention that the issues of Keller's being a fiduciary or in a trust relationship or have a debt
26
involving fraudulent conduct adjudged against him had been "thoroughly litigated". Further,
27
contrary to Cadle's assertions, it is not clear that Defendant failed to list or schedule or otherwise add
28
- 3
Case 10-05104-gwz
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Page 4 of 14
by amendment the non-dischargeable United Healthcare debt stemming from 1990 in the more recent
Chapter 7 filing, or even that he had a duty to, and bringing this up is unduly prejudicial towards
Keller and says more about Cadle's tactics than anything.
4
5
A few days before the filing of the adversary proceeding, Plaintiff conducted an
examination of Defendant pursuant to Rule 2004 F .R. Bankr. P. Plaintiff finally got around to
conducting a dubiously brought examination of Defendant's wife, Samantha Hall, on April 18, 2011.
Plaintiff has made not attempt to explain why it is a simple search of Pacer or court records would no
have revealed the incredibly easy to discover fact that Keller filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in
10
1990. Plaintiff in no way specifies in any detailing whatsoever specifically how, at "both
11
12
examinations, Plaintiff learned additional facts t o support the novel cause o f action contained i n its
13
Amended Complaint." What facts? How do they support the new cause of action in the Amended
14
Complaint? Plaintiff provides no support for an argument that such "facts" were not easily
15
discoverable through a reasonably diligent inquiry by Plaintiff, sueh as checking courts records or
16
Pacer to see if a previous bankruptcy had been filed by Keller. It does not take a great big billing
17
18
event like deposing Keller and his wife to find that out, and further, Plaintiffs failure to do so is not
19
excused merely by the fact that Plaintiff may have subsequently become aware of the 1990 filing via
20
the depositions. The point is, a reasonably diligent inquiry by Plaintiff would have revealed the 1990
21
filing, and Plaintiff has made no attempt to establish that the depositions of Keller and his wife yield
22
any "special" information that would excuse Plaintiffs earlier lack of diligence or the undue burden
23
24
and expense is has caused Keller. What is clear is that Keller can produce a cover letter and FedEx
25
billing of lading that were mailed along with the Stipulated Judgment on the eve of trial on that
26
specifically refer to the talks and documents involved in incorporating into the Stipulated Judgment
27
the Settlement Agreement Keller can produce (if not more, depending upon what is recoverable from
28
- 4
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT IN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING
Case 10-05104-gwz
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Page 5 of 14
Bitting and Brown's dusty files) dated April 10, 1995, that more clearly sets for the fact that Keller
did not stipulate to any fraudulent conduct or a fidicuary or trust relationship in connection with the
Judgment entered in May 1995. Certainly, even if something isn't found in Bitting (the Receiver's
4
5
attorney) or Keller's old counsel Brown's files, the April 10, 1995 Settlement Agreement and the
cover letter and FedEx bill of lading Keller can produce and which were mailed along with Keller's
signed Stipulated Judgment on March 23 or thereabouts, placed the onus on Bitting and the Receiver
to make some affirmative action to disavow the contentions made by Keller therein with respect to
the excuplatory nature of the discussions and documents connected to the Judgment entered in May
10
1995.
11
12
II.
LEGAL ANAYLSIS
l3
14
Amendment of complaint A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at
15
any time before responsivc pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
16
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so
17
amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served; otherwise a party may amend the party's
18
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave must be frccly
19
given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. l 5(a), made applicable in adversary proceedings by
20
21
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015. This rule is applicable to complaints objecting to discharge. Fourth Circuit In
22
re Tester, 56 B.R. 208 (W.D. Va. 1985). 5B Fed. Proc., L. Ed. 9:1750A bankruptcy court lacks
23
authority to grant an untimely motion to amend an adversary complaint to state new causes of action
24
objecting to discharge where such motion is not filed until after the deadline for objecting to
25
discharge. Eighth Circuit In re Bozeman, 219 B.R. 253 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1998), affd, 226 B.R.
26
27
28
627, 42 Fed. R. Servo 3d 416 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998). Whenever the claim or defense assertcd in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
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forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(c)(2), made applicable in adversary proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015. Thus, a
proposed amendment to a complaint objecting to discharge may relate back to the time of the filing
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the original complaint. Fourth Circuit In re Tester, 56 B.R. 208 (W.D. Va. 1985)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), as amended and effective December 1, 2009, provides that (I) a party
may amend its pleading. once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the
pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive
pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e(, or (f), whichever is earlier. Fed.
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R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) was redesignated as Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(I)(B) in 2007. Additional discovery
12
that defendant would have to conduct if postconfirmation trust established under debtor's confirmed
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Chapter II plan were allowed to amend its turnover complaint to allege that funds retained by
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defendant related, not to debtor's prepetition shipments of goods, but to goods provided postpetition,
and that defendant's retention of funds thus violated automatic stay, did not rise to level of "undue
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prejudice" of kind warranting denial of motion for leave to amend; trust was not asserting new count
with unrelated facts that would require parties to start discovery anew, and defendant could not be
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surprised that trust was now attempting to amend its complaint to conform to the "new" facts recently
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asserted by defendant regarding pre- or postpetition nature of funds it was withholding. In re Fleming
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Companies, Inc., 323 B.R. 144, 61 Fed. R. Servo 3d 296 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005). Additional claims tha
22
Chapter II trustee sought to assert, in his amended complaint, against bank that financed the
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leveraged buyout (LBO) that he challenged as actually and constructively fraudulent transfer, for
25
bank's alleged improvident lending and aiding in breach of fiduciary duty, were not time-barred, but
26
related back to his original timely complaint, where these additional claims arose out of the same
27
facts as those that formed basis of trustee's original claims against bank. In re OODC, LLC, 32 I
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B.R. 128 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005). "Undue prejudice" to party opposing motion for leave to amend
complaint is more than mere inconvenience; it is found only where the party must overhaul its entire
litigation strategy. In re Fleming Companies, Inc., 319 B.R. 359 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005). Chapter II
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debtors' motion to amend their amended adversary complaint would be denied as untimely where,
although motion was made within extended period for making pretrial motions, debtors failed to
justify their extended and undue delay in waiting until well over a year after the parties had agreed
that the pleadings were "settled" to request further amendment, and to allow debtors to add new
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causes of action and change the focus of the litigation after discovery had been completed, and after
defendants had invested significant time and money in preparing and presenting summary judgment
motions on the pleadings, would have been prejudicial to defendants. In re Thorian, 387 B.R. 50
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2008).
Plaintiff has made not attempt to explain why it is a simple search of Pacer or court records
would not have revealed the incredibly easy to discover fact that Keller filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition in 1990. Plaintiff in no way specifies in any detailing whatsoever specifically how, at "both
examinations, Plaintiff learned additional facts to support the novel cause of action contained in its
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Amended Complaint." What facts? How do they support the new cause of action in the Amended
20
Complaint? Plaintiff provides no support for an argument that such "facts" were not easily
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discoverable through a reasonably diligent inquiry by Plaintiff, such as checking courts records or
Pacer to see if a previous bankruptcy had been filed by Keller. It does not take a great big billing
event like deposing Keller and his wife to find that out, and further, Plaintiffs failure to do so is not
25
excused merely by the fact that Plaintiff may have subsequently become aware of the 1990 filing via
26
the depositions. The point is, a reasonably diligent inquiry by Plaintiff would have revealed the 1990
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filing, and Plaintiff has made no attempt to establish that the depositions of Keller and his wife yield
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any "special" information that would excuse Plaintiff's earlier lack of diligence or the undue burden
and expense is has caused Keller. What is clear is that Keller can produce a cover letter and FedEx
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billing of lading that were mailed along with the Stipulated Judgment on the eve of trial on that
specifically refer to the talks and documents involved in incorporating into the Stipulated Judgment
the Settlement Agreement Keller can produce (if not more, depending upon what is recoverable from
Bitting and Brown's dusty files) dated April 10, 1995, that more clearly sets for the fact that Keller
did not stipulate to any fraudulent conduct or a fidicuary or trust relationship in connection with the
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Judgment entered in May 1995. Certainly, even if something isn't found in Bitting (the Receiver's
attorney) or Keller's old counsel Brown's files, the April 10, 1995 Settelment Agreement and the
cover letter and FedEx bill of lading Keller can produce and which were mailed along with Keller's
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signed Stipulated Judgment on March 23 or thereabouts, placed the onus on Bitting and the Receiver
14
to make some affirmative action to disavow the contentions made by Keller therein with respect to
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the excuplatory nature of the discussions and documents connected to the Judgment entered in May
1995.
Allowing Cadle to amend here certainly would amount to undue prejudice to Keller. Already,
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just to file this Opposition, Keller has been forced to procure the services of the undersigned, and
20
absent that, Keller would be paying a weekend plumber'S emergency ransom to address a situation
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caused by O'Rourke's failure to run a name search for Keller to discovery previous bankruptcy's and
the dockets therefrom. O'Rourke should surely be aware of and able to use Pacer. Further,
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O'Rourke, whose aggresive litigating is having a deleterious effect on Keller for sure, doesn't even
25
bother to cite a single case in support of his "res judicata" argument (wouldn't that argument work the
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other way too, i.e, since there was no language specifically incorporating by reference the allegations
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of the Complaint in the Judgment, the issue that Keller committed no fraud is barred by issue or clai
preclusion?)
Qwest Communications Intern., Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 114 S.W.3d 15 Tex.App.Austin,2003
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Court rendering agreed judgment must do so in strict or literal compliance with settlement agreement.
Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc., Rule II. Issues of fraud or willful evasion of taxes were never
actually litigated or admitted as to debtor 1984 tax liabilities in litigation before Tax Court, and thus,
debtor was not collaterally estoppcd to deny nondischargeability of 1984 tax debt based on his
consent to decision by United States Tax Court of dccision imposing fraud penalties, where no
10
admissions, factual findings, or intention of parties concerning fraud issue or willful evasion for 1984
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12
taxes were incorporated into Tax Court decision, govcrnment admitted in its answer that fraud
13
penalties, which were only discernible reason from face of Tax Court decision for denying
14
dischargcab- ility of 1984 tax liability, were dischargeable, and stipulated entry of decision was bare
15
of any factual support. Bankr.Codc, I I U.S.C.A. 523(a)( l )(C). In re Goff, 180 B.R. 193, Bankr. L.
16
Rep. (CCH) P 76497, 75 A.F.T.R.2d 95-2531 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995).

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15 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 337 (Originally published in 2006) See page 149 thru 160 specific to
"Where the Insurance Commissioner of the State of West Virginia
19
insurance industry.
20
(Commissioner) was appointed the receiver and liquidator of an insolvent life insurance company,
21
and the Commis- sioner sued the former directors of the life insurance company, the court in In re
22
Wilbur, 1997 WL 375687 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997), found that the Commissioner failed to prcsent
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evidence that a debtor former director committed fraud while acting in a fiduciary capacity, since the
25
state court's holdings regarding the debtor's fiduciary role did not satisfy the requirements of the
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discharge exception for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity under 11 U.S.C.A.
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523(a)( 4). Florida Department oflnsurance, in its capacity as the receiver of insolvent insurance
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companies, brought adversary proceedings against a bankrupt former officer and director to recover
for the former officer's alleged usurpation and breach of fiduciary duty and to except this
indebtedness from discharge, and on the debtor officer's motion for summary judgment, the court in
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In re Blackburn, 209 B.R. 4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997), concluded that the general fiduciary duties
owed to a Florida corporation by its officers and directors were insufficient, by themselves, to suppo
the claim that the officers and directors stood in a "fiduciary capacity" to the corporation for debt
dischargeability purposes under 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(4); 15 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 337 Page 160 15 A.L.R.
Fed. 2d 337 (Originally published in 2006). "The court In re Nordstrom, 8 Fed. Appx. 823 (9th Cir.
10
11
200I), held that no fiduciary relationship, for the purposes of the fiduciary fraud or defalcation
12
discharge exception of I I U.S.C.A. 523(a)(4), existed between the judgment-creditor and the
13
individual debtor as owner and operator of two related corporations engaged in the sale of insurance
14
where the creditor could not show the requisite express or technical trust between the parties. The
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credit- or had been injured in an automobile accident and obtained a default judgment against the other driver, who was insured by an insolvent company that sold insurance through the debtor's
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corporation. The creditor then filed a state court action against the debtor, individually and through
19
his companies, alleging that he had intentionally engaged in a fraudulent scheme to sell underfunded
20
insurance policies in violation of California law, and obtained judgment against the debtor
21
companies."
22
Rule 7015 Fed. R. Bankr. P., incorporating Rule 15 Fed. R. Civ. P., provides a standard for
23
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the amendment of pleadings. After, where, as here, Defendant has already filed a responsive
25
pleading, leave to amend should be granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing
26
party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue delay. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 975
27
F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992). In this case, Plaintiff should not be accorded leave to amend its
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OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND
10 COMPLAINT IN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING
Case 10-05104-gwz
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adversary complaint on all those accounts, and further, as Plaintiff and its counsel thoroughly fails to
specify in any detail whatsoever what additional information regarding Defendant's actions and the
underlying judgment came to light after the filing of the initial adversary proceeding that a simple
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name search for Keller on Pacer or the bankruptcy dockets or any other attempts at making a
reasonably diligent inquiry vis a vis Rule 9011 would have revealed. Speaking of 9011, opposing
counsel fails to cite to a single case supporting his truly creative res judicata argument, and the same
can be said, with ever more vigor about Plaintiffs failure to provide any legal support for what seems
to be their contention that Keller was under some legal duty to become a psychic and know that 3
10
years after the close of the bankruptcy Keller filed in 1990 that Keller would have a judgment against
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him in Texas in 1995, though O'Rourke makes conclusory assertions in his pleadings that Keller's
13
"liability was clear" by the time the 1990 Ch. 7 filing was ending (not clear enough, apparently, to
14
prevent over three more years time passing before any judgment was rendered against Keller in
15
Texas, though), however, O'Rourke fails to cite even one case that would support his argument under
16
those circumstances, even if they could be proven. O'Rourke failed to cite a case for what seems to
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be his argument that if Keller's liability was clear vis a vis the Texas matter, it should have been
19
scheduled in the 1990 Arizona bankruptcy filing by the time that ended sometime in 1992, and that,
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Keller's failure to do so now subjects him to the cause of action that the Cadle Company now seeks to
21
add by amending its original Complaint in this adversary proceeding. Plaintiffs amendment will
22
certainly delay the proceedings even further since each cause of action does not substantially overlap
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or relates back to the original complaint. Actually, O'Rourke has not even established that this new
25
cause of action does relate back to SOMETIME BEFORE the filing of the original Complaint in
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Texas (again, Cadle requiring Keller to be a psychic, apparently). Quite simply, the debt that
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Defendant owes Plaintiff could not have possibly been listed or scheduled by the debtor in his earlier
case in the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of Arizona and it is
therefore dischargeable under 11 U.S.c. 523(a)(1 0), which reads that: "(10) that was or could have
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been listed or scheduled by the debtor in a prior case concerning the debtor under this title or under
the Bankruptcy Act in which the debtor waived discharge, or was denied a discharge under section
727(a)(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of this title, or under section 14c(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), or (7) of such
Act".
Bid protestor would be granted leave to file second amended complaint after it learned that
10
contract had been modified three times after re-award, notwithstanding defendants' objection that
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amendment would be futile because jurisdiction was lacking over new claims which alleged facts
13
which occurred after contract award, as new claims alleged "material" post-award changes to the
14
contract, allowing retention of jurisdiction pursuant to the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA).
15
Information Sciences Corp. v. U.S., 80 Fed. Cl. 648 (2008). A motion to amend may be deemed futil
16
if a claim added by the amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss. Shoshone Indian Tribe
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of the Wind River Reservation, Wyoming v. U.S., 71 Fed. Cl. 172 (2006). A plaintiff would not be
19
allowed to amend a complaint where a plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata or collateral
20
estoppel and otherwise did not come within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, and thus
21
further amendment was futile. Saladino v. U.S., 62 Fed. Cl. 782 (2004).
22
Finally, defendant will thoroughly be prejudiced as a great deal of invasive discovery has
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taken place to date already and Cadle has been provided conclusive proof that Keller's wife should
25
not be bothered by this litigation, much less be subject to even more invasive vexation even beyond
26
the Rule 2004 examination she has already been forced to submit to. Since so very much time has
27
now passed since the filing of this Adversary Proceeding, not to mention the couple of decades that
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Case 10-05104-gwz
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2
3
have passed since Keller's 1990 Arizona bankrntpcy filing, much less that complete and utter absence
of a nexus between that filing and the 1995 Judgment in Texas, to say nothing of the reputation the
Cadle Company have developed in State and beyond for scurrilous, vexatious litigation, the standards
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5
of Rule 15 should yield an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend their Complaint.
III.
CONCLUSION
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For the reasons cited above, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order
denying The Cadle Company's Motion to amend its Adversary Complaint and perhaps consider
10
whether Keller is due something for his trouble in opposing a motion that didn't bother to cite to
11
much in the way of legal authority in support of its contentions.
12
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2011.
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--?
(
6-z/
/s/ Za
Barker Cou hlin
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 23 2011 a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed
"
in hard copy with the Clerk of Court in compliance with LR 5005, as the undersigned is not yet
registered to efile on the CMIECF system. I filed and deposited in the U.S. Mail a true copy of the
within: OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT IN ADVERSARY
PROCEEDING to:
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7
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9
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MICHAEL P. O'ROURKE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6764
O'ROURKE LAW GROUP, PC
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4100
Seattle, Washington 98104
Telephone: (206) 477-1475
Facsimile: (206) 470-1150
orourkelawgroul2@gmail.com
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12
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BRIAN 1. SMITH, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 11279
Of Counsel to O'ROURKE LAW
GROUP, PC
700 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89\01
Telephone: (702) 380-8248
Facsimile: (702) 382-7595
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Dated this 23th day of November, 2011
z-
22
lsi Zach COUg
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Keller
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OPPOSITION TO MOTION
TO AMEND
Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 37
Entered 11/28/11 09:29:31
Page 1 of 3
Attorney for Robert Keller

DISTRICT OF NEVADA
7
8
9
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n Re:
ROBERT KELLER
Debtor.
11
12
Case No.: BK 1O-52639-gwz

) Chapter 7
Adversary Proceeding
No. 10-05 104-gwz
HE CADLE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
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DECLARATION OF ROBERT KELLER IN SUPPORT
13
OF KELLER'S OPPOSITION TO THE CADLE
14
ADVERSARY COMPLAINT
COMPANY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
15
OBERT KELLER,
Hearing Date: 12/7/10

Hearing Time: 10:00 AM
Defendant.
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DECLARATION
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21
OF ROBERT KELLER IN SUPPORT OF KELLER'S
THE CADLE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE
OPPOSITION TO
TO AMEND ADVERSARY COMPLAINT
I, ROBERT KELLER, declare that:

I. I am over the age of 18 years and I am competent to testify regarding the following information. I
22
23
am the Defendant in the above-referenced matter and I have personal knowledge regarding the
24
circumstances and events recounted below.
25
2. During the pendency of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy Petition I filed in Arizona in 1990, at no time
26
was it ever clear to me that anything connected to what would ultimately become a Judgment against
27
me in Texas in May 1995 presented a situation of "clear liability" on my part, prior to the close of the
28
-
1 -
DECLARATION OF ROBERT KELLER IN SUPPORT OF KELLER'S OPPOSITION TO THE CADLE
COMPANY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ADVERSARY COMPLAINT
Case 10-05104-gwz
Doc 37
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Page 2 of 3
1990 Chapter 7 Petition I filed in Arizona, such that the 1995 Judgment agaisnt me in Texas was or
could have been listed or scheduled by the myself at anytime prior to the close of the 1990
bankrutpcy filing under this 523(a)(1 0) or under the Bankruptcy Act.
4
5
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7
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is
true and correct.
Dated this 23th day of November, 2011 :
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9
10
11
/s/ Robert W. Keller

Robert W. Keller
Defendant Robert Keller
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- 2 DECLARATION OF ROBERT KELLER IN SUPPORT OF KELLER'S OPPOSITION TO THE CADLE
COMPANY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
ADVERSARY COMPLAINT
'.
Case 10-05104-gwz
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Page 3 of 3
2
3

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 23" 201 I a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed in hard copy with
the Clerk of Court in compliance with LR 5005, as the undersigned is not yet registered to efile on the CMIECF system.
filed and deposited in the U.S. Mail a true copy of the within: :
DECLARATION OF ROBERT KELLER IN SUPPORT OF KELLER'S OPPOSITION TO THE CADLE
COMPANY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ADVERSARY COMPLAINT to:
MICHAEL p, O'ROURKE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6764
O'ROURKE LAW GROUP, PC
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4 l O0
Telephone: (206) 477-1475
Facsimile: (206) 470-1150
orourke\awgroup@gmail.com
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8
9
10
11
12
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15
BRIAN 1. SMITH, ESQ.
Of Counsel to O'ROURKE LAW
GROUP, PC
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephone: (702) 380-8248
Facsimile: (702) 382-7595
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Dated this 23th day of November, 2011
20
lsi Zach
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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- 3 DECLARATION OF ROBERT KELLER IN SUPPORT OF KELLER'S OPPOSITION TO THE CADLE
COMPANY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO AMEND ADVERSARY COMPLAINT
Case 10-05104-gwz Doc 53
Entered 04/10/12 06:00:34
Page 1 of 6
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
3
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
4
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
5 Attorney for Defendant Robert Keller
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
In Re:
ROBERT KELLER
Debtor.
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THE CADLE COMPANY,

Plaintiff,
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14
v.
15
ROBERT KELLER,
16
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No.: BK 10-52639-gwz,

Chapter 7
MOTION TO DISMISS CADLE
COMPANY'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
OBJECTING TO DISCHARGEABLITY OF
DEBT
Adversary Proceeding No. 10-05104-gwz
Filed 11-18-2011
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MOTION TO DISMISS CADLE COMPANY'S AMENDED COMPLAINT OBJECTING TO

DISCHARGEABLITY OF DEBT
Defendant/Debtor Robet Keller, by counsel Zach Coughlin, Esq.,hereby files this Motion to
Dismiss the Adversary Complaint of the Cadle Company and any Amended Complaints on file. The
undersigned ask that the Court allow such a Motion to Dismiss to be filed despite any Answer herein
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24
on file, particularly any pro se one filed prior to the undersigned's attachment to this case.
25
LEGAL ARGUMENT
26
. Defendant states that the May 23, 1995 Final Judgment from Travis County and the April 10, 1995
27
Settlement Agreement and the March 23, 1995 cover letter from Robert W. Keller to the
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- 1 MOTION TO DISMISS CADLE COMPANY'S AMENDED COMPLAINT OBJECTING TO DISCHARGEABLITY
OF DEBT
Case 10-05104-gwz
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prosecutor/Plaintiff in the Travis County, TX matter decided in 1995 speaks for themselves
Plaintiff admits to having failed to originally serve complaint copies of the Complaint in this matter,
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6
citing that the exhibits were too voluminous in an email to Keller. That is not permissible and
forms a basis for dismissal due to insufficient service of process. Any subsequent electronic service
of such exhibits does not override such technical deficiencies early on.
Defendant was not an officer, director and underwriter of two Lloyds Insurance companies
organized pursuant to the Insurance Code of the State of Texas: American Guardian Underwriters
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12
Lloyds Insurance Company (hereinafter AGULIC) and American Guardian Lloyds, Inc.
(hereinafter AGL). Despite Plaintiff's attorney's manipulated and tortured recounting of the facts,
during the late 1980s, Defendant was not an officer, director and underwriter of two Lloyds
13
Insurance companies organized pursuant to the Insurance Code of the State of Texas: American
14
Guardian Underwriters Lloyds Insurance Company (hereinafter AGULIC) and American Guardian
15
Lloyds, Inc. (hereinafter AGL). Rather, as the Judgment Plaintiff's attorney clearly had (given he
16
attached it to the Complaint in this Matter) indicates expressly, Keller participated in the business of
17
18
insurance in Texas by serving as an underwriter and member of the executive committee of American
19
Guardian Insurance Underwriter Lloyds, and as an officer, director, and shareholder in American
20
Guardian Lloyds, Inc. As such, Plaintiff's have failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
21
granted and the variosu iterations of the Complaint should be dismissed.
22
Nevada's foreign judgment act and the kind of certification required has not been pled or
23
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shown, justifying a dismissal here.. The Nevada certificate of service and service address for Mr.
Keller argues towards a dismissal.
A dismissal is further appropriate here in that Cadle fails to state a claim where there is not
mention of or ability to show that there was the justifiable reliance. What was the state law which
28
OF DEBT
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imposed a fiduciary duty between the parties, which is a pre-requisite to (a)(4)? Cadle cannot show
one. A debt buyer can't prove justifiable reliance.
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6
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Cadle Company should lose on the collateral estoppel argument unless the stipulation
confessed a factual basis for fraud. Sandoval, 232 P.3d 422 speaks to the acdtually litigated
requirement and augers towards a dismissal here for failure to state a claim.
The judgment is ultra scrires, its went dormant under Texas law, and was not revived in
timed, especially in light of the void attempt by a non-lawyer to register the foreign judgment in
Nevada where doing so is impermissilbe. VTCA Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sec 31.006.
A dormant judgment may be revided by scire facias or by an acdtion of debt brought not later than
the second anniversary of the date that the judgment becomes dormant.. Calde cannot show this.
13
See also, Sec 34.001 No Exceutionon Dromant Judgment.. Non-lawyers generally may not
14
represent another person or an entity in a court of law. > Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506
15
U.S. 194, 201-03, 113 S.Ct. 716, 721, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993). Some courts have allowed non-
16
lawyers to represents entities in court under certain circumstances. See, e.g., > Vermont ANR v.
17
18
Upper Valley Reg. Landfill, 159 Vt. 454, 621 A.2d 225, 228 (1992). This court, however, has [112
19
Nev. 543] consistently required attorneys to represent other persons and entities in court. > Salman
20
v. Newell, 110 Nev. 1333, 885 P.2d 607 (1994); > Pioneer Title v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 189-90,
21
326 P.2d 408, 410 (1958); see also > NRS 7.285 (no person allowed to practice law in Nevada unless
22
admitted to State Bar).
23
24
Sound policy reasons support requiring entities to be represented only by licensed counsel:
25
[The reasons] are principally that the conduct of litigation by a nonlawyer creates unusual burdens
26
not only for the party he represents but as well for his adversaries and the court. The lay litigant
27
frequently brings pleadings that are awkwardly drafted, motions that are inarticulately presented,
28
OF DEBT
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proceedings that are needlessly multiplicative. In addition to lacking the professional skills of a
lawyer, the lay litigant lacks many of the attorney's ethical responsibilities, e.g. to avoid litigating
5
6
unfounded or vexatious claims. Sunde v. Contel of California,915 P.2d 298, 299 112 Nev. 541,
(Nev. 1996) 915 P.2d 299.
Also, the supreme court cases are Brown v. Felsen and Archer v. Warner allow the court to look
behind the judgment here to the cover letter to the signed stipulated judgement Keller sent the State
of Texas, wherein any admission of fraud is expressly disclaimed and therefore that issue was
10
11
12
acdtually litigated and res judicate works against the Cadle Company's assertions and own res
judicate cause of action. Further, 523a7 would seem to allow for dischargeability here to the extent
the stipulated judgment operated as a fine of sorts.
III.
CONCLUSION
13
14
15
For the reasons cited above, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order
16
dismissing The Cadle Company's Complaint and any Amended Complaint, and barring such an Order
17
being granted, then provide a reasonable period of time in which Defendant may file an Answer or
18
Amended Answer to the Complaint or Amended Complaint. To the extent such an Answer or
19
Amended Answer is so required to be filed now or within a few days, Defendant denies all
20
21
22
allegations contained therein and opposes the relief sought.

DATED this 10th day of April, 2012
23
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/s/ Zachary Barker Coughlin

Attorney for Defendant/Debtor Keller
28
OF DEBT
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OF DEBT
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 10th, 2012 a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
3
was thereby caused to be served electronically on all registered users of the CM/ECF system who
have filed notices of appearance in this matter. I further certify that the foregoing was served via first
4
class mail, postage-prepaid and addressed as follows:
5
MICHAEL P. OROURKE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6764
7
OROURKE LAW GROUP, PC
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4100
8
Telephone: (206) 477-1475
Facsimile: (206) 470-1150
10 orourkelawgroup@gmail.com
11
12
13
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15
16
BRIAN J. SMITH, ESQ.
Of Counsel to OROURKE LAW
GROUP, PC
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephone: (702) 380-8248
Facsimile: (702) 382-7595
17
18
19
20
DATED this April 10th, 2012
21
22
/s/ Zach Coughlin
23
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant/Debtor Keller
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OF DEBT
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PATRICIA HADFIELD
BANKRUPTCY LAW GROUP
200 So. Virginia Street, 8th Floor
Reno, NV 89501
Tel: 775-827-9600
Fax: 888-843-7260
e-mail: PatriciaH@BankruptcyLG.com
5
6
Attorney for Debtor

ROBERT KELLER
7
8
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
10
11
In Re:
Case No: 10-52639

Chapter 7
ROBERT KELLER,
AP No. 10-05104
12
13
14
Debtor.
/
15
THE CADLE COMPANY,
Hrg. Date:
Hrg: Time:
Hrg: Place:
16
Plaintiff,
17
v.
March 27, 2013

2:00 p.m.
Department 2
300 Booth Street, 5th Floor
Reno, NV
18 ROBERT KELLER,
19
Defendant.
/
20
21
22
DEFENDANT/DEBTOR ROBERT KELLERS

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BASED ON TEXAS LAW OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
AND EXPIRATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
23
24
25
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
26
Plaintiff The Cadle Company, a collection agency, brought this adversary proceeding
27 objecting to the dischargeability of a $500,000 Final Judgment entered against Defendant

28 Robert Keller on May 23, 1995, by the 53rd District Court of Travis County, Texas. Plaintiff
1
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1 contends that the Texas Judgment is non-dischargeable because it proves Mr. Keller
2 committed fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, defalcation, embezzlement and larceny.
3
Plaintiff is wrong. That two-page, agreed-upon Judgment contained no
4 finding that Defendant Keller committed fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, defalcation,
5 embezzlement, or larceny. The Judgment referred only to Defendant Kellers actions
6 and conduct as described in Receivers Petition on file, and stated very clearly in the
7 last sentence that: All relief not expressly herein granted is expressly DENIED.
8 [Capitalization in the original; emphasis added.] (A copy of that Judgment is attached as part
9 of Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Complaint and as Exhibit H to the Declaration of Robert Keller
10 [hereafter Keller Decl.] filed herein.)
11
On March 21, 2001, the Texas Department of Insurance, by and through Jose
12 Montemayor, a receiver appointed to oversee the liquidation of American Guardian Insurance

13 Underwriters Lloyds and American Guardian Lloyds, Inc., assigned that Travis County
14 Judgment against Mr. Keller to The Cadle Company. (A copy of that Transfer and Assignment
15 is attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Complaint in this action.)
16
17
18
19
Plaintiff has alleged only four Claims against Keller in this adversary proceeding:
1.
First Claim: Fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4);

2.
Second Claim: For money, property, services, or an extension,
20
renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a
21
false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
22
debtor's or an insider's financial condition under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A);
23
3.
Third Claim: This is a claim that was or could have been
24
listed by the debtor in a prior case concerning the debtor under this title or
25
under the Bankruptcy Act, pursuant to 11 U.S.,C., 523(a)(10); and
26
4.
Fourth Claim: The debt that Defendant owes Plaintiff should
27
be determined to be nondischargeable according to principles of res judicata
28
and collateral estoppel.

2
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As the facts and law set forth below prove, Defendant is entitled to Summary
2 Judgment in his favor on all four claims in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint.
3
II
STATUS OF THE CASE
This case is set for a Status Conference on December 4, 2012, at 11:00 a.m., in
6 Department 2 of the above entitled court.

7
8
9
The following matters are presently pending before this Court:

1.
Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, [Docket 53]
filed April 10, 2012. Plaintiff submitted its Opposition on May 8, 2012
10
[Docket 56].
11
2.
Motion to Strike Answer and Purported Counter-Claim filed by
12
Plaintiff on May 8, 2012 [Docket 57]. Defendants then-counsel filed an
13
Opposition on May 21, 2012 [Docket 62].
14
15
16
3.
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants then-counsel
on May 23, 2012 [Docket 63].

4.
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
17
then-counsel on June 9, 2012 [Docket 68].
18
Contemporaneously with the filing of this motion for Summary Judgment,
19 Defendant has withdrawn his previously filed Motion to Dismiss [Docket 56], Motion for
20 Summary Judgment [Docket 63] and Amended Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 68].
21
III
22
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
23
There are two court actions referred to in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint
24 [Docket No 42] filed December 18, 2011:

25
26
1.
The Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy filed by Robert Keller on April 20,
1990, in Arizona, and,
27 - - - - 28
3
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The Texas Department of Insurance action No, 92-14679, filed
October 18, 1992, against Robert Keller and many other people and entities in
the 53rd District Court of Travis County, Texas.
4 Each of these actions will be addressed in detail below.

5
A.
1990 Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition Filed by Robert Keller in Arizona:
6 Plaintiff The Cadle Company alleges in the Third Claim of its First Amended Complaint
7 [Docket No. 42, Page 6, Lines 8-14] that:
8
9
The debt that Defendant owes Plaintiff could have

been listed or scheduled by the debtor in his earlier case in
10
the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of
11
Arizona and it is therefore non-dischargeable under
12
11 U.S.C. 523(a)(10).
13
As the further facts set forth in Section B below will show, the Texas
14 Department of Insurance action was not filed against Mr. Keller until October 18, 1992,
15 two years after Mr. Keller filed for bankruptcy in Arizona. (Statement of Undisputed Facts
16 [SUF] filed herewith, No. 18, at 4:4-7.) Mr. Keller did not become aware of that Texas
17 action until he was served some 18 months after that, in June, 1994 (SUF No. 19 at 4:8-10),
18 and the agreed upon Judgment against Mr. Keller in the Texas Insurance Department action was
19 not entered until May 23, 1995 (SUF No. 39 at 7:8-10.), five years after Mr. Keller filed his
20 Arizona bankruptcy case and two and one-half years after that bankruptcy case was
21 dismissed. Thus, it is not reasonable to assume that Mr. Keller could have or should have
22 listed the Texas Department of Insurance as a creditor in his1990 bankruptcy.
23
Plaintiff The Cadle Company also attempts to mislead this Court by alleging
24 in General Allegations Nos. 16-18 of its Complaint that:

25
16. In addition to the instant a bankruptcy case, Defendant had
26
filed a Voluntary Petition for Relief under Chapter 7 of Title 11 U.S.C.
27
in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona (Phoenix) in 1990,
28
case number 90-04058.
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17. Although the AGULIC matter had not yet been reduced to
1
2
judgment but his liability was clear, Keller sought to discharge in
bankruptcy a similar judgment in favor of United Healthcare
Corporation resulting from his dubious business practices.

18. After an adversary proceeding that stretched out for two and a
5
6
half years due to delays and procedural maneuvers, the Court issued an
Order Denying Discharge on November 25, 1992. United Healthcare
Corporations judgment remains unsatisfied.
Actually, the United Healthcare facts were totally different from the Texas
10 Insurance Department facts. The United Healthcare adverse proceeding arose from a default
11 judgment entered against Mr. Keller in Minnesota. Mr. Keller had been one of the owners of an
12 insurance brokerage that provided professional liability coverage to a PPO that United
13 Healthcare purchased. The adverse proceeding was not dismissed as a result of a factual
14 finding of non-dischargeability; it was dismissed at the request of United Healthcare because
15 Mr. Keller did not appear for his court-ordered deposition. (SUF 14 at 3:10-12 and Docket Nos.
16 44-48 of Exhibit L to the Keller Decl.)
The undisputed evidence in this case proves that Mr. Keller did not list the
17
18 Texas Department of Insurance as a creditor in his 1990 Arizona Bankruptcy because at that
19 time he had no reason to believe that it was a creditor of his or any way to predict that five years
20 in the future it might become one. Therefore, entry of summary judgment in Mr. Kellers favor
21 at this time on the Third Claim of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is appropriate and just.
22
23
B.
Texas Department of Insurance versus Robert Keller:

In 1987, Defendant Robert Keller was one of 11 investors who founded and
24 funded American Guardian Insurance Underwriters Lloyds (referred to variously in court

25 documents as AGULIC and AGLU) in the State of Texas to issue workers compensation
26 insurance policies. (SUF No. 1 at 1:27-2:2.) AGIUL then formed American Guardian Lloyds,
27 Inc., (AGLI) to act as the attorney in fact to manage day-to-day operation of AGIUL, including
28 collecting premiums and paying claims. (SUF No. 2 at 2:3-5.) Defendant Keller was the first
5
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1 President of AGLI. (SUF No. 3 at 2:6.) [Both American Guardian entities will be referred to
2 collectively as American Guardian in this Motion and supporting documents.]
3
Less than one year later, in 1988, Defendant resigned from AGLI and turned
4 over all of its operations to the remaining officers and directors of AGLI. (SUF No. 4 at 2:7-9.)
5 At that same time, he surrendered his investment in AGIUL. (SUF No. 5 at 2:10-11.)
6
Some two years later, on October 18, 1990, the State of Texas commenced
rd
7 delinquency (receivership) proceedings against American Guardian in the 53 Judicial District
8 Court of Travis County, Texas, Case No. 492413. [See Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs First Amended
9 Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt filed herein, Page 22, Paragraph 68.]
10
Two years after that, on October 18, 1992, Sandra A. Aubrey, Permanent
11 Receiver of American Guardian Underwriters Lloyds Insurance Company, filed her Original
12 Petition in the District Court of Travis County, Texas, Action No. 92-14679, in which the
13 agreed-upon Final Judgment against Mr. Keller was eventually entered on May 23, 1995.
14 (Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt filed
15 herein [Document 42]).
16
The first knowledge Defendant Keller had about the Texas Receivers action
17 that named him was sometime after June 2, 1994, when Defendant received a Citation
18 [Summons] issued on that date, together with a copy of the Receivers First Amended Petition
19 filed on December 31, 1992, a year and a half before he was served. (Copies of that Citation
20 and the First Amended Petition are attached as Exhibits A and B, respectively to the
21 Declaration of Robert Keller filed herewith.)
22
Defendant was not living in Texas in 1994 and his lawyer of choice, Chet
23 Brown, was admitted to practice only in California. Therefore, it was agreed with the attorney
24 representing the Department of Insurance that while Mr. Brown would act as Defendants
25 personal lawyer and advisor, Mr. Keller would appear in propria persona in the Receivers
26 action in Travis County, Texas. (Keller Decl. 3:19-22 and SUF No. 20 at 4:11-12.)
27 - - - - 28
6
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In or about June, 1994, Defendant filed a general Answer to the Receivers
2 First Amended Petition denying all of the charges made against him in the Receivers action.
3 (SUF No. 21 at 4:13-15.)
4
Thereafter, Attorney Daniel C. Bitting, a partner in Austin, Texas, firm of
5 Scott, Douglass, Luton & McConnico, L.L.P., who represented the Receiver in the Travis
6 County action, and Defendant dealt directly with each other and Attorney Bitting also
7 communicated with Defendants counselor, Chet Brown, to reach a conclusion of the matter
8 as to Defendant Keller. (SUF Nos. 22-24 at 4:16-21.)
9
The Receivers case against Defendant Keller was never litigated, nor
10 were any facts supporting the allegations against him contained in the Receivers Petition
11 or First Amended Petition ever proven against him. Defendants deposition was never
12 noticed or taken by anyone representing any party in the Receivers case and Mr. Keller
13 never produced any documents or other evidence in Travis County Action No. 92-14679.
14 (SUF Nos. 25-27 at 4:23-5:3.)
15
The Receivers case was set for trial on March 27, 1995. On March 21, 1995,
16 Attorney Bitting sent a letter to Defendants counsel, Chet Brown, confirming the agreement
17 that had been worked out among Attorneys Bitting and Brown and Defendant Keller that
18 Mr. Keller would sign a Judgment for $500,000 to end his involvement in the Receivers case.
19 (SUF 28-29 at 5:4-9; Keller Decl. Exhibit C.)
20
Two days later, Mr. Keller signed and returned to Mr. Bitting via Federal
21 Express the Final Judgment Defendant had prepared. (Keller Decl. Exhibit D.) Mr. Kellers
22 cover letter also confirmed the agreement with Mr. Bitting that Mr. Brown would prepare a
23 document stating that: this judgment is not indicative of admission of guilt of any of the
24 allegations, including but not limited to the fraud and RICO charges, but rather as a
25 method of concluding the matter without additional expense on the part of all concerned.
26 [Emphasis added.] (SUF Nos. 30-31 at 5:10-18.)
27
On March 28, 1995, Mr. Bitting sent a letter to Attorney Brown confirming
28 that pursuant to the settlement agreement, the Receiver would apply to the receivership court
7
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1 for approval to enter into the Final Judgment with Defendant Keller. Mr. Bitting stated that if
2 that could not be accomplished before the new April 24, 1995, trial date, he would either pass
3 the setting at trial call or sever the claims against Mr. Keller so that he would not have to go to
4 trial. (Keller Decl. Exhibit E.)
5
(SUF Nos. 32-33 at 5:19-27.)
On April 11, 1995, Defendant sent a letter to Mr. Bitting enclosing a
6 Settlement Agreement which Defendant prepared with the assistance of Attorney Brown (the
7 additional document referred to at Page 7, Lines 20-26 above). That Agreement expressly
8 states:
In complete and total settlement of all claims and
9
10
liability to PLAINTIFF it is hereby understood and agreed that
11
DEFENDANT would, on or before March 24, 1995, execute a
12
FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of PLAINTIFF in the amount of
13
$500,000., AND;
14
....
15
That on March 22, 1995, it was FURTHER AGREED
16
that the parties hereto would execute a SETTLEMENT
17
AGREEMENT reflecting the fact that DEFENDANT denies
18
any wrongdoing, fraudulent conduct, and any other illegal
19
activity, and has executed the FINAL JUDGMENT only
20
because it is in his best interest to do so at this time. . . .
21
[Emphasis added.]
22 (Keller Decl. Exhibit F.) (SUF No. 34 at 6:1-19.)

23
Attorney Bitting subsequently had that agreement retyped to add
24 Plaintiff/Receivers position on the agreement at the end of the penultimate paragraph:

25
and that, notwithstanding Defendants denials, Plaintiff
26
maintains the allegations in its pleadings and has decided to
27
accept the final judgment because it is in Plaintiffs best
28
interests at this time. . . .
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1 Attorney Bitting then signed and returned the Settlement Agreement to Mr. Brown and
2 Defendant Keller signed it on May 9, 1995. (Keller Decl. Exhibit G and SUF Nos. 35-36
3 at 6:20-28.)
The Receivers case was continued to May 23, 1995, for trial. On that date
5 when the case was called, counsel for the Receiver appeared and announced that the Receiver
6 and Defendant Keller had agreed to the entry of the Final Judgment. The Court then signed the
7 Final Judgment prepared by Mr. Bitting. That Final Judgment was filed by the Court on
8 May 23, 1995, at 1:57 p.m. (Keller Decl. Exhibit H.) (SUF Nos. 37-39 at 7:1-9.)
One minute later, at 1:58 p.m., the Court entered a document entitled Notice
10 of Non-Suit of Certain Defendants, in which counsel for the Receiver represented to the Court
11 that the Receiver had entered into agreed judgments with eight defendants, including
12 Mr. Keller, and that: the Receiver hereby non-suits its claims against all Defendants other than
13 the Settling Defendants. The non-suited defendants included seven individuals and a number
14 of companies that had been named by the Receiver. (Keller Decl. Exhibit I.)
15 (SUF Nos. 40-41.)
On May 24, 1995, Attorney Steven J. Wingard of Mr. Bittings law firm sent
16
17 a letter to Defendant Kellers counsel, Chet Brown, enclosing Mr. Kellers Final Judgment and
18 the Notice of Non-Suit. (Keller Decl. Exhibit J.) (SUF No. 42 at 7:18-20.)
Not only was no allegation in the Receivers Petition or Amended Petition in
19
20 Action No. 92-14679 ever litigated or otherwise proven against Defendant Keller, so far as
21 Mr. Keller is aware, none was ever litigated or proven against any of the other named
22 defendants in the Insurance Departments case, either.
23
IV
24
LEGAL ARGUMENT
25
26
A.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, applicable this Adversary Proceeding, via
27 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, provides for summary judgment where there is no
28 genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
9
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1 matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56( c). [A]t the summary judgment stage the judges function
2 is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
3 whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S., 242
4 (1986). A motion for summary judgment in an adversary proceeding under 523(a)(2)(A) is
5 governed by the same standards applicable to motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
6
7
B.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR EXCEPTIONS TO DISCHARGE

Dischargeability exceptions are narrowly construed, and complainants must
8 show by a preponderance of the evidence that their claim comes squarely within an exception
9 specifically enumerated in the Bankruptcy Code. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 287, 288 (1991).
10
As noted above, Plaintiff The Cadle Company alleges only four Claims for
11 Relief in its First Amended Complaint, in the following order:

12
13
14
15
16
1.
First Claim - 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) fraud, defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny;

2.
Second Claim - 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A) - fraud, false pretenses or false
representations by Mr. Keller;

3.
Third Claim - 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(10) Mr. Keller could have listed the
17
Texas Department of Insurance action in Travis County, Texas, in his 1990
18
Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Arizona;
19
4.
Fourth Claim - Application of res judicata and collateral estoppel to
20
determine the nondischargeability of the Final Judgment in Travis County, Texas,
21
Action No. 92-14679 entered May 23, 1995..
22
As evidence presented in support of this Motion shows, The Cadle Companys First
23 Amended Complaint is so factually and legally flawed that it cannot be amended to state a
24 cause of action against Mr. Keller. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendant Robert
25 Keller should be entered at this time.
26 - - - - 27
28
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TEXAS LAW PREVENTS APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA AND
2 COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO THIS ADVERSARY PROCEEDING.

3
As a matter of full faith and credit, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738 requires courts to
4 apply the collateral estoppel principles of the state in which the Judgment was entered.
5 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 (1991). The judgment which Plaintiff The Cadle
6 Company seeks to enforce against Defendant Robert Keller was entered in favor of the Receiver
7 for the Department of Insurance of the State of Texas in Travis County, Texas, on May 23,
8 1995. Almost six years later, on March 21, 2001, that judgment was assigned by the receiver to
9 The Cadle Company. A copy of that Assignment is Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Complaint for Non10 dischargeability. Therefore, this Court must apply Texas collateral estoppel principles to
11 determine dischargeability of Plaintiffs Judgment against Defendant Robert Keller.
12
Plaintiffs Fourth Claim against Defendant incorporates the allegations of the
13 First, Second and Third Claims described in detail above and alleges that:
14
28. The Debt that Defendant owes Plaintiff results
15
from a Final Judgment which was reviewed, ordered and
16
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction after thoroughly
17
being litigated.
18
29. Defendant Keller consented to this Final Judgment
19
which is based on and incorporates the allegations and causes
20
of action raised in the permanent receivers Original and
21
Amended Petitions.
30. The debt that Defendant owes Plaintiff should
22
23
be determined to be non-dischargeable according to
24
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. [Docket
25
No. 42, Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint 6:17-26.
26
Emphasis added.]
27
1.
28
Res Judicata Does Not Apply: Plaintiff The Cadle Company assumes
that res judicata applies to this case; it does not. The doctrine of res judicata
11
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does not apply in bankruptcy nondischargeability proceedings. Fielder v. King
(In re King), 103 F.3d 17, 19 (5th Cir.) (citing Brown v. Felsen ,
S.Ct. 2205 (1979), cert denied 117 S. Ct. 2454 (1997). Therefore, the Judgment
entered against Defendant Keller in Texas 17 years ago cannot be used to,
ipso facto, give The Cadle Company a victory in this adversary proceeding.
2.
442 U.S., 127, 99
Collateral Estoppel: The doctrine of collateral estoppel likewise does
not favor Plaintiff in this case. The United States Supreme Court has explicitly
stated that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, principles apply in bankruptcy
dischargeability proceedings, Grogan v. Garner, supra, at 285 n.11, 111 S.Ct. 654,
10
658, n. 11, although the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction to ultimately determine
11
the dischargeability of the debt. Gober v. Terra + Corp (In re Gober), 100 F.3d
12
1195, 1201 (5th Cir. 1996).

However, when the Texas rules of preclusion are applied, as they must
13
14
be to this Texas judgment, Plaintiff loses again. Under Texas law, collateral
15
estoppel bars relitigation of any ultimate issue of fact actually litigated and
16
essential to the judgment in a prior suit, regardless of whether the second suit is
17
based upon the same cause of action. Id, at 689 (quoting Bonniwell v Beech
18
Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex 1984). [Emphasis added.]
19
The elements of collateral estoppel under Texas law are:
20
(1) the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully
and fairly litigated in the prior action;
21
22
(2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and
23
(3) the parties in the second action were also parties to the first action.
24
Bonniville v. Beech Aircraft Corp., supra.

The Final Judgment entered on May 23, 1995, against Mr. Keller does not
25
26 meet the first two criteria:

27
28
---
No facts were fully and fairly litigated in the Insurance Departments

1992 Action No. 92-14679. The case did not go to trial before either a jury
12
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or a judge. Defendant Keller was never deposed nor did he provide any
other evidence in the case. (SUF Nos. 25-26 at 4:21-24.)
---
The Final Judgment against Mr. Keller was entered as a result of a
Settlement Agreement entered into in the weeks preceding the trial date
of May 23, 1995, between Mr. Keller and the attorney representing the
Insurance Department Receiver. That Settlement Agreement specifically
states:
THAT on March 22, 1995, it was FURTHER
8
9
AGREED that the parties hereto would execute a
10
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT reflecting the fact
11
that DEFENDANT denies any wrongdoing,
12
fraudulent conduct, and any other illegal activity,
13
and has executed the FINAL JUDGMENT only
14
because it is in his best interest to do so, and that,
15
notwithstanding Defendants denials, Plaintiff
16
maintains the allegations in its pleadings and has
17
decided to accept the final judgment because it is in
18
Plaintiffs best interest at this time. . . .
19
(SUF No. 34 at 6:1-18.)
20
---
The Final Judgment against Mr. Keller explicitly states in the last
21
sentence that, All relief not expressly herein granted is expressly
22
DENIED. [Emphasis in the original.]
23
Therefore, collateral estoppel prevents Plaintiff The Cadle Company from
24 using the May 23, 1995, Judgment to establish any of the allegation of fraud, breach of
25 fiduciary duty, defalcation, embezzlement or larceny against Mr. Keller in this adverse
26 proceeding.
27
28 .
D.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR DETERMINING RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE:

The Cadle Companys rights to collect on the Judgment assigned to it by the
13
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1 Texas Department of Insurance are only as good as the rights the Department had to collect the
2 original judgment against Mr. Keller. Texas law has been clear for over a hundred years that
3 the assignee of a judgment takes just such interest as the assignor had and subject to such
4 defenses, legal and equitable, as existed against it in the hands of the assignor. McManus, et al.,
5 v. Cash & Luckel, No. 1760 decided January 8, 1908, Texas Supreme Court Reporter (1908)
6 Vol. 101.
Thus, The Cadle Company has no greater rights now to directly sue Defendant
7 Keller for fraud, false pretenses, false representations, defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
8 capacity, embezzlement or larceny than the Texas Department of Insurance would now have
9 had it retained the Judgment.)
10
E.
THE CADLE COMPANYS PRESENT ACTION FOR NON-
11 DISCHARGEABILITY IS BARRED BY THE TEXAS STATUE OF LIMITATIONS.:

12
The Texas Statute of Limitations on civil actions is found in its Civil Practice
13 and Remedies Code, Title 2, Chapter 16, entitled, Limitations. Section 16.004(a)(3), (4) and
14 (5) provide that a suit must be brought not later than four years after the day the cause of
15 action accrues on debt, fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, respectively. Section 16.003(a)
16 provides a two-year statute of limitations on acts of conversion of property.
17
In Texas, as in most other states, a cause of action for fraud or breach of
18 fiduciary duty accrues when the fraud or breach is discovered, or could have been discovered
19 through reasonable diligence. (See Computer Associates Intern. v. Altai, 918 S.W.2d 453,
20 455456 (Tex. 1994); Ruebeck v. Hunt, 142 Tex. 167, 176 S.W.2d 738, 739 (1943); Woods v.
21 William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1988).)
22
Mr. Keller severed his ties with American Guardian in 1989. The Receiver
23 for the Texas Department of Insurance began its investigation into the activities of American
24 Guardian in 1990 and filed its Original Petition in Travis County Action No. 92-14679 on
25 October, 1992, alleging many acts of breach of fiduciary duty and fraud against all of the dozen
26 or so defendants named in its action, including Mr. Keller. Thus, for the Texas Department of
27 Insurance, the four-year statute of limitations for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against
28 Mr. Keller for acts he may have done while associated with American Guardian began to run, at
14
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1 the latest, during the Departments two-year investigation of American Guardian from 1990 to
rd
2 October, 1992, when it filed Action No. 92-14679 in the 53 District Court of Travis County,
3 Texas. The statute of limitations for suits against Mr. Keller by the Texas Insurance
4 Department would, therefore, have expired, at the latest, on or before October 18, 1996
5 more than 16 years ago. Any rights that assignee The Cadle Company, had to bring a
6 new action for fraud, defalcation, embezzlement or larceny against Mr. Keller likewise
7 expired on or before October 18, 1996.
8
CONCLUSION
10
Any direct cause of action for non-dischargeability of debt by The Cadle Company
11 against Robert Keller is barred by the four-year Texas Statute of Limitations on actions for
12 fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, which expired , at the latest, on October 18, 1996.
13
The principle of res judicata does not apply in bankruptcy cases.
14
The principle of collateral estoppel does not apply to save Plaintiff, either, since the
15 issues of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, defalcation, embezzlement and larceny were never
16 litigated at all in the Texas Insurance Departments action against Mr. Keller. Instead, the Final
17 Judgment entered in that action against Mr. Keller was part of a Settlement Agreement between
18 him and the Department which expressly stated that Defendant Keller admitted no wrongdoing,
19 and the Final Judgment expressly limits its effect to only those matters stated on its face.
20
Therefore, Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant Keller on all issues raised in
21 Plaintiffs Complaint is just and proper at this time.

22 DATED: December 3, 2012.
23
24
/s/ Patricia Hadfield

PATRICIA WILSON HADFIELD NV Bar No. 10890
Bankruptcy Law Group
Attorneys for Debtor/Defendant Robert Keller
25
26
27
28
15
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 10
1
probably should administer the oath to Judge Beesley.
2
3
MR. KING:
will administer you the oath.
4
5
MR. COUGHLIN:
BRUCE BEESLEY
Having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:
8
9
I'm going to object on
relevancy grounds.
6
7
Judge Beesley, the court reporter
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KING:
10
Judge Beesley, can you explain to the panel
11
your knowledge in this relevant time frame 2011-2012
12
regarding Mr. Coughlin and his conduct in your court?
13
Mr. Coughlin appeared in my court a couple of
14
times, at least two or three times.
15
recall him coming to my court he came in, he was wearing,
16
I think, a T-shirt and a tie, and no jacket.
17
indicated that he had been evicted from his residence or
18
his office, indicating it was not because of not paying
19
the rent, and that that was why he wasn't what I would
20
consider appropriately dressed.
21
I apologize.
The first time I
And he
I don't have my letter in front
22
of me.
But my recollection is that he had filed a
23
pleading on behalf of his client in regard to some aspect
24
of a bankruptcy case, and that the pleading was lengthy,
25
didn't make any sense, and just sort of rambled through a
1380
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 11
1
great deal of irrelevant stuff.
I had him a couple other times in my court and
had the same experience, that -- he was dressed
appropriately the other times I had him there, and he was
very polite and appeared to be a very intelligent man.
But his pleadings didn't make any sense.
His
arguments didn't make any sense.
that he was suffering from alcohol or drug abuse or had
some sort of mental issues which were preventing him from
10
And I became concerned
being able to represent his client.
11
I talked to -- I made some inquiries of the
12
court and State Bar if there was anything -- the federal
13
court first, if there was anything that I had authority to
14
do to try and get Mr. Coughlin some help and learned that
15
I could not.
16
17
18
I then talked to, I think I talked to Coe

Swobe, who is Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers -MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection.
Relevancy.
This
19
wasn't noticed either or -- no -- or mentioned in the
20
DOSEAL, which you didn't serve appropriately, and you're
21
violating SCR 102 -- 1052(c).
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
THE WITNESS:
Overruled.
I talked to Mr. Swobe who
24
indicated that the State Bar did have some services
25
available, and that he had been in contact with
1381
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 12
1
Mr. Coughlin.
That's really all he told me.
And it became apparent to me that over a
period of a couple months at least and I also learned of
some other odd behavior in some of the courts with judges
that I knew.
MR. COUGHLIN:
THE WITNESS:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection.
Hearsay.
But based on -Objection.
Can I get a ruling
on my objection before you continue testifying?
10
MR. KING:
I'm going to ask the chairman to
11
direct Mr. Coughlin not to shout or make speaking
12
objections.
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm going to do that.
You
14
can do it -- I appreciate being able to be heard, but we
15
can do it at a lower level, Mr. Coughlin.
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You didn't seem to hear me.

Madam Reporter, would you
18
please read back the answer to which Mr. Coughlin was
19
objecting.
20
(Record read by the reporter.)
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
Mr. King?
23
MR. KING:
The objection is hearsay.
The judge was just about to testify
24
as to the action he took based on the information he
25
received, and that is the purpose of the information is to
1382
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 13
1
show why he took the action he did.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. KING:
THE WITNESS:
Overruled.
Thank you, Judge.

I'm not quite sure where I was
in my testimony, but based on the discussions I had, and
the information I got from other people, it became
apparent to me that there wasn't a program that was going
to --
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
MR. KING:
Objection.
Foundation.
Mr. King?
The testimony is clear.
He's
12
explaining the actions he took relative to Mr. Coughlin's
13
conduct, which is the purpose.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
He was specifying -Mr. Coughlin.

-- no foundation for what he
was asserting.
19
20
Overruled.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, I've overruled
your objection.
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
24
25
Yes, sir.
Please proceed, Judge.
BY MR. KING:
Q
I apologize, your Honor, for the interruption.
But you were just about to testify as to what action you
1383
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 14
1
took with respect to the information you learned.
What I did was I wrote a letter to the State
Bar explaining what had occurred with Mr. Coughlin,
indicating, I believe, that I thought that in his current
state he was not able to represent his clients adequately,
and that the State Bar should look into it.
was the extent of what I did in summary.
BY MR. KING:
I think that
Based on your actual personal knowledge of
10
Mr. Coughlin, would you believe that he has violated
11
Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct?
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
Objection.
Calls for an expert
opinion.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me.
Overruled.
I said objection, Pat.

Mr. Coughlin.
17
You do not need to yell in this proceeding.
18
Settle down.
BY MR. KING:
19
Would you be of the opinion --
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
24
25
judge?
I said objection, Pat.

Mr. Coughlin.
Can we get a ruling from the
Can we have some due process here, Pat?

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, do not raise
your voice again in this proceeding.
1384
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 15
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
If this is a proceeding, it
needs to be handled like a proceeding according to the
rules of evidence.
4
5
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That's true.
we're doing.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
12
No, it's not.

And I'm going to overrule
your objection.
9
10
And that's what
Please proceed.
BY MR. KING:
Q
Have you formed an opinion, your Honor, as to
whether or not Mr. Coughlin is competent to practice law?
13
Yes.
14
And what is that opinion?
15
I don't believe he is, unfortunately.
16
17
18
MR. KING:
further questions.
Thank you very much.
I have no
I really appreciate your time.
The panel in these settings may ask you
19
questions or they may have questions for you, as well as,
20
I suspect, Mr. Coughlin.
21
22
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, do you have any
cross-examination?
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
24
25
1385
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 16
1
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Good morning, Judge Beesley, your Honor.
Morning.
I'm sorry to hear you feel that way about me,
sir, but I would like to ask you a few questions.
Certainly.
I would bet that your statements are made out
of concern.
10
They are.
11
So I appreciate that, sir.
And I don't mean
12
for my reactions this morning to indicate anything other
13
than a complete and utter lack -- a complete and utter
14
respect for you, sir.
15
I don't take it any other way.
16
Thank you, sir.
But it's out of a profound
17
respect for the law and due process that I'm acting the
18
way I am.
19
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you have a question,
Mr. Coughlin?
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
23
Yes, I do.
24
25
Did you have Karen Sabo as a member of your
firm at one point?

A
Yes, I did.
1386
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 17
1
2
Can you describe any connection between myself
and Karen Sabo that you might be aware of?
I'm not aware of any.
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Objection.
Relevance.
The relevance, Mr. Coughlin?

I couldn't hear the judge, sir.
I'm asking you the relevance
of that question.
MR. COUGHLIN:
But to the extent that the
10
judge's speaker is right next to Mr. King, I believe it's
11
affording him an impermissible advantage.
12
what the judge just said.
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I couldn't hear
Doesn't matter.
You asked a
14
question about was Judge Beesley aware of any relationship
15
between you and this lady.
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
objected on relevance.
19
Yes.
Just for --
Wait a minute.
Mr. King
Your proffer of relevancy?
MR. COUGHLIN:
Well, sir, if I can just
20
preserve for the record.
You said that if Mr. King is
21
obtaining an impermissible advantage it doesn't matter to
22
you.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I didn't say that.

That's what I heard.
Please address the issue at
1387
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 18
1
hand.
What is the relevancy of your relationship with
this former lawyer and Mr. Beesley's law firm?
pausing on that --
MR. COUGHLIN:
federal judge, sir.
You're
Because this is a respected
organization right now.
7
8
MR. KING:
But I am suing Ms. Sabo's
I would object on the ground that
it goes beyond the scope of direct.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
The relevancy of that?

His objection is relevant.
11
response, with all due respect to the Honorable Judge
12
My
Beesley, it goes somewhat to witness bias.
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, the issue is
14
very narrow.
15
your relationship with this Ms. Sabo?
16
relevant to the issues in this proceeding?
17
The question is what is the relevancy of
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
Beesley's testimony.
19
How is that
I believe it bears on Judge
I don't know quite the extent to
which --
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. KING:
Objection sustained.
For the record, the judge did
22
answer.
23
not aware of any such relationship.
24
25
And for Mr. Coughlin's benefit, he said he was
Did I mischaracterize your testimony, your

Honor?
1388
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 19
1
THE WITNESS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Next question, please.

Can I clarify?
He wasn't aware
of any such relationship meaning?
5
6
That's what I said.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, please address
another issue.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes,
sir.
A basis for conflict.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
10
11
Judge Beesley, did you testify on behalf of
Stephen R. Harris recently?
12
MR. KING:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
Objection.
The relevance, Mr. Coughlin?

I didn't hear Judge Beesley
again.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
Relevance.
That doesn't matter.

It doesn't matter that Pat can
hear him, but I can't hear him?
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No.
I can't hear the judge
20
either, because you interrupted him.
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
Yes.
There's an objection as
to relevancy as to whether or not what relevancy --
24
25
Just now?
MR. COUGHLIN:
I objected.
I didn't interrupt
him.
1389
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 20
1
2
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
relevancy.
3
4
I asked you to explain the
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
I'm trying to
remember the question.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The question was did he
testify on behalf of Mr. Harris.
issue in this proceeding?
MR. COUGHLIN:
The relevance of that
Well, I think it provides a
basis for me comparing Judge Beesley's response to me
10
being evicted to his response to Mr. Harris's issues.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
sustained.
13
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
14
Overruled -- I'm sorry,
Next question, please.
Judge Beesley, what in particular did you
15
notice about my work product -- when did you first contact
16
Mr. King about me?
17
When did I first contact who?
18
Mr. King.
19
I don't know that I ever contacted Mr. King.
Bar counsel for the State Bar.
20
I sent a letter to the State Bar.
21
addressed to Mr. Clark, but I'm not positive.
22
23
24
25
I think it was probably
So I'm sorry for that, your Honor.
I do
recall you saying you sent a letter now.

Did you ever speak with Bar counsel Patrick
King with regard to me?
1390
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 21
1
The only time I recall speaking to him was a
few weeks ago or a few days -- probably a few weeks ago
when he asked me if I would be able to testify at this
hearing.
Are you aware of any extent to which Mr. King
has violated SCR 121's confidentiality dictates by
contacting my clients prior to any SCR 11 petition?
8
9
10
Hold on one second.
Go ahead.
I'm sorry.
I aware that Mr. King violated a particular statute?
Am
In
what manner?
11
Whether or not he violated one?
12
No, I'm not, one way or the other.
13
Do you have knowledge of there being a motive
14
for Mr. King to all of a sudden seek to bring you into
15
this forum in that he has been subject to an accusation
16
setting forth a basis for this proceeding that relies
17
primarily upon some contention that you or -- I believe
18
you yourself, your Honor, because you're the only
19
bankruptcy judge I appeared before -- but Mr. King telling
20
his boss and, apparently, at least one of my clients prior
21
to my being suspended or even the petition being filed,
22
that your court had issued an order preventing me from
23
practicing there?
24
25
I have no idea what Mr. King may or may not
have said to anybody.
But I do not recall issuing an
1391
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 22
1
order that said you couldn't practice there.
2
3
So can I take that to mean you haven't issued
any such order?
I don't think so.
I sign probably 150 orders
every day.
certainly I would have remembered a case not allowing you
to practice there.
because I was concerned that you weren't able to represent
your clients adequately, and they were being hurt.
10
So I don't remember all of them.
I think
But if I did, it would have been
But I
don't know that I did that.
11
What review did you undertake of my work
12
product and filings in your court to come to your
13
opinions?
14
I looked through two or three pleadings that
15
you had filed in, I think you had one or perhaps two
16
cases, and read them.
17
court.
And I observed you arguing in
18
When specifically?
19
I don't recall.
20
Was your testimony earlier today that the
21
first time you recall being aware of me was when I
22
appeared at the March 15th hearing in Cado Company v.
23
Keller at 2:30 P.M. shortly after being evicted at
24
gunpoint by the Washoe County Sheriffs --
25
I actually think you had appeared in front of
1392
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 23
1
me one time before that.
recollection of you appearing in front of me.
3
4
5
But that was my first strong
And it was that brief interaction whereupon
you formed your opinion that I wasn't fit to practice?

No.
I thought it was odd, but I do understand
that people have adversity in their lives sometimes, which
happens --
8
9
You took it to be adversity rather than
misconduct by the sheriff?
10
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted
the witness.
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes.
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
THE WITNESS:
Go ahead, Judge.
And I believe that you had filed
15
some pleading in that case.
16
and they frankly didn't make any sense.
17
subsequently filed pleadings in other cases which also
18
didn't make any sense, and I became concerned.
19
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
20
21
22
25
And I think you
At what point did you -MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me, Mr. Coughlin.
Quit interrupting the witness.
23
24
And I went to the pleadings,
MR. COUGHLIN:
I thought he was done, sir.
I'm sorry.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Go ahead, Judge.
1393
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 24
1
THE WITNESS:
I became concerned, and I
undertook further inquiry with Mr. Swobe following that.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
5
6
Your Honor, I would like to narrow it down.
When did you first contact the State Bar about me?
A
I don't recall.
I actually contacted Coe
Swobe who works for the State Bar, but is independent of
them in most ways.
When did you first contact Mr. Swobe?
10
I think it was perhaps a month or six weeks
11
after my first recollection of you appearing, my first
12
recollection of you appearing in front of me after you had
13
been evicted.
14
15
incident?
16
Yes.
17
With a suit jacket on though?
18
Yeah.
19
20
You would be referring to the T-shirt and tie
And your apology was satisfactory,
although I thought your appearance was odd.

Q
Do you recall a hearing prior to that in that
21
same Cado Company v. Keller wherein Cado sought to amend
22
their adversary proceeding charges, and there was maybe a
23
five- to ten-minute hearing on that incident to which I
24
submitted about a 15-page motion addressing the salient
25
points of law in that setting?
1394
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 25
1
I cannot place it in the context of that case.
But I do remember you submitting a motion describing some
points of law on something, and I didn't think that that
was competent work, frankly.
You're referring to which motion?
I don't know.
front of me.
8
9
10
I don't have any motion in
So you have a fairly strong opinion on it, yet
you don't recall any specifics.
Would that be an accurate
assessment of your testimony?
11
What I recall is that your appearance in court
12
was odd, and your pleadings were not truly comprehensible,
13
and that and further inquires made me concerned that you
14
were having some difficulties that prevented you from
15
serving your client appropriately.
16
Did you find any of my work competent?
17
I don't believe I did.
18
Not a single filing?
19
MR. KING:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
Argumentative.
Sustained.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
22
Objection.
23
school class, and a National Merit finalist?
24
25
Sir, are you aware I was ranked 10th in my law
MR. KING:
Objection.
Beyond the scope of
direct.
1395
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 26
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
He testified as to my
competency and my credibility as a lawyer and a
professional.
4
5
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
what time frame?
6
7
Your question had to do with
MR. COUGHLIN:
It has to do with my
capabilities.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
11
In law school?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
In life.
specific event.
But you asked about a
Did that occur in law school?
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
What event?
The merit scholar thing.
No.
That's a standardized
15
test.
The top half of one percent of all high school
16
juniors are selected as national merit finalists.
17
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You're inquiring about a high
school test?
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm inquiring about the judge's
20
representation that he hasn't found one filing of mine
21
competent.
22
believe it goes to this judge's credibility, frankly.
23
And the reason I'm going into that is I
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
Next question,
please.
25
Sustained.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
1396
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 27
1
Your Honor, I'd like to narrow down some of
these assessments you've made vis-a-vis when they
occurred.
Unless you can show me the document, I don't
think I can help you with that.
But you've testified pretty definitively here
today.
So wouldn't that indicate some negligence on your
behalf in that regard?
MR. KING:
10
Objection.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
Sustained.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
12
Argumentative.
Your Honor, do you have any specific points of
13
law or issues with which you can elucidate why you
14
question my competency to practice in your court?
15
MR. KING:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
Asked and answered.
Sustained.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
18
Objection.
19
20
Do you recall any of my work product in Cado
and Company?
A
Not specifically, no.
I remember a fairly
21
lengthy brief that you filed which, I think, was that
22
case, that I thought was rambling, addressing points of
23
law which weren't relevant.
24
of historical matters and some discussions of perhaps
25
constitutional law, but it wasn't really relevant to the
I think had some discussions
1397
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 28
1
matter that was in front of me.
MR. KING:
Mr. Chairman, if you could be
mindful of the fact that the judge has a hearing he needs
to attend, and advise Mr. Coughlin that he needs to be
judicious in his questions.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We have issued an order,
Mr. Coughlin, that limits the examination of witnesses on
each side to 15 minutes.
minutes.
10
this up.
11
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
12
You have slightly exceeded 15
If you have a few more questions to rapidly wrap
Your Honor, on Cado Company, wouldn't it
13
indicate a fairly high level of skill, particularly for
14
one who hadn't been practicing in a bankruptcy setting for
15
very long at all for, one, to deduce that in that case
16
Cado had issues with respect to the fact that they had not
17
renewed a dormant foreign judgment in that under the Texas
18
statute at issue, given the fact that the judgment was
19
over ten years old, and within the two years under the
20
statute within which they had to take some act to revive a
21
dormant judgment, they failed to do so.
22
that I pointed that out in a brief, and specifically cited
23
to relevant legal research with respect to what particular
24
acts would qualify as reviving a dormant judgment in that
25
respect, wouldn't that indicate some level of competency?
Wouldn't the fact
1398
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 29
1
I did not ever say that I did not think you
are highly intelligent.
intelligence and legal competence are not the same thing.
I think you have a significant lack of ability to focus on
the issues at hand, but you're very smart.
I think you are.
But
If I pointed out, which I believe I did in
that case, that Cado, by having a vice president file an
affidavit seeking to register a foreign judgment, that
their doing so violated NRCP 11, in that a corporation
10
such as Cado is not entitled to appear pro se, to wit
11
through a vice president who is not an attorney, wouldn't
12
that evince some level of capability as an attorney
13
sufficient to avoid having a federal judge respond to
14
Mr. King's imploring him to badmouth me at a hearing?
15
MR. KING:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. KING:
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
Objection.
Argumentative.
Sustained.
Thank you.
I appreciable your time, your
Honor.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. KING:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
Thank you, Judge Beesley.
24
MR. KING:
25
No.
Anything further, Mr. King?

Any questions of the panel?
Any questions of the panel?
Appreciate your time this morning.
1399
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 30
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We took that testimony under
consideration of your objection.
objection, Mr. Coughlin.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Let's hear your
Yes, sir.
Well, I believe
Judge Beesley was identified in a supplement to
Mr. King's, I'll call it a DowSoE, and I hope the panel
will know what I mean, designation of witness's summary of
evidence.
I've shortened it in my filings.
Which, incidently, SCR 1052(c) is one of the
10
few procedural rules in the supreme court rules designed
11
to afford attorneys or suspended attorneys, such as
12
myself, some due process.
13
DowSoE be served in the same manner in which the complaint
14
is served upon the respondent by the panel with at least
15
30 days notice, or at least 30 days prior to the hearing.
16
That rule requires that the
This panel wasn't even empaneled until, I
17
believe the order was October 30th.
18
have sent the DowSoE himself rather than in some
19
separation in accord with the rule, but he sent it
20
himself.
21
that he sent a certified mail October 12th, and in that
22
way it's completely violative of the rules.
23
24
25
Mr. King purports to
On October 12th he filed material suggesting
Completely.
And Steve Harris, who the judge testified to,

who was -- he admitted to misappropriating 800K.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Harris is not the subject
1400
IN THE ORIGINAL 12/24/12 ROA, THE SBN DID NOT SERVE COUGHLIN A COPY
OF THE TRANSCRIPT. THE SBN THOUGHT COUGHLIN WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO
HEARING - 11/14/2012
AFFORD THE TRANSCRIPT. PAGES 31 AND 32 OF THE TRANSCRIPT ARE MISSING
FROM THE 2/13/13 ROA, such pages involved very key subjects Page 31
1
matter of this hearing.
You are.
MR. COUGHLIN:
He got David Grundy.
got his DowSoE sent by the panel.
days.
And he
And he got his full 30
And I sent that forward --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Harris.
I'm not concerned with
be testifying?
Did you get notice that Judge Beesley would
9
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
my records, but like a couple days before this hearing.

couple days.
11
12
Maybe -- I would like to check
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Was that a supplemental
designation?
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yeah.
Is that permitted?
I think it is permitted,
16
perhaps if something comes up out of the blue that's
17
really bearing, but Mr. King's known about this for quite
18
some time.
19
And, in fact, I've filed a complaint with, I
20
believe I included this in my complaint with State Bar
21
president Lardon -- I hope I'm saying that correctly --
22
under SCR, I want to say 104(3) in that I believe upon
23
information and belief that Mr. King contacted one of my
24
clients or maybe one of my clients contacted him in early
25
May --
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 32
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm focusing on your
objection to the testimony of Judge Beesley.
any prejudice because of that?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you claim
Yes.
What is that prejudice?
Lack of notice.
How does the lack of notice
lead to prejudice?
cases that appeared -- in which you appeared in front of
10
You seem to be very familiar with
Judge Beesley.
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
I wasn't.
I wasn't as sharp on
12
that Cado stuff, because I didn't think I needed to be
13
this morning, and I could have been a lot sharper on that.
14
I really could have.
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm going to overrule the
16
objection.
I think the notice was sent.
17
aware that Judge Beesley would be testifying, and unless
18
the panel has any objection to Judge Beesley, would accept
19
that testimony.
20
Next witness, Mr. King.
21
MR. KING:
Mr. Coughlin was
22
If I could, I will ask that this
packet be marked for identification purposes as Exhibit 1.
23
(Exhibit 1 marked.)
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
record, Mr. King, what that packet is?
Could you describe for the
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 33
1
MR. KING:
This is the formal hearing packet.
It was provided to each member of the panel.
It is
identified as the Zachary B. Coughlin formal hearing.
has the grievance numbers and the date of November 14th,
2012, beginning at 8:45.
showing the contents, and within the packet it includes
some of the applicable Nevada Rules of Professional
Conduct that the panel may find relevant to this case.
addition, a copy of the complaint and the notice of the
It
It has an index on the front
10
hearing, as well as a motion filed by Mr. Coughlin, as
11
In
well as the first designation of hearing panel members.
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. KING:
15
Fraudulent return of service.

So I would ask that this be
admitted as Exhibit No. 1.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
Mr. Coughlin, any objection?

I would object based on the
18
fact that Mr. King's violating NRCP 11.
19
returns of service are fraudulent.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
That he knows what?

He knows the returns -- that
he's submitting that is fraudulent.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
And he knows the
How so?
Because one, the notice of the
hearing, he's attached a certified mailing that says it
1401
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 34
1
was mailed out on the 12th.
confirm on the USPS Website, it says the first time it was
scanned into their service was the 16th.
I didn't get it until the 27th.
couldn't have gotten it -- the soonest I could have gotten
it was the 22nd, through no fault of my own.
Well, if you do a tracking
Further, it says
Further, it says I
Now, that might have been due to, one, it
didn't get into the system until the 16th, and I can
testify to that in some respect.
But even beyond that, it
10
didn't get into my mailbox or become available to me,
11
according to the USPS tracking confirm Website, because it
12
gets that specific, until the 22nd.
13
Now, we're speaking about the notice of the
14
hearing, which is also, according to SCR 1052(c), supposed
15
to include the DowSoE.
16
sent by the panel.
17
is supposed to be in accordance with SCR 109, is supposed
18
to be such that the hearing, I would be served notice of
19
the hearing in the DowSoE no less than 30 days prior to
20
the hearing.
21
And that is again supposed to be
And that service by the panel, which
Instead, Mr. King, which he's wont to do every
22
chance he gets, every chance Mr. King gets, he wants to
23
play the director.
24
he's controlling the clerk of court here, he's, I believe,
25
controlling my clients and offering them attorneys --
And he's taking on the panel's role,
1402
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 35
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm interested in an
objection to Exhibit 1 being admitted, and your objection
is improper service?
4
5
MR. COUGHLIN:
That it's fraud.
Mr. King's
committing fraud by presenting that to the court.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Because of improper service?

Because of -- the State Bar has
represented to me, one, that the 823 purported certified
mailing would not be presented as a return of service.
10
And that's what he's doing here, he's presenting that as a
11
return of service to get around the fact that when I
12
appeared here on September 25th Mr. King pulled my jacket
13
for a hearing, for the hearing I'm supposed to get --
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
Let's focus on -I am.
But this is very
important.
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No, you're not, sir.
I'm
18
interested in what your objection is to the admission of
19
Exhibit 1.
20
conclusion.
You say it's fraud.
That's a broad
21
Is it fraud because of improper service?

MR. COUGHLIN:
It's fraud because he's seeking
22
to avoid what happened on the 25th.
23
what the State Bar told me.
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
on the 25th.
He's going against
I have no idea what happened
I'm interested in your explanation of fraud.
1403
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 36
1
I've asked you three times.
meaningful answer.
I've been unable to obtain a
I'm going to overrule your objection.
Mr. King.
(Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence.)
MR. KING:
court reporter, since it's the one that's been marked.
7
8
I will call my next witness, attorney Richard

Hill.
9
10
I'm going to hand this back to the
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Will he be appearing live,
Mr. King?
11
MR. KING:
Yes.
12
RICHARD HILL
13
having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:
14
DIRECT EXAMINATION
15
BY MR. KING:
16
Mr. Hill, you know me.
I'm Patrick King,
17
assistant Bar counsel representing the State Bar of Nevada
18
in a formal disciplinary hearing against Mr. Zach
19
Coughlin.
20
morning?
Did you understand that's why you're here this
21
Yes, sir.
22
Could you state your name and spell it for the
24
Richard Hill.
25
And could you explain to the panel how long
23
record.
H-I-L-L.
1404
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 37
1
you've been practicing law, and if you are in good
standing with the State Bar of Nevada?
3
4
I have been practicing for 33 years and am in
good standing.
Where is your office located?
652 Forest Street in Reno.
Did there come a time when you were involved
with a Zachary Coughlin?
Yes, sir.
10
And would you recognize Zachary Coughlin?
11
Yes, sir.
12
And is he in this room?
13
Yes.
14
And how did you first come into contact with
15
He's seated to my right.
Mr. Coughlin?
16
Well, I was hired by a Dr. Matthew Merliss.
17
My office was to remove a tenant from a home at 121 River
18
Rock in Reno.
19
with Mr. Coughlin for several months.
20
not paid any rent for, at that point I believe it was --
Dr. Merliss had been going back and forth
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
question.
24
25
Lack of foundation.
You didn't object to the
Overruled.
THE WITNESS:
gone on.
Objection.
Mr. Coughlin had
We got into looking at what had
And Mr. Coughlin had fabricated reasons why he
1405
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 38
1
shouldn't be paying rent, habitability claims.
off --
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
Objection.
We started
Relevancy.
Overruled.
We started off with, I believe
it was a rent.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Is he just testifying in the
narrative?
Is he going to sit here all day so I can't
object to anything because he isn't asking any questions?
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
He asked a question.
I don't even remember the
12
question, it was so long ago from the monolog Mr. Hill is
13
giving.
14
MR. KING:
15
would appreciate it.
16
I'll break it down if the chair
BY MR. KING:
17
18
Mr. Hill, was Dr. Merliss -- was Mr. Coughlin,
rather, was he the tenant that you were referring to?
19
Yes, sir.
20
And did you end up representing Dr. Merliss in
21
22
23
an eviction action?
A
My office did.
I assigned the case to my
associate at the time, Casey Baker.
24
Did you end up taking over that matter?
25
I have now, yes.
1406
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 39
1
And as a result of your dealings with
Mr. Coughlin, did you form an opinion as to his competency
to be a lawyer?
MR. COUGHLIN:
conclusion.
Objection.
Expert testimony.
Calls for a legal
is qualified.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
9
10
11
I don't believe Mr. Hill
Overruled.
Yes, I did.
BY MR. KING:
Q
And let's start with your conclusion, and then
work backwards.
Is Mr. Coughlin competent to be a lawyer?
12
No, he is not.
13
Could you describe to the panel in a
14
chronological manner some of the events that you have
15
personal knowledge of that exhibited this behavior that
16
formed your opinion?
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection.
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
THE WITNESS:
Relevancy.
Overruled.
I've read virtually everything
20
that Mr. Coughlin has filed, not only in the Department 7
21
eviction case, and before that the Reno Justice Court's
22
eviction case.
23
Nevada Supreme Court in that case, and I've read virtually
24
everything that he's done.
25
He's now got -- had two appeals to the
I've also followed the filings that he's had
1407
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 40
1
in his dealings with Washoe Legal Services.
followed the filings that he had in the supreme court
discipline matters.
And I've
And you see the same thing running through all
of his papers.
His filings are basically stream of
consciousness.
To say they are disrespectful to the Bar,
to the court, to the other litigants, to third parties is
an understatement.
happens is as the matter goes on, they tend to become
10
11
He uses a cut and paste so what
longer, because he just keeps filing the same stuff.

In the appeal -- we had recovered a $42,000
12
attorney's fee award against Mr. Coughlin for handling
13
just his appeal of the eviction.
14
documents that would have a caption on it that would
15
indicate that it was a motion under Rule 59, for example.
16
And you would get into it, and there would be no mention
17
in the body of Rule 59, there would be no analysis of Rule
18
59, but we would have to run down all of the little issues
19
that he would raise on the off chance that if you don't
20
respond to one, the district court judge is going to find
21
something that he thinks is important, and the client ends
22
up having an adverse result.
23
He would file these
$42,000 on a no-cause 30-day eviction, and
24
that's just for the appeal of it, is absolutely
25
astronomical.
But that should tell you -- I have provided
1408
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 41
1
Mr. King with a copy of Judge Flanagan's orders in which
he sets forth the reasons for such an extraordinary award,
being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the quality of the work
that he was filing.
We have subsequently asked and received an
order from Judge Flanagan designating Mr. Coughlin as a
vexatious litigator under Jordan versus DMV, and ruling
that we do not have to respond to anything he files in
that courtroom, absent a court order directing us to do
10
so.
11
At this point he has an appeal pending.
Two
12
appeals.
He appealed the attorney's fees awards, and that
13
was just dismissed last week because he didn't do anything
14
with it.
15
MR. KING:
16
question.
17
Mr. Hill, let me ask another
BY MR. KING:
18
19
Did you end up getting an eviction order
removing Mr. Coughlin from Dr. Merliss's home?
20
We did.
21
Subsequent to the eviction order, was
22
23
Mr. Coughlin removed from the home?

A
I'm sorry.
There was an order issued in court
24
that gave Mr. Coughlin a week to vacate.
I believe it was
25
November 1 that my wife, my associate -- and my associate,
1409
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 42
1
went to the home with the sheriff and conducted a lockout.
The front door locks were changed.
were changed.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
videotaped.
The back door locks
Objection.
Excuse me.
Objection what?
Hearsay.
Hearsay?
Overruled.
And the whole thing was
The next day I went to the home to videotape
10
the place to preserve what was there to prevent any
11
arguments later, because by that point in time we knew
12
what we were dealing with.
13
I get there, and the front door is locked, but
14
almost all the windows are closed but unlocked, and the
15
back door is unlocked.
16
everything, make sure the place is secure, videotaped it.
17
And I went back and read my wife and my associate the riot
18
act, and they both said no, the doors were locked.
19
And I, of course, go through, lock
I go back the next day, same thing.
20
door's unlocked, windows are unlocked.
21
Okay.
Back
the next two weeks.
22
This continues for
Mr. Coughlin is sending out e-mails to us but
23
will not, apparently, read the e-mails we're sending to
24
him saying we have to get your stuff out of here.
25
response.
No
1410
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 43
1
Two weeks after the eviction on a Sunday
Dr. Merliss comes to town and says, I want to see the
house.
morning at the house.
There's food wrappers on the counter that've been there
that weren't there the last time I was in.
open again, and it's a very exacerbating situation.
I meet him about 10:30, 11:00 o'clock on a Sunday
8
9
We go in.
Back door is open.
Windows are
And he says, I want to check the basement.

didn't know there was a basement in the house.
There's
10
things piled in the stairwell to get down into the
11
basement, tool kits, and heavy stuff.
12
We get it out of the way.
We get down there.
13
And I can see when he pushes on the door, and he turns to
14
me, and he says, "It's barricaded," from the inside.
15
wasn't locked, it was barricaded.
16
We know what's going on.
So we call the
17
police.
18
of the basement, whoever was in there at that point.
19
police bang on the door, "Come on out, Zach.
20
have to go."
21
we're going to leave.
22
have the authority to break the door down.
23
that."
24
25
The police come over.
It
No response.
They try to get Zach out
Police.
The
You
They turned to us and say,
Wait a minute.
I'm the owner.
You
"We don't do
So Dr. Merliss goes down to the bottom of the

stairs.
Dr. Merliss kicks the door open, and the police
1411
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 44
1
officer sticks his head around the corner and pulls his
gun out, and here's Mr. Coughlin down there.
voluntarily came upstairs with his dog and was placed
under arrest.
After he left, we went downstairs.
Mr. Coughlin had a dwelling set up.
food.
set up down there.
dog poop.
10
He had water.
He had
He had a hot plate, a microwave, had his computer

He had the dog.
There was dog food,
He had a bed and his computer system set up
down there.
11
12
Mr. Coughlin
He was arrested and was subsequently convicted

of criminal trespass.
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection.
Relevancy.
14
testifying about trespass, that's one thing.
15
If he's
testifying about a lot of stuff beyond trespass.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
THE WITNESS:
18
But he's
Overruled.
If I may.
One more thing about
the basement.
19
When we ultimately got down into the basement
20
to remove his possessions, I counted 14 automobile seats
21
down in the basement, including one that was identified to
22
me as being the front bench seat out of a Blazer.
23
backyard --
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
Relevancy.
25
The
I've been hearing
you talk about a Blazer for months --
1412
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 45
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
(Exhibit 2 marked.)
Sustained.
-- where your -Sustained, Mr. Coughlin.
BY MR. KING:
Mr. Hill, do you recognize that document?
This is the attorney's fees order from Judge
Flanagan.
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
11
I object, your Honor.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Wait a minute, Mr. Coughlin.
Wait.
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
There's a question, Mr. King?
14
MR. KING:
I asked Mr. Hill if this was
Yes.
15
the order that he was testifying about regarding the judge
16
ordering of sanctions of $40,000 in attorney's fees.
17
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you have an objection to
that question, Mr. Coughlin?
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
putting it into evidence.
21
object.
22
23
Well, sir, I thought he was
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
So I probably was too early to
That's why you interrupted
too early?
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yeah.
I'm sorry.
Mr. Hill.
1413
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 46
1
THE WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
This is the award
regarding attorney's fees in accordance with NRS 69, I
believe it's 050.
approximately $2500 in costs.
BY MR. KING:
6
7
There is also an order granting us
In this particular order at Page 2, is this
the order signed by Judge Flanagan?
Yes, sir.
What date did Judge Flanagan sign this order?
10
This is dated June 25th, 2012, and it bears a
11
12
file stamp of the same date.

Q
Could you read the paragraph regarding
13
"Merliss goes even further and states."
14
that paragraph on Page 2.
15
Beginning at line 4?
16
Line 9 on Page 2.
17
Okay.
Could you read
"Merliss goes even further and states:
18
As proven above and below, the frivolity and vexatiousness
19
of Coughlin's maintenance and extension of this matter has
20
been so beyond reason, and so outrageous, and the nexus of
21
his behavior to the fees incurred by Merliss so direct and
22
indisputable, that nothing less than a full award of those
23
fees should even be considered by the court.
24
impose the full measure of the harm Coughlin has caused
25
would reward and encourage his vexatiousness in this and
To not
1414
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 47
1
other cases.
Coughlin's antics."
There needs to be a day of reckoning for
In this order did Judge Flanagan accept that
by granting the full amount of fees requested?
read the last sentence of Page 3.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Yes.
If you
"Accordingly, Merliss's motion for
attorney's fees is granted in the sum of $42,065.50.

Q
Do you have personal knowledge of whether or
not, as the attorney for Dr. Merliss, whether or not that

award has been paid by Mr. Coughlin?
A
It has not.
MR. KING:
Mr. Chairman, we have provided you
13
with certified copies of each of these orders.
14
move that Exhibit No. 1 be admitted pursuant to the NRS
15
statute 52 --
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. KING:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
I would
Exhibit 1 has been admitted.
I'm sorry.
I meant Exhibit 2.
Any objection, Mr. Coughlin?

Your Honor, is it truly a
certified copy has been --
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
MR. KING:
That's what he's represented.

Is that true?
I have certified copies of all the
24
orders that are going to be admitted.
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't believe this was
1415
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 48
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
provided earlier.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you have an objection,
Mr. Coughlin?
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't believe it was noticed.
It wasn't included in the summary of evidence.

MR. KING:
If you take a look at the bottom
right-hand side.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Have you seen this order?

Yes, sir.
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
14
It's admitted.
I just didn't know it was for
this hearing.
MR. KING:
Your Honor, if you look at the
15
bottom right-hand side of any documents I present, you'll
16
see a Bates stamped number.
17
copied at the State Bar's expense, and Bates stamped and
18
provided to Mr. Coughlin to avoid any suggestion that he
19
didn't receive copies of these documents or know that I
20
intended to introduce them.
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The entire file was actually
I had earlier granted that
22
portion of Mr. Coughlin's motion to have access to the
23
State Bar file.
24
the State Bar files were copied, Bates stamped and
25
delivered to Mr. Coughlin?
And are you representing, Mr. King, that
1416
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 49
1
MR. KING:
Yes.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
In the lower right-hand
corner this document bears the Bates stamps 2975 to 2978.
And was this order included in the group of documents
delivered to Mr. Coughlin?
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, it was.
It's admitted.
Your Honor, may I respond to
that?
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
Sure.
The rule says I'm to have no
12
less than 30 days from service of the notice of the
13
hearing to inspect, up to within three days of the
14
hearing, these materials.
15
these materials for months, going all the way back to
16
March.
17
Mr. King refused to let me see
All of a sudden he's rigged this system so
18
that I don't get 30 days' notice of the hearing.
19
panel is coming into this hearing.
20
to prepare and inculcate themselves with an idea of what
21
this case is about.
22
about, I want to say about one of the $30 boxes, and I get
23
it on the 8th for a hearing that's on the 6th.
24
somehow --
25
The
Scant amount of days
And further, I get a big box of
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And that
The hearing is on the 14th,
1417
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 50
1
Mr. Coughlin.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm sorry.
Six days from the
8th.
That somehow complies with the rule?
was sent out on November 1st.
any access to inspect the file, inspect the docket from
November 1st to November 8th.
days, not the 30.
8
9
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And what I got
So I didn't get anything,
Further, I only got the six
Mr. Coughlin, as I view it,
you got more than access, you got copies.
Exhibit 2 is
admitted.
11
MR. KING:
Just for the record, I would also
12
like to respond to the suggestion that we didn't provide
13
Mr. Coughlin with these documents.
14
time we had these Bates stamped he had come to the State
15
Bar office many times.
16
the court proceedings for him at his request.
17
documents with the supreme court in terms of motions.
18
was served with copies of all of those, and those exhibits
19
were all attached.
20
Well in advance of the
I even made copies of the disks of

We filed
He
Furthermore, the orders that he's suggesting
21
shouldn't be admitted.
22
specifically from courts involving cases that he was
23
involved in.
24
25
These orders are orders
MR. COUGHLIN:
I got those, Pat.
I'm talking
about the stuff -- who is the --
1418
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 51
1
2
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We're talking about Exhibit 2
that's admitted.
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Thank you.
Proceed, Mr. King.
Who's the grievant?
Did I get
a look at that?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
order.
Mr. Coughlin, you're out of
BY MR. KING:
10
11
Mr. Hill, I appreciate your time today.
Thanks for your patience.
12
Was Mr. Coughlin, in his dealings with you as
13
an attorney, was he truthful or did he show candor in his
14
dealings with you as a lawyer?
15
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
can interject.
17
I'm sorry, your Honor.
If I
It's been well over 15 minutes.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
MR. KING:
Do you want to
wrap it up, Mr. King?
19
That's true.
20
Yes.
BY MR. KING:
21
With that said, did he show candor to you?
22
In our dealings with Mr. Coughlin, you could
23
not trust him at all.
24
Mr. Coughlin was honored by him.
25
No agreement ever made with
For example, when Judge Sferrazza ordered that
1419
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 52
1
Mr. Coughlin could have two days -- he was originally
given a week to move his stuff out before the eviction
order was served.
judge gave Mr. Coughlin two days to go in and remove his
possessions.
Thereafter there was a hearing.
The
Mr. Coughlin -- we went over there, opened the
doors about 8:00 o'clock.
He wasn't there.
About 11:00
o'clock we get an e-mail from Mr. Coughlin saying I have
appealed Judge Sferrazza's ruling.
That means his ruling
10
is stayed.
That means I can go back into the house.
11
staying in the house, and there's nothing you can do about
12
it.
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
THE WITNESS:
I'm
Objection, hearsay.
Overruled.
Sometime later that day we got
16
an order from Judge Sferrazza saying that the request for
17
a stay had been denied.
18
a whole day doing nothing trying to get his stuff out.
19
That was typical.
20
Mr. Coughlin had burned basically
He repeatedly has signed certificates of
21
mailing that he mailed thus and so to us.
We have never,
22
ever gotten anything by mail from Mr. Coughlin.
23
justice's court he would serve things that he didn't file.
24
He would file things that he didn't serve.
25
to call the clerk on an every other day basis to stay on
In the
We would have
1420
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 53
1
top of what was going on.
Finally, when we got in the district court, we
were able to use the e-flex system, and we were able to
keep track of what was going on.
BY MR. KING:
Let me restate the question.
The question is:
As an attorney, having a responsibility to be truthful and
to have candor with opposing counsel, was Mr. Coughlin
truthful, and did he use candor with you?
10
No.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. King, wrap it up, please.
12
You're limited to 15 minutes.
13
BY MR. KING:
14
15
Specifically relating to Mr. Coughlin's candor
to the court, did he show candor to the courts?
16
No.
17
In his demeanor --
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
MR. KING:
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
22
23
Objection.
Lack of foundation.
My last question.
Pretty damming statement to
have no foundation.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We
haven't heard the question yet to which you've objected.
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
The last one, whether I showed
25
candor to the court, and he said no.
1421
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 54
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
overruled.
You object to that one?
It's
BY MR. KING:
Go ahead.
With regard to a person perhaps -- to the
extent that Mr. Coughlin may have exhibited these bad
behaviors, was he otherwise kind in his dealings with you
and Dr. Merliss?
panel his actual demeanor with regard to his dealings with
you and your client?
10
Could you explain, just briefly, to the
His e-mails, his filings were abusive, to say
11
the least.
12
I'll admit we all had to retreat to the dictionary on that
13
one.
14
Police Department to have him arrested.
15
absolutely terrorized by this man.
Name calling.
16
17
18
Calling my -- he called my associate a lichen.
MR. KING:
He's accused me of bribing the Reno
Thank you.
My staff is
I have no further
questions.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, I'm going to
19
afford you extra time also for cross-examination.
20
it, the length of the direct, was due to lengthy
21
objections, and I have to take that into consideration.
22
So please proceed, and I will give you additional time.
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
Part of
Thanks, sir.
If you think you need it.
Yes.
1422
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 55
1
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Mr. Hill, did the Reno police identify
themselves as law enforcement prior to your client kicking
the door down on November 13th?
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
9
10
11
Objection.
Relevance.
Overruled.
I believe they did, sir.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q
Is that what you testified on June 18th in
your sworn testimony in the criminal trespass trial?
12
I believe it is.
13
Did you testify to that today?
14
I believe I just did.
15
Just now, but not earlier when you were
16
providing an answer to Mr. King, and you went through what
17
happened?
18
Mr. Coughlin, let me make it easy for you.
19
don't recall what I testified to on direct from Mr. King.
20
It is my clear recollection that before Dr. Merliss kicked
21
the door down in the basement, the police had identified
22
themselves loudly and clearly.
23
24
possible?
25
Can you describe that in as much detail as
MR. KING:
Objection.
Relevance.
1423
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 56
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The relevance, Mr. Coughlin,
as to your competency or candor, which are the two issues
raised?
4
5
MR. COUGHLIN:
was a criminal trespass, which I believe --
6
7
It goes to whether or not there
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You were convicted of
criminal trespass, true?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
I was.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Sustained.
But a conviction under
11
Claiborne is not something you're entitled to just say,
12
all right, conviction, and be done with it.
13
Further, I'm not offering it to prove whether
14
or not there was conviction.
15
Mr. Hill's credibility, which is severely impeached by
16
this in that he lied, and his client lied to get an arrest
17
made.
18
MR. KING:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
I'm offering it to impeach
Mr. Chairman, if I can respond?

That's been proven in my
filings.
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
Mr. King?
23
MR. KING:
This is totally beyond the scope of
24
the direct examination.
If he wants to call him back or
25
make it his case, but if the convictions of the criminal
1424
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 57
1
trespass and of the theft at Walmart, which will be coming
in, the appeals are exhausted.
as the supreme court has --
4
5
MR. COUGHLIN:
Why did we have testimony on
it?
6
7
Those are final decisions
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, you are going
to cease interrupting.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. KING:
Yes, sir.
To the extent that Mr. Coughlin
10
wants to refute the answers that Mr. Hill gave regarding
11
his demeanor or conduct, whatever.
12
to attempt to suggest that the arrest wasn't valid or that
13
he wasn't convicted, I would say it should be excluded.
14
Otherwise, we'll be retrying those cases here today, and
15
that's not the purpose of this hearing.
16
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
it.
Sir, I'm not trying to retry
I'm trying to impeach Mr. Hill's credibility.
18
19
To the extent he wants
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
To that extent I'll allow
that question.
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Thank you, sir.

But you better have some
22
evidence that -- if you are going to ask questions, they
23
better be based on fact.
24
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
They are.
They're based on
video.
1425
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 58
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you have a -- propose a
witness that will testify that the police did not identify
themselves?
4
5
MR. COUGHLIN:
I have a video of the
sergeant --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
Do you have a witness?

-- admitting to that.
Do you have a witness?
So you're telling me it has to
come in the form of a witness as evidence?
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
If you are intending to
12
impeach him on some facts, then I would require that you
13
make an offer of proof as to what witness will impeach
14
Mr. Hill.
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
I would like to show Mr. Hill a
16
video of Marsha Lopez, the sergeant with him that day,
17
admitting that Mr. Hill's account is wrong.
18
MR. KING:
I'm going to object to any video or
19
display of videos.
20
number one, they are irrelevant.
21
edits.
22
something didn't occur by showing an excerpt of a video.
23
It would be totally irrelevant and immaterial.
24
25
And the reason I will object is,

Number two, they're all
And number three, he's trying to show that
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'll address the
admissibility of the video when that appears.
1426
pages 59 and 60 are missing from the 2/13/13 ROA filed by the SBN
as well, and such reveals a key difference between the way Judge
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Beesley was allegedly sworn for his telephonic testimony compared to
Page 59
how Judge Holmes was
for her own telephonic testimony.
1
Right now Mr. Coughlin has asked Mr. Hill
whether the police identified himself.
they have.
have impeachment testimony that's admissible, when you
offer it --
6
7
10
11
12
I think you've laid the groundwork.
MR. COUGHLIN:
If you
I'll ask a more clarifying
question.
8
9
Mr. Hill said that
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Please proceed to another
subject.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q
So when they identified themselves, how long
between identifying themselves and kicking the door down?
13
Three minutes.
Two or three minutes.
14
Which one of them identified themself?
15
I believe there was a lady sergeant, and there
16
was a male officer.
17
on the door with his nightstick and identified himself as
18
being with the police.
19
on out, Zach.
20
21
And I believe he's the one who banged
And I believe his words were, come
Was that it, come out Zach?
Does that
identify it as being the police?
22
He identified himself as being with the Reno
23
Police Department.
24
In what words?
25
I believe those were the words he used, sir.
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 60
1
What words?
This is the police, please come out Zach.
Because previously all you said was, come on
out Zach.
I believe you're mistaken, sir.
So you're saying that officer Chris Carter,
Junior, three minutes before the door was kicked in by
your client, banged on the door with his nightstick, and
said, this is the police.
Come on out, Zach?
10
Mr. Coughlin, three minutes is probably a long
11
estimate.
The process was we had cleared the stairwell --
12
Did he say, this is the police?
13
MR. KING:
Objection.
14
THE WITNESS:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Argumentative.
I believe he did, sir.

Excuse me.
16
going to go ahead and overrule.
17
Let me -- I'm
Go ahead.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
18
Did he say, this is the police?
19
I believe he did, sir.
20
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
now.
22
23
You've asked that three times
THE WITNESS:
At least.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
24
Did Sergeant Lopez, the female sergeant?
25
She may have, but I don't recall.
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 61
1
Did you have a video camera with you?
We had Dr. Merliss's phone.
Did you take 14 videos that you propounded to
the Reno city attorney that day?
MR. KING:
THE WITNESS:
We gave them what we had.
The
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Relevance.
number I don't recall.
Objection.
Was there some reason -- you seem to have
10
video of every moment of that day, except for this
11
announcing themselves as law enforcement.
12
you're testifying to right now?
13
Is that what
Mr. Coughlin --
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, the issue here
15
is whether or not you're competent to be an attorney and
16
should continue in the practice of law.
17
on a rather minor detail, and I would like you to focus on
18
the broader issues.
19
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
You're focusing
It's not just competency, it's
candor.
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
impeach him.
23
police identified themselves.
24
different.
25
laid the foundation.
You've indicated you want to
The issue is Mr. Hill has testified that the

You say something
I've asked you for an offer of proof.
You've
Let's proceed.
1427
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 62
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It also goes to -Please proceed, Mr. Coughlin.
You would do yourself some good if you will focus on the
issues, if you will.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Who served the eviction notice -- no.
How did
the eviction notice get from the justice court to the
sheriff's?
9
10
MR. KING:
Beyond the scope of
direct, and irrelevant.
11
12
Objection.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
sustain.
Let's address the issues --
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Can I make an offer of proof?

-- this panel has been asked
15
to look at.
16
properly in that residence building, the issue as to
17
whether you were trespassing has all been litigated.
18
That's not the function of this panel.
19
The issue as to whether or not you were
This panel is to determine, by supreme court
20
order, what, if any, punishment you should be subject to.
21
I'd like you to focus on that issue.
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
Please proceed.
Whether the punishment under
23
Claiborne is binding authority upon you entails more than
24
a cursory, receiving a certified conviction in the mail
25
from a clerk of court, and not undertaking any diligent
1428
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 63
1
inquiry in that regard.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You're focusing on some very
minor details as to who said what at the time -- do you
admit you were behind the barricaded door?
5
6
MR. COUGHLIN:
of proof, your Honor.
7
8
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Have you read anything I filed
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I've read quite a bit of it.
I'm not sure it helps you.
13
14
I'll give you
in this case?
11
12
Please do so.
two minutes.
9
10
I would like to make an offer
MR. COUGHLIN:
If that order was stale, it's
Mr. Hill --
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
What's the offer of proof?

It's that if I can demonstrate
17
that that order was stale, it would be Mr. Hill who was
18
trespassing, not me.
19
the sheriff has been very unhelpful in this regard.
20
Mr. Hill and his associate testified, perhaps to their
21
detriment, that the trespass trial as to when that lockout
22
order was --
23
24
25
And that entails finding out -- and
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You're testifying.
And
Tell me what the proof is.
MR. COUGHLIN:
The important thing is the law
1429
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 64
1
in Nevada says within 24 hours of the sheriff receiving
that eviction order they've got to do the lockout.
3
4
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
hasn't it?
That's all been litigated,
Didn't you raise these issues below?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
In which context?
In the trespass conviction.
Yes.
Okay.
Let's focus on the
issues here, which, as I understand it, are to focus on
10
what, if any, punishment you should be subject to with
11
respect to --
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
basement stuff have to do with that?
14
Richard Hill in a nutshell.
15
Hearsay.
16
rebut it, and this is not the issue, it's not relevant.
17
Nothing he says is relevant.
18
What's all this living in the
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
relevant.
20
This is
Prejudicial nonsense.
Character assassination.
19
Jesus.
And then you try to
I didn't say that.
Your conviction is relevant.
It is
relitigate --
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
You're trying to
He's talking about slippers -I'm sorry.
I shouldn't
keeping talking while you're trying to interrupt.
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:

Go ahead.
Interrupt.
1430
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 65
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm sorry.
Do you have another question
to Mr. Hill?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:

to Mr. Hill?
MR. COUGHLIN:
You had some direction to me,
and I wish I would have listened to it.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
for Mr. Hill?
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, I do.
I don't know if you
12
are going to find it relevant, your Honor, and I don't
13
want to upset you.
14
issues here with respect to what he's testified to on
15
direct, I imagine.
16
doesn't have candor.
17
time I try to rebut that, well, there's a conviction.
18
That's been proven.
19
conviction.
20
I'm offering it to go to the extent he's saying there is
21
not candor.
22
23
24
25
You're telling me to focus on relevant
He's made some general -- no, he

I guess I can -- it seems like every
I'm not offering it to undo the
I have motion for a new trial and all that.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
for Mr. Hill?

MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
1431
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 66
1
Who got the order to the sheriff, and when and
I have no idea.
understanding --
how?
MR. KING:
THE WITNESS:
I can tell you that it is my
Could you speak up, please.

It is my general understanding
from having done a few evictions that that is handled by
the court staff.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
10
11
12
Did Mr. Baker testify that he had met with the
sheriff on the 28th?

A
I don't know the date.
I presume you're
13
referring to the eviction, the date on which the
14
eviction -- the eviction order was unusual in that it gave
15
you until 5:00 o'clock on a particular day to vacate.
16
The sheriff -- we tried to get him to show up
17
at 5:01, and they weren't going to do that.
18
the next day when Mr. Baker and my wife met with the
19
sheriff's personnel at the property, changed the locks,
20
and posted the lockout order in standard operating
21
procedure for every eviction I've ever done in Washoe
22
County, Nevada.
23
24
25
And it was
Did I ever accuse you of taking bribes or the
police of taking bribes from you?

A
You have made that statement on numerous
1432
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 67
1
occasions in papers that you have filed with various
courts.
As I sit here right now, I don't know that you -Q
4
5
Would it be more accurate -MR. ECHEVERRIA:
question.
Mr. Coughlin, you asked a
Let the witness finish the answer.

THE WITNESS:
You've made the statement
numerous times in filings in district court and in the
supreme court.
specific incident when you verbally made that statement to
I do not, as I sit here today, recall a
10
me, although it is entirely possible.
11
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
12
13
Is it more accurate to say that in my filings
I quoted Officer Carter?
14
There have been --
15
As to what he said exactly?
16
There have been instances when you have
17
couched that accusation in terms of purporting to quote, I
18
think it was Carter.
19
where you have directly, without couching it as quoting
20
Carter, made that accusation against me, sir.
21
22
23
24
25
Where?
However, there have been instances
Specifically when?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Are you asking him to tell
you when you made some allegations?

MR. COUGHLIN:
When I did anything other than
attribute a quote to an officer.
1433
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 68
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm going to overrule that.
Do you have an offer of proof?
assertion that Mr. Hill bribed the police officer?
you made that assertion?
5
6
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't believe I've ever done
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Have you made that assertion,
sir?
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
11
Have
anything --
7
8
Did you make that
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I don't believe I have.

You just asked him.
And your
question, you implied --
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
Because he's saying that.
And
13
I think there is a difference between repeating a quote
14
from an officer and making an accusation.
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You may find the distinction.
16
I don't know that others would.
17
proof on that?
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
Do you have an offer of
I'm sorry, your Honor, I don't
19
know that I know what you mean by that.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you have evidence to
21
establish an assertion that Mr. Hill bribed a police
22
officer?
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
I've never done anything more
24
than say that officer said that, because I feel like I
25
need more of a basis.
1434
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 69
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm not alleging that.
that.
Do you have proof?

I'm not making that assertion.
I'm just saying that officer said
That's all I'm doing.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I keep trying to talk while
you're interrupting, and I apologize.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you have any evidence that
what you cite as this officer's statement is true?
10
11
I'm sorry.
MR. COUGHLIN:
To clarify.
me if he truly said that, but if what he said was true?
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
Correct.
No.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
Do you have another question?

-- remarkable rapport with the
police, no.
18
19
Other than the fact that
there's --
15
17
You're not asking
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
So you have made an
allegation.
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
No.
All I've done is repeat
21
what that officer said, which was, I believe, to be
22
somewhat of a statement against interest.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You've repeated that without
24
any independent proof that what the officer said was true.
25
Yes?
1435
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 70
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I don't know that that's true.

What's the evidence -- excuse
me.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I've been arrested five times.

Excuse me.
What is the
evidence that you have that this allegation you quote from
this officer is true?
8
9
MR. COUGHLIN:
One, that he said it.
Okay.
believe I'm entitled to take that as somewhat of proof.
10
Two is that I keep getting arrested every time Richard
11
Hill gets upset.
12
after I noticed that his contractor who billed me a
13
thousand dollars for boarding up the porch used my own
14
plywood to do it.
15
16
17
I get arrested for jaywalking shortly
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, when a lawyer
puts an allegation in a pleading -MR. COUGHLIN:
I didn't make any allegation.
18
He's the one who said he found a crack pipe and a bag of
19
weed and all these other allegations.
20
repeated -- I'm sorry, your Honor.
21
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I merely
I'm talking over you.
Do you have any further
questions for Mr. Hill?
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
Pardon me?
Yes, sir.
I gather you'd like
1436
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 71
1
me to wrap this up.
Your Honor, may I ask some direction in terms
of what subjects you would like me to focus on with
Mr. Hill?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
sir.
I can't direct your case,
I've indicated to you what I believe the focus of
this hearing should be.
8
9
MR. COUGHLIN:
That my fitness -- if I can ask
for clarification.
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I believe the issue that this
11
panel has to determine is what the degree, if any, of
12
punishment should be for the conduct that you have alleged
13
to have been involved with, in terms of candor to the
14
court, candor to counsel, candor to witnesses, competency
15
to practice law.
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
issues that this panel should focus on.
19
intend to in any way limit what you think should be
20
important.
21
Including -I believe those are the

But I do not
So if you have further questions of Mr. Hill,
22
please ask them.
23
hearing.
24
intention to complete this hearing today.
25
It's my intention to complete this
The panel met last week.
It is the panel's
So do you have any further questions of
1437
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 72
1
Mr. Hill?
MR. COUGHLIN:
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
Mr. Hill, is it somewhat incongruus for you to
assert to this panel that I completely lack competency,
and yet you ran up, counting the trial court $20,000 you
asked for, and the $42,000 you were ultimately awarded in
that appellate court?
MR. KING:
10
Objection.
irrelevant.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
Argumentative and
Sustained.
I think it goes to his
credibility.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm sorry?
Your Honor, I think it goes to
16
his credibility to the extent that he's saying, well,
17
Mr. Coughlin is so baseless and vexatious, yet I was able
18
to bill 60 grand for it.
19
To me it's like, well, at some point if
20
somebody's arguments are so worthless and so unsupported,
21
shouldn't you be able to bring it home for less than 60
22
grand for a summary eviction?
23
MR. KING:
Mr. Chairman, if I could respond by
24
pointing out the fact that the order from Judge Flanagan,
25
which has been admitted, suggests that that was -- that
1438
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 73
1
those fees were generated because of Mr. Coughlin's
vexatious conduct.
were awarded against Mr. Coughlin, not one cent of which
has been paid.
And that the fees were reasonable and
So I think any suggestion to the contrary is
irrelevant, because Judge Flanagan's order is to be
accepted by the panel.
8
9
MR. COUGHLIN:
counter that.
Your Honor, if I can quickly
I don't know that's actually pled in your
10
complaint, Mr. King, or included amongst one of the three
11
grievances.
12
because this like Judge Gardner's sanctions coming up two
13
years later?
14
sanction?
15
too?
16
17
18
The extent to which -- am I here today
Am I here today on Judge Flanagan's
Is he a grievant and accorded a case number
MR. KING:
Mr. Chairman, I was responding to
his question.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I believe you're here today
19
to measure all of your conduct as a practicing lawyer.
20
I'd like to move on.
21
Mr. Hill, please ask them.
22
excess of 20 minutes.
23
24
25
So
If you have further questions of

I've now afforded you in
I'll give you another five.
MR. COUGHLIN:
So we're not here today based
on what's been noticed?

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We're not here today to
1439
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 74
1
relitigate orders that have been filed that you have
appealed, and that you have lost.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm not asking -- I'm asking
what is it limited to?
you just said it's not limited.
Because it sounds like from what
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I don't intend to impose any
limits on you in terms of what you attempt to proffer as
evidence.
9
10
I will rule on what you proffer as evidence.

MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm saying what he's limited
to, your Honor.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The issue here, sir, as I
12
understand the supreme court's order with respect to your
13
conviction of theft, and the issues here with respect to
14
the other grievances that have been filed against you are
15
to the extent as to what, if any, should be the punishment
16
that you should sustain as a result of your conduct.
17
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yet this is entered into
evidence.
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
This is what?
This order has been entered
into evidence.
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
Exhibit 2 has.
But it's not pled in any
24
complaint.
Judge Flanagan's not a grievant.
25
noticed that that was the purpose of this hearing to some
I wasn't
1440
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 75
1
extent today.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You were noticed that the
issue of your conviction of trespass was an issue, that
your handling of that case was an issue, and it's relevant
as to that.
Now, if you have some more questions of
Mr. Hill, please ask them, and let's move on.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
10
Mr. Hill, what did you think when I was
arrested for jaywalking?
How did that make you feel?
11
12
arrested.
13
go get a TPO from the justice court.
14
I filled out the paperwork at the justice's court and came
15
back to the River Rock home.
16
you had been taken into custody.
17
Mr. Coughlin, I was not present when you were

If you'll recall, the police suggested that I
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
And
And by that point in time

I was not --
Objection.
Nonresponsive.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
19
I did do that.
20
21
22
I asked you about your feelings, Rich.
Your
feelings, not a narrative.

A
I felt sorry for you, Mr. Coughlin.
You are
your own worst enemy.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
25
Next question.
Did you or anyone that day issue me a warning
1441
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 76
1
to leave the property on November 13th when I was arrested
for custodial arrest for criminal trespassing?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Could
you repeat it?
I couldn't hear that.
Did you, Mr. Hill, or anyone else there that
day, either the sergeant or the officer or your client,
the landlord, did anyone that day issue me a warning,
trespass warning, to leave the premises?
10
11
MR. KING:
Objection.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
of the conviction.
15
16
that.
Plus, it goes to --
Sustained.
You've already litigated
Next question.
I'm not offering proof, just
the legitimacy of the conviction.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That's what you just said,
and I sustained the objection.
21
22
Well, it goes to the legitimacy
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
20
The relevance, sir?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
It was a multifaceted basis for
that.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
He was
convicted.
12
14
Relevance.
What's the rest of it?

That it goes to impeach
Mr. Hill's credibility.
1442
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 77
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
How so?
If he's standing behind this
assertion that I demonstrated a lack of candor or fairness
to opposing counsel, even where he knows that no one
issued a warning to leave, then I believe it would impeach
his credibility, and it would bear on the extent to which
I have been unfairly accused of a multitude of sins which
have been either pled or not pled in Mr. King's complaint
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Anything further?
12
14
Sustained.
Next question.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
13
No, sir.
summary eviction?
Mr. Hill, what rules of procedure apply in a
15
MR. KING:
Objection.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
Relevance.
Sustained.
Well, he got to testify as to
18
how he's worked so much on this case, and he had to bill
19
so much.
20
rules of procedure go to.
And I would just like to know if he knows what
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
Sustained.
Next question.
So it was relevant when he was
23
talking about all that, but when I want to ask him about
24
that, it's not relevant.
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You're asking a specific
1443
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 78
1
question about what rule of procedure.
in this hearing.
Proceed.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
But -Proceed, Mr. Coughlin.

I don't think you're going to
let me with him.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't think you are going to
let me ask him any good questions.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
questions, sir?
16
17
I'm going to allow you to
proceed.
14
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
I do, but none that you're
going to let me ask him.
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
21
22
23
24
25
I'm waiting.
I don't think you're going to
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
13
I have no idea.
let me proceed with a board member.
10
11
That's irrelevant
We don't know that, do we?

You've pretty much made that
clear.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
questions, sir?
MR. COUGHLIN:
I do, but you're not going to
let me ask him.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Please ask them.
I'll give
1444
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 79
1
you another five minutes for a total of a half-hour.
five minutes Mr. King --
3
4
MR. COUGHLIN:
In
-- telling me no for five more
minutes.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me.
I have this
terrible habit of continuing to talk while you're trying
to interrupt.
8
9
10
I'll give you another five minutes, at which

point Mr. Hill will have been here an hour.
So do you
have any further questions?
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
MR. KING:
Ask them.
I don't feel that you will find
any of them relevant.
15
I do.
I would ask the chairman to
16
acknowledge that he's not asking any further questions,
17
and ask the panel if they have any further questions, and
18
excuse the witness, because I have several more witnesses,
19
including a judge, standing by.
20
21
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Does the panel have any
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
questions?
23
offer you one more opportunity to ask a relevant question,
24
if you believe you have one.
25
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
1445
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 80
1
2
Is there anything I've done that's competent,
That's a tough question to answer,
Rich?
3
4
Mr. Coughlin.
Dr. Merliss as much harm as possible, in that regard you
were successful.
should, I just don't think so.
8
9
Considering that your goal was to cause
Did you perform as a reasonable attorney
Do you think it's possible that I just felt
that I had a basis for defending against a summary
10
eviction as a commercial tenant where you pled no cause,
11
and the law has an express dictate against summarily
12
evicting commercial tenants unless you pled nonpayment of
13
rent?
14
legitimate position I took?
Do you think maybe I just thought that was a
15
No, sir.
16
Have you noticed that in the tenth affidavit I
17
pled that it was my law office?
18
19
You made that up after the fact.
You did not have a business license, sir.
You
were not lawfully operating a business there.
20
Well, regardless of whether or not that's
21
true, that's different than what you just said.
22
this is a criminal trespass trial.
23
that up after the fact."
24
that, no, Rich it's pled right there.
25
there.
You said
You said, "You made
But then I pointed out to you

It's pled right
So is that truthful?
1446
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 81
1
MR. KING:
THE WITNESS:
Argumentative.
Is there a question in there?
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection.
Yeah.
You throw out, "You made it up after
the fact."
it's pled there, it's pled in the tenth affidavit, it's
dealt with extensively at trial.
testimony at the trial which was later remixed into a --
so is that demonstrating candor on your part to assert
10
that I made it up after the fact when there's all this
11
documentation that says, no, Rich, it's right there, it's
12
commercial tenancy?
13
And then I say, no, Rich, it's October 19th,
A lot of questions and
Mr. Coughlin, as you know, I did not attend
14
that trial, nor have I read the transcript.
I will note
15
though that Judge Sferrazza ruled that you did not prove
16
anything that you attempted to try to prove.
17
So you just said --
18
That speaks very loudly to your competence and
19
what you put in the record in that court.
20
affirmed on appeal.
21
And it was
Can you tell me, when you say you didn't plead
22
that, you didn't bring it up.
But then a minute later you
23
say, I didn't go to the trial, and I didn't read this and
24
that.
25
it up after the fact, and reconcile that with the
How can you say you didn't bring that up, you made
1447
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 82
1
statement that you didn't go to the trial?
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Objection.
Argumentative.
Sustained.
I'll allow you
one more question.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
clock on the wall here, it's now 10:45.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
10
11
That's all.
It's now, according to the
What do you mean when you say, "You made that
up after the fact"?

A
Mr. Baker, in papers that he filed, pointed
12
out to the court that you had not raised that issue in the
13
justice's court, and you did not challenge that statement
14
by Mr. Baker in the papers that he filed with the court in
15
your responding papers.
16
What statement by Mr. Baker?
17
That you had not timely raised the commercial
18
tenant business in the justice's court.
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Okay.
Mr. Hill, you've been
20
here an hour.
21
witnesses to half an hour.
22
Mr. Coughlin the opportunity to ask as many questions he
23
believes are relevant as possible.
24
25
I believe we have limited the testimony of

I think we have afforded
If the panel has nothing further, I'll excuse

Mr. Hill.
1448
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 83
1
THE WITNESS:
MR. KING:
Am I released from the subpoena?
Yes.
Thank you, Mr. Hill, for your
time today.
MS. PEARL:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MS. PEARL:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Chairman?
Excuse us for a second.
Can we have a tiny break?

As soon as we release
Mr. Hill, we'll take a break.
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
And I can't call him on direct?
12
direct?
Pardon me?
I can't call him -- do I have
Do I have a case in chief?
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
Sure.
So he's not released from the
subpoena.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
19
20
Do you not want him released?

No, I would like to have him
subject to subpoena duces tecum.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you intend to call him on
direct in your case in chief?
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
being on telephone standby?
24
25
I might.
Mr. Hill, would you mind
And, Mr. Coughlin, if you intend to call him,

I want a half-hour notice.
1449
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 84
1
THE WITNESS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That will be today?

Yes.
Are you available this
afternoon?
THE WITNESS:
I will cancel whatever I have to
make myself available for the panel.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
Thank you.
Do you want me to come back out
here or do you want me to be available telephonically?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I just want you to be
10
available by a phone call, because I'm not sure
11
Mr. Coughlin has committed that he, in fact, will call you
12
this afternoon.
13
the subpoena.
14
But he's asked us not to release you from
I'm asking Mr. Coughlin to give us at least a
15
half-hour notice if you intend to call Mr. Hill in your
16
case.
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
Chairman, sir, may I
18
ask, with respect to the subpoena duces tecum, can I ask
19
Mr. Hill to present documentation as to when his office
20
met with the sheriff?
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
That's difficult to answer
given --
24
25
Did you subpoena Mr. Hill?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It shouldn't be.
It's either
a yes or no.
1450
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 85
1
2
MR. COUGHLIN:
I have to know what rules
apply.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
I would have to know what rules
apply in this setting.
6
7
Pardon me?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The issue is, did you
subpoena Mr. Hill to testify here today in your case?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
According to the law of what?
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
The State of Nevada.
17
NRCP?
Yes.
Is applicable here?
Yes.
Really?
Did you subpoena Mr. Hill?
Because it doesn't seem like it
is applicable here.
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, that's a very
19
simple question.
20
for Mr. Hill's attendance in your case in chief?
21
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
Bar counsel told me I don't
have to pay subpoena fees.
23
24
Did you cause a subpoena to be issued
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, will you answer
my question?
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm trying to, sir.
1451
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 86
1
2
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It's either a yes or a
no.
3
4
No.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Depends whether or not witness
fees are required.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No, it doesn't.
another issue.
be issued to Mr. Hill and serve him with a subpoena; did
you do that?
9
10
11
The issue is:
That's
MR. COUGHLIN:
I say, sir.
Did you cause a subpoena to
I have to be careful about what
And I don't say this out of disrespect.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I think you should be
12
careful, because it requires a truthful answer.
13
answer is either yes, I did subpoena him, or no, I didn't.
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
The
You're not going to force me
15
into saying what's dismissed when they have made
16
representations that I'm allowed to issue subpoenas, or
17
that I don't have to pay witness fees, and you want to jam
18
me into saying yes, yes, I did this under the rules of
19
this, and not taking into accord what they have been
20
saying to me.
21
22
23
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, did you cause a
subpoena to be issued -MR. COUGHLIN:
I would have to know what they
are telling me is -MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm going to take that as a
1452
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 87
1
no.
Mr. Hill, you're excused.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't know that I would say
that.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. KING:
I just did.
Mr. Hill, would you do me a favor?
Would you confidentially share your telephone number with
Laura Peters, the clerk, in case the chair does decide to
call you?
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We'll be in recess until
11
11:00 o'clock.
And now, because it's a lot easier, and we
12
can all look at it, I think now we'll go with the clock on
13
the State Bar wall here.
14
(Recess taken.)
15
(Exhibit 3 marked.)
16
PAUL ELCANO
17
18
MR. KING:
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
My next
19
witness is Mr. Paul Elcano, and Mr. Elcano's already been
20
sworn.
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Before we do that, let's go
22
on the record, because I was informed at the recess that
23
the conversation we had regarding recording this
24
proceeding did not appear on the record.
25
Mr. Coughlin asked if it was appropriate for
1453
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 88
1
him to record this proceeding.
I indicated to him it was
not, that we had an official court reporter, and that will
be the official record of this proceeding
Mr. Coughlin, do you have a tape recorder on?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No, sir.
Let the record reflect that
the panel, Mr. Coughlin, Mr. King, and the witness,
Mr. Elcano, who, during the course of the recess, was
previously sworn.
10
Mr. King.
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
12
May I just ask?
plug I might be able to use?
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
I'm sorry?
Is there somewhere a plug I
would be permitted to use?
16
17
Is there a
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I have no idea.
Is there a
plug for Mr. Coughlin's computer?
18
(Discussion off the record.)
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The time, according to the
20
clock on the State Bar wall is now 11:05.
21
pursuant to the panel's previous order, you have 15
22
minutes to present Mr. Elcano.
23
24
25
Mr. King,
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KING:
Q
Mr. Elcano, could you state your name and
1454
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 89
1
spell it for the record, please.
Paul Elcano.
And how are you employed?
E-L-C-A-N-O.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm sorry.
If I can just
quickly interject.
second of three witnesses is one who was only noticed
about four, five days ago, so I will object to that.
standing on ceremony with SCR 1052(c).
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
I don't mean to take up time.
Overruled.
The
I'm
Proceed.
BY MR. KING:
11
Could you tell the panel how you are employed?
12
I'm currently the executive director of Washoe
13
Legal Services, a 501(c)3, that provides legal services to
14
indigents.
15
Thank you for that service.
Did you have
16
contact with Mr. Coughlin as an employee of Washoe Legal
17
Services?
18
Yes.
We employed Mr. Coughlin from August --
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
If I can just -Excuse me.

Is there any conflict that I
should be aware of?
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Any what?
Conflict.
Among the panel members?
1455
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 90
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
long-standing personal relationship?
Yes.
Not that I know of.
With Mr. Elcano?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Are you looking to me?
known Mr. Elcano since we were young children.
haven't seen you in two or three years.
socially, I don't even remember where.
I've
conflict you're referring to, Mr. Coughlin --
10
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
I probably
And then briefly

So if that's a
Did you go to Stanford
together?
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
No.
know where Mr. Elcano went.
You both went to Stanford?
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
THE WITNESS:
18
MR. KING:
19
I went to Stanford.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
I don't
Stanford?
Yes, sir.
It's part of Mr. Coughlin -Are you raising an objection
that I should recuse myself?
21
Not that I know.
MR. COUGHLIN:
If so articulate your point.
Sir, it's my understanding that
22
I might have some duty to ask if there's a conflict or
23
some basis.
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm taking it as an
implication that you are asserting that I have a conflict.
1456
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 91
1
Make your case.
2
3
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't know that I'm doing
that, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Make your case.

I don't have enough information
to do that.
judicial canons at least suggest that maybe upon some
prompting or without prompting often kind of like with the
Gardners when I had to prompt, you're Judge Gardner's
10
That's why I'm asking.
brother?
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
I couldn't understand that.

Well, the criminal trespass
case, it was --
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
17
18
19
I believe the
I'm focusing --- Judge Gardner's brother who
was the judge on that.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, you're raising
an issue that I perhaps should recuse myself.

MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't know that, sir.
20
don't know enough about the situation.
21
were friends as small children.
22
went back that far.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I didn't know you
I didn't know you guys
Are you asserting that the
24
grounds that someone knew someone at a young age is
25
grounds enough to require recusal?
1457
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 92
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't know.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Are you asserting that?

I doubt that's enough.
Okay.
Are you asserting that
the fact that two people went to college at the same place
and didn't even know they were there together is grounds
for a mandatory recusal?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
I just asked for information.

Are you making that
assertion?
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
I just asked for information.
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I gave you the information.
13
I don't know when Mr. Elcano went there.
14
I attended
Stanford from 1966 to 1967.
15
Mr. Elcano, when were you there, if you were?
16
THE WITNESS:
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
MR. KING:
'66 to '69.
So the same year?
Pardon me?
'66.
Mr. Chairman, I hope this isn't
21
counting against my time.
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
24
25
You were unaware of this?
You
were childhood friends, and you're unaware of this?

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yes.
That's true.
That's
how limited our relationship is.
1458
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 93
1
Now, are you asserting, sir, that the fact
that Mr. Elcano and I attended the same school at the same
time and didn't know that to this day, are you asserting
that is grounds for mandatory recusal?
5
6
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I did not know that, sir.
Are you asserting that as grounds; yes or no?
9
10
So you didn't know that to this
day?
7
8
Yes or no?
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't think I have enough
information.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
MR. VILLAS:
Proceed.
Just for the record, Mr. King
13
should have 15 minutes from I guess 10 minutes after.
14
That shouldn't eat into his time for the examination.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I agree.
It's now 11:10.
BY MR. KING:
Q
I believe I asked you if the Washoe Legal
Services had employed Mr. Coughlin?

A
According to our records, he was employed
about August 29th, 2007, to May 11, 2009.

Q
And in your capacity working for Washoe County
Legal Services, did you come to work with Mr. Coughlin?
23
Yes.
24
In your work with Mr. Coughlin, did you form
25
an opinion as to his competency to practice law in Nevada
1459
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 94
1
as a lawyer?
Yes.
I'll first ask what that opinion is, then work
backward as to why you feel that way.
opinion currently of Mr. Coughlin's ability to practice
law?
7
8
Currently I don't believe he's competent to
practice law based on the information I have.
9
10
Just by way of background, did you at one
Q
point?
11
12
13
What is your
MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection.
Relevancy.
BY MR. KING:
At some point in time --
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
question yet, Mr. Coughlin.
17
BY MR. KING:
18
19
20
21
22
Calls for an expert -He hasn't finished the
At some point in time did you consider
Mr. Coughlin as a friend or did you like Mr. Coughlin?

A
Yes.
Mr. Coughlin.
Q
Actually, in a way I've always liked
I don't have a dislike for him.
Backing up to what activities did you
23
personally see or witness that formed the basis of your
24
opinion that he is not competent to practice?
25
The first one was the order entered in the
1460
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 95
1
Joshi case by Judge Gardner wherein he was sanctioned for
various things which are listed in the order.
of that, I reviewed the tape of the hearing.
4
5
As a result
So you actually listened to the hearing
Yes.
itself?
I went through the hearing transcript.
MR. KENT:
Can I ask a question on that?
MR. KING:
Handing you what has been marked as
Exhibit 3 for identification purposes.
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
MR. KENT:
12
question.
13
Excuse me, Mr. King?
I just want to ask a clarifying
employed?
14
15
THE WITNESS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
21
What were those dates of
employment again?
18
19
Yes, he was still employed for
us at that time.
16
17
If that was during the time that he was
THE WITNESS:
August 29th, 2007, to May 11th,
2009.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Can I just ask, am I in danger
of communication with represented parties?
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
Are you what, sir?

Am I in danger of making
24
communications with a represented party to the extent
25
Mr. Elcano is, I'm assuming, I believe him and his
1461
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 96
1
organization right now, and his lawyer Joseph Gearing's
not here?
MR. KING:
No.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I want to be sure.
I don't know what kind of an
objection that is, but let's take the issues one at a
time.
Mr. King you're proffering.
MR. KING:
10
I was asking the witness if he
recognized this particular document.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Have you marked it?
12
MR. KING:
It's been marked as Exhibit
13
3.
Yes.
It has not been proffered yet.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
THE WITNESS:
16
Okay.
Yes.
BY MR. KING:
17
Which judge signed that order?
18
Judge Linda Gardner, who is a family court
19
20
21
22
judge in Washoe County, Nevada.

Q
What is the date that she signed the order?

MR. COUGHLIN:
You say it's been marked, Pat,
you haven't entered it yet?
23
MR. KING:
That's correct.
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
He hasn't offered it yet.

Just a --
1462
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 97
1
BY MR. KING:
The date next to her signature?
April 10th, 2009.
MR. KING:
I'm going to move that this order,
a certified copy of which has been produced, be admitted
as Exhibit No. 3.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'll object, sir.
It just
looks substantially different than what I have seen of
this order.
Further, the received on it is not certified,
10
and that goes to a material issue here to the extent that
11
this is purportedly a ghost grievance.
12
this materialized at the State Bar.
13
involves some brother and sister judicial -- well, we
14
actually kind of do know that Judge Linda Gardner passed
15
it to her brother, the administrator of muni court who
16
presided over the trespass conviction.
17
passing to Judge Nash Holmes --
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
We don't know how
We don't know if it
And he admits
What's the objection?

-- the day before March 15th on
this filed her grievance with the State Bar.
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
What is the objection?

I want to know exactly where
23
and how Mr. King got this order.
Why the 5 on this March
24
15th looks so odd and different than the previous versions
25
where -- it looks like somebody drew the 5 in a little
1463
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 98
1
darker, Pat.
2
3
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
So your objection is what,
sir?
MR. COUGHLIN:
He's talking about it being
certified, and all this and that.
information about that.
MR. KING:
I would like some more
How is it certified?
I asked the witness -- I was going
to ask the witness -- the witness identified this as a
document he recognized that was signed by the judge.
10
witness testified that he heard the hearing.
11
The
BY MR. KING:
12
Why did this matter to you --
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
has been offered.
16
No, he said it's certified.

Wait.
Please.
clear.
17
Your objection is?
The exhibit
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm still not
He's saying -- when you offer,
18
it's my understanding when you offer, and I'm not that
19
great at this.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
What's the objection?

It's not certified, as far as I
22
know.
If you are going to be offering a judicial
23
document, it needs to be a certified copy.
24
MR. KING:
It does not.
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
Did he get it from --
1464
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 99
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That's one way of having it
admitted is to be certified.
foundation.
There's other ways to lay a
Do you have an objection?

MR. COUGHLIN:
Well, he said it was certified.
So my objection is, let's see the proof.
from Joey or Gina Hastings or did you get it from the
clerk of court of the muni court?
8
9
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin.
Did you get it
I'm not going
to entertain questions between and among the lawyers.
10
you have a question, direct it to the panel or the
11
witness.
If
12
13
The objection is this lacks foundation?

MR. COUGHLIN:
No.
hadn't been proved or even spoken to besides --
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
That this certification
Is it your position --- certified.

-- position that only legal
documents can be admitted that are certified?
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
on that.
20
Well, I didn't make a position
My position is he said it was certified.
contesting that.
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
MR. KING:
So I'm
Is this certified?
Let me get the clerk to bring the
23
certification copies, unless she gave them to you already,
24
which I understood she did.
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Did she bring you copies?

This particular one is not
1465
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 100
1
certified.
2
3
MR. KING:
I have already introduced -- the
copies do not show that it's certified.
4
5
Do you have one that's certified?
MR. COUGHLIN:
Your Honor, if I can quickly
interject for the record, I mean that not disrespectful.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Are we on the record?
you getting this, Ms. Reporter?
THE COURT REPORTER:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Are
10
MR. KING:
Yes.
Go ahead.
Mr. Chairman, I'll lay -- I
11
understood, and since this has been filed with the courts
12
that we have certified copies.
13
is not certified, I'm going to lay a foundation a
14
different way and withdraw the representation that the
15
copy I gave is a certified copy.
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yeah.
Since the copy I gave you
And that's just another
17
basis for all -- the 13th time on the clock.
18
say formally yes, I think a recusal is appropriate.
19
think, Pat, you need to consider whether that's fraud, to
20
be saying it's certified, backtracking once you get caught
21
on it.
22
23
I'm going to
And I
But I'm just going to put that out for the record.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Let's deal with this.
Are
you now making a motion that I should recuse myself?
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you think you should?

No.
Are you making that
1466
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 101
1
motion?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
position.
Well, then articulate your
MR. COUGHLIN:
I think it's been set forth
enough.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Probably.
I'd like to hear it.
5
6
Yeah, I think so.
childhood friends.
Set forth what?

You've admitted to being
There's a rather odd suggestion that
10
you didn't know you both went to Stanford in 1966 despite
11
being childhood friends, and being in northern Nevada
12
practicing law or members of the legal community.
13
would like to know any other relevant nexus between the
14
two of you.
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And I
So your basis for moving that
16
I should recuse myself is that I knew Mr. Elcano as a
17
childhood friend, and we were at the same school together?
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
And the fact that Mr. King has
19
worn every different hat he's wanted to wear here.
20
fact he just said something was certified, then he
21
backtracks and -- you asked me for my basis.
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The
Mr. Coughlin, I'm asking you
23
to focus on your motion for recusal.
Is it your position
24
that legally any judicial officer must recuse themselves
25
if he happens to have --
1467
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 102
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm not going to get narrowed
down into if you were childhood friends.
my basis, and that is that there is too much funny
business going on here.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm telling you
Overruled.
I'd like to set forth
specifically.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
times, and you won't do it.
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
I've asked you to three
You want to narrow it down just
11
if you were childhood friends, and I want to go with the
12
totality of the circumstances.
13
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Articulate your case, sir.
I've asked you to.
15
THE WITNESS:
SCR 105's been thrown out the
16
window.
17
chance to oppose them or file a reply to an opposition.
18
You claim that NRCP is applicable here.
19
when I file a motion to bifurcate, and he filed an
20
opposition, and I get three days for mailing under 6-C,
21
and he purports to file it on the 24th, and you rule on it
22
when?
23
mailing to file my opposition to preserve for appeal?
24
25
You've ruled on motions before I've even had a
On the 30th?
Yet under NRCP
Don't I get five days, plus three for
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
So should we disregard the
motions you filed without giving the State Bar the
1468
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 103
1
opportunity to respond timely?
under my door last night.
under your legal reasoning?
State Bar the opportunity to respond.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
I had two motions shoved
Should those be disregarded

Because you did not offer the
Well, that -Yes or no, Mr. Coughlin?

It's not a yes or no.
Yes, it is.
That would entail figuring out
whether or not 30 days prior to the hearing --
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
back.
13
Let's focus on the issues
You've made a motion now to require me to recuse
myself.
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
Yeah.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You made it on the basis
16
that, one, Mr. Elcano and I knew each other as childhood
17
friends.
18
together, apparently.
19
did not know that.
And two, that we attended the same school

And you say it's suspicious that I
Anything else?
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
Every -Anything else?

Every aspect of SCR 1052(c) has
23
been violated by your orders.
And the way this thing has
24
been run, you have thrown out every last procedural due
25
process substantive protection accorded me for my property
1469
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 104
1
right under the 14th Amendment.
the way you have run this panel.
MR. KING:
MR. COUGHLIN:
And I find out you're childhood
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm childhood friends with
justice --
8
9
Mr. Chairman --
friends with a guy I'm suing.
6
7
You have insulted me by
MR. COUGHLIN:
And you went to Stanford
together in '66, and you didn't know that.
And let me
10
guess.
Are you on the Basque board too for UNR?
11
tells us he's Basque every five minutes you talk to him.
12
MR. KING:
Mr. Chairman.
And Paul
My experience with
13
Mr. Coughlin is if this is allowed to continue, he will be
14
thrilled, and it will go on for eight hours.
15
has a limited time.
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
My witness
throw from the State Bar.
18
19
MR. KING:
And your office is a stone's
I need to move forward, because the
witness has limited time, with your permission.
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
I like you personally.
I do, your Honor.
I think
21
you're a charming guy.
22
Mr. Elcano.
23
don't put into the record what is it going to say on
24
appeal?
They are trying to merge me here.
25
honest.
So if it's a merging that's going on here, I'm
But the clock chimed 13 times.
Just like
And if I
Let's be
1470
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 105
1
going to preserve everything for the record.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm going to overrule your
motion for recusal.
that the fact that a judge knows a witness or a lawyer is
not, in and of itself, grounds for recusal.
decided and litigated in this state.
recusal is overruled.
8
9
10
The supreme court has already ruled
That's been
So the motion for
Mr. King, proceed to lay the foundation for

Exhibit 3.
BY MR. KING:
11
Exhibit 3.
Thank you.
You just testified
12
that this is the order that emanated from the hearing you
13
heard?
14
Yes.
15
And why were you concerned about this
16
particular order?
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm sorry.
I don't want to
18
take up more time.
19
my procedural whining and moaning for why I think the
20
recusal is appropriate.
21
22
23
If I can incorporate by reference all
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Is this a motion you filed
within the last 30 days?

MR. COUGHLIN:
It's hard, because Mr. King
24
lies to me so much about how things --
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Which motion --
1471
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 106
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
-- whether they're filed or
not, whether they will accept, who controls who, who the
clerk of court has independence from.
being done by anybody, what I need to do for a subpoena,
whether I have to pay witness fees, or whether the
certified mailing of August 23rd is going to be used --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't know what's

There is no return of service
here.
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
interrupt you.
12
Mr. Coughlin.
You're off base.
I'm going to
Exhibit 3.
13
Proceed, Mr. King.
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
We're focusing on
15
reference --
16
17
Can I incorporate by
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I don't know what you are
trying to incorporate --
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
All my filings.
No.
The arguments.
I'm not going to allow
you to incorporate all your filings.
21
Mr. King, please proceed.
22
MR. KING:
23
appreciate your patience.
24
BY MR. KING:
25
If you recall the question, it was, why did
1472
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 107
1
you find that -- or did you find that order important?
Under this order Mr. Coughlin was sanctioned
for attorney's fees in, I forget the amount, $900-some as
I recall.
$934.
5
6
MS. PEARL:
Can you speak up, please?
I can
barely hear you.
THE WITNESS:
attorney's fees.
$934 he was sanctioned in
reviewed the transcript.
10
And as a result of the sanction, I
BY MR. KING:
11
This hearing, you testified that this hearing
12
and the resulting order were one of the factors that you
13
used to determine that Mr. Coughlin is not competent to
14
practice; is that correct?
15
16
17
Yes.
That's the first, the first really major
The court specifically --
one.
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection.
That wasn't pled in
19
relevancy.
20
expert to provide the opinion as to someone's competency
21
to practice law.
22
And Mr. Elcano has not been qualified as an
23
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Overruled.
BY MR. KING:
Q
Could you -- for the record could you read
from Page 13 of the Order, which is the one that contains
1473
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 108
1
her signature, the paragraph that begins at Line No. 5 and
goes to Line 13?
Yes.
"The most troubling aspect of this case
was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic, and disrespectful
presentation at trial.
understand the balance sheet, his failure to conduct
discovery, and his lack of knowledge with regard to the
rules of evidence and trial procedure.
compounded with a continuously antagonistic presentation
Mr. Coughlin's inability to
All of this was
10
of the case that resulted in a shift from a fairly simple
11
divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an
12
excessive amount of time."
13
In the next sentence the court also finds that
14
the "arguments in support thereof to be unfounded in fact,
15
unwarranted by existing law, unreasonable, and vexatious
16
throughout this entire proceeding."
17
Is that a correct statement of that order?
18
For the most part, yes.
19
Is there anything that needs to be clarified?
20
No, I don't think so.
21
22
I'm just saying that my
review of the transcript confirmed that.

Q
When you listened to the -- were you a
23
supervisor -- at this time were you a supervisor of
24
Mr. Coughlin?
25
Yes.
1474
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 109
1
Did you determine -- did you have an opinion
at that time, having listened to the hearing itself, did
you determine that the position of the judge was correct?
Yes.
What was another factor that formed your
opinion that Mr. Coughlin is not currently competent to
practice law?
8
9
10
Several things have happened since.
have been two issues that I'm personally aware of dealing

with dishonesty.
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
12
THE WITNESS:
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
There
Objection.
The quality -Foundation.
Hearsay.
Relevancy.
15
THE WITNESS:
The quality of the work --
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
THE WITNESS:
Overruled.
-- that has comes across my desk
18
has been disjointed, filled with irrelevant material, and
19
has not met reasonable competency standards.
20
tortious residential pattern, and I don't believe he's
21
made any type of regular office, so it would be difficult
22
for clients to contact him based on what I have seen and
23
know.
24
capable of exhibiting judgment to counsel people in what
25
they should and shouldn't do with their legal situations.
He's had a
And I don't believe he has a mental status that's
1475
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 110
1
BY MR. KING:
In your capacity as a supervisor and somebody
who said they like Mr. Coughlin, did you attempt to advise
Mr. Coughlin to seek mental health or assistance with his
circumstances?
No, I don't believe I've ever advised
Mr. Coughlin to do that.
Because of the Joshi matter he
was terminated, and I didn't have any further contact with
him.
10
Did you have contact with his family?
11
I've had, subsequent to his termination, I
12
believe somewhere in the neighborhood of two or three
13
telephone calls with his father, maybe four, trying to
14
find a way to get him some help.
15
16
To your knowledge, has Mr. Coughlin ever
heeded the recommendation that he get help?
17
I have no knowledge one way or another.
18
There are some times when a person has an
19
issue or mental infirmity or whatever is going on if they
20
are nice.
21
Mr. Coughlin, his demeanor in his current state?
How would you describe, in terms of
22
As we sit here today?
23
If you know what his --
24
I haven't seen Zach since -- I haven't seen
25
him for a long time.
Today is the first time I've seen
1476
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 111
1
him.
Back when you were supervising him, and he
wasn't acting appropriately, how would you describe his
demeanor?
Well, we had him for this given period of
time.
And initially I worked on virtually -- when we
hired him, I knew that Zach had had some issues in the
past.
if he did, I don't know that to this day.
I did not know he had any mental issues.
Or even
And so I
10
mentored him and watched him very closely for a period of
11
time, and his work seemed to improve.
12
We had some complaints from the two women's
13
shelters, CAAW and Tahoe Women's Services, over the course
14
of, I couldn't be exact, I would have to check, but maybe
15
the first year.
16
met with the people from those two shelters.
17
they were biased in part.
18
Mr. Coughlin's clients, and I didn't really think there
19
was a critical issue.
20
I'm very protective of my employees.
I thought
And I reviewed some of
And after about a year, 18 months, he started
21
to deteriorate, in my opinion, started to have
22
difficulties, serious difficulties, relating with other
23
employees.
24
from Judge Gardner.
25
I didn't believe we could maintain him as an employee.
And then about this time the order came down

And after I reviewed the transcript,
1477
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 112
1
And one of the things that was relevant there
is that this hearing took place in two sections; I want to
say they were a week or ten days apart.
and the criticisms of the conduct by the judge in the
first hearing, Mr. Coughlin came back and behaved exactly
the same way in the second hearing, he had not heeded
anything the judge had told him.
8
9
And Mr. Coughlin is not stupid.
So I took
that in large part to be a competency issue.
10
MR. KING:
11
testimony and candor.
12
13
And the conduct
I very much appreciate your

I'll pass the witness.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Thank you, Mr. King.
Mr. Coughlin, it's now 11:31.
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
MR. KING:
You have 15 minutes.
Yes, sir.
I apologize.
16
admitted.
17
Thank you.
I meant to have this
Did I lay a proper foundation?
for Exhibit 3 to be admitted.
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
I would move
Any objection now, sir?

I didn't hear the foundation.
I'm sorry.
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The foundation was Mr. Elcano
22
attended the hearing, reviewed this order, and determined
23
it to be --
24
25
This is a true and correct copy of the order

that you looked at following the hearing?
1478
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 113
1
2
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
transmitted to us by the judge.
MR. COUGHLIN:
THE WITNESS:
The one that was
Transmitted just by the judge?

We have a copy of it in our
file.
MR. COUGHLIN:
THE WITNESS:
Washoe Legal Services.
checked it with my order.
Transmitted to you?
I
order.
10
11
It appears to be the same
MR. COUGHLIN:
But you're not saying how it
was transmitted to the State Bar?
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm interested in how it was
13
transmitted.
14
correct copy of the order issued by Judge Gardner in the
15
Joshi case --
16
17
I'm interested in if this is a true and
MR. COUGHLIN:
trial.
You mentioned he attended
He didn't attend the trial.
18
MR. KING:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
You said he attended the trial.
But he didn't attend the trial.
21
22
He said he --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Elcano testified he
attended the hearing.
23
THE WITNESS:
24
hearing.
25
No, I reviewed the tape of the
I wasn't at the hearing.
But in the family
court they are on tape.
1479
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 114
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm focused on whether or not
this is a true and correct copy of the order issued by
Judge Gardner.
true and correct copy?
5
6
And have you determined this to be the
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
It's the order I relied
on.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It will be admitted.
(Exhibit 3 admitted.)
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Go ahead, Mr. Coughlin.
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
11
respect to the received stamp on it.
12
that was on the order.
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
One thing, your Honor, with
21
22
23
24
25
the order.
That's something
Pardon me?
See the received?
Right.
That's State Bar.
Right.
Put that there.
Right.
So it's not really a copy of
It has something that was not on the order.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Okay.
Overruled.
Is that
your objection?
MR. COUGHLIN:
It has a funny 5 on it.
one day after Judge Gardner submitted hers.
It's
It seems kind
1480
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 115
1
of funny, like ghost reading is going on, because we don't
know who submitted this.
Who submitted it, Pat?
MR. VELLIS:
Mr. Elcano, do you have another
copy of the order that you received from the court after
the hearing that you compared this one to?
said you did?
8
9
THE WITNESS:
I think you
I compared it to it.
Mine has
two blank spots in it though, two short areas, but
10
otherwise they seem to be verbatim and end on the same
11
pages.
12
13
14
15
16
17
MR. VELLIS:
Is there a stamp from the State
Bar on the one that you got from the court?

MR. COUGHLIN:
You didn't get this from Joey
or Gina Hastings -MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, I'm not going
to permit questions among the attorneys.
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That's improper.
Yes, sir.
So if you have a question,
20
you need to address it to the panel.
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
certified when it's not.
23
THE WITNESS:
It's improper to say it's
24
25
The copy I reviewed is filed
electronically by Howard Conyers, the clerk of the court.

MR. VELLIS:
And there's no stamp from the
1481
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 116
1
State Bar on the one that you reviewed?
THE WITNESS:
MR. VELLIS:
No.
That's the one you received from
the court?
THE WITNESS:
MR. VELLIS:
Yes.
And that one is the same as the
one that's been admitted, Exhibit 3?
THE WITNESS:
that are the fault of the copier.
10
11
Save and except two blank spots
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, it's admitted.
Proceed.
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
Yes.
Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
14
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
15
Mr. Elcano, did you tell me when I was working
16
at Washoe -- I'll say Washoe for short -- and I'll say I
17
like Mr. Elcano a great deal.
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
side issues.
20
I respect him a lot.
I do.
I'm not interested in your
ask him.
21
If you have a question of Mr. Elcano, please
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
23
Okay.
When you were telling me, giving me some
24
mentoring, that when you walk into that courtroom, that
25
courtroom is yours.
It's not the judge's, it's not
1482
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 117
1
opposing counsel's, it's yours.
something you said to me?
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Objection.
Relevance.
Was there an objection?
didn't hear it.
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
Does that sound like
Yes.
Objection.
Relevance.
I'll overrule it.
Yes.
Go ahead.
Out of context.
But
that's a statement I would make, yes.
10
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
11
12
How is that reconciled with your criticism of
my work in the Joshi case?
13
I don't understand the question.
But your
14
work in the Joshi case was that it was incompetent.
15
had nothing to do with whether or not you took over the
16
courtroom.
17
was no statement or itemization of the community property.
18
There was no statement or itemization of the community
19
debts.
20
relevance.
21
went over and over and over again without legal basis, and
22
incorporated strange rules.
23
There were no -- it was a divorce case.
It
There
You were completely at a loss as to issues of

You made objections like you did today that
The judge kindly tried to give you direction,
24
which you totally eschewed.
You did this for three or
25
four hours the first time, came back a week or ten days
1483
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 118
1
later and did it again.
or not you took control of the courtroom.
3
4
It had nothing to do with whether
Have you reviewed the mandamus position I
filed in response to that sanction?
I don't know.
I don't recall.
You fire an attorney based on, in your words,
solely in light of her order, yet you don't recall whether
or not you reviewed a petition for writ of mandamus that
attorney filed?
10
11
MR. KING:
Argumentative, and
mischaracterizes the testimony.
12
13
Objection.
MR. COUGHLIN:
That attorney that is suing
your organization right now.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The question is:
You've compounded the
15
question.
Do you recall reviewing the
16
writ of mandamus?
17
having reviewed it.
18
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
19
To clarify, your answer is you don't recall?
20
I don't recall reviewing the mandamus.
His answer is no, he doesn't recall

Go on to your next question.
21
recall reviewing your motion for reconsideration of
22
60-some pages or 58 pages, but not mandamus.
23
So even -- did that reconsideration motion
24
evince any more competency or skill in that family law
25
setting than you felt was shown at the trial?
1484
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 119
1
No.
Are you aware of whether or not the majority
viewpoint of the law was argued by me vis--vis the setoff
or impermissibility thereof of a domestic duty with a
third party debt, such as was presented by
Mr. Springgate's illusory settlement offer of waiving
alimony in exchange for his client agreeing to be
responsible for a multitude of third-party debts on which
he was the sole signature?
10
I don't understand the question.
11
And yet you --
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Wait a minute.
13
he didn't understand the question.
14
didn't either.
15
He indicated
ask simple questions?
16
Quite frankly, I
I felt it was compound.
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
Yes.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
18
Do you want to
What's your understanding with respect to the
19
position taken by me in that trial vis-a-vis the majority
20
viewpoint of law on setting off or offsetting domestic
21
duties like alimony or child support with third-party
22
debts in a property settlement or debt settlement context?
23
I'm still not sure I understand the question.
24
But there were no children, as I recall, so child custody
25
had no issue in it.
And in terms of the offset, I don't
1485
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 120
1
know what law you proffered.
3
4
Well, a duty like alimony.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
question.
A domestic duty.
To me that's an incomplete
What's the complete question?

MR. COUGHLIN:
I guess I'm trying to ascertain
Mr. Elcano's awareness of the position.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
9
10
What's your understanding of the
permissibility of setting off a debt with a duty, a

domestic duty?
11
MR. KING:
Objection.
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
Irrelevant.
Sustained.
Did you say relevancy?
May I
14
respond to it, your Honor?
15
is here today purporting to critique my work in that
16
regard, I think it is relevant to ascertain whether or not
17
he has any sort of conception of permissibility of setting
18
off a domestic duty, like alimony, with some debt.
19
point.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
Just to the extent Mr. Elcano
My
Are you finished?

Yeah.
And I didn't end it very
22
well, but I didn't want to give away what I feel the
23
answer is or the majority viewpoint of American law.
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The objection is sustained.
25
Mr. Coughlin, it's now 11:41.
You have five
1486
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 121
1
more minutes.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Okay.
Really?
The relevancy
objection is sustained.
clueless I am.
sort of knowledge in this area, it's not relevant?
He gets to testify as to how
And this when I ask to see if he has any
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
He's testified on a number of
issues as to your competency, your demeanor in the
courtroom, your conduct toward witnesses, toward judges,
your ability to follow the judge's directions.
10
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
They are all relevant when he
was talking about them.
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Those issues are, sir.
13
Whether or not he knows the intricacies of some fine point
14
of law to me is irrelevant.
15
questions to address to Mr. Elcano, please do so, and
16
let's not argue.
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
Okay.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
19
Now, if you have some
Mr. Elcano, for you to have any sort of
20
legitimate informed bases for the opinion you proffered
21
here today with respect to my competency incident to my
22
work in that Joshi case, wouldn't you need to know whether
23
or not a domestic duty is accorded greater significance
24
and protection in the law than is a third-party debt --
25
No.
1487
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 122
1
-- therein?
It's not permissible to do
essentially what Judge Gardner tried to force on my
client, which is accept a settlement, whereby a setoff is
made whereby my client waived her alimony in exchange for
Mr. Springgate's client saying he set it off by the debts,
by taking them on, even though they could never get at her
anyway because he was the sole signatory.
8
9
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin?
10
THE WITNESS:
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
I don't understand.
Or is that a statement?
It is a statement.
I think --
Then ask a -He's talking about things he
doesn't know about.
16
17
Is there a question there,
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Then ask a question.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
18
Was it appropriate for Judge Gardner to tell
19
my client, Ms. Joshi, not to listen to her attorney in a
20
close-range informal settlement conference?
21
I don't recall that issue.
23
You don't recall that issue?
24
No.
25
Do you know whether or not Judge Gardner in
22
I have no opinion
on it.
1488
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 123
1
sitting informally with myself and Ms. Joshi in the
settlement conference impromptu five minutes before the
trial told me to shut up?
No, I have no knowledge of that.
Do you know whether she told my client not to
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
listen to her attorney?

A
I have no knowledge of that settlement
conference.
Q
Do you know whether or not all these materials
were cited in filings?

A
I don't understand that question.
I don't
know what materials you're talking about.

Q
Were those issues brought up in filings that
14
you have purported to this panel to have read and
15
reviewed?
16
No, I read the order.
17
But you didn't just read the order; right?
18
MR. KING:
Objection.
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Argumentative.
That is argumentative.
20
can ask it in a way that is not argumentative.
21
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
22
You
Didn't you testify earlier that you read the
23
motion for reconsideration?
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
he previously testified to.
We're not interested in what

That's on the record.
Ask a
1489
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
direct question.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Did you read anything besides the order?
Back at the time of your termination I did go
through the file.
I read your motion for reconsideration when it was filed.
results came in?
I don't remember currently what I read.
10
Did you hire Lindy Wisher before her Bar
We hired Lindy Wisher long before she went to
law school.
11
Right.
But as an attorney, before her Bar
12
results came back, did you extend an offer of employment
13
to her?
14
MR. KING:
15
THE WITNESS:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
Relevance.
Yes, sir.
It goes to witness bias.
Goes to what?
Goes to bias.
Mr. Elcano
hired --
20
21
Objection.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It's now 11:46.
I'm going to
afford you two more minutes.
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
24
Yes, sir.
25
Did you say that Matt Pinkolini couldn't deal
with working with Karen Sternly?
1490
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
I don't think I said that in those words.
Did you say anything remotely like that?
I don't recall.
I can testify that Matt
Pinkolini left our employ, and he did not enjoy working
with Karen Sternly.
you.
7
8
9
Exactly why he left, I can't tell
Would that be a similar basis for Larry
Belasco leaving the domestic violence unit?

A
That I'm not sure of.
But Larry Belasco
10
wanted a transfer to work in the child advocacy unit.
11
When an opening came up, I moved him.
12
13
Did he ever communicate to you a displeasure
in working with Miss Sternly?
14
He may have.
15
Did he?
16
I don't recall exactly, but he may have.
17
know I've had difficulties in working with her, so it
18
wouldn't surprise me if Larry Belasco had some.
19
Did you have a communication with me incident
20
to some of these complaints or a complaint, I don't know
21
if it was the Tahoe one or CAAW one or if it was Rhonda or
22
something, in about January-February 2009, wherein you
23
said, you know what?
24
and I asked Judge Gardner -- might have been it was Judge
25
Gardner by that point -- and they both gave you thumbs up,
I asked Master Edmondson about you,
1491
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
or something similar to that?
I said correctly.
4
5
No.
I don't think you're characterizing what
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin.
Your time has expired,
Do you want to ask one more question?
MR. COUGHLIN:
clarify as to where I'm amiss there.
might have said.
9
10
Yes.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I would like him to

What it is that he
Go ahead, if you can,
Mr. Elcano.
11
THE WITNESS:
Periodically I ask judges how
12
our employees are doing, and especially if there's a
13
complaint.
14
Mr. Coughlin's employment I asked one or two judges if he
15
was doing okay, and they said he was doing okay.
16
result, I did not pursue the complaint of the two shelter
17
organizations.
And somewhere early on or to the middle of
So I stood by my employee at that time
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
23
24
25

Was one of those judges, Judge
Gardner?
21
22
So as a
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, your time has
expired.
MR. KING:
I don't know if the panel has any
questions, but I don't.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Any questions from the panel
1492
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
members?
May Mr. Elcano be excused?
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. KING:
Thank you for your time today.

Call your next witness.
I'm going to see if I can get Judge
Holmes on the phone.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Why don't we do that.
If she
is available, if the panel agrees, let's go ahead and take
her testimony, and then take a lunch break.
Because that
10
may put her through her lunch break, which may accommodate
11
her schedule as well.
12
MR. VELLIS:
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
I agree.
Can I enter my objection to her
testifying by phone?
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
Was that
something for the record?
17
I didn't hear that.
18
appearing by telephone.
19
Entering my objection to her

I would like her to be sworn.
I may ask for that.
20
(Placing phone call to Judge Holmes.)
21
MR. KING:
If
Judge Holmes, as you know, my name
22
is Pat King, assistant Bar counsel, representing the State
23
Bar in a disciplinary action against Zach Coughlin.
24
you understand that I was asking you to testify today on
25
that?
Did
1493
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
2
JUDGE HOLMES:
Yes.
And I'm available, and
I'm here, and I'm ready.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Did you have something, Mr. King?
MR. KING:
10
I was going to lay out the room.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Echeverria.
Judge Holmes, this is John
I'm the chair of the panel.
And we'll ask
the court reporter to swear you in at this time.
11
(The oath was administered telephonically
12
13
Just a second, Mr. Coughlin.
But maybe have her sworn first.
8
9
Can we have her sworn?
to the witness.)
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Judge Holmes, the panel has
14
previously issued an order that we're going to limit each
15
side's examination and cross-examination of the witnesses
16
to 15 minutes.
17
JUDGE HOLMES:
18
Okay.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We're using the clock here at
19
the State Bar office.
20
I'll give Mr. King 15 minutes to put you on direct.
21
The clock here says it's 11:51.
JUDGE HOLMES:
All right.
So
Let me just warn
22
you that my cell phone, if I disconnect, it's because my
23
cell phone battery is dying.
24
I'll go up to my room and keep talking to you.
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
If it starts getting low,
Also, do you have any
1494
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
objection -- the panel feels that we would like to go
ahead and get your complete testimony even though we might
encroach into the noon hour.
JUDGE HOLMES:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yeah, that's fine.

It's now 11:52.
Let's start
the time at that point.
7
8
Is that agreeable with you?
MR. KING:
With your permission, may I move
closer to the phone?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Sure.
10
DOROTHY NASH HOLMES
11
12
DIRECT EXAMINATION
13
14
BY MR. KING:
Q
Judge Holmes, could you explain to the panel
15
how you -- whether or not you formed an opinion as to
16
Mr. Coughlin's competency to practice law in Nevada?
17
Yes, I did.
I was the presiding judge in a
18
traffic trial where he was the defendant, and also
19
representing himself.
20
and it was quite an ordeal.
21
couple, three hours of trial, and I saw his performance at
22
that time, and it caused me to draw some conclusions.
23
24
25
And it was a traffic ticket case,

We basically went through a
Did you end up holding Mr. Coughlin in
criminal contempt?
A
I did.
As I said, the trial was a bit of an
1495
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
ordeal.
I held him in contempt because of numerous antics
and actions, and what I considered to be misconduct that
he was performing during the representation of himself.
4
5
(Exhibit 4 marked.)
BY MR. KING:
I'm holding in my hand an order that was
signed by you dated the 28th of February, 2012, in the
matter of 11 TR, which I assume stands for traffic, 26800
21.
And it's an order finding the defendant in contempt
10
of court and imposing sanctions.
11
such an order?
12
Yes, I did.
Do you recall executing
I wrote it myself, and I signed
13
it, and I found him in contempt, in direct contempt during
14
the proceeding, and right after that did the order.
15
I'm reading from Page 3 of your order, which
16
is the final page that has your signature on it before the
17
service, certificate of service.
18
paragraph it says, "The court finds that the defendant's
19
actions were intentional and done in utter disregard and
20
contempt for the court, and in the presence of the court,
21
for purposes of disrupting and delaying the proceedings
22
and dishonoring the rule of law and this court, and
23
constitute the misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a
24
violation of NRS 22.010.
25
the following sanctions are imposed."
But in that final
Good cause appearing therefore,
1496
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
Did you write that order?
Yes, I did.
Is there anything that's occurred since you
issued the order to make you believe that your order is
not accurate?
Well, no.
I've seen Mr. Coughlin a few more
times, and I believe he's got some serious mental illness
issues that drive his conduct.
he is capable of practicing law because of either case,
But I don't believe that
10
whether it's because he intentionally acts that way or
11
because he is unable to control his actions and acts that
12
way.
13
MR. KING:
I'm going to ask that Exhibit No. 4
14
be admitted, which is the order that I just had the judge
15
confirm is her order.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18

She is not here to be able to
see it.
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
22
Pardon me?
She is not here to see it, so
she can't confirm it.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Did you write -- Judge
23
Holmes, this is John Echeverria.
Did you write any other
24
order in the case of City of Reno versus Zachary Barker
25
Coughlin that was dated February 28th, 2012?
1497
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
2
THE WITNESS:
No.
I wrote one order holding
him in contempt.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That was lodged with -- was
that lodged with the Reno Municipal Court on that same
day?
6
7
THE WITNESS:
And then I
provided a copy of that to Mr. King at his request.
8
9
Yes, it was.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I believe this Exhibit 4 has
been authenticated, and I allow it to be admitted.
10
11
THE WITNESS:
And the part he read from, I'm
12
familiar with, and I reviewed it again before when he
13
asked me to be available for testimony.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
(Exhibit 5 marked.)
16
MR. KING:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
19
Okay.
Thank you, Judge.
Is number 4 admitted?
Yes.
BY MR. KING:
Q
Your Honor, I've asked another order be marked
20
for identification purposes that was signed by you on the
21
12th day of March 2012.
22
And in the order you are discussing at some length
23
Mr. Coughlin's conduct again in the traffic case 11 TR
24
26800 21.
25
And it simply states an Order.
Yes, I did.
1498
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
And on Page 4 of that order, after some
discussion, you write the following -- or I'm asking you
if you wrote the following.
circumstances of this case, the in-court performance of
the defendant as observed by this court, the written
documents faxed to the court for filing by the defendant,
the statements and behavior of this defendant and his
overall conduct herein, this court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that Zachary Barker Coughlin, an
"Based upon the total
10
attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada,
11
has committed numerous acts of attorney misconduct,
12
including, but not limited to, violating the following
13
rules of professional conduct."
14
Do you remember writing that paragraph?
15
16
Yes, I did.
I wrote that.
And again, I wrote
it all myself and provided a copy to you after I had --
17
Do you have any kind of a background --
18
besides being an experienced judge, do you have any kind
19
of background working with people that have mental
20
illness?
21
Yes, I do.
Well, of course, I'm the
22
prosecutor for many years, and came across many people
23
with problems.
24
corrections for the State of Nevada for seven years, and
25
during that time I educated myself a great deal on
But I was the deputy director of
1499
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
rehabilitation and correctional programming, substance
abuse, mental illness, and the such, because I had to set
up programs about those things in the prison system.
ultimately I also did a great deal of training on that, on
those topics.
substance abuse counselors, social workers, and others.
And
And I supervised 25 psychologists,
I also currently am a municipal court judge.
I just had my second year anniversary yesterday.
run three specialty courts, including one which is --
10
11
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
And I
I believe that's been 15
minutes.
THE WITNESS:
-- mental health court for
13
individuals with addiction and co-occurring disorders, one
14
that is a drug, a DUI court, which many people, almost
15
all, are addicted as opposed to just abusing, and a serial
16
inebriate court.
17
specialty courts.
So I have three dockets within my
18
And I've had a lot of training over just the
19
last two years on the subject, as well as in addition to
20
having training at the National Judicial College on
21
pharmacology and that sort of thing.
22
conference I just stepped out of is another one, a
23
specialty court conference in Las Vegas right now where
24
they are going over pharmacology and the effects of drugs
25
and alcohol on different parts of the brain and mental
And, in fact, the
1500
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
illness.
BY MR. KING:
Thank you, Judge.
The last paragraph on Page
3 states as follows.
been inappropriate, bizarre, dishonest, irrational and
disruptive to say the least.
7
8
MR. COUGHLIN:
Are you reading the order from
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm not seeing this on the
thing he gave us.
12
13
He has not practiced law" --
the 28th, Pat?
11
"The conduct of Mr. Coughlin has
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, I've cautioned
you about interrupting in the past.
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. KING:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
You interrupted counsel in
the middle of a question.
17
I'm asking for clarification.
20
23
I'm handing it to you right now.

He didn't give me that.
Is
this admitted into evidence?
21
22
He didn't give me that.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Not yet.
BY MR. KING:
Q
-- paragraph 3, and this is partly for the
24
purpose of laying a foundation, did you actually write it?
25
It says, "He has not practiced law in this case in a
1501
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
manner that demonstrates his competence, professionalism,
preparation, consideration for the court, the witnesses or
his opposing counsel.
the court."
He has been very disrespectful to
Did you write that?
Yes, I did write that.
And then you made a list, you actually went so
far as on Page 4 as to be very specific in listing the
rules of professional conduct that you were saying he
10
violated?
11
Yes, I did.
12
You listed 8.4, engaged in dishonesty, fraud,
13
deceit or misrepresentation.
14
Because I'm limited in time, I'm not going to
15
read them all, but I'm going to ask that Exhibit Number 5
16
be admitted.
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection, Counsel?
Yeah.
This looks totally
19
different than the one that's in the file.
20
on here?
21
this one like pristine clean, Pat?
22
23
What's going
Why is this one all blurry and illegible, and
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
What is the objection,
Mr. Coughlin?
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
If this wasn't propounded.

This wasn't what?
1502
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
2
MR. COUGHLIN:
earlier.
3
4
This version wasn't propounded
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It was attached to the
complaint.
MR. COUGHLIN:
This is clear.
The problem is
the one he's always attached to the complaint is not
clear.
8
9
THE WITNESS:
Mr. Echeverria, that was also
provided to Mr. Coughlin.
At the time that order was
10
entered, I had him served up in jail when he was being
11
held for contempt --
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
No, you didn't.
13
THE WITNESS:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
-- mailed to his house as well.

No, she didn't.
Thanks, Judge.
16
admit Exhibit 5.
17
complaint.
18
1809 to the documents copied and produced for
19
Mr. Coughlin.
I'm going to
It was provided as Bates numbers 1804 through
20
21
22
It was the order attached to the
So Exhibit 5 is admitted.

BY MR. KING:
Q
Judge Holmes, was it your intention -- you
23
made these findings by clear and convincing evidence,
24
which is the standard of proof necessary for disciplinary
25
proceedings.
Was it your intention that this order be
1503
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
accepted by the panel as proof of his -- as irrefutable
proof of his violation of these rules?
Yes, it was.
And I'm not intending to
substitute myself for the panel.
understand, that it was their job to conclude that.
did want to tell them that in my experience, and based on
my judicial position, I did find that established by that
particular level of proof.
that, in my experience with him.
10
MR. KING:
But I
And I do believe that it has
MR. COUGHLIN:
11
I understand, and did
It's been 15 minutes.
Thank you for your time.
I'm going
12
to pass the witness.
13
cross-examine you, and the panel may have some questions.
14
Thank you, your Honor.
15
16
In this case Mr. Coughlin may
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11:04.
Thank you, Judge.
Mr. Coughlin, I will give you 18 minutes --
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
He had 30.
-- the same amount of time
that the State Bar --
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
MR. VELLIS:
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
24
25
It's now
He had 30 minutes.
No, he didn't.
How many minutes did he have?
18?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
He used 13 minutes,
Mr. Coughlin.
1504
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. JOHNSON:
He had 13 minutes?
John, I think you misspoke.
think it's 12:04.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
What did I say?
It's 12:04.
I'm going to give you the other two minutes that the State
did not use.
So, Mr. Coughlin, you will have until 12:19.

MR. COUGHLIN:
8
9
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
10
11
Judge Nash Holmes, what did your marshals tell
you about a bathroom break?
12
I'm sorry.
13
Well, the ones you reference on the audio from
14
the March 12th hearing?
15
16
Well, again, which -- my marshals.
Could you
be more specific, please, in your question?
17
18
What marshals when?
How much have they told you about the
Q
hearing --
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted
20
the judge.
She asked you a question.
21
specific as to a particular conversation?
22
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
23
Yeah.
Do you want to be
There was one bathroom break in the
24
hearing.
What were you told during the bathroom break by
25
either a marshal or the city attorney?
1505
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 140
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
With respect to any
particular issue, Mr. Coughlin?
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
5
6
No.
Just anything.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Anything connected to me?
That's what I'm asking.
Is
it involving you, sir?
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
All right.
Mr. Coughlin asked for a
10
bathroom break.
11
break.
12
all his materials in the courtroom.
13
because I suspected that he was tape-recording the court
14
proceedings without my permission, and without asking
15
permission first.
16
do that.
And then I said that I would, but he had to leave
17
18
I originally said I would not give the
Because he's apparently been known to
MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection, hearsay.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
THE WITNESS:
24
25
Overruled.
So I required one of my marshals
to accompany him to the restroom.
22
23
Lack of
foundation.
19
21
And I said that
MR. COUGHLIN:
She just gets to say a bunch of
hearsay?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, she is
responding to your question.
1506
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
Go ahead, Judge.
THE WITNESS:
When the marshals came back from
the restroom, they told me that Mr. Coughlin had, in fact,
been recording the proceedings because he had disassembled
a device and left parts of it in the bathroom.
disassembled parts of it, and then they discovered parts
of it.
8
9
Or left --
In any case, when he was taken into custody

and held in contempt of court at the jail, he had
10
physically two recording devices on him, a cell phone --
11
either two cell phones or a cell phone and some other
12
recording device.
13
was messing with in the bathroom.
14
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
15
Which marshal told you that?
16
I'm sorry?
17
Which marshal --
18
19
20
I assumed that was pieces of which he
I can't hear that.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, you don't need
to yell.
THE WITNESS:
It was Marshal Harley that told
21
me that, Joel Harley, H-a-r-l-e-y.
He said when they went
22
in and checked the bathroom after Mr. Coughlin left, and
23
he had found evidence that he had disassembled some object
24
or something in there.
25
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
1507
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
What evidence, and what object?
I just described it as some sort of a
recording device.
the SIM card out or whatever it was, I wasn't sure.
had asked you, Mr. Coughlin, point blank in court if you
were recording, and you told me no.
immediately to go to the bathroom, and I said no.
then you begged and squirmed and said you had to relieve
yourself, and I had to let you go to the bathroom.
Whether it was a cell phone and he took

But I
And then you asked

And
And
10
then when you did that, you went into the bathroom --
11
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
12
Really?
13
Took apart and disassembled a recording
Really?
14
15
device.
16
17
Would audio show that, Judge?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin.
repeatedly to please not interrupt people.
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
I thought she was done.

It was clear she wasn't when
you were interrupting her.
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
I've asked you
the judge.
All right.
You will cease that conduct.
Okay.
She answered it.
You've asked a question of

Do you have a question?
1508
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Judge, was there one bathroom break during the
I'm sorry.
trial?
The crowd has recessed here, and
let me move across the hallway, because I can't hear
anything right now, there's a big crowd.
7
8
Don't worry.
Just my law license, Judge.
No
biggie.
Was there one bathroom break?
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, I for one do
11
not appreciate your side comments.
12
focus seriously on the issues to be addressed here.
13
judge simply asked for accommodation so she could hear.
14
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
I think you should

The
I only have so much time, your
Honor.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I know.
Quit wasting it.
17
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
18
Was there one bathroom break during the trial?
19
There was one bathroom break.
20
Have you reviewed the audio of that trial?
21
I'm sorry, I can't hear you again.
22
again.
23
24
25
Say it
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Did you review the audio of
the trial?
THE WITNESS:
I have not reviewed them
1509
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 144
1
recently, no.
I did at the time.
I did when I entered my
contempt order and sent my package to the discipline
board.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Why does the audio of the trial indicate that
you did not ask any questions about recording until after
the one bathroom break?
I'm not sure that's the case.
That is the case.
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
Mr. Coughlin --
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
12
I don't know.
Yet you testified today that Mr. Coughlin
13
asked to use the bathroom right after I asked him about
14
recording.
How do you explain that?
15
16
recall --
17
You just said you --
18
I listened to the audio at the time when
19
things happened.
20
bathroom, either way I determined from -- I concluded that
21
you were most likely recording without my permission.
22
I don't know the sequence of events.
I don't
And when you came back from the
Earlier your testimony was that you asked
23
Mr. Coughlin if he was recording, and he got real squirmy
24
and asked to use the bathroom.
25
Is that correct?
Yes.
1510
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 145
1
Now are you remixing that testimony?
No.
You just said, I don't know the sequence of
Well, I don't recall the sequence of events.
events.
5
6
I know that I asked you if you were recording.
you were.
recording, if you had gotten permission to record, what
you were doing.
10
You denied
I asked you a couple times if you were
And at some point it was determined that
you most likely were.
11
You know there is an audio of these things
12
you're testifying to, right, that we can like compare to
13
what you're saying; right, Judge?
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, please exhibit
15
a civilized tone.
16
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
17
You're aware there's an audio?
18
Yes, there's an audio.
19
That we can compare --
20
-- I'm giving you my best recollection at this
21
22
I have not --
time.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, you're trying
23
my patience with your continuing interruptions.
That's
24
not evincing the conduct of a competent lawyer.
You
25
should wait until the witness finishes before interrupting
1511
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 146
1
her.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Ask your next
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Go ahead.
question.
Yes, sir.
So the marshals said Mr. Coughlin left some
disassembled part of a recording device in the bathroom,
and they retrieved it from there; is that correct?
I don't recall the exact words.
The
10
impression I got from what the marshal said is that you
11
had gone into the bathroom, disassembled some sort of
12
recording device, and they went in the bathroom after you
13
and checked that and determined that.
14
recollection of the events.
15
That's my
Is that murky recollection of yours maybe the
16
reason why the law requires, in a contempt not occurring
17
in the immediate presence of a judge, that somebody
18
actually put their name on an affidavit and sign it?
19
20
21
MR. KING:
Mr. Chairman, as Bar counsel, a
member for Bar Counsel office, I find -THE WITNESS:
Mr. Coughlin, you were not found
22
in contempt on that reason alone.
You were found in
23
contempt for engaging in behavior of the same kind it
24
appears that you're doing now, and much more than that.
25
And you were found in contempt for your entire conduct
1512
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 147
1
throughout the course of the proceedings, including
repeatedly asking questions I ordered you not to ask,
delving into areas I had ruled were inadmissible, being
disrespectful, making faces, pretending like you were a
mime, sitting down, slumping down, standing up, walking
around, and doing a number of other things that were
completely improper in the manner of conducting a trial.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Is it proper procedure for you to --
10
-- among one of the many reason why I found
11
you in contempt of court, sir.
12
Is it proper for you to call something summary
13
criminal contempt when you cite to a civil contempt
14
statute?
15
I don't know what is proper in your book,
16
Mr. Coughlin.
I know that the behavior that I saw, I know
17
that I held you in contempt, I held a precise -- you
18
committed direct contempt in front of me in my court --
19
Criminal contempt or civil contempt?
20
-- I held you in contempt on the spot, and
21
then I went and wrote the order.
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, you continue to
23
interrupt.
I'm getting very tired of it.
That's improper
24
behavior.
25
You should exhibit behavior that would justify you keeping
As you said, your law license is at stake here.
1513
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
it.
Have I made myself clear?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Go ahead, Judge.
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
Thank you.
Had you finished?
I finished with that answer,
yes.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
10
Judge, did your order characterize it as
misdemeanor criminal contempt?
11
I do not have my order in front of me, so you
12
can consult my order.
13
contempt.
14
I believe it was misdemeanor
contempt.
15
I believe it was criminal, direct criminal
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'll note on Page 3 at line 14
16
it says, Misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a violation of
17
NRS 22.010.
18
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
to, Mr. Coughlin?
20
21
Which order are you referring
MR. COUGHLIN:
February 28th order.
Page 3,
line 14.
22
MR. KING:
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
Okay.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
25
I think it's Exhibit No. 4.
Judge, is NRS 22.010 a civil contempt statute?
1514
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 149
1
MR. KING:
Objection.
THE WITNESS:
Mr. Coughlin, you can consult
the statutes.
I don't have my books right in front of me.
NRS identifies in Chapter 22 contempt.
Municipal Code has sections relating that or incorporating
those sections into the Reno Municipal Code.
And the Reno
Either way, what you did in front of me was
direct contempt, and I held you in direct contempt, and
you went to jail for five days because of it.
10
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
11
Is it permissible for a judge to call a civil
12
contempt statute a criminal contempt statute, vis-a-vis --
13
this is 22.010, a civil contempt statute.
14
Nevada does have NRS 199 -- I believe it's 240 -- which is
15
the criminal contempt statute.
16
to cite to a -- easier to meet civil contempt statute, and
17
then recharacterize it as criminal contempt?
18
MR. KING:
19
THE WITNESS:
And the law in
Is it permissible for you
Objection.
Mr. Coughlin, I'm not going to
20
argue the law with you.
You have the statutes there.
21
can consult them yourself.
22
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
23
You
On Page 3 at line 4, sub .9 --
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
Which exhibit, sir?

Exhibit 4, your Honor.
1515
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 150
1
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
You wrote, defendant lying to the court in
response to direct questions posed by the court.
What were the lies in your vague order that
lacks any specificity to support a summary contempt
finding, what were those lies that you failed to elucidate
in your order?
8
9
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
is argumentative.
10
11
Mr. Coughlin, that question
Do you want to rephrase it?
MR. COUGHLIN:
Sure.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
12
What were you referring to when you wrote,
13
"Defendant lying to the court in response to direct
14
questions"?
15
Well, it would be explained in the order
16
there.
I don't remember everything at this time because I
17
don't have it in front of me.
18
lied about or misrepresented that you were not recording,
19
because I believe you probably were.
20
believe you probably were.
21
But I do believe that you
I don't know.
At the same time there were things that you
22
and the prosecutor were arguing about with regard to
23
discovery.
24
lying to her about that.
25
you went back and forth about that appeared to me that you
And she disagreed with you and said you were

And there were other items that
1516
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 151
1
were not totally honest about.
So when -MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me.
the record reflect that it's 12:18.
Mr. Coughlin, let
more minutes.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Thank you, sir.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
I'll afford you two
lying.
When you say, alternately you were probably
And then you put in your order, "I find by clear
10
and convincing evidence that he lied," is that ambiguous
11
there?
How do you reconcile that?
12
How do I reconcile what?
13
The fact that your order says you find by
14
clear and convincing evidence?
15
Because that's what I wrote.
I did find by
16
clear and convincing evidence.
17
convincing evidence that you were behaving improperly in
18
court, as you are now, apparently.
19
I found by absolutely
You're saying you found by clear and
20
convincing evidence that a licensed attorney lied to the
21
court.
22
I kind of think he was.
23
some unattributed hearsay that I'm going to base it on.
24
I'm going to get the order I think is wrong about the
25
bathroom break.
And then you characterize that as probably, well,

I think he was, because I know
I'm not going to have a marshal sign an
1517
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 152
1
affidavit.
statute with a summary contempt statute and pick and
choose and make it as retaliatory as I possibly can.
Isn't that a fair characterization of your approach as a
judge?
Then I'm going to remix a criminal contempt
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
answer that question.
extremely argumentative.
THE WITNESS:
Judge, you don't need to
10
That was way out of line, and
Thank you.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you want to ask a
11
legitimate question, Mr. Coughlin?
12
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
13
What basis do you have to assert in your order
14
that defendant lying to the court in response to direct
15
questions posed by the court with regard to his recording
16
the proceedings?
17
The opinion is self-explanatory.
18
have it in front of me, Mr. Coughlin.
19
the tapes and the opinion.
20
I do not
and I stand by the proceedings that day.
21
You have access to
And I stand by what I wrote,
But it's kind of hard to pick inconsistencies
22
in your testimony today and those materials when you
23
refuse to testify now, isn't it?
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Argumentative, Mr. Coughlin.
You are not assisting yourself here.
1518
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 153
1
2
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm asking her.
It's a
question.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
No.
Is that not true that she is
subverting the legal process by refusing to testify
instead of saying, well, read the order and read -- listen
to the recording, and therefore she is not subjecting
herself to putting forth any further inconsistencies.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
argument is later, not now.
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
Mr. Coughlin, the time for
12
It's
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
14
So I'm objecting.
nonresponsive.
13
Okay.
15
What was your basis -MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That objection is overruled.
16
Now it's 12:20.
17
significance that's relevant to the issues in this case,
18
please ask that question, I'll allow you one more.
19
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
20
21
If you have anything further of
What was communicated to you during the
bathroom break, and by whom?
22
MR. KING:
Asked and answered.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I think you've asked that.

I don't think she answered it.
She did.
Do you have another
1519
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 154
1
question, Mr. Coughlin?
MR. COUGHLIN:
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Sure.
Did you or anyone with the Reno Municipal
Court transmit or otherwise deliver Judge Linda Gardner's
order for sanctions to the State Bar of Nevada?
7
8
I'm sorry.
A
what?
I didn't hear all that.
Did I
You'll have to repeat the question.
Did you or anybody with your court, the Reno
10
Municipal Court, transmit or otherwise deliver Judge Linda
11
Gardner's April 2009 order sanctioning me to the State Bar
12
of Nevada?
13
I'm sorry.
Deliver to whom?
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
THE WITNESS:
Oh.
The State Bar, Judge.

After -- let me explain
16
quickly.
My trial was my first experience in exposure to
17
Mr. Coughlin.
18
in contempt, then Judge Gardner told me that his sister,
19
Judge Gardner, has a life experience with Mr. Coughlin,
20
and he provided me a copy of her opinion from a couple
21
years earlier.
22
forwarded to the court.
23
possibly include that would show Mr. Coughlin's ability to
24
practice law.
25
that he faxed to the court.
After everything happened, and I held him
And that may have been in the package I

I forwarded everything I could
Including Mr. Coughlin's 200-page motion
1520
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 155
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Thank you, Judge.
12:22, and we'll excuse you.
It's now
the time --
4
5
MR. COUGHLIN:
Can I ask one more question
about the pending --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
And we appreciate you taking
Mr. Coughlin --- competency evaluation or -Mr. Coughlin.

-- with the trial?
It's a good
question.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It's an interruptive
12
question, and it's improper conduct.
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
answer that, huh?
15
You're not going to let her
You are not going to make her answer
that?
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm sorry.
17
I continue to
talk while you're trying to interrupt.
18
Judge, thank you for your testimony.
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
21
22
She held a trial with a pending
competency evaluation in violation of law.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Quit interrupting,
Mr. Coughlin.
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
I just got it on the record.

Thank you, Judge.
We
appreciate you taking your time into the lunch hour.
1521
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 156
1
THE WITNESS:
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Thank you.
I'll hang up now.
Thank you, Judge.

It's now 12:23.
Mr. King, do
you have additional witnesses?
MR. KING:
I have -- my understanding is I'll
have two additional witnesses.
will be able to reach them, but Judge Howard and Judge
Elliott.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm not certain that I
I'd like to call Judge Nash
10
Holmes in my case in chief and ask her why she persists in
11
holding trial if she was aware of a pending competency
12
order.
13
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
ask her those questions.
15
16
You had the opportunity to
MR. COUGHLIN:
No, I didn't.
it to me.
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
You just refused
No, I gave you -You did another basis for an
impartiality finding.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm sorry.
I have this
21
terrible habit of continually talking while you're trying
22
to --
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
You're not letting me ask any
24
question that would tend to implicate impropriety on the
25
part of a judge.
1522
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 157
1
2
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
rulings as you wish.
3
4
You can characterize the
I have made the rulings.
And you intend to call -- you have two more

witnesses?
MR. KING:
I'm not sure whether or not I will
be able to reach them.
I'll take a very short time with them.
records, which I do have certified copies of, speak for
themselves, and I'll introduce them as the documents
10
If I can, it might be good, but

It may be that the
before I close my case.
11
I did want to call Mr. Coughlin, but depends
12
on if I can reach these people.
13
complete for Mr. Coughlin's sake.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
preference?
16
I want to make the record
What's the panel's
break?
17
Do you want 45 minutes?
MR. KING:
An hour for a lunch
We do have lunch for you here,
18
including you, Mr. Coughlin, and our good security, and
19
the court reporter.
20
MR. VELLIS:
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
23
As short as possible.
Let's come back at 1:00
o'clock, straight up on the State Bar clock.

(Recess taken at 12:25 P.M., to
24
return at 1:00 p.m.)
25
-oOo-
1523
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 158
1
-oOo-
RENO, NEVADA; WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14th, 2012; 1:00 P.M.
-oOo-
4
5
6
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
1:03.
Back on the record.
It's now
We're resuming the hearing en re Mr. Coughlin.
Mr. King?
MR. COUGHLIN:
subpoena.
10
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Do you
Doesn't Spivack say that I have
a choice in that matter?
14
15
You're here, sir.
want do be sworn in, please.
12
13
I don't believe I was served a
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No.
Would you go ahead and
swear the witness.
16
Are you refusing to testify?
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
21
I'm asking you.

Asking me what?
You just told me no, Spivack
doesn't -MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Tell me what Spivack says.
22
I'm not familiar with it.
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
Amendment applicable to Bar matters.
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I think it makes the Fifth
If that's so, do you exercise
1524
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 159
1
that Fifth Amendment privilege?
2
3
MR. KING:
While he's thinking, I'm going to
ask that this be marked as Exhibit 6.
(Exhibit 6 marked.)
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
think, whether or not to claim the Fifth Amendment.
7
8
Mr. Coughlin is debating, I
MR. COUGHLIN:
What I want to figure out is,
you are intent in getting this done today.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
The panel is, sir.

I was told you're the only one
11
with any authority to make any decisions, but -- Mr. King,
12
he said you were.
13
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
told.
But the panel --
15
16
I don't know what you were
MR. COUGHLIN:
I was told lots of stuff by
Mr. King.
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
you raised.
19
Let's address the issue that
privilege?
20
21
22
Do you intend to assert your Fifth Amendment
MR. COUGHLIN:
What we were saying about
you're the only one with authority to make any decisions.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
question, I think.
24
I've asked a pretty direct
call you as a witness.
25
Mr. King has indicated an intent to
MR. COUGHLIN:
Okay.
Now I remember what.
My
1525
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 160
1
question was, it's over, half the day is over.
like ten minutes at the end to put on my case in chief?
3
4
MR. KING:
Do I get
No, I'll be done quite quickly,
Mr. Coughlin.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You'll have probably most of
the afternoon.
and give you as much time as you need.
8
9
Let's address the issue so we can move on
Mr. King has indicated an intent to call you

as a witness.
You've raised a case called Spivack which
10
you tell me allows you to exercise your Fifth Amendment
11
privilege, and I'm asking you if you intend to do so.
12
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
have to subpoena me to call me as a witness?
14
15
I'm also wondering, doesn't he
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Not in my view.
you're here, you're a party.
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
As long as
We're back on the record?

Yes.
We have been on the
record.
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
Do any of the rules that
20
provide procedural protections, are any of those in effect
21
here?
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
This proceeding, as I read
23
the supreme court rules, is governed by the Nevada Rules
24
of Civil Procedure to the extent that they are not
25
inconsistent with the specific rules in the supreme court
1526
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 161
1
rules.
Let's focus on the issue.
MR. COUGHLIN:
-- need to make a motion to
have the witnesses appear telephonically if they aren't
subpoenaed?
MR. KING:
Mr. Coughlin, I'm calling you as a
witness.
And I intend to call you as a witness.
need to indicate whether or not --
8
9
MR. COUGHLIN:
Change the subject.
Doesn't he
need to --
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
a very specific issue here.
Mr. Coughlin, I'm focusing on
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. King has indicated --
12
14
And you
Appearing telephonically.
I'm sorry.
I kept talking
while you're interrupting.
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
interrupted me.
17
I was talking while you
talking.
18
19
I'm sorry.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I keep talking while you're
That's true.
And you do that
repeatedly.
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
I didn't understand that.
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We're focused on a very
22
specific question here.
Mr. King has desired to call you.
23
You have raised an issue in a case you say is Spivack.
24
I'm taking you at your word that that involves your right
25
to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege in this kind of
1527
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 162
1
proceeding.
2
3
I'm going to let you have that.

So my question is:
Are you asserting your
Fifth Amendment right?
MR. COUGHLIN:
The thing is, anything that
would tend to rebut the inference of guilt, you always
rule it's not relevant.
of calling me then?
8
9
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
questions are posed.
Can you focus for me, sir, on the
MR. COUGHLIN:
Which is Pat King wants to call
me?
13
14
We won't know that until the
precise issue that we're facing right now?
11
12
So I'm wondering what's the point
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Correct.
case called Spivack --
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
22
23
Yes.
-- which you claim allows -Go ahead.
Fire away, Pat.
Would you swear the witness
in, please.
20
21
You have raised the
(The oath was partially administered to the

witness.)
MR. COUGHLIN:
I would like to be sworn in the
other room, and call in.
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
You would like to do what?

I would like to call in and do
1528
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 163
1
my swearing in on the phone like Judge Holmes did.
2
3
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You're here, sir.
Are you
going to be administered the oath or not?
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
ZACHARY COUGHLIN
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
sorry.

The time is now 12:08 -- I'm
The time is 1:08, we'll go to 1:23.
11
12
Mr. King.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KING:
13
Mr. Coughlin, I'm handing you what's been
14
identified as Exhibit No. 6.
15
you received that letter from me?
16
Would you please tell me if
Is this the letter in its entirety?
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
receive that from Mr. King?
19
THE WITNESS:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The question is:
Did you
This letter, he said?

I don't know what it is.
21
I know is it's Exhibit 6, and the question is, did you
22
All
receive Exhibit 6 from Mr. King?
23
THE WITNESS:
No, that wasn't the question.
24
He said did you receive this letter.
25
know --
And I need to
1529
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 164
1
BY MR. KING:
2
3
But the question is:
4
5
The next question may be about attachments.
Did you get this letter?
I need to know what is entailed in the term "a
letter."
This document that I handed you.
Did you
receive this document either alone or as part of a
package?
02983?
Did you receive this document Bates stamped
10
Without the Bates stamp?
11
I believe it did not have the Bates stamp when
12
it was sent to you.
13
Yes.
I think so.
14
received something longer.
15
I'm not sure.
I think I
Maybe that's the attachments
you're referring to.
16
So is that a yes?
17
Actually, I might have ultimately received
18
this.
But I recall there being an issue.
19
of domestic violence during this time, and my mail was
20
being -- there was some issues with it.
21
ultimately I did receive this, Mr. King.
22
isn't going to your question.
23
yeah, I think I received this one.
24
MR. KING:
25
I was a victim
So I think
But maybe this
You didn't ask me when.
So
I would ask that Exhibit No. 6 be
admitted as evidence.
1530
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 165
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It's identified as, appears
to be a letter sent by the State Bar of Nevada dated
February 14th, 2012, to Mr. Coughlin at an address of 1422
East Ninth Street, Reno, Nevada 89512, and also appears to
bear a Bates stamp 02983.
(Exhibit 7 marked.)
BY MR. KING:
Mr. Coughlin, I'm handing you what purports to
10
be a letter on your letterhead marked as Exhibit 7.
11
you tell me if you recognize that letter.
12
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
Can I know the
court reporter's name?
14
15
I'm sorry.
Could
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We have a question pending,
and I think it's, did you receive Exhibit 7?
16
MR. KING:
Correct.
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
May I just clarify?
18
Pam Longoni, the court reporter today.
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Is this
20
21
22
I'm sorry?
I didn't hear
that.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Is the court reporter today
named Pam Longoni?
23
MR. KING:
No.
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
No.
I'm sorry.
I apologize.
1531
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 166
1
Forget I asked.
2
3
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
A question is pending,
Mr. Coughlin.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
Did you receive Exhibit 7?
Did I mail this?
Is this my
letter?
I'm sorry, your Honor
BY MR. KING:
Yes.
10
On first blush it looks like a letter that I
11
Do you recognize Exhibit 7?
either faxed or mailed to you, yes.
12
13
March 9th, 2012.
14
letter I've just had admitted that's dated February 14th?
15
16
17
Was this letter -- it appears to be dated

Is that your letter in response to the
I believe so.
MR. KING:
I would ask that Exhibit No. 7 be
admitted.
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
25

On relevance.
Pardon me?
Relevance.
Can you elaborate?
Were you asking me to
elaborate, sir?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yes, sir.
1532
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 167
1
2
MR. COUGHLIN:
were asking, you were prompting Mr. King.
3
4
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
In terms of why I feel it might
not be relevant?
7
8
I'm asking you to elaborate
on your relevance objection.
5
6
I'm sorry, sir, I thought you
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That would be a good
conclusion.
MR. COUGHLIN:
It always strikes me as though
10
the party seeking to have it admitted bears the burden of
11
explaining why it's relevant.
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm not understanding your --
13
I'm asking you to elaborate on why you believe this to be
14
irrelevant to these proceedings.
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
I think that's interesting,
16
because isn't it usually the other way around, he needs to
17
provide an offer of proof how it's relevant?
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
He proffered the exhibit.
19
You objected on relevance.
20
because I'm not sure I understand why you believe it's not
21
relevant.
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
I'm asking you to elaborate,
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
25
Yes, sir.
And I'm offering you the
opportunity to explain that.

MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't know that it bears on
1533
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 168
1
any material facts at issue.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. KING:
Anything further?
No, sir.
Mr. King?
I would suggest that for the
clarity of the record, the February 14th letter is the one
conveying the grievance by Mr. Hill and the response.
I asked him to respond within ten days of his receipt of
this letter.
10
And
And the first response that we received is a
11
letter dated March 9th, 2012.
12
supported by the fact that Mr. Coughlin states at the
13
beginning of the letter that, "I only just now received
14
the letter dated February 14th," the exhibit previous.
15
And then in this he's asking for additional time to
16
respond.
17
And that's further
But my question is -- so I'm asking that that
18
letter be admitted.
19
response to the State Bar's grievance and our
20
investigation.
21
I believe it's relevant to show his
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
As to the degree of
22
cooperation with the State Bar in terms of the
23
investigation?
24
25
MR. KING:
I've alleged in the complaint that
he failed to cooperate with the State Bar's investigation.
1534
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 169
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
3
4
Exhibit 7 will be admitted.
BY MR. KING:
Mr. Coughlin, in this letter you're explaining
that you only just received the letter of February 14th.
And then you go on to explain some hardships, none of
which had to do with the arrest or anything or your
eviction, it appears.
No.
That eviction, that's what you guys don't
10
understand, the way you're sanctioning.
11
have a very human cost.
12
people, Pat.
13
What you are doing is awful to
You're ruining lives.

My question is:
Did you send a subsequent
14
letter or explanation to the State Bar?
15
you're asking for additional time.
16
These evictions
In other words,
Did you ever send --
What you do is evil, Pat.
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
THE WITNESS:
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin.
What you do is evil.

Mr. Coughlin, I have
20
cautioned you about interrupting on numerous occasions.
21
But apparently a pattern of behavior has been the subject
22
of at least three court orders that we have seen so far.
23
And I would ask you to, in your best interests, to attempt
24
to resist yourself, allow the question to be completed,
25
and then make whatever objection you wish.
1535
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 170
1
2
The question directly to you, and if it's not

direct enough, let me ask it.
3
4
Did you ever specifically respond to the

letter of February 14th, 2012, Exhibit 6?
THE WITNESS:
I responded to it.
Specifically.
believe I cooperated with Bar counsel.
thousand pages of stuff.
I'm not sure exactly what that means.
Videos.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I don't have a
Audio.
The question is:
On
10
February 14th you were sent substantial, apparently,
11
correspondence from Richard Hill alleging professional
12
misconduct.
13
within ten days.
14
unless you have some evidence to the contrary --
You were asked to make a specific response

It appears that you did not do so,
15
THE WITNESS:
I didn't get this letter.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
talk while you're trying to interrupt.
18
My question is:
I'm sorry.
I continue to
Did you ever respond
19
specifically, prior to the institution of the complaint,
20
to Mr. Hill's comments and reporting to the State Bar?
21
Did you ever address those issues raised by Mr. Hill prior
22
to the filing of the complaint?
23
24
25
THE WITNESS:
Mr. Hill attachment.
Maybe it would help if I had the
I believe I did.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
When did you do that?
1536
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 171
1
2
THE WITNESS:
There's a multitude of instances
where I wrote or responded or communicated with Mr. King.
(Exhibit 8 marked.)
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
When was the first time?
Well, probably this time in
asking for more time, because I didn't get this letter
very soon after it was sent.
Craigslist.
the people I rented it from.
I rented a room off
And there was some ill will that built up,

And I didn't get this
10
letter -- basically I think I got it this day, and I threw
11
this together.
12
I was obviously very upset to see that the
13
State Bar had wanted to hear from me, and given me ten
14
days.
15
point.
16
I had been noticed on this, I would have given you the
17
envelope that shows that there was some -- like the post
18
office wouldn't let me -- I forget exactly what happened.
19
But I think I gave Pat this stuff --
I think, obviously, it had already passed by this

So right when I got that letter -- and I think if
20
21
MR. KING:
With the chair's permission, I'll
move on.
22
THE WITNESS:
-- legitimate reasons why I
23
didn't get this that evince a lack of culpability on my
24
part.
25
on stuff he knows is baseless.
But that's consistent with what Pat does.
He puts
1537
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 172
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, I don't believe you answered the
question.
It was a direct question.
respond substantively to Mr. Hill's complaints?
not heard an answer.
THE WITNESS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yeah.
MR. KING:
11
THE WITNESS:
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Thank you.
I can answer it.
THE WITNESS:
But it sounded like you said I
didn't answer the last question.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
THE WITNESS:
Then I'd like to answer it
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
25
Mr. King, ask your next
question.
21
23
That was my observation.
fully.
19
20
Mr. Coughlin, there's not a
question pending.
14
18
Your response is
Mr. King, go ahead with your next question.
10
15
Excuse me.
argumentative.
13
I have
The response --
When did you first
No, I mean the last question.

Mr. King, ask your next
question.
THE WITNESS:
I'll just note for the record
that I feel that I was prevented from responding to the
1538
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 173
1
last question.
BY MR. KING:
3
4
as Exhibit 8.
5
6
I'm handing you a document that's identified
-- sent Mr. King a multitude of e-mail
A
responses.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
interrupting.
caution you.
10
Mr. Coughlin, again you are
I don't know how many times I have to
BY MR. KING:
11
Mr. Coughlin, do you recognize this letter?
12
May I just ask clarification?
13
14
Can I respond
to this?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, it is now 1:23.
15
We have gotten about eight or ten substantive questions.
16
You hesitate for a great deal of time.
17
answer the question directly.
18
I'm going to extend the time that Mr. King has to examine
19
you, and I'm going to do it indefinitely until I feel that
20
you're attempting to be responsive to the questions.
21
22
23
You hesitate to
You ask for clarification.
Now, I'm going to permit you to ask the

question you wanted to ask.
MR. COUGHLIN:
What is the question?

Well, it just sounds like he's
24
setting me up to say I didn't respond to this.
25
would like the opportunity to illustrate why I think I did
And I
1539
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 174
1
respond and attempt to cooperate with Bar counsel.
And,
in fact, I took a great deal of time and effort to do so.
So it seemed like we were granting summary judgments to
the extent that, oh, he didn't reply to this letter, which
nothing could be further from the case.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I asked you to explain to us
when you did respond.
thought you did so on numerous occasions.
9
10
In any event, there is a question pending.
Go
ahead and repeat it.
11
12
The best you could tell me was you
MR. KING:
Thank you.
BY MR. KING:
13
Do you recognize that letter that's been
14
identified as Exhibit 8 that purports to be written to
15
Mr. David Clark, Office of Bar Counsel, from Judge Dorothy
16
Nash Holmes?
17
18
It is the one that has a received March 14th
A
date on it?
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
Exhibit 8.
21
It's the one that's marked
BY MR. KING:
22
23
Did you see that
I don't see it marked Exhibit 8.
letter?
24
25
The one I just handed you.
It's not
marked.
1540
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 175
1
It's marked up here, Mr. Coughlin.
That's why I was asking for clarification.
March 14th.
The question is:
Yes, sir.
And --
This is the letter where she alleges a
Do you recognize that
letter?
competency issue, and then goes on to say, but I'm still
10
trying to hold a trial, I'm trying to get this trial set
11
right away, in violation of NRS 178.405 which states you
12
stay proceedings when you feel a defendant has a
13
competency issue.
14
letter, yeah, I recognize it.
15
You don't plunge right ahead. That
MR. KING:
I'm going to ask that Exhibit No. 8
16
be admitted.
This is the letter that Judge Holmes sent to
17
the Office of Bar Counsel that she testified about during
18
her testimony.
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
relevancy.
22

I don't think so.
Well,
And I don't believe this is pled in the
complaint.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
25
Overruled.
BY MR. KING:
1541
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 176
1
2
Mr. Coughlin, you received that because Bar
counsel forwarded it to you; is that correct?
I don't remember how I received this.
imagine it would -- I don't think a stranger sent it to
me.
I don't know.
Did you respond to the allegations to Bar
counsel, the allegations made in the letter by Judge
Holmes, and the accompanying documents; did you respond to
that investigation?
10
Actually, I'm trying to remember -- did I get
11
this letter attached to like an SCR 117 petition?
12
help me out?
13
kind of coy about this, actually, Pat.
14
of -- you were kind of coy about having it.
15
just get this letter, and then I don't think you mailed it
16
to me on March 14th.
17
18
Can you
Did I get it soon after -- I think you were
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Right?
You kind
You didn't
Mr. Coughlin, the question is
did you reply to it?
19
THE WITNESS:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
THE WITNESS:
I'm sorry.
The question is:
Was it forwarded to you?
22
I don't know --
That's what I was expounding
23
upon.
I'm trying to remember when did I first get this
24
letter.
25
devoted your life to becoming an attorney.
Because this is like a gut punch if you've
1542
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 177
1
And, in fact, I didn't get her March 28th
letter -- I mean her March 28th order that was entered.
didn't even get that until I saw it attached to an SCR 117
disability petition in case number 60975.
of figured she just wasn't going to make an order, you
know.
she mailed it to the old River Rock address where I was
evicted from, despite the fact it appeared, at least a
couple other departments in her court had a more recent
10
I guess I kind
And she mailed this one, the one for February 28th,
address for me.
11
And then I have -- if I had been noticed on
12
this -- I have a lot of these letters.
I meticulously
13
kept the envelopes.
14
think I might have sent Pat these with the yellow -- I had
15
a lot of the yellow stickers on my letters, you know,
16
where they were like -- and the court, the court had these
17
too.
I kept the change of addresses.
The muni court.
18
And I had a big ordeal with the post office
19
incident to they didn't want to give me a key to the
20
mailbox.
21
sanctioned, Pat, that I mentioned earlier, it has a
22
fallout necessarily.
23
24
25
This eviction, the evil work that you
In my opinion --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, excuse me.
Do
you remember the question?

THE WITNESS:
Yes.
1543
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 178
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
What was the question?
Did I receive this.

And the answer?
I'm working my way through it
mentally as to how I got this.
MR. KING:
If I'm not mistaken, we're past
that.
how.
the allegations by Judge Holmes that are contained in that
10
You said you did receive it.

And my follow-up question was:
He doesn't recall
Did you respond to
letter, and by the accompanying documents?
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, if you could
12
focus on answering that question, that would be helpful to
13
the panel.
14
THE WITNESS:
One, this letter is not to me.
15
I would like to read it.
Again, that's where the notice
16
part of due process is key, you know.
17
If I was noticed on the idea that I didn't
18
respond to this -- and I'll enter my objection.
19
like to see where in the complaint it says Mr. Coughlin
20
failed to respond or cooperate with Bar counsel.
21
might.
22
I would
It
I'd just like to be sure.

Where does it say where -- was I noticed the
23
import of today was going to include, the relevant inquiry
24
today that I have been put on notice for, was going to
25
include the idea that I didn't appropriately respond to
1544
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 179
1
2
this?
So if I go to the complaint, I'm just
wondering where in the complaint might I be put on notice
that I would be expected to know when I got this today,
and respond intelligently in that regard.
(Exhibit 9 marked.)
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
10
11
Mr. Chairman, may I move on?

You may.
May I answer as best as I can
remember then?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
If you will answer the
12
question, it would be helpful.
13
discourses are not helpful.
14
15
16
THE WITNESS:
But these rambling
They're not winning any points
on notice and due process?

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
This is a preliminary
17
investigation.
Bar rules require attorneys to cooperate
18
with the preliminary investigation.
19
Mr. King is trying to establish whether or not you did so.
20
That's an issue that I believe is relevant to the
21
determination of the degree of punishment, if any, that
22
should flow to you as a result of your conduct.
As I understand,
23
So, Mr. King, move on, please.
24
MR. KING:
25
THE WITNESS:
Thank you.
Your Honor, can I just quickly
1545
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 180
1
attempt to more thoroughly address that issue?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I think you've been afforded
adequate opportunity to do so.
How you choose to respond
is up to you.
Mr. King, next question, please.
MR. KING:
THE WITNESS:
Thank you.
That's the whole notice thing.
You're asking me to answer a question based upon a
two-page letter where I haven't been noticed on the idea
10
that I will be asked to.
11
working through it, you're cutting me off, not letting me
12
put it in the record.
13
And then if I don't -- if I'm
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. King, you cited in one of
14
your pleadings a request that all issues pending before
15
you be heard at one hearing.
16
to the state Bar that you quote in one of your pleadings.
17
THE WITNESS:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
THE WITNESS:
There was a letter you sent
I requested that?
Yes, sir.
You haven't read my pleadings.
20
My whole point was bifurcating, how ridiculous it is to
21
glom all these together.
22
on the record.
23
BY MR. KING:
24
25
I'm so glad you just said that
Could you please take a look at this document
that's been marked as Exhibit No. 9, and tell me if you
1546
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 181
1
recognize that?
You actually just said that.
Mr. Coughlin, there is a question pending --
-- separate hearing.
My whole point
was --
60838 suspension, on a candy bar.
The sole purpose of the
point.
8
9
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
have been resolved.
10
That was my whole
Mr. Coughlin, those issues
Mr. King has asked you a question.
THE WITNESS:
11
after you were empaneled.
12
By an order you entered the day
BY MR. KING:
13
I don't have that much time, Mr. Coughlin.
14
Would you please answer the question I asked, which is if
15
you recognize --
16
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me.
I'm going to make
a comment for the record.
18
MR. KING:
Yes.
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Thank you.
Repeatedly this morning, and
20
I haven't put on the record yet, Mr. Coughlin is making
21
faces, rolling his eyes, expressing exacerbation, the
22
conduct of which does not appear directly on the record,
23
and I want the record to reflect.
24
members disagree with me, they are free to say so.
25
MR. VELLIS:
And if the panel
I would join in what the chairman
1547
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 182
1
said.
BY MR. KING:
3
4
The question is:
Do you recognize what's been
marked as Exhibit No. 9?
I'm sorry for that.
To the extent that's
true.
I don't know that it's that noteworthy, but I do
want to convey my respect for this panel, and I'll try to
mitigate that more.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
believe.
11
There's a question pending, I
BY MR. KING:
12
Do you recognize that document, Mr. Coughlin?
13
This is the affidavit?
14
It has a title of Affidavit of Poverty in
15
Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.
16
I don't see a caption on it, Mr. King, so
17
that's throwing me off a little.
18
it?
19
missing.
20
21
Maybe -- oh, this is Page 2.
So maybe Page 1 is
It looks like there is a Page 1, and a
signature notarized.
22
23
Was there no caption on
And the next question I have is:
Is that your
signature?
24
On Page 3?
25
On Page 2.
Page 3 is Certificate of Service.
1548
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 183
1
2
Not on mine. Page 2 is the first page.
The
first page is Page 2.
Do you recognize that document?
I would object to that based on it being an
incomplete document.
6
7
MR. KING:
I'm going to move to have Exhibit
No. 9 admitted.
THE WITNESS:
MR. KING:
10
It looks as though page --
Affidavit submitted to the court,
filed into the court by Mr. Coughlin, notarized.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
THE WITNESS:
Any objection, Mr. Coughlin.
Yes, sir, your Honor.
The first
13
page has a 2 at the bottom.
14
Page 2.
15
object to the fact it doesn't appear to be a complete
16
document.
It seems to be missing Page 1.
17
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Does that appear to be your
Yes, sir.
Is that your signature
affixed to what's identified as Page 3, Bates stamp 1699?
22
23
And I would
handwriting?
19
21
That's what I mean by it's
THE WITNESS:
It looks like a partial
signature.
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
MR. KING:
Thank you.
1549
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 184
1
2
BY MR. KING:
This is dated -- it says it was filed in
municipal court March 7th, 2012.
part of a document that you had filed with the court
seeking in forma pauperis status?
7
8
Is this a document or a
I recall responding to this March 14th letter.
I just don't recall when I got it.
I'm talking about your affidavit.
10
Exhibit No. 9, Mr. Coughlin.
11
that's no longer at issue at the moment.
12
We're on
at your affidavit --
13
14
15
You're looking at the letter

Could you look
I thought the letter referenced this in some
No.
way.
This affidavit is something you filed in
16
the municipal court in Reno.
17
this to be filed into the court?
18
I'm asking you if you caused
I don't believe I caused anything that's
19
started on Page 2.
20
a document.
21
So if you're referring to a portion of
Whatever this document is, part of a bigger
22
document, did you submit this to the municipal court
23
seeking in forma pauperis status?
24
Did I submit a partial document?
25
This document.
As part of a document or on
1550
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 185
1
its own?
This is the document I have in front of me that
you've acknowledged you signed, and I'm asking if you
filed it with the municipal court.
don't know.
If you don't know, you
But if you know, I'd like you to answer.
It looks like an IFP, I recall.
It says in your household, one dog, three
years old.
Do you have a dog?
Is that your writing?
I believe it is.
And then under self-employment you've checked
10
you're a jack-of-all-trades to the court.
11
lawyer barred at the time.
12
truthful with the court?
13
You were a
Did you believe you were being
I always find this interesting when people --
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
THE WITNESS:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin --
I'm answering his question.

Mr. Coughlin.
17
believe I'm interrupting you now?
18
You were interrupting Mr. King.
19
Why do you
refrain from doing so.
20
21
22
23
24
25
THE WITNESS:
You don't get it yet?

I've asked you to please
I'm sorry.
His question was
compound, so I was trying to answer the first part of it.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
If you have an objection to
his question, make the objection, but don't interrupt.

THE WITNESS:
Actually, I think he was done
with the first part of his question, and I was answering
1551
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 186
1
it.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. King.
Proceed with your question,
BY MR. KING:
The question is:
When you identified yourself
as a jack-of-all-trades as opposed to informing the court
that you were a licensed attorney in Nevada, do you
believe you were being truthful with the court?
9
10
I've always found it interesting when this
subject is brought up --
11
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
calls for a yes or no answer.
13
14
THE WITNESS:
all times.
I think I've been truthful at
Maybe too truthful.
15
16
Mr. Coughlin, that question
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
So the answer is:
Yes, that
was a true statement?
17
THE WITNESS:
Yeah.
And I think it's
18
interesting the idea that just because I have a law
19
license --
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
arguing.
22
Mr. Coughlin, you're now
You've answered the question.
time to argue later.
23
Mr. King.
24
MR. KING:
You will have
25
the affidavit?
Has Exhibit No. 9 been admitted,
I'm moving for --
1552
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 187
1
2
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin?
3
4
Do you have an objection,
MR. COUGHLIN:
It's not a complete document,
and it's not certified.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The ruling of the chair will
be that Exhibit 9 will be admitted.
appear to be a complete document in and of itself entitled
an Affidavit and concluding with a signature, and a
notarized signature, together with a proof of service by
10
the Reno Municipal Court.
The first two pages
11
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
I have a question on that.
What is jack-of-all-trades, Mr. Coughlin?
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
To me it meant somebody
15
struggling to make a living is what I was doing to pay
16
some bills.
17
18
(Exhibit 10 marked.)
BY MR. KING:
19
Handing you, Mr. Coughlin, a copy.
If you
20
look at the bottom right-hand side of the paper, you will
21
see this is a certified order.
22
23
I would ask that it be admitted as Exhibit

No. 10.
24
Oh, I know.
25
It is an order by Judge Kenneth Howard.
If
1553
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 188
1
you'll look at the bottom of the first paragraph, you'll
see, "Appellant Coughlin requested that he be provided the
trial transcript at public expense on the basis that he
was indigent.
filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis wherein he
seeks a waiver of certain fees due to his asserted
indigence."
8
9
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't believe this is noticed
in the complaint.
12
13
Exhibit 10 has been offered.
10
11
On November 14th, 2011, Defendant Coughlin
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I couldn't hear that.
You
had your hands covering your mouth, and you mumbled.
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't believe it was noticed
15
in the complaint.
So my objection, I guess, would be
16
relevancy, lack of notice, SCR.
17
I don't believe the designation of witnesses summary is
18
evidence.
It wasn't in the DowSoE.
19
So it's kinds of a, hey, gotcha here today.
20
Oh, you're not prepared to rebut this because we didn't
21
notice it?
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
Any other objection?

No, sir.
Overruled.
Exhibit 10 will
be admitted.
1554
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 189
1
MR. KING:
You will see it's Bates stamped
document 01831.
that it was produced to Mr. Coughlin.
BY MR. KING:
Or actually 080 sequentially as showing
If you will look at the second to the last
paragraph on Page 2.
It reads, "Mr. Coughlin is a
licensed attorney at law who implied during trial that his
incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his
10
clients.
Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in his 'affidavit of poverty'
11
does not indicate any" --
12
Are you wearing cargo pants at a bar hearing?
13
-- "from his practice of law."
14
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
interrupt again?
THE WITNESS:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
have.
THE WITNESS:
No, you didn't.
You couldn't
I was taken aback by the fact
that he's wearing cargo pants to a Bar hearing.
21
22
I thought he was done.
Please, sir --
19
20
Did you just
Sir?
16
18
Excuse me.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Sorry.
Mr. Coughlin, please, for
your own sake, please do not interrupt again.
23
Mr. King.
24
MR. KING:
25
BY MR. KING:
1555
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 190
1
It says, "Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in his 'affidavit
of poverty' does not indicate any income from his practice
of law.
litigation of the instant matter.
Of note, Mr. Coughlin posted cash bail during the
"This Court has not been provided sufficient
information to determine Mr. Coughlin's indigency status
and will not grant him carte blanche authority to continue
the fishing expedition he conducted during the trial of
this matter.
10
11
12
13
14
Appellant's motion to further pursue this
matter at public expense is denied."

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. King, it's now 1:45.
Do
you have much further?

MR. KING:
I have no more witnesses to call,
and I only have a couple of documents to admit.
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
THE WITNESS:
Okay.
Excuse me, sir.
Was there a
17
question or was he just reading -- he was just reading it
18
into the record?
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
He read part of what was in
20
Exhibit 10, which has been admitted.
21
that exhibit into the record.
22
THE WITNESS:
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
25
He read portions of
Yes, that's what he did.
Okay.
questions of Mr. Coughlin?

MR. KING:
Yes.
1556
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 191
1
2
3
4
BY MR. KING:
Q
Mr. Coughlin, I'm handing you Exhibit No. 11.
Do you recognize that document?
It looks like Judge Howard's contempt order.
We heard from Judge Holmes, and she held you
in contempt.
were quizzing her about whether it was criminal or civil
contempt?
10
Yes, sir.
11
In this particular order Judge Howard held you
12
Do you remember that discussion where you
in contempt of court; is that correct?
13
I believe so.
14
Did Judge Howard -- as a result of this
15
contempt order, were you incarcerated?
16
Yes, sir.
17
Do you recall for how many days you were
18
incarcerated on this particular order?
19
I believe it was three.
20
Do you recall the reason that Judge Howard
21
22
sentenced you to jail and held you in contempt?

A
Are you referring to what he verbally rendered
23
at the time or what has been reduced to writing here or
24
what I think he did it for?
25
Express to the panel, if you know, what reason
1557
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 192
1
2
you were given for being held in contempt by Judge Howard.

A
That's what I was asking.
When you say what
reason I was given.
I might draw that reason, whether it's this reduced to
writing order or what he might have rendered at the time
shortly before handcuffs were placed on me.
say what reason he gave --
8
9
10
There's a number of things from which
But you did
Your understanding of the reason that you were
held in contempt by Judge Howard?

A
I recall him -- well, I think it was one thing
11
before I got this.
12
got this, you know.
13
rendered from the bench at that time.
14
basically contemptuous conduct.
15
time continuing lines of inquiry after being told not to.
16
And then it changed somewhat when I

But it was -- and I forget what he
But it was
He might have said at the
There was a definite sense that any sort of
17
questioning that might somehow subject the police to
18
respond in a way that might bring to light any culpability
19
or their part was something that upset him greatly.
20
21
22
23
24
25
Thank you, Mr. Coughlin.

Looking at the first page of that document
where it says -MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you
have a copy for the panel?

MR. KING:
Yes.
As a matter of fact, since
1558
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 193
1
this is a certified copy, I'll move to admit this as
Exhibit No. 11.
3
4
5
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
into evidence.
Exhibit 11 has been moved
Mr. Coughlin, any objection?
MR. COUGHLIN:
Well, I would object based on
the fact that the entire res in which this prosecution
stems is violative of Nevada law, and the tribal police
officers are not allowed to conduct a misdemeanor arrest,
and this was a misdemeanor arrest.
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm interested in any
11
objection to Exhibit 11 being admitted.
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
21
Yes, in that it's a void order.

Did you appeal it?
I did.
Was it affirmed?
It was.
I don't know if my appeal was
dismissed or not.
MR. KING:
With the court's permission, the
22
reason given by the judge, he has check boxes, but he
23
actually has some typed in bold sections.
24
the record, "Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior
25
toward the judge while he is holding court, or engaged in
Reading it into
1559
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 194
1
his judicial duties at chambers, To wit:
directives of the Judge, continuing lines of inquiry after
being advised by the Court to refrain from doing so,
demeaning the Court with statements such as 'WOW' in
response to court rulings, laughing during testimony and
further questioning the court and its authority."
Refusing to obey
I may have to get additional copies of this
order, your Honor.
This order is signed by Kenneth Howard.
10
This is a certified order as well.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
Exhibit 10; is it not?
12
I think that's the same as
BY MR. KING:
13
Mr. Coughlin, after a trial on the -- I think
14
you just alluded to a charge that had something to do with
15
the Indian tribal police or something, I'm not sure.
16
were you charged with theft out of a Walmart store?
But
17
I believe so.
18
Was there a trial on that, a court trial?
19
Yes, sir.
20
At the end of that court trial did the judge
21
render a verdict finding you guilty?
22
Yes, sir.
23
Was that appealed, was the decision of the
24
25
court appealed by you?

A
Yes.
1560
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 195
1
Was the conviction upheld on appeal?
Well, when he rendered his order --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
calls for a yes or no answer.
Mr. Coughlin, the question
BY MR. KING:
Was the conviction --
I'll give you an opportunity to explain.
if you would just start with that answer.
But
on appeal?
10
yes or no.
11
Was it upheld
I don't know quite how to answer that, if a
thoroughly.
12
I would have to read the order more
Not to be condescending, but you're fighting
13
for your law license.
Do you know whether or not you
14
filled an appeal and whether or not it was upheld on
15
appeal?
16
17
being not upheld?
18
the preparation of transcripts, which doesn't apply to a
19
criminal defendant.
20
some people would say that's kind of -- I don't know how
21
appropriate that is.
22
If something is dismissed, is that the same as

I know it cited to a civil statue on
Even though on the bench 14 years,
And he told me that when they brought me back
23
from the cell.
He said, you have to pay for the
24
transcript up front at your own expense.
25
Nevada law does not say that.
When actually
It says the court has to
1561
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 196
1
order the transcript prepared within ten days, regardless
of whether you pay or not.
stealing?
Regardless.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
phrased differently.
So who is
Maybe the question can be
You did take an appeal from the
conviction?
THE WITNESS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
What was the result of the
appeal?
10
11
Yes, sir.
THE WITNESS:
Judge Elliott said I didn't cite
to the transcript.
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
THE WITNESS:
What was the result --
So I want to say he denied the
14
appeal, because I didn't cite to the transcript that the
15
muni court violated Nevada law in not preparing -- when
16
they hold out Pam Longoni, house transcriptionist, and
17
they tell you she is the only one you can use, and you
18
have to pay her a substantial down payment up front, and
19
we're not going to prepare the transcript until you do
20
that.
21
And I think they also say they are not going
22
to transmit it in full until you pay in full.
But they
23
don't start it until you put down like 250 or something.
24
It depends on how long it is.
25
Nevada law --
Which is all violative of
1562
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It would help, Mr. Coughlin,
if you could focus on the questions.
THE WITNESS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
5
6
Yes, sir.
What was the result of the
appeal?
THE WITNESS:
Technically, I don't know how.
I filed a brief.
don't know whether they said it was denied or upheld.
basically the order was short, and it said, you didn't
10
11
It did not turn out good for me.
I
But
cite to the transcript.

So I think he essentially said I'm not going
12
to consider your 40-page 50-page brief, whatever that I
13
typed out -- well, maybe that was a subsequent supreme
14
court thing --
15
MR. KING:
Mr. Chairman, I was hoping to
16
expedite by getting the testimony from Mr. Coughlin.
17
have the orders.
I will just mark them and admit them.
18
19
THE WITNESS:
20
Basically Judge Elliott said you
have to cite to the record --
21
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
24
25
to the reporter.
Mr. King is handing something
Please don't talk while he's doing that.
MR. KING:
So you should each have two
documents in front of you.
One is entitled Order Granting
1563
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 198
1
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
the Order Affirming Ruling of the Reno Municipal Court.
MR. VELLIS:
MR. KING:
5
6
The other order is
What numbers are those?

12 and 13.
BY MR. KING:
Q
Mr. Coughlin, just a couple of follow-up
questions.
There's a couple of other matters pending that
are not yet resolved in the courts.
the -- what I'm going to ask you simply is if you know the
One has to do with
10
status of the case, if you yourself know the status of
11
your cases.
12
Do you know the status of that case?
One has to do with the theft of a cell phone.
13
Yes.
Trial is continuing on the 19th.
14
And then another arrest and charge of making
15
9-1-1 calls in violation of the law.
16
status of that case?
17
Yeah.
Do you know the
The D.A. is seeking a letter, CR1116,
18
serious offense, by pleading it down to a simple
19
misdemeanor of something like resisting, which will
20
necessitate upon a conviction of a serious offense
21
petition, versus incongruously the greater gross
22
misdemeanor I don't believe would be a serious offense
23
under our supreme court rules.
24
25
So they're thinking of increasing it to
include a resting charge?
1564
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 199
1
No, they're --
Dropping it down?
They're dropping it down.
But it's worse for
me to what they are dropping it down to, because, like I
could beat my wife, and I wouldn't be suspended
temporarily.
lacking due process the trial was of a candy bar, you get
suspended.
But if you're convicted, no matter how
And it's pretty much the same if you
10
misappropriate 800K and use it on hookers, versus like
11
eating a candy bar maybe you didn't even steal.
12
be something, your meds, some issues with that.
13
14
I'm sorry, Mr. King.
Could I finish up on
that?
17
18
Then the last question I'm going to ask you,
just to give you an opportunity to expound --
15
16
It might
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you want to interrupt on
that, despite being cautioned?
19
THE WITNESS:
I don't, sir.
You know what,
20
when you say to a diabetic your blood sugar is low again.
21
When you keep just picking at them --
22
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Are you claiming to be a
diabetic?
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No.
I'm making an analogy.
Draw the analogy for me then,
1565
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 200
1
please.
What do you claim to be that you claim I am
picking on you about?
THE WITNESS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I don't want to get into it.

Would you withdraw your
comment?
THE WITNESS:
Well, I mean, let's deduce this.
What could I be referring to?
insensitivity with regard to?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
What might you be lacking
You made the comment, sir.
10
I'm asking you to draw the analogy.
11
form --
12
13
THE WITNESS:
Do you claim some
You keep picking at me for
interrupting you, not following the rules.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Because that's part of what
15
is expected of a competent attorney is to not interrupt,
16
to show respect for the other counsel, to show respect for
17
the court, to show respect for the reporter who can't
18
interpret --
19
THE WITNESS:
Well, you -- okay.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
THE WITNESS:
Excuse me.
Two --
You're doing it again.
22
kept saying, hey, blood sugar.
23
blood sugar right, diabetic.
24
MR. KING:
25
THE WITNESS:
Blood sugar.
If I
Get your
Mr. Chairman -You would be kind of
1566
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 201
1
insensitive, wouldn't you?
weakness.
We all have our strengths and
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you claim to have some
level of incompetency or impairment that you assert I am
picking on?
THE WITNESS:
Well, let's say hypothetically
someone had like an attention deficit disorder or
something.
9
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me.
I don't want to
talk hypothetically.
11
THE WITNESS:
Of course not, because we're not
12
talking about your personal stuff.
13
specific when it's not your personal stuff.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You want to get real
Mr. Coughlin, you made an
15
analogy, sir, and I'm asking you to draw the connection.
16
Do you claim to have some infirmity similar to diabetes
17
with which I'm picking on you?
18
THE WITNESS:
I guess, yeah.
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
THE WITNESS:
What is that?
21
getting into it, you know.
22
I don't want -- feel comfortable
deficit disorder.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
hypotheticals.
25
But let's say I had attention
I'm not interested in
Do you claim to have an attention deficit
disorder?
1567
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 202
1
2
THE WITNESS:
I don't really want to get into
it.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You raised it, sir.
part of mitigation.
this panel is entitled to hear that.
It's
claiming an impairment, then we should know that.
If you're claiming some impairment,
THE WITNESS:
If you are not
I think all I'm doing is
suggesting to you that maybe somebody is not derogating
your authority or continuing on lines of inquiry after
10
being told not to or filing things that are too long to
11
make you mad or because they lack competency, you know.
12
Some people are just different, you know.
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm offering you an
14
opportunity to explain to this panel some mitigating
15
factor that might involve an impairment.
16
analogy.
17
claim some form of impairment.
18
so and withdraw your comment.
You drew an
I'm giving you an open widow if you want to
19
THE WITNESS:
If you don't, then tell us

If you do, then tell us.
Well, it's just -- there seems
20
to be certain types of, forms of impairment that are more
21
in vogue than others, and that are -- get more sympathy
22
than others.
23
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm asking you if you are
claiming -THE WITNESS:
My ex, for instance, she's a
1568
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 203
1
diabetic.
2
3
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
here, Mr. Coughlin.
4
5
Your ex is not the subject
You are.
THE WITNESS:
She is the one that took two
months' rent --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm going to take your
failure to answer my direct question that you're not
claiming some form of impairment.
THE WITNESS:
Can we conclude that?
No, I guess I am.
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
THE WITNESS:
What's that impairment?
There is a shame aspect to it.
12
But I am, I guess, diagnosed with attention deficit
13
disorder.
14
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Have you sought treatment for
that?
16
THE WITNESS:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
Yeah.
Have you been prescribed
medication for that?
19
THE WITNESS:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
THE WITNESS:
22
Do you take it?
I do.
take it when I'm in jail.
23
Uh-huh.
The jail won't let me
But when I'm outside, I do take
it.
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
THE WITNESS:
Have you taken it today?
Yeah.
But --
1569
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
THE WITNESS:
it.
you take it.
Do I have to answer that?

No.
There's just a lot of stigma to
So much so that when you go to jail they won't let

Then you have to --
7
8
What are you taking?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you feel you need
additional help in dealing with your problem?
THE WITNESS:
Not really.
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
12
MR. KING:
13
With the panel's indulgence,
my last question.
14
Yes.
Okay.
BY MR. KING:
15
Mr. Coughlin, I want to give you an
16
opportunity to explain your concern that two of the judges
17
that were involved in prosecuting you, if you want to, you
18
can explain their relationship.
19
Somehow you were trying to suggest that there
20
was a brother and sister, some sort of familial
21
relationship between the judges that caused you to be
22
treated unfairly.
23
to expound on that.
24
25
I just want to give you an opportunity
I'm a little uncomfortable with that, because
the sister judge's bailiff is here.
1570
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
2
If you wouldn't mind, can you tell me which
judges you're referring to?
That would be the judge whose order is
apparently ghost grievance, NG12-0435.
Judge Linda Gardner, the family court judge.
'09 sanction order, that would be the sister judge.
you're prompting me to kind of expound upon where I
think --
9
10
That would be
The April
And
You put in pleadings to me, or not pleadings
but in e-mails rather --
11
This is a good subject.
12
I'm letting you expound on it a little bit.
13
This is interesting, because it all ties it
14
together.
15
presented letters from Mr. Elcano saying, you're fired,
16
sole reason Judge Linda Gardner's order, or you can say my
17
conduct that led to that order, whatever.
18
Of course, I was fired.
I appreciate it.
I believe I have
And so then fast-forward to before the
19
eviction starts, I start getting some clients at my home
20
law office which is commercial tenancy, or at least
21
somewhat of a commercial tenancy.
22
business that's pretty much dormant, but that's the thing.
23
I have a mattress
But anyway, I'm trying to get to it quickly.
24
I note focus is something judges would like to see more
25
out of me.
1571
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
But my point is that she issued -- the next
time I appeared before her, she recused herself.
I got a
client, and it was just before the Richard Hill eviction
thing started.
me that's per se evidence that I was operating a law
practice out of my home.
fact that, okay, well, Judge Gardner, she cited, and I
have the order if I'll be able to put it on later, but she
indicated which judicial canon her recusal was done in
So it's just this weird irony, because to
And then it ties in with the
10
light of.
11
I think as I read it, that's the one that says basically
12
the judge flat out admits they have a problem with you or
13
bias.
14
And she cited, I think it's 2112.1181, maybe.
So anyway.
I guess my point would be, well,
15
okay, if the sister judge straight out has a bias against
16
me, and I had filed a mandamus action against her, which I
17
understand she probably didn't appreciate.
18
I know judges.
A guy I'm somewhat acquainted with, Dennis
19
Widdis, he filed a mandamus action against Judge Berry at
20
one point.
21
relationship now, bygones be bygones.
22
point that's the case, you know, here.
He says they have a really good working

And I hope at some
23
But I think it's possible her brother
24
shouldn't have sat on the criminal trespass case.
25
fact, I feel quite strongly in that regard.
In
And I want to
1572
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 207
1
be fair to Judge William Gardner RMC.
And I've been
staying up real late for a while now reviewing all these
tapes and transcripts and I don't want to say he didn't
tell me it was his sister, but I think it's possible that
it was -- I had to bring it up, you know.
I think I had to bring up the fact that he
worked for the Reno city attorney from -- I didn't say
exactly what years he worked for them.
the fact that he did.
But I brought up
And then subsequently I heard he
10
worked for them from '87 to '97, then he took a short
11
break, went to Arizona to be a prosecutor, then he worked
12
from '97 to 2000 in private practice for seven years, then
13
he was Reno city attorney, civil division, from '07 to
14
'10.
15
When the judge is somebody who worked the vast
16
majority of their career for the institute that's
17
prosecuting you, it's a little difficult to believe that
18
that wouldn't have some bearing on their decision-making.
19
That being said.
I know people who know Judge
20
William Gardner personally, and they speak very highly of
21
him.
22
apparently first or second year out of law school or
23
something, he took a murder trial to acquittal on a solo
24
basis.
25
He was a public defender at some point.
And he,
But I don't think he should have sat on this
1573
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
case.
I feel quite strongly in that regard.
gone through that trial with a fine-tooth comb.
it's illustrative of the fact that we all can think we can
be unbiased about things, but maybe this is a situation
where bright line rules have their utility, you know.
And I've
And to me
And I think there is a bright line rule.
But
I think you might have to live in the same house as the
judge.
first-degree; brother, sister, I don't know if that's a
Just being a very close family relation like a
10
bright line recusal.
11
house, it would be.
12
I think if they live in the same
But to the extent that during the time that
13
this trial went on the mandamus action, me against his
14
sister, me against the Second Judicial, that wasn't
15
pending.
16
disposed of.
17
to the procedures of the State Bar, I would imagine.
I think that was resolved or pretty much
18
Whether there was a grievance pending goes
Because there wasn't a complaint, because that
19
wasn't filed until August 23rd.
20
well, actually, the grievance that involves his sister's
21
sanction order was March 15th received.
22
setting in a case on March 8th.
23
during the pendency of a competency evaluation.
24
25
But I suspect that --
There was a trial
That setting occurred

And --
Is that a competency evaluation that you went
through?
1574
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 209
1
Yes.
Was that to determine whether or not you were
And I've had three of them this year.
fit -- you were capable of committing a crime, in essence?
Of standing trial for a crime?
Yes.
Yes.
And then in each of those cases they
determined you were competent to stand trial thus far; is
that fair?
10
Yes.
But I bring that up because there's been
11
a great deal of activity which I believe is violative of a
12
statute in Nevada requiring proceedings to be stayed once
13
a judge enters an order for a competency evaluation.
14
In that instance Judge William Gardner, he set
15
a trial.
16
to ask Judge Holmes this.
17
this in my briefs, but there is a real relevant period of
18
time area that that deals with February 27th.
19
happened on February 27th.
20
He set a trial date despite -- and see, I wanted
MR. KING:
Because, and I've gone into
A lot
Mr. Coughlin, I'm going to say that
21
my questioning of you is concluded.
22
will give you a chance to answer, but I don't want it to
23
be in the form of an answer to my question.
24
25
So I thank you.
of Mr. Coughlin.
I'm sure the chair
I have no further questions
I'm not done with my case, because I
1575
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 210
1
want to make a statement.
questions.
But if the panel has any
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do any of the panel members
have any questions at this time?
MR. KING:
At this point in time I'm going
to --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Thank you.
MR. KING:
then I'm going to rest our case.
Mr. Coughlin.
-- ask the panel to do something,

Then I'm going to save
10
argument for the end of the entire case, of course, and a
11
recommendation.
12
But I would like the panel to recognize its
13
responsibility to conform the pleading to the proof that's
14
presented before them.
15
realize it's a very important responsibility for the sake
16
of the panel, the Bar, the attorneys that practice law in
17
Nevada and Mr. Coughlin himself.
18
I think this panel has a very, I
But at these disciplinary hearings
19
Mr. Coughlin has demonstrated the type of conduct that
20
he's been accused of --
21
22
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I think you're starting to
argue the case, and that's -MR. KING:
I want to bring to the attention of
24
the panel that I'm wanting them as part of my case to
25
amend the order to show that Mr. Coughlin was
1576
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 211
1
disrespectful to Judge Holmes, and that his conduct was
not lawyerly, and that he showed a lack of candor to the
court and this panel.
4
5
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
argument, Mr. King.
6
7
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you have any other
evidence?
10
11
I thought I might have to do that
in my case.
8
9
I actually think that's
MR. KING:
With that said, I have no other
evidence.
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
You're seeking to amend your
13
complaint here today about my conduct today?
14
a summary disciplinary proceeding now?
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
has rested.
Mr. Coughlin, the State Bar
You may call your next witness.
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
Is this like
Can I just confirm what -Do you want to take a short
break?
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
No, I'm good.
Can I just
21
confirm what happened?
22
in light of conduct committed allegedly in the presence of
23
the panel?
24
25
He sought to amend his complaint
Is that it?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I didn't entertain that.
told him I thought that was argument.
I believe that he
1577
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 212
1
doesn't need to amend the complaint, that this panel can
assess the performance of a lawyer subject to potential
discipline.
4
5
MR. COUGHLIN:
Summary disciplinary
proceeding?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No.
It's part -- I believe
a panel can personally observe the conduct of attorneys
who are present before the panel and assess whether the
conduct at the hearing is consistent or inconsistent with
10
what appears to be a pattern of conduct.
11
assessment that the panel can make as part of its
12
determination.
13
That's an
In my view, I don't think any amendment has to
14
be made.
15
practice law in the state of Nevada, whether you have
16
violated rules of professional conduct.
17
mandate from the supreme court in your case that we're to
18
consider what, if any, punishment should be afforded as a
19
result of your conviction for theft.
20
The issue here is whether you are competent to
So that's why I cut him off.
We have a direct
I believe he was
21
entering into argument.
I think he's entitled to argue
22
that your conduct here exhibits a continuation of a
23
pattern.
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
But I don't get like a -Mr. Coughlin, let's take a
1578
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 213
1
recess until 2:30.
It's now 20 minutes after 2:00.
we'll offer you an opportunity --
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
talk while you interrupted.
I would like the -I'm sorry.
I didn't mean to
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Go ahead and interrupt.
And
My blood sugar is low.

For that we'll take a break
until 2:30 according to the State Bar clock.
(Recess taken.)
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
panel is present, reconvening at 2:31.
12
Let the record reflect the
Mr. Coughlin, are you prepared to proceed with
13
your portion of the case?
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
19
Go ahead.
Do you have a
witness?
17
18
Yes.
MR. COUGHLIN:
on my case.
I'm going to go ahead and put
Judge Nash Holmes lied today.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
Do you
have evidence to present?
21
That's an argument.
conclusion of the evidence.
I'm testifying.
You're testifying?
Later on I'll testify.
We'll do the argument at the
1579
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 214
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
evidence right now.
I'm going to put on some
This is the audio from the trial,
Judge Nash Holmes' deal.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you have a transcript?

The audio transcript?
I don't know what you are
MR. COUGHLIN:
The official audio from the
muni court.
12
13
Yes, I do.
offering, so I would like to see a transcript.
10
11
Do you have a copy for us?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
What is it exactly that
you're proffering here?
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
record the proceedings.
16
proceeding.
It's a court of record.
They
And it's the audio from that
Pat King has it.
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
I got it from Pat King.

Which proceeding is this?
The traffic case that she
19
testified to today where she said, I asked you if you were
20
recording, and then you got all sneaky, and then you
21
wanted to go to the bathroom.
22
show whether or not the going to the bathroom occurred
23
before the sua sponte interrogation about the recording,
24
and we'll see how truthful Judge Nash Holmes will be.
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And I want to show this and
Do you have a transcript of
1580
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 215
1
that proceeding?
MR. COUGHLIN:
The problem is I appealed it.
And under the law she is supposed to order the transcript
whether I pay a down payment or not, but they keep
breaking the law in the muni court.
break the law.
bottom line not to prepare the transcript, even though the
law says they have to.
9
10
Some people might say it helps their
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
My question is, do you have a
transcript?
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
They just flat out
Yes.
May I see it, please?
No.
It's an audio transcript.
Do you have a transcribed
transcript?
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
You mean like a typed out?
17
Some of this stuff I typed out.
18
I submitted to you, you would see I typed some of it out
19
myself.
20
21
22
23
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
If you had read the stuff
So it's not a certified
transcript?
MR. COUGHLIN:
The only certified one I have,
I believe, is that Richard Hill trespass case.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Well, what is it exactly that
you're offering now?
1581
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 216
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
I would like to
attached.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I have three or four DVDs.
Can you be specific?
13
14
All right.
admit into evidence the DVDs that I gave you, that I
11
12
No, it was after it was
admitted into evidence.
8
9
You let him just read stuff
into evidence from an order.
6
7
I don't want it just played
into evidence.
4
5
The audio from the trial.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yeah.
The one attached as
exhibit, I believe it's Exhibit 4 to the ex parte motion.
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't have an Exhibit 4.

But I also was told that you
17
consented -- is it not the case that you consented to
18
electronic service to some extent?
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
I did not consent to that.
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
Then how did you rule on a
21
22
23
motion if -MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The motion was written,
presented to me, and I ruled.
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
How did you get the motion?

The State Bar provided it to
1582
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 217
1
me.
2
3
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That's their function,
Mr. Coughlin.
6
7
MR. COUGHLIN:
Did they provide the DVDs I
gave them?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
No.
They didn't?
I thought that
was their function.
11
12
So did the State Bar
provide all the DVDs I gave them?
4
5
Oh.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
present, identify it.
No.
If you have evidence to
Let's be specific.
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes.
The DVDs.
That's not specific, sir.

It's the file on the DVDs that
16
is 11 TR 26800R -- I only have a limited time.
17
this?
18
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
25
It has my name on the file, and
it's on the DVDs attached.
22
23
I don't know anything about
it.
20
21
Can I play
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That does not lay a
foundation.
MR. COUGHLIN:
It's the official court audio
from the muni court case that Judge Nash Holmes testified
1583
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 218
1
to.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Lay the foundation.
You
object to documents that have a certification by the
county clerk or the city clerk.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Mr. King gave me this.
He gave
it to me as part of the leftovers from his screening
panel, which he still won't tell me who was on the
screening panel.
by the muni court of that.
10
11
It's the court of record audio recording
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you have that on a
separate DVD or disk or whatever?
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. KING:
I gave it to Mr. King.

As a separate document?
Actually, it's not.
It's not,
15
Mr. Chairman.
16
municipal court and purchase or acquire, however it's done
17
appropriately, official records --
18
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
And I did.
Actually, my mom
did.
20
21
I encouraged Mr. Coughlin to go to the
MR. KING:
them.
Mr. Coughlin said, I can't get
They won't give them to me.
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
MR. KING:
Yeah, they wouldn't.
I said that's not my
24
responsibility.
You get them.
And I contacted the court
25
myself just to find out, and they said all he needed to do
1584
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 219
1
is come in, fill out a short form, and he can acquire
them.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. KING:
Which was a total lie.
So that's what they told us.
So I
explained to Mr. Coughlin that I don't have the official
version.
copies.
records --
I have copies which are, in essence, copies of

The reason I object to any use of audio
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
sorry.
11
I was wrong, Mr. King.
I'm
My mom actually bought an official version, just
to cut to the chase.
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin.
Can you tell
13
me how many times I need to remind you not to interrupt?
14
At what point do you get it?
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
Sir, I just thought it would be
16
helpful to the court, given the limited time we have here
17
today to make sure the court is aware I might have
18
misspoke earlier when I said -- I did get a copy from
19
Mr. King --
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
sir, and quit interrupting?
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. KING:
Can you answer my question,
25
Yes, sir.
Mr. King.
Thank you.
The reason I object so
strongly to these recordings is a transcript you can look
1585
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 220
1
at, you can fill in the blanks, if you want to read on
either side of something to put it in proper context, you
can.
transcript.
And that's why a court requires a written
I was punished to sit through the recordings
of all these proceedings as part of my job as Bar counsel
doing an investigation.
case of this particular matter more than one day.
They go on for hours.
And in the
So to suggest that anything is going to be
10
proved by having Mr. Coughlin pull out excerpts and have
11
you listen to it where there is no ability to put it in
12
proper context, no ability to see the entire record, I
13
think is highly prejudicial, and no doubt would confuse
14
the matter as opposed to assisting the matter.
15
Dorothy Nash Holmes' order as she said it
16
speaks for itself.
17
she testified that this is what I believe took place with
18
regard to the audio transcript.
19
reason for her contempt order, and he was convicted.
20
Those were her findings.
That's when
But that wasn't the sole
So him wanting to burden us by having you
21
listen to an excerpt of a video recording I think is
22
highly inappropriate.
23
an ability to post matters to YouTube, to do editing, and
24
we have no way to know whether or not, in fact, these have
25
been edited.
Plus, Mr. Coughlin has demonstrated
I have listened to a couple of excerpts from
1586
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 221
1
him regarding an arrest, and it is my opinion that they
were extremely altered.
So for those reasons, either an official
transcript be produced of which he's had plenty of time to
acquire one, or they not be admitted for that purpose.
Thank you.
7
8
9
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm going to require you to
lay a foundation for whatever it is you proffer.

MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
I provided to this
10
court and the Bar true and accurate copies of the official
11
audio transcripts.
12
have gone in typed out things.
13
least probably 80 percent of the summary eviction I took
14
advantage of a free trial.
15
16
And in some instances the pleadings
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm focusing on what you're
proffering now.
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
Yes, sir.
This is a transcript of the
trial for your traffic citation?
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
In one instance for at
Yes, sir.
The one that Judge Holmes
issued an order finding you in contempt?
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes.
Did you appeal it?
I tried to.
She wouldn't let
1587
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 222
1
me.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
And it's a final order?

I did the research on that, but
she is saying -- I don't know what she is saying.
is not letting me appeal it.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
But she
We know what she said in her
order.
So I'm not going to entertain an inquiry into the
conduct of the trial on your traffic citation itself.
That issue has been litigated.
10
And if you are offering portions of that
11
transcript without a foundation, without a witness here to
12
tell us that what you are about to play is an official
13
part of the transcript, without an official written
14
transcript that is easily obtained, I'm going to sustain
15
the objection.
16
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
the order was such and such?
18
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yes.
It's called a
certification.
20
21
Did he have a witness to say
MR. COUGHLIN:
He got orders that weren't
certified into the record today.
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Elcano --
He laid a separate foundation
23
for them.
24
foundation for what you are about to play.
25
I'm giving you an opportunity to lay a
MR. COUGHLIN:
Okay.
1588
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 223
1
2
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm not going to take it on
your word.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
foundation to be laid.
6
7
Because the law requires a
Independent.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Independent of what I can lay
for it?
8
9
Why not?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Right.
I want something from
the court that says this is an official transcript.
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
My objection, I believe I am
11
able to lay a foundation.
12
an official copy of the audio transcript in that case.
I'll testify under oath this is
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
But you don't know that.

Yes, I do know that.
My mom
15
had to go pay for it because they would not give it to me
16
for months.
17
played his little game and wouldn't give it to me.
18
wouldn't give me any of the screening panel things,
19
because he's so dishonest.
20
They wouldn't let me buy one.
Pat King
He
It's disgusting.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, from my view
21
one of the rules of professional conduct is to treat
22
opponents with respect.
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
just made is respectful.
I agree.
I'm not sure that comment you
So let's proceed.
If you're
1589
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 224
1
about to play some audio, I'm not going to permit it
without an adequate foundation being laid.
MR. COUGHLIN:
So move on.
Can I -- without an adequate
foundation being laid.
mom had to pay for, 35 bucks, to get from the court?
And I can't say it's the audio my
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No.
Your mother is not here.
If you want to call her, we'll listen to what she has to
say.
9
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't have a phone.
call her?
11
MR. VELLIS:
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
Should I get up and dial?

Pardon me?
Should I approach the phone and
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
However you think you need to
lay a foundation.
18
19
Can he use this one?
dial?
16
17
I can
MR. COUGHLIN:
foundation?
Mr. King, he can't lay the
He was provided these by the muni court.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
This is your case, sir.

Can I call Pat King and say,
22
Pat, were you provided these copies of the audio?
23
Everything is a copy, okay, it's not --
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
What are you intending to prove?
1590
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
MR. COUGHLIN:
To show she is so reckless.
show a lot of things.
conviction is completely dispositive, he cited no
authority for that.
But one,
To
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
this idea that a
Mr. Coughlin, the supreme
court issued an order in your case that says with respect
to, in essence, a conviction, that the sole issue to be
determined here is the nature and extent of the
punishment.
10
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
You guys made a hearing about 30 other things.
12
13
But that's the candy bar thing.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm sorry.
I kept talking
while --
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
You were done talking, and I
15
responded.
16
trying to make a record of that, and it's dishonest the
17
extent to which you do that.
18
respond.
19
the fact that you keep appearing to want to do that.
20
You keep trying to bait me, and you keep
You stop talking, and I
I didn't talk over you that time.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And I resent
The supreme court, as I read
21
its order, tells this panel that the only issue to be
22
determined with respect to a conviction is the nature and
23
extent of the punishment, if any.
24
25
So if you have testimony on that issue with

respect to any conviction, or order holding you in
1591
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 226
1
contempt, please present it.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Not under Claiborne.
Claiborne
says a conviction is not the end of the inquiry.
fact, the panel and the Bar have a duty to look beyond the
conviction.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That in
We have a specific order in
your case with respect to what the issues to be determined
in this proceeding are with respect to a conviction.
do you wish to offer evidence as to the nature and extent
10
of punishment, if any, that should be rendered by this
11
So
panel?
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
16
17
18
19
Yes.
And I --
Please proceed.
Okay.
So I'll play that audio
with your permission.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm sustaining the objection
because it lacks foundation.

MR. COUGHLIN:
Then I'll call my mom.
May I
approach to call my mom?
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
(Telephone call being placed.)
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
MRS. BARKER:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
right now, okay?
Sure.
Mom, it's Zach.

Yeah.
Listen, you're on the record
The panel can hear you.
Are you there?
1592
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
2
3
4
MRS. BARKER:
I'm having trouble hearing you.
But anyway -- I'm in a store.

MR. COUGHLIN:
now and recorded.
Go ahead.
You're being listened to right
Okay?
MRS. BARKER:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Would you swear the witness in, please.
I understand that.
I need to ask you -Let's put her under oath.
(The oath was administered telephonically
10
to the witness.)
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
Would you tell us your full
name and address, please.
13
MRS. BARKER:
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MRS. BARKER:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
THE WITNESS:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MRS. BARKER:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MRS. BARKER:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
Mr. Coughlin, you may proceed.
24
MRS. BARKER:
25
Mary Eleanor Barker.
94 --
Spell your last name.
B-a-r-k-e-r.
And your address, please.
945 West 12th Street.

West what street?
12th.
South?
12th.
Reno, Nevada 89503.
Thank you, Ms. Barker.
No, it's Barker.

MARY BARKER
1593
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Mom, did you have to buy an audio of the trial
with that Judge Nash Holmes?
Did I have to buy an audio?
Yeah.
Yes.
Did you give it to me?
10
Oh, God.
11
Did you buy a copy of the proceeding?
I think so.
I did several things.
I paid $100 for something -- no, that was something else.
12
Right.
You paid a hundred dollars for bail,
13
and she wouldn't let me out, but she kept the money
14
anyway?
15
Yes.
And the man that I gave the money to
16
told me that you would be released within several hours,
17
and you weren't.
18
They did the old switcheroo, right?
19
I'm sorry?
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, I would
21
appreciate it if you would refrain from interrupting even
22
your own mother.
23
THE WITNESS:
Especially his own mother.
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Is that good enough?

No.
1594
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Mom, was it an official copy?
I don't know.
Did you go to the court and say I want a copy
of the proceeding, and you paid the money they asked you
to pay?
I don't know that it was official or not.
I requested a copy, yes.
official.
10
But
I would assume it would be
I was requesting it in the courthouse.

And you filled out whatever form it was they
11
made you fill out, and paid whatever money it was they
12
wanted right?
13
14
15
Yes.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I would like to move to admit
that into evidence.
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
questions?
18
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
19
20
Mom, you paid $100 bail, and the muni court
kept the money but didn't let me out?
21
Yes.
22
What did that Tom guy, the counter clerk, say
23
24
25
about that?
A
When I went back on Monday, he said, no, he
should have been released.
And I said, well, he wasn't,
1595
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
and I would like to get my money back.
And he made a
phone call.
possible.
Did he say that she had done something wrong?
No.
And he said, I'm sorry, but that's not
No, he didn't say anything to me like
that.
He just said it was not what he expected.
When I
went down there and paid the hundred dollars, he said you
would be out within three hours.
And I believe that was on a Thursday.
And that didn't happen.

The courts were
10
closed Friday, so I went back on Monday to find out why
11
you weren't released, and to see if I could get my hundred
12
dollars back.
13
Did my dad say the State Bar of Nevada's Coe
14
Swobe kept hounding him, calling him up, trying to lean on
15
me so Washoe Legal Services and Paul Elcano could get
16
out --
17
I'm sorry, I could not hear that.
18
Did my dad ever tell you that the State Bar of
19
Nevada's Coe Swobe called him up trying to get him to make
20
me settle easier with Washoe Legal Services whose director
21
is friends with the chairman here, close childhood
22
friends, they both went to Stanford together, 1966?
23
MR. KING:
Objection, hearsay.
24
THE WITNESS:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Your father told me -Sustained.
1596
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 231
1
2
THE WITNESS:
-- yes, they wanted you to
settle.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
was an objection made to the question.
objection.
Excuse me, Ms. Barker.
Mom.
I don't want to take up
any more of your time, sweetheart.
to do.
10
I'm going to let you go.

THE WITNESS:
Okay?
All right.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Sorry this wasn't
You're the clearest thing I've
heard today, Mom.
13
THE WITNESS:
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
You have better things
clear, but now I'm in the parking lot.
11
12
I'm sustaining the
It's also argumentative.

MR. COUGHLIN:
There
Good luck.
Any questions, Mr. King?
Well, she hung up.
16
MR. KING:
I have no questions of the mother,
17
but I would think it was patently clear when the direct
18
question was, did you give me the official copies, she
19
said I don't know.
20
Mr. Coughlin does not have the official copies which would
21
be identified on the disk by the court as an official
22
copy.
23
And that's how it was left.
And
Since he does not have them or they are --
24
whatever he has downloaded on the record may not be the
25
official one, I would still object.
1597
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
Plus, as I said before, since he's attempting
to prove negatives that this wasn't said, this wasn't
done.
on either side the context of listening to a little blurb
totally out of context is going to provide no relevant
information to you, because there's no way you can say
with a certainty that's the end of the story.
elsewhere in the transcript it could be made crystal
clear.
Without the ability to read the transcript or see
10
Because
I would suggest that Mr. Coughlin's efforts to
11
have you listen to excerpts, aside from being very
12
time-consuming, is irrelevant.
13
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
terms of laying a foundation?
15
16
Anything further to offer in
MR. COUGHLIN:
Penalty of perjury, I'm going
to play an official copy of it.
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
No.
I've given you the opportunity
19
to go review the stuff to your heart's content if I'm
20
lying.
21
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
foundation.
Playing it doesn't lay a
We need a foundation laid.
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
Foundation is -Do you have anything further
to offer?
1598
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 233
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
-- I, Zach Coughlin, under
penalty of perjury, this is the official transcript, audio
transcript.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
That the court gave it to us.

No, the court didn't.
This is just amazing.
Okay.
Let's move on.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
11
What do you base that on?
MR. COUGHLIN:
We need to comply -I would like to play a video I
can provide a foundation of, because I filmed it.
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We're dealing with whatever
13
it was you were going to proffer with respect to the
14
traffic citation.
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
We have eaten up 40 percent of
16
my time with this.
17
audio tape that I paid money for from the court.
18
You wouldn't let me play a copy of an
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
But you haven't laid a
19
foundation for it, Mr. Coughlin.
20
understand.
21
something.
22
transcript.
23
you or not --
24
25
That's what you don't
Your mother said she went and bought

She doesn't know if it's an official
You didn't establish whether she gave it to
MR. COUGHLIN:
I got an official one from Pat
King.
1599
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 234
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
More important, sir, you
haven't established what you're about to play is what she
bought.
MR. COUGHLIN:
If we just move on from hers.
I got an official copy from Pat King after we paid for it
with our money --
7
8
9
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That's not a foundation,
sir.
MR. COUGHLIN:
State Bar of Nevada.
I'm saying I got it from the
Directly from Pat King.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
That's not a foundation.

In that Mr. King told me it's
an official copy from the Reno Muni Court.

MR. KING:
Absolutely not true,
Mr. Coughlin -MR. COUGHLIN:
You are testifying now, Pat.
I'd like him sworn if he's going to testify.

MR. KING:
I'd be happy to be sworn.
And
that's a lie.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, laying a
foundation is a rather rudimentary procedure.
22
MR. KING:
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
laid a proper foundation --
25
Sorry.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I do not believe you have
I'll move on.
1600
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 235
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
-- proper to play.
So I'm
sustaining the objection to playing whatever it was you're
going to play, and proceed.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Okay.
I'd like to play an
official copy of the transcript from that Reno Muni Court
traffic citation case.
7
8
9
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
that.
You've already proffered
I've sustained the objection.

MR. COUGHLIN:
I'd like to play a copy of a
10
video I took of Sergeant Lopez admitting certain things
11
with respect to the criminal trespass.
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
MR. KING:
Mr. King?
I would object to the extent that
14
Mr. Coughlin is trying to suggest in any way that he
15
wasn't guilty of the criminal trespass, because he was
16
convicted and exhausted his appeal rights.
17
that I think shouldn't occur here.
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. KING:
And to retry
The relevance of this --
To the effect he wants to produce
20
it for some other reason, I think he would need to explain
21
specifically what that reason is.
22
or not he's guilty of a criminal trespass, I would say
23
it's not relevant.
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
If it goes to whether
And your relevance,
Mr. Coughlin?
1601
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 236
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
I would like to give you the
30-minute notice that I would like to cross-examine Judge
Nash Holmes and Richard Hill or call them in my case in
chief, rather.
time of 2:55.
I'll do that now.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I note that I have a
Right now we're dealing with
the relevancy of a videotape that you claim to have taken.
And how is that relevant?
MR. COUGHLIN:
Because it goes to rebut
10
everything that you deem relevant to which Richard Hill
11
testified.
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
Everything?
Yeah.
What is contained in this
proffered video?
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
There's a couple of them.
17
There's video of the arrest, the trespass arrest.
18
discussion between myself and Richard Hill, and his
19
client, and the police officers.
20
and then there is a video of a couple months later of me
21
interviewing Sergeant Lopez about whether or not they
22
identified themselves as police officers before the door
23
was kicked in, or whether they issued a lawful warning to
24
leave.
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The
Then -- and that was --
Those are relevant to what
1602
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 237
1
issue that this panel is to determine?
MR. COUGHLIN:
You listened to Richard Hill go
on and on about what he thinks about me and my candor and
competency.
Then it bears on the legitimacy of his testimony.
And these videos show he's a fricking liar.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I asked you to specifically
address what portion of his testimony this addressed.
said everything?
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
You
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yeah.
He also testified to us how
11
long he's been practicing law.
12
that?
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
Does this video impeach
It impeaches the extent to
14
which putting a number of years behind how long somebody
15
has been practicing law somehow is determinative of
16
anything or bearing some sort of indication of the
17
legitimacy or competency or fidelity to the principle that
18
this Bar is supposed to uphold, but which some people
19
might say it doesn't seem as to a lot of the time.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
Anything else?
It also goes to mitigation, I
think.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
How so?
I think it places me in a lot
more sympathetic light to the extent that it shows police
1603
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 238
1
misconduct.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. KING:
Mr. King?
Mr. Chairman, there has been a
multitude of videos taken by Mr. Coughlin.
recall when he was in his bedroom in his pajamas, and he
was talking about things like Mr. Hill taking bribes.
posted information about court personnel, their salaries,
et cetera.
off of YouTube by Mr. Coughlin so they cannot be accessed.
10
Some you might
He
Those, all of those YouTube, have been taken
I have viewed a videotape of Mr. Coughlin and
11
the 9-1-1 calls where every other word out of his mouth is
12
starting with F-you to the police officers.
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
MR. KING:
15
Objection.
Lack of foundation.
However, it's not admitted in this
case --
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me.
17
Mr. Coughlin, I've tried to be very patient in
18
terms of your interruptions.
19
you find it within yourself to refrain from doing that?
20
You will have every opportunity to respond.
21
appreciate your continuing interruptions of virtually
22
every person that speaks, including your mother.
23
please refrain from doing it.
24
MR. KING:
Can
But I do not
So
Proceed, Mr. King.
25
You continue to do so.
In review of some of the excerpted
1604
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 239
1
videos that Mr. Coughlin submitted to me, they are cut,
and I don't know the word, because I can't do it, I'm not
an editor, but they're not complete, they don't show the
story.
would put him in a more sympathetic light, because I
suspect he's taken out all of the derogatory things he
said to the police officers.
8
9
And I suspect that whatever he's going to show you
More important, those were not part of my case

against Mr. Coughlin.
I did not allege in the complaint
10
that he abused the police officers, or resisted arrest, or
11
used profanity with the police officers.
12
convicted of theft, convicted of criminal trespass, and
13
has demonstrated here a pattern of contempt for the court,
14
and a lack of ability to practice law.
15
I said he was
What Mr. Coughlin is attempting to do is to
16
steer you back to whether or not he was guilty of the
17
crimes of which he was convicted, and to show you that
18
perhaps somebody within the arrest process either did or
19
didn't follow all of their procedures, which are
20
irrelevant to this proceeding.
21
And so I would just say that because the video
22
excerpts that he intends to play are suspect, and there's
23
nobody to testify that they're the complete or accurate
24
videos other than Mr. Coughlin himself.
25
irrelevant, and in this case would be highly prejudicial,
I think they're
1605
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 240
1
plus a waste of time.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Anything further?
Your Honor, if I could just
enter for the record.
Mr. Johnson's been on his smart
phone throughout this proceeding.
disrespect, sir.
connection to what's going on here today.
indicate that to the extent that this is presented as a
panel, and somehow some sort of consensus thereby
I mean you no
Maybe he doesn't feel much of a

And I would
10
suggested, I would just enter for the record, Mr. Johnson
11
does not seem to find much of a consensus being found here
12
today.
13
throughout this proceeding.
14
that for the record.
So much so that he's been on his smart phone
15
MR. KING:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And I'm just going notate
If I can respond briefly.

So far you've attacked me.
17
Now you've attacked Mr. Johnson.
18
any other panel member?
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
Do you wish to attack
I do not find that I've
20
attacked anybody, sir.
21
fidelity to fundamental notions of due process and fair
22
play.
23
I find that I've demonstrated my
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Let's return to the video
24
that you claim to have taken that you now intend to
25
proffer.
Is it a video of your arrest that ultimately led
1606
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 241
1
to your conviction for criminal trespass?
2
3
MR. COUGHLIN:
Sergeant Lopez.
4
5
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
That's
Incident to the Richard Hill
deal.
12
13
Police misconduct.
not an issue here.
10
11
A video where I'm asking her
some stuff about police misconduct.
8
9
What is it that you intend to
play of Sergeant Lopez?
6
7
Not the one of the admission by
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'll rule it as irrelevant.
Proceed.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Okay.
Can I play a video
15
where, incident to the Walmart conviction, it shows that I
16
did give my driver's license to the officer, the tribal
17
officer, and that given that his testimony at trial was
18
that the only reason he was allowed to effectuate an
19
arrest was my lack of giving him my driver's license.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That is not an issue for this
21
panel to determine.
22
directed that the only issues with respect to that
23
conviction was the nature and extent of punishment.
24
not going to relitigate your conviction for theft.
25
The supreme court specifically
MR. COUGHLIN:
We're
So the --
1607
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 242
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
Pardon?
Can I enter my objection or
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Basis for your objection to
your own?
8
9
Can I enter my objection?
basis for my objection?
6
7
Next, Mr. Coughlin.
MR. COUGHLIN:
of proof, I guess.
Wanting to put that in an offer
Something like that.
the Claiborne case?
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
Have you read
Yes.
Does that have any
applicability here?
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm governed by the case that
15
the supreme court decided with respect to Zachary Barker
16
Coughlin in which they tell us that the only issue that
17
this panel is to determine is what the nature and extent
18
of the punishment is flowing from your conviction for
19
theft.
20
involving that conviction.
21
We're not to address the underlying issues
MR. COUGHLIN:
How are you addressing so many
22
issues completely divorced from that Walmart theft case?
23
How did you do that today?
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
with one issue at a time.
Mr. Coughlin, I'm dealing

You have proffered a videotape
1608
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
that the supreme court tells us is not relevant. Proceed
with your next witness.
3
4
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'd like to offer into evidence
my ex parte emergency motion and the DVD attachment to it.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Which one?
You attempted to
fax several to me, one of which was labeled emergency ex
parte motion that apparently was 32 pages of which I only
received three.
MR. COUGHLIN:
You only received three?
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
Did the State Bar get it?

You attempted to fax it to my
office on four different occasions.
14
15
Correct.
MR. COUGHLIN:
And all four times did you guys
reject it somehow or otherwise keep it from going through?
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No.
It was sent to my office
17
after business hours.
There was no one manning the fax
18
machine, so no one could have interrupted the
19
transmission.
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
And it just didn't go through?
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
None of your faxes went
22
through.
The first one was one of 362 pages that you
23
attempted to fax on November 8th at 4:50 in the afternoon.
24
We received two of them.
25
that one was entitled, Well Would You.
Apparently the second page of
1609
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
MR. COUGHLIN:
All right.
Well, I gave the
State Bar copies of it, and you said they forwarded it on
to you.
4
5
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
ex parte motion that you now wish to offer as evidence?
6
7
Sir, what specifically is the
MR. COUGHLIN:
I wish to offer the one I gave
the State Bar filed November 13th.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Filed yesterday?
Well, I mean, I object to the
10
way the State Bar is representing certain things to me
11
with respect to how I can submit things, then they back
12
out of it.
13
going to use the 823 certified mailing to prove service.
14
They have lied extensively to me throughout this
15
proceeding.
16
Just like they back out of whether they are
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Let me ask you a question,
17
sir.
18
and first class mail a copy of the complaint.
19
offered 20 days to respond.
20
or an answer verified within 20 days.
21
didn't arrive.
22
On August 23rd the State Bar sent by certified mail

You were
The rules require a response

That apparently
I then entered an order granting you until
23
Friday, February 9th -- I'm sorry, November 9th at 5:00
24
P.M. to file a verified answer or response.
25
Do you claim to have filed such a verified
1610
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 245
1
answer or response?
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm not sure.
I believe that
calls for a legal conclusion.
exactly what technically a verified answer response means.
I think a motion to dismiss might qualify as that.
6
7
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you understand what a
verified response is?
8
9
I don't know that I know
MR. COUGHLIN:
do more research on.
It's something I would like to
I would imagine it involves a
10
declaration or maybe an affidavit.
11
into the extent to which pro se for self-representing
12
parties -- and Judge Nash Holmes purported to do this,
13
where she tried to make those representing themselves be
14
subject to sworn testimony to one extent or another,
15
although she was very --
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
But then that gets
We're not talking about Nash
17
Holmes here.
18
verified response or answer to the complaint.
19
I'm asking you if you claim to have filed a
MR. COUGHLIN:
To answer that I would have to
20
know how one is able to file something.
21
involved representation by Clerk Peters and Mr. King and
22
the Bar that, I believe, have been gone back on.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And that's
Sir, I'd like you to focus on
24
whether or not you believe you filed a verified answer or
25
response to the complaint.
1611
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
At all?
Yes.
At any time?
Prior to November 9th,
which is --
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
If I can just --- two months and a couple
weeks after the complaint.
anything that you would call a verified answer or
response?
9
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
In that interim did you file
And you're sua sponte asking me
this?
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
14
I'm asking it.

And that's taking up my time to
put on my case, as I had hoped to put it on.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm asking you at the start
15
of your case, apparently, because you just proffered
16
something you filed on November 13th.
17
learning whether you believe --
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm interested in
I think I --- you have complied with the
20
supreme court rule that requires the respondent in a
21
compliant by the State Bar to file a verified answer or
22
response to the complaint.
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
Have you done so?

I believe I have.
What pleading is that?
I believe various different
1612
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 247
1
pleadings could be characterized as such.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
I would like to look into that
more.
5
6
Which ones?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you still have confusion
as to what verified means?
MR. COUGHLIN:
I think it's something that can
mean different things in different settings.
sure who we're talking about, who it means what to.
10
So I'm not
Then I think that goes a large extent to how
11
the procedural rules apply here.
Because if you file a
12
motion to dismiss, and it winds up jamming you up for
13
time.
14
such that he's the one who picks the hearing date.
15
the one who sets up the notice of hearing way before the
16
panel is even empaneled.
17
chairman who is ruling on things before I even have an
18
opportunity to file a reply to his opposition.
And Mr. King is able to manipulate this process
19
He is
Then I get jammed up or the
And then one, I'll testify under penalty of
20
perjury I didn't get the notice of intent to take default.
21
I'll testify that I went to the United States Post Office
22
and attempted to pick up on at least -- on multiple
23
occasions.
24
downtown Reno apparently couldn't find the envelope.
25
next time I went back, he did find the envelope that had a
On one occasion a Tim at the Vassar station in
The
1613
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
postmark date of 10-9-12, October 9th, 2012, and it had
postage of about 1.25.
information and belief it was the notice of intent to take
default.
It was a certified mailing upon
I'll note that in the file that was given to
me by Mr. King this certificate of mailing on that
document indicates it was sent by only one method,
certified mail.
been sent, if you look at the certificates of mailing
10
attached at the end of the documents has been sent in
11
two -- by two methods, first class mail and certified
12
mail.
13
Where I believe every other document's
So it's a little strange that notice of intent
14
to take default -- maybe this is some kind of old school
15
Bar counsel trick.
16
one method, certified mail.
17
the guy doesn't find it.
18
the guy Tim --
19
20
I don't know.
But it was only sent by
So I go to pick it up once,
I go the next week, and this is
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
How did you know to pick it
up?
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
Because I got the little slip.

Okay.
And then the next time he did
24
find it.
And right before he gave it to me he noticed
25
that it only has -- it's a large manila envelope, he
1614
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
noticed it only has $1.25 postage on it.
insufficient postage, and he won't give it to me unless I
pay the difference, which is like some five dollars that I
don't have.
That means it's
So it gets sent back.

I check the USPS and confirm for that number,
and Mr. King and the State Bar received it on November
9th.
believe very dishonest.
Mr. King's been very, very evasive about this, and I
I saw Tim notate the insufficiency of postage.
10
Yesterday Mr. King told me he didn't see anything about
11
insufficiency of postage on the envelope.
12
point is I never got notice of intent to take default.
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And the whole
You replied to it.

What's that?
You replied to it.
I replied to your orders.
No, you replied before I
18
entered the order.
You replied and provided your own
19
witness list that parroted the witness list --
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
I think it's probably -- sorry.

-- that parroted the witness
list that the State Bar proffered, you filed your own.
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
witness list, the DowSoE.
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I think I was replying to the
And that came with the notice
1615
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
of intent to take default.
MR. COUGHLIN:
No.
The DowSoE -- along with
the DowSoE they sent a notice of hearing.
hearing.
the panel after being empaneled shall provide at least 30
days from when it, the panel, not Bar counsel, serves the
DowSoE and the notice of hearing by the same method in
which the complaint is served.
by certified mail.
10
Yeah, notice of
And this is pursuant to SCR 1052(c).
It says
Which under SCR 109 can be
Although I don't believe it can be when, and
11
I'll testify under penalty of perjury on the phone, if not
12
also in writing, Clerk Peters told me I could rely on the
13
fact, I could bank on it that the State Bar of Nevada
14
would not assert that 8-23-12 certified mailing would be
15
proffered as affecting service of the complaint on me in
16
any way at any time.
17
At that time on the phone, I'm swearing this
18
under penalty of perjury, she said we are going to send it
19
out to you again, the certified mailing.
20
I actually undertook a lot of research in this
21
regard, because there is case law that says when the
22
Bar -- not in this jurisdiction.
23
you a certified mailing, I think they can say within three
24
days you are served, whether you ever picked it up or not,
25
you know.
But when the Bar sends
So I was worried about that, you know.
1616
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 251
1
But I called and talked to Clerk Peters.
And
I believe when a court, particularly a clerk of court,
makes an express explicit representation to you that you
can rely on something, that you're entitled to, you know.
And I think it's -- it doesn't set a good precedent for
the State Bar to essentially be pulling the rug out from
under people like me.
8
9
At that time on, I believe it was September

11th, she said, oh, I got back that certified mailing of
10
the complaint.
11
that it's stamped, the complaint.
12
said it was returned as undelivered or something.
13
said you think Pat is going to try to take a default?
14
This or that?
15
that.
16
would like to check my notes, but she said you're not
17
served until we get that signature on the thing.
18
we don't get the signature on the thing after the second
19
time we're going to mail it to you, then we'll send out
20
for service a notice of intent to take default.
21
upon that not being picked up would, I guess, a default be
22
taken.
23
That was, I guess, sent 8-23, the date

She got it back.
She
And I
And she said definitively, no, we'll not do
You are not served -- she said, I believe, and I
And if
And only
So I felt completely entitled to rely upon
24
that.
However, Mr. King, and this is found in Laura
25
Peters' affidavit I found in the file that I have only six
1617
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 252
1
days to review.
Mr. King has coyly prevented me from accessing
this file since March.
Yes, he gave me some audio, and I
appreciate that.
he's preventing me from getting it into the record here
today.
disgusting going on.
that's just not true.
I don't appreciate the extent to which
Particularly where it's something really
Where the judge is saying something

It's just not true.
Penalty of perjury, it is completely false for
10
her to say that she asked me if I was recording or had a
11
recording device at any time prior to the one bathroom
12
break.
That's just not true.
13
There was a bathroom break.
And immediately
14
after I got back from that bathroom break she starts
15
interrogating me sua sponte about recording.
16
I should say -- I would like to play it for
17
you to know exactly what was said, exactly what my
18
response was --
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, we have already
20
addressed that issue.
So now we're on -- I have been
21
trying to determine from you whether you believe you have
22
filed a verified answer or response to the complaint at
23
any time.
24
issue, and I'll afford you that opportunity.
25
quite frankly, I have not seen anything that you filed
And you indicated you'll have to research that
Because,
1618
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 253
1
that has been verified.
2
3
So let's go on with your next witness.
affording you the opportunity of putting on a case --
4
5
MR. COUGHLIN:
I would like to testify in a
narrative.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm sorry.
ADD, sir.
10
11
I'm
I'm sorry.
I keep talking --
I'm sorry, sir.
I don't mean to do it.
I really am.
That is a hallmark of
It is.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
So we have not conducted this
hearing as a default hearing, in deference to you.
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
proffer your next evidence.
15
So now I'm asking you to
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
I appreciate that.
narrative, if I may, sir.
17
18
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'd like to just testify in the
MR. COUGHLIN:
You want to testify?
First can I admit into evidence
these materials?
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
Which materials?
The thing I tried to file, the
ex parte emergency motion with the DVDs attached.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
of them.
Which ex parte motion?

The one that bears -- well, two
One that bears a file stamp of October 31st, the
1619
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 254
1
prehearing motion to dismiss, summary judgment, memorandum
of law, which I believe could be --
3
4
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Is that the one with the
handwritten caption?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
What appears to be an appeal
from the State of Nevada versus -- I'm sorry?
8
9
Yes, sir.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I filed this.
I prepared this
to be basically a motion for a new trial in the trespass
10
case.
11
for a petty larceny trial, preparing for this.
12
started to get scared that I wasn't getting something in
13
the record on this.
14
But I've been operating on little sleep preparing

And I
And so I just said, you know what, you're
15
crossing that out, and you're filing this in the State Bar
16
so you get something.
17
So I think this could be characterized as a
18
verified response.
19
believe you made a law of the case now that you're not
20
talking a default on me here.
21
And I do appreciate the extent -- I
And I believe -- I'd like to look at my
22
records more, but I believe I was told I could fax file at
23
least, if not also e-mail file by Clerk Peters.
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Bar is one thing.
What you filed with the State
You asked me earlier if I had consented
1620
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 255
1
to being served by e-mail, and I have not.
I have -- nor have I consented to being served by fax.
believe all documents that you need to file should be
filed with the State Bar, and then they can provide them
to us.
You asked, and

I
But you've attempted to file, and you've
indicated you've had little time to work on this, but you
have attempted to fax to my office in excess of 700 pages
of documents.
That's quite a lot of documents that, at
10
least from my experience, requires a lot of time to
11
prepare.
12
you're complaining about a lack of time.
13
So I take it a little bit disingenuously that
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
sir.
15
all my time on this.
16
I'm sorry.
No, that's not what I meant,
I didn't mean to interrupt you.
I spent
I didn't mean it like that.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Unfortunately, you haven't
17
deemed it necessary to file a verified answer or response
18
that I can identify as a verified answer or response.
19
have filed documents entitled, Wow, Would You Look At
20
That.
21
22
You filed -MR. COUGHLIN:
Can I ask what Mr. King is
doing right now?
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
You
-- in response to this -Is this appropriate, Mr. King,
during my case for you to be walking around handing out
1621
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 256
1
2
pamphlets?
MR. KING:
To the extent, Mr. Coughlin -- if
you don't mind, Mr. Chairman -- to the extent you're
making representations of what the State Bar said --
MR. COUGHLIN:
You've been breaking me down
all day for not following process, and he just gets up and
is doing that, and you don't say anything.
MR. KING:
MR. COUGHLIN:
10
11
MR. KING:
Mr. Chairman.
The e-mail you say Mr. King --- slamming me all day.
If I can make the record,
A letter that was faxed to me --
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. KING:
I object.
-- Mr. Coughlin, which says,
14
Mr. King, this is the first I've heard of you wanting a
15
physical address for me, in contravention of Rule 79 which
16
requires that he provide an address.
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Let's address that after
18
Mr. Coughlin makes his point, which I'm trying to get him
19
to do succinctly, but which I'm failing at.
20
21
I'm interested now, do you have any further

evidence to offer in your case?
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
Yes.
What is it?
I would like to submit these
materials I prepared into evidence.
If it's a case of you
1622
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 257
1
feel I haven't verified them, and I think some of that
might be due to the difficulty inherent to
self-representation where -- it's like Mr. King isn't
filing things under penalty of perjury.
the client needs to sign a verification --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And I gather that
The rule is very specific
that says the attorney against whom a grievance is made
and a complaint is filed, the attorney, that attorney,
must file a verified response.
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
If I hire David Grundy to
11
represent me, then I still have to sign something that
12
attaches to David Grundy the answer he files for me saying
13
I verify yes that the factual assertions in here are true?
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. KING:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
18
that.
19
verified means.
20
21
22
Yes.
Objection.
Okay.
No.
Hypothetical.
I'll do that right now.
I'm asking if you filed
And you've indicated, one, you're not sure what

And two, that you need to research it.
So what is your next piece of evidence you

intend to offer, sir?
MR. COUGHLIN:
I intend to take these
23
materials that I have already filed and say I declare
24
under penalty of perjury, NRS 53.045, that the assertions
25
herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge,
1623
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 258
1
except for those materials based on information and
belief.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And a verification cannot be
made on information and belief.
true and correct?
MR. COUGHLIN:
So is everything in there
If I had hired David Grundy, I
don't think that would be the standard.
Grundy could stand in my stead and sign it under NRCP 11.
MR. KING:
10
11
Because David
No, he couldn't.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
What is the next piece you
have to offer, Mr. Coughlin?
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
You know what though?
This
13
stuff is true, you know.
14
But do you think you file this much stuff if you are
15
lying?
16
lie a lot or do I strike you as somebody that doesn't have
17
much of a filter and maybe tells the truth too much?
You know.
18
19
Do I strike you as somebody who would
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
What's your next piece of
evidence?
20
21
Some of it's opinion, you know.
MR. COUGHLIN:
You're not letting me admit
this either?
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You still haven't identified,
23
because I have seen at least three documents entitled an
24
ex parte motion, and you haven't identified which one it
25
is yet.
1624
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 259
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
he's offering.
Ex parte motion.
Okay.
I would object on two grounds.

Let's identify what it is
I still don't know.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I would like to offer this one
that has a file stamp of October 31st, 2012, prehearing
motion to dismiss summary judgment, memorandum of law.
I'll interlineate verified response.
MR. KING:
Don't change it now, Mr. Coughlin.
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
11
MR. KING:
12
I'll get a --
It's already stamp filed.
I don't
want you to alter a file copy.
13
MR. COUGHLIN:
14
-- a new file stamp on it.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You have just added some
15
writing to that document that was lodged with the State
16
Bar on October 31?
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
20
Yeah.
It's the one dated September
12th?
MR. COUGHLIN:
No.
21
nitpicking Pat King like this.
22
every aspect of SCR 1052(c).
23
I really don't see you
see you nitpicking him a bit.
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And Pat King violated

Every aspect.
And I don't
It will serve you better if
you did not exhibit such anger and contempt for the panel.
1625
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 260
1
I'm trying to identify, sir, because I have
seen at least two filings that are the handwritten
iteration of the caption that the original caption is in a
State court proceeding wherein you're a defendant where
you have handwritten in ex parte motion.
those.
I've seen two of
I'm interested in having you identify which
one you are now offering, because the two are slightly
different.
10
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
offering today.
12
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
It's the one that I'm offering
today.
16
17
We don't know which one that
is.
14
15
I'm offering the one I'm
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
So identify it for us,
please.
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
MR. KING:
Okay.
You haven't shown it to us.
One second, please, sir.
I realize Mr. Coughlin has not
22
identified the document to the satisfaction of the chair
23
yet.
24
to be a disk attached to the back that should definitely
25
not come in, because there is no foundation for it
But I would object on the grounds that there appears
1626
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 261
1
whatsoever.
And ex parte motions are not necessary in
these proceedings, because we're right here at the State
Bar trying to find out what his responses are.
him to suggest he's filing ex parte documents to the chair
of the panel to avoid the State Bar is inappropriate.
And for
And lastly, I think it's a great concern that
Mr. Coughlin is adding.
Instead of creating a new
document or asking for leave to file a new document is
10
apparently interlineating or adding to the document that's
11
already been proffered and stamped.
12
it was originally.
13
not the same document anymore.
14
So I don't know what
Now I know he's added to it, but it's
MR. COUGHLIN:
That's new.
It a new document I'm filing
15
right now.
It's different and new.
16
be substantially similar to one previously filed, but it's
17
new.
18
MR. KING:
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It might
For those reasons I would object.

Mr. Coughlin, would you ask
20
the court reporter to please mark it and make it part of
21
the record.
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
MR.
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
Doesn't matter.
KING:
Yes, sir.
I apologize.
Can I ask the disk be removed?

It hasn't been admitted yet.
He's offering it.
I want it to be part
1627
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 262
1
of the record.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I want the disk too.

The next issue is whether it
will be admitted.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, let me
understand this.
from something you had previously filed?
You've added some handwriting to this
MR. COUGHLIN:
I attempted to use something.
10
I believe that's a copy of what was previously filed.
11
I attempted to notate that.
12
anybody.
13
scratched out the file stamp, and then I changed the title
14
of the document, and I redated it and signed it and put a
15
verification, what I believe should suffice as a
16
verification.
17
if this court would be so kind as to give me an education
18
of what it might like to see in that regard.
19
And
I'm not attempting to mislead
I think I wrote something about it being new.
And I would be happy to further verify it
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I have had an opportunity to
20
review this document in an earlier form.
21
address the underlying issues as to whether or not the
22
conviction on the various orders by the court -- I think
23
this one addresses Judge Holmes' order.
24
25
It seems to
To me this is a document that was used to -originally entitled Notice Of Errata And Revised
1628
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 263
1
Supplemental Motion For New Trial, Or Alternatively
Supplemental Motion To Vacate Judgment Or Conviction Or In
The Alternative Motion For Arrest Of Judgment that appears
to have been filed in the underlying case.
It appears that Mr. Coughlin is now attempting
to refile that document which addresses issues of the
underlying case in this current State Bar proceeding, and
therefore, unless panel members disagree, I would rule
this document as irrelevant to the proceedings as it
10
constitutes an attempt to obtain a new trial or vacation
11
of an earlier judgment.
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
No, it -That's my ruling, sir.

All right.
But it is part of the record.
I thought you just ruled you
weren't accepting it.
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It's part of the record.
19
It's just not admitted into evidence.
20
to the supreme court that I committed error.
21
22
It's now 3:36 or so, and I want to afford both

sides the opportunity to present a final argument.
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
But you can argue
So -Do you have any additional
evidence?
1629
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 264
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
So the amount of time today
went from 9:00 o'clock to 2:30 for Mr. King, and you gave
me an hour?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No.
I'm giving you 15
minutes -- the ruling was it was 30 minutes per witness,
15 minutes per each side.
to present your next evidence.
8
9
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
Okay.
I would like to
present -- give me one second, please.
I would like to
move into evidence a declaration.
11
12
I'm giving you the opportunity
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Let's have the reporter mark
it.
13
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
handwrite some information on this?
16
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
the panel.
20
Mr. Coughlin.
21
23
24
25
That's attorney-client
privilege.
18
22
I believe -- did you just
You did it in the presence of
I saw you writing on some document,

Was this --
MR. COUGHLIN:
I don't think that's been
proven.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
-- was this the document that
you were writing on?

MR. COUGHLIN:
I've been writing on lot of
1630
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 265
1
stuff today.
2
3
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
document?
4
5
When did you file this
MR. COUGHLIN:
right now.
I'm just giving that to you
I don't see a file stamp.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
with the State Bar?
You haven't filed it yet?

I don't see a file stamp on it.
I'm asking, did you file this
This is a pleading.
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
11
That's a declaration.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It's a pleading in a case
12
entitled State Bar of Nevada, Petitioner, versus Zach
13
Coughlin, reference in cases NG12-0204, NG-0435, and
14
NG-0434.
15
believe it was stuck under my door at my office last
16
night.
The caption of the document I have seen.
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
That's a different one.

A different one?
Yeah.
Did you serve this one on
anybody?
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
That's a whole new thing.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
written on this.
25
No.
You've completely
I'm just trying to understand what you
are attempting to offer here.
1631
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 266
1
2
MR. COUGHLIN:
If you change one blade of
grass, it's a different field, a different ball game.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
So this is a document that
you want now entitled Declaration.
Verified response?
your verified response to the State Bar's complaint?
7
8
And what is that word?
And this is what you are offering as
MR. COUGHLIN:
It's what I'm offering into
evidence right now.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
MR. KING:
Mr. King, any comment?
I haven't seen that.
I'm sorry.
11
First of all, I will object to it, and I would strongly --
12
I believe it's extremely inappropriate for Mr. Coughlin to
13
have written on this document, and then to have suggested
14
he doesn't acknowledge your question, but he just wrote on
15
this particular document.
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
17
said.
18
not that many things.
19
MR. KING:
I don't know that that's what I
I've written on a lot of things today.
Well, maybe
The document purports to be similar
20
to other irrelevant pleadings that have been filed in the
21
past, essentially incoherent.
22
Of great concern to me is that attached to the
23
document again purport to be disks that Mr. Coughlin has
24
created or handwritten on.
25
have essentially altered a document in an attempt to
And in addition, for him to
1632
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 267
1
proffer it as some sort of motion or evidence today I
think is objectionable and should be refused.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. KING:
Altered?
I don't know what it says,
actually.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Would you ask the court
reporter to mark this document as the next.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Because of the unusual
10
circumstances presented by this, unless panel members
11
disagree, I'm going to admit both Exhibits 15 and 16,
12
because I think the manner -- and Exhibit 16 I will
13
identify, first of all, as a document that I received a
14
phone call at about 7:00 o'clock last night, that was a
15
document shoved under my door at my office.
16
file stamp with the State Bar of November 13th, 2012.
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
21
There's no file stamp on that.

I'm sorry?
I'm asking -I'm showing you Exhibit 16.
It has a file stamped copy that was shoved under my door.
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
25
It bears a
Did I give you the wrong one?

Exhibit 16 will speak for
itself.
I'm going to admit Exhibits 15 and 16, because
1633
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 268
1
I think they bear relevancy on the issue of competency,
candor with the tribunal.
15 and 16 are admitted, Mr. Coughlin.
Next?
(Exhibits 15 and 16 admitted into evidence.)
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. VELLIS:
I would like -Are those admitted with the
transcript or tape on the back?
had objected to the tapes.
MR. KING:
Because I think Mr. King
I don't have the capability, nor do
10
I want to make copies of the disks so I will have to ask
11
how that gets accomplished.
12
be made part of the record that goes to the supreme court,
13
Laura will make copies.
14
those documents now?
15
16
To the extent it's going to
Do you want her to make copies of
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm admitting these for the
limited purpose, not for the truth of what's in here --
17
MR. KING:
I totally understand.
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
-- or admitting the disk as
19
evidence itself.
But I'm admitting the two documents,
20
because I believe it goes to the credibility of this
21
witness in terms of what he told us he was altering today.
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Altering?
I'm sorry, Mr. Coughlin?
Altering?
Yes, altering.
1634
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 269
1
2
MR. COUGHLIN:
told you?
3
4
What are you purporting that I
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The record will speak for
itself --
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
-- get out of the room.

-- this panel writes its
decision, I will explain my reasoning for it.
trying to do it now.
But I'm
You filed with the State Bar yesterday a
10
pleading that is, in my opinion, virtually identical to
11
the one you say today was not filed, that you handwrote
12
on, and then changed it from the pleading that you
13
originally filed it as, to a verified -- attempted to
14
change it to a verified response.
15
I believe the fact that you did that -- I'm
16
not admitting them for the truth of anything in there.
17
I'm admitting it because I think it bears on the issue as
18
to the competency and the ability to represent people in a
19
tribunal.
20
MR. COUGHLIN:
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Why can't I admit -I'm not arguing with you,
22
Mr. Coughlin, I'm explaining my decision.
23
to argue.
24
25
We're not going
Do you have any other evidence to present?

MR. COUGHLIN:
I would like to preserve for
the record that I am seeking to have it admitted for the
1635
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 270
1
truth, presented it for the truth of the matter.
imagine most courts can either believe it not believe it.
But to say we're not going to admit it.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm admitting it for the -No.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes.
And I'm saying I would like to
admit it for the truth of the matter asserted.
10
11
You said you are admitting
it for a more limited purpose.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm going to overrule that
objection.
12
MR. KING:
Mr. Chairman, Laura Peters has
13
asked me to ascertain how many copies of those three
14
documents the panel really needs.
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
whatever is in the official transcript.
17
MR. KING:
I believe from my perspective
Do I need to make five copies of
18
those documents for each panel member or can I just make a
19
couple?
20
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Whatever panel member wants a
copy of them.
22
MR. KENT:
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
25
I don't.
For the record, you don't want
a copy you said?

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
1636
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 271
1
2
MR. KENT:
MR. KING:
MR. KENT:
I don't need another copy from
reporter.
5
6
The original will be with the court
reporter.
3
4
The original is with the court
that.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. KENT:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Did you ever get a copy?
No.
10
MR. KENT:
11
MR. COUGHLIN:
Of the CDs?
12
13
14
No.
So you are admitting you're not
going to review it?

MR. KENT:
No.
I don't need another copy.
The copy is being marked with the court reporter.
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
MR. KENT:
17
MR. COUGHLIN:
How are you going to view it?
I will go look at that.

The CD.
But Mr. King earlier
18
today said he has been giving the panel -- I see you all
19
have a copy of everything I filed, yet he's not giving you
20
a copy of the CD or DVDs.
21
MR. KING:
That is not correct, Mr. Coughlin.
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That seems fraudulent.

Stop it.
Stop it.
24
admitted those two documents for a very limited purpose,
25
Mr. Coughlin, because you denied having changed or altered
1637
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 272
1
them.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
That's not correct.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The record speaks for itself.

I took no position.
You asserted an
attorney-client privilege despite the fact that you did it
in the presence of people --
8
9
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm allowed to file things how
I --
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
11
my patience.
12
Mr. Coughlin, you're trying
evidence to present?
13
It's 10 to 4:00.
MR. COUGHLIN:
It's as though you're telling
14
me how I'm allowed to practice law.
15
telling me what I'm allowed to paint.
16
don't like the picture, but don't I get to choose what
17
colors to paint it?
18
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
the rules.
20
No.
It's like you're

You can say you
You have to comport with
Do you have any other evidence?

MR. COUGHLIN:
21
into some fraud on my part.
22
You're attempting to turn it
Holmes did.
23
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That's like what Judge Nash
evidence?
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yeah.
I would like to testify
1638
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 273
1
in a narrative.
2
3
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
under oath.
All right.
You're still
Will you do it in -MR. COUGHLIN:
I haven't been under oath this
whole time, because I've been representing myself.
everything I said so far I don't believe has been sworn
testimony.
of stuff.
So
Just like Pat King has been able to say a lot

It's not quite sworn, is it, Pat?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
as a witness.
11
You intend to call yourself
answer format.
12
13
I will ask you to do it in a question and
MR. COUGHLIN:
Before I do that, I would like
to call Laura Peters as a witness.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
MR. KING:
18
he wants to call her.
19
You'd like to what?

Call Laura Peters.
Mr. King?
If he can lay a foundation for why
MR. COUGHLIN:
Well, because a lot of the
20
representations she's made to me throughout this that have
21
gone back on -- the State Bar has gone back on, have a
22
material effect, a prejudicial one, on my ability to
23
defend myself in this proceeding.
24
are filed.
25
prove service with or will attempt to file as a proper
Vis-a-vis how things
Vis-a-vis what the Bar counsel will attempt to
1639
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 274
1
return of service.
mail as postage insufficient.
Vis-a-vis what the Bar got back in the
And I would like to indicate at one point
Mr. King told me, Zach, you don't accept responsibility,
that's why things don't go your way.
Mr. King, if you don't put the postage on the notice of
intent to take default, you need to accept responsibility
for that, sir, and not --
And I proffer that
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
for you to lecture anybody.
11
lawyer in a proceeding to be making accusations.
12
Mr. Coughlin, we're not here

That's not becoming of a
Now, let's get down to Ms. Peters.
13
to call her to establish?
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
You intend
What she told me about witness
15
fees and subpoenas and issuing subpoenas.
16
like to call Mr. King with respect to what he told me, and
17
what he told me Mr. Clark had authorized me to do with
18
respect to issuing subpoenas.
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I would also
I'm not going to permit that.
20
I believe the State Bar and State Bar personnel are
21
immune.
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
mean to interrupt you, sir.
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I believe they're -- I don't
25
That's the first time.
Go
ahead.
1640
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 275
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
I believe it's Rule 106 might
say they are immune from civil lawsuits.
that's limited.
think he's immune from it.
I don't think it says they're immune from questioning or
subpoenas or anything else.
action.
8
9
And I think
If Pat King stabs me right now, I don't

There's some limit to it.
But
It says they are immune from
Mr. King has taken an incredibly broad view of

the action because Mr. King is a good lawyer.
I respect
10
his acumen and ability.
He's a crafty lawyer too.
11
has defined actions in the most broad sense imaginable,
12
where I would say SCR 106 to be more speaking to like a
13
civil action, or I would be suing Pat --
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
But he
with respect to Ms. Peters.
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
Let's focus on the proffer
Yeah.
I attempted to have the
17
note -- she made representations to me about how you go
18
about getting subpoenas done.
19
to get subpoenas served under NRCP 45, if that is indeed
20
the rule that's applicable, given the extent to which I
21
didn't ever get a notice of intent to take default.
22
penalty of perjury I'll say that.
23
got it when I was given the full file.
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
And I didn't have much time
I didn't.
Under
I got it.
I'm trying to focus.
Mr. King asked for a proffer of what evidence you intend
1641
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 276
1
to solicit from Miss Peters.
MR. COUGHLIN:
being accused of perjury.
take default, I just didn't get the one they mailed on the
9th of October.
stuff, I believe I signed for it on the 8th or 7th, I
believe the 8th of November.
8
9
I don't want to get caught up

I got a notice of intent to
I got it when they gave me the big box of
With respect to Miss Peters -- and I also,

just to stay under penalty of perjury -- I got the
10
certified mail version of the notice of hearing on the
11
27th of October.
12
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
13
you intend to solicit from Miss Peters.
14
MR. COUGHLIN:
Let's focus on the evidence
What she told me about my
15
rights with respect to issuing subpoenas or witness fees,
16
and whether or not I had to pay those or subpoena duces
17
tecum fees.
18
MR. KING:
I would object on a couple of
19
grounds.
Number one, repeatedly, and in my presence, both
20
I and Ms. Peters have repeatedly cautioned Mr. Coughlin
21
that we cannot give him legal advice.
22
lawyer, so if it weren't for the fact that I am precluded
23
from giving respondents legal advice, I could, but Laura
24
cannot, and would never suggest that she could inform
25
Mr. Coughlin of his legal rights.
Laura -- I am a
So to the extent he
1642
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 277
1
wants to quiz her on that subject.
Further, the records are the best evidence in
that regard, and conclusively establish when he was served
and how he was served.
So I think, unless the panel wants to question
Ms. Peters on an issue, I think having her subjected to
Mr. Coughlin suggesting that he could rely on statements
by Miss Peters, even if she made them, which she certainly
didn't, would be irrelevant.
10
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
panel?
Does it wish to hear from Ms. Peters?
12
13
What is the sense of the
MR. KENT:
I do not.
Just seems to me like
that's like calling opposing counsel or their sister.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
15
MR. VELLIS:
16
MR. JOHNSON:
Mr. Vellis?
No.
No.
These are procedural
17
issues, and not substantive concerns evidence is required
18
on.
19
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
20
MS. PEARL:
21
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
22
Miss Pearl?
I agree with Mr. Johnson.

It's the sense of the panel
that Miss Peters will not be called as a witness.
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
I think it's instructive, the
24
commentary by Mr. King to the extent that he has
25
equated --
1643
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 278
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
You can argue --- argued the whole time,
because I've been saying there's no separation between
clerk and court and the prosecutor.
controlling the clerk of court.
Miss Peters, I swear under penalty of perjury, she told me
this.
10
11
12
13
14
He's telling her -- and
Pat King said I couldn't file a motion to submit --
8
9
The prosecutor is
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin.
you can argue your case later.
Mr. Coughlin,
evidence?
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm not arguing it.
I'm
putting on evidence.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, do you have any
other evidence to offer?
15
MR. COUGHLIN:
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
question and answer format.
18
Sure.
I'll testify.
MR. COUGHLIN:
All right.
Please do so in a
I prefer, if it's all right,
19
your Honor, to testify in a narrative.
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I will not permit that.
If
21
you want to call yourself as a witness, I want a question
22
and answer format so that the State Bar has an opportunity
23
to object to the question.
24
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
Okay.
ZACHARY COUGHLIN
1644
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 279
1
having been previously duly sworn, testified
further as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
sir.
Mr. Coughlin, thank you for being here today,
You look very well.
I like how you're dressed.
MR. VELLIS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'll remind you you are under oath still.
10
Does he need to be sworn?
MR. COUGHLIN:
He's already been sworn.
I'll note for the record that
11
it has been my understanding that while I have been
12
representing myself, and not offering testimony, that I
13
have not been under oath.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Your understanding is wrong.
15
Not only as an officer of the court, although albeit under
16
suspension, you have an obligation to express extreme
17
candor with the court and not lie to it.
18
that that's your obligation, then I believe everything
19
that you say should be truthful.
20
away from that, we would like to know that.
21
So to the extent
And if you are walking
If there's some things you have said today
22
that you now believe are not truthful that you wouldn't
23
have said had you believed you were under oath, I would
24
like to know that.
25
But whether or not you're under oath, as an
1645
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 280
1
officer of the court you owe an obligation not to deceive
this panel, not to deceive co-counsel.
however, that now that you're offering explicit testimony
under question and answer format, that you are under oath,
in addition to your obligation as an officer of the court,
albeit under suspension.
So, do you want to proceed?
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You are reminded,
10
think you look.
11
Yes.
You told us how nice you
Any other relevant questions?
MR. COUGHLIN:
It just seem there's a level of
12
redundancy.
If what you're saying is true, then why are
13
you reminding me now that I am sworn and all this?
14
I don't believe Pat King has been sworn today.
15
Are you saying everything he said has been said under oath
16
today?
17
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No.
I'm saying what he said
I expect to have been in candor --
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
There is a difference, right?

-- with deference to the
21
court, and with deference to the truth, and without an
22
intent to deceive.
23
now.
But you are offering specific evidence
24
MR. COUGHLIN:
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Now.
Now you're under oath.
1646
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1
MR. COUGHLIN:
That's why I made the
distinction between everything I've said up to now, and
now.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Question?
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Please proceed.
Do you feel Pat King has lied and/or misled
you or displayed a lack of candor to opposing counsel
through this process, Mr. Coughlin?
I think there certainly is strong probability
10
of that.
I'm very disappointed in Mr. King's behavior
11
throughout these proceedings.
12
that has been rather off-putting, sure.
13
And something that denigrates the dignity of the Bar, I
14
think a lot of people would say.
It's frankly been something

Surprising, yeah.
15
I think Pat King has functioned primarily as
16
an attack dog for the rich and powerful throughout these
17
proceedings.
18
I mean it in a broad sense from minute one when I met Pat
19
King.
20
and wrong, and more something in line of opportunistic
21
social climbing that cares not for what's for the best of
22
the greater good, but rather for what is in line with Pat
23
King's own self-interest, the pursuit of ease and comfort,
24
and that which enables him to remain as Bar counsel with
25
the least amount of consternation or risk to adverse
And his behavior -- when I say proceedings,
His behavior has evinced a lack of regard for right
1647
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
consequences directed at him by those in power and control
of our legal profession.
To wit, Mr. King has attempted to
impermissibly exert control of who has been held out to me
as the clerk of court, Laura Peters.
been held out to me as an investigator, though she has
gone to such great lengths recently to avoid being given
any information which might present her with the duty to
follow up and investigate that she has added me,
10
Miss Peters has also
apparently, to her blocked senders list of e-mails.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
the question.
13
Mr. King.
14
Sorry.
You're going beyond
Your question was what do you think of

MR. COUGHLIN:
15
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
16
Yes, sir.
What did Mr. King tell you when you broached
17
the topic of whether or not you ever received the
18
certified mail notice of intent to take default
19
purportedly mailed and postmarked on November 9th, 2012 --
20
or October -- October 9th, 2012?
21
respect to you indicating to Mr. King that the post office
22
would not give you that mailing, that large manila
23
envelope, due to the insufficient postage marked on it,
24
which you have previously indicated was only in the
25
neighborhood of $1.25, and was lacking somewhere in the
Specifically with
1648
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
neighborhood of five dollars postage for that certified
mailing of notice of intent to bring default?
Well, I'm glad you brought that up, Zach.
Mr. King was particularly evasive in that regard, and it
almost seemed as though he realized that he and/or his
staff had made a mistake, but didn't want to own up to it
because the time had been booked, and/or the court
reporter was a nonrefundable expense, and/or Mr. King
realized he would yield a benefit by jamming Zach Coughlin
10
into proceeding with this proceeding, absent all the
11
procedural safeguards, the few of them that exist.
12
13
To wit, Mr. King seemed to take an axe to the

entirety of SCR 1052(c).
14
If I may, I would like to read that rule into
15
the record.
Court's indulgence for a second, and I'll try
16
to pull it up.
17
In the meantime --
18
MR. KING:
19
extensive.
20
Mr. Chairman, the rule is pretty
Due to the time constraints, I think the panel
can --
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
22
MR. KING:
It's only a paragraph.
-- notice of what the law is.
23
Instead of having Mr. Coughlin read it, whatever emphasis
24
he's going to apply, I would suggest the court admonish
25
Mr. Coughlin that it will read the law on its own.
1649
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I agree.
And you've been
testifying now approximately nine minutes.
more.
the record the State Bar rule.
in front of us.
I don't feel it's necessary for you to read into
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
You have six
I think most of us have it
Okay.
Yes.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
10
Can you tell me more about some of the
11
procedural violations and due process violations that have
12
been attendant to this proceeding?
13
Sure.
Answer, sure, I would love to.
14
Mr. King and/or Miss Peters, who seem to have signed
15
certificates of mailings for both the State Bar, and for
16
the panel chair, which might be what the rule entails, but
17
they have mailed out and/or purported to serve upon me a
18
notice of hearing and designation of witnesses summary of
19
evidence that they purport was placed in the mail by
20
certified mail on October 12th.
21
However, upon reviewing the USPS Website track
22
and confirm system, it indicates that the first scanning
23
of that item into the UPS system was on October 16th.
24
25
I moved.
I moved.
On approximately September 27th-ish
SCR 79, I believe, requires that I update my
1650
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
address within 30 days for the State Bar.
a physical address, as Mr. King seemed to indicate
earlier, but I believe a mailing address.
Not necessarily
I believe I did that, in that I believe it
was -- at least with the CLE board I believe I updated the
address sometime around October 10th, maybe earlier.
know, and I believe it's in the materials that I have
submitted on file in this matter, that I believe it was
October 23rd I sent an e-mail to the State Bar, and it
10
might have been a fax to Mr. King, and I typically copy
11
Mr. Clark on it that said, you know what, I haven't wanted
12
to give out my address because I'm afraid of local law
13
enforcement.
14
There seems to be a clear-cut retaliatory animus against
15
me, and I just haven't felt comfortable.
16
adjudged a victim of domestic violence, sometime, I
17
believe, in February 2012.
18
I've been incarcerated ten times this year.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And I have been
Mr. Coughlin, your question
19
was addressed to procedural violations, and now you're
20
wandering away and talking about incarcerations.
21
you focus on the question?
22
to your question?
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
Would
Have you finished your answer
No, sir.
They go to the
24
address.
And the reason I bring that up, and I'm sorry I
25
had to go off into that is that that DowSoE and notice of
1651
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
hearing that he purports.
Peters, signed the certificate of mailing saying the
certified mail version was put in the mail on the 12th.
He by way, I believe, of Laura
At first scan on the tracking confirm on the
16th it shows on -- USPS track and confirm is on-line.
You can type in the number of the certified mail.
shows the first time it was placed in my mailbox was
October 22nd.
It
I believe the reason it took five days was
10
because I filed a change of address from my post office
11
box, which was expiring.
12
address on East Ninth Street.
13
P.O. Box 3961.
14
delivery to the Vassar station on, I'm pretty sure on
15
October 5th, because that was the day my post office box
16
was supposed to run out; I submitted that change of
17
address.
18
I changed it to my new physical

So I changed it from the
I know I submitted it in my hand via hand
It's my understanding it can take some time
19
for those to actually process.
You get the yellow
20
stickers.
21
took from scanning that DowSoE notice of hearing on
22
October 16th all the way to October 22nd before it was
23
available in my, either in my mailbox or my new physical
24
address or I was still getting mail in my old P.O. box.
25
And in fact the key is still working right now.
And I believe that might be the reason that it
1652
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Let me just try to help you.
You have about -- I'll afford you two more minutes if you
would like to address other issues.
interested in having you address the issues the supreme
court asked us to look at, and that is what the nature and
extent of the punishment should be.
questions on that topic?
8
9
MR. COUGHLIN:
Specifically I'm
Do you have any
Well, I think getting this
whole hearing thrown out is in my best interests.
And the
10
fact that all the procedural safeguards of SCR 1052(c)
11
have been violated is my best avenue to do that.
12
Further, I believe the extent to which this
13
court has -- I'm testifying right now, so I'm going to get
14
this in.
15
Mr. King has evinced a --
16
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
17
18
19
20
Mr. King.
You have told us your view of
I'm asking you -MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm going to the notice of
intent to take default, whether I got it.

MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, I'm asking you
21
specifically.
22
respect to the supreme court's directive that this panel
23
is to determine the nature and extent of any punishment
24
you should suffer as a member of the State Bar?
25
Do you wish to present any evidence with
MR. VELLIS:
Or any mitigation.
1653
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
Or any mitigation?
Mitigation.
I've been
diagnosed and treated with ADD.
I hate admitting this on
the record.
girlfriend of 4 1/2 years, my domestic partner, in
August -- no.
15th.
for at least, I believe May and June, she took the rent
portion that I normally gave her and she would forward on,
Also major depressive disorder.
My
She finally graduated in June -- no, May
Two days later she moved out.
She hadn't told me
10
and instead she kept it and started a new life with it
11
when she moved out.
12
I wasn't aware of that until sometime in
13
August.
14
was arrested on August 20th for the iPhone thing that
15
there's a trial on the 19th.
16
on the Walmart thing.
17
August 11th the landlord sent me an e-mail.
17 days later I was arrested
August 2nd I canceled an appointment with
18
Dr. Yasar, my psychiatrist, because I couldn't afford it
19
or the medications.
20
was some ill will incident of the breakup of my domestic
21
relationship.
22
went off my medications because I couldn't afford them.
23
did make several calls to NAMS, but given the sensitivity
24
of being on these medications and a lawyer, a
25
professional, and the prejudice attendant thereto, and the
I reached out to my family.
There
I didn't receive any help from anybody.
I
I
1654
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
fact that even if I went to NAMS they wouldn't cover the
ADD medication, and they would cover the antidepressant,
which is also somewhat of a dual-use medication.
But long story short, I was running out of
money, and I decided a lot due to money, some due to
desire to take a medication holiday.
take these things long enough, sometimes you want to see
what it's like not taking them.
9
10
Just see, when you
I went off those medications, probably too

abruptly, at the start of August.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
What year?
'11.
Within like 20 days all
13
of a sudden the iPhone arrest that's pending right now,
14
and I maintain my innocence on that.
15
ridiculous law school effect pattern.
16
this is a hypothetical exam in law school, it would be
17
some guy finds an iPhone on the ground in a skate plaza in
18
downtown Reno at 11:15 at night on a Saturday, and holds
19
it aloft offering it up to the denizens of the skate
20
plaza.
21
somebody, claim this.
22
river.
23
the phone.
24
25
It sounds like a
But essentially if
Then he says something to the effect of, come on,

I'm going to throw it into the
And at that time people will allege that I claimed
And then there's some suggestions -- there's

some ambiguity, some might say, as to whose phone it is at
1655
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 290
1
that point.
lost, mislaid property is larceny.
have a right to coerce you into consenting to search.
4
5
Whether it would be in the river, is that
There is a video -- I gave you a video of the

arrest --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Does a police officer
this question.
Could you focus for us on -The mitigation.

-- the factors -- let me ask
Do you believe that any of the issues that
10
you have described impair your ability to practice law and
11
adequately represent clients?
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
I believe when I'm not under
13
such -- getting arrested, spending six days in jail,
14
getting out, finding an eviction notice on my door.
15
eviction which I would maintain is against the law, a
16
summary eviction, where nonpayment of rent is not pledged
17
against a commercial tenant.
18
An
There's laws against that for a reason,
19
because it can murder your business, and it's a huge
20
fallout personally.
21
So I get arrested.
Spend six days in jail.
22
maintain it's a wrongful arrest.
23
everything perfect, but I do believe if you look at it,
24
look at the criminal law, you might agree with me the
25
I might not have done
arrest was wrongful.
1656
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
My question was not whether
that arrest is valid or invalid, but whether or not the
conditions that you described you feel you suffer from
impair your ability to practice law and/or represent,
adequately represent clients?
MR. COUGHLIN:
No.
No.
And I think if you
had been with me through all this you would be
impressed --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
Do you have --- by my dedication to my
11
clients and the level of work product I churn out,
12
especially considering the remuneration I've received from
13
those clients.
14
doing people's custody, people's foreclosure defense,
15
adversary proceedings in bankruptcy.
16
noncompete case I think -- I'm not happy with how my life
17
has gone.
18
with the courts.
19
I have basically worked for minimum wage
And there was a
I'm not happy with all this drama and problems

But --
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
While we're on that.
Do you
20
recognize any symptom of validity in some of the language
21
used by Judges Gardner, Judge Nash Holmes, and their
22
orders in which they find you in contempt?
23
recognize that there may be some validity in what they
24
say?
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
Do you
I think it is important to know
1657
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
when to just accept what the judge says for the dignity of
the court, and to know that fine line between standing up
for what you think is right, and not continuing to push
past the point where it's -- my own best interests or
where it damages the standing or appearance of the legal
profession in general.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you feel a sense of
remorse for the way you conducted yourself in front of
judges, both Judges Gardner and Judge Nash Holmes?
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
13
different.
14
though.
Yes.
How so?
I wish the result had been
I think my heart was in the right place
You know, I was standing up for the --
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
MR. COUGHLIN:
Do you feel that any --- the domestic violence victim
17
in the Joshi case, because I felt she deserved a swing at
18
the bat for alimony.
19
and imploring me to advocate on her behalf there.
20
She said that she was looking to me
With respect to the Judge Nash Holmes case,
21
there's a lot of ancillary matters that this panel told me
22
they simply don't find relevant.
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Do you regret any of the
24
conduct that you exhibited in either Judge Linda
25
Gardner's, Judge Gardner or Judge Nash Holmes' courtroom?
1658
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 293
1
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Sure.
What conduct do you regret
having entered?
MR. COUGHLIN:
I do think it would have been
preferable for me to have been able to better articulate
to Judge Gardner the basis for the position I took.
think my position -- I generally cited to an ALR article
that I had reviewed previous to that trial for which the
title was something to the effect of a domestic duty,
10
impermissible to set it off with a debt, a duty greater
11
than a debt accorded greater significance under the law.
12
But I didn't give her the presentation that a more
13
experienced attorney like John Springgate did where he had
14
ten exhibits.
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
One of the judges accused you
16
of refusing to follow the judge's directives.
17
agree with that conclusion when the order came down?
18
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You appealed each of the
orders?
22
MR. COUGHLIN:
23
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
24
25
I think that
there's --
20
21
I don't know.
Did you
I tried to.
Do I take from that that you
disagreed with the conclusion the judges -MR. COUGHLIN:
Absolutely.
1659
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 294
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
-- made?
Absolutely.
And you still disagree?
See, I feel like this is the
Guantanamo for coerced confessions in this proceeding.
I don't say yes, if I don't do the big mea culpa, then I
don't get the check box on the mitigation analysis.
think that's wrong.
was right here.
10
If
And I
Because I stood up for what I thought
It's as though the system is set up to
demand me to not stand by that.
11
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
12
To --
have any further questions?
13
MR. VELLIS:
Do any of the panel members
Mr. Coughlin, just one thing.
14
Some of those orders refer to what's called rude or
15
sarcastic behavior.
16
feelings of remorse about a judge feeling that you're rude
17
or sarcastic in the courtroom?
18
What is your sense of that, and
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm disappointed in that.
And
19
I want to ameliorate that in the future and limit that
20
which is experienced by those judges as rude and
21
sarcastic.
22
I think that's part of the adversarial process, you know.
23
But make it so that my presentation in court as a
24
professional is more in line with what's acceptable.
25
Eliminate that, maybe not completely, because
That being said, you're going to have your
1660
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
counselors out there, you know, and not everybody is easy
like Sunday morning, you know, as an attorney.
okay.
about Karen Sternly.
just -- people don't accept them quite so readily coming
from me.
point of view or from my -- from where I'm coming from.
But, you know, I just -- I know this is not
That's how Karen Sternly did.
And that's
And I like that
I stole all her moves.
And they
And maybe that's a lack of common sense from my
going to get me any points.
But frankly, I think there's
10
a lot of things that are very regrettable that are going
11
on in the legal profession these days.
12
lot of positions that are very, very honorable, and I've
13
done a lot of good things this year, particularly with
14
respect to landlord tenant law as it's carried out in
15
Washoe County, Nevada.
16
and retaliated against because of it.
17
And I've taken a
And all I've gotten is punished
And Richard Hill is able to leverage the
18
police force, and some might say the board and the Bar,
19
some might even say the courts, to an extent that I
20
find -- I won't say I, but I'll say some might find
21
objectionable.
22
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
23
MS. PEARL:
24
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
25
MS. PEARL:
Anything else?
I do.
Go ahead.
May I make a comment first?
1661
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 296
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MS. PEARL:
Sure.
You made more sense in the last 15
minutes than you did all day.
amount of respect for you.
would have you represent me tomorrow in the behavior you
had just in the last 30 minutes.
do that.
8
9
And I have an enormous
You're very intelligent, and I
I'm very proud of you to
May I ask you a question?
And when you were
going through all of these trials and tribulations with
10
the judges and the contempt charges, were you on
11
medication at the time?
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
Well, the medication was -- I
13
went off both of them in August.
14
2nd I went off both of them.
15
Then I got arrested on the iPhone thing, I got arrested
16
August 9th on the Walmart thing.
17
Walmart thing I got back on one of the medications,
18
because I felt I couldn't afford both.
19
that medication while I got the contempt charge with Judge
20
Howard on November 30th.
21
I got arrested -- August
I got arrested August 20th.
The day after the
And so I was on
It wasn't until basically getting -- the
22
February 27th contempt charge with Judge Nash Holmes, same
23
deal, only on one of the medications.
24
25
It's somewhat not a controlled study, because

I'm getting evicted, and my life is chaos in the meantime.
1662
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 297
1
So Judge Nash Holmes, that's another contempt.
it wasn't until -- by the way, I need to say this.
And then
There was -- I want this to be in the record.
There was three different competency orders this year.
There's a rule that says proceedings must be stayed for
the pendency of those.
through the pendency of all three of those.
8
9
10
My proceedings kept on rolling
So all three of these convictions could be

thrown out as void given that trial settings were -MS. PEARL:
Let me add a question to what your
11
statement was just now.
12
through the competency hearings, and you admit that you
13
have ADD and some depression issues.
14
responsibility as an attorney to go to the Bar and say,
15
look, I'm going through some tough times right now that is
16
not -- you're not -- it's not your fault that you have a
17
disease, that you're needing the medication -- that you
18
could get a suspension of your license until you can get
19
back into a regimen of pills and back in acting like this
20
court and the supreme court is asking you to act.
21
You're saying that you went
Can't you do that?
Isn't it your
Isn't there a rule of
22
order that says, look, I need a temporary suspension with
23
no bad marks on my record until I can get my act back
24
together, and then work on that?
25
MR. COUGHLIN:
I didn't want that.
I didn't
1663
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 298
1
want that, because that's an out for all of the
misconduct, all the police misconduct, all the
prosecutorial misconduct, and some might say all the
judicial misconduct that I've come up against this year --
MS. PEARL:
Why did you do that?
MR. COUGHLIN:
-- it's always Zach's problem,
the mental case problem.
misconduct by all these others --
MS. PEARL:
10
And it's too much of an out for
I'm done.
MR. COUGHLIN:
-- I'm a domestic violence
11
attorney.
Mental health care is the first tool the tyrant
12
leverages.
13
the time.
14
You're not acting like we want, buddy, we're going to get
15
you some mental health.
16
do.
Oh, we're going to -- and it comes to this all

We're going to get you some mental health.
That's what tyrants and abusers
17
MS. PEARL:
That's not my question.
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
19
MS. PEARL:
I'm not saying it is.
I'm not trying to be
20
disrespectful.
21
asking you is why put yourself in jeopardy of losing your
22
license altogether rather than trying to get it together?
23
24
25
There is nothing wrong with it.
MR. KING:
What I'm
I think he's asked and answered
that.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I think it -- Pat, nobody else
1664
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 299
1
has spoken from this panel the whole day from the chair,
and you're going to object.
MR. KING:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
question.
Mr. Coughlin -Go ahead, answer the
We're running out of time.

MR. KING:
-- explain why he didn't avail
himself of Rule 117.
We have encouraged him up the
ying-yang to get treatment, taking advantage of that
rule --
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
11
MR. KING:
12
I don't trust Pat King at all.
Would you mind if I asked a
follow-up question?
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
MR. KING:
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
16
Have you finished your questions?
17
MS. PEARL:
18
Pardon me?
May I ask a follow-up question?

In a minute.
Yes.
And I thank you for the
answers.
19
MR. COUGHLIN:
20
MR. KING:
Thank you.
I appreciate it.
Mr. Coughlin, did I on many
21
occasions, including with David Clark, encourage you to
22
read and take advantage of Rule 117?
23
MR. COUGHLIN:
24
25
Pat, I just don't trust you at
all.
MR. KING:
The question is did we encourage
1665
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 300
1
you to?
MR. COUGHLIN:
If you did, Pat, it came as
nothing more than, hey, make my job easy.
deal.
will all come out in the wash when you come back.
Pat, I just don't trust you, man.
MR. KING:
Sign on this
Oh, it pauses everything, it pauses everything.
It
And,
I don't.
That's okay.
But was what was
said, that it would pause everything --
MR. COUGHLIN:
No, I didn't say that either,
10
Pat.
11
your case for it, and now you're not going to use my case
12
to prove that.
13
You had your time to prove that, and you didn't use
14
MR. KING:
cross-examine you.
15
16
Mr. Coughlin, I get to
Did I ask you to get treatment --
MR. COUGHLIN:
Can I just finish my testimony
quickly before -- there's just a couple things.
17
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We're running out of time.
18
afforded you in excess of 20 minutes.
19
when you were getting close.
20
issue as to how you felt about the supreme court's
21
directive for this panel to determine the nature and
22
extent of punishment, if any.
23
I cautioned you
I tried to redirect your
We focused on that.
It's now 4:31, according to the State Bar
24
clock.
I would like to give everybody an opportunity to
25
give us a final argument.
I'm going to give Mr. King
1666
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
another two minutes to finish questioning you, and then
we'll start final argument.
MR. KENT:
Can we take a real quick break?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Pardon me?
I think we can if
we're willing to go beyond 5:00 o'clock to whatever break
it is.
that okay?
I'm prepared to stay here until 5:30 or so, is
MR. VELLIS:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
Yeah.
Do you have any more
questions?
11
MR. VELLIS:
Do you want to finish your
12
cross-examination, or are you done?
13
MR. KING:
I'm probably done.
14
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Let's take a quick break.
15
Let's come back at 20 minutes to 5:00, and we'll go until
16
5:15 with final argument.
17
(Recess taken.)
18
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Back on the record.
19
is now 4:40.
20
minutes for final argument.
21
the panel members.
22
The time
arguments to address these issues.
23
24
25
I'd like to now provide both sides 15
One.
I've conferred with some of
We would like specifically the final
Whether Mr. Coughlin is currently
competent to adequately represent litigants and clients.

Two.
Whether or not there should be penalties
1667
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
and discipline imposed on Mr. Coughlin, and if so, what
the nature and extent of that should be.
Mr. King.
MR. COUGHLIN:
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
MR. COUGHLIN:
One second.
Can I interject?

Sorry, your Honor.
There was
just one other thing I was hoping to offer into evidence.
It will only take a second to ask to do it.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
10
MR. COUGHLIN:
What is that?
11
file.
12
I would like to -- but the
sheriff here and --
13
And then the subpoena that I tried to get the
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I believe that all the
14
pleadings that have been filed would be part of the
15
panel's record that would go to the supreme court.
16
MR. KING:
Anything that's been marked as an
17
exhibit and identified and accepted into evidence by the
18
panel will be part of the record.
19
transcript of the proceedings.
20
time, anything that hasn't been proffered as evidence will
21
be not admitted.
22
23
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And the entire
No other documents at this
Do the pleadings go up or
just that which is offered into evidence and accepted?

MR. KING:
To the extent that the complaint
will certainly go up, everything that's in this packet
1668
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 303
1
will go up.
evidence will be sent up on the record, along with the
entire transcript.
Anything that you had marked and accepted as
But to have other documents just compiled, it
won't help the record, it will make it more confusing.
The supreme court has better things to do.
MR. VELLIS:
Pleadings filed, they don't go
automatically, the whole case file doesn't go, just
whatever is entered here?
10
MR. KING:
Correct.
My pleadings, for
11
instance, as you can see by the Bates stamp numbers are
12
thousands of pages of nonsensical e-mails and disparaging
13
e-mails.
14
or help the supreme court.
I didn't think that that would add to this day
15
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I think the confusion, at
16
least I have, is whether or not the pleadings themselves,
17
whatever file, whatever Mr. Coughlin has filed, a motion
18
for whatever reason, are those part of the record that go
19
up on appeal?
20
familiar, that does become part of the record if so
21
designated.
22
23
MR. KING:
If the orders go up, pleadings that
are not admitted do not go up.
24
25
In civil litigation, with which I'm only
MR. COUGHLIN:
Your Honor, if I can just
interject --
1669
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 304
1
MR. KING:
In other words, everything
Mr. Coughlin sent, oftentimes with these multiple captions
where he's sending them to many people, he might caption
as a pleading, it doesn't make it a pleading.
be something that was sent to us, filed in, and that would
be a pleading.
stamped with the supreme court, it will go up.
It has to
And if there was such a thing as file
MR. VELLIS:
That is my question.
It doesn't
have to be necessarily be brought up here, but if it was
10
submitted and file stamped as being submitted, then it's
11
part of the record that goes up, whether it was mentioned
12
here or not?
13
MR. KING:
Correct.
14
understanding.
15
That would be my
filed, stamped in by the court.
16
17
Only if it was properly filed, timely
MR. VELLIS:
I think Mr. Coughlin has
something else to say.
18
MR. COUGHLIN:
I would ask that I would be
19
allowed to be a little bit more specific.
20
a big box of stuff.
21
was broken up into about four different things, each one
22
kind of had a cardboard thing and a rubber band holding it
23
together.
24
25
Mr. King got me
I'm only seeking to put in -- and it
The one I'm seeking is the one he labeled as

the Formal Hearing File, SBN Coughlin.
And it's Bates
1670
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 305
1
stamped number 02701 is the start.
way through 0394, at which point I started to just keep
the more recent pleadings, and just pleadings that I got
to continue on with the file from when it was taken to the
printer, I believe.
And it goes all the
This is not just the pleadings.
There's some
stuff in here I never even saw before, like an affidavit
by Laura Peters that speaks to things like the service of
the complaint.
It's filed.
I'm wondering why didn't I
10
get a copy of it if it has a file stamp on it?
11
kind of strange.
12
13
That's
So I do think -- I would ask that I be able to

admit this into evidence.
14
MR. KING:
I don't know what that is.
And I
15
object to it at this stage, proffering a bunch of papers
16
that haven't been discussed, haven't been admitted, no
17
foundation laid.
18
the supreme court, it doesn't make sense.
19
Just to say they are going to go up to
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I tend to agree.
These are
20
all -- the pleadings themselves, as we now understand it,
21
are going to go -- would be part of the record the supreme
22
court reviews.
23
of documents three inches thick that I have no idea what's
24
in there.
25
What you're offering appears to be a stack
MR. COUGHLIN:
May I --
1671
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 306
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We don't have time.
I would
really like to afford you an opportunity to address the
issue that I asked.
objection.
entered into at this stage.
do that, and identify specific pieces and proffer specific
pieces.
attempting to get in videotapes and transcripts.
So I'm going to sustain the
I'm not going to permit those exhibits to be

You had all day in which to
Instead you chose to spend a great deal of time
So I'm going to overrule that objection to the
10
extent these are factual documents.
11
are pleadings in there that are part of the official
12
record, they are going to go up.
13
To the extent there
It's now a quarter to 5:00.
You've heard the
14
questions that the panel is interested in having addressed
15
in the final arguments.
16
Mr. King.
17
MR. KING:
If I could
18
start by just expressing to this panel how important it is
19
to protect the public and the profession through our peer
20
review and disciplinary process.
21
this panel to recognize whether or not Mr. Coughlin is or
22
isn't competent to practice law.
23
sympathy for his condition, whatever that is, or we feel
24
sorry that he has not obtained help, if there is help.
25
It is incumbent upon
Not whether we have
Because I can tell from questioning from the
1672
HEARING - 11/14/2012
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1
panel or statements from the panel that you can be
extremely sympathetic of an individual circumstance where
you can envision in your brain if things were different
with your intellect, being as smart as you are, you might
have made a great lawyer or added something.
imagining that in your head and saying, I want to afford
Mr. Coughlin the opportunity to get to that point I say is
not this panel's purview today.
And
Because Mr. Coughlin clearly has established
10
that he has not accepted responsibility for his condition.
11
That he knew it could have been offered, that he could
12
have received help, but chose not to.
13
explanation at the very end, and I'll back into this.
14
his explanation at the very end is, well, then, I would
15
look bad.
16
injustices.
And what was his

But
I would be caving to the bad judges and the
17
He has not demonstrated to this panel that I
18
have a problem, and I want to correct it, and there is
19
help for me.
20
And going to the complaint.
This is not
21
something we wanted to occur.
If you look at the
22
complaint that was served, it starts off by introducing
23
Mr. Coughlin, and then the grievance we received.
24
points out right at the beginning on Paragraph 2, the
25
respondent was advised of the grievance via U.S. mail and
And it
1673
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 308
1
e-mail, and by brief meeting with Mr. King at the State
Bar.
and rather than respond to the grievances as requested,
respondent sent nonresponsive and disparaging e-mails.
Respondent did not cooperate with the investigation,
That never changed.
And then go to the next paragraph.
Respondent
has not made a request to be placed on disability status,
nor has he acknowledged that he may have a mental
infirmity, illness, or addiction.
10
He has never said to the State Bar that I have
11
a mental affliction or inability.
You heard the judges
12
testify.
13
little background in this area, but clearly she felt that
14
he had mentally degenerated and could not practice law.
15
And she felt it was so serious that she made those
16
findings by clear and convincing evidence.
You heard Judge Holmes suggest that she had a
17
You heard from our very first judge, Judge
18
Beesley.
19
advocate of Mr. Coughlin when he first became admitted,
20
and said what, he can't practice, and he's not appropriate
21
in the courtroom.
22
the clients.
23
He talked about I contacted Coe Swobe, an
And I felt that it would be a danger to
So just cutting right to the chase.
This is a
24
circumstance where in the complaint we recognized it.
25
have a policy at the State Bar that if an attorney has a
We
1674
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 309
1
crisis in their life, whether it be -- heaven forbid, you
can have a death of a child or a wife.
disease.
drug or alcohol problems or some sort of an addiction.
And the State Bar wants attorneys to get help and to
maintain their law license, and that's that we wanted for
Mr. Coughlin.
8
9
You could have a stroke.
You could have a
You could have even
Instead, he did not accept his condition.

he hasn't today.
And
And when you are asking those probing
10
questions, leading as they were, did you feel bad when you
11
conducted yourself this way?
12
yes, and I'll never do it again, and I'm sorry, and I'm
13
falling on my sword.
14
psychiatrist he's going to try new medications.
15
that has occurred.
16
There wasn't an immediate
Now that I've talked to my

None of
Instead what you get is the testimony that you
17
heard from Mr. Coughlin today, and that is it is
18
everybody's fault except his.
19
he didn't produce any evidence to suggest it, but he
20
started off by saying Judge Holmes lied, that these judges
21
have some sort of almost a conspiracy theory to get him,
22
and that the State Bar does.
23
You heard him say, although
So what is the seriousness of this?
Well, the
24
State Bar forwarded a 111 petition to the supreme court.
25
Why?
Because the law mandates that we do.
And what does
1675
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 310
1
the law say?
amount, is a serious crime.
that pending the disciplinary hearing.
You don't get to practice law.
That theft by an attorney, regardless of the

And they suspended him like
Hey, you're done.
That's our Nevada Supreme Court saying, if you
are going to behave this way, you don't get to practice.
Now come before a disciplinary panel.
Mr. Coughlin come before you, which he did not, and said,
I have a mental problem or some other issue, and I'm
And had
10
working on getting it resolved, and I need to throw myself
11
at your mercy, and give me a chance to go through this
12
designed treatment program that I am working on.
13
four years or three years I want to have an opportunity to
14
come back and prove myself, that would have been
15
thrilling.
16
case.
And in
And I would have been glad if that was the
I encouraged Mr. Coughlin to take that approach.
17
I explained to him, I can't give you legal
18
advice, but this is my opinion.
19
suggested I pack my bag and go to Arizona.
20
And he said no way.
What was the theft part of?
He
Well,
21
Mr. Coughlin said what?
22
got myself arrested, and then I had all these series of
23
crimes.
24
his meds?
25
I went off my meds, and then I
What date did he give you for when he went off

2011.
But from the beginning of his practice we have
1676
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 311
1
a judge who writes an order that got him fired from Washoe
Legal Services.
disrespectful.
finding by a judge back in 2009.
She said that his conduct was

And you've got the order.
That was a
And then if you go through the history of the
patterns, this has been an ongoing consistent pattern for
Mr. Coughlin.
has the opportunity, a single client to testify here today
to say he helped me.
He hasn't brought forth, which he certainly
He did a good job.
He didn't bring
10
a single attorney from the entire Bar to come in and say,
11
you know, Mr. Coughlin is okay.
12
So who did we hear from?
We have heard from
13
people that knew him and liked him, and consider him
14
somebody they like.
15
experienced attorney who no doubt would have been thrilled
16
if Mr. Coughlin was competent to practice law and was
17
helping people.
18
And that was Paul Elcano, a very
I don't think Mr. Elcano wanted to testify
19
here today against Mr. Coughlin, but he felt compelled to
20
as a member of the Bar to say, he's incompetent to
21
practice.
22
judge, and I witnessed that.
23
added, but I've seen more recent things.
24
that testimony?
25
ongoing.
He was incompetent when he was before the

And then if you remember he
Do you remember
He said this is, in other words, this is
This wasn't an episode.
1677
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 312
1
Mr. Hill testified.
Now Mr. Hill is
representing an adversary client.
tell you?
office, my entire staff, you heard him testify, my entire
office was terrorized.
But what did Mr. Hill
You can't believe anything he says.
And my
And Mr. Coughlin can sit here while we have
marshals in the room and at one time apparently act
passive.
conduct right here to this panel.
But you saw his aggressive, disrespectful

He cannot control
10
himself or does not control himself or chooses not to.
11
Whatever that is.
12
what is his actual conduct today?
You have to look at his conduct and say
13
So he steals, and he's convicted.
14
serious crime according to the supreme court, because it's
15
theft.
16
it or understand what circumstances he did it?
17
entire focus was on whether or not there was -- I don't
18
know.
19
ID, but never a suggestion that I was foolish, or I made a
20
mistake, shouldn't have done this.
21
And it's a
Did he give any explanation today for why he did

No.
His
I heard something about a tribal police officer and
But he went through an entire day trial with a
22
judge who did what at the end of the trial?
It's not like
23
it was enough that I'm going to find you guilty of this
24
serious crime, which that judge certainly is experienced
25
enough to know if I find you guilty, and you're a lawyer,
1678
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 313
1
you're going to have a serious problem.
contempt of court and put him in jail for his conduct
before him during an entire proceeding where he was
obnoxious and disrespectful and condescending, many times
of which he started to exhibit before this very panel.
That's one judge.
Judge Holmes.
her trial?
in criminal contempt.
He held him in
What did she do at the end of
She found him guilty.
And then she held him
And then she issued another order
10
after trial detailing out his conduct and the violation of
11
each of the Nevada disciplinary rules.
12
is telling the panel the man can't practice law.
13
fit to practice.
14
Why?
Because she
He's not
And she said -- I asked her, what was your
15
intention in writing the order?
16
all of the rules of professional conduct?
17
find it by clear and convincing evidence, which you know
18
isn't a typical standard for civil practice.
19
said, because I wanted this panel to understand that he
20
needed to stop practicing law.
21
Why did you detail out

And why did you
And she
So now you have had three experienced judges
22
testify.
You had Judge Beesley who told you as a federal
23
judge I reviewed his pleadings.
24
investigated.
25
one federal judge.
I talked to others.
And he is incompetent to testify.
That was
1679
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 314
1
Then you heard from Judge Holmes who said he
cannot testify.
competent to practice law.
4
5
He's not competent rather, he is not
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You have a couple more
minutes.
MR. KING:
Aside from the fact that he's mean
and argumentative and condescending and disrespectful.
That was in each of the judges' orders.
You have admitted --
10
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. King, you've only got a
11
couple more minutes, and I would like to hear the State
12
Bar's thoughts on what, if any, punishment should be
13
issued, and what that should be.
14
MR. KING:
Yes.
Thank you.
Judge Howard.
15
Every one of these experienced judges that had him before
16
him said he was practicing in an incompetent manner and it
17
would pose a threat to clients.
18
said this.
19
Every single one of them
So you cannot, in my opinion, under any
20
circumstance, suggest in any way that Mr. Coughlin is
21
competent.
22
Mr. Coughlin that would support that.
23
witness.
24
25
Because you've heard no evidence from

Not from a single
So let's start with the proposition that he is

not going to be practicing law.
This is how I would
1680
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 315
1
suggest on behalf of the State Bar that you view this.
When an attorney acknowledges their behavior,
takes steps, remedial measures, steps, to address their
position and avails themselves of Rule 117, which stops
the disciplinary proceedings during the pendency of their
recovery, and allows them an opportunity to come through a
character and fitness committee to be reinstated, we
should -- I think that's laudable, and we should applaud
that and assist any attorney that wants to go that path.
10
Mr. Coughlin has testified that he refused to
11
go down that path, because he felt somehow it would not be
12
in his interests or would go against the grain --
13
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
14
punishment?
15
address that, please?
16
MR. KING:
What should be the
I've allowed you to go over.
Could you
Because of that, it is not
17
appropriate, in my opinion, under these circumstances with
18
Mr. Coughlin's conduct it would be totally inappropriate
19
to suggest that we're merely going to give him a
20
suspension pending some sort of nonexistent recovery
21
efforts, some sort of an effort that he could reestablish
22
himself, get on medications, retake the Bar exam and the
23
professional responsibility --
24
25
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
appropriate.
You're telling us what is not
I'd really like to hear what is appropriate.
1681
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 316
1
MR. KING:
serious, because it's permanent.
to say what isn't appropriate is I want you to understand
that I acknowledge there are going to be great
opportunities for somebody to take a leave, get help, come
back.
Disbarment.
And disbarment is very

And so the reason I felt
Mr. Coughlin is not that character.
When he
is out there, he is hurting people, he is making life
difficult for people, he's not even measuring up to the
10
lowest standard of a lawyer.
11
And so I think under these circumstances the
12
answer should be, Mr. Coughlin, because of your conduct
13
over these past years, and your refusal to recognize it or
14
seek help, and your continued contempt of our courts and
15
of the process, you have forfeited your right to practice
16
law.
17
profession or the public.
18
And when that occurs, he will not be a threat to the
And after that, then I personally would wish
19
nothing but the best for Mr. Coughlin in a less stressful
20
career that doesn't have the ethical responsibilities and
21
the fiduciary duties that an attorney has.
22
this case the highest recommendation would be that he be
23
permanently disbarred.
24
25
I think in
Thank you.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I've allowed you to go, or
you've gone an extra four minutes.
So, Mr. Coughlin, I
1682
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 317
1
will allow you to go until 5:25 with your final argument.
And I'm going to rule, Mr. King, that having
exercised all of your time in your opening statement, that
you waived a rebuttal.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Mr. King made a good point with there's not
one client here today.
There's not one client here today
complaining about a single thing I've done.
Where are all
10
the victims of all my terribleness and all my lack of
11
competency?
12
didn't hear a single client call Mr. King up complaining
13
about anything I did, anything I charged them, that I
14
didn't return some sort of work product for, any unearned
15
fees, any misappropriations spent on hookers.
16
Beesley testified recently for somebody who was just
17
reinstated last week, who didn't get a temporary
18
suspension --
19
20
Where are all these victimized clients?
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We
Like Judge
Mr. Coughlin, please address
your situation, not another lawyer's situation.
21
MR. COUGHLIN:
Oh.
Yes, sir.
So where are the
22
victims?
Oh, they are all judges.
23
judges who all have a background as a prosecutor.
24
shucks.
25
judges, so victimized by this broke, evicted,
Oh, shucks.
Mostly muni court

Oh,
Those poor, poor, prosecutors turned
1683
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 318
1
retaliatorily arrested attorney.
Lord does the public need to be protected from that guy.
Well, he's a menace.
disbarment is appropriate here.
Those poor things.
He's just the worst.
Good
I think
Pat, do you have any idea how ridiculous you
sound?
Ricola.
Disbarment.
grip.
Ridiculous.
That's how you sound, Pat.
Pat, reach deep inside yourself and get a
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, would you
10
please address your arguments to the panel, not to
11
Mr. King.
12
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
We have heard today
13
a multitude of reasons why these, quote-unquote,
14
convictions are just not appropriate, a basis for this
15
panel to issue any further punishment than that which has
16
already been felled and lived through.
17
I'm a licensed -- I've been a licensed patent
18
attorney with the United States Patent and Trademark
19
Office.
20
Respectfully, your Honor, I'll just note that one of the
21
bases for recently reinstating Mr. Harris was Judge
22
Beesley testifying that he's one of the very few Chapter
23
11 bankruptcy attorneys in town who has a certain level of
24
skill and acumen --
25
There's a couple of those, maybe, in town.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, Mr. Harris's
1684
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 319
1
situation is not before us, and I would like you to
address your situation.
3
4
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm only mentioning
that, because it seems to be a factor --
5
6
I am, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It's not in evidence even.
Please proceed.
MR. COUGHLIN:
The law decisions, you can cite
to other discipline matters, published or not with respect
to.
And it seems as though in that case the extent to
10
which that respondent offered the public something which
11
it would not have were he not there was relevant.
12
The fact that I'm a patent attorney, I
13
believe -- I don't know, but I think I still might be an
14
attorney, because the United States Patent and Trademark
15
Office says so.
16
In fact, a suspended attorney may still
17
practice in some bankruptcy courts, even if they only have
18
one State Bar license, and it's suspended, there's a
19
wealth of authority that says they're still an attorney
20
who is licensed to practice before the federal court.
21
But regardless, I believe on that basis to the
22
extent that that respondent, who I'm friends with, I know
23
him, I see him on Thursdays, a basis for his reinstatement
24
was the rarity of what he offered to the public given his
25
expertise and acumen in a Chapter 11 context.
1685
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 320
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Apparently, I'm not making
myself very clear.
your situation, and not Mr. Harris's situation.
do that for us?
I would really like you to address
MR. COUGHLIN:
My situation is I'm a patent
attorney.
of work no other attorney wanted to do.
don't know.
interestingly.
10
Could you
Beyond that, I'm an attorney who has done a lot

Maybe Boles.
Who Pat also has prosecuted this year,

Anybody who stands up to law enforcement
seems to get prosecuted by Pat.
11
You know, we have an interesting town here.
12
It's pretty isolated.
13
enforcement doesn't have law enforcement in the next
14
county or otherwise really stopping them from --
15
It's on an island.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Local law
I'm really sorry,
16
Mr. Coughlin.
17
following our directions.
18
whether or not you're competent to continue to practice
19
law.
20
mandate that we are to consider the nature and intent of
21
punishment as a result of that theft conviction and other
22
misconduct, and if you believe punishment is warranted,
23
what the nature of that punishment should be.
24
25
But I would like you to assist the panel in

I've asked you to address, one,
Two, how should we deal with the supreme court's
If we can focus on those issues, it would help

this panel do its job a lot better than trying to
1686
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 321
1
understand Mr. Harris's situation or some other lawyer's
situation.
Could you focus on that for me, please?

MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
Let me define focus,
because somebody with ADD seems incredibly creative, they
typically, people with ADD, focus, but they often have a
hyper focus that they are able to shift into in certain
settings where they're involved, and that's what you see
in my work product.
But granted, some of this was written the night I got out
10
11
People might not like what it says.
of jail after being a victim of a foiled plot.

But there are some work products here that I
12
would defy you to tell me you weren't impressed by.
There
13
is a level of detail that you don't see that often.
And,
14
in fact, to get back to your focus, your Honor, let me
15
make a list here.
16
punishment -- your Honor, would you indulge me?
17
them off once more, and I promise I will focus.
18
You indicated three things.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The
Just list
The panel is interested in
19
learning, one, whether or not you're currently competent
20
to practice law and represent clients in this
21
jurisdiction.
22
court's mandate to this panel that we listen to and
23
address what the nature and extent of punishment should be
24
for your conviction of theft.
25
and extent of the punishment should be given the totality
Two, what your thoughts are on the supreme
And three, what the nature
1687
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 322
1
of the circumstances, and the issue that you have had with
respect to several judges in front of whom you've
appeared.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
So to reiterate.
The first prong would be current competency, whether or
not sufficient to practice in this jurisdiction.
The second prong would be the nature and
extent of the punishment, vis-a-vis the theft, serious
offense conviction, from which the temporary suspension
10
stems from 60838.
11
The third would be totality of the
12
circumstances, nature and extent of the punishment given
13
these other matters we have gone into today.
14
To start with the first one with respect to my
15
competency.
16
it's too over the top, it's too mouthy, belligerent.
17
it doesn't contain the appropriate level of the decorum
18
that one needs to see typically of an attorney.
19
that, it's exceedingly good.
20
particular and intricate.
21
exceedingly competent.
22
an extent.
23
this is one of them I feel I can do well.
24
25
My review of my recent work product is that

And
Beyond
And it's very, very focused,
And in that respect I think I'm
And I've found my path in life to
Because there's not many jobs I can do, but
You start getting me into a place where I can

do my laundry regularly, and I can have a launching pad,
1688
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 323
1
and I think you'll find that the work product and the
decorum and the comportment I exhibit will be better and
better, more in line with what people saw out of me in my
life previous to August of 2011.
I'm not the most consistent person in the
world, but capable of some impressive things.
you're going to find that.
that are nothing but consistent, they just never do
anything great.
10
And often
You're going to find people
But that's -- we're all different in life
like that.
11
So I believe currently my competency is more
12
than sufficient to be a licensed practicing attorney in
13
Nevada.
14
to which I've identified issues that are of import in this
15
setting, that of a disciplinary hearing.
16
articulating my position with respect to, with all due
17
respect, things about how this proceeding has been carried
18
out that I take issue with.
19
I hope it's been shown to this panel the extent
And in
That being said, I gain a greater
20
understanding of what it is this panel is charged with,
21
and why this proceeding has proceeded the way it has.
22
to some extent it's impressive, because I think this panel
23
and the chair and the members of it have managed to get to
24
the heart of the inquiry here with a fair amount of, high
25
amount of skill, I would say.
And
1689
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 324
1
To move on to the second prong, the nature and
extent of the punishment with respect to the conviction
for petty larceny of, quote, a candy bar and some cough
drops in September stemming from an arrest in September of
2011 where there's a conviction, it's a candy bar and some
cough drops.
details about that the store admits I bought $85 of stuff,
and they are alleging I ate the stuff while I was
shopping, there's some dispute.
10
I suppose it's not worth getting into the
I understand the position that regardless of
11
Claiborne I think the rules are set up to say, look, this
12
proceeding has a different purpose than relitigating your
13
guilt.
14
I'm grasping that more.
15
at times I appreciate you've had to be pretty patient with
16
me, because I do just want to go back and relitigate that.
It's about a different purpose here, and I think

Slowly.
And I'm sorry.
I know
17
But I think, and I hope this panel will take
18
it, will review some of the filings I filed this year in
19
the Nevada Supreme Court.
20
particularly focused with respect to that second prong in
21
60838.
22
I essentially moved under SCR 1024(d) for the temporary
23
suspension to be dissolved.
24
alternate basis under 111.8, I think, where you can show
25
good cause why the temporary suspension should be
I filed one that was
I believe it was filed August 13th of 2011 wherein
I also believe I moved on an
1690
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 325
1
dissolved.
The third basis, I think you have to get the
conviction overturned.
can do that because I haven't achieved that with any of
these yet.
That's 111.10.
I don't think I
But I say that filing I filed in 60838, and I
also filed a separate for essentially the same thing in
61426 which is based on the 10124(d), which maybe is
inapplicable here.
The rules are hard to discern in that
10
regard.
11
attorney has been convicted of shoplifting.
12
surprised to find out there's quite a few.
13
a few cases where an attorney has been convicted of
14
shoplifting.
15
But I set out the lion's share of cases where an

You might be
There's quite
And that filling, I believe, is somewhere in
16
the neighborhood of 85 to a hundred pages.
And it
17
probably pulls together most if not -- actually, probably
18
50 percent, at most, of the cases where an attorney has
19
been convicted of shoplifting, published opinion.
20
have the guy in Vermont, the three ski shops, thousands of
21
dollars in ski boots and stuff in a few days.
22
the female attorney that broke up with the boyfriend,
23
broke into his house, took a few things.
24
of those.
25
reprimand was the punishment.
You
You have
You have a lot
And a lot of those wound up with a public

There was no suspension.
1691
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 326
1
There's probably 30, 40 cases in that motion
to dissolve that I filed on August 13th, 2011, 60838, 30
to 40 published decisions wherein the punishment didn't
consist of a suspension.
particular conviction is amongst the lowest in all these
reported decisions in dollar values of theft that exist.
And I would submit that my
It's literally akin to the case where -- there
is a case where someone -- I don't know if the attorney --
but someone from a buffet walked out with an orange.
My
10
case is a candy bar.
11
question some people's decision-making abilities and where
12
they are coming from when they are talking about
13
disbarment.
14
So really, it kind of makes me
That being said, it's not -- we're not just
15
here about a candy bar now, are we?
16
totality of the circumstances, which goes to the third
17
prong, your Honor.
18
off by saying we have a process for those sorts of things.
19
And it's not a sort of, let's see into the future and
20
issue a punishment now for that which hasn't even yet been
21
adjudicated upon.
22
We're here about a
In that respect I would first start
Montero supports that view under Nevada law,
23
that case wherein the Bar sought to essentially seek a
24
suspension for some pending criminal prosecution.
25
understanding that totality of the circumstances herein is
It's my
1692
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 327
1
going to consider what else besides this candy bar thing.
Well, it could consider the trespass thing certain, right?
But Bar counsel filed an SCR 111.4 petition
recently.
themselves admit that that was not a serious crime, a
serious offense as elucidated under SCR 111.6 wherein the
crime must involve certain elements, chief among them
usually some element of deceit, theft, misappropriation or
obstruction of justice.
10
What does that mean?
It means Bar counsel
Bar counsel himself filed the SCR 111 petition
11
under the fourth subheading, which is basically along the
12
same lines as a DUI, a first-offense DUI, where there is
13
no damage or harm or bodily harm or some other crime like
14
maybe disturbing the peace would fall in that line as
15
well.
16
Further, just to back up for a second with
17
respect to the appropriate punishment for the petty
18
larceny conviction.
19
other cases I cite to the person got a suspension that was
20
less than what I've already served, which is, I believe
21
it's about five months now.
22
going to take a thousand-dollar bond and an order of the
23
court to get me back in.
24
where if I don't get readmitted right away, I don't know
25
if I'm ever going to get readmitted, just for various
I'll note that in a vast majority of
And if it goes over six, it's
So it's getting down to the wire
1693
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 328
1
reasons.
But I think I probably would, because I want
to be an attorney that bad.
to offer, and that the profession has that much to offer
me.
And I feel I have that much
But getting back to the point I was going to
quickly make about the second prong.
The vast majority of
the reported decisions where someone got a lesser
punishment than I have already served entailed a situation
10
where someone pled down to a petty larceny from something
11
more substantial, such as a grand larceny, or something
12
even more than that where it was some even more
13
significant event, and plea bargaining involved with petty
14
larceny.
15
Me, sometimes my personality's so rancorous or
16
I'm so willing to butt heads with what I see sometimes as
17
prosecutorial misconduct that there was no plea bargaining
18
going to be had.
19
from under me, no, we're not going to stip to a
20
continuance even where unlawful registry is being applied
21
to potentially exculpatory material.
22
In fact, there was a pull the rug out
To put it simply, I was convicted of the most
23
serious crime they could have charged with me with, a
24
first-offense shoplifting charge for food, and not even
25
much food.
1694
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 329
1
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, it's 5:23.
know your back is to the clock, and I want to remind you
you have a couple minutes left.
MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir.
To finish up with
the third prong.
The totality of the circumstances I
would say, one, that's not something that's burdening this
panel here today, I do not believe.
be asking this panel to adjudicate that which is not
properly before it.
I believe that would
Let the judges who are assigned to
10
any pending criminal prosecution issue their rulings on
11
those, and let this panel proceed from there.
12
With respect to any other matters that might
13
be attendant to a totality of the circumstances, certainly
14
I think this panel does have to consider the contempt
15
rulings.
16
punishment already.
17
devastating impact on my family.
18
However, I think there's been a significant

And I can tell you this has had a
To some extent anytime something like that
19
happens, an individual has to say what's my part in this.
20
And despite what Mr. King's assessment might be, I think
21
any failure to set forth a spirit of that sort on my
22
behalf is not so much engendered from a lack of
23
introspection or willingness to address my own part in
24
this, but it's more just a fidelity to the principles that
25
caused me to get into some of these scrapes in the first
1695
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 330
1
place; i.e., my heart was in the right place, and I was
just standing up for what I think was right.
So much so that I find it difficult to back
off now, because I believe in some of the things that I
did and said that ultimately got me punished and held in
contempt.
But that being said.
Going forward, I think
I'll understand that, you know, it's not easy being a
judge.
And I did touch on this in my ex parte motion
10
recently, the extent to which I know being a judge must
11
just weigh enormously on a person, the decisions they
12
make, and the enormity of some of them sometimes.
13
that regard I intend to show more respect toward the
14
members of the bench should I be fortunate enough to be
15
placed back among the active members of this profession.
16
I thank you for your time today.
17
MR. KING:
And in
I have no further argument as the
18
panel chair directed, but I do have something I need to
19
put on the record.
20
If the panel chooses not to disbar
21
Mr. Coughlin, but instead afford him some opportunity
22
through reinstatement, regardless, he should be held
23
responsible for paying the costs of the investigation of
24
these proceedings.
25
members of the Bar to pay.
They shouldn't fall on the other
1696
HEARING - 11/14/2012
Page 331
1
And I believe it would be appropriate since
you heard evidence on the issue of the court order that he
pay Dr. Merliss's fees.
don't disbar him permanently, would be he would be
required to follow that court order to pay those fees.
That any reinstatement, if you
Thank you.
MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Anything further?
I'm going
to propose, because it's getting late, I would like to
circulate an e-mail to the panel members tomorrow to
10
arrange a date when we can either get together in person
11
and/or on the phone and discuss the situation.
12
days, I believe, in which to issue a written opinion.
13
would like to set up a meeting sometime within the next
14
week where we can all discuss this issue and come up with
15
a ruling, and then I'll offer a tentative ruling, then
16
I'll offer to write the opinion and circulate it for
17
approval or disapproval.
18
19
We have 30
I
At this time is the hearing will stand

adjourned, and I will circulate an e-mail tomorrow.
20
(Proceedings concluded at 5:30 P.M.)
21
-oOo-
22
23
24
25
1697
1699
.,
1.1 Rule .Competence. A

lawyer
shall
provide
competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.
1.2 Rule .Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority
Between Client and Lawyer.
Subject to paragraphs (c) (a) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by
Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to
be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by
a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer
shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to
a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
testify.
A lawyer's representation of a client, including (b) representation by
appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
economic, social or moral views or activities.
A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation (c) if the limitation is
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or (d) assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a
client and may counselor assist a client to make a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
3.1 Rule .Meritorious Claims and Contentions. A lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal
proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in
incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require
that every element of the case be established.
1700
3.3 Rule
.Candor Toward the Tribunal.

A lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) Make a false statement of fact or law to a
(1) tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal (2) authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be (3) false. If a lawyer, the
lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of
a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is
false.
A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative (b) proceeding and
who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in
criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal.
The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue (c) to the conclusion
of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the (d) tribunal of all
material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an
informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
3.4 Rule
.Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel.
A lawyer shall
not:
Unlawfully obstruct another party's access to (a) evidence or unlawfully
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential
evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counselor assist another person to do
any such act;
Falsify evidence, counselor assist a witness to (b) testify falsely, or offer
an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
Knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a (c) tribunal except for
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;
In pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery (d) request or fail to make
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request
by an opposing party;
1701
In trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does (e) not reasonably believe
is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert
personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or
state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a
witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused; or
Request a person other than a client to refrain from (f) voluntarily giving
relevant information to another party unless:
The person is a relative or an employee or (1) other agent of a client; and
The lawyer reasonably believes that the (2) person's interests will not be
adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.
3.5 Rule
.Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal and Relations
With Jury.
A lawyer shall not seek to influence a judge, juror, (a) prospective juror or
other official by means prohibited by law.
A lawyer shall not communicate ex parte with a (b) judge, juror,
prospective juror or other official except as permitted by law.
Subject to the limitations imposed by this Rule or (c) by law, it is a lawyer's
right, after the jury has been discharged, to interview the jurors to
determine whether their verdict is subject to any legal challenge. A lawyer
shall not communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of
the jury if the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to
communicate, or the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion,
duress or harassment. The scope of the interview should be restricted and
caution should be used to avoid embarrassment to any juror or to influence
his or her action in any subsequent jury service.
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct intended to (d) disrupt a tribunal.
Before the jury is sworn to try the cause, a lawyer (e) may investigate the
prospective jurors to ascertain any basis for challenge, provided that a
lawyer or the lawyer's employees or independent contractors may not, at
any time before the commencement of the trial, conduct or authorize any
investigation of the prospective jurors, through any means which are
calculated or likely to lead to communication with prospective jurors of any
allegations or factual circumstances relating to the case at issue. Conduct
prohibited by this Rule includes, but is not limited to, any direct or indirect
communication with a prospective juror, a member of the juror's family, an
employer, or any other person that may lead to direct or indirect
communication with a prospective juror.
1702
3.5A Rule .Relations With Opposing Counsel. When a lawyer

knows or reasonably should know the identity of a lawyer representing an
opposing party, he or she should not take advantage of the lawyer by
causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about
the opposing lawyer's intention to proceed.
4.1 Rule .Truthfulness in Statements to Others. In the course of
representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
Make a false statement of material fact or law to a (a) third person; or
Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person (b) when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
4.4 Rule .Respect for Rights of Third Persons.
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use (a) means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of
such a person.
A lawyer who receives a document relating to the (b) representation of the
lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document
was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.
8.1 Rule .Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters. An applicant for
admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission
application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
Knowingly make a false statement of material fact; (a) or
Fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a (b) misapprehension known
by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a
lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6.
8.2 Rule .Judicial and Legal Officials.
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer (a) knows to be false
or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal
officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal
office.
A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office (b) shall comply with the
applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
1703
8.4 Rule .Misconduct. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of (a) Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;
Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the (b) lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, (c) deceit or
misrepresentation;
Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the (d) administration of justice;
State or imply an ability to influence improperly a (e) government agency
or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law; or
Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in (f) conduct that is a violation
of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.
1704
'110 'I. .. !(O'Q ..,

:1
~t
f. ' . " " ..,
'~""J
~',~.1"
;
l-
AUG 2:3 2012
STATE Ev~FNtADA
Case No: NG120204, NG120435 and NG120434
STATE BAR OF NEVADA

3
4
6
7
COMPLAINT
Complainant,
vs.
ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESa.,
Bar No. 9473
Respondent.
9
10
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule ("SCR") 105(2) a
11
VERIFIED RESPONSE OR ANSWER to this Complaint must be filed with the Office of Bar
12
Counsel, State Bar of Nevada, 9456 Double R Boulevard, Ste. B, Reno, Nevada, 89521,
13
within twenty (20) days of service of this Complaint.
14
addressed in SCR 109.
15
16
Procedure regarding service is
Complainant, State Bar of Nevada ("State Bar"), by and through its Assistant Bar
Counsel Patrick O. King, is informed and believes as follows:
17
Zachery Coughlin ("Respondent"), Bar number 9473, is a member of the State Bar of
18
Nevada admitted on March 25, 2005. Respondent's date of birth is September 27, 1976.
19
The address that Respondent has on file with the State Bar of Nevada, in accordance with
20
Rule of Professional Conduct ("RPC") 79(1)(a) is Post Office Box 3961. Reno NV 89505.
21
Respondent engaged in acts of misconduct warranting the imposition of professional
22
discipline.
23
The State Bar alleges as follows:
24
1.
25
Multiple grievances were received by the Office of Bar Counsel between Ihe
period of January 14 and March 15, 2012. concerning Respondent
Due to the serious
0001
1705
('
allegations of misconduct, grievance files were opened and an investigation was initiated by
Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King.
2.
Respondent was advised of the grievances via U.S. mail, e-mail and by a brief
meeting with Mr. King at the State Bar Office in Reno. Respondent did not cooperate with
the investigation and rather than respond to the grievances as requested, Respondent sent
non-responsive and disparaging e-mails.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
3.
Respondent has not made a request to be placed on disability status, nor has
he acknowledged that he may have mental infirmity, illness, or addiction.
4.
The investigation of the grievances against Respondent shows a serious
pattern of misconduct.
5.
On September 9, 2011, Respondent shoplifted a candy bar and cough drops
from a Wal-Mart store with an approximate value of fourteen dollars ($14.00). On November
30, 2011, Municipal Court Judge Kenneth R. Howard found Respondent guilty of the offense
of Petit Larceny, a violation of RMC 8.10.040.
Respondent appealed the judgment of
15
conviction. The judgment of conviction was affirmed on appeal. See Exhibit 1.

16
6.
During the trial Respondent's conduct was so disruptive that Judge Howard
17
found Respondent in direct contempt of Court and sentenced him to serve three (3) days in
18
jail. See Exhibit 2.
19
7.
On August 20,2011, Respondent was arrested on a second larceny charge for
20
allegedly stealing a cell phone. Those charges are currently pending in Reno Justice Court.
21
22
23
24
25
8.
Respondent was again arrested on January 13, 2012, for allegedly abusing 911
emergency services, a gross misdemeanor.

9.
~pearance,
On February 21, 2012, Respondent filed a document entitled. Notice of

Entry of Plea of Not Guiltv, Waiver of Right to Arraignment: Motion to Dismiss
2
0002
1706
in one of his pending criminal matters, Case No. RCR-2012 065630, City of Reno v. Zachary
Coughlin.
and lack of respect for the court and opposing counsel.
10.
The document clearly shows Respondent's unprofessional, disruptive conduct,
Respondent was arrested on November 13, 2011 by Reno Police Department
and charged with trespassing, a misdemeanor, for which he was later convicted.
11.
The circumstances leading to the above-mentioned arrest are as follows: at an
eviction hearing Justice of the Peace Peter Sferrazza ordered that Respondent vacate the
home he was renting effective November 1, 2011. After the locks were changed and the
eviction notice was posted on the front door the owner, Dr. Merliss, discovered that someone
10
11
12
had broken into the home and was barricaded in the basement. The Reno Police tried to
coax whoever was in the basement to open the door. Dr. Merliss was forced to kick open the
door where the Reno Police found Respondent. Respondent had broken into the home and
13
17
determined to be without merit. The motion, on its face, demonstrates that Respondent lacks
18
competence to practice law.

19
13.
Once Respondent was evicted, an order was obtained to remove his
20
belongings from the home. Respondent interfered with the contractor who was hired to
21
22
23
24
remove Respondent's personal belongings. The police were called and after talking with
Respondent they recommended that he find something else to do. Respondent refused to
follow their advice and was subsequently arrested by the Reno police.
25
3
0003
1707
l:;zJ
(1
14.
In the case of City of Reno vs. Zachary Barker Coughlin, Case No. 11 TR
26800 21, a trial was held on a traffic citation issued to Respondent. The matter was called
at approximately 3:00 p.m. and concluded without a verdict at about 4:30 p.m. after the court
held Respondent in criminal contempt of court for his behavior and activities committed in the
direct presence of the court during trial.
15.
In a March 12, 2012 Order, Municipal Court Judge Dorothy Nash Homes found
by "clear and convincing evidence" that Mr. Coughlin committed numerous acts of attorney
misconduct. See Exhibit 3.
served his five-day contempt of court sanction imposed by the court on February 27, 2012,
10
Respondent fax-filed to the court a 224-page document. Judge Holmes found that the
11
12
13
14
15
Judge Holmes explained in her Order that after Respondent
document contained rambling references to his personal life and was incoherent.
16.
In her Order, Judge Homes found by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent violated Rule of Professional Conduct ("RPC") 1.1(Competence), RPC 1.3

(Diligence), RPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), RPC 3.2 (Expediting Litigation),
RPC 3.3(a) (Candor toward the Tribunal), RPC 3.4(e) (Fairness to Opposing Party and
16
Counsel), RPC 8.4 (c) (Engaging in Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation) and
17
RPC 8.4(d) Engage in conduct that is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice).

18
17.
Respondent filed Affidavits of Poverty in Support of his Motion to Proceed
19
Informa Pauperis, wherein he fails to disclose that he is a licensed attorney and instead
20
under Employment and Self-Employment he identifies himself as a "Jack of All Trades".

21
18.
Despite a claim of poverty in the above mentioned affidavits, Respondent told
22
23
24
25
the Court that his incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients.
19.
On March 22, 2012, Respondent appeared at the Reno Municipal Court
wearing (smiley face) nannel pajamas. Respondent became argumentative and Marshals
were called to ask him to leave.
0004
1708
25.
On April 10, 2009, District Judge Linda Gardner of the Second Judicial District
Court executed an "Order After Trial," in case No. DV08-01168. In that case, Respondent
represented the Defendant/Counter Claimant.
Respondent's inappropriate behavior in part as follows:
The most troubling aspect of this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic and
disrespectful presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inability to understand a balance
sheet; his failure to conduct discovery and his lack of knowledge with regard to
the rules of evidence and trial procedure. All of this was compounded with a
continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that resulted in a shift from a
fairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive
amount of time.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
In her Order Judge Gardner explained
27.
In light of the forgoing Respondent violated RPC 1.1 (Competence); RPC 1.2
(Diligence); RPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions); RPC 3.3 (Candor to the
Tribunal); RPC 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel); RPC 3.5 (Impartiality and
Decorum of the Tribunal); RPC 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others); RPC 4.4
13
(Respect for the Rights of Third Persons); RPC 5A (Relations with Opposing Counsel); RPC
14
8.1 (Disciplinary Matters); RPC 8.2 (Judicial and Legal Officials); and RPC 8.4 (Misconduct).
15
WHEREFORE, Complainant prays as follows:

16
1.
That a hearing be held pursuant to Nevada Supreme Court Rule 105;
2.
That Respondent be assessed the costs of the disciplinary proceeding
17
18
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 120(1); and

19
III
20
III
21
III
22
23
\
24
25
5
0005
1709
!"
1
3.
That pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 102, such disciplinary action be taken by
the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board against Respondent as may be deemed appropriate
under the circumstances.
Respectfully submitted this
day of August. 2011.
5
6
STATE BAR OF NEVADA

DAVID A. CLARK, BAR COUNSEL
8
9
10
11
By:
-jJD 07~
Patrick O. King:~sistant Bar Counsel

Nevada Bar No. 5035
9456 Double R. Blvd., Ste. B
Reno, NV 89521
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
,
\,
24
25
6
0006
1710
LOOO
)
1711
J
IN Til E MU NI CI PA L COURT OF
TH E CI TY OF RENO
CO UN TY OF WASHOE. STATE
OF NE VA DA
~hlllnl:
ON E SOU TII SIE RRA STR EET

, REN O, NY 895 05
P.O . nOI 1900, R.n o, NY 89505
PIIO NE (775)33"*-2190 FAX (715
)33"*-J824
v.,
DEFENDANT: CO UG HL IN , ZA
CH AR Y
Cou rt C.. eM: II CR 11176 11

"lIencylll: RSI CPI ICII 061 7
DOB : 09117/ 1916
"ctidenllll:
II ENCH TRIAL
RENell rRIAL
919/1011
10/1011011
a
FORMAL COM PLA INT FILED WIT
II TilE COU RT
TilE D[f E."fDANT ,\PP EAR ED,
WAS EXPLAINED 1115IlIER RIG
HTS BY TilE JUD GE AND IND
ItEl SItE UND tRS TOO D Til EM
ICATED nlA T
COM PLE TEL Y.
CITY'S EXIIIBIT MARKED/AD.\
fITTF.D I,
PRESENT IN COU RT t'OR filE
CIT Y or RENO: PAM ROBERT
S AND FOR TilE DEFENSE: PRO
PER
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SIIALL A
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ADDRESS
C O N T ,\ C
T W IT Il lI
OR PIION
IS il lE R A
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ITORNEY
R. TIlE D
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l' SHALL
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T Il E COU
RT OF SU
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1'1"",
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1713
1~..flJI,I,
",to
./rfrE"
IJI:H.N IlMH SII,II.I. IIU'OR T

.. 1. Y. I JR IJPON REI.F.,ISE FRO.\( ).1/1.. \
Sr."I'EN CI; CO.\IPI.I,INCE WI:'1DOW
FOR ORIE:'H MION ANU nlEIIEM TER ,IS OHEN ,IS IJIRliCf
ElJ IIY TilE RENO ~IIINIClr,II.CUUR nl,IRS II"L DIVISION.
f ,III.liRIO TO no so WII.!. RESULT IN TilE ISSI/,\N CIi Of A f,IILlJR
E ro COMI'L Y W,IRRM>IT ,IND INC,IRC ERA nON fOR
CONTE~IPT OF COURT. rilE SENTF.NCE CO~lrI.lMjCE
WINDOW IS LOCME D ON TilE FIRST FLOOR OF HIE RENO
~IIJNIClr,IL
COllRT . ONE
SIERRA ST. RENO. NV (77') l1412'1O.
soum
ruE DEFEN D,IST 511,ILL ,IPPE,IR ,IS ORDER ED FOR ,ILL REV
IEWS ,IND SIIALL COOPE RATE FIlLL Y WITII TIlE
IlAILlFFSJMARSIIALS AND ALL COURT ST,IFF.
HIE DEFEN DANT SII,\LL AmND ,II.L RF.VIF.WS. COURT .IPPE,IR
ANCES ,IND COIlRT ORDF. RED I'ROGR MIS ON TIME MID
ALCOI IOL ,IND DRUG FREE.
PRIOR TO CII,INGING IIISIIIER ,IDDRF.SS OR PIIONE NIlMIlE
R. TIlE DEFENDANT SIIALL NOTlFIY TilE COURT OF SUCH
CIIAN( 'E.
OBEY ALL LAWS.
~E;s..5Mfw@tYf%~m:.,)!git;mIID1mggjsrlNl'<lRiWDlO$ti
MW~$iUiir)!"tt4QBg#1@1
IIII~/ZOII ,IDDITIONAL CASE INFORM A nON: l cilY

wilnesse. had ""pcared (0' bench llial
11I1~ZOII
111I~ZOII
IIIJOl10 11
II/JOIZO II
IIIJO/Z OII
I 011 OIZO I I
ADDITIONAL CASE INFORM ATION: DEFENDANT W,IS IN CUSTO

DY Ar TIME AND DATE OF IIENCH TRIAL;
DF.FENDANT WAS TRANS PORTE D BUT NOT RROUGHT INTO
COURT
,IDDITIONAL CASE INFORM ATION: RAIL FORFEITURE CANCE
LLED
,IDDmO NAL C,ISE INFORM ATION: CITY REST ITS CASI!; DEFENS
I! 1IF.IiINS illS CASF~ 6:"
,IIJOITIONAL CASF. INFORM A nON: DEFENDANT REFUSED
TO STATE WIIETI IER OR NOT liE WOULD RE TESTIFIED;
,IDDITIONAL C,ISE INFORM ATION: CLUSING OY 110m PARTIE
S
.IDDITIONAL CASE INFORM ATION: DF.FENDANT DID NOT WANT
A COIlRT APPOINTF.D ATTORNEY.
TilE HONO R.IoLE

JIJOGE S SIG:oI.ITURE:
o.Irf.:
You .Ire t>n":red by Ihe Cuurt to ;Irrivc tfnlWill cuhul rree and IJn
lime for 1111 CtJlu1 he~uin!:! and Court tcla.cd prog.un . F.lilure h)
"flPe:ar III CI1Ur1 \\Ii II fe,"" in rhe i'i11Ii,nc e tH'il w.uranl (or )'1)1" ,Inc".
,\ny "inl.llion I,f,hi. inSI;)"1 order ,"OIY n: . lIh in (OIIlCr"p'
prm:'("ln'~., '1f1t1 rhe rilin" Iii .r.!dilillf1ul ~flll1in,11 ~h,1rgl!"
Irt,lccorthlOCe wl,h .'1RS n.oJt), ir i.'l il ,"i~dc,"C'~nl)r ftlr imy pcnon
Il, liul,
) n;Iil-.~c ' I ( li..:gli!cI III ~oJ11ply wlrh rhe
nr" Illy order i"Hllcd by rhe ,\1unicipal ("tnrrt JIIJge. I hi) nrd erm
'. in (ffeet
e
COUll i"u", .lnouh<,
'lIp.""f ing ;1.
,
J
,11.1.'< llf.R.H. \."Il.\." D l'IIO.\II Sf. ro
fillS OROf.R . Of.rf.:o Io."'lr? "'
t/1
.
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liftl0l.-.3t3D {J
Ul7''lh.
n.
()/I~:Y
]?e.-ru.<:L
Il.I
fE:
I . If.: _ _ _ __
I. fllf. ~wnH.'II:HPRI:n:1t II.\\"~: fl' 1.1. \" I.~ fI:IU'H f.n:o

rtll.~ ORDr.R fO !'IIf.
11I:1'I:."n.\.~
~,
l..:nl1'
r:
n.1 n::
,lY.CI:I V.IlIIV IIHI'IV

'''' ..... t-U
IJ \ I
fI.\II':: _ _ _ __
:1
v:
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'~'''f"j.' f"'I'~J?
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00010 '
1714
NOTE BY COUGHLIN
NOTICE HOW THE MANNER THE SBN SCANS
OR COPIES DOCUMENTS MAKES THEM 15% SMALLER THAN THEY

ACTUALLY ARE...THAT IS NOT EASY TO DO, BUT IT SURE
MAKES THE READER FEEL A LOT LESS LIKE READING...
1715
own behalf, that certain evidence should have been suppressed pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, that his conviction Is not supported by
suffldent evidence, and that "[f]urther Improprieties and due process dellclencles-
occurred.
Unfortunatelv, Appellant neither supports his arguments with relevant authority nor
dtatlons to relevant portions of the record. Most Importantly, Appellant has railed to
provide this Court with a copy of the transcr1pt of relevant proceedings In the Reno
8 Munldpal Court. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that an "[a)ppellant has the ultlmat
9 responsibility to provide this court with 'portions of the record essential to determination of
10
Issues raised In appellant's appeal,' 71Ioma$ v. State, 120 Nev. 37 n. 4,83 P.3d 818
11
(2004) (dtlng NRAP 30(b)(3). Further, NRAP 28(e) provides that "[e)very assertion In
12
briefs regarding matters In the record shall be supported by a reference to the page of the
13
transcript or appendix where the matter relied on Is to be found,"
14
While Appellant did provide this Court with a Compact Disc containing a recording of
15
the Municipal Court proceedings, Appellant did not dte to the portions of the Compact Disc
16
that he felt supported his arguments, and It Is not the responsibility of this Court to guess
17
which portions of the Compact Disc might support Appellant's arguments. In short,
18
Appellant did not satisfy his responsibility to supply and cite to relevant portions of the
19
record merely bV producing a Compact Disc recording of the entire Municipal Court
20
proceeding.
21
In light of Appellant's failure to provide this Court with an adequate appellate
22
record, and Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a record, this Court Is unable
23
to conduct a meaningful review of Appellant's appeal. Thus, Appellant has failed to meet
24
II/
25
11/
26
II/
/1/
/1/
27
28
z
000i2
1716
:.J
I~
1 his burden In providing an adequate appellate record, and this Court must afflrm the ruling
2 of the Reno Munldpal Court. I

3
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ruling of the Reno
4 Municipal Court Is AFFIRMED.

5
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter Is remanded back to the Reno
6 Municipal Court for all further proceedings.
7
8
DATED ... J5LdoyotM",".
I-
'012.~
9
10
EN P. EWOTT
DIstrict Judge
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
,
I It Is worth noting that. pursuant to NRS 4.410(2), "[t]he rees ror transcrIpts and caples [at munIcipal court
proceedIngs] must be paId by the party order1"9 them. In a civil case the preparatIOn or the transatpt need
not commence unttl the rees have bej!fl deposIted wIth the deputy clerk at the court. AccordIngly, NRS
189.0)0, whIch requIres the munIcipal court to transmIt various pape" to the dIstrict court upon appeal, does
not requIre action until such rees have been paid. Here, it .ppea" that Appellant never paid the requIsite
rees to secure the tranSCription or the proceedIngs. For thIs reason. the appellate record IS Incomplete.
I.
. J.
00013
1717
CERUBCATI OF MAILING
1
2
I hereby certify that I electronIcally filed the foregoing with the Oerk or the Court by
using the ECF system which served the following parties electronically:
ZACHARY COUGHUN, ESQ. ror ZACHARY COUGHUN
PAMELA ROBERTS, ESQ. for CITY OF RENO
6
7
9
10
DATED this
/5
d~dM'~~paUL
E I HO
Judicial Assistant
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
00014
1718
s~ooo
).
J
1719
..
RENO MUNICIPAL COURTF
WASIIOE COUNTY, NEVADA
vs.
ZACHARY COUGIiLlN,
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
Oefendant.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
,
~ihat
ORDER FOR SUMMARY

PUNISHMENT OF CONTEMPT
COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE
VIEW AND PRESENCE
OFTHECOURT
--....,.,W"",..,.1E=RE"""'A""S.....N"""'R':OS... 6""'.S"'7""0.,a,.-ec.,j-are-s
2""6"'
municipal judge may punish for conlempt for
the same acts or omissions, in the same manner lllld with the same effects lIS provided for
judges in Chapter 22 of Nevada Revised Statute, and
WHEREAS NRS 22.030 declares that when a contempt is committed in the immediate
view and presence of the Court or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for
which llll order shall be made, reciting the facts lIS occurring in such immediate view and
presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby guilty ofa contempt lllld Ihat
he/she be punished lIS Iherein preSCribed, and
WHEREAS, on the 30'h day of November, 20 II, the above nruned defendllllt appeared
belore this court.
16
17
Dept. 4
Plaintiff,
Court Dept. 4
Case No. ~l~~~:-ID5ieiiip:uiu\YiYCClale'iiCrk
CITY OF RENO,
5
7
NOV 3020\1
Reno M
3
4
,L E 0
NAME: ZACHERY COUGHLIN, who is II DEFENDANT

_ _ _ _ _ Party;
Witness;
Spectator, lllld
WHEREAS such individual committed the following act(s) in the immediate view and
presence of the Court:
Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward Ihe judge while he is

holding court, or engaged in his judicial duties at chambers,
To wit: Refusing to ohey directives or the Judge,contlnulng lines of Inquiry after
heln advbed b Ihe Court 0 re rain from doin s i Oemeanln Ih Court with
stalements such as VO
n response to court rullng~' LaughIng during
lestlmony and (urlher questionIng the court and its adlhorlly, .
A breach of Ihe peace, boisterous conduct or violent dislurbllnce in the presence of Ihe
Court. or in ils immediate vicinity, lending 10 inh:mlpt due to the course of the trial or other
judicial proceeding,
Refusing to he sworn or answer as a witness,
27
_ _ _ _ Disobeying a lawful writforder/rulclpr~&tN;~ ~.!1J. ~WiII'jwoIiA IHpy 01 I~. Ol~ I

cOhrunben" ami C\~HERE"S such conduW:~~:~ ~~~~ '~':::t:~ ~~=.. 011
_ _ _ _ cmeaneu the ourt
orlQ1nol'- and I/Il1t:un autlooril..t 10 make /Ilia C4rl11lcu*,\
2~
__v- n~rogalcd the :Ollthorily of Ih.: Court

__
26
"
. ;..
.,
._ .......-
" .... P .._ ,.

~
on
II.... "
Ir
foIUHICI
AT
~~~~~~~~~+
_ _V- lilt~rf~n:<I.'"h Ih~ .I":~rly .IJminisrr.lti.lll \\filuti~e .Jnd n:qllin:d irnm~Jlare

__
vinoli.:;,ti.JrI hy [h~ (',,"rt III pr~~"r.e .)(Iler .Ind rc,pc,t.
00016
1720
'.
,
'jl
Based upon the above linding ZACHARY COUGIiLiN is Guilty of Direct
Contempt.
3
The Contemnor, when asked if9she hnd anything to say as to why sentence should
4
S
not be pronounced, replied:
.s.t:~
C.M\;J-
/lcQOQ
7
8
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED. and DECREED that the

contemnor is hereby sentenced to the following punishment:
A fine in the amount of ($500 or less).
10
Imprisonment for (25 dnys or less). NO ALTERNA TlVE SENTENCING.
II
12
DEFENDANT TO BE RELEASED on
11--
J, -II
';-8 f ......
,2011.
13
A fine in the amount of _ _ _ _ ($500 or less) and imprisonment for _ _
14
DA YS WASHOE COUNTY JAIL - No alternative sentencing.
IS
Release on Own Recognizance revoked, bail set at:
16
Defendant is hereby remanded into the custody and will be seen in video
17
arraignments on _ _ _-', 2011, at 8:30 a.m. NO flAIL HOLD PENDING
18
19
20
21
22
SENTENCING.
DATED this 30'h day of November, 2011.
KE~HfiJw~QJUDGE
Reno Municipal Court
23
24
)
-)
26
27
"-
..
..... ~
--
11--
,.~.
1~
'I'.'
,
1_"",-'J'
.M.,
"
00017
1721
~F!\.1t1tl :
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: NOTICE HOW

NON OF THE OTHER PAGES HERE HAVE TWO DIFFERENT SETS OF
THREE HOLE PUNCHES ON THE LEFT SIDE (WELL, THE OTHER TWO
EXHIBIT COVER PAGES ARE UPSIDE DOWN, BUT, WHATEVER),
NO SO COINCIDENTAL WHERE KING ALTERED THE 8/23/12
COMPLAINTS VERSION OF THE 3/12/12 NASH ORDER ATTACHED AS
EXHIBIT 3 TO ATTEMPT TO HIDE THE LEGIBILITY ISSUES THAT
RESULTED IN COUGHLIN'S LAWSUIT AGAINST ELCANO AND WLS
BEING THROUGH OUT IN 60302 AND 60317.
THIS VERSION OF THE SBN'S 2/13/13 ROA UTILIZES DIGITAL COPIES

WHEREVER POSSIBLE, WHICH INCREASES THE LEGIBILITY THEREOF
COMPARED TO THE DUBIOUSLY SCANNED SBN VERSION.
Exhibit 3
0001'8
1722
elISe No. I I TR 26800 21

2
Depl. No.3
J
4
5
6
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF HIE CITY OF RENO
COUNTY OF WASHOE STA TE OF NEVADA
8
9
10
II
CITY OF RENO,
Plainliff,
ORDER
vs.
12
13
14
IS
16
17

Defendlll1l.
------------',
Moreh 12, 2012 was lhe lime sel for the resumplion of lhe tromc cilalion lrial of
Defendlll1t ZACHARY DARKER COUGHLIN who,lIS member No. 9473 of the Nevada Oar,
is an allomey represenling himself, lhe defendlll1l. The lrial was continued on Febnonry 27,
18
2012, when, aller approximately 1111 hour and
half,lhe defendant was held in criminal
19
20
21
22
23
24
conlempt by lhe coun for his anlics and misconduct during lhallrial. His behavior is nOled in
delail in lhe coun's Order entered on February 27, 2010.
Today, Mr. Coughlin failed
10
appear 10 complele lhis lriol. He has nol conlaCled Ihis
coun to explain or exeuse his absence. Depuly Cily Allomey Alison Ormoos appeared and
was prepnrcd
10
proceed. She infomlcd Ihe coun lhlll she had no eonlaCl wilh Mr. Coul:hlin
25
olher lhan receiving voluminous faxed documents from him allhe Reno Cily Allomey's
26
27
28
Otnce. The dcfcndonl's failure
10
appt!1II' was nOled on lhe record.
Tlw cOlin makes Ihe following findings un lhe record:
'I ...
.- ..... ..
........ IP'" " II
, ,,1
~
,'-110'" I:"
00019
1723
After he served his five-day Contempt of Court sanction imposed by this court on
Febnuuy 27,2012, Mr. Coughlin fax-flied to this court I a 224-pagc document entitled "Notice
3
of Appeal of Summary Contempt Order; Motion to Return Personal Property Confiscated by
Reno Municipal Court and Its Marshall; Motion for New Trial and to Alter or Amend
Summary Contempt Order." The document purported to appeal this court's Order holding
him in direct criminal contempt. It contained a portion of one sentence on page 4 seeking a
continuance oftoday's hearins, but no further discussion of that topic. It also mentioned
being a "tolling" motion in an apparent afterthought. II did not address most of the other
10
II
topics listed in the caption. Instead, the document contained rambling references to his
12
personal life and this court's; his father's football career in college; dozens of pages of string
13
citations taken off the internet; documents from a prisoner online site; an article about a
14
"police state;" an article about Discovory; a website printout showing a police officer's salary;
15
and copy of court documents from a District of Columbia case.
16
II was a disjointed regurgitation of case low citations from a legal research online site
17
18
with little reference to, or argument about, the foclS of his instant "BoulevDrd Stop" traflic
19
cose. The document was an incoherent Dnd pathetic demonstration of what might once have
20
been legal and academic prowess that appears to now be greatly damaged. Mr. Coughlin fax-
21
filed another document in which he apparently took a Motion to Proceed Inforrnn Pauperis
22
[sic I in another case and typed over it "Request for Audio Recording ofFcbOlary 27'h, 2012
23
Trial and for Appt [sic] and to Waiv'c Filing fee and Transcript Fee for Appeal Counscl."lle
24
25
had that filed in Ihe instant case on MlI1Ch 7, 2012, even thou\:h it was dated November 12.
26
2011.
27
.. "".
" .... 1'01 . . . . ,

III ,\ .. 'Q
,_
Whereas Mr. Coul!hlin's cflorts to conduct his own delimse in his traflic citali,lO Ifial ,m
28
I RMC Rule! dnl! f'wccdurc. , p..:nnil1
rJJl
rlling ormolionl.
.V,~.l'
,">I,.,.,:"
00020
1724
(
February 27, 2012 disrupted Department 3 of this co un ond caused distress to this coun and
2
its st~rr and mMshals, as well as the prosecutor nnd the witness, ~nd resulted in Mr. Cou!;hlin
3
being held in contempt of coun, his faxing nnd filing of these documents greatly disrupted the
operation of the entire Reno Municipal Coun system, including the clerk's ollice and the
5
6
other depanments, nnd necessitated that action be taken by the Coun Administrator and
Administrative Judge.
Apparently begi'lIIinll on March 9,2012 at 12:38 p.m., Mr. Coughlin ngain undertook
9
nnother massive fax-filing to Reno Municipal Court. This time it was a document that was
10
II
file-stomped by the clerk on March 12, 2012 at 8: 12 a.m. This second 218-page document
12
purported to he yet nnother motion in this case entitled "Motion to Return Cell Phones;
13
Motion to Set Aside Summary Contempt Order; und Notice of Appeal of Summary COOlempt
14
Order." With scant discussion of, or relevance to, the above-captioned maltcr, said document
15
mostly arllues allninst Judge Howard in 0 Depanment4 case and again contains more than
16
17
200 pages or string lellol citations; lyrics to rocks songs; Mr. Coughlin's personal family
18
history; discussion of~n eviction case and another contempt case; disjointed legal citations,
19
and other nonsensical molters that have no apparent relevance to his traffic citation case.
20
Ooth documents were massive and took up a great deal of time because the coun hnd to
21
review them to look for some connection to the case. This court has Ihe inherent ~ulhority to
22
main lain respect, order and decorum in the court, and 10 refuse to allow the coun to be used
23
(IS
n vehicle for the deranged rantings of a litigant.
24
25
The conJucl of Mr. Coughlin has been inappropriate, bizarre, dishonest, irrational anJ
26
27
Jemonstrates his competence, profeSSionalism, preparation, consideration li'r the court, the
211
.. "" "0....
,',' ,\ ... '"
.-...".... ,
disnlptive, 10 say the 10:.1st. He has not practiced law in this case in
witness. or his "pposing counsel. lie has hecn Ji<rcspeetfultn the enun. II~ has 1:,ilcJ to
it
manner that
,'I':' ',".,:
00021
1725
appear or explain his absence to the court. Inasmuch
2
3
lIS
the court has at least four dilTerent
addresses for him. it is unable to ascertain his exact whereabouts. He shows ~igns of mental
inst~bility. ifnot serious mental illness.
Ba~ed upon the total circumstances of this case. the in-court performance of the
defendant.
this defendant, the statements and behavior of this defendant and his overall conduct herein.
this court finds. by clear and convincing evidence, that Zachary Barker Coughlin. an attorney
lIS
observed by this court. the written documents faxed to the court for tiling by
licensed to pmctice law in the State of Nevado, has committed numerous acts ofnttomey
10
II
12
misconduct, including. but not limited to. violating the following Rules of Professional
Conduct:
13
8.4(c)-engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrcpresentation;
14
8.4 (d)-engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
15
3.3 (a)-lack of candor to the court by knowingly making false statements to a tribunal;
16
17
18
19
20
3.I-defending in a proceeding by asserting or controverting an issue without a basis in

fact and with matters that arc known to be frivolous;
3.2-failure to make rellSonoble efTorts to expedite litigation. and, in fact, tnking
extreme measures to delay litigation;
3.4(e}-being unfair to opposing counsel by continually alluding to matlers the lawyer
docs nut reasonably believe are relevant or supported by admissible evidence;
21
22
1.3-failing to uct with reasonable diligence and promptness; and
23
I. I-lack of competence in his practice and appearances before this court.
24
In addition. Zachary Darker Coughlin. likely "Iso violated Nevada Supreme Court Rule
25
229, section 2(b), as omended by ADKT 449 on August 1,2011, by surreptitiuusly reconJinK
26
the trallic citation trial of February 27,2012 without the advance permission of this court nnd
27
......
.;".or.,. ..
,., ........
28
then Iyinillo this court ..... hen questioned IIbout it and dcnj'inl! th"t he had done so.
1_"'\ ..... ,
...... .. 1: ..
.\
00022
1726
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: SEE THE

SMOKING GUN? WHY IS THE "01901"
PORTION OF A BATES STAMP SERIES ONLY
PRESENT ON ONE PAGE OF THIS VERSION
OF THE 3/12/12 NASH ORDER...
WHY DOES THE EXHIBIT COVER PAGE TO
THIS HAVE TWO SETS OF THREE HOLE
PUNCHES ON THE LEFT SIDE
WHERE NO OTHER PAGES DO?
LINE UP THE STAMPEL HOLES IN THAT
ALLANGE.
1727
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: NOTICE

FROM THE VERSION ON THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING PAGE THAT
EVEN WITH THE SBN'S CONVENIENT (AND, CURIOUSLY DIFFERENT
THAN THE BATES STAMPING UTILIZED FOR THE 11/7/12 SCR
105(2)(C) PLEATHER OF 3,100 PAGES IT PRODUCED TO
COUGHLIN)THAT NEITHER THE "01901" BATES STAMP, NOR THE
"00023" BATES STAMP (FROM THE SERIES AFFIXED TO THE ITEMS
IN KING'S FHE1 PACKET) SHOULD BE OBSCURED BY THE NEW
SERIES OF BATES STAMPING PLACE ON THE 2/13/13 ROA.
NOTE BY COUGHLIN. HERE IS THE VERSION OF EX 3 TO THE COMPLAINT THE

SBN INSERTED IN THE 11/7/12 SCR 105(2)(C) SPAM
\.~
IJ
Case No. NG12-0204, NG12-0435, NG12-0434
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
5
6
Complainant,
8
9
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
vs.
ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ.,
NEVADA BAR NO. 9473
10
Respondent.
11
FIRST DESIGNATION OF
HEARING PANEL MEMBERS
12
TO:
13
Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq.

Post Office Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
14
The following are members of the Disciplinary Board for the Northern District of
15
16
Nevada.
Pursuant to Nevada Supreme Court Rule 105, you may issue peremptory
challenge to five (5) such individuals by delivering the same in writing to the Office of Bar
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Counsel on or before the date a response to the Complaint is due. The Chair of the
Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board, J. Thomas Susich, Esq., will thereafter designate a
hearing panel of five (5) members of the Disciplinary Board, including at least one
member who is not an attorney, to hear the above captioned matter.
1.
Kathleen Breckenridge, Esq. (flkla Kathleen Price)
2.
Gregory Brower, Esq.
3.
Julie Cavanaugh-Bill, Esq.
4.
Trina Dahlin, Esq.
5.
Linda Daykin, Esq .
,-
0002
1728
1729
1730
55.
Carolyn Vaught, Laymember
56.
John White, Laymember
Dated this ;1...:3 day of August, 2012.
4
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
DAVID A. CLARK, BAR COUNSEL
5
6
7
8
9
10
By:
--/J-d" 0 /<:::7'
Patrick O. King, KsSlStant Bar Counsel
9456 Double R Boulevard, Suite B
Reno, NV 89521
(775) 329-4100
ATTORNEY FOR COMPLAINANT
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
(
25
- 4 .
0002
1731
I,J
'J
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
STATE OF NEVADA
COUNTY OF WASHOE
)
)SS:
)
Laura Peters, under penalty of perjury, being first and duly sworn, deposes and
says as follows:
1.
capacity, Affiant is Custodian of Records for the Discipline Department of the State Bar of
Nevada.
2.
That Affiant is employed as a paralegal for the State Bar of Nevada. That in such
That Affiant States that the enclosed documents are true and correct copies of the
10
COMPLAINT and FIRST DESIGNATION OF HEARING PANEL MEMBERS in the
11
matter of the State Bar of Nevada v. Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. Case No. NG12-0204.
12
NG12-0435 and NG12-0434.
13
3.
14
Hearing Panel Members were served on the following by placing a copy in an envelope
15
which was then sealed and postage fully prepaid for first class, certified mail, and
16
deposited in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada to Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., Post
17
Office Box 3961, Reno, NV 89505 .
18
That pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 109, the Complaint and First Designation of
Dated this
.d
1...3 day of August, 2012.
19
20
Lau a Peters, an Employee
Of the State Bar of Nevada
21
22
23
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to

Before me this 23,d day of August, 2012.
r-----.--____.__
.
.",
~".
JOAN T. NeUFElD
}, "0101')' Pubflo Sialo of NoWida
1
'I /I~R~--'.-I
_I~ -~I:!WaWoColrlr
' . ; ~'lJ' ~. r2 EJIIIn>o.u.1!, 2015
____ ..::.:
24
25
5-
0002
1732
I:'"
'~' I"'j
1: .:., ~t
. , ' I.}
r:'
.:, ..;':.:'';:I.~;' - ; ..-.~,'"
-
c~~~~
,_, I'~--
Case No: NG12-0204, NG12-0435 and NG12-0434
STAT
~AR OF NtVADA
STATE BAR OF NEVADA

3
4

5
Complainant,
6
7
vs.
NOTICE OF INTENT TO PROCEED ON

A DEFAULT BASIS
ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN
Bar No. 9473
Respondent.
TO:
10
11
Zachary B. Coughlin
Reno, NV 89505
12
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT unless the State Bar receives a responsive pleading in
13
the above-captioned matter by October 24, 2012, it will proceed on a default basis and the
14
charges against you shall be deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 105(2) states in
15
relevant part:
16
A copy of the complaint shall be served on the attorney and it shall direct that
a verified response or answer be served on bar counsel within 20 days of
service ... ln the event the attorney fails to plead, the charges shall be
deemed admitted; provided, however, that an attorney who fails to respond
within the time provided may thereafter obtain permission of the appropriate
disciplinary board chair to do so, if failure to file is attributable to mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Emphasis added.)
17
18
19
20
11/
21
11/
22
11/
23
24
25
0002~
1733
Another copy of the Complaint previously served upon you accompanies this Notice.
Dated this 9 th day of October, 2012
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
David A. Clark, Bar Counsel
3
4
5
6
7
By:
~...gKfn/~~:;stant
Bar Counsel
9456 Double R Blvd., Ste. B
(775) 329-4100
AHorney for State Bar of Nevada
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
2
0003
1734
..
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice
of Intent to Proceed on a Default Basis was deposited in the United States Mail at Reno,
Nevada, postage fully pre-paid thereon for certified mail, addressed to: Zachary B. Coughlin,
Post Office Box 3961, Reno, Nevada 89505.
Dated this 9th day of October, 2012.
8
aura eters, an employee of
the State Bar of Nevada
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
II
000311
1735
;J
Reno/Carson M....enger Service.lnc.
185 Manin Streel
Reno .NV 89509
175.322.2424
Federo( T... 10: 880306306
NV STATE LlC~322
Invoice~: 14600
Dme: 10/0612012
mi. RENO r&HS oNT.LAS sYEGAS

" **
*WE MAKI! OG.\OlINliS .. ,. ..
INVOICE FOR SERVICE;
Amount Due: $0.00
STATEDAHOF.
DA~
600 Eo CH,\HI
ON DO
VAH
I~\S VEG,.
89104
I
Phone number: 1753294119

F... number:
Email Address:LAURAP@NVBAR.ORG
Requeslor: L PETERS
Your File~ COUGHLIN
Service ~15653: ZACHARY B. COUGHlIN. ESQ.. BAR NO. 9473
Manner of Service: NON.SERVE
Service: D3Id1ime:10J06I201212:ooPM
Service oddrc:..:94' W 1211l ST Rl!NONV 8950)
Served by:JOHNNO LAZIl11CH
~'TATE DAH OF NEVADA NOHTIIEHN DISClPJ.lNAHV BOAND

STAll! BAR OF NEVADA
Y.
7.AClfARY B. COUGHUN.ESQ.. BAR NO. 947)
Service Doeumen,.: COMPLAINT; FIRST DESIGNATION OF IfF.ARING PANEL MEMBERS
CASEII: NG 120204. NG 12.(4)' AND

NGI204J4
Scalee Noles
Service Comments:
O9I18f20llll:22
0912312012 II:"
091211201211:19
09J2lnoI210;0,5
Siandard Service
TOTAL CHARGES:
LEFT ANOmER MESSAOH wml VOICE MAIL

AOAIN CAIJ.EO. MR COUOIII.IN ANSWf.RED, TIleN HUNO UP. "'I-"FIANT
FOI.LQWPJ) WITH A TRXT Dl1I' RF.CI!JVRD NO Rf.SPONSB.
CAI.J.I!O AND lIlPT MESSAOH wml VOICP. MAil. A'.50TRX'Tf'D
SUBJl!CT.
IOHNNO CAU.P.D ClIBHr: ALSO CALLP.D 7~Of AND IJ!PT MPSSAOB
$0.00
$0.00
DALANCE:
$0.00
00032
1736
CASES NO'd. NGI20204; NG I 2-0435 and NR120434
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
Complainant,
vs.
ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN,
Bar No. 9473,
9
Respondent.
10
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER APPOINTING
FORMAL HEARING PANEL
II
PLEASE BE ADVISED that a Formal Hearing Panel of the Northern
12
Nevada Disciplinary Board has been scheduled for Wednesday, November 14, 2012, at
13
the hour of 9:00 a.m., to convene at the Reno office of the State Bar of Nevada, 9456
14
Double R Boulevard, Suite B, Reno, Nevada 89521.
15
16
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following members of the Northern

Nevada Disciplinary Board have been designated as members of the hearing panel:
17
1.
John P. Echeverria, Esq., Chair;
18
2.
Michael K. Johnson, Esq.;
19
3.
Clark V. Vellis, Esq.;
20
4.
Stephen Kent, Esq.; and,
21
5.
Karen Pearl. Laymember.
22
DATED this 291h day of October, 2012.

STATE BAR OF NEVADA
23
24
."
By:
I~
~\ -- 1'~\1
J:
rfo~~SICH:(H".IRMAN
'ilo~hern Nevada Disciplinary Board

I
00033
1737
(
,
1
2
The undersigned hereby cenilies that a true and correct copy of the loregoing Order
Appoinling I'ormaillcaring Panel was deposited in the United States Mail at Reno, Nevada, postage
fully pre-paid thereon for cenilicd and first class mail addressed to the following:
Zachary B. Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno NV !l9505
6
7
8
9
I ~rs, an employee of
10
11
12
13
. u:s, POslal,Service"..
14
" '.:'
"., ~ ,
"CERT,IFIED" MAIi::;u' R'ECEIPT

IT1
15
'
(OomesUc Moll OnlY;'No InsuroncB 'Coversgo P:.ovfdtlCl)"
:;::~~~~~~
;1 0 F Fie I A L USE
16
ru
:r
Po$bI~
U"1
17
1------1
CorUf!od Foe
IT1
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o
18
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19
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notum RIfC'8IPI F..
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20
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21
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.
22
23
~
24
25
II
0003
1738
OCT 1 ?
,2gJ9 .
STA -~r~
TE ~ 'OF' NEVAD
STATE BAR OF NEVADA

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
NOTICE OF FORMAL HEARING
Complainant,
vs.
ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN
Bar No. 9473
Respondent
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that thc fonnal hcaring in the abovc-cntitlcd action has been
scheduled for Wednesday, Nuvember 14, 2012, beginning at the hour of 9:00 a.m. The hearing
will be conducted at the Reno office of the State Bar of Nevada. located at 9456 Double R Blvd., Stc.
13
B. Reno. Ncvada. You arc entitled to be represented by counsel. to cross-examine witnesses. and to
14
present evidencc.
15
DATED this
<-
day of October. 2012.

STATE BAR OF NEVADA
DA VID A. CLARK. Bur Counsel
16
17
18
By:
19
20
21
~7"?-=?;d-=-.
~O::........:.../_~7.L---_ _ _ _ __
Patrick O. King, AiSlant Bar Counsel
9456 Double R. IlIvd . Stc. B
Reno. Nevada 89521
(775) )211-1 JM2
Attorney li)r State liar of Nevada
22
23
(
24
25
0003
1739
I)
(
'J
STATE DAR OF NEVADA

NORTHERN NEVADA DlSCIPLlNARV BOARD
3
4
STATE i)AI{ OF NEVADA,
Complainant,
\'s.
)
)
)
)
DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES;
SUMMARV OF EVIDENCE
)
)
)
)
ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN
Bar No. 9473
__________~R~es~p~o~n~d~e~nt~._____________ )
9
PLF.ASE TAKE NO-riC.: that the following is a summary of evidence and list of witnesses
10
11
which may be olTered against Respondent at the time of the formal hearing on the above-entitled
12
complaint.
13
A.
I)oeumcnlury F.vidcnce
I.
14
Any and all documentation contained in the State Bar of Nevada's Ii!.: regarding
15
grleyance liles NG 12-0204, NG 12-0435 and NG 12-0434, except lor screening materials and Bar
16
Counsel work product. Pursuant to SCI{ 105 (2)(c) Respondent may inspect the State Bar lile up to
17
three (3) days prior to the hearing.
18
B.
19
20
21
22
23
24
Witnesses und Brief Slulemenl or Faels

I.
Judge Dorothy Nash I-(ollnes will appear by phone to testify with regard to
Respondent's wnduct in connection with Case No. II-TR-26800 12 in Reno Municipal Court.
2.
Judge Kenneth R. Howard is expected tn testify "bnut Respondent'S cnndllct in
connection with Case No. II CR 21176 21.
3.
Dr. Matt Merliss is expected to testify about the situation leading lip to Respondent's
arrest I',r trespassing.
25
2
0003
1740
4.
conduct in conncction with ('''SI! No. CV (1-03628.

5.
3
4
6.
7.
8.
'>.
10.
Dr. Richard T. Bissett is expected to testify about the examination he perfonned on
Respondent in preparation for a competency hearing in Case No. 12-0376.
15
16
Robin Baker, Rcno Justice Court employee, is expected to testify about Respondent's
conduct when visiting the court complex.
13
14
Karen Stanek, Reno Justice Court employee, is expected to testify about Respondent's
11
12
Steve Tuttle, Reno Justice Court employee, is expected to testify about Respondent's
9
10
Attorney Daniel Wong is expected to testify about Respondent's conduct in Reno
Justice Court.
Scott Coppa, Marshall for thc Reno Municipal Court is expected to testify ahout
Respondent's disruptive behavior on March 22, 20(2.
5
6
Attorney Richard I(ill, Esl(., is expected to tcstimony with regard to Respondent's
II.
Dr. M"ry R. Vieth is cxpected to testify "hout thc examination shc perfomlcd on

12.
17
A member of the slaff of the State Bar of Nevada Ethics Department is
18
expected to testify as Custodian of Records regarding documentation contained in the records of the
19
State Bar of Nevada and Respondent's discipline and licensure history.
20
III
21
III
22
III
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3
00037
1741
J
(
3
4
13.
Zachary B. CUIIl,:hlin is expected to testify rCl,:arding the I:\cts :md circllmstances ill all
three disciplinary mailers.

The State Bar of Nevada reserves the ril,:ht to supplement this disclosure.
DATED this ~ day
ur October, 2012.
STATE OAR OF NEVADA

DAVID A. CLARK, Bar Counsel
6
7
By:
8
9
10
-;O,..,d ~/~
I'atrick O. Killg, Assistant Bar Counsel
9456 Double R Blvd., Stc. B
RCIIO, Nevada 89521
(775) 328-I3K2
Allorney tor State Bar Ill' Nevada
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0003
1742
(J
1
CERTIFICATE OF SF-RVleE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice uf
Furmaillearing was deposited in the United States Mail at Reno. Nevada, postage fully pre paid
thereon for certified and !irst dass mail addressed to the following:
Zachary B. Coughlin
Post Ollice Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
6
7
DATED this l2'h day of October, 2012.
8
9
a ters, an employee of
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13
:U.s. postal'Seryice ,,;,
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;CERTIF.IED'MAIL.,; RECEIPT.' :\ .. ' . ,
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(Domesrlc Mall Onty: No InSUfonCQ Covcrago Provldod),
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23
24
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,
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0003~
1743
1744
, I
I
(
\
PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Office of Bar Counsel will arrange for copies of the file
to be delivered to Mr. Coughlin at the address that he has provided to the State Bar at the
earliest opportunity.
The Motion to Bifurcate Hearing and the Motion to Dismiss for Complaint [sic) Failure
to Sufficiently State the Charges with Specificity and Support and for Utter Failure of Bar
Counsel to Perform Reasonable Investigation are both DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Formal Hearing in these matters will proceed on
a default basis pursuant to the State Bar's Notice of Intent to Proceed on a Default Basis
filed October 9.2012, unless Mr. Coughlin prepares and files a Verified Answer to the State
10
Bar's Complaint by Friday, November 9, 2012. The State Bar is prepared to proceed with a
11
12
13
14
full evidentiary hearing in the event that Mr. Coughlin does file a Verified Answer to the
State Bar's Complaint and is present for the Formal Hearing scheduled to take place on
Wednesday, November 14, 2012.
/.~
I day of October, 2012.
DATED this\ J
15
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...-
~:~~~~~~~~~~~====-ohn P.
h !lerria, Esq., Chair
Formal He ng Panel
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2
00041
1745
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and com:ct copy of the foregoing Order was
depusited in the United States Mail at Reno. Nevada. postage fully pre-paid thereon lor certilied and
first class mail addressed tu the lolluwing:
Zachary B. Coughlin
1471 E.9thSI.
Reno NV 89505
DATED this 31" day of October, 2012.
Laura Pe ers. an employee of

10
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13
'u~s:
14
PoslaI"Service',;. . ,',
' .
'.'CERl'IFIEO',MAIL;,;RECEIRT
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. (Dam8st'~ Mall Only: No Insufa'nCQ COllflf8gtl p,rovldadJ,
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Cert!hdF.
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(,
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"
II
0004
1746
1
2
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4
CODE: 2185
John Echeverria
Nevada State Bar No. 200
ECHEVERRIA LAW OFFICE
9432 Double R Boulevard
Reno, NV 89521
Tel: 775.786.4800
Fax: 775.786.4808
5
6
7
Franklin Brockway Gowdy

California State Bar No. 047918 (Pro Hac
Rollin B. Chippey, II
California State Bar No. 1 07941 (Pro Hac
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
nnp l\Jf"r],pt
Vice Application Pending)

Vice Application Pending)
San Francisco, CA 94105-1126

Tel: 415.442.1000
Fax: 415.442.1001
'-'.1..1. .....
..L .. .a._.I..I.'t.. .....
<;:np<lr <;:trppt T,,,,,,,,l'
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Attorneys for Defendant

Ben Roethlisberger
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l'1' ..... .I.
NOTE: by Coughlin The SBN has had a Character and Fitness

Committee Chairman who owns the Strip Club
The Spearmint Rhino for years, in Vegas.
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
The apparently funnel 10 million a year to cabbies to lure tourists to its doors,
thats a lotta candy bars. Sometimes when people really overdo a cleansing ritual,
its because they feel just that dirty inside, and need
ANDREA MCNULTY,
Case No. CV-09-02222
someone else to take bath
Dept. 6
on one for them.
Plaintiff,
vs.
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18
'-'
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
13
14
.I.
BEN ROETHLISBERGER; JOHN

KOSTER; GUY HYDER; MARK
MASTERS; DAVE MONROE; MIKE
ROSENOW; DEBBIE NEALL; BRYAN
CASUSCELLI; STACY DINGMAN; DOE
DEFENDANTS I-XX (partnerships,
companies and business entities that have
an ownership interest in and promote
Defendant Roethlisberger; his name, his
celebrity, and his various commercial
enterprises): DOES XXI-XXXV
(individuals who participated in and
committed acts alleged herein,
individually, or along with or at the
direction of other Defendants, and/or
conspired with other Defendants to cause
the harms alleged herein),
Defendant.
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28
DB2/21286044.1
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

CASE NO. CV-02222
DEFENDANT BEN ROETHLISBERGER'S

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
FILED
(
O~T 3 1 ~?.
CASE NUMUER: ngI2-1J20-lng-O-l35 ng-0434
~ <:S
STATE r~\R OF NEVADA
,
STATE
IIA~
OF NEVAIM
NORTHERN NEVADA DISCII'I.INARY BOARD

n Rc Mall.:r .,1':
.<
)
)
.. ACHARY BARKER COUGIII.lN. ESQ.
c"ada 1.lar No: 9-173
) ng 12-0204 ng-04J5 ng-0434 n1Ulion 10

) hil'urcalo: 10 15 12
)
)
I I
,.,
."
1.1
CIIIIl!hlin's I)ESI(;NATION OF WI'I'NESSES Ai'ih SUM I\It\ I( OF EVII)ENCE
I ".
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the following is a summary of evidence and list of witnesses which may
be offered against Respondent at the time of the formal hearing on the above-entitled complaint.
I"
Coughlin reserves any and all objections to matters not included in the Complaint (or even in the
greivances themselves from being testfied to or evidence put on directedto, lack of notice. etc .... Dr.
Vieth. et al not reasonably related to any allegations)
I .,
A. Documentary Evidence 1. Any and all documentation contained in the State Bar of Nevada's tile
regarding gnevance tiles NGI2-0204. NG12-0435 and NGI2-0434. except for screening materials
and Bar Counsel work product. Pursuant to SCR 105 (2)(c) Respondent may inspect the State Bar
tile up to three (3) days prior to the hearing. Seet attached Exhibit 1 (cd/dvd of relevant materials.
that will be further supplemented later. and incorproated by reference everything previously sent to
anyone with the SBN. including emails and links to videos/skydrives. etc).
.,
B Witnesses and Brief Statement of Facts

t. Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes will appear by phone to testify with regard to Respondent's conduct
in connection with Case No. 11-TR-26800 12 in Reno Municipal Court.
2.
Judge Kenneth R. Howard is expected to testify about Respondent's conduct in connection with
Case No. II CR 21176 21.
3. Dr. Matt Merliss is expected to testify about the situation leading up to Respondent's arrest for
trespassing and his lies before and after the face
.,
'10
l'u,,:!!!liJ!" !lf~)!;.' \.rlO'
II
Ot \\IL".:sst:s
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0004~
1747
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111
1I
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13
. I ,
11
I .~
/11
. I
"
.,
4. Allorney Richard Hill, Esq., is expected to testimony with regard to Respondent's

conduct in connection with Case No. CVIt-03628.
5. Scott Coppa, Marshall for the Reno Municipal Court is expected to testify about
Respondent's disruptive behavior on March 22,201 2.
6. Reno City Allorney Daniel Wong, Pam Roberts, Allison ORmaas, and Chris Hazlett-STevens are
expected to testify about Respondent's conduct in Reno
Justice Court.
7. Steve Tuttle, Reno Justice Court employee, is expected to testify about Respondent's
conduct when visiting Ihe court compkx.
8. Karen Stancil, Reno Justice Court employee. is expected to testify about Respondent's
conduct when visiting the court complexand various matters related to Coughlin in the RJC ..
9. Robin Baker, Reno Justice Court employee, is expected to testify about Respondent's conduct
when visiting the court complex and various mailers related to Coughlin in the RJC.
10. Dr. Richard T. Bissell is expected to testify about the examination he performed on
11. Dr. Mary R. Vieth is expected to testify about the examination she performed on
12. A member of the staff of the State Bar of Nevada Ethics Department is
expected to testify as Custodian of Records regarding documentation contained in the records of the
State Bar of Nevada and Respondent's discipline and licensure history.
13. Zachary B. Coughlin is expected to testify regarding the facts and circumstances in all three
disciplinary matters. The State Bar of Nevada reserves the right to supplement this disclosure.
14. Steve Tuttle, RJC administrator is expected to testify about various matters related to Coughlin in
the RJC.
15. Dr. Bill Davis of Lake's Crossing expected to testify about the eX3mination he performed on
16. Dr. Sally Farmer pected to testify about the examination he performed on
17. Kevin Kelly, strip club ownin' Character and Fitness Committee Chairman is expected to testify
regarding the imperissible mailers related to Peter Christiansen's "representation" of Coughlin
between 2002-2005.
18. Mike Rowe, dillo what Kelly will to .
Dear 010 Judge Elliot, Judge Flanagan, and the Second Judicial District Court Clerk of Court Joey
Orduna Hasitings. WDC Custodian of Records, Associate Clerk of Court Julie Wise:
Included in the relevant materials and information sought is the legal basis for incarcerating in Cr120376 (despite DDA Young violating NRS 178.405's mandatory stay. in his moving for a "Molion for
Revocation of Bail" (despite WDCR 19 requiring a hearing be set, Coughlin never got one in crl12064, nor in cr12-1262 (both Judge Elliot appeals involving pro se Coughlin. nor did Coughlin get a
hearing in cvl1-03628, well, there was two hearings on Hill's fraudulent Motion for Order to Show
cause, but that it not what wdcr 19 is invoking)Coughlin between april19th, 2012 to April 26. 2012
(during which time the $40,050 attorneys fees molion resulting in an Order awarding it in CV1103628 was filed) for appealing a summary eviclion as a pro se lenant .apparently deemed residential
tenant with met of less than $1 K a month) also, despite Chief Civil Clerk kconstantly rejecllng
Coughlin'S filign under wdcr 10, Coughlin was actually sanctioned yet another $5K by his former
coworker
. Judge Flanagan (whom declined to recuse himself form the order to show cause hearings despite.
arguably. Coughlin requeting as much. in violation of nrs 22.030(3) ... but RCS/QLS in the Carpentier
v Aames case (that Richard hill copied Coughlin's January 13th, 2012 filing on in cv08-0 1709 in hills
1124112 grievance to bar counsel against Coughlin ... which Coughlin was subject to custodial arrest
for jaywalking by rpd and hill on 1112/12. and another arrest for "misuse of 91 t" on 1114/12.
1748
seemingly connected to filing in carpentier matter of 1/13/12 ... violated WDCR 18 and
38&#8194:Rule&#8194:&#8194:.Caption for all pleadings and other legal documents,
Every document submitted&#8194:&#8194:
1. for filing in the family division shall bear the
following caption:
"IN THE FAMILY DIVISION
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE"
Where there filings said "county of clark" ... Coughlin was the one attorney who pointed that out.. .. He
is sanctioned $5K? And the WDC continues to reject Coughlin's filings under WDCR 18 and 10 at a
remarkable rate?
Further, caplow 302 p.2d 755 made unnecessary the seemingly fraudulent 3/8/12 affidavit of service
by wcso machen, by way of rmc marshal harley (judge nash holmes 3/12112 comments in court
seem to indicate "summary criminal contempt" finding premised upon "peeping Tom" style peering
through restroom stall walls by RMC Marshal Harley (or some other Marshal, like Scott Coppa,
involved in the impermissible "search incident to arrest" by RMC a a full day after attorney's pro se
criminal defenant's smart phone and micro sd card booked into wCdc property on 2127112 ... violates
state v diaz ... anyways, no "summary contempt" finding based upon allegations of "dissessemblign"
smartphone in restroom stall, where no RMC Marshal, Harley or Coppa or otherwise, signed an
affidavit detailing facts supporting contempt. In re oliver requires such contempt be, in every
element, in the "immediate view and presence of the court" sixth amendment right violated, nrs
189.010-050 violated, etc .. etc.and m
ost of this ng12-0435 involves judge nash holmes denying Coughlin right to appeal final appealable
summary criminal contempt finding from 2/27/12., in re oliver, denied sixth amendment right to
counsel, and Cook, 267 us 517 at 536 (as did judge Flanagan in 3/23/12 contempt hearing of
Coughlin), notifying Coughlin of 3/23/12 hearing on hill's order to show cause motion in cvll-03628
before Judge Flanagan (nrcp 56(g) bad faith affidavits should result in expense awards and
contempt finding against hill, perhaps, baker, and stewart ... not $40K in attorneys fees against
Coughlin, de novo review and hearing required by wcdr 19 not provided .... plus in rmc 11 tr 26800
judge nash holmes violates nrs 189.010 by refusing to transmit record on appeal and transcript in
response to Coughlin filign a notice of appeal on 3/7/12 (rmc's garder, brother to Judge Linda
Gardner, whose April 2009 Order got Coughlin fired from Washoe Legal services (60301 60317 case
in n. s. ct.), she passed her order
to her brother, he passed it to Judge Nash Holmes, she filed ng 12-0435 on behalf of all rmc judges,
and apparently family court Judge L. Gardner (Coughlin filed mandamus to that order in 54844).
Also, why is Coughlin thrown in jail based upon "evaluation" filed on 4/18/12 by dr. bill davis (where
davis denies any responsibility for the letter he signed, saying he didn't write it, and didn't submit it
for filing? He SIGNED IT and Lakes filed it, arguably should'nt even be filed, and should be an
affidavity if Coughlin was incarcerated for contempt "not in court's presence" nrs. 22.040
Incarcerating Coughlin from april 19 to april 26th, 2011 in cr12-0376, and refusing to even look at the
authority Coughlin attempt to submit respecting tailoring competency orders, hipaa rights (also,
Order was not sufficiently clear, nor any violation thereof by Coughlin, under Houston v 8th judicial
dist4rict court to support 8 days in jail and wdcd denying Coughlin his medication and right to file
court documents. resulting in $40K attorney fees award by Judge Flanagan in cv1 t-03628 .... plus
MHC's biondo lied about basis for Coguhlin's removal in MH 12-0032 in her letters 10 RJC. Also nrcp
37(b)(2)(d) incarceration wrongful (civil rule, but perhaps instructive) In lieu of any of the foregoing
orders or in addition thereto, an order&#8194:(D) treating as a contempt of court Ihe failure to obey
any orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination"
.,
-.
10
II
I?
1.1
I 'j
I J
1H
I"
-' I
, ,
, '
.- ,
',.
Dated this 31 5t day of October, 2012:
cnu~hlin's IlESI(;~.\I'I()N
-0
II
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
OF WI !":"ESSES .\,'m Sl ,\I,\!'\WY IF E\II>E,\(E
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
"
"
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
0004~
1749
Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq. (Nevada law license temporarily suspended, USPTO license in tact,
and given permission to issue subpoenas by SBN Chief Bar Counsel David Clark, Esq.)
...'
(.
'I
10
11
12
II
1 '.
'I)
,'1
,
1750
.. _....,.. -. -'. .-.
~"."'''-'-'-''-'''-''''._''-'''''----'._-'-
.. _ -- .... _.....
F I LED
ElocIrOnlcally
06-25-2012:12:38:15 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings

Cieri< 01 the Coull
Transaction # 3039397
3
4
5
6
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATIl OF NEVADA
7
8
ZACHARYOARKERCOUGffi.IN,
10
Appellant.
II
CVII-03628
Dept. No.:
vs.
12
Case No.:
MATT MERLISS,
J3
14
RespondeDL
--------------------,
IS
16
ORDER
Currently before Ibis Coun is Respondent MATT MERLISS's ("Merliss") MOIlonJo
In the ubsence of any opposition from AppellllD
17
AI/orney's Fees tiled on April 19, 2012.
18
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN ("Coughlin"), Merliss submined this maner for dision or
19
May 9, 2012. However, on June 9, 2012, Coughlin filed n S"pplemenllo Opposition 10 Motio,
20
Jor AI/orney's Fees. [n response, Mer[i .. filed n Reply 10 SupplemenllO Opposillon 10 MOliol
21
Jar Allorney 's Fees on June 14,2012, and submined the maner-again-that SIIITIe day.
22
Merli .. requests this Coun to award attorney's fees in the amount of.$42,065.50 a8ain~
23
Coughlin in the underlying summasy eviction maner pursuant to NRS 69.050 and NRS 7.085
24
Me/liss and his counsel aver these fees nrc reasonable, pnrliculnrly given Coughlin'
25
"deliberote[) ... pattern of abusive, vexatious, and most importanlly, npeDI[ve behavior in botl
26
this uppeal and in the case below [in Reno Justice Counl." (Mol. ut p. 2) (Original emphasis.
27
Merli.s overs Coughlin'. litigation sImtegy "was simply to keep the fight goinl!" and "r"'juire<
28
substantial additional work by Merli .. ' counsel, far beyond Wlythiug in
'normal' eviction.'
EXHIBIT
02975
1751
......
__
_. __ .._.__ ..... _. ._._---- ._-. __ ..........-
...
(Mol. at p. 3.) Merliss assens this additional work was necessary because he "could not risk th
court accepting some random citation in Coughlin's papers and entering an adverse rulin
because !hel had not opposed il." (Mol. at p. 5.)
Further, Merliss's counsel, Richard O. Hill, nlleges these fees "do nol include
substantiaiamoWlI of ediling and other activities performed by [Mr. Hill) in this case." (Mol.
p. 6; Mol. Ex. 4.) Merliss contends
which \0 aword the maximum amounl justified by the substantial evidence before the court.'
(Mot. al p. 6.) Merli goes even further and slBtcs:
9
10
II
12
13
"I i)1 is hard to imagine a more appropriale case than this i
A. proven above and below, the frivolity and vCllatiousness of Coughlin'.

mninlenance and extension of Ihis maner has been so beyond reason, and so
outrageous, and the nexus of his behavior 10 the fees incurred by Merliss so direct
and indispulBble, that nothing less than a full aword of those fees should even be
considered by the court. To not impose the full measure of the harm Coughlin has
caused would reward and encourage his vexatiousness in this and other cases.
There needs 10 be a day ofreckooing for Coughlin's anlics.
(Mol. u\ p. 8.)
14
15
Nevada law provides for "0 reasonable anomey fee 10 be fixed and allowed by Ihe disuic
16
court for nil services rendered in behalf of the prevoiling pany" on appeuJ from justice court
17
NEV. RJ;v. STAT. 69.050. In addition, NRS 7.085 requires the districl court to order an anome)
18
personally 10 pay reasonable anomey's fees incurred
19
defending of civil Hetion where "such action or defense is not well-grounded in fact or is no
20
warranted by existing law . . . ." NEV. RJ;v. STAT. 7.085(I)(a). The same tIJlPlies to
21
attorney who has "[uJnrcasonably and vexatiously .xtended a eivil action . . . ." NEV. REv
22
STAT. 7.08S(I)(b).
23
lIS
a result of the filing, maintaining
If grounds exist to award anomey's fees, Nevada courts follow the lodestar annIysis.
24
Shuetle v. Boozer Homes Holdings Com .. 121 Nev. 837, 864, 124 P.3d 530, 549 (2005) ("Th
25
lodestar approach involves multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on the case by
26
reasonable hourly mte. ") (QuolBtions and cilBtions omitled.) In determining the reasonablen
27
of the fee "ward, the disuicl court should consider the following four faclor.;: (I) the advocates"
28
qunlities; (2) the charaeler of the work; (3) the worlt performed; and (4) the result obtoined.
02976
1752
_........ -- -- ..--....
-,
_ _ ri _
"'~.--.-.--
- -- ..
....... ........ ..... -..... - -, .... ....... --_. ...

-
-4 . . . .
Bronze!! y. Golden Gate Nat'l Rank, 8.5 Nev. 34.5, 349, 455 1'.2d 31, 33 (1969) (citation.
2
omined); Barney v. Mt Rose Heating & Air Condiljonine. 124 Nev. 821. 829, 192 P.3d 730, 73
(2008) (per curiwn) (applying the Brunull factol'll)
After reviewing Merli .. 's moving paper.r-including the detailed nod thorough summ
of fees nod his counsels' accompanying DeciaraJ/oru-und after considering all of the parties
orgumenlS, this Coun concludes Merliss's anomey's fees request is authorized by Nevada law
This Coun also has considered the fnc!ol'll set forth in B!U!!ZCII. supra. After analyzing tho
foctol'll, ODd given the unique features of thi, coso, this Coun concludes Morti ..', fee request i
reosonoble.
10
II
Accordingly, Merli,.', Mol/on fo~ A"o~ne)"s Fees is GRANTED in the sum
541,065.50.
12
IT IS SO ORDERED.
13
DATED thi,
,,15
day oOune, 2012.
14
15
PATRICK FLANAGAN
District Judge
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02977
1753
Pursuant to NRCP S(b), I hereby certify that I wn an employee of the Second Judicial
.15
District Coun of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe; that on this
I electronically filed the following with the Clerk of the Coun by using the ECF system which
will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:
day of June, 2012,
Richard Hill, Esq. for Matthew Merliss; and
Zachary Coughlin, Esq. for himself.
I deposited in the Washoe County mailing system for postage and mailing with the
9
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United States Postal Service in Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the attached document addressed .
to:
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NOTE BY COUGHLIN: WHEREAS THE RMC PLACES "CERTIFICATIONS"

ON THE FACE OF DOCUMENT, EVEN THOSE FROM OTHER COURTS
LIKE THE 2JDC, THE SECOND JUDICIAL PLACES SUCH ON THE
BACK OF A DOCUMENT, THOUGH, TYPICALLY SUNSHINE LITIGATION
WOULD COPY THE BACK OF SUCH A DOCUMENT TO REVEAL AN
ACTUALL CERTIFIED COPY IS AT ISSUE, RATHER THAN BLEED
THROUGH FROM A COPY OF ONE. REGARDLESS, KING'S
8/30/12 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN ATTACHING JUDGE FLANAGAN'S
8/28/12 ORDER IN CV11-03628 ADMITTING THAT THIS
6/25/12 ORDER IN FHE2 IS NOT A SANCTION, CERTAINLY
REVEALS A GOOD DEAL OF FRAUD ON HILL AND KING'S PART IN
PURPORTING IT TO BE AT THE FORMAL HEARING.
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l.j-
1754
2/22/13
Outlook Print Message
FW: Mr Coughlin
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org) This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Thu 8/30/12 1:46 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
1 attachment
Order (8-28-12).pdf (147.4 KB)
Go AtronM.Cuhi,
od feno r ogln
Atce i a Odrta pran t yu
tahd s n re ht etis o o.
Ihv ntytrcie a ase t teCmlitta Ifldaant
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Takyu
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arc ig
FILED
Electronically
08-28-2012:04:32:12 PM
Clerk of the Court
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8
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Case No.:
Dept. No.:
Appellant,
11
vs.
12
CV11-03628
MATT MERLISS,
13
Respondent.
__________________________1
14
15
ORDER
16
Currently before this Court are two matters initiated by Appellant ZACHARY BARKE
17
COUGHLIN but submitted-and opposed-by Respondent MATT MERLISS. The first is
18
Motion to Alter or Amend Order, or Pled in Alternalid [sic] Motion to Set Aside Attorney Fe
19
Award and Motion for Order Shortening Time and Notice of Appeal of A tty [sic] Fee Award a
20
6/25/12 filed on July 24,2012. Merliss filed an Opposition to "A1otion to Alter or Amend Order,
21
or Pled in the Alternatid (sic), Motion to Set Aside Attorney Fee Award and Motion for Orde
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Shortening Time and Notice of Appeal of A tty (sic) Fee Award of 6/25/12" on July 31, 2012.
23
Coughlin filed no Reply Brief and the matter was submitted for decision on August 10, 2012.
24
The second is a NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion to Set Aside Attorney's Fees filed on July 31
25
2012. Merliss filed an Opposition to NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion to Set Aside Attorney's Fees
26
August 10, 2012. Coughlin filed no Reply Brief and this matter was submitted for decision
27
August 22, 2012.
28
Essentially, both Motions seek to set aside this Court's June 25, 2012 Order grantin
attorney's fees to Merliss. Having reviewed both of Coughlin's Motions and the relevant la
applicable to each one, this Court finds each Motion is devoid of any facts or legal argument
sufficient to require or justify setting aside the attorney's fees award. And this is aside from th
myriad procedural and substantive deficiencies contained in each Motion.
Again, as was the case in Coughlin's attempt to set aside Merliss's award of costs
Coughlin's Motions here attempt to re-litigate substantive issues this Court has already decided,
or frivolous claims this Court has previously ignored. This Court has entered final judgment
the merits of Coughlin's underlying claim and awarded attorney's fees and costs to Merliss. Thi
10
Court will not revisit those decisions here, particularly when Coughlin alleges nothing that woul
11
satisfy the requirements ofNRCP 59 or NRCP 60. Accordingly, Coughlin's Motion to Alter 0
12
Amend Order, or Pled in Alternatid [sic] Motion to Set Aside Attorney Fee Award and Mofio
13
for Order Shortening Time and Notice of Appeal of Atly [sic] Fee Award of 6/25/12 and NRC
14
60(b)(4) Motion to Set Aside Attorney's Fees are DENIED.
15
In addition, Merliss requests this Court to sanction Coughlin for his repeated violations 0
16
the local rules of procedure. Merliss requests this Court to sanction Coughlin under WDCR 21
17
such that Merliss and his counsel need not oppose or reply to any further filings by Coughlin i
18
this case absent an Order to that effect from this Court.
19
Alongside the numerous procedural violations Coughlin has committed in filing hi
20
papers (ignoring page limits, missing deadlines, etc.), Merliss contends Coughlin's litigatio
21
tactics-including Coughlin's instant attempt to set aside the attorney's fees award-have bee
22
employed not to pursue arguments in good faith but to delay and harass him. Merliss contend
23
Coughlin's behavior has been not only abusive but costly, requiring Merliss to contest each an
24
every allegation Coughlin makes no matter how meritless. This Court agrees.
25
In addition to this Court's power under NRCP 11 to issue sanctions to deter abusiv
26
litigation practices and frivolous filings, "Nevada courts ... possess inherent powers of equit
27
and of control over the exercise of their jurisdiction." Jordan v. State De t. of Motor Vehicle
28
& Public Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 59, 110 P.3d 30,41 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Buz
Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008).
Coughlin's aberrant behavior has become, unfortunately, common in this case. His failure t
follow basic rules of practice and the absence in his numerous filings of any arguable basis eithe
in law or fact to support his various claims has led Merliss to needlessly incur costs tha
otherwise could have been avoided had Coughlin simply followed the rules. Consequently, thi
Court finds sanctions are appropriate under WDCR 21.
Merliss and his counsel may but are not required to oppose or reply to any further filings b
Coughlin in this case absent an Order to that effect from this Court.
9
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Accordingly, this Court ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this
)8
day of August, 2012.
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PATRICK FLANAGAN
District Judge
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NOTE BY COUGHLIN: HERE THE SBN'S KING'S BATES STAMPING ("02733") FROM HIS 11/7/12 PRODUCTION TO
d
COUGHLIN OF 3,100 pages of SCR 105(2)(c) cubic zirconium king of hurts any argument he now wants
to make respecting this 3/27/12 Order refuting much of what Hill testified to and King
argued.
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial
ciB
District Court of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe; that on this
2012, I electronically filed the following with the Clerk of the Court by using the ECF system
which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:
day of August,
Richard Hill, Esq. for Matthew Merliss; and
Zachary Coughlin, Esq. for himself.
I deposited in the Washoe County mailing system for postage and mailing with the
9
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United States Postal Service in Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the attached document addressed
to:
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-- _._--... ,.-._-.- ...
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.,
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FILED
RECEIVED
CODE: 1845
EleclJonlcally
04-13-2009:119:23:48 AM
HowanIW.Conyera
Cletlo oIlhe Court
MAR 15
T~'7~269
~lill
STATE BAR Of NEVADA

RENO OFFICE
II
INnflIFAMlLYDIVlSlON
II
OF niB SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
srATB OF NIiVADA
IN AND FOR llfE COUNTY OF WASHOB
'0
"
A5HWIN JOiHI,
12
PJaIntifl,
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18
D\f08.C1168
DepL No.
13
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Case No.
\'9.
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BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant/Counterciaimant
------------------------~I
ORDBR AFJ'BR TRIAL
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A Complaint lor Divorce was flied by ASHWIN JOSHI (hereinafter Mr. Joshi), by
'8
It
and through his attorney, JOHN P. SPRINGGATB, ESQ., on July 8, 2008. An Answer and
20
Counterclaim waa liIe<! by BHARTI JOSHI (hereinafter 'Ms.1oshi'), by and through her
21
attorney of record, ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ., on 1uly lB, 2008. Argument was
22
heard on March 12, 2009 and Man:h 17, 2009. Mr.1oah1 was present and represented by
23
24
,olin P. Sprlnggate. !!sq.; and Ms. Joshi, was present and represented by Zachary B.
Coughlin, Esq., oJ Washoe Legal Services.
AU testimony and orgwru>nl:!J having been heard, all pleadings on file having been
:ze
27
28
read, aU exhibits, topes. and noles having been reviewed. the Court finds and Order! as
fOUOW9.
III
III
02961 .
1755
FINDINGS Of fACT
2
1.
The parties were marrled May 11, 1987, In Bombay, India.
2.
The parties have two children, both of whom are now adul ...
Although Mr. Yoshl has no obll8lltlon 10 support said chUdren any longer
pwsuant to NRS 12S.510(9)(b), Ms. Yosh.! requests Ihe flnanclalasslstance of Mr. Yoshl ~
as 10 provide for the children's continuing education. (Anewer, pg. 2, 1Ines 1~18).
The Court nolel that on August I, 2008, Mr. Joshi Wed a 'Modon For Return Of
8 Personal Property' requesUng that Ms. J09h1 rehlm his passport, green card and sodaI
9
security card. On August 7, 2008, Ms. Joshi, by and through her attorney 01 record,
10
Mr. Coughlin, flied an OpposlUon 10 the return 01 Mr. Joshi's passport dUng case law
11
involving minor children and their support. Ms. YoshlllJed said opposition while
12
acknowledging the partics' children were both over eighteen yean of age at the time. On
13
August 18, 2008, Judge Schumacher ordered Ms. Joshi to immediately return Mr. J09hI's
14
passport within five days.

There Is community property to be dlvlded.
1~
3.
18
In Mr. Joshi's Complaint fUed July 8,2008, he Indicated there was community
17
18
property and deb.. which should be diVided by the Court.
Ms. Joshi flied an Answer and Counterclaim on July 18, 2008, indicating the
19
parties' community property should be equitably dlvlded, Including Ms. J09h1's
20
"women'. wealth", the vehicles In "ach party'. poasesslon, the v"hlcles In !heir children',
21
possesalon, and "the money the [Ms. Yoshi) earned while working for Legendary Luxury
22
Camping Solari In Houston Texas which was automatically deposited in [Mr. Yoshl's)
23
account every month for two and one-half years, [and) which [Mr. Yoshl] told [Ms. Yoshl)
2'
he would give to her." (Answer, pg. 2, lines 21-26).
23
2S
,7
28
The Court notes the following WormaUon has been provided and has been taken
inlo consideration on this Issue:
.." Women', Wealth" Property - The parties agreed that the parties'
community interest In the "woman', wealth" jewelry (location unknown) belongs 10 Ms.
02962
1756
._- ......--... -
_.....-.-- .....
-~.
--~ .....
,.-. -
--.- ..- -.....---..-.-.-..- .... --......... ....... ..... -- ....... ........---~
'
---_._---
Josh!. Mr. Joshi stated that he would contact his relatives, who may have some of the
property, and wtII request 1111 Immediate return to Ma. Joshi.
b.
Mr. I*r, yehlcle - Mr. Joshi Introduced evidence that the balance
on his 2005 Chevrolet Blazer Is S15.()09.75 II of Much 6, 2009. (Trial I!xhJbtt n A'); and
JCelley Blue Book value lor the Blazer Is $10,910 (ExhIbit "B"). Therefore, II defICit in IN
amount 01 approximately SUOO.OO exists on the vehicle. At the conclusion oIlr1a1, Mr.
Joshi requested that he be awarded the Otevrolet Blazer.
s
g
10
II
12
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this Issue. To the Court's knowledge, Ms.
Joshi conducted no discovery on this Issue.
c.
M8. Ioahi', Vehicle" There was no evidence Introduced regarding the
value of Ms. Joshi', Cill'.

d.
Son', Vehlcls" Mr.JoshJ testified that his adult DOn Is presently
13
driving the Jeep Grand Oterokee and Is mnkIng the paymenlB for the car directly to the
,.
lender, Oear Star Financial. 80th pardes testified that Ms. Joshi and the parties' son are
Ie
named on the tide. No evidence was presented regordlng the balance owed on the jeep
II
Grand Cherokee.
11
Ma.JOlIhi presented no evidence on this Issue. To the Court's knowledge.

MIl. Joshi conducted nO discovery on this issue.
,8
,8
e.
Daughte(s Vehicle" Mr. Joshi testified that the parties' adult
20
daughter drives and maIcea payments on the Honda Accord and that IItle Is held In the
21
name of both Mr.Joahi and the parties' daughter.

Ms. JOshi testlAed that she made a payment 01 $6,000.00 on her credit cord for 5aJd
22
23
automobile and the present balance on the credit card was approximately $5.000.00.
24
However. Ms. Joahi presented no evidence to corroborate thl& contention. Ma.JOfIhI did
28
not specify a date on which said debt wu Incurred. she did not provide evidence of any
21
paymenl1 made on said credit card, and she did not present evidence of any credit card
71
with. balance In the amount of $5.000.00 remoining Ihereon.
28
Ms. Joshi presented nO further evidence on this issue.
cop~
of orlgtn
t.
fll .ttb the S.cond Judlel., DI.trlct cGYre
02963
1757
__
........ L
' _ _ _ _ _
~_L.
,,_ _ " -
__
e.
Londg n BaM ASX9\!nt Mr. Joshi testilIe d that that he did not know
it Ma. Jolhl'8 earnin gs from Tanzan ia were placed In a Londo n bank accoun
t. Mr. Joshi
testilled he did not contro l Ms. Joshi's money al that time.
<
Ms. Joshi presen ted no eviden ce thaI her eamln p were placed In a London
bank
5 a(Q)un l To the Court' s knowle dge, Ma. Joshi conduc ted no discov
ery on this Issue.
s
7
f.
Comm unity Banis Accgunta Ma. Joshi testifie d thaI she requested
access to the bank accoun ta from Mr. JoshI, but thaI he would nol let
her see the bonk
8 statemenl9. Purthe r, Ms. Joshi testilled that she did have her own
credil and she did have
t
access to Mr. Joshi' 8 credit card statem ents.
'0
There was no further eviden ce pn:uented as to the conun unlty bank
accounla.
11
4.
There Is conunu nlty debt to be divided .
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2<
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:Ie
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The Court notes the follOWing inform ation has been provid ed and has
been tol<en
Into consid eration on this lsaue:

a.
Genera ! Credit Card Debt Mr. Joshi testille d that he owes
approx imately $15,650 In credit card debt (I'rIaI ExhIbit "E), and argued
the charge s
were Incune d forcon unuolt y expeDSe9, holidays, fomily ClCpenees
and househ old
erpens es .
Ma. Joshi presen ted no eviden ce regardi ng conunu nlty aeellt card debt
Beat Buy Credit Card Debt . Mr. joshl stated that the parties
purcha sed II compu ter and T.V. Bt8est Buy lor appro>dmately $1,314.
00. Mr. Joshi
teltille d Ms. joshl has both of these Items.
b.
Mr. Joshi reques ted he be awarde d the compu ter presen tly In Ms. joshi'.
possession and that ,he retain the T.V.
Ms. joshl pr\,sen ted no eviden ce on this Issue.

c.
Medical
Debt Mr. Joshi testified he owes $6,735.00 to Sl Mary's
Hospital for surger y in May 2008 (Tria! I!lChiblt "pn) and SSOO.OO to
REMSA (Trial Exhibit
-G").
At trial, Mr. JOlIhi offered to pay these commu nity debts.
<
02964
1758
Ma. Joshi presen ted no eviden ce on this Issue. To the Court' s knowle dge,
Ma.
Joshi conduc ted no discov ery on this issue.
3
4
d.
Family Debt - there are two debts owing to family members or on

behalf of family membe rs that were present ed at trial.
s
8
7
Mr. Josh/In troduc ed evIden ce at trial regard ing a $5,000.00 debt

to Rod and
Meena Fowler (TrIal I!xhJblt "H") In the fann of a letter hom Rod
and Meena Fowler.
The letter states that tha parties owe money in the amoun t of $6,000.
00, which was "long
overdu e" by approx imatel y six (6) yean. for money loaned to Mr.
Joshi's mother when
she was W. The letter referen ces a copy of your letter agreeIn g to pay
us back", bul did
'0
nol attach a copy 01 said letter. At IrJal, Mr. Joshi testifie d thai he
did not have a copy of
the referen ced letter. Ms. Joahi testified that this debt was "made up."
'2
.3
.4
.8
.8
.7
8
'9
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2'
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2B
Mr. Joshi testifie d regard ing 8 debt of approd mately $5,000 owing
to a family
membe r by the name 01 Ashlk Nanab y (sp?), for buying plane tickets
for the Joshi family
to come to the Unites Slates In 2001. Ma. Joshi testUled thai she could
not obtain any
inform ation regard ing thJa debt as the other party wante d to stay
out of the divorce . n
AI trial, Mr. Joshi oUered to pay these commu nity debts.
e.
Genera ! Comm unity Debt Mr. Joshi testifie d that he pays

approx imately $600 per month for commu nity debts, exclud ing his
car and insurance.
Ma. Joshi presen ted no eviden ce regard ing genera l conun unlty debt.
Mr. loshi offered to pay the commu nity debt in his nome that he
had been paying
and take an unequ al divisio n of commu nity debt.
5.
Ms. loshi reques ts spousa l suppor t.
Sf"'Cifically, Ms. Joshi reques led spouso lsuppo rt until her death
or remarr iage,
whiche ver occurs first." (Answ er, p. 3, tinea !ki).
The Court notes the foUowlng inform ation has been provid ed and
has been taken
Into consid eration on this Issue:
Mr. Joshi Is 51 years of age and Ms. Joshi Is 46 years of age. The parttes
moved to
the United Slates from Tanzan ia In 2001.
02965
1759
Ms. Joshi Is a college gradua te and haa worked contin uously since the parties
2
moved to the United States.
phanna ceuttca l technic ian and eamed approx imately 529.soo.00 In

2008. Ms. Joshi has
testified she has raised thl! parties ' chlldm l and thereby has (orego
ne educat ional
Ms. Joshi Is pA!Sel\tlyemployed by Raley's as a
opport unities and has put her dreams aside.
Mr. Joshi testifie d he Is a high school gradua te. Mr. Joshlls employ ed as
a catenn g
manager. In 2008, Mr. Joshi eamed approx imately 541.500.00 while
workin g for two
compa nies Ameri can Bar and Restau rant and Siena Sport Service
. At trial, Mr. Joshi
8 Introdu ced his W2 from Americ an Bar IIIId Restau rant
reflect ing earnin gs of U,JS7.
10 (rrial Exhibit .C"); and his W21ro m 9ierra Sport Service
In the amount of S37,SOU8
II
(rna! exhibi t "0"). Mr. Joshi testified that busines s is slow ond he
is presen tly workin g
8
12
13
for only one compa ny Americ an Bar and Restau rant Mr. Joshi testifie
d he has only two
weeks 01 work schedu led (or March. 2009: and he fUed tor unemp loyme
nt benefits In
14
March, 2009.
18
Mr. Joshi reques ted the Court consid er his net income after deduct ing taxes.
lactor
in the presen t $600 per month he Is presen tly paying tor comm unity debt.
and set oft any
18
17
18
alimon y respon sibility by his assump tion of an unequa l distrib ution

of commu nity debt.
Furthe r. to protec t Ms. Joshi in the event Mr. Joshi Bled (or bankru
ptcy. Mr. Joshi
18
sugges ted that the court mainta in jurisdiction over the Issue of spousa
l suppor t for
20
years.
21
Ms. Joshi reques ts reasona ble attorne y'a fees be paid to Washo e legal
ServIC1!9 for the service s of Mr. Cough lin. Mr. Joshi reques ts rea90n
sble attome y's fees be
paid to his attorne y. Mr. Sprlng gate.
22
23
24
28
78
21
78
five
5.
The Court notes the following inform ation has been provid ed and
has been taken
into consid eration on this 168ue:
On July 18, 2008, Mr. Cough lin lIIed Statem ent of Legal Aid Repres
entatio n
which state. Defend ant Is receiving "lree legal Msl9lance" from Washo
e Legal Services
pursua nt to NRS 12.015.
02966
1760
.............. _
............
_- .... _-_....... _....__.._...... -_.... -. ..

"
'-
.. _
..
_- --- _. __..
On Octobe r 3, 2008, Judge Jordan pteslde d over the parlles ' elISe Mruulg
ement
2 Conference. At that heartng . the parties were unable
to reach a selemcmt. Further, on
3 March 12. 2009, Judge Gardn er conducted a Settlem ent
Conference for approximately one
4 and one-ha lf hours, prior to slBltlng the trial at
approx imatel y 3:00 pm. The parties did
8 not agree on settlem ent and trial waa commenced.
In hlB closing argum ent at trial, Mr. CoughUn. on behalf of Ms. Joshi,
8
7
did not unders tand and could not agree with equalizing debt when one
stated thot he
party ended up
with a nicer car. He stated that he had "crunched the numbe rs" and
could not see It the
8 other way. Nr. Coughlin cited an ALR artII:letegerding
commu nity debt and steted his
10 client "does not hove much for the credltol8 to take."
He reques ted that his cllent8S9ume
II one-hall the comm unity debt and that the Court
find Plainti ffs two $5.000 debts to family
12 members and friends as Mr. Joshi's separa te debts.
Mr. Cough lin stated his client Is being
8
13
asked to "foot the bill" for Plalnllff's debts and referenced thot Mil. Joshi
14
ccmmltted mothe r.
18
Mr. Joshi testifie d that he had paid Mr. Sprlng gate $4,000.00 alnce July,
2008,
for attorne y's fees and costs.
18
11
18
18
20
21
22
Mr.J09hI reques ted that Mr. Coughlin personaUy pay his attorne y's
feel for 4.15
hoon of trial at the rate of $22S per hour pursua nt to NRS7.0SS. Mr.
Sprlnggate testified
Mr. Cough lin hod not conduc ted any discovery, had produc ed no evidence
regarding
MIl. Joshi's comm unity debts other than her Financial Declaration on Ole.
had presented
no evidence regard ing alimony, and had acted In a vexatious and unreas
onable manne r
In represe nting Mil. Joshi In this divorce proceeding.
23
24
Is a caring and
CONC LUSIO NS OF LAW
I.
Ongoi ng Suppo rt lor the Adult Childr en's Educat ion
25
Pursua nt to NRS 125.510(9)(b), except where a contract provid ing otherw

ise has
28
been execut ed pursua nt to NRS 123.080, the obllgallon for care, educall
Ol\, maintenance
-n
and suppor t of ony minor child created by any artier entered pursua
nt to this section
2S
ceases: (a) Upon the death of the pelSOn to whom the order was directe
d; or (bl
When
02967
1761
the child reaches 18 yean of ase U he Ia no longer enrolled In high school, otherwise,
when he reaches 19 years of age.
Thtft has been no evidence presented by Ms. Joshi JustUylng a request for
continuing support of the parties' adult children. As there has been no legal basis
presented to make such a finding. the Court denies Me. Joshi's requeat that Mr. Joshi
e financially provide for the adult children's education.

Community Propertyl Debt
2.
Pursuant to NRS 125.150(l)(b) and Pultnmsl1I v. i'ultmrum, 113 Nev. 606, 939 P.2d
100 (1997), In gnmtlng a dlvcm:e, the Court shall ensure an equal disposition of the
'0
community estate, absent compelling reaaons Justifying an unequal distribution. 1Re
Court must make written Ilndlngs sa to why such a division Is approprlste.
.2
a.
Women's Wea!d( The parties have agreed that the parties'
.3
community Interests In the women's wealth" belongs entirely to Ms. Joshi according to
.4
lhelrcuatomsry beliefs, and thereby should be declared her sole and separate property.
"
Asauch. Mr. Joshi Is ordered to contact any and aU relatives who may have this property
'8
and immediately retum said property to Ms. Joshi as soon as possible.
b.
Mr. JoaN'1I Veb!de - The 2005 Chevrolet Blazer shall be considered
'8
Mr. JosN's sole and separate property. Mr. Joshi shall be responsible for the debt
'9
remalnlng thereon. As the car Is worth $10,910.00 but there Is 515,009.75 due and owing
20
on said car, the Court will conslder Mr. Joshi's assumption of tNs asset as an undertaking
2.
of community debt of approximately 54.100.00.
22
c.
Ms. Ioshl's Vehicle - Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered her sole and
23
separate property. Ms. Joshi shaJl be responslWe for any debt remaining thereon. As
24
there was no evidence presented as to ilS value (either positive or negative), the Court Is
211
unable to determine" value for this community asset.
28
d.
Son's Vehicle - As the only evidence presented on this Issue was the
27
fact that the parties' adult son drives this vehicle and makes the payments thereon, this
2S
"sset will not be divided omong the community.
COPV O. or19ln.1 an .11. with th. S.cond Judlel.' D,.trlct Court
02968
1762
--
--
__
. . .... - ..
.-
_---- ......__ ..-
--~.'----'
. --.'----' .__ -.... -.._---- .
e.
e.
---_.... -_...-.. . .... _- ....__ .._.__..._------.-
'-" --'
-"
.....__..- '-" ''--' ---_.... -_...-..-.. " .... _- . ...__ . ._.__..._------.-
Daughter's Vehlrle Daughter's Vehlrle - The only evidence presented on this iMue was
presented on this
2
2
malcee
the lart that the parties' adult daughter drives this car and malcee payment! thereon. Ms.
l
l
Joshi preented no evldena!

car lte
Joshi preented no evldena! of a balance owing on the car Or lte fair marlcet value.
4
4
Thereby, this car wID not be divided as a communi ty wet

this car
be
a communi ty
wet
,
,
f.
London Bank Account W8I

to
London Bank Account - there W8I no ev Idena! presented to the
8
8
cOOsill.
Is no
Court verUylng said bank Ilount cOOsill. A& such. there Is no fllctual basis to support an
basis to
7
7
order dividing it as a commu nity asset.

dividin g it as a community asset.
Community
A9COUnte - there WQS no evidence
Community BanIs A9COUnte - there WQS no evidence presented as to
8
8
10
the
bank
the existence of community bank accounts. As such.
such.
there Is no factual basis to uppon

~uppon
there
asset.
d ividing it as a
an order dividing it as a community asset.
h.
h.
It
It
Cpmputer Cpmputer - Mr. JoahIls awarded the computer purchased at Belt
12
12
JoshishaU
to Mr.
or
Buy. Ms. Joshi shaU deliver said computer to Mr. Sprtnggate's office q,'1 or before Frtday.
13
13
April 17, 2009, at 5:00pm.

2009,
i.
14
14
15
15
at Best
Television - Ms. JoshIlB awarded the television purchased at Best
Buy. It Is the Court's understanding this television Is currently In Me. Joshi's possession.
j.
18
18
General Credit Card Debt - The evldenre presented Indicates a

General
Card Debt - The evldenre presented
a
11
11
general debt of approximately $1S, 650.00 which has been expended for community
18
18
purposes.
be
this
Josbl
be
Mr. Joshi agreed to be responsible for this debt at trial. As such. Mr. Josbl shall be
agreed
19
19
20
20
and
solely and separately responsible for thls debt.
k.!!cst Buy Credit Card J)ebt The evidence presenh!d indicates there
Card J)ebt
k.
!!cst Buy
presenh!d
21
:r.z
a
$1,314.00 oUllltandlng
is a debt of approximately $1,314.00 oUllltandlng for the purchase of the lelevlslon and
23
23
computer.
Mr. Joshi agreed to be responsible for this debt ot trial. As such. Mr. Joshi shall be
Joshi
to be
for this
ot trial. As such.
Joshi shall be
24
2S
2S
solely and separately responsible for thlB debt.

responsible
28
III
27
27
III
II I
29
29
9
9
02969
1763
I.
Medical Debl- A8 Mr. Josh! has offered 10 pay these deblll. he shall
be solely and separately responsible for the payment of $6,735.00 to StMary. H05pltal;
and $500.00 10 Remsa.

m.
Pamlly Debt - There waa no documentary evidence presented as to
the debl owing 10 Aahlk NBnaby (ap?) lor buying plane tlcket5 for the Josh! family.
Purther, aa the only evidence provided regarding the $5,000.00 debt to Rod and Meena
Fowler Indlcates said debt was Incurred for the benellt of Mr. Joshi's mother. As
Mr. Joshi has agreed 10 take on both of these debts, they shall henceforth be his sole and
sepanote responsibUlty.
n.
10
Genet'al COmm\!!llty Qebt - There W08 no evidence other than
11
testimonial evidence to eslDbUsh community debts. As Mr. Joshi haa offered to pDy any
12
remaining community debt In his nBme thBt Is hereafter outstanding. said debt shall be
13
the sole and sepamle responslbUlty of Mr. Joshi.
"
The Court notes Mr. Joshi has likely Incurred an unequal distribution 01 the
18
community debt in thI5 ClIBe. The Court finds his testimonial acqulcacencc at triaJ to take
18
on this debt Is a compelling reason to maIce an unequal distribution of the community
17
debt.
18
3.
18
The sllltutory mandalll10r alimony is that It be RjU8t Bnd equitable."
Spousal Support -
20
NRS 125.15O(1)(a). Alimony Is an equitable award to serve the post.<fecree needs and
21
rights of the fonner spouse. Wollf v. Wolff. 112 Nev. 1355, 929 P.2d 916 (1996). Although
22
poet-decree Incomes need not be equalized, In marriages of some duration, alimony may
23
be used to narrow large gap. between the post-dlvorce earnlng capacities of the parties
24
"
and to allow the reclplenlspouse to live "as nearly lIS possible 10 the station In life
enjoyed before the dlvorce. R Shydler v. Shvdler, 114 Nev. 192,196 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1998).
28
The individual circumstances 01 each case will determine the appropriate amount and
27
length 01 ""y alimony DWllrd. !.!I.
28
10
(apu
G'
ortqln'l an '11. with the Second Judlcl Ol.trlct Court
02970
1764
__
__
_ _
.~_,_~_,
__ , _ _ _
._~
_ . _ . ._ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ._ . . . . _
.. - . . ___ _ _
, . __ . , "
__
..... _
.."
__ 0
. . . . . . . . . . .. , . _ . . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _
..
'
Pumaant to NRS 125.150(8), there are eleven (11) factors the court shall consider In
2
awarding alimony.
Ms. Joshi presented no evldenoe In support of her request for alimony other than
<
her own testimonial evidence thet she ~ the partiea' chOdren, had foregone
educational opportunities. and put her drelllM on hold while married. Ms. Joshllestlfied
that she Is healthy and two always worked. There waa no reference to any of the eleven
factors in NRS 125.150(8) In Ms. Joshi's presentation and argument in support ofan
award of spousal support.
The Court finds that the plll1tes preSP.lldy earn approximately the same amount,
10
Ms. Joshi earns $2.458 per month and Mr. Joshi earned approximately 53,125 per month
II
in 2008, but testified he Is worldng substantially leas In 2009 and haa fUed for
12
unemployment benefilll the beginning of March 2IlO9. (lka NRS 125.15O(8)(a. The
13
parties have been married 21 years and Mil. Joshi has always been employed during that
1<
IS
ai!:I! NRS 125.15O(8)(d. Ms. Joshi obtained a college degree prior \0 marriage ami
Mr. Joshi has a high school degree. Cl!s!: NRS 125.150(8)(h. Both parties iU'e healthy and
IS
able to work. (!m: NRS 125.150(8)(k.
17
IS
time.
Based upon the evidence presented and the applicable law, this Court does not
believe Ms. JOlihJ Is entitled to an award of alimony.
Ie
4.
20
This Court enjoys discretion to award attorney's fees In a divorce action.
Attorney's Pees~
21
NRS 125.150(3); Loye v. Love, 114 Nev. 572. 959 P.2d 523 (1998).) Also, pursuant to
22
NRS 18.010(2)(b), the court has authority to order attorney's lees when the court IInds
23
that the ... defense of the opposing party w"'" brought or lTI4intained without reasonable
2'
ground or to har,," the prevailing party." Finally, pursuant to NRS 7.085, If a court
20
finds that an attorney has: (a) fUed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding
28
In any court in thl. State and .uch action or defense is not well-grounded in fact or Is nol
..
WarTanted by existing law or by nn argument/or changing the existing law that i. made
28
in good faith; or (b) unreasonably and
ve~at!ously e~lI!nded
a civil action or proceeding
11
COPV Qf
QrlQln~1
OD rill .Ith la, Stcond judie ot_trlct Court
02971
1765
---'-".--
,-
.. -.- .. _._--- -.... - ..
~-
.. --'-
..
..-- ..
~-"
..__.._ _...
......
before any court In thJa State, the court m!Y require the attorney personaUy to pay the
additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees reasonably Incurred because of such
conduct.
At trial. Mr. Sprlnggate stated that Mr. Coughlin had conducted no discovery in
this case. In addition, Mr. Coughlin faUed to present one documentary piece of evidence
at trinl on behall of Ma. Joshi's claims. Mr. Coughlin argued incessantly with the Court
throughout trial and made sarcastic, derogatory remarks to the Court, Mr. Springgote,
and Mr. Joshi throughout trial.
The Court notes that there were well o'/er 40 objections during four (4) hours 01
9
10
trial. Mr. Sprlnggate's objections were well-founded and continuously sustained except
11
In one insInnI:e. Mr. Coughlin was overruled on every objection except one and argued
12
with the Court over most rulings. Mr. Coughlin wu admonished approxImAtely 15 times
13
by the Court to quit arguing. to ask specific questions, to discontinue asking questions
14
calling for a legal conclusion, and to refrain from making degrading remarks to both Mr.
I,
Joshi and Mr. Sprlnggate.

The Court notes that at one point,. after on exhibit hod been admitted.
18
17
Mr. Coughlin could not find the copy provided by Mr. Springg&te in discovery. Mr.
18
Coughlin demanded a copy be provided at trial, stating am I supposed to be rifling
19
through my papers? My understanding Is that you are supposed to provide a copy."
20
When asked
21
could spend my time and mental energy looking around for Mr. Sprlnggate's document
Z2
like I am his assistant,. or we could ask Mr. Springgate to provide a copy at the time he Is
23
seeking admission like I believe the rule states." Mr. Coughlin clled no rule and then
24
proceeded to interrupt the proceedings twice approximately five (5) minutes and twelve
211
(12) minutes post ruling to re-argue the point. Mr. Springgate replied to the arguments
29
by referencing when exactly the copy hod been provided to Mr. Coughlin during
21
dlsc:overyand where the copy could be located. The Court hod to admonbh Mr.
28
Coughlin to quit arguing the point and reitemte that the exhibit had been admitted.
tr he had the copy of the document,. Mr. Coughlin stated, .J do not know. I
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: UNDERLING ADDED BY COUGHLIN

12
coPV of orttln
Dft
ftl' Mltft (h, S.eond Judlel Dlltrtct Court
02972
1766
.
. -. .. -... -- - - -
,.
........- .----..-.-.---.---.-. . ----..- ... _ . . .... _._.
----_._- .. --.... .-.
Mr. Coughlin rued an Answer and Counterclaim on Ma. Joshi's behalf that
2
Included aIIegationa unsupported by law; and Bled an Opposition to the request for
return of Mr. JOIIhI's passport without any factual or legal basis. Purther, at trial, Mr.
CoughUn preaented almost no evIdence to support
Ma.losh1's requesta and c1aJO'IS.
The most troubling ospect of this cax WIUI Mr. Coughlin's rude, SIlrcBSt1c and
disrespectful presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inabUity to understand a balance sheet;
his l a Uu re to conduct dlscoveJ}'; and his lack of knowledge with regard to the rules of
!!Vidence and trial procedurv. AU of this was compou nded with a continuously
antagonistic prelel\tatlon of the case that res\llted in a shift from a fairly simple divo=
10
11
case to a contentious divorce triallostlng an excessIve amount of time.
Por all these reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Coughlin's presentation of the case
12
and arguments In support thereof to be unfounded In fact. unwamlnted
13
unreasonable,
'4
by existing low,
and vexatious throughout this entire proceeding.
8ased upon the foregoing. Mr. Springgate's request that Mr. Coughlin personally
GRANTED.
'5
pay Mr. Joshi 4.15 hoUlll at the rote ofS225 per hour for the cost of the trial is
Mr. Coughlin shall submit 0 check to Mr. Joshi in the amount of 5934 within 30 days of
17
this Order.
18
5.
Preparation of the Decree -
19
Mr. Springgate .haIl prepare the decree of divorce consistent with this
Mr. Springgata shall tender his proposed d ecree to Mr.
20
memo rand m decision.
21
Coughlin. pursuant to WDCR 9, within 20 da ys from the date of this order,
22
23
24
25
27
28
GOOD CAUSB APPEARING, IT IS SO ORDBRED,
Doted:
)JL. 2009.
Ai /1
G"""'=:;
DISTRICT JUDGB
Note by Coughlin: despite the Order requiring Springgate tender his Proposed
April
'-
Decree to Coughlin, Springgate and WLS conspired to obstruct Coughlin's ability

to review such per the Order and WDCR, with WLS assenting the the 5/21/09
Proposed Decree originally, and not until Coughlin's squawking on 5/24/09 did
WLS's Ashley moved for an Amendment to the Proposed Order incorporating the Sec
523 bankruptcy arguments that a then novice family law attorney Coughlin went to
the trouble to glean. WLS refused to pay the $1,000 sanction, refused to provide
'3
any assistance to Coughlin in challenging it, and obstructed Coughlin's access to
materials necessary to his defense.
02973
1767
".
..
-.-.
'"
...
.... --.......... _._.- ....., '-.' .-- .-. -'
..
. .......
......
.... .
CERTIflCATB OF MAILING
2
Pursuant to NRCP SIb), I certily that I run an employee 01 the Second Judidal
DIstrict Court, and that on the ~ day of Apr!l, 2009, I electronically filed the Ioregoln
with the Oerk 01 the Court System which will send a notice 01 electronic flUng to the
foUowlng:
8
7
Document. ORDER AFIliR TRIAL
8
\l
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE ESQ

ZACHARY 8. COUGHLIN E5Q
10
12
13
14
18
18
17
18
19
20
21
22
2J
2<
27
28
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: ITS HARD TO DECIDE WHAT IS MORE INAPPROPRIATE, WLS'S ELCANO'S
TESTIMONY OR KING'S ALLEGING IN HIS COMPLAINT AND MAKING ARGUMENT THAT THIS
FHE3 BY 2JDC JUDGE L. GARDNER IS AN ACTUAL ORDER, RATHER THAN THE TRUTH, WHICH
IS THAT THIS ORDER AFTER TRIAL WAS SUPERSEDED BY THE FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE OF
6/19/09 WHICH ADMITS THAT THE ARGUMENTS (WHICH IS WHAT NRCP 11 IS CONCERNED
WITH, AS OPPOSED TO THE ONE'S CONDUCT, WHETHER CONTEMPTUOUS, DISRUPTIVE, OR
OTHERWISE, AND JUDGE GARDNER'S FAILURE TO MAKE A FINDING THAT COUGHLIN VIOLATED
ANY SUCH RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, AND CONCOMITANT FAILURE TO TAKEN ANY
NCJC CANON 2, RULE 2.15 "APPROPRIATE ACTION" PROVIDES A COLLATERAL BAR TO ANY
ARGUMENT THAT THIS ORDER (WHICH IS NO MORE) SUPPORTS A FINDING BY "CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF SOME RPC VIOLATION
WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT SPRINGGATE'S 5/21/09 PROPOSED DECREE WAS REJECTED BY
JUDGE W. GARDNER, WHOM DECIDED TO GO AHEAD AND AWARD THE VERY ALIMONY THAT SHE
FOUND COUGHLIN HAD VEXATIOUSLY PURSUED, SPECIFICALLY NOTING THE 21 YEAR LENGTH
OF THE MARRIAGE THAT COUGHLIN ASSERTED PROVIDED A strong argument for just such
an award, and beyond that, Judge W. Gardner also excised from Springgate's
Proposed Decree the attorney fee award...a little late considering Coughlin had
been fired over it in the interim (amazingly, Springgate (whom should be
brought up on charges) still filed a Motion for OSC, on 8/4/09 to have Coughlin
held in contempt for failing to pay the attorney fee award that had been
vacated by virtue of the final Decree superseding the Order After Trial, and
I.
any subsequent attempt to suggest the fee award was always intended to be
separate from such final Decree is belied by Springgate's including it in his
5/21/09 Proposed Decree and the language at the end of this FHE3.
Elcano's is lucky the Panel wouldn't let Coughlin call him in his case in
chief,and that King cheated by failing to supplement Elcano to his witness list
in a timely manner.
Otherwise, Elcano would have been made to look like even more of a fraud02974
than he already was made to look.
1768
OTE by Coughlin: so, her is the sum total of what the SBN's OBC's King provided Coughlin in his SCR
05(2)(c) rampage of obstructionism with respect to the "grievance" he earlier indicated he "received"
from Judge Linda Gardner". Whether 2JDC Judge L. Gardner ever contacted an "appropriate authority"
ike the SBN (no comments from the peanut gallery, please) pursuant to NCJC Canon 2, Rule 2.15 is
ather important to an offensive and or defensive collateral estoppel analysis (which is, of course,
hy King needed to quash Coughlin's subpoenas on he and SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters, so
esperately). Still, if Judge L. Gardner did not contact the SBN, King's presenting her "grievance
ile" as nothing more than an "FYI" stamp on a printout from a blog King allege's belonged to Coughlin
etailing prosecutorial misconduct kind of puts former prosecutor turned Judge Linda Gardner, whose
HE3 Order was undone by her final decree in DV08-01168 (superseded) of 6/19/09 (though it was active
ong enough to get Coughlin fired from his legal aid domestic attorney job where he was paid half the
alary of prosecutors whom he ran circles around in law school while passing the bar exam a year early,
eing ranked tenth in his class, whatever, whatever...)
Well, that kind of puts 2JDC Judge Linda Gardner and her lifelong prosecutor turned RMC Judge
brother in a bit of a tough light, some might say. It would be enough to make other judges think
twice in the future before letting the Richard G. Hill, Paul Elcano, or the Patrick O. King's of
the world lead them down some primrose path...and maybe that is not such a bad thing, no?
--
03018
ZachCoughlinEsq
Page 1 of 1094
-,
ZachCoughlinEsq
FYI
Unfrozen Caveman La\\.'yer practicing in Reno and beyond in Nevada
About
Zach Coughlin Esg
Attorney focusing on Prosecutorial and
. . ...
Police Misconduct cases and lawsuits a2ainst the Public

Defender for Malpractice Nevada
Police, Prosecutorial
and Judicial
Misconduct
"There is no crueler tyranny than that which is exercised under cover of law, and with the colors of
justice ..
- U,S.
v,
,"
Jannotti, 673 F,2d 578,614 (3d Cir. 1982)
Note: We add links to updates with the original news articles reporting police and/or prosecutor
misconduct, so be sure to scroll down to check for "new news".
LIVE CRIMINAL LAW INFORMATION
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in criminal law, at low cost. Follow the link on the main page, or click on the one here:
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The Justice Project's Recommendations to Ensure Prosecutorial Accountability
States should require that prosecutors' offices adopt and enforce clearly defined official policies and
procedures.
States should require open-file discovery in criminal cases.
States should require that prosecutors document all agreements with witnesses and jailhouse
informants concerning conferment of benefits of any kind.
States should require trial and appellate judges to report all cases of prosccutorial misconduct,
including cases where the misconduct is ruled to be harmless error.
States should establish a prosecutor review board with the power to investigate allegations of
http://zachcoughlinesq ,wordpress.coml
3/15/2012
03019
Za"hCoughlinEsq
..
Page 25 of 1094
Florida: The Florida Department of Law Enforcement is joining the investigation of Broward
Sheriff s Office detectives suspected of falsifying crime reports. Prosecutors recently filed criminal
ch:lrges against two deputies who are charged with falsifying documents and making up confessions
to clear cases in Weston and Southwest Ranches. Dozens more deputies have been informed that they
are under invcstigation or havc been asked to give statements to prosecutors. Exceptional Clearance
Florida (but could be anywhere in the US): .Tames Faller claimed innocence in a complicated loan
fr:llld from the time he reported it to Florida regulators more than 10 years ago, when he tried to
explain it to an FBI Agent, when he was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced to prison. Along the
way he infuriated federal prosecutors by making hundreds of allegations of misconduct at virtually
evny stage of his prosecution in the
$3.6 million fraud because, he claims, they got the wrong guy.
1l.:.:y'll Get You if You Tick Them Off

UPDATE: Faller's federal lawsuit has made it through the initial (and inevitable) barrage of motions
to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. Federal Judge Allows Suit to Stand
l]'i!1ois: Cook County, Illinois prosecutors have dropped murder charges against Dan Young, Jr. and
Ib'old Hill, who have spent more than 12 years behind bars, after DNA test results undermined their
(c(.:rced) confessions and testimony from a dentist who implicated the two through a bite mark and a
hi4 ,ey. A Chicago Tradition
Illinois and Missouri: A federal jury has awarded nearly $6.6 million in damages to former Chicago
police Officer Steven Manning, finding two veteran FBI agents framed him for a Cook County
murder that put him on Death Row. The jury also held that one of the FBI agents also framed
Manning in a Missouri kidnapping case. Manning spent 14 years in prison before both convictions
w 're ovcrturncd and the prosecutions were dropped. Framed by FBI
}\I-;zona: Last year, former Pima County DA Kenneth Peasley was disbarred for intentionally
pr;<;cnting false evidence in death-penalty cases-something that had never before happened to an
i\1'lcrican prosecutor. In a 1992 triple-murder case, Peasley introduced testimony that he knew to be
faLe; three men were convicted and sentenced to die. Peasley was convinced that the three were
guilty, but he als o believed that the evidence needed a push. According to the Death Penalty
111 ('ormation Center, since the mid-nineteen-seventies a hundred and seventeen death-row inmates
h, \'c been released. Defense lawyers, often relying on DNA testing, have shown rcpeatedly how
sl'Jdy crime-lab work, lying informants, and mistaken eyewitness identifications, among other
fadors, led to unjust convictions. But DNA tests don't reveal how innocent people Come to be
pr. secuted in the first place. The career of Kenneth Peasley - and the case of Martin Soto-Fong
(,. Killer Instincts [pdf format]
J' ... vada: Police and prosecutors in the Las Vegas Valley routinely try to keep essential information
frum defense laVl.yers, violating the constitutional rights of those accused of crimej, defense attorneys
an'! the county public defender say. Putting Away the Innocent
Wisconsin: Everything was hunky-dory at the Department of Corrections when thcTV show "Lie
Deector" proposed filming a polygraph exam of prisoner Mark Price. But when Penny Brummer and
At:drey Edmonds were added to the slate, Deputy Corrections Secretary Rick Raelllisch pulled the
ph g, claiming the show is "entertainment", not news. Why the 180 degree switch? Perhaps it's
bet..:ause Raemisch was Dane County Sheriff and at the helm of the Brummer and Edmonds
inyestigations. Conflict of Interest
http://zachcoughlinesq. wordpress.coml
3/15/2012
03043
3696
F I LED
FEB 2 5 2009
HOWBA D6': C
K
y DEp{f(;,J CLERK
IN THE FAMILY DIVISION
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
II
12
13
14
15
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: COUGHLIN ADDED UNDERLINING, THE FHE3 CRITICISM OF COUGHLIN REARGUING
A POINT IS TEMPERED BY THE FACT THAT AS SPRINGGATE APPROACHED AND PASSED THE TEN
EXHIBITS THRESHOLD,THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER CREATED CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN THAT RESPECT
FURTHER, RESPECTING FOLLOWING PROCEDUREAL RULES, IT WAS COUGHLIN, NOT SPRINGGATE, WHOM
ASHWIN JOSHI, MANAGED TO GET HIS PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT TIMELY FILED (THOUGH CREDIT FOR
THAT LARGELY GOES TO WLS'S DEBORAH PRINGLE, AS
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
COUGHLIN LIKELY DID NOT EVEN KNOW WHAT A PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT WAS AT THAT POINT).
CASE NO. DV08-01168
VS.
BHARTI JOSHI,
DEPT. NO. 14
Defendant/Countcrclaimant.
16
________________________
ORDER RE PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
17
18
This matter is set for trial on March
12, 2009 at 1 :30 p.m.
19
Good cause appearing,

20
21
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, if a party intends to offer more than ten trial
22
exhibits, the proposed exhibits must be bound, tabbed and indexed. Plaintiff's exhibits will be
23
marked in alphabetical sequence and Defendant's exhibits will be marked in numerical sequence.
24
Each party shall submit two copies of the proposed exhibits to the Court and one copy to the
25
26
27
28
opposing counsel.
Counsel shall contact Martha Casique-Andrews at
775-325-6779 to
schedule a
time with the Clerk to organize and mark exhibits. For trials set for one full day or more,
counsel shall meet with the Court Clerk no later than 3 :00 p.m. on the Friday prior to trial to
2
mark the trial exhibits. For trials which are scheduled for less than one full day, exhibits shall be
marked immediately prior to the convening for trial, and counsel shall arrive at least 15 minutes
4
5
6
7
8
before the scheduled time of trial.

Prior to meeting
with (ile Court
Clerk, counsel shall meet and discuss the
admissibility of proposed exhibits. At the time of marking the exhibits with the Clerk, the Clerk
shall be told which Exhibits may be admitted without objection.
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II
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At the opening of trial, counsel shall inform the Court which exhibits are being
admitted without objection.
Each party must file with the Court a trial statement, financial declaration and
UCCJA declaration. Courtesy
copies of the
trial statement shall be hand-delivered to opposing
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counsel and Judge Gardner's chamhers by no later than 5:00 p.m. five (5) days prior to trial.
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Failure to timely deliver these documents may result in sanctions against the offending party as
set forth in NRCP 37.
If the
financial
circumstances of a
party have changed substantially since the
filing of the most recent financial declaration, that party is to fi l e an updated financial declaration
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at the same time as filing the trial statement.

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Dated this
ay
of February, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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Pursuant to NRCP
5(b),
I certifv that I
am an
employee of the Second Judicial District
Court, and that on this date I deposited by county mail, at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
attached, addressed to:

ZACHARY B COUGHLIN ESQ
WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES
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299 SOUTH ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO NV 89501
JOHN P SPRINGGATE ESQ
203 SOUTH ARLINGTON AVENUE
89501
RENO NV
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Dated this
day ofFcbrualv, 2009.
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mmlS alive ASSIstant
!iJ
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Print
Close
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Sent: Sun 4/19/09 7:52 PM
To: Paul Elcano (pelcano@washoelegalservices.org); zcoughlin@washoelegalservices.org
THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED FOR PAUL ELCANO ONLY, PLEASE DO NOT READ UNLESS YOU ARE THE INTENDED
RECIPIENT.
Paul Elcano, Executive Director

Washoe Legal Services
299 S. Arlington Ave.
Reno, NV 89501
April 15th , 2009
Dear Paul,
I wish to make another formal complaint alleging a hostile work environment that includes harassment, sexual
harassment, workplace bullying, discrimination and other prohibited conduct directed towards due to my race, gender,
religion, national origin, political affiliation, sexual orientation, and age.
I have been harassed, sexually harassed, and discriminated against by employees of Washoe Legal Services on many
occasions.This is ongoing. I have informed you and others at our workplace of this harassment many times. Some, but
not all, of the prohibited behavior directed towards me includes inappropriate sexually charged comments, racially
charged comments, gender discrimination, screaming, the use of disparaging and foul language, bullying, and
intimidation.Much of this conduct has focused on my gender, sexual orientation, national origin, political affiliation or
viewpoint, race and other immutable characteristics. This conduct has continued to occur and is presently ongoing.Marc
Ashley, Karen Sabo, and John Sasser were definitely made aware of this by me in one of our sit down meetings and I
informed them of my wish to file a formal complaint at that time, though I do not believe my request was followed up on.
I recently filed a formal complaint approximately two months ago but have yet to hear back from anyone with Washoe
Legal Services regarding that complaint.
I am in no way going to detail every single inappropriate or prohibited act by a Washoe Legal Services employee directed
at me in this communication. It is my firm desire that we all just get along, serve our clients well, and make efficient use
of the grants bestowed upon us, and I would hate to see anyone lose their job without a real opportunity to address these
issues. This inappropriate conduct has included a variety of activities, not all of which I will be able to fully detail in this
complaint but will be able to provide details at an appropriate time.
I would like a copy of this and my other complaints placed in my employment file. I request that the formal complaint
and grievance process begin soon.
Sincerely,
Paul Elcano,Executive Director
Melissa
Marc Ashley,Esq.
Karen P
Larry Belasco, Esq.
Karen Sa
anaracina,Esq.
er,Esq.
0,
Esq.
cht,Esq.
Sarah Class,Esq.
Caryn St
Zach Coughlin,Esq.
Jon Sasse ,Esq.
Erin Ching, Esq.
Washoe
Legal
Services
April 20,2009
Zach Coughlin
931 Forest Street
Reno, NV 89509
Dear Zach,
Due to serious allegations of profe sional misconduct, you have been placed on
administrative leave with pay effec ive immediately.
Sincerely.
Paul
ano
Executive Director
299 South Arlington Ave.
Reno, Nevada 89501
Fax: 775.324.5509
- http://www.clicktoconvert.com
FILED
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Code 2490
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
299 S. Arlington Ave
Bar No.: 9473
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Attorney for Zach Coughlin
Attorney of Record for Joshi Bharti*
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Electronically
04-30-2009:03:35:1 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 744 44

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIVISION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
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Case No.: DV08-01168
Ashwin Joshi,
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Plaintiff,
Dept. 14
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vs.
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Bharti Joshi,
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Defendant
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REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION; REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO

RESPOND
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COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq., on behalf of himself with respect to the personally
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liability for attorney's fees pursuant to NRS 7.085, and commenting to the Court in regard to his
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representation of the Defendant, Joshi Bharti, and moves the Court to Reconsider the Order After
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Trial it entered and served electronically on April 13th, 2009. This motion is made and based
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upon the attached memorandum of points and authorities and all the papers and pleadings on file
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in this action.
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Request for Reconsideration - 1
Docket 54844 Document 2009-26305
- http://www. clicktoconvert.com
141
(Please Note : Mr. Coughlin attempted a to timely file this Request on eFile, however, a technical
deficiency regarding the signature line resulted in a rejection of the filing, communicated to Mr.
Coughlin on April 29th 2009, and required a refilling after being informed of the problem by
Annie at the filing office (775 328 3112 is Annie contact number).
Dated this 27th day of April, 2009

/sig/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf
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The Order Requiring Attorney to Personally Pay Opposing Counsel's Legal Fees Should be
Reconsidered and Set Aside.
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Mr. Coughlin wishes to express his sincere and profound respect for this Court and for
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opposing counsel John Springgate, Esq. He recognizes the valuable opportunity presented by
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the criticisms set forth and is resolved to redouble his efforts in developing along the path of
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becoming a consummate professional of the ilk to which Judge Gardner and Mr. Springgate
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belong. Mr. Coughlin feels is fair to point out that subsequent to this Trial Mr. Springgate
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reached out to Mr. Coughlin and a very productive communiqu resulted which has led to Mr.
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Coughlin being fortunate enough to be provided much useful instruction in aid of Mr. Coughlin's
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journey to, hopefully, one day becoming anywhere near as accomplished and respected a
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professional as Mr. Springgate.
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*It is important to note at the outset that Mr. Coughlin does not believe he is currently
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representing Ms. Joshi. It is Mr. Coughlin's understanding that Washoe Legal Services
substituted a different attorney to represent Ms. Joshi henceforth in this case. Mr. Coughlin has
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and intends to continue to make every appropriate attempt to accomplish this transition in a
manner that attends to all matters of concern to Ms. Joshi.
This Court enjoys discretion to award attorney's fees in a divorce action. (See NRS
125.150(3); Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (1998)). Also, pursuant to NRS
18.010(2)(b), the court has authority to order attorney's fees "when the court finds that
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the... defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to
harass the prevailing party." Finally, pursuant to NRS 7.085, if a court finds that an attorney has:
(a) filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such
10
action or defense is not well- grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by an
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argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or (b) unreasonably and
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vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State, the court shall
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require the attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees
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reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
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Whether counsel defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State where such
action or defense is not warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the
existing law that is made in good faith?
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Should Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half the community credit card debt (for
which her personal property probably could not be used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on
nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent failure on her part to do so could likely not be
22
used as a proper basis to set off any alimony award received . However, the Court's Order
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After Trial points out that "Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income after deducting
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taxes, factoring in the present $600 per month he is presently paying for community debt, and
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set off any alimony responsibility by his assumption of an unequal distribution of
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community debt.
(Emphasis added). The Court's Order seems to endorse this arrangement as
28
fair and acceptable and the Court's statements to Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Joshi at the Settlement
Conference explicitly indicated how well grounded in legal custom this scenario was thought to
be. However, the majority rule in the various states and overwhelming balance of recorded case
law suggests otherwise, sometimes very strongly. Nevada may not have authority directly on
point, though In Re Anders (a bankruptcy case from Nevada) may be.

6
The court in each of the following cases determined that an offset against an arrearage of
alimony for payments to various third parties on behalf of a former spouse, including tuition and
sums spent in satisfaction of a bank loan or credit card charges, would not be permitted. The
10
special nature and purpose of the support obligation owed by a divorced spouse to her former
11
spouse will be a consideration affecting the court's determination of the propriety of an offset in
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most instances. For example, in several jurisdictions in which the courts have determined that
14
the support obligation is a "duty" and not a "debt," it has been held that a setoff of an ordinary
15
debt should not permitted as a matter of right against the support obligation. It should be noted
16
that in a few jurisdictions, there is no indication that an offset considered by the court to
17
retroactively modify the decree will be permitted under any, or at least most, circumstances.
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Nevada does not appear to have any reported case law on this issue, as can sometimes be the
20
case.
21
Remanding the case for a new trial to determine whether the wife consented to certain
22
payments to third parties in lieu of alimony arrearages due under a separation agreement, the
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court in Lopez v Lopez (1980, App) 125 Ariz. 309, 609 P2d 579, observed that support
25
payments, whether for the wife's or child's support, are to be disbursed by the supported spouse
26
as she sees fit, and the supporting spouse ordinarily is not entitled to credits against past-due
27
support for monies that he paid to third parties on his own accord and without her consent.
28
The court in Morel v Morel (1982, La App 5th Cir) 425 So 2d 1289, cert den (La) 430 So
2d 99, refused to allow as an offset against delinquent alimony pendente lite and child support
several non-complying expenditures by the husband, including the payment of the children's
tuition, a community debt, when the amount expended could be recovered by him at the time of
the settlement of the marital community, and the payment was not made pursuant to the spouses'
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agreement. A request by the wife that the husband make such payments during a later time
period was found irrelevant to the instant indirect payments.
Although apparently agreeing with jurisprudence to the effect that the supported spouse is
entitled to spend support funds as she chooses, and the supporting spouse may not usurp this
11
right by making payments to others on his own accord, the court in Feazell v Feazell (1984, La
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App 3d Cir) 445 So 2d 143, held that the husband's payments to third parties on behalf of his
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former wife were not unilateral, but in accordance with the wife's direction and, consequently,
15
permissible.
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Where the wife testified that she used the credit card to "balance out" household expenses
17
for herself and the children while the couple was separated, the court in Youngberg v Youngberg
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(1986, La App 4th Cir) 499 So 2d 329, would not permit an offset against post-divorce
20
permanent alimony and child support arrearages for one-half of the credit card charges. The
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husband had been ordered to pay alimony pendente lite and child support during the period in
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which the charges were made, but was current in his payments at that time, and asserted that the
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wife made the charges without his permission. The wife maintained that the credit card charges
25
were for expenses for which the husband was responsible. The court concluded that neither
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spouse intended such a credit when the husband paid the credit card account balance, denying th
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offset apparently based on the lack of evidence of an agreement between the parties.
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In Gottsegen v Gottsegen (1987, La App 4th Cir) 508 So 2d 162, the court disallowed
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credit against past-due permanent alimony for pre-award payments made on veterinarian and
cable television bills when those items could not be considered necessary for the wife's support,
pursuant to La.R.S. 9:3 10, which provided for the retroactive effect of such awards subject to
credit for any support provided.

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Credit card charges for the purchase of luggage and an airline ticket by the wife
immediately prior to separation, which apparently fell to the husband to pay, were not offset
against arrears in alimony pendente lite by the court in Rauch v Rauch (1988, La App 5th Cir)
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535 So 2d 1317, when the husband's claim was not "liquidated" within the meaning of LSA-C.C.
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art. 1893, the statutory setoff provision.

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Although affirming the lower court's postponement of a decision respecting the husband's
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right to credit until the divorce trial because this aspect of the decision was not appealed, the
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court in Keff v Keff (1983, 3d Dept) 95 App Div 2d 888, 464 NYS2d 29, remarked that a
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judgment requiring the husband to pay the full amount of the claimed arrears in temporary
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maintenance and child support would have been appropriate, notwithstanding a claimed setoff
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for amounts paid by him for attorney's fees owed by the wife (Ms. Joshi should receive a similar
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set off for the fees paid to Mr. Springgate). The court noted that the husband neither moved for
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relief of the support order, nor proffered any reason for his neglect, and his unilateral reduction
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of support was improper.

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The court in Gluck v Gluck (1987, 2d Dept) 134 App Div 2d 237, 520 NYS2d 581,
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concluded that a husband's payment of the spouses' credit card bills, apparently prior to divorce,
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could not be offset against arrears in (temporary) maintenance and child support owed to his
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wife.
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In Bruner v Bruner (1978, La App 2d Cir) 356 So 2d 1101, cert. gr. (La) 358 So 2d 641,
it was held that the trial court erred in allowing a husband credit or an offset against a claimed
arrearage of alimony pendente lite for payments made by him to third parties on his wife's behalf
where the evidence did not show that the payments were made at the request of, or with the
consent of, his wife.

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A husband was not entitled to credit against arrears in pendente lite maintenance and
child support for voluntary payments he made to third parties for his wife's and children's
benefit, according to the court in Krantz v Krantz (1991, 2d Dept) 175 App Div 2d 865, 573
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NYS 2d 738, on the ground that several of the payments also satisfied the husband's
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contractual obligations.
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And, in Kerpen v Kerpen (1991, 2d Dept) 172 App Div 2d 496, 567 NYS2d 849, the
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court refused to credit a husband with voluntary payments made on behalf of his wife for "club
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and other items" toward the sum of money owed by him for maintenance and child support under
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a pendente lite order.

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Mr. Springgate presented no case law or other legal authority beyond his own
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professional opinion as to the legal basis for including such a set off for payments owed to third
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party creditors in satisfying a domestic support obligation. Courts universally have embraced
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the position that the unique nature or purpose of the support obligation owed to the former
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spouse must be considered in any determination as to whether a setoff would be permitted

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against that obligation. Mr. Springgate, who provided a thorough exposition in court (that
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astutely referenced the Hein and Rodriguez cases) regarding the precedential history of
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excluding evidence of the respective fault of the parties in property distribution and also in,
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perhaps, an alimony determination, seemingly was unaware of the reasonableness and firm
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grounding in multitudinous precedent for sticking to the position that a debt to a third party
creditor might not be used to properly offset an alimony obligation.
This, so much so that Mr. Springgate felt it reasonable to move for Mr. Coughlin to
personally pay Mr. Joshi's legal fees, at least in part, for Mr. Coughlin's part in Ms. Joshi's
declining to accept the offered settlement. One might wonder whether Mr. Springgate's request
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for sanctions in that regard was well- grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or by an
argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith, or whether it unreasonably
and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State.
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The court in Palmer v Palmer (1966) 52 Misc 2d 610, 275 NYS2d 978, recognized the
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principle that a husband may not set off against unpaid alimony and child support payable to his
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wife debts or claims owed to him by her, nor payments made by the husband to third parties for
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the benefit of his wife or child without the wife's prior consent that they be instead of the amount
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fixed by the matrimonial judgment or order, although in the controversy before the court,
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concerning summer camp expenses paid by the husband on behalf of a daughter, the wife waived
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the rule. The court added that without consent, indirect payments must be regarded in addition to,
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not in lieu of, the support fixed by the court, that is a gift.
The court in Compton v Compton (1987, Tenn. App. Middle Section) No. 86-258-II,
held that a husband could not offset against alimony arrearages bills paid on behalf of his wife
22
without her request or agreement that the payments were in lieu of alimony, but in making the
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payments had conferred to her an "officious benefit." The husband paid less alimony per month
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than the amount ordered by the court, but contended that he also paid bills for his wife which
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more than offset the deficiency for that period. Refusing to permit the offset against the
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deficiency in alimony, the court pointed out that to vary the terms and allow a set off for the
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i k does not appear in the registered version - http://www. clicktoconvert.com
payment of other bills not included in the decree would subject the courts to a plethora of
such claims, making enforcement of the simplest divorce decree a quagmire for the trial
judge.
The language emphasized immediately above brings up an interesting point. The
Settlement, and ultimately the Order After Trial call for a situation where Ms. Joshi may well
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(and it is very likely according to Mr. Springgate) need to ask this Court to have another hearing
in the future should Mr. Joshi discharge any of the debts he has been ordered to pay (or perhaps
even where Ms. Joshi has done so). However, the resolution urged by Ms. Joshi's counsel would
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arguably be more in line with judicial economy were courts in this State to adopt the majority
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rule forbidding the offset of alimony due through payment to third party creditors. To the extent
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the case loads in Family Court are so overburdening, having such a clear statement of the law
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would obviate the need to have more and more contempt hearings following the discharge of a
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supporting spouses obligations in bankruptcy.
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Can it be said, considering NRS 7.085, that Mr. Coughlin "filed, maintained or defended
17
a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such action or defense [was] not well18
19
grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the existing law
20
that is made in good faith in the instant case? Mr. Coughlin respectfully urges this Court to
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consider the arguments set forth herein for reasons why the sanctions entered could be
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reconsidered.
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Seemingly, the award of attorney's fees relates, in part, to Mr. Coughlin's failing to
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counsel his client to accept a settlement offer whereby Ms. Joshi would agree to take $1.00 of
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alimony for five years in exchange for Mr. Joshi agreeing to be responsible for about $20,000 of
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consumer debt. This is the arrangement contemplated by Siragusa, and it makes sense when
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courts are adjudicating the marital dissolutions of extremely wealthy parties. This is not one of
those situations. This consumer debt was largely incurred on the Mr. Joshi's credit cards, to
which Ms. Joshi was not a co-signer or authorized user and was never allowed to examine any
sort of itemized statement of the charges incurred (despite Mr. Coughlin's written requests to
opposing counsel and indication that allowing her to do so would further settlement
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negotiations). Exhibits A and B (please note that not all such correspondences are immediately
available to Mr. Coughlin given the situation referenced elsewhere in this Motion). Whether the
large balance transfers Mr. Joshi testified to making were made to transfer debt from an account
10
for which he was the only signatory to one where Ms. Joshi was a co-signatory ( and thus could
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see her separate property used to satisfy the debt) is certainly a valid point of inquiry.
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Mr. Coughlin argued against accepting such a settlement (though he certainly informed
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Ms. Joshi that the decision to go to trial was largely hers, but an attempt will be made to veer
15
away from considering the divergent interests of attorney and client in situations such as these, a
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well as the "lack of notice constitutional problems associated with NRS 7.085 awards). Mr.
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Coughlin anticipated the trial may well result in an alimony award to Ms. Joshi of roughly $500
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per month, potentially for over 10 years, when considering that equalizing payments for a
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$12,000 yearly income disparity was a good yardstick for a 21 year marriage that produced two
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children. This seems particularly true where it would take 12-20 years of payments to get Ms.
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Joshi to social security age.

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Should Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half the community credit card debt (for
25
which her personal property probably could not be used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on
26
nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent failure on her part to do so could likely not be
27
used as a proper basis to set off any alimony award received . However, the Court's Order
28
After Trial points out that "Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income after deducting
taxes, factor in the present $600 per month he is presently paying for community debt, and set
off any alimony responsibility by his assumption of an unequal distribution of community
debt. (Emphasis added). Additionally, the Court noted that "to protect Ms. Joshi in the event
Mr. Joshi filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi suggested that the court maintain jurisdiction over the
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issue of spousal support for five years.
Indeed at the Settlement Conference (which was conducted the same day as the Trial,
something Mr. Coughlin agreed to in an effort to appease Mr. Joshi's counsel stated desire to
10
encourage judicial economy) the Court seemed to indicated the reasonableness of this settlement
11
proposal and the jurisdictional $1.00 payment. It was unclear whether any subsequently
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increased support obligation over and above the $1.00 set forth in the decree would enjoy
14
priority over third party creditors should Mr. Joshi file bankruptcy. It is clear that support
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obligations enjoy priority in bankruptcy proceedings, it is not as clear whether this priority is
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with respect to the original $1.00 per year award, or to any subsequently modified amount.
17
Like many domestic violence cases, the Settlement offered essentially exerted a good
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deal of inappropriate "power and control" (a la the Duluth model) over Ms. Joshi and her rights
20
and Mr. Coughlin objected to that and is hopeful others can see why he felt strongly that doing
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so was the right thing to do.
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The Court' s Order after Trial is not sufficiently detailed and specific to support an award
personally requiring counsel to pay opposing side's attorney's fees.
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-Requirements of specific findings
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In the following cases, the courts held or recognized that specific findings by the trial
court were required before an attorney could be assessed with his opponent's fees. Major v First
Va. Bank, 97 Md. App 520, 631 A2d 127 (1993). (RICO claim; $25,000 for counsel fees).
In O'Brien v Cseh, (1983, 2d Dist) 148 Cal App 3d 957, 196 Cal Rptr 409 ( 12[b]), the court
found that an order by the trial court assessing attorney fees against counsel and giving only
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"good cause appearing" as a reason for the sanction failed to meet the statutory requirement of
detailed recital of the circumstances justifying the imposition of sanctions.
The court reversed an award of fees against an attorney that was imposed by the trial
court without any finding as to the actual costs incurred by the opposing parties, in City of El
11
Monte v Takei, (1984, 2d Dist) 158 Cal App 3d 244, 204 Cal Rptr 559 ( 9[a]). The case was
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remanded for a hearing to determine reasonable expenses and counsel fees , since under the
14
applicable court rules the sanctions were limited to that amount.
15
If Mr. Joshi's bare and inconsistent assertions in court regarding the various debts he
16
sought this Court to divide constitutes sufficient "evidence for the court a question arises. Why
17
is this proof deemed sufficient with regard to the evidence presented where, when Ms. Joshi's
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points of contention are backed by similar evidence (testimony and financial declarations), the
20
court takes issue with the lack of evidence presented?
21
Mr. Coughlin recognizes the level of skill
Mr. Springgate displays in court, when combined with the far superior reputation amongst his
22
peers in legal circles that Mr. Springgate enjoys arguably entitles Mr. Springgate the benefit of
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the doubt.
Trial court abused its discretion in imposing a monetary sanction on the ground of failure
to perform a reasonable investigation before filing claims; no evidence was presented at the
sanctions hearing, and the sanctions order did not state that the trial court considered evidence.
28
Russell v. McBride Elec., Inc., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2022 (Tex. App. Dallas Mar. 16 2006).
Administrative findings and decision were not supported by substantial evidence and the record
did not demonstrate a reasonable basis for the ALJ's refusal to set aside the default order;
however, the record did not demonstrate that the department's motion for new trial was a
pleading frivolously presented for an improper purpose, unwarranted by existing law, and
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without evidentiary support, and there was no showing that the motion was filed in bad faith to
support an award of attorney's fees. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Frieda, 112 S.W.3d 768, 2003
Tex. App. LEXIS 6604 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2003). In a lawyer's action to impose sanctions
10
against another lawyer, the sanctions were reversed as the stated bases for the sanction were
11
violations of Tex. Civ. Pac. & Rem. Code Ann. chs. 9, 10 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; both the lack o
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evidence for the amount of necessary attorney's fees and the failure of the trial court to
14
demonstrate either the rationale for the sanction imposed or that a lesser sanction would have
15
sufficed, required a remand. Hemphill v. Hummel, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5799 (Tex. App.
16
Corpus Christi July 31 2008). In a case where a mother was trying to recover real property from
17
her daughter, sanctions were properly not awarded because there was some evidence supporting
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the daughter's counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud; the mother did not disprove
20
allegations made by the daughter that she and her husband had paid part of the cost of a septic
21
system, as well as the taxes on the property. Delahoussaye v. Kana, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS
22
8561 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. Nov. 13 2008).

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In Charles v Charles, (1986, Dist Col App) 505 A2d 462 ( 4[a]), the court reversed an
25
assessment of attorney fees against an attorney, where the trial court had failed to make a
26
specific finding of bad faith . The court stated that it is within the inherent authority of trial
27
courts to assess attorney fees against an attorney who has acted in bad faith, if the sanction is
28
imposed after fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record. But although counsel's
conduct in this case made an assessment of fees appropriate, and there had been fair notice
and a hearing on the plaintiff ' s motion for attorney fees, the court decided that the absence of
a specific finding of bad faith required reversal and remand for a new hearing directed to that
issue.
6
7
The Court's Order after Trial in the Joshi divorce matter did not contain any language
related to this intent question. This Order failed to specify whether the court found counsel's
actions to exhibit bad faith. As such the sanction should not be upheld as it is not sufficiently
10
detailed and specific.
11
Before a proper finding of a Frivolous claim may be made under a statute authorizing fee
12
13
awards against attorneys on that basis, it is necessary for the trial court to find that the
14
attorney knew that the action was without any reasonable basis in law and could not be
15
supported by a good- faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
16
held the court, in Radlein v Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., (1984) 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345
17
NW2d 874. The court stated a two-pronged test for determining an attorney's responsibility in
18
19
sanctions for commencing a Frivolous action: first, is the law ready for an extension,
20
modification, or reversal; and if not, then second, was the argument for such change made in
21
good faith even though not successful. Frivolous action claims are an especially delicate area,
22
said the court, since the ingenuity, foresightedness , and competency of the bar should be
23
24
encouraged and not stifled.
25
The Court's Order After Trial in the case at bar should reconsider any finding that
26
counsel put forth an action that was without basis in law (it is not entirely clear what NRS 7.085
27
contemplates necessary with respect to the intent issue). Mr. Coughlin mentioned the Siragusa
28
and Allen opinions in court and referenced the American Law Reports covering the pertinent
issues underlying the dispute with regard to the appropriateness of the settlement discussed. The
ALR's counsel was referring to are Debts for alimony, maintenance, and support as
exceptions to bankruptcy discharge, under 523(a)(5) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11
U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5)), 69 A.L.R. Fed. 403; Spouse' s right to set off debt owed by other
6
7
spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments , 11 A.L.R.5th 259 (Originally
published in 1993); Change in financial condition or needs of husband or wife as ground for
modification of decree for alimony or maintenance , 18 A.L.R.2d 10 (Originally published in
10
1951).
11
In a post-divorce proceeding, the court did not err in modifying husband's alimony
12
13
obligation by continuing it beyond term called for in decree where original decree called for
14
husband to make alimony payments to wife of $3,000 per month for sixty months, where decree
15
also required husband to pay wife $1.250 million over fifteen years for her share of community
16
property interest in husband's medical practice, where husband fell behind in his payments and
17
his property settlement obligation was later discharged in bankruptcy although his alimony
18
19
obligation was not, where court properly considered discharged obligation as "changed
20
circumstance" justifying modification in that discharge of obligation had changed both husband's
21
and wife's financial circumstances, and where modification of alimony award based upon
22
discharged property settlement obligation did not re-create debt discharged under federal
23
24
bankruptcy laws. Siragusa v Siragusa, 108 Nev 987, 843 P2d 807, CCH Bankr L Rptr 75035
25
(1992); In re Siragusa, 27 F.3d 406, 31 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 890, Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,965,
26
C.A.9 (Nev.), June 20, 1994 (NO. 92-16788).
27
28
"There is no explicit relation of debt allocation and community property distributions to
the spouses. The Nevada statutes do not mandate any particular order of decision among child
support, spousal support, property division, or debt allocation. This has led to a certain amount o
confusion as judges attempt to achieve equity through a "holistic approach to deciding all issues
in the case. (Marshall Willick, Esq. article at http://www.willicklawgroup.com/get_file/id=283).

6
7
The Nevada Supreme Court has opined that where a party does not pay the debts that
were supposed to be paid, that party is not entitled to the property share that was awarded based
on anticipation of such payment. Allen v. Allen, 112 Nev.
10
P.2d
(Adv. Opn. No.
149, Oct. 22, 1996). The Nevada Supreme Court has likewise allowed the reopening of alimony
11
to the party to whom a debt fell because the other party was supposed to pay that debt but failed
12
13
to do so. Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d 390 (1992). What is still lacking, however,
14
is any clear guideposts as to which party should have been allocated what debt to begin with.
15
The Nevada case law, however, appears to presume that the debt terms set out in the decree are
16
absolute, and that other terms, such as alimony (See Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d
17
390 (1992)), or property division (See Allen v. Allen, 112 Nev.
P.2d
(Adv. Opn.
18
19
No. 149, Oct. 22, 1996)), will be amended to enforce the debt division. In the interests of
20
judicial economy it is important to note that, while there is no significant appellate authority on
21
these subjects, costly proceedings in the lower courts to enforce debt payment terms by less
22
drastic means (primarily, contempt sanctions) are common.

23
24
To the extent that the Court' s sanctions in the case at bar were motivated by a concern for
25
judicial economy, fashioning a decree that will potentially see these parties returning to court to
26
litigate costly contempt proceedings should Mr. Joshi (or perhaps Ms. Joshi, though much case
27
28
1
2
3
4
law is presented here that would argue against it) discharge his various debts in bankruptcy
seems ill advised.
In Nevada, except for real estate and jointly-managed businesses , it appears that both
spouses have free reign to incur debt for which the community is responsible . It also seems
rather clear that the creditors of such community debt are unaffected by anything in a divorce
6
7
decree from pursuing either of the parties for repayment . See Marine Midland Bank v.
Monroe, 104 Nev. 307, 756 P.2d 1193 (1988) (bank is free to pursue wife for delinquent joint
credit card debt despite divorce court's order for husband to pay such debt). It is typically very
10
difficult to pursue a spouse who is not a cosigner with respect to using that spouses separate
11
property covers any community debt.

12
13
In Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d 390 (1992), an August 1988 divorce decree
14
ordered child support and for the husband to pay two Visa accounts. He filed bankruptcy in
15
September, and had them discharged in April of 1989. The wife filed a motion for spousal
16
support; after an evidentiary hearing, the lower court found that the debt payment terms were
17
"characterized as being in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support and so ordered
18
19
support in an amount sufficient to repay wife for credit debts now falling to her. On appeal, the
20
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that in this case the "hold harmless provisions qualified as
21
maintenance or support, since court found that without it the "spouse would be inadequately
22
supported. The husband's assumption of debt was tied to an agreement for lower child support,
23
24
and when he breached the agreement, he left her inadequately supported. While discharge was
25
proper, he could not discharge obligations arising out of the decree. The appellate court
26
apparently did not address timeliness question of how wife could file a motion for alimony
27
nearly a year after the divorce was final (local rules permit only six months to modify a decree
28
1
2
under NRCP60(b)), but there may have been additional procedural facts not recited in the
opinion.
3
4
In Allen v. Allen, the husband and wife entered into an oral property settlement; the wife
waived child support, and the husband agreed to pay certain debts and pay $16,250.00 to the
wife "to equalize the division of community property. 112 Nev.
P.2d
(Adv. Opn.
6
7
No. 149, Oct. 22, 1996). The agreement was made during a "settlement conference held by the
district court judge, but was not reduced to writing for a year, when the court entered a divorce
decree "nunc pro tunc adopting the agreement. In the interim, the husband filed bankruptcy, and
10
was "released from most of the financial obligations. The wife claimed that the husband used
11
the bankruptcy to defraud her out of her share of the community property and that because of the
12
13
bankruptcy there was a failure to equalize the division of community property as intended. The
14
wife moved to set aside the decree, which was denied by the district court as "barred by federal
15
law.
16
The Supreme Court, noting that the district court knew all these facts, expressed no
17
understanding of why the district court would enter the decree in the first place, but held that in
18
19
any event, it was error to refuse to set it aside. Noting its holding in Siragusa v. Siragusa (108
20
Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807 (1992)), the Court again held that the lower court could consider the
21
effect of the husband's bankruptcy upon the community and the rights of the parties, "but this is
22
not to say the state court would be interfering in any way with the bankruptcy court's decree.
23
24
The Court expressly rejected the husband's assertion that the wife's fraud claim was waived
25
under 11 U.S.C. 524 because she failed to file a complaint in the bankruptcy action. Finally,
26
the Court concluded that even aside from the question of fraud, the decree entered was inherently
27
unfair and should be set aside: "Under no circumstances, bankruptcy or no bankruptcy, should
28
one party to a divorce be allowed to take all of the benefits of the divorce settlement and leave
the other party at the disadvantage suffered by the wife in the present case. Although some of
these comments may be dicta, Allen provides authority for the proposition that whenever a
bankruptcy has "an effect upon the community and the rights of the parties, a motion can be
entertained to ameliorate that effect.

6
7
However, it appears that an intervening bankruptcy has no effect on the liability of
the non-custodian for child support arrears , or the ability of the custodian to collect them.
In In Re Anders, No. BK-S-91-24783-LBR (Bk. Ct., D. Nev., Mar. 10, 1993), the court held that
10
a former wife who declares chapter seven bankruptcy could retain a child support arrears
11
judgment (granted after she filed bankruptcy) despite the bankruptcy. The court held that child
12
13
support "is a property interest belonging to the child and the custodian "merely has a right to
14
enforce the child's property interest. The 11 U.S.C. 541(b) exception from the property of the
15
bankruptcy estate for "powers which are exercisable solely for the benefit of another apply to
16
child support by analogy. This argument should arguably be expanded to include the duty
17
associated with other support obligations, such as alimony, ahead of the debt to monolithic third
18
19
party multi-national credit card and insurance companies being rewarded with trillions of dollars
20
in bailouts whilst throwing luxury executive getaways weekend bashes.
21
The proposition supported by In Re Anders speaks to a situation addressed at trial in the
22
case at bar. What should or would happen if Ms. Joshi was granted alimony and subsequently
23
24
moved to discharge her share of the community debt in bankruptcy or simply just failed to pay
25
these debts (or, as Mr. Springgate suggested, if she was forced into bankruptcy)? In Re Anders
26
and the large number of cases representing persuasive authority ( all non-Nevada and non-U.S.
27
Supreme Court cases are cited herein merely as persuasive authority, of course) cited
28
elsewhere in this motion support the position that a support obligation (alimony too, not just
child support) should be upheld even where the supported party has failed to live up to the debt
distribution terms of a Court's divorce decree. Following this rule would cut down on the costly
contempt proceedings that Mr. Springgate suggested he may bring should Ms. Joshi be granted
alimony and fail to pay her share of the debt distribution (something that case law from Nevada,
6
7
8
9
10
In re Anders arguably bars).

Indeed, the very existence of this majority rule would seem to vitiate Mr. Springgate's
argument that counsel' s actions were vexatious in regard to the position counsel argued on behalf
of Ms. Joshi at trial. Mr. Coughlin stated in court at trial that the public policy underlying
11
alimony and other support obligations did not warrant placing the interests of behemoth multi
12
13
national credit card conglomerates ahead of those of the citizens of Nevada who have been
14
granted an alimony award by the courts of this state. Perhaps it is for that reason that, at one
15
point during trial, Mr. Springgate announced to the Court that he could basically see the logic in
16
the position opposing counsel was taking and could understand why one would make the
17
argument. Mr. Springgate's Trial Statement mentions that this probably would seem like an
18
19
alimony case to most people. Mr. Springgate moved for attorney's fees to be personally assessed
20
against opposing counsel at the conclusion of trial, a point at which Mr. Springgate for the first
21
time broached the subject of moving for such personally liability for fees against opposing
22
counsel. Clearly the lack of notice in this regard is troubling from a constitutional law
23
24
25
26
27
perspective.
One might ask how Mr. Springgate, in making such a motion (never mind presenting a
divergence of interests between opposing counsel and opposing counsel's client) has not himself
violated NRS 7.085. Can one really seek personally liability for fees, alleging that opposing
28
counsel has "filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State
and such action or defense is not well- grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by
an argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or ... unreasonably and
vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State when one has
plainly announced in open court that they actually see the validity of opposing counsel's
6
7
position?
This brings up the question of a legal services attorney who is not charging the client for
8
9
10
his services asking the court to award attorney's fees to his client. This Court's Order After Trial
perhaps takes issue with such a request, noting that "Ms. Joshi requests reasonable attorney's fees
11
be paid to Washoe Legal Services for the services of Mr. Coughlin ... The Court notes the
12
13
following information has been provided and has been taken into consideration on this issue: On
14
July 18, 2008, Mr. Coughlin filed a Statement of Legal Aid Representation which states
15
Defendant is receiving "free legal assistance" from Washoe Legal Services pursuant to NRS
16
12.015.
However, Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (September 22, 2005) the
17
Nevada Supreme Court concluded that "a party is not precluded from recovering attorney fees
18
19
solely because his or her counsel served in a pro bono capacity. While Nevada law has been
20
silent on this issue, many courts have concluded that an award of attorney fees is proper, even
21
when a party is represented without fee by a nonprofit legal services organization.
There exist
22
many decisions to support such a ruling: Martin v. Tate, 492 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1985); In re
23
24
Marriage of Brockett, 474 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Butler v. Butler, 376 So. 2d 287,
25
287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Gaddis, 632 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo. Ct. App.
26
1982); Ferrigno v. Ferrigno, 279 A.2d 141, 142 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971); Sellers v.
27
Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (SthCir. 1975) (holding that it is proper to award attorney fees to
28
legal aid society in Truth-in-Lending Act action); Folsom v. Butte County Ass'n of
Governments, 652 P.2d 437, 447 n.26 (Cal. 1982) (concluding that an attorney fee award is
proper to a legal service organization in a suit to enforce a public transportation law).
In addition to the various state courts, "the United States Supreme Court has concluded
that an award of attorney fees to a nonprofit legal services organization is to be calculated

6
7
according to the prevailing market rate, stating that Congress did not intend the calculation of fee
awards to vary depending on whether plaintiff was represented by private counsel or by a
nonprofit legal services organization.
10
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894 (1984).
The Court's Order in Joshi arguably does not comply with the dictates set forth in Miller
11
v. Wilfong, and thus should not stand. "Second, while it is within the trial court's discretion to
12
13
determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees under a statute or rule, in exercising that
14
discretion, the court must evaluate the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National
15
Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). The Nevada Supreme Court noted that under
16
Brunzell, "when courts determine the appropriate fee to award in civil cases, they must consider
17
various factors, including the qualities of the advocate, the character and difficulty of the work
18
19
performed, the work actually performed by the attorney, and the result obtained . We take this
20
opportunity to clarify our jurisprudence in family law cases to require trial courts to evaluate the
21
Brunzell factors when deciding attorney fee awards. Id. at 349. (Emphasis added).
22
Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled in Wright v. Osburn, that family law trial
23
24
courts must also consider the disparity in income of the parties when awarding fees. 114 Nev.
25
1367, 1370, 970 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1998). The Court in Miller v. Wilfong clarifies the Wright
26
language, noting that "parties seeking attorney fees in family law cases must support their fee
27
request with affidavits or other evidence that meets the factors in Brunzell and Wright.
28
Miller
v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (September 22, 2005). Ms. Joshi's counsel submitted
such in affidavit, seeking a fee waiver. The Court's Order notes that "Mr. Coughlin filed a
Statement of Legal Aid Representation which states Defendant is receiving "free legal
assistance " from Washoe Legal Services pursuant to NRS 12.015.
Mr. Joshi seemingly did not produce the required materials pursuant to the language in
6
7
the cases cited above, nor did the Court's Order set forth an application of specific elements
required in an award of attorney's fees.
The result obtained in this case would not seem to argue
on favor of an award of attorney's fees.
Mr. Joshi would not seem to be able to argue that he
10
was the prevailing party where he has been ordered solely responsible for the vast majority of
11
community debt. Pursuant to NRS 125.150(1)(b) and Putterman v. Putterman, 113 Nev. 606,
12
13
939 P.2d 1047 (1997), in granting a divorce, the Court shall ensure an equal disposition of the
14
community estate, absent compelling reasons justifying an unequal distribution. The Court must
15
make written findings as to why such a division is appropriate. The Court's Order here notes
16
that "Mr. Joshi has likely incurred an unequal distribution of the community debt in this case.
17
The Court finds his testimonial acquiescence at trial to take on this debt is a compelling reason to
18
19
20
21
make an unequal distribution of the community debt.

It is not clear to Ms. Joshi's counsel that any such testimonial acquiescence on Mr.
Joshi's part took place at trial. Mr. Joshi's counsel may have broached a suggested disposition,
22
though it is not clear to Mr. Coughlin how this differs from discussing settlement negotiations at
23
24
trial. Typically statements against interest made during settlement negotiations are not
25
admissible. If such acquiescence did take place at trial, then why would Mr. Springgate devote
26
the majority of the Trials four and a quarter hours running time to entering credit card balance
27
statements (devoid of itemization and only representing very recent balances), one after another?
28
Mr. Springgate's case took over three hours to conclude. By that time, Mr. Coughlin felt forced
to present a much shorter case on Ms. Joshi's behalf, resulting on only approximately forty
minutes being devoted to Ms. Joshi's presentation. This was a particular disadvantage with
respect to the presentation of evidence in support of an alimony award.
The Court found a lack
of factual support for an award of alimony to be one of these reasons supporting awarding
6
7
sanctions. Perhaps, Mr. Springgate could have sent some discovery of his own to speed up that
part of the Trial in the form of Requests for Admissions. Mr. Coughlin does not recall Mr.
Springgate sending any discovery requests, though access to the file would certainly enable Mr.
10
Coughlin to verify this to be the case. Mr. Springgate did not do this. Indeed, there was a real
11
paucity of discovery requests sent out by Mr. Springgate, though the Court spent much of its
12
13
opinion on the sparseness of discovery sent out by the non- moving party. Additionally, though
14
no formal Offers of Judgment appears to have been exchanged between these parties, NRCP
15
68(e) and NRS 17.115(3) makes offers during settlement negotiations inadmissible.
16
No evidence was presented at trial or cited in the Court's Order as to the qualities of the
17
advocate, the character and difficulty of the work performed, or the work actually performed by
18
19
the attorney. The Court's Order did make one mention of the difficulty of the work performed
20
here, pointing out that issues the Court took with Mr. Coughlin's counsel were "compounded
21
with a continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that resulted in a shift from a fairly
22
simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive amount of time.
23
24
25
26
27
(Emphasis added). The Court viewed this as a simple divorce case in its bare essence. The court
viewed a trial that lasted 4.15 hours to have taken an excessive amount of time.
Ms. Joshi has paid taxes during her adult life, taxes which fund the administration of
justice. If, where, as here, there are genuine disputes with regard to how the law should be
28
applied, and Ms. Joshi's position is supported by a vast body of reported case law (though,
admittedly, Mr. Coughlin's Trial Statement was wholly insufficient in setting out the authority in
support of the position taken at trial and it is inappropriate to essentially put the Court in the
position at trial of knowing every arcane point of law that might come up), and the opposing side
has refused to honor requests (See Exhibit A and Exhibit B) to produce proof in support of
6
7
various points of contention (i.e., support for whether Mr. Joshi had made efforts to track down
the woman's wealth, sufficient documentation to prove two personal loans totaling over $11,000,
proof that his surgery was necessary, itemized statements proving that his incongruously high
10
amount of credit card debt was all incurred for community purposes in a marriage where
11
expenses were essentially shared and paid for out of each spouses respective personal credit
12
13
accounts), the trial length in the present case does not appear excessive. 4.15 hours for a
14
Divorce Trial stemming from a 21 year marriage that produced two children, where a short
15
Settlement Conference was conducted the same day and immediately preceding the beginning of
16
the Trial, would not seem to be so excessive, especially in an age where some party's divorce
17
trials last several days or weeks.

18
19
20
21
Indeed, some parties Divorce Settlement Conferences, whether singular or multiple, last
longer than this combined Settlement Conference/Trial did. Ms. Joshi's counsel chose not to
penalize Ms. Joshi by accepting a settlement where the only legal precedent offered in support of
22
the positions it contained was the esteemed opinion of opposing counsel as to the imminent
23
24
reasonableness of the offer on the table, along with Mr. Joshi's counsel mentioning perhaps one
25
case where jurisdiction was reserved to increase alimony where a millionaire physician had
26
offered to cover some debts along with agreeing to a very, very large cash payout (in the
27
millions) to the spouse he was pledging to support. Mr. Coughlin recognizes the deficiencies in
28
his own presentation and admits that a thoroughly briefed Trial Statement or Settlement
Conference Statement by Mr. Coughlin likely would have gone a long way towards determining
whether the Court believed the issues related to using third party debts as a set off for alimony
where a worthy use of the Court's limited resources and in line with the concerns for judicial
economy that all competent practitioners need to keep foremost in their minds. Regarding
6
7
Siragusa, such a case simply does not resonate with someone in Ms. Joshi's set of circumstances.
Regardless, such a case says one could proceed with such a settlement arrangement (dependent
upon the chance to come back to court to litigate contempt proceedings in the future and possibly
10
be put in a better position as a result), it does not say that one must or risk having one's attorney
11
face the peril of being personally responsible for opposing counsel's attorney's fees.
12
13
The Court's Order did not compare the result obtained at trial to the settlement discussed,
14
nor was any exposition given to the relative merits of either during the Settlement Conference,
15
save a very strong and prolonged suggestion to accept the settlement both by the Court and
16
opposing counsel. The Court's Order did not set forth anything that seemed to "evaluate the
17
Brunzell factors when deciding attorney fee awards.
Miller at 349. Nor did the Court address
18
19
the proviso in Wright that "family law trial courts must also consider the disparity in income of
20
the parties when awarding fees " (Id. at 1370), and Miller that "parties seeking attorney fees in
21
family law cases must support their fee request with affidavits or other evidence that meets the
22
factors in Brunzell and Wright.
Mr. Joshi did not appear to submit such an affidavit, unless one
23
24
considers his Financial Declaration to suffice. The parties respective Financial Affidavits
25
indicate that Mr. Joshi makes approximately $12,000 more per year than Ms. Joshi. When Ms.
26
Joshi's requests were supported only by her testimony and Financial Declaration on file the
27
Court took the view that the evidence was so little so as to support sanctions against Ms. Joshi's
28
attorney. Further, the Court's Pre-Trial Order mandates that Mr. Joshi file an updated Financial
Declaration wherein he swears, under penalty of perjury that his recent reduction in income is
based in fact.
In another case, the trial court did not satisfy requirements for exercising its inherent
authority to impose attorney fees against an attorney for bad faith conduct when it ordered
6
7
husband's counsel to remit one half of his fees received to wife's counsel, where trial court did
not permit husband's counsel to present witnesses or other Evidence in his defense, trial court did
not make an express finding of bad faith or findings justifying the relief ordered, and order did
10
not show how the fees awarded directly related to the fees incurred as a result of the alleged bad
11
faith conduct by husband' s counsel . Finol v. Finol, 912 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist.
12
13
2005), related reference, 2005 WL 2373889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005) and reh'g denied,
14
(Nov. 7, 2005).
15
Another court ruled that petitioner's request for costs and expenses of litigation, including
16
attorney fees, did not provide notice to respondent's attorney that she could be held liable for
17
attorney fees under statute that awarded fees in situations where an attorney brought or defended
18
19
an action that lacked substantial justification; there was no motion requesting attorney fees from
20
attorney, there was no mention that the trial court was considering an award against attorney, and
21
the notice of the hearing contained no reference to the statute that awarded fees against attorneys
22
for bringing or defending an action that lacked substantial justification or to the possibility that
23
24
attorney could be assessed attorney fees for her conduct; overruling Cohen v. Feldman, 219
25
Ga.App. 90, 464 S.E.2d 237. West's Ga.Code Ann. 9-15-14(b). Williams v. Cooper, 625
26
S.E.2d 754 (Ga. 2006). See Kukui Nuts of Hawaii, Inc. v R. Baird & Co., (1990, Hawaii App)
27
789 P2d 501, 8[a].
28
At trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr. Coughlin had conducted no discovery in
this case. To the extent that discovery can exist outside of asking Mr. Joshi to produce something
via a Request for Production or the like, it is not clear how Mr. Springgate is able to be certain
with regard to what Ms. Joshi's counsel did or did not do with respect to conducting discovery.
Mr. Springgate did not appear to send Ms. Joshi any Interrogatories, Request for Productions, or
6
7
Request for Admissions, nor did he take anyone's deposition. Mr. Coughlin would need access
to the file to determine this with surety, however eFlex and CourtConnect provide no indication
that any was sent out. Ms. Joshi's counsel did send Mr. Springgate several written
10
correspondences suggesting documentation that Mr. Joshi could produce in an effort to speed
11
these parties along towards settlement.

12
13
Whether Mr. Coughlin defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State
where such action or defense is not well-grounded in fact?
14
The Court's Order After Trial points out that, at trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr.
15
16
Coughlin had conducted no discovery in this case. Apparently Mr. Springgate did not mention
17
the attached written correspondence wherein Mr. Coughlin suggested a multitude of documents
18
that Mr. Joshi could provide if he sought to expedite settlement, including a request for
19
documentation that would help establish that the debts Mr. Joshi claims were exclusively for the
20
21
benefit of the community and the existence of a valid medical debt incurred out of necessity.
22
Exhibit A. Further Mr. Coughlin requested documentation from Mr. Joshi related to three of
23
the car loans involving these parties and the respective title holders for each of these vehicles.
24
Exhibit B. Additionally, Mr. Coughlin sent Mr. Joshi written correspondence requesting that
25
Mr. Joshi provide some indication of what he meant on his Financial Declaration when he listed
26
27
jewelry in a Wells Fargo safe deposit box and India Locker safe deposit box. Exhibit B. This
28
1
2
3
4
written request asked that Mr. Joshi provide information related to the whereabouts of this
jewelry, what a description of this jewelry would entail, and what happened to this jewelry.
The Court also notes, in explaining its decision to personally charge this legal aid
attorney with the legal fees of the accused perpetuator of domestic violence, that "Mr. Coughlin
failed to present one documentary piece of evidence at trial on behalf of Ms. Joshi's claims.
6
7
This is not so, Mr. Coughlin presented Mr. Joshi's own Financial Declaration, as well as that of
Ms. Joshi, both of which clearly supported the claim for alimony in establishing at the least a
$12,000 yearly disparity in the parties respective incomes. Nonetheless, there does not seem to
10
exist any legal precedent supporting the implication that failing to produce some specific form or
11
type of evidence (here documentary evidence is mentioned) plays some role in a proper
12
13
application of NRS 7.085. Were this the case, attorneys could arguably be told they violated
14
NRS 7.085 for failing to conduct even one deposition, or send out one request for admission, etc.
15
Such an arbitrary interpretation of NRS 7.085 simply should not stand when considering the
16
potentially devastating policy implications and chilling effect on attorneys' ability to zealously
17
advocate for their clients. Were this application upheld it would perhaps encourage attorneys to
18
19
further over utilize the sometimes ineffective and inefficient practice documentary discovery has
20
become in so many instances. This is not meant to suggest that attorneys should not be gravely
21
concerned with discovering all items necessary to protect their clients' interests to the fullest, but
22
rather, to merely consider what is the judicious use of discovery techniques.

23
24
Indeed, discovery is hopefully conducted to further some legitimate objective, rather than
25
to satisfy some perceived need to send out what may be unnecessary and overly burdensome
26
discovery requests in an attempt to avoid sanctions that may later arise.
27
This situation arises, by
analogy, in modern medicine, where, in some cases, the practice of the day is to order every
28
diagnostic test known to science, no matter how costly and ineffective is and without regard to
whether any intelligence was actually utilized in making the decision to order such a test,
whether or not some analysis and deduction could obviate the need to make such arrangements.
Further some people can afford more discovery than others, and many legal services attorneys
would likely attest to the need to make do with less when representing domestic violence
6
7
8
9
10
victims.
With respect to whether the position taken by Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Joshi was supported
by the facts, Mr. Joshi's own admission at trial and the party's financial declarations prove the
income disparity necessary to support any alimony award. The undisputed length of the
11
marriage, 21 years (included in the Court's Findings of Fact), certainly argues in favor of an
12
13
alimony award and is, pursuant to NRS 125.150(8) (and the six Sprenger factors,), among the
14
eleven (11) factors the court shall consider in awarding alimony. The fact that Ms. Joshi worked
15
fewer hours than Mr. Joshi, largely to enable her to be the children's primary caregiver,
16
particularly in the children's younger years, similarly argues for an alimony award and is
17
included among these factors.

18
19
20
21
Ms. Joshi's counsel feels strongly that existing law did indeed warrant the position taken
at trial. The court also took some issue with Ms. Joshi's counsel's repeated objections to
opposing counsel entering exhibits into evidence without providing a copy to opposing counsel
22
at the time they were being introduced (indicating that the documents were produced at some
23
24
earlier stage of the litigation). However, the court's own Pre- Trial Order indicated that "should
25
more than ten exhibits be used at trial, the introducing party is to provide opposing counsel with
26
copies that are bound, tabbed, and indexed.
27
It is possible more than ten exhibits were
introduced into evidence. Mr. Coughlin has not been afforded sufficient opportunity to review
28
1
2
3
4
the tape of the trial to determine exactly how many exhibits were offered. Nonetheless the Court
can amend the Pre-Trial Order at any time and in any way necessary.
The Court's Order "finds that the parties presently earn approximately the same amount,
Ms. Joshi earns $2,458 per month and Mr. Joshi earned approximately $3,125 per month
in 2008, but testified he is working substantially less in 2009 and has filed for unemployment
6
7
benefits the beginning of March 2009.
The Court may have failed to include both jobs Mr.
Joshi worked in 2008 in assessing the income disparity of the parties. This may have been done
on purpose given Mr. Joshi's testimony regarding the reduction in hours offered by his employer,
10
though that is not clear. Mr. Joshi violated the rules set forth in the Court's Pre-Trial Order by
11
failing to submit and updated Financial Declaration upon his claim of substantially changed
12
13
circumstances bearing on any potential alimony liability. Ms. Joshi's counsel's experience is
14
that an inordinately high percentage of litigants experience just such a set of circumstances
15
immediately prior to trial. The Court's Order After Trial states that "Mr. Joshi earned
16
approximately $3,125 per month in 2008, but testified he is working substantially less in 2009
17
and has filed for unemployment benefits the beginning of March 2009.
18
19
20
21
However, dividing by 12 the amount Mr. Joshi himself reports in his own Financial
Declaration indicates that Mr. Joshi actually earned $3,458 per month in 2008. At trial, Mr.
Joshi introduced his W-2 from American Bar and Restaurant reflecting earnings of $4,157.
22
(Trial Exhibit "C"); and his W-2 from Sierra Sport Service in the amount of $37,504.18
23
24
(Trial Exhibit "D").If the Court finds Mr. Joshi's mincing, erratic, testimonial evidence regarding
25
the prospects of his future unemployment (and how he kind of applied for unemployment though
26
he knew he would be working a few shifts in the next couple weeks except for the fact that he
27
also said he would not have any shifts at all in the next couple weeks) to be persuasive, one must
28
wonder why Ms. Joshi's testimonial evidence regarding the reduction in hours she is facing at
her employment was not similarly instructive to the Court. In 2008, Mr. Joshi earned
approximately $41,500.00 while working for two companies -American Bar and Restaurant and
Sierra Sport Service. At trial, Mr. Joshi introduced his W-2 from American Bar and Restaurant
reflecting earnings of $4,157. (Trial Exhibit "C"); and his W-2 from Sierra Sport Service in the
6
7
8
9
amount of $37,504.18 (Trial Exhibit "D").

The Court may have left out the additional $333 per month that Mr. Joshi has reported
making at Sierra Sport Service by introducing his 2008 W-2. The Court makes no mention of
10
the fact that Mr. Joshi failed to present any sort of evidence, save his own testimony, to support
11
12
his contention that his income will be changing substantially in 2009. It is not clear to Mr.
13
Coughlin that Mr. Springgate, though an officer of the court, can sufficiently corroborate such an
14
income reduction to an appropriate degree of certainty by merely discussing it with Mr. Joshi and
15
then proceeding to attest to it in court (without submitting an updated Financial Declaration). To

16
suggest this is in no means meant to impugn Mr. Springgate's reputation.
However, Mr.
17
18
Springgate's reputation (that of an extremely skilled and versatile litigator who has taken on
19
some of the most high profile cases around) does not make something Mr. Joshi said true and in
20
need of no further evidentiary support simply upon Mr. Springgate's repeating it to the court.
21
Bringing of frivolous civil claim or action as ground for discipline of attorney , 85 A.L.R.4th
22
23
24
25
544 (Originally published in 1991).

The Court's opinion chose not to describe Mr. Joshi's failure to file the required updated
Financial Declaration in the terms it chooses to describe similar situations involving Ms. Joshi.
26
Indeed, the Court's opinion sets forth no less than thirteen instances where "Ms. Joshi failed to
27
28
present any evidence relating to some specific issue. However, just going on the testimony
referenced in the Court's opinion, one has to wonder why the Court failed to similarly point out
that Mr. Joshi failed to introduce any evidence (or "documentary evidence or non-testimonial
evidence per the Court's varying descriptions of what is and is not evidence) to support his
claims that he had contacted his family to try to ascertain what they had done with the
approximately $7,000 golden jewelry bridal dowry, that all the consumer debt he alleges was
6
7
indeed incurred for the benefit of the community (realizing the presumption found in Nevada
law), that his surgery was necessary or that he was even sure it was surgery (he testified he had
no idea what kind of procedure was performed or why somebody, apparently a surgeon, took a
10
sharp object and cut open his body and presented him with a large bill... certainly there was no
11
documentary evidence presented to prove that this was not an elective procedure or that it was
12
13
necessary and not a result of Mr. Joshi's negligence in the same way that his failure to opt in to
14
the health insurance offered by his employer was, though Mr. Coughlin recognizes he was remiss
15
in not doing the appropriate discovery in this regard, to the extent that it was not barred by the
16
physician-patient privilege), that he had actually written some letter to Meena Fowler indicating
17
that he was pledging to pay back some $6,000 Ms. Fowler was sending to Mr. Joshi's mother,
18
19
that he had taken out a loan of $5,000 from Mr. Anaby to purchase plane tickets for the family's
20
2001 immigration (the Court's Order did note the paucity of evidence in this regard), that he
21
actually does pay or has been paying $600 per month towards the community credit card debts
22
(though he apparently has been making these payments with community funds, in much the same
23
24
way that he has paid Mr. Springgate, though Mr. Joshi did appear to indicate that he used his
25
personal property, his IRS tax return, to pay Mr. Springgate, though the community is apparently
26
liable for such a necessary), that he actually has paid Mr. Springgate the various amounts he
27
inconsistently testified too, or that he has only two weeks of work scheduled for late March,
28
2009; and he filed for unemployment benefits in March, 2009, or that the large balance transfers
he made in this year of divorce were actually for the purpose of obtaining a better interest rate
rather than making sure as much of the debt as possible was placed in an account where Ms.
Joshi was a co-signer, rather than in an account that Mr. Joshi was the sole signatory to.
5
6
The Court simply did not choose to comment on Mr. Joshi's failure to present any
documentary evidence regarding these pertinent claims. Alternatively, the Court seemingly did
not miss any opportunity to point out an instance (on at least thirteen occasions) where Ms. Joshi
did not present the type of evidence the Court apparently wished to see (documentary evidence,
10
apparently, was sought, as opposed to the proffered testimonial evidence or statements against
11
12
interest under oath by the opposing party regarding the fishy payment arrangements related to the
13
daughters motor vehicle, the mode of payment used to purchase it, and the existence of a $6,000
14
cash advance taken from Ms. Joshi's personal credit to fund the cash purchase). Mr. Joshi
15
testified that his wife had taken out a $6,000 cash advance from her personal credit card and
16
given the cash to Mr. Joshi who converted that cash to a money order to purchase the car the
17
18
19
daughter uses, but which is titled in the daughter's and Mr. Joshi's name.
Why Ms. Joshi would need to present documentary evidence regarding these matters
20
when Mr. Joshi readily admitted the case in question is unclear, particularly where Mr. Joshi has
21
22
been involved for some curious reason in transferring the monthly car payments made by the
23
daughter to Ms. Joshi for the car that Ms. Joshi took out a $6,000 cash advance from her credit
24
card account, to which she was the sole signatory, the same car that has Mr. Joshi's name on the
25
title and does not have Ms. Joshi's name on the title.
26
27
Miscellaneous Other Issues
28
Given the decision in Lofgren v.Lofgren, ("if community property is lost, expended or
destroyed through the intentional misconduct of one spouse, the court may consider such
misconduct as a compelling reason for making an unequal disposition of community property
and may appropriately augment the other spouse's share of the remaining community property.
112 Nev.
, 926 P.2d 296 (Adv. Opn. No. 156, Nov. 7, 1996).
6
7
Arguably, Mr. Joshi and Ms. Joshi's combined testimony (together with Mr. Joshi's early
Financial Declaration where he lists two separate safety deposit boxes containing gold jewelry)
support the view that the disappearance of the "woman's wealth ceremonial wedding jewelry at
10
issue here should be held against Mr. Joshi, and accordingly an unequal disposition of
11
community property (or community debt) may be appropriate to the extent of the approximate
12
13
value of these items. Ms. Joshi testified their value was in the $6,000 range. The "woman's
14
wealth is arguably Ms. Joshi's separate property to begin with, as per Indian custom (though at
15
times in court Mr. Joshi's grasp of the culture from which he apparently came was astoundingly
16
faint), however, the holding in Lofgren could arguably be extrapolated to apply in such a
17
situation.
18
19
20
21
Mr. Joshi's own Trial Statement (line 12, page 2) comments on the case at bar, stating
that "while it may seem to be an alimony case Mr. Joshi's earnings are subject to the travel and
convention business fluctuations, while hers are not. Further, Mr. Springgate's Trial Statement
22
was filed at 5 p.m. the day before Trial. Mr. Joshi's Trial Statement was filed more than 5
23
24
calendar days before Trial, in accordance with Rule 5 of the Second Judicial District Court
25
Rules. Mr. Joshi's Trial Statement notes that Mr. Joshi "he is prepared to take an unfair amount
26
of the community debt, which he has been servicing, which equalizes their incomes. (emphasis
27
added). Whether it is appropriate to include the terms of a settlement negotiation in a Trial
28
Statement is debatable. However, Mr. Springgate clearly wrote that the case "may seem like an
alimony case and then clearly moved for opposing counsel to have personal liability for fees
under NRS 7.085 for the first time in his closing statement at Trial, seemingly asserting that
opposing counsel could not reasonably see this as an alimony case. Ironically, it would seem
Mr. Springgate's moving for fees under NRS 7.085 was not reasonably grounded in fact or law.
6
7
WDCR 5(1)(c)-(d) requires that Trial statements shall be served and filed 5 calendar
days before trial, and that "each party shall serve and file a trial statement which shall set forth
the following matters in the following order:
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
(c) A statement of issues of law supported by a memorandum of

authorities.
(d) In non-jury cases, a list of summaries of schedules referring to
attached, itemized exhibits concerning any subject matter which involves
accounting, computation, chronology, or similar data reasonably calling for
orderly itemization, e.g., wages, income , expenses , inventories, business
operations, tax computations, disability periods, property losses, itemizations
of claimed losses or injuries, and the data and reasons upon which an expert
bases his opinion (not the opinion itself), which clearly reflect the claims,
defenses, or evidence of the party, together with references to the records or
other sources upon which such summaries or schedules are based.
17
Mr. Springgate's Trial Statement, at page 2, line 14, lists "none under the heading of
18
19
"Statement of Issues of Law.
20
support of this, or any authority in support of the matters for which are apparently so well
21
His Trial Statement fails to cite a single source of authority in
established by precedent that there are literally no real issues worth disputing. Mr. Springgate's
22
Trial Statement does not contain any a "list of summaries of schedules referring to attached,
23
24
itemized exhibits concerning any subject matter which involves accounting, computation,
25
chronology, or similar data reasonably calling for orderly itemization, e.g., wages, income,
26
expenses , inventories, business operations, tax computations, disability periods, property losses,
27
itemizations of claimed losses or injuries, and the data and reasons upon which an expert bases
28
his opinion (not the opinion itself), which clearly reflect the claims, defenses, or evidence of the
party, together with references to the records or other sources upon which such summaries
or schedules are based .
(emphasis added). There simply is nothing attached to his Trial
Statement. There were no exhibits attached to the Trial Statement submitted at 5 p.m. the day
before Trial by Mr. Joshi. WDCR 5(d) calls for attaching exhibits to the Trial Statement. Mr.
6
7
Springgate failed to do this. Ms. Joshi's counsel objected on that basis. The Court seemingly
took Mr. Springgate's word that he had provided the documents forming the basis of the exhibits
he introduced at some earlier point in the litigation, likely as part of his 16.2 production, though
10
even if that were the case, the documents provided at that time clearly were not marked as
11
exhibits or organized by an index. Mr. Coughlin does believe Mr. Springgate provided these
12
13
documents in the 16.2 production and that they were bates stamped in the manner Mr. Springgat
14
indicated. Mr. Coughlin recognizes that, in the future, he should be prepared to utilize such
15
production at trial should it be offered as an exhibit without having an additional copy,
16
specifically marked as an exhibit provided at the time it is sought to be introduced into evidence.
17
In some cases , argument may be appropriate that suggests that to simply announce that one
18
19
previously included the needle they are now wishing to introduce into evidence at Trial in the
20
haystack that they had produced to the opposing party several months earlier is simply
21
insufficient. This may be a stronger argument where a party's Trial Statement is deficient in
22
some ways, such as note referencing with any specificity the documents a party intends to offer
23
24
25
26
27
as exhibits. Lastly, the Court's own Pre-Trial Order was not followed by Mr. Joshi's counsel.
The Court's Order and reasoning for imposing sanctions focused in large part on Ms.
Joshi's counsel's objections to Mr. Joshi's counsel introducing exhibits into evidence without
providing opposing counsel a copy at the time in which Mr. Joshi was seeking to introduce these
28
exhibits. The Court's own Order Re Pre-Trial Procedure Orders that "if a party intends to offer
more than ten trial exhibits, the proposed exhibits must be bound, tabbed and indexed... each
party shall submit two copies of the proposed exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing
counsel.. .for trials which are scheduled for less than one full day, exhibits shall be marked
immediately prior to the convening for trial, and counsel shall arrive at least 15 minutes before
6
7
the scheduled time of trial.. .each party must file with the Court a trial statement... five days
before trial... failure to timely deliver these documents may result in sanctions against the
offending party as set forth in NRCP 37...if the financial circumstances of a party have changed
10
substantially since the filing of the most recent financial declaration, that party is to file an
11
updated financial declaration at the same time as filing the trial statement.
12
13
Mr. Joshi's case relied in large part upon the idea that his income had been greatly
14
reduced and would continue to be so hindered. There was testimony on his part that he might
15
have filed for unemployment, that he probably was not schedule to work anymore at one or both
16
of his jobs in the foreseeable future, only to be contradicted minutes later by his testimony that
17
he had a shift or two scheduled at his main job, the one where he earned $37,500 in 2008. How
18
19
he could still qualify to file for unemployment without yet losing his job completely is another
20
question. Nevada's unemployment system allows one to file if his hours have been reduced
21
such that he is no longer earning more than his weekly benefit amount. Mr. Joshi's weekly
22
benefit amount, based on his Financial Declaration could be no more than the $350 maximum
23
24
cap set by law. Mr. Joshi grossed approximately $700 per week in 2008. Mr. Joshi did not file
25
an update Financial Declaration, as required by the Pre-Trial Order ("financial circumstances of
26
a party have changed substantially since the filing of the most recent financial declaration, that
27
party is to file an updated financial declaration at the same time as filing the trial statement )
28
Mr. Joshi's arguments against alimony were largely based on the idea that his income had
declined significantly, yet Ms. Joshi did not have the benefit of enforcing the requirement that
Mr. Joshi file, under penalty of perjury, an updated Financial Declaration attesting to as much.
The court should not criticize Ms. Joshi for a lack of discovery in this regard while viewing Mr.
Joshi's testimonial assertions (however erratic and inconsistent they may have been) at trial as
6
7
presenting sufficient "evidence (though lacking in the documentary evidence required by the
Pre-Trial Order and perhaps NRS), while at the same time sanctioning Ms. Joshi's counsel for
essentially not trying the case in the way the Court (which does not have the benefit of knowing
10
everything that goes on behind the scenes) would suggest it be tried. The Court essentially
11
overlooked multiple instances of divergence from the NRCP and the Pre-Trial Order by Mr.
12
13
Springgate while sanctioning what could perhaps be deemed optional litigation decisions that are
14
customarily left up to the parties own volition as to whether or not to proceed upon some specific
15
course (such as choosing to conduct a deposition).
Mr. Coughlin recognizes that the direction
16
given by Judge Gardner during this Trial as to the type of evidence that should be offered or the
17
manner of presentation at trial were absolutely dictates that he should adopt immediately if he
18
19
20
21
hopes to function at all effectively as an attorney.

It appears that Mr. Joshi may have offered more than ten exhibits at Trial (especially if
the documents representing the various money transfers in regard to the Meena Fowler debt were
22
considered separate exhibits), though the proposed exhibits were not bound, tabbed and indexed.
23
24
They were never even proposed until the exact point in time at which Mr. Joshi sought to
25
introduce them. Surely they were not all being offered for impeachment purposes. For this
26
Trial, which was scheduled for less than one full day, the exhibits were not marked immediately
27
prior to the convening for trial, and Ms. Joshi's counsel did indeed arrive at least 15 minutes
28
before the scheduled time of trial. Mr. Joshi's counsel did not submit two copies of the proposed
exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing counsel. See Cardenas v. Peterson Bean Co.,
180 Neb. 605, 611-612, 144N.W.2d 154, 159 (1966); Priest v. McConnell, 219 Neb 328, 330
(1985); In Re O'Bryan, 246 B.R. 271, 276-279 (1999).
To qualify as an exhibit a document should be marked as an exhibit or in some way

6
7
contain some indication that it is an exhibit. Though arguably the relatively slight amount of
documents produced in the instant case makes such an argument irrelevant, one should not be
able to pick several needles out of a haystack they produced in their 16.2 productions and claim
10
that they are exhibits previously provided to the opposing party. This places an inappropriately
11
high burden on the opposing party to index and organize the documents produced by Mr. Joshi.
12
13
Many litigators suggest that if one is following the other side they are not leading the litigation.
14
"Rule 46. Trial-Statements and documentary evidence.
15
1. Stipulating to documents. Before trial, the parties shall stipulate

which documents are admissible. Such stipulation will avoid the need for
foundational witnesses.
2. Exchanging documents. Copies of documents shall be exchanged
by counsel and marked for identification by the court clerk no later than 1
business day prior to the commencement of trial.
3. A trial statement shall be filed in accordance with Rule 5. (Local
Rules of Practice for the Second Judicial District Court).
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
"Rule 12. Form of papers presented for filing; exhibits; documents; legal
citations.
4. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers shall clearly show the
exhibit number at the bottom or on the right side thereof. Copies of
exhibits must be clearly legible and not unnecessarily voluminous, and
must be reduced to 8 1/2 inches by 11 inches, or conveniently folded to
that size. Original documents shall be retained by counsel for introduction
as exhibits at the time of a hearing or at the time of trial rather than
attached to pleadings. Rules of the District Courts of the State of
Nevada.
27
28
Mr. Joshi's counsel clearly did not comply with Rule 46 or Rule 12. Ms.
Joshi's counsel should not be sanctioned for objecting to the introduction of Mr.
Joshi's exhibits. The exhibits entered clearly were not marked for identification
by the Court one day prior to trial. Mr. Springgate had not provided any
documents prior to Trial that contained any attempt to mark them as exhibits such
6
7
that compliance with the rules could be inferred. They were only marked at the
time Mr. Joshi sought to introduce them. There is ample persuasive authority for
the position taken by Ms. Joshi's counsel with regard to the introduction of Mr.
10
Joshi's exhibits.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
"LR 9017. Use of Alternate Direct Testimony and Exhibits at Trials...

(d) Submission of Declarations, Exhibits , and Objections. Unless
the court orders otherwise, copies of all declarations of witnesses
and exhibits that are intended to be presented at trial or at the
hearing on a contested matter must be furnished to opposing
counsel and lodged with the court as follows:
(1) The plaintiff or movant must submit to opposing counsel all
declarations and exhibits in its case in chief not less than ten (10)
business days before the trial or the hearing on the contested
matter;
(2) The defendant or respondent must submit all declarations and

exhibits in its case five (5) business days before the trial or the
hearing on the contested matter;
(3) Two (2) business days before trial or the hearing on a contested
matter each party must lodge with the courtroom deputy clerk of
the judge to whom the matter is assigned, one (1) copy of all
declarations and exhibits that the party intends to present at trial,
and an original and one (1) copy of that party's written objections
to the admission of any of the declarations or exhibits of an
opposing party. Copies of exhibits lodged with the clerk must
be premarked by counsel, and must be accompanied by a cover
sheet index containing a brief description of each exhibit ; and...
U. S.Dist.Ct.Rules D.Nev., LR 9017.
26
27
28
3. Selecting exhibits
After all possible exhibits are identified, counsel should select those that
he himself will bring to the trial, and those that he will subpoena another
1
2
to bring. He should have available everything that he might have to

produce at the request of his opponent, and, if he doesn't have original
documents or articles, he should be prepared with copies, and/or testimony
concerning the originals.
3
4
5
6
7
4. Preparing exhibit lists

Counsel should prepare a list of his witnesses with an outline of the points
to be established by each one . The outline should indicate which exhibits
the witness can identify, the number tentatively assigned to the exhibit,
and a description of it. .. 5 Am. Jur. Trials 553.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
"WDCR 10: Form of Pleadings:

6. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers must be 8 1 /2 x 11 inches
in size ; must be separated with bottom-tabbed divider pages; must be
labeled numerically, i.e., Exhibit 1, 2, 3, etc ., rather than alphabetically,
and it will be mandatory effective January 1, 2008, that all exhibits be
identified numerically. Exhibits that are smaller must be affixed to a blank
sheet of paper 8 1/2 x 11 inches in size , with invisible adhesive tape on all
sides. Staples must not be used to affix an exhibit to a sheet of paper.
Exhibits that are larger than 8 1/2 x 11 inches must be reduced to 8 1/2 x
11 inches. Exhibits such as maps must be folded so as to appear 8 1/2 x 11
inches in size . All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers must be
separated by a bottom- tabbed divider page and clearly marked with the
exhibit number at the top and bottom of the page. All exhibits attached to
pleadings or papers must be preceded by an Index of Exhibits indicating
the exhibit number, exhibit description , and the length of each exhibit
(number of pages). Copies of exhibits must be clearly legible and not
unnecessarily voluminous . Original documents must be retained by
counsel for introduction as exhibits at the time of a hearing or at the time
of trial rather than attached to pleadings.
21
Ms. Joshi's counsel's comments were not rude or sarcastic, especially considering the
22
23
totality of the circumstances here, as more fully discussed above. Nonetheless, the Court failed
24
to include much at all in the way of specific examples of the "rude, sarcastic, or derogatory
25
language or behavior that formed the basis for these sanctions. Specificity is required as set forth
26
in the cases cited supra. Specifics are very important in using judgments as precedent. Further,
27
it might be somewhat unfair to criticize Ms. Joshi's counsel for a "lack of knowledge with regard
28
to the rules of evidence and trial procedure where Mr. Springgate's presentation was counter to
the rules and Pre-Trial Order in so many ways. However, Ms. Joshi's counsel certainly will
utilize the Court's Order as an important and informative guide to the areas of counsel's trial
presentation and practice that need immediate improvement.
5
6
The sanctions issued in this case were improper in that they apparently relied upon the
delay in the return of Mr. Joshi's Tanzanian passport early in this litigation. The Court's Order
notes that Ms. Joshi's counsel "filed an Opposition to the request for return of Mr. Joshi's
passport without any factual or legal basis... that on August 1, 2008, Mr. Joshi filed a'Motion
10
For Return Of Personal Property' requesting that Ms. Joshi return his passport, green card and
11
12
social security card. On August 7, 2008, Ms. Joshi, by and through her attorney of record,
13
Mr. Coughlin, filed an Opposition to the return of Mr. Joshi's passport citing case law involving
14
minor children and their support. Ms. Joshi filed said opposition while acknowledging the
15
parties' children were both over eighteen years of age at the time. On August 18, 2008, Judge
16
Schumacher ordered Ms. Joshi to immediately return Mr. Joshi's passport within five days.
17
18
19
20
Regardless, Judge Schumacher already ruled on Mr. Springgate's request for attorney's
fees related to this issue. No Attorney's fees were granted by Judge Schumacher. Mr. Joshi did
not file a Motion for Reconsideration at that time. The issue is barred under the law of the case
21
doctrine. The law of the case doctrine is a species of collateral estoppel and it applies to intra
22
23
action issues. Tien Fu Hsu v. County of Clark, 2007 WL 4532623 (Nev. 12/27/2007). Thus,
24
once an issue has been decided on the merits, the law of the case doctrine makes that issue
25
"binding not only on the parties, but on the court as well: no other judge of coordinate
26
jurisdiction may undo the decision (Siegel, NY Prac 448, at 723 [3d ed.]).
27
28
Mr. Springgate filed a Motion seeking the return of this passport which on a somewhat
questionable interpretation of 18 USC 1028 and 18 USC 1544, claiming Ms. Joshi's failure to
immediately return it to him amounted to extortion. Ms. Joshi's counsel merely asked Mr.
Springgate to provide some law that was relevant to the issue at hand or allow a reasonable
amount of time for Mr. Coughlin to determine the prudence of turning over the Tanzanian
6
7
passport. Mr. Coughlin did not suggest Mr. Joshi was committing a RICO violation by
withholding or doing nothing to aid in the return of Ms. Joshi's woman's wealth. Granted, a
passport may deserve a greater degree of protection, but this is the type of judgment call that can
10
take some time for attorneys to consistently and immediately make in an appropriate fashion.
11
Mr. Springgate's Motion and Reply on this issue failed to cite any particular section of these
12
13
statutes or include much in the way of their statutory language. Ms. Joshi's counsel has looked
14
up these statues and included the only parts that could seem even tangentially relevant below:
15
16
17
"18 U.S.C. 1544-Misuse of a Passport: Section 1544 of Title

18 proscribes the use or attempted use of someone else's passport,
or its use in violation of any applicable regulation or law. It also
proscribes giving one's passport to another for the other's use
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
"18 USC 1028: Fraud and related activity in connection with

identification documents, authentication features, and information
(4) knowingly possesses an identification document (other than
one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor), authentication
feature, or a false identification document, with the intent such
document or feature be used to defraud the United States;...
(7) knowingly transfers, possesses , or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person with the
intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that
constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law; or
To assert that Ms. Joshi was committing some form of extortion such to bring this
situation within the purview of either of these sections of the U.S.C. is not entirely fair.
28
The Court's Order appears to have taken issue with the request made for ongoing child
support where the two children of the marriage were 19 and 20 years old and in college, noting
that "1. Ongoing Support for the Adult Children's Education- Pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b),
except where a contract providing otherwise has been executed pursuant to NRS 123.080, the
obligation for care, education, maintenance and support of any minor child created by any order
6
7
entered pursuant to this section ceases : (a) Upon the death of the person to whom the order was
directed; or (b) When the child reaches 18 years of age if he is no longer enrolled in high school,
otherwise, when he reaches 19 years of age. There has been no evidence presented by Ms. Joshi
10
justifying a request for continuing support of the parties' adult children. As there has been no
11
legal basis presented to make such a finding, the Court denies Ms. Joshi's request that Mr. Joshi
12
13
financially provide for the adult children's education.
14
Nevertheless, in appropriate cases, a support obligation may be imposed on the basis of
15
estoppel or implied contract. In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal.App.3d 848, 152 Cal.Rptr. 121
16
(1979); In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal.App.3d 837, 126 Cal.Rptr. 38 (1975). See, also,
17
Clevenger v. Clevenger, supra; V.L.P. v. J.S.S., Del., 407 A.2d 244 (1978); Fuller v. Fuller,
18
19
D.C., 247 A.2d 767 (1968); Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1980); Gingery (not
20
reported) 1992 WL 150269; Watkins, 117 P.3d 1114; Kass, 235 A.D. 2d 150 (1997); Callahan v.
21
Dye, L 1667668, 8-10 (Alaska 2006); Ramsey, 23 N.E. 69, 71 (Ind. 1889).
Additionally, the
22
demonstrable needs of the child, not the child's age, are determinative of the duty of support.
23
24
Therefore, while parents are not generally required to support a child over eighteen, his or her
25
enrollment in a full-time educational program has been held to require continued support.
26
Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543; Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971); Limpert, supra, 119
27
28
1
2
3
4
N.J. Super. at 442-43; Schumm, supra, 122 N.J. Super. 149-50.
See, also, Ross v. Ross, 167
N.J. Super. 441, 444-46 (Ch. Div. 1979) (law school).

Testimonial evidence was presented by Ms. Joshi that these spouses had planned to help
their children financially during college. An implied contract to contribute to the adult children's
educational expenses is supported by the evidence presented. Ms. Joshi's testimony showed that
6
7
this family adhered to the strong cultural tradition in many families with ties to India in that the
education and furtherance of their children's careers was of paramount importance to these
parties and that Ms. Joshi had lived and planned her life I accordance with that belief. Ms. Joshi
10
anticipated and believed, quite reasonably, that Mr. Joshi would contribute something to his
11
children's college expenses.

12
13
14
There exists more attenuated support for this proposition. In Miller v. Miller, 16 Ill. 298,
where "one remains with a parent, or with a person standing in the relation of a parent, after
15
arriving at majority, and remains in the same apparent relation as when a minor, the presumption
16
is that the parties do not contemplate the payment of wages for services.
17
18
19
Additionally, this "presumption may be overthrown, and the reverse established, by proof
of an express or implied contract, and the implied contract may be proven by facts and
20
circumstances which show that both parties, at the time services were performed, contemplated
21
22
or intended pecuniary recompense other than such as naturally arises out of the relation of parent
23
and child... in the absence of express proof a contract may be implied from circumstances.
24
Schwarz v. Schwarz, 26 Ill. 81.
25
Incidentally, one of the objections the Court ruled against Ms. Joshi's counsel on
26
27
concerned a recently proposed bill before our State's Legislature:
28
13
"Assembly Bill 125 AN ACT relating to domestic relations;

requiring the court, in certain actions for divorce, to consider any history
of domestic violence between the spouses when determining whether to
award temporary maintenance or alimony ; creating a rebuttable
presumption in certain actions for divorce that an award of temporary
maintenance or alimony should not be made to a spouse who engaged in
certain acts of domestic violence against the other spouse; and providing
other matters properly relating thereto.
"Legislative Counsel ' s Digest : Existing law provides that a court
in any action for divorce may: (1) require one spouse to pay money for the
temporary maintenance of the other spouse; and (2) award alimony to
either spouse in a manner that appears just and equitable. (NRS 125.040,
125.150) This bill requires a court that is considering whether to award
temporary maintenance or alimony in certain actions for divorce to
consider evidence of any history of domestic violence between the
spouses . This bill also creates a rebuttable presumption in certain actions
for divorce that temporary maintenance or alimony should not be awarded
to a spouse who has engaged in acts of domestic violence not more than 5
years before the filing of the action for divorce or at any time after the
action is filed. ) (http ://www.leg. state. nv.us/74th/Bills/AB/AB125.pdf)
(Referred to Committee on Judiciary)
14
The Court was not precluded from considering the abuse allegations in the instant case.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
15
It was arguably appropriate to let the abuse allegations into evidence for purposes of the alimony
16
determination. Mr. Springgate gave a detailed explanation of the validity of basing property
17
distributions and, perhaps, alimony on such fault issues. This led to the Court ruling such abuse
18
19
allegations were inadmissible. However many courts allow such evidence. Bernard, L20641 1,
20
2-7 (Ohio 2002); Havell, 186 Misc. 2d 726; "The Place of Fault in Modem Divorce Law , 28
21
Ariz. St. L.J. 773 (Fall 1996); Divine, 752 S.W. 2d 79 (1988). The Court at times seemed to be
22
object to Ms. Joshi's counsel desire to respond to the various objections, or make his own
23
24
objections, seemingly out of annoyance with Ms. Joshi's counsel's trial presentation.
Ms.
25
Joshi's counsel has great respect for Judge Gardner and deeply regrets any trial presentation
26
found objectionable and is resolved to improving as an advocate with renewed vigor. Hopefully
27
this Motion's attempt at thoroughly presenting some of the issues that arose at trial will
28
1
2
3
4
demonstrate such a desire. Objections must be entered into the record to preserve issues for
appeal (particularly such potentially precedent making questions of law).
The Court's seeming annoyance is understandable. The expectations on Family Court
Judges in Nevada are enormous, the case loads crushing, and the need to enforce standards of
practice that aid in judicial economy is high. This is combined with the extreme emotional
6
7
intensity of the subject matter and the litigant's very personal connections to the issues at hand.
Further, it is likely very frustrating to have attorneys who are a mere work in progress practicing
in one's courtroom, particularly where such an attorney may feel the opposing side is seeking an
10
advantage through intimidation, causing such an attorney to react in an overly antagonistic
11
manner, to the detriment of one's trial presentation.

12
13
Many of Nevada's Family Courts do allow evidence of abuse to be presented in arguing
14
for an award of alimony. Nevada is a no- fault state; consequently, marital fault is not an issue in
15
the division of property or the awards that the court makes. The Nevada Supreme Court has set
16
forth a series of factors in the Sprenger case [Sprenger v. Sprenger, 110 Nev. 855, 878 P.2d 284
17
(1994)] called the Sprenger Factors. There are six different factors that the court set forth in
18
19
determining how to award alimony. They have also addressed the fault issue in the Rodriguez
20
case [Rodriguez v. Rodriquez, 116 Nev. 993, 13 P.3d 415(2000), and Hein, and these two cases
21
may be contradictory]. There is no current factor that says the issue of domestic battery must be
22
considered, but many of the courts already do consider it. (see Minutes for AB 125: Assembly
23
24
25
26
27
Committee on Judiciary February 26, 2007, pages 4-5).

Conclusion
For the reasons cited in the various arguments contained in this Motion for
Reconsideration, the sanction assessing Ms. Joshi's counsel to personally pay Mr. Joshi's
28
attorney's fees for 4.15 hours of Trial should not be upheld. Ms. Joshi's counsel had found no
authority supporting a request under NRS 7.085 on account of a failure to accept a settlement
that proposes using consumer credit card debt as a set off for an alimony award. To ask for fees
under these circumstances may be a NRS 7.085 violation itself. Ms. Joshi should be awarded an
alimony payment of $500 per month for a period of twenty years, taking her to social security
6
7
age. Mr. Joshi should be ordered to contribute $6,000 to each of his two children' s college
expenses . The children's contributions to the car payments should not be considered in dividing
each party half of the respective debt related to these vehicles, which the parties admitted at trial
10
were incurred during the marriage. The party's testimony and Mr. Joshi' s admissions establish
11
the amount owing on these vehicles. Mr. Joshi should be ordered to refinance the vehicle
12
13
awarded to him in this Court's Order. Any debt amounts that Mr. Joshi balance transferred from
14
an account to which he was the sole signatory to an account both spouses were signatories to
15
should be subtracted from the community debt apportioned to Ms. Joshi. As a side note, Mr.
16
Coughlin has been prevented from accessing Ms. Joshi's files, contact information, and other
17
items necessary to prepare this Motion. Perhaps this Motion is not an appropriate place to go
18
19
into why that has occurred, but Mr. Coughlin wishes to implore this Court to preserve for Ms.
20
Joshi, the opportunity to seek Reconsideration, and possibly an Appeal, and to allow an
21
extension of time for another attorney at Washoe Legal Services to appear as counsel (though
22
Mr. Coughlin remains counsel of record as of this date). Alternatively, this Motion would seem
23
24
to provide support for the various issues that Ms. Joshi may seek Reconsideration of. Mr.
25
Coughlin also asks that he be allowed more time to more fully develop this Motion for
26
Reconsideration and to access the necessary materials from Washoe Legal Services to do so,
27
including the relevant file, work product, video of the trial, and record of correspondences
28
between opposing counsel and Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin has been prevented from doing so
despite making all reasonable efforts to do so. More information related to this set of
circumstances can be provided, however, it seems prudent at this juncture not to set forth details
in this Motion at this time.
5
6
7
Respectfully submitted to the Court this 27th day of April, 2009

/sig/ Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf
8
9
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15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1
2
3
4
5
6

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq. and that on
the 27th day of April, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the within
Request For Reconsideration and Motion for Extension of Time, fully addressed to:
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ

Reno, NV 89501
8
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030
9
10
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number of any person.
11
12
Dated this 27th Day of April, 2009

13
14
15
16
17
Melissa Ulloa /sig/
18
Melissa Ulloa
Agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
LIST OF EXHIBITS
2
3
4
1.
Exhibit 1- email from Zach Coughlin, Esq. to John Springgate, Esq. sent October 22nd,
2008. Two pages long.
2. Exhibit 2- email from Zach Coughlin, Esq. to John Springgate , Esq., sent November 10th,
6
7
2008. Two pages long.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
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20
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22
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25
26
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FILED
-Exhibit 1-
Electronically
04-30-2009:03:35:14 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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,a<-,h Coughlin
Fccrn:
Zarh Cou^hlir'.
San t.
To:
Wednesnzy , Octo7ar 22, ^QD

'John Sprng ate'
Subject -
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FILED
-Exhibit 2-
Electronically
04-30-2009:03:35:14 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
o:I II:
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Zach uuulblin
Fro1,:
Zach Cruoh1in
Sant :
c1cndzy, Noloember 10, 2008 -i:47 PM
Ta:
'Jahn Sprir.gg;te
Suhjeci; 2harl. Settlenler.t

Dei;r klsirl,
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in getting thcscitlei:lent praposal moved aLL%nigj i_ surll: prociffrnrn your client oJ'L he various
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documentation tcit include:
Cm e'l r r1aI i.i p siLAC. The dcbI_
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whits h, snebli:6 $5,0 A 00
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E-Lr.idl:a . 6 .ri7. . R4 i,Ariz . CL. App. 199 j."
:'
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Lind in i safe depnît box in FndLa) . presrllnaLbl = me " %Nninan'S tik ÎLi] ill;il is asg ual lY'
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IIItade;^>rr,ler us xp. nditullx:s th.t
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Or his MCIW'h LILL it 1
it l{1 11L7[ 'L'2llertit CI7e a 7rnm LintL> ( Sufi lL its s I 1ti11d i11L, a grreaL dc'a1 u Ill urie
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`9111 y: LhI C.O LSt5 liirie SLIppo''t fir such a Llrllcticc Under 1 evvl+ JL: fxr4^, 'l ' 11.4, rrx4-,, 1; arLi bl y
k1.15L
LIs }I 1w. contiiderin the Iike] Maxi Ill[IL th variou s dchts invc.'ved will be ones ill at RIItr[i
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WLS
From: Paul Elcano (pelcano@washoelegalservices.org) You moved this message to its current
location.
Sent: Fri 5/01/09 8:52 AM
Cc: Kathy Breckenridge (kathy@kbreckenridgelaw.com)
1 attachment
ltrCoughlin2ndDraft.doc (30.5 KB)
Letter attached.
Close
Dear Zach,
I have been authorized by the Board to handle this matter.
1.
Your current suspension was a result of the order entered by Judge Gardner in
the Joshi matter;
2.
Suspension means that you are no longer to participate as a lawyer in any case
assigned to you by WLS until further notice. You may appear on your own
behalf to litigate the order of sanctions entered by Judge Gardner. If any
lawyer contacts you about a WLS case you must refer them to Caryn
Sternlicht or Marc Ashley;
3.
According to the Courts order, you were sanctioned for arguing incessantly,
being unprepared, making sarcastic and derogatory remarks to the Court, and
for rude and disrespectful conduct. You were personally fined $934 as a result
of this conduct;
4.
I could not evaluate your conduct at trial until I received the tape of the
hearing; this tape was promptly ordered, and was finally received on
Thursday, April 23rd. I have not yet reviewed this tape in its entirety.
5.
You have requested a copy of your personnel file. This has been made
available to you;
6.
We have delivered a copy of the tape of the Joshi matter to you;
7.
You requested a formal response to your complaint concerning Rhonda. This

was investigated by me within 48 hours of your complaint. There is no
question that your office behavior (which included yelling, and calling her a
hall monitor, etc.) upset her, and as a direct result she made a comment to you.
She was counseled as to the type of language she used, and specifically told
that even though she was upset this language (bite me) was not appropriate
for the workplace. I did not realize you wanted a formal response to this
incident. Please consider this your formal response. I am unaware of any
specific written complaints other than the one you made to me about Rhonda.
Please provide me with copies of all other written complaints sent by you to
me prior to the entry of Judge Gardners order. Please make sure they are
dated. I will review them and indicate to you what the disposition of those
matters may be.
8.
Counseling for difficulties in office interaction had already been scheduled

when I received Judge Gardners order. You did not appear for the mandatory
meeting at which I announced this counseling;
9.
We have received a copy of a 50 page motion for reconsideration you filed in

the Joshi matter. I will review this in its entirety. If there is any other written
material you want me to review in determining whether or not your
employment should continue with WLS you must provide it to me by 5:00 pm
Monday, May 4th. I will be happy to pick up any such material at a reasonable
time and place if you are not comfortable emailing it to me.
Based on the forgoing I will be taking the following action:

1. I will review the tape in the Joshi matter, your fifty page motion for
reconsideration and any other written material you provide to me. If your conduct
was as represented by Judge Gardner you will be terminated. This termination
will be based exclusively on the manner in which you conducted this hearing, and
will not be related to any ultimate outcome regarding the sanctions order. WLS
can not maintain an employment relationship with a lawyer who argues
incessantly, appears unprepared and makes sarcastic and derogatory remarks to
the court, and otherwise conducts his or her case in a rude and disrespectful
manner. This determination will be made by me by 10:00 am Wednesday
morning, May 6, 2009.
2. If the hearing tape does not justify Judge Gardners order WLS will require you to
participate in the previously referred to employee counseling pursuant to the
directives of our industrial psychologist. This counseling is currently going on
with other employees at WLS. The counselor will determine the extent to which
you will participate and maintain a case load. You will maintain your employment
status, and will receive pay and benefits throughout this course of counseling.
3. If you wish to discuss any resolution of this matter between now and Wednesday
morning at 10 am I will be available to meet with you at any convenient time and
place, including this weekend. You may bring any person you would like to a
resolution discussion. I will come alone unless you request otherwise.
This has been sent to you by email. Please advise me as to the address to which a hard
copy of this transmittal should be delivered.
Sincerely,
Paul Elcano
May 7, 2009
Washoe
Legal
Services
Zach Coughlin
945 W. 12th Street
Reno, NV 89509
Dear Mr. Coughlin,

I have reviewed the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
" '
1'he' oshlihearing CD
Youfnttypage Motion forRecortsid iati n before J!lgg Gardner
e
Your seventeen page letter to me
to date,including your e-mail of
%
Eachandeve ,9?e, y fygur emails
"
May 7, 2009sentat,1;45
The.Toshi file
alll .
In an attempt t(fresolve thisffia.tterlhave tried to sche<fule a meeting with you. I have

left you ..gicemails asking you to c(l.111J.1.e. iandl have indicated tihat I would meet you at any
()lution.,For,,Wl1ateyer reason, you have not scheduled
convenient time and place to discuss"
p
such a sessi6h. In addition, I have attetn ted through independent means to schedule meetings
with you. This involved discussionwitltpersons I believe to be your mentors prior to and during
your emploYlIlent here, } } my understanding that they also have been unable to schedule a
,.
meeting withyou.
I have reviewed the hearings ill <letail and have concluded that your conduct in these two
hearings warrants ternllnation. TheJugg ' s findings that you argued incessantly, made rude and
sarcastic remarks, and refused to heegthe Court's admonitions were well founded. Your conduct
obstructed the hearing process. YOUl" U!)ed to or were unable to follow the simplest instructions
from the Judge. Washoe Legal Servic(:scannot employ an attorney who repeatedly conducts
himself with such lackof civility and professionalism in court.
Your performru)ce in the second hearing was virtually a repeat of the first, even though
hearings were five days apart.Jhavetherefore concluded that 'heat of the battle" was not a
significant factor in your inappropria econduct. Judge Gardner was not rude or antagonistic. She
repeatedly explained how she wantediyou to handle matters and you refused to conform your
conduct t04erwishes:The hearing , (2L)' .speaks for itself: so I will not analyze it any further in the
body ofJ4isJetiet.
.
299 South Arlington Ave
Reno, Nevada 89501
TeleP!iQue: 775.329.2727
Fax:
775.324.5509
Washoe
Legal
Services
Your employment termination is effective as of Monday, May 1 1,2009 at 5:00 pm. Your
final paycheck will be available Monday, May 1 1,2009 at 5:00 pm. It will be made by direct
deposit unless you request otherwise. Your medical benefits will terminate in conformity with
this letter, and applicable law. You may schedule a time with me outside of business hours to
pick up your personal effects. Computer contents will be handled as discussed in my previous
email. If you wish to resign from your employment to avoid an involuntary termination on your
employment records, you must meet with me prior to Monday, May 1 1,2009 at 5:00 pm to
discuss this issue.
smcl1
p
/1t
W
rl
an
Executive Director
PE:bw
Sent by e-mail.
Hard copy sent to:
th
945 W. 12 Street,
Reno, NV 89509
299 South Arlington Ave. Reno, Nevada 89501
Telephone: 775.329.2727
Fax: 775.324.5509
$3785
_
_
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Bar No. 9473
945 W.12th St.
Reno, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 8118
Attorney for Zach Coughlin
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BV68-6ft68
IN THE FAMILY DIVISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF THE

ST ATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
10
11
12
Ashwin Joshi,
13
N.o.;
Plaintiff,
14
15
16
\) V ()
0 \ \ 6
\JP'- It.{
vs
---'
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
17
18
19
20
21
REPLY TO OPPOSITION
Comes Now, Zach Coughlin, Esq., to file this Reply to Opposition to
Motion For Reconsideration of the Order After Trial. This Reply to Opposition is
made and based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Exhibit,
22
and all the papers and pleadings on file in this action

2J
DATED this
20m day of May, 2009.
24
15
ach Coughlin, Esq

16
27
l8
Page I

Mr. Joshi's counsel's Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration presents and
opportunity to really clarify some of the salient points at issue in this litigation. The
decision in this case is clearly erroneous. Mr. Springgate incorrectly asserts that two
Settlement Conferences occurred in this case. That is patently incorrect. The argument
Mr. Spring gate leads with is that past due alimony is far different than soon to be due
alimony and therefore the multitude of case offered in support of denying a set off for debts
to third party creditors with alimony are not relevant.
Further, Mr. Springgate makes another misstatement when on page 3 of his
Opposition he claims to quote from Mr. Coughlin's Motion for Reconsideration, citing that
creditors of such community debt are unaffected by anything in a divorce decree from
pursuing either of the parties for repayment. See Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe, 104
Nev. 307, 756 P.2d 1193 (1988) (bank is free to pursue wife for delinquent joint credit
card debt despite divorce courts order for husband to pay such debt). (Emphasis added).
This is true, perhaps, were both spouses are signatories and on the credit applications.
Indeed, the portion Mr. Springgate quotes refers to a situation involving a joint credit card
account, that is where both spouses are signatories. The point Mr. Springgate seems to be
making is not so true where, as here, only Mr. Joshi is a signatory to the credit accounts at
issue. Perhaps this was an another innocent mistake on Mr. Springgate's part. However,
the very next sentence, on page 17 of the Reconsideration Motion points out that it is
typically very difficult to pursue a spouse who is not a cosigner with respect to using that
spouses separate property covers any community debt. Mr. Springgate is curiously silent
as to where the law falls in that respect. Given the years and years of experience that Mr.
Springgate reminded the Court he possesses (at one point, during the Trial he mentioned
that while Mr. Coughlin was not practicing in those unfortunate days where fault was still
a factor in an alimony analysis, I was...) it would be very desirable for Mr. Springgate to
provide his input with regard to what creditors might do to execute upon Ms. Joshi's
Page 2
property in this situation. In fact, Mr. Springgate did, as will be discussed, make some
vague arguments with respect to the doctrine of necessaries.
Mr. Springgate attempts to encapsulate what he believes Mr. Coughlin's argument to
have been when, in his Opposition, on page 3, that Mr. Coughlin's position was based on
a flawed premise. He seemed to be arguing for a equal distribution of debt, with the
knowledge that Ms. Joshi would essentially be judgment proof because of her limited
assets and income. Here, again, Mr. Springgate curiously fails to address the more
pressing issue that stems from the fact that his client is the sole signatory on all the credit
accounts at issue. Perhaps it is the weakness of the doctrine of the necessaries application
the facts of this case present that result in Mr. Springgate's failing to pursue such a line of
argument and instead focus on relative non sequiturs, such as Ms. Joshi's post-divorce
income or near complete lack of assets. Instead, Mr. Springgate reverts to a tactic he seems
to employ just about every time his arguments come up short, that of accusing opposing
counsel of bad faith, and usually, calling for sanctions. To the extent that no real
precedent is offered in support of such an assessment, Mr. Springgate's argument are
veering, regrettably to the ad hominem.
Again, on line 28, page 3 of his Opposition, Mr. Springgate misstates Nevada law, in
spite of his many, many years of experience. With regard to the assertion that any failure
on Ms. Joshi's part to fulfill an obligation to pay a third party creditor stemming from a
divorce decree could not be properly used to set off a spousal support obligation, Mr.
Springgate not only brings in an argument that is only relevant to situations where both
spouses are signatories on a credit account and application, but he goes on to seemingly
misstate Nevada law as it relates to the Court's ability to reduce a supported spouses
alimony award where the supported spouse failed to fulfill some debt distribution term in a
decree. Mr. Springgate states that his client could move the Court for a modification of
his alimony award to reduce the same. Mr. Springgate may have been able to get some
opposing party or opposing counsel to agree to some settlement along those lines, but
Nevada law would seemingly prevent (or at least strongly argue against) those Nevada
Page 3
District Courts bound by Upton-Wheeler from entering such a modification under such
circumstances. This is discussed in more detail, infra. Mr. Coughlin does admit that he is
not sure the extent to which Upton-Wheeler would prevent a court from entering a
modification of an alimony award based on a supported spouses failure to comply with a
debt distribution, however, the precedent does seem to preclude an offset. The difference
between an offset and a modification seem dubious, or at least, difficult to fully
understand.
Pursuant to NRS 7.085, if a court finds that an attorney has: (a) filed, maintained or
defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such action or defense is
not well-grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by an argument for
changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or (b) unreasonably and vexatiously
extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State, the court shall require
the attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct. Neither basis is supported by the record with regard to
the sanction issued.
The Courts Order After Trial is not sufficiently detailed nor specific enough to be
upheld. The Courts Order , with respect to attorneys fees (set forth below), gives a broad
indication of what it was Mr. Coughlin did that it found objectionable. It does not
specifically identify which actions violated NRS 7.085(a) or which violated NRS 7.085(b).
Further, the Court improperly relied on testimony by opposing counsel Springgate. Mr.
Springgate was never sworn in, nor did he provide any affidavits to support his various
assertions, including the extent to which Mr. Coughlin conducted discovery, the amount
and difficulty of the work Mr. Springgate performed, the extent to which Mr. Springgate
himself sent out any discovery, etc.
The notes that Mr. Coughlin made sarcastic, derogatory remarksthroughout the
trial... However, aside from quoting Mr. Coughlin in one instance where Mr. Coughlin
correctly pointed out that Mr. Springgate was not in compliance with court rules with
respect to his attempts to enter exhibits into evidence at trial, the Court never provides any
Page 4
specificity or detail with regard to how Mr. Coughlins conduct was sarcastic or
derogatory. This allows little to no transparency and permits an impermissible amount
of unfettered discretion to the Court. The potential for abuse is simply to high to uphold a
sanction where only mere broad, general, and conclusory basis are offered as the Courts
for the sanctions. The potential for sanctions being handed down because of a mere
difference of philosophy, political ideology, viewpoint, or other impermissible
characteristic must be strongly curtailed.
This is particularly true in family court where tempers run hot, the subject matter is
quite emotional and personal, and the demands on the Court, attorneys, and litigants are
high. Attorney's liability under state law for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th
486. See Annotation: What conduct constitutes multiplying proceedings unreasonably and
vexatiously so as to warrant imposition of liability on counsel under 28 U.S.C.A. 1927
for excess costs, expenses, and attorney fees, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 36 (the Committee Minutes
from the Nevada Legislatures discussions of NRS 7.085 indicate that this federal statute
and FRCP Rule 11 played a significant role in the formulation of NRS 7.085, see Exhibit
#1)(This Court often references the legislative history of statutes and amendments to
statutes, to verify the intended objects and goals of legislation, and often makes reference
to the proposed objective of statutory amendments, and the comments of those proposing
the changes, to ensure that the interpretation of statutes is consistent with legislative intent.
See, e.g., Steward v. Steward, 111 Nev. 295, 890 P.2d 777 (1995) (exploring bill draft and
quoting committee minutes at length to ensure that the Courts interpretation was
consistent with the intent of the legislature in enacting the provision); Joseph F. Sanson
Investment v. 286 Limited, 106 Nev. 429, 795 P.2d 493 (1990) (noting that committee
minutes would be reviewed to discern legislative intent and purpose if such minutes
existed); Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200 (1997) (same);
McKellar v. McKellar, 110 Nev. 200, 871 P.2d 296 (1994) (reviewing 1987
amendment to child support statute for legislative intent).
Mr. Springgate's Opposition makes mention of the clear intent of the legislature with
Page 5
regard to NRS 7.085. It is not clear from where or with what Mr. Springgate was able to
divine the intent of the legislature. Exhibit #1, attached hereto, is a comprehensive
collection of all relevant Committee Minutes and other documentation related to the
Legislature's creation and subsequent amendments to NRS 7.085.
There is a wealth of authority to support requiring a court to set forth specific and
detailed findings in support of ordering sanctions. In the following cases, the courts held
or recognized that specific findings by the trial court were required before an attorney
could be assessed with his opponent's fees. Major v First Va. Bank (1993) 97 Md App
520, 631 A2d 127 (RICO claim; $25,000 for counsel fees).
In O'Brien v Cseh (1983, 2d Dist) 148 Cal App 3d 957, 196 Cal Rptr 409 ( 12[b]), the
court found that an order by the trial court assessing attorney fees against counsel and
giving only "good cause appearing" as a reason for the sanction failed to meet the statutory
requirement of a detailed recital of the circumstances justifying the imposition of sanctions.
The court reversed an award of fees against an attorney that was imposed by the trial
court without any finding as to the actual costs incurred by the opposing parties, in City of
El Monte v Takei (1984, 2d Dist) 158 Cal App 3d 244, 204 Cal Rptr 559 ( 9[a]). The case
was remanded for a hearing to determine reasonable expenses and counsel fees, since
under the applicable court rules the sanctions were limited to that amount.
In Charles v Charles (1986, Dist Col App) 505 A2d 462 ( 4[a]), the court reversed an
assessment of attorney fees against an attorney, where the trial court had failed to make a
specific finding of bad faith.
The court stated that it is within the inherent authority of
trial courts to assess attorney fees against an attorney who has acted in bad faith, if the
sanction is imposed after fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record. But
although counsel's conduct in this case made an assessment of fees appropriate, and there
had been fair notice and a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees, the court
decided that the absence of a specific finding of bad faith required reversal and remand for
a new hearing directed to that issue.
Before a proper finding of a frivolous claim may be made under a statute authorizing
Page 6
fee awards against attorneys on that basis, it is necessary for the trial court to find that the
attorney knew that the action was without any reasonable basis in law and could not be
supported by a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, held the court, in Radlein v Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. (1984) 117 Wis 2d
605, 345 NW2d 874. The court stated a two-pronged test for determining an attorney's
responsibility in sanctions for commencing a frivolous action: first, is the law ready for an
extension, modification, or reversal; and if not, then second, was the argument for such
change made in good faith even though not successful. Frivolous action claims are an
especially delicate area, said the court, since the ingenuity, foresightedness, and
competency of the bar should be encouraged and not stifled. In this case, however, the
court decided that a special hearing before the trial court on the issue of frivolousness was
not necessary, because the attorney had been placed on notice to defend his position both in
the trial court and on appeal. The court affirmed the award against the attorney, observing
that there was no possible reasonable argument for his theory.
See Williams v Capps Trailer Sales, Inc. (1992, Ala App) 607 So 2d 1272.
Trial court did not satisfy requirements for exercising its inherent authority to impose
attorney fees against an attorney for bad faith conduct when it ordered husband's counsel to
remit one half of his fees received to wife's counsel, where trial court did not permit
husband's counsel to present witnesses or other evidence in his defense, trial court did
not make an express finding of bad faith or findings justifying the relief ordered, and
order did not show how the fees awarded directly related to the fees incurred as a
result of the alleged bad faith conduct by husband's counsel. Finol v. Finol, 912 So. 2d
627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005), related reference, 2005 WL 2373889 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005) and reh'g denied, (Nov. 7, 2005).
Petitioner's request for costs and expenses of litigation, including attorney fees, did not
provide notice to respondent's attorney that she could be held liable for attorney fees under
statute that awarded fees in situations where an attorney brought or defended an action that
lacked substantial justification; there was no motion requesting attorney fees from attorney,
Page 7
there was no mention that the trial court was considering an award against attorney, and the
notice of the hearing contained no reference to the statute that awarded fees against
attorneys for bringing or defending an action that lacked substantial justification or to the
possibility that attorney could be assessed attorney fees for her conduct; overruling Cohen
v. Feldman, 219 Ga.App. 90, 464 S.E.2d 237. West's Ga.Code Ann. 9-15-14(b).
Williams v. Cooper, 625 S.E.2d 754 (Ga. 2006). See Kukui Nuts of Hawaii, Inc. v R.
Baird & Co. (1990, Hawaii App) 789 P2d 501.
Further, it cannot be said that Mr. Coughlin unreasonably and vexatiously extended a
civil action or proceeding before any court in this State. In Eberly v Eberly (1985, Del
Sup) 489 A2d 433, a divorce action, the court assessed attorney fees against a lawyer who
has acted in bad faith or willfully abused the judicial process, sanctioning the wife's
attorney for tactics that unreasonably and vexatiously prolonged the proceedings and
increased the cost of representation to both parties. These tactics included filing repeated
motions to hold the husband in contempt for failure to pay alimony on time, even though
the husband was hospitalized and had explained to the trial court the good faith efforts he
was making to meet his obligations, and advising his client to deny that the marriage was
irretrievably broken even though she had made such an allegation herself, in order to delay
the proceedings. The court ordered the amount of the husband's reasonable attorney fees
attributable to such tactics, both at trial and on appeal, to be determined on remand and
assessed against the wife's attorney personally.
The extent to which the Court deemed Mr. Coughlin conduct to be vexatious or
unreasonably prolonging the proceedings in this action seems to rest on a finding that Mr.
Coughlin argued incessantly with the Court throughout trial and made sarcastic,
derogatory remarks to the Court, Mr. Springgate, and Mr. Joshi throughout trial. The Court
notes that there were well over 40 objections during four (4) hours of trial. Mr. Coughlin
is obliged to make such objections given that his failure to do so will prevent the
preservation of the various issues for appeal. Attorneys in Nevadas District Courts are
not obligated to take a continuing objection and contemporaneous objections are
Page 8
supportable conduct under all applicable rules. One of Mr. Coughlins arguments with
respect to an objection concerned the admissibility of evidence of abuse or domestic
violence for the purposes of establishing monetary damages to be considered in the
property or debt distribution as well as any alimony determination. There is Nevada case
law that arguably sets the precedent that the admission of evidence of such conduct for the
purpose offered is mandatory. See Catherine Mazzeo, Note, Rodriguez v. Rodriguez:
Fault as a Determinative Factor in Alimony Awards in Nevada and Other Community
Property Jurisdictions, 2 NEV. L.J. 177, 182-83 (2002). The economic consequences of
spousal abuse or marital misconduct can provide compelling reasons for unequal
disposition of community property. Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d
200 (1997). In Rodriguez, the Nevada Supreme Court added example of factors that
conceivably could from time to time be relevant as well such as repetitive acts of
physical or mental abuse by one spouse causing a condition in the injured spouse which
generates expense or affects that persons ability to work. In Wheeler, the Nevada
Supreme Court recognized that sometimes marital misconduct results in adverse
economic consequences for one of the parties. 113 Nev. at 1190, 946 P.2d at 203. We
determined that a district court may consider evidence of the economic consequences of
marital misconduct in determining whether an unequal division of community property is
warranted. See id.
Further, the Rodriguez Court seemed to suggest that evidence of spousal abuse could
factor in to an alimony analysis, not so much as a fault factor, but as a part of an analysis of
the factors specifically set forth by statute or Buchanan. Moreover, an exception is
unnecessary. Nevada has well settled case law that provides guidelines for the trial court to
consider when making a just and equitable alimony award. So, for example, if one spouse
commits repetitive acts of physical or mental abuse against the other, causing a condition
in the injured spouse which generates expense or affects that person's ability to work, the
physical and/or mental condition caused by the misconduct can be taken into account in
two ways: first, as a compelling reason to make an unequal distribution of property or
Page 9
second, without considering evidence of fault or misconduct, the court in deciding

alimony will, per Buchanan, take that spouse's physical and mental condition into account
when examining his or her financial condition, health and ability to work. Id. at 998-99.
Mr. Coughlin sought to have this issue introduced at trial for both debt distribution and
alimony, however the Court ruled against it. To the extent that the sanctions issued relate
to a lack of evidence presented, documentary or otherwise, such an inadmissibility ruling
presents a Catch-22. Mr. Coughlin should not be sanctioned in such a situation.
Mr. Springgate seemingly misstated the holding of the Nevada Supreme Court in
Rodriguez to the Court. Mr. Coughlin should not be sanctioned for arguing objections
based on mandatory precedent in support of his position at trial. A similar argument exists
for Mr. Coughlin objecting to Mr. Springgates violation of WDCR 5 and the Courts own
Pre-Trial Order with respect to attempting to have exhibits introduced into evidence
without properly identifying such exhibits previously and where Mr. Springgate failed to
comply with court rules by neglecting to provide an appropriate copy of such exhibits at
the appropriate time.
The Courts Order After Trial is instructive in pointing out the difference between
providing a copy of a document and providing a copy of an appropriately identified and
marked exhibit. When asked if he had the copy of the document, Mr. Coughlin stated, "I
do not know. I could spend my time and mental energy looking around for Mr. Springgate's
document like I am his assistant, or we could ask Mr. Springgate to provide a copy at the
time he is seeking admission like I believe the rule states." Mr. Coughlin cited no rule and
then proceeded to interrupt the proceedings twice approximately five (5) minutes and
twelve(12) minutes post ruling to re-argue the point. Mr. Springgate replied to the
arguments by referencing when exactly the copy had been provided to Mr. Coughlin during
discovery and where the copy could be located. The Court had to admonish Mr. Coughlin
to quit arguing the point and reiterated that the exhibit had been admitted. (Emphasis
added).
There is a significant difference between a document and an exhibit. An
Page 10
inappropriate advantage is granted a party who can deliver a large quantity of documents in
the 16.2 production, only to subsequently fail to ever properly mark or identify which of
these documents it chooses to make exhibits, and who then refuses to provide a copy of the
exhibit at the time its introduction is sought at trial. This places an inappropriate burden on
the receiving party to index, categorize, and maintain the 16.2 production of the party
seeking introduction of a document as an exhibit. WDCR 5 was enacted for a reason, and
this very situation argues in favor of enforcing WDCR 5 and the Courts own Pre-Trial
Order. Granting Mr. Springgate such an advantage is unfair, particularly where Mr.
Springgate never filed a Case Management Conference Statement, filed his Settlement
Conference Statement at 5 p.m. the day before trial (in contravention of WDCR 5 as well),
improperly indicated in his Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration that two
Settlement Conferences had taken place in this case when only one existed (and the one
Settlement Conference was actually combined with the first day of trial in deference to Mr.
Springgates request and suggestion that the parties do so in the interest of judicial
economy and, presumably, to keep Mr. Springgates fees down for his clients benefit), and
where Mr. Springgate failed to comply with the Courts direction that he draft a Final
Decree from the Courts Order After Trial within 20 days of that Orders date of entry.
Mr. Springgate holds opposing counsel to an extraordinarily high standard considering
some of the areas in which his own execution is lacking. Further, Mr. Springgate actually
tried to argue that opposing counsels prudence in seeking to ascertain the availability of
having Mr. Joshis passport put in the Courts custody pending the resolution of this matter
or the state of the law with regard to the propriety of a spouse retaining the other spouses
passport during a divorce proceeding was tantamount to extortion. Mr. Springgate was
threatening sanctions even at that early stage of this litigation. Surprisingly, Mr.
Springgate did not assert a RICO or FDCPA claim at that time as well. Mr. Joshis failure
to ever contact anyone in his family (despite he and Mr. Springgate's attesting on
approximately 15 occasions that they would do so) with regard to returning Ms. Joshis
womans wealth or Mr. Joshis dubious inability to remember anything about his
Page 11
cultures customs in this regard seemingly were not relevant to Mr. Springgate's passport
issue analysis.
Regardless, Judge Schumacher did not see fit to enter sanctions, as such, the law of the
case doctrine bars Judge Gardner from relying on that issue to support the present sanction.
It is simply in poor taste for counsel to constantly use the threat of sanctions in lieu of
actually producing some written legal authority or precedent to support the positions or
demands Mr. Springgate seeks to maintain. It seems Mr. Springgate would rather prefer to
attempt to intimidate, threaten calling for sanctions, or suggest what a small little
community the family law bar is and how quickly word gets around, as opposed to present
cogent legal analysis.
The Courts Order After Trial further notes that Mr. Coughlin filed an Answer and
Counterclaim on Ms. Joshi's behalf that included allegations unsupported by law. Page
13. The parties have two children, both of whom are now adults. Although Mr. Yoshi
(sic) has no obligation to support said children any longer pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b),
Ms. Yoshi (sic) requests the financial assistance of Mr. Yoshi (sic) so as to provide for the
children's continuing education. (Answer, pg. 2, lines 16-18). Id. at page 2. Mr. Coughlin
clearly stated, on several occasions, during the Settlement Conference, to Ms. Joshi and
Judge Gardner, that there was little support for the claim Ms. Joshi continued to urgently
implore Mr. Coughlin to present, that of support for the continuing education of the partys
children, who both recently reached the age of majority. Mr. Coughlin counseled Ms.
Joshi, in front of Judge Gardner and out loud, that there was little to no chance that Judge
Gardner would rule favorably for Ms. Joshi on that issue.
Mr. Coughlins Motion for Reconsideration, however, does establish that there is a
basis in law for seeking such a contribution. As such, sanctions are inappropriate to the
extent they are based on this issue, an issue which not a second of court time at trial was
spent. Judge Gardner was present and across the table when Mr. Coughlin implored his
client to accept Judge Gardners strong indication that the ongoing child support or
educational costs contribution issue for the adult children was a dead end that would likely
Page 12
try the courts patience.

Mr. Coughlin presents a wealth of legal precedent and authority in support of the
position taken at trial, much coming from community property jurisdictions. Indeed, the
sum of American jurisprudence suggests the majority rule with respect to an offset of
alimony and joint obligations to third parties is in line with the position argued by Mr.
Coughlin at trial.
For example, the request to offset the husband's payment of a pre-existing joint
obligation against a support obligation was denied when categorized by the court as a
request by the husband for contribution of the wife's share of a pre-existing joint
obligation. Maloof v Maloof, 1991 Ohio App LEXIS 523 (Ohio App, Cuyahoga Co.
1991). It should be noted that the court also found that the spouses did not agree to the
offset. Id.
It is debatable whether the credit card debt Mr. Joshi asked the court to consider in
failing to award alimony is a joint obligation. Mr. Joshi was the sole signatory on all the
credit accounts for which he presented debt at trial. While Nevadas community property
law presumes such debts were incurred for the benefit of the community, and as such, joint
obligations, the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act and Nevadas common law doctrine of
necessaries arguably do not expose Ms. Joshi to any liability for these debts on the facts
presented, and certainly there is little chance of personal liability being attributed to Ms.
Joshi. Further, the ability of these third party creditors to actually get and enforce any sort
of judgment against Ms. Joshi is arguably infinitesimally small, if not barred by federal law
and or the FDCPA. See, Articles or services for husband personally as "family expenses"
or "necessaries," within statute making wife liable therefore, 13 A.L.R. 1396.
In an action by a hospital against a wife to recover the reasonable value of hospital
services furnished during the last illness of her late husband, who died leaving no property,
and who had not abandoned or deserted his wife or secured a decree of separate
maintenance, the court held in Swogger v Sunrise Hospital, Inc., 88 Nev 300, 496 P2d 751
(1972) , that in view of a statute providing that a wife must support her husband out of her
Page 13
separate property when he had no separate property, they had no community property, and
he could not support himself, the wife's separate property was liable for the hospital debt
incurred by her husband. It accordingly affirmed a judgment of the lower court in favor of
the hospital. As a general rule, the court explained, the separate property of a wife is not
liable for the debts of her husband. It pointed out, however, that the statute in question was
an exception to the rule. The duty to support as provided in the statute, the court explained,
necessarily ran to the benefit of creditors, such as the hospital, who supplied necessaries of
life to an infirm, impecunious husband.
The facts presented in the marital dissolution at bar do not support finding Ms. Joshi
liable on a doctrine of the necessaries analysis, as Mr. Springgate suggested at trial and
throughout this litigation. Mr. Joshi is currently an able bodied and employed adult. There
was no showing that Mr. Joshi could not support himself.
The court in Keck v Keck, (1933) 219 Cal 316, 26 P2d 300, reversed an order which in
effect allowed a husband to offset a pre-existing judgment debt in his favor against accrued
alimony owed his former wife, saying that alimony was founded on the marital duty of a
husband to support his wife and not an ordinary debt, and the two demands did not by
operation of law compensate and discharge one another under California Code of Civil
Procedure 440. Consequently, the court decided that the husband could not, in the
manner of an ordinary judgment debtor, as a matter of right, and by motion, avail himself
of the remedy provided for by the statute. The judgment against the wife, who had been
appointed as guardian of her husband for a period of years during the marriage, arose as the
result of a settlement of guardianship accounts.
Upon the wife's order to show cause, the court in Williams v Williams, (1970, 1st Dist)
8 Cal App 3d 636, 87 Cal Rptr 754, ruled that a husband could not automatically set off,
under California Code of Civil Procedure 440, his former wife's portion of a net deficit
resulting from the operation of a community property apartment house against either
alimony or child support arrearages for the reason that a support obligation was not an
ordinary debt but rather was a court-imposed marital duty. The husband had made none of
Page 14
the support payments provided for in a divorce decree, but managed, by agreement, the
apartment house, discharging the loss incurred in its operation by paying taxes, trust deed
payments, and for repairs and improvements, subsequently arguing that the past-due
support obligations and the apartment house deficit were "cross demands" within the
purview of the Code which should be deemed satisfied so far that they were equal. The
court ruled that to allow the set off of a wife's portion of a net deficit resulting from the
operation of a community property apartment house against the husband's alimony
arrearages would amount to a retroactive alteration of the alimony debt which had accrued,
in violation California Code of Civil Procedure 139.
Many courts adopt a view that the support recipient's control of support funds is a
consideration in determining other spouse's right to set off The courts in the following
cases expressed or recognized the view that a set off would not be permitted where the
supporting spouse usurped the right of the recipient of support to control those funds, but
allowed the requested set off, or found it supportable, where the supported spouse, by
agreeing to an alternative means of paying the support owed, was found to have controlled
the disbursement of the funds.
Observing that support payments, whether for the wife's or child's support, are to be
disbursed by the supported spouse as she sees fit, and the supporting spouse ordinarily is
not entitled to credits against past-due support for monies that he paid to third parties on
his own accord, the court in Lopez v Lopez, (1980, App) 125 Ariz 309, 609 P2d 579,
remanded the case for a new trial to determine whether the wife had consented to allow
certain indirect payments, made to doctors and dentists and others, to substitute for
payments to her of alimony and child support, and the grant of the requested credits
consequently allowable.
Where, as the result of a dispute between the spouses, the husband made direct
mortgage payments on a community property, those payments could not be set off against
alimony due his wife according to the court in Van Morkhoven v Kleiner, (1965, La App
3d Cir) 180 So 2d 601, under the rule that the wife was entitled to spend her alimony as she
Page 15
chooses. It was shown that soon after a judgment of separation, a dispute arose as to
whether the wife was required to pay from an award of alimony the monthly mortgage
payment on the community home which she occupied, which she refused to do. Thereupon,
the husband made the payments directly to the mortgage holder, deducting the same
amount from the alimony due her. The court applied the general test to determine what
payments made by the husband should be credited to alimony: whether the wife had the
unrestricted right to determine how the funds were disbursed. Disallowing credit for the
mortgage payments, the court found a clear restriction as to how the wife spent her
alimony.
Nevada case law supports the view that a Nevada court has no authority to permit set
off of a supported spouse's debt which was discharged in bankruptcy. Wheeler v. UptonWheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200 (1997). Also, it was decided in the cases related
below that it was beyond the authority of the court to enter a judgment against a spouse to
whom support was to be paid, subsequent to bankruptcy proceedings, in order to effect an
offset against the support obligation for marital debts, avoided by the spouse in bankruptcy,
that the supporting spouse was required to satisfy.
Where the wife's obligations, assumed as part of the property division pursuant to the
divorce, were discharged in bankruptcy, and those debts could in no way be considered
nondischargeable alimony or support, it was decided in Macy v Macy, (1986, Wyo) 714
P2d 774, that the court had no authority to enter a post-bankruptcy judgment for the
husband, to be offset against past-due child support, for payments he had paid, as codebtor, or might ultimately be required to pay in satisfaction of the marital debts. The
divorce decree ordered the husband to pay child support, and awarded to the wife a van, the
family home, and a floral business, all subject to the indebtedness incurred against them,
and required her to pay approximately $13,650 in other debts, including certain credit card
bills. The wife was discharged in bankruptcy with respect to all of these debts. However,
most of the arrears in child support accrued when the husband deducted payments made on
the credit card debts from the ordered child support. The judgment appealed by the wife
Page 16
allowed the husband to recover for all payments made on the discharged debts, then and in
the future. The court voided most of the provisions of the judgment due to the supremacy
of the federal bankruptcy law, the purpose of which was to afford the debtor a new
opportunity in life unhampered by pre-existing debt. Moreover, the court enjoined the
husband, as a creditor named in the bankruptcy proceedings, from trying in any fashion to
offset the debts in the future. The husband was allowed to recover for post-visitation air
fare he had paid in order to return the children to the wife when this obligation might be
categorized as nondischargeable support owed by the wife under the bankruptcy laws. The
court also was influenced in small measure by the principle that child support is for the
benefit of the children and only administered in trust for them by the wife.
And see, in the context of this discussion, Re Marriage of Mills, (1989, Iowa App) 441
NW2d 416, in which the court refused to allow the offset, against support arrears, of a lien
on the marital home owed to the husband under the terms of the decree, which survived
bankruptcy proceedings, based in some part on equitable grounds, when that wife lost the
home through foreclosure, rather than profited from its sale.
However, the Court in the present case seemed to find even the impression that Mr.
Coughlin might somehow contemplate such an application was sanctionable. Mr.
Coughlin cited an ALR article regarding community debt and stated his client "does not
have much for the creditors to take." He requested that his client assume one-half the
community debt and that the Court find Plaintiff's two $5,000 debts to family members and
friends as Mr. Joshi's separate debts. Mr. Coughlin stated his client is being asked to "foot
the bill" for Plaintiff's debts Order After Trial, Page 7.
The court in Maloof v Maloof, 1991 Ohio App LEXIS 523, (1991, Ohio App,
Cuyahoga Co), did not believe that it was error to deny a husband credit against his support
obligation for money paid in satisfaction of a deficiency judgment arising from the
foreclosure sale of the marital home, in some measure, because the original mortgage loan
for the property was undertaken by the spouses prior to their divorce and, as such, the debt
was not made on the credit of alimony awarded to the wife subsequently.
Page 17
Consequently, according to the court, the husband, as an assignee standing in the shoes of
the lending institution, the assignor, could not attach alimony and child support payments
to collect on the judgment when the lending institution could not have done so.
Where the husband sought credit for one-half the payments of debts on various jointly
owned properties, the court in Hanshaw v Hanshaw, (1988, W Va) 377 SE2d 470, held it
was proper to refuse to off set unpaid temporary alimony owed to the wife by such
payments when the debts were incurred prior to the spouses' separation.
The court in Morel v Morel (1982, La App 5th Cir) 425 So 2d 1289, cert den (La) 430
So 2d 99, ruled that payments, not in compliance with the support order, on a community
obligation incurred to purchase an automobile in possession of the wife were not available
to reduce arrears in alimony pendente lite and child support when those payments were
recoverable by the husband at the time of the settlement of the marital community, and the
wife did not agree that they should be made in lieu of support payments. The wife's later
request that the husband make the payments, together with several other indirect payments,
was found insufficient to prove an offset against arrears that accrued during the period at
issue.
A husband who had paid community automobile loan payments was properly denied
credit for his wife's share of such payments against his accrued alimony obligation to her
where the parties had not "clearly agreed" that the husband's payments on the vehicle were
in lieu of part of the alimony obligation, according to the court in Thompson v Thompson
(1983, La App 1st Cir) 428 So 2d 858. The rule applied by the court was that an alimony or
child support judgment remains in force until the party liable applies to the court and
obtains a modification, unless the party to whom payments are made requests or consents
to indirect payments or waives the payments. Although the wife had been aware that the
husband was making payments on the vehicle because she called the lender each month to
ask if he had, and she would have used any equivalent amount paid directly to her to
discharge the same debts, the court found that, at most, the wife had merely acquiesced in
the husband's payments on the vehicle rather than agreed to an alternative method of
Page 18
alimony payment. The court also noted that the husband admitted that there was no
mention of alimony at the time he expressed the desire to provide his wife with
transportation. The court did agree that the results in this case were inequitable, and that a
tacit understanding between two adults as the parties here obtained should be permissible
in law in those cases not involving child support. The court suggested that the husband was
free to seek appropriate credit for discharging a community obligation in a property
settlement with his wife, but rejected the argument that she was personally liable to him for
the amount paid under a theory of quasicontract.
Some courts have refused an offset when the obligation associated with an automobile
or residence was incurred prior to the divorce and, thus, the payment benefited the spouse
obligated to pay support as well.
Where the wife testified that she used the credit card to "balance out" household
expenses for herself and the children while the couple was separated, the court in
Youngberg v Youngberg (1986, La App 4th Cir) 499 So 2d 329, would not permit an offset
against postdivorce permanent alimony and child support arrearages for one-half of the
credit card charges. The husband had been ordered to pay alimony pendente lite and child
support during the period in which the charges were made, but was current in his payments
at that time, and asserted that the wife made the charges without the his permission. The
wife maintained that the credit card charges were for expenses for which the husband was
responsible. The court concluded that neither spouse intended such a credit when the
husband paid the credit card account balance, denying the offset apparently based on the
lack of evidence of an agreement between the parties.
In the following cases, in which the particular type of payment or debt was not
disclosed by the court or at issue, it was decided that a spouse was not entitled to the
requested set off against accrued alimony.
In Bruner v Bruner (1978, La App 2d Cir) 356 So 2d 1101, cert gr (La) 358 So 2d 641,
it was held that the trial court erred in allowing a husband credit or an offset against a
claimed arrearage of alimony pendente lite for payments made by him to third parties on
Page 19
his wife's behalf where the evidence did not show that the payments were made at the
request of, or with the consent of, his wife. Had Ms. Joshi consented to the settlement
agreement she was so urgently implored to accept, she could not avail herself of this
argument. A husband was not entitled to credit against arrears in pendente lite
maintenance and child support for voluntary payments he made to third parties for his
wife's benefit, according to the court in Krantz v Krantz (1991, 2d Dept) 175 App Div 2d
865, 573 NYS2d 738, on the ground that several of the payments also satisfied the
husband's contractual obligations.
Credit Matters:
Things are less than cheery for creditors pursuing premarital debt, or a debt incurred by
only one of the spouses after marriage. This is not Mr. Coughlins fault and he should not
be sanctioned on account of this. Nevada does, however, recognize the doctrine of
necessaries.
However, a curious duality existed in the Joshi Trial. The Court seemed to be
upset with Mr. Coughlin, implying some bad faith to the extent that the position Mr.
Coughlin argued might somehow take advantage of the creditors difficulty in forcing
Ms. Joshi to pay them on accounts to which Mr. Joshi is the sole signatory. The
Courts consternation in this regard was in strange incongruity to the claims of Mr.
Springgate that the doctrine of necessaries would necessarily aid these creditors in
executing upon Ms. Joshis property. It would seem one cannot have it both ways.
NRS 123.110 states a gender-based standard for when husbands must be supported by
wives:The wife must support the husband out of her separate property when he has no
separate property and they have no community property and he, from infirmity, is not able
or competent to support himself.
This statutory exception to the protection of separate property only applies if a creditor
supplies goods or services "necessary" for the life of the other spouse. Although the limits
of this have not been defined, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a husband cannot be
held personally liable under NRS 123.090 for the debts of his wife which were incurred
Page 20
pursuant to a contract to rent an automobile. Ferreira v. P.C.H. Inc., 105 Ney. 305, 774
P.2d 1041 (1989). Thus, it is likely that the word "necessary" will be narrowly construed by
the Nevada courts, therefore providing protection for the personal property of spouses. The
facts of the case at bar do not support holding Ms. Joshi personally liable for Mr. Joshis
attorneys fees, as Mr. Springgate stated the law required, nor do they support precluding
Ms. Joshi an appropriate alimony award in light of the fact that Mr. Joshi chose to be the
sole signatory on all his credit accounts. Mr. Joshi wanted the power and control of
being a sole signatory, he should not be rescued by the doctrine of the necessaries.
Regardless, Mr. Coughlin should not be sanctioned for failing to agree to such a rescue of
Mr. Joshi.
By way of analogy, Nevada case law has expressed the burden of proof as one of clear
and certain evidence that a lender or vendor primarily relied on that spouses separate
personal property to secure the credit rather than on that spouses earning capacity to
establish that loan proceeds are separate property. This is known as the intent of the
lender test. See Schulman v. Schulman, 92 Nev. 707, 716-17, 558 P.2d 525, 530-31
(1976). Conversely, the argument can be made that Mr. Joshis the debts on the accounts
to which Mr. Joshi is the sole signatory should not be viewed as community debts given
that the lender apparently did not consider Ms. Joshis status at all. Further, federal law
may prevent such consideration in the event Mr. Joshi qualified for credit on his own.
Creditors thus need to have the signature of both parties on an application for credit in
order pursue collection of the credit debt from both parties.
As a theoretical matter, creditors would appear to be restricted to collection against the
person (or property of the person) incurring the obligation, either during the marriage, or
after the divorce. At least when the creditor is someone other than a former spouse of one
of the parties to the marriage, as in Greear v. Greear, supra, 303 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1962).
As a practical matter, this restriction appears to provide no barrier; banks do not typically
care about the source of money in accounts being garnished, but only the name on the
account. (See, also, Dimick v. Dimick, 112 Nev. 402, 915 P.2d 254 (1996) (husbands
Page 21
signature of both spouses' names on a trade-out purchase agreement, and both parties
signatures on vesting instructions that would have made them joint tenants of the
property at the close of escrow, did not actually transfer any property interest to the wife)).
One notable exception by which one spouse can create a debt that becomes an
obligation of the other spouse as a matter of law is through the doctrine of necessaries,,
discussed above, although the stated statutory grounds for when husbands property is
liable for the support of wives is different from that in which wives property is liable for
the support of husbands.
The only appellate case discussing the 1873 statute for a husbands payment of
necessaries for a wife indicates that the terms necessary for her support and
necessities will be construed somewhat closely. In one such Nevada case, a husband was
found not liable for his wifes car rental for failure to provide adequately for her support
where there was no conversion of the automobile and no proof of community purpose in its
rental. This argues in favor of the position Mr. Coughlin argued at trial. Ferreira v. P.C.H.
Inc., 105 Ney. 305, 774 P.2d 1041 (1989); see, also, United Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland,
105 Nev. 504, 780 P.2d 193 (1989).
NRS 123.110 states a gender-based standard for when husbands must be supported by
wives: The wife must support the husband out of her separate property when he has no
separate property and they have no community property and he, from infirmity, is not able
or competent to support himself. If a debt is incurred during marriage and owed by both
spouses, nothing in the divorce decree prevents the creditor from chasing whichever spouse
it chooses for payment. Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe, 104 Nev. 307, 756 P.2d 1193
(1988). Whether one must be a signatory for the debt to be owed is somewhat dependent
on who is doing the enforcing, the creditor or a Family Court Judge and whether or not
more than one spouse was a signatory on the credit application. Of course, where such a
creditor chases one spouse for a debt allocated to the other upon divorce, the spouse
saddled with the others adjudicated debt has recourse to the divorce courts to obtain
reimbursement. See, e.g., Putterman v. Putterman, supra, 113 Nev. 606, 939 P.2d 1047
Page 22
(1997) (upholding the trial courts unequal division of community property for, among
other things, the husbands violation of a joint preliminary injunction by charging several
thousands of dollars in credit card debt after the separation, which the wife paid).
Strangely, while spouses cannot do so directly, to some extent the duty of support can
be enforced indirectly, but this seems primarily to benefit creditors, not a marketdisadvantaged spouse. Under the doctrine of necessaries the untitled spouse, in theory, is
allowed to pledge the other spouses credit to purchase a necessary. A creditorbut not a
spousemay have the right to sue to enforce the duty and collect the debt. For a recent
article arguing that the necessaries doctrine and the community property regime more
broadly, may place creditors rights above spouses, see Andrea Carroll, The Superior
Position of the Creditor in the Community Property Regime: Has the Community Become
a Mere Creditor Collection Device?, SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2007).
Creditors do rely on the support doctrine quite regularly, particularly medical care
providers. A typical example is where medical care is provided with the assumption that
the patient spouse will pay, but then does not. At that point (frequently after the death of
the patient spouse), the medical care provider attempts, often successfully, to establish
liability of the non-patient spouse based on the necessaries doctrine. The non-patient
spouse is often held accountable for the medical bills, and even non-marital wealth can be
reached. See, e.g., Jersey Shore Med. Ctr. Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003,
1010 (N.J. 1980). Courts have recently grappled with whether liability is sole, joint, or
primary and secondary. The trend seems to be toward primary liability for the debtor
spouse and secondary for the non-debtor. Mr. Joshis sole signatory debts are largely very
poor candidates for a doctrine of the necessaries approach towards Ms. Joshi by the various
creditors. Mr. Joshi did have about $7,000 of medical debt for a surgery, but to the extent
that Mr. Joshi seemingly had no idea what surgery was performed or why, it was arguably
not a necessary procedure. The fact that the hospital or medical provider apparently
wrote-off nearly $50,000 of the debt would argue against such an application as well.
The third party creditors in this case (especially considering the bulk of the debt is not
Page 23
medical debt) likely realize it is not at all clear they will have a right to get paid by Ms.
Joshi, and even if they do, it likely will take costly litigation to determine liability. See,
e.g., Marie T. Reilly, You and Me Against the World: Marriage and Divorce from
Creditors Perspective, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 195, 196 (Robin Fretwell
Wilson ed., 2006).
Mr. Joshis arguments concerning his sole signatory credit debts are largely based on
the illusory promise of the necessaries doctrine. For further discussion and citations
regarding the merchants burden of proof, see id. See, also, Mistaking Marriage for Social
Policy, Vivian Eulalia Hamilton, William & Mary Law School,Virginia Journal of Social
Policy and the Law, Vol. 11, p. 307, Spring 2004. The Settlement offered to Ms. Joshi
was, therefore, largely a chimera. Mr. Coughlin indicated as much in court. He should not
be sanctioned for that. Actually, one may consider Mr. Coughlins recognition of such an
arcane wrinkle in the law to be fairly impressive for an attorney being paid at the low end
of salaries for one in the legal profession. Such analysis does not come without substantial
dedication. This seemingly would not be a reason to levy a sanction. Wherefore, the Order
should not be maintained, the Request for Reconsideration granted.
Dated this 20th day of May, 2009 by:

/signature/ Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
In Pro Per
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
945 W.12th St., Reno, NV 89503
Tel: 775 338 8118
Page 24

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq. and that on
the 12th Day of May, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within Reply to Opposition, fully addressed to:
John Springgate, Esq.
Attorney for Ashwin Bharti
Reno, NV 89501

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the
social security number of any person.
Dated this 20th Day of May, 2009.
/signature/ Melissa Ulloa

Melissa Ulloa
Agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Page 25
INDEX TO EXHIBITS
1. Exhibit #1- Thirty (30) pages long.
Page 26
Code 2475
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Bar No. 9473
945 W. 12'h St.
Reno, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 811 8
on behalf of himself

II
Case No.: DV0 8-011 68
12
IJ
Ashwin Joshi,
Dept. 14
14
15
Plaintiff,
16
17
vs.
Bharti Joshi,
18
19
21
22
2J
24
25
Defendant
MOTION TO STRIKE; or in the alternative Mr. Coughlin's OBJECTIONS TO

PLAINTIFF'S REOUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF DIVORCE; AND 2) MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REOUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED DECREE OF
DIVORCE
COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq., on behalf of himself (and not on behalf of his
26
former client Ms. Joshi) with respect to the personally liability for attorney's fees
27
pursuant to NRS 7. 0 85, and commenting to the Court in regard to his former
28
representation of the Defendant, Joshi Bharti, and moves the Court to grant his Motion
Page 1
to Strike the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, & DECREE OF

2
l
4
DIVORCE submitted by John Springgate, Esq. on May 22'd , 2009. This motion is
made and based upon the attached memorandum of points and authorities and all the
papers and pleadings on file in this action.
5
6
DATED this 29th of May, 2009
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
WDCR Rule 9 holds that "Preparation of findings, conclusions, and judgment. In a

non-jury case, where a judge directs an attorney to prepare findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and judgment, the attorney shall serve a copy of the proposed document upon
counsel for all parties who have appeared at the trial and are affected by the judgment.
19
Five days after service counsel shall submit the same to the court for signature together
20
with proof of such service."

21
Mr. Coughlin was not appropriately served a copy of this proposed Order by either
22
Mr. Springgate or anyone connected with Washoe Legal Services. It is important to

2l
24
25
26
27
28
note that Mr. Coughlin is not Ms. Joshi's attorney anymore, however, WDCR 9 calls for
the attorney, here Mr. Springgate per the court's instructions, to "serve a copy of the
proposed document upon counsel for all parties who have appeared at the trial and are
affected by the judgement."
Mr. Coughlin is arguably a intervening real party in interest, though he has not
Page 2
technically made such an appearance. Mr. Coughlin is likely not a "party" for the
2
J
4
5
purposes of a NRAP 3A analysis (attorney representing a client in a case is not a party to

the action and does not have standing to appeal. Albany v. Arcata Associates, 106 Nev.
688, 799 P 2d 566 (1990). However, the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, & DECREE OF DIVORCE Mr. Springgate has submitted does affect Mr.
Coughlin. Further the proposed final decree Mr. Springgate submitted does not contain
a sufficiently detailed or specific recitation of why attorney's fees sanctions were entered,
8
as called for by NRCP 11 and NRS 7.085. By way of analogy such specificity was
9
10
required in Houston v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 51 (2006).
Mr. Coughlin is not Ms. Joshi's attorney; however, to some extent Mr. Coughlin
11
12
1J
will be affected by the shape Ms. Joshi winds up in after all is said and done in this
divorce matter. As such Mr. Coughlin would like to voice his objection (while
14
requesting and reserving additional time to have an appropriate opportunity, in
15
compliance with WDCR 9 to review the proposed Order and voice further objections)
16
with respect to the proposed final decree's amibiguity, and or silence, with respect to the
17
characterization of the debt distributed and whether such a distribution is in some way a
18
form of alimony in light of the restrictions found in 1 1
19
(15).
20
USC
523(a)(5) and 523(a)
Under 523(a)(15), many courts have held that there must be "hold harmless" or
21
other indemnification language in a divorce decree in order for one spouse to be
22
obligated to avoid discharge. See, In re: LaRue, 204 B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
2J
1997) Hold harmless agreements and indemnity provisions contained in divorce decrees
24
are often times characterized as non-dischargeable support awards in bankruptcy,
25
although the underlying debts to third parties may still remain dischargeable. Bailey v.
26
Bailey, 254 B.R 901 (6thCir. B.A.P. 2000). The debt is non-dischargeable to the ex
27
spouse to extent that the other party is required to pay it. Sanders v. Lanfare, 187 B.R.
28
Page 3
588 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1996). Other courts have held that debts owed to third parties may
2
J
4
5
not qualify for non-dischargeability under 523 (a)(5) and (a)(15) without a hold
harmless provision creating the debt to the ex-spouse. Gibson v. Gibson, 201 B.R. 1 13
(Bankr N.D.Oh. 1997); McCracken v. LaRue, 204 B.R. 531,535 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1997).
Pursuant to 523(a)(5), "a given domestic obligation is not dischargeable ifit is

7
'actually in the nature of' alimony, maintenance, or support." In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902,
8
904 (11 th Cir.1 985). Whether a given debt is in the nature of support is an issue of
9
10
11
12
IJ
federal law. In re Strickland, 90 F.3d 444, 446 (II th Cir.1996). Although federal law
controls, state law does "provide guidance in determining whether the obligation should
be considered 'support' under 523(a)(5)" Id. To make this determination a bankruptcy
court should undertake "a simple inquiry as to whether the obligation can legitimately be
14
characterized as support, that is, whether it is in the nature of support." In re Harrell, 754
15
F.2d at 906.
16
In conducting this inquiry, a court cannot rely solely on the label used by the
17
parties. As other courts have recognized, "'it is likely that neither the parties nor the
18
divorce court contemplated the effect of a subsequent bankruptcy when the obligation
19
arose.' " In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 7 62 (3d Cir.1990) (citation omitted). The court
must therefore look beyond the label to examine whether the debt actually is in the
21
nature of support or alimony. Id. A debt is in the nature of support or alimony if at the
22
time of its creation the parties intended the obligation to function as support or alimony.
lJ
See In re Brody, 3 F.3d 35, 3 8 (2d Cir.1993); In re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 723-24
24
( lOth Cir.1993); In re Davidson, 947 F.2d 1 294, 1296-97 (5th Cir.l991); In re Gianakas,
25
917 F.2d at 762; Williams v. Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1 057-58 (8th Cir.1983). Thus,
26
"the party seeking to hold the debt nondischargeable has the burden of proving by a
27
preponderance of the evidence that the parties intended the obligation as support.... " In
28
Page 4
re Sampson, 997 F. 2d at 723.

2
l
4
5
However, the above analysis and precedent must be considered in light of the
recent BAPCP A, as at least one court has ruled that debt arising from a divorce decree
was non-dischargeable even where it was not alimony or support. Proctor v. Tulloss,
Adv. No. 06-4112, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1571 (Bankr. N.D. Ga., March 21, 2007).
(Debtor's obligation, pursuant to a divorce decree, to pay for ex-spouse's vehicle was
non-dischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(15).) The BAPCPA amendments also

8
omit any time limt for contesting the dischargeability of such debts.
9
10
11
12
1J
Further,
it is
unclear whether the stipulations to extend the time for filing a Motion
for Reconsideration allows for filing such a proposed decree at this time or the extent to
which that stipulation applied to Mr. Coughlin's interests, albeit the fact that this Court
has entered an Order Denying Mr. Coughlin's Motion for Reconsideration (though
14
apparently entered prior to receiving Mr. Coughlin's Reply to Opposition) may be
15
dispositive in that regard.
16
17
Accordingly, the undersigned asks the Court to strike the proposed final decree
given the non compliance with WDCR 9 and the other objections cited above.
18
19
20
21
22
2J
24
25
26
27
28
Page 5
2
AND
MAILING
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an agent ofZach Coughlin, Esq. and that on
the 29
th
day of May, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within MOTION TO STRIKE; or in the alternative Mr. Coughlin's OBJECTIONS TO

5
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF FINDINGS OF F ACT,

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND
DECREE OF DIVORCE; AND 2) MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED DECREE OF

DIVORCE, fully addressed to
JOHN P. SPRTNGGATE, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Marc Ashley, Esq. or Caryn Sternlicht, Esq.
Reno, NY 89501
16
17
AFFIRMAnON PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030
18
19
20
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the
social security number of any person.
21
22
Dated this 29
th
Day of May, 2009
2J
24
25
Melissa
,...
26
27
Melissa Ulloa
Agent ofZach Coughlin, Esq.
28
Page 6
IN THE FAMILY DIVISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
--...:. b \
_ :!..L!L. Ji'
' ..:....
__'B'I.J'!::.!.!...L _VS-=-' _o_s l\..'---I
_
_
__
_
FAMILY COURT
MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE
(REQUlRED)
CASE NO
DEPT NO.
\\l
oil 6Y
Mark the CORRECT ANSWER with an
NO
YES
X.
I. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in thIs

, then continue to Question 2. Ifno, you do not
case? If
need 10 answer any other questions.
2. Is this a mohon or an opposition to a motion filed to

, then continue to Question 3. If
change a final order? If
no. you do not need to answer any other questions.
3. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed only to
change the amount of child support?
4. Is this a motion or an Opposilion to a motion for

reconsideration or a new trial and the motion was filed
within 10 days of the Judge's Order?
IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the filing

date found on the front page of the Judge's Order.
B.
THIS MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE MUST BE ATTACHED AS THE

LAST PAGE to every motion or olher paper filed pursuant to chapter 125, 125B
or 125C ofNRS and to any answer or response to such a motion or other paper.
NOTICE:
A.
0 vo j
[XJ (Jg
D Iv I
0
D C?J
/
Date
If you answered NO 10 either Question I or 2 or YES to QuestlOn 3 or 4, you are exempt

from the $25.00 filing fee However, if the Court later determines you should have paid the
filing fee, your motion will not be decided until the $25.00 fee is paid.
I affirm t
Dale
at the answers provided on thisNotice are true.
,.lh, 01
I
)
(1
SIgn ature
PnntName
Print Address
'
/:/'
'L
'/'
--2 "'-.. c\
q"') \ k4=r,J '>
......
.
'\ '\..
Telephone Number:
Rev. 10/24/2002
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: COUGHLIN HAS THINGS HE PUT BATES STAMPS ON AS WELL...DOES THAT PROVE KING OPERATED
FRAUDULENTLY IN MAINTAINING THAT THE FHE3 SOMEHOW WAS EVIDENCE OF SOME MISCONDUCT?
FILED
2
3
Electronically
06-19-2009:09:57:23 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
CODE: 1745
1745
JOHN
SPRINGGATE,
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar #1350
203 South Arlington Avenue
Reno, NV
Reno,NV 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff

IN THE FAMIL Y DIVISION
6
7

8
8
9
*****
*****
ASHWIN JOSHI,
JOSHI,
10
Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
11
11
vs.
12
12
CASE NO.: DV08-01168
BHARTIJOSHI,
BHARTIJOSHI,
13
13
14
14
14
DEPT. NO.: 14
Defendant.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----'1
--------/
15
15
FINDINGS OF FACT,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND DECREE OF DIVORCE
16
16
17
17
trial
11,
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before this Court on March 11, 2009 and
18
12,2009.
JOSHI, Plaintiff,
counsel,JOHN
18 March 12,2009. ASHWINJOSHI,Plaintiff,was present and represented by his counsel,JOHN
19
19
SPRINGGATE, ESQ.
JOSHI, Defendant,
P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ. BHARTI JOSHI, Defendant, was present and represented by her
20
counsel,
COUGHLIN,
Trial
counsel, ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ. The Court issued its Order After Trial which was filed on
21
April 13, 2009.

13,
22
23
FINDINGS OF FACT
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
1.
Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Nevada,and for a period of more than six (6)
of
of Nevada,
of
Plaintiff
ofthis
weeks
24 weeks before commencement of this action has resided and been physically present and domiciled
25
26
of
in the State of Nevada.
2.
2.
of
of Nevada,
of
Defendant is a resident of the State of Nevada,and for a period of more than six
27
(6) weeks before commencement of this action has resided and been physically present and
of
28
of
the
domiciled in the State of Nevada.
3.
2
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on May 11, 1987 in Bombay, India, and ever
Plaintiffand
since that date have been, and now are, Husband and Wife.
Wife.
4.
4.
ofthis
of
adults.
There
There are two children of this marriage, both of whom are now adults.
5.
5.
Defendant is not pregnant at this time.
6.
6.
Plaintiff
have
Plaintiff and Defendant have become, and continue to be, incompatible in
marriage, and no reconciliation is possible.
7.
7.
of Plaintiff
NV 89434.
The current address of Plaintiff is 1644 Fieldcrest Drive, Sparks, NV 89434.
8.
8.
of
Reno, NV
The current address of Defendant is 260 Booth Street, Apt. Q, Reno, NV 89509.
9.
9.
of
of
The Court adopts, as Findings of Fact, each and every Conclusion of Law below,
10
10
which by this reference are expressly incorporated herein.
11
11
12
13
13
14
15
15
16
17
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
1.
JURISDICTION. This Court has jurisdiction of Plaintiff and Defendant, and of

JURISDICTION.
of
of
the subject matter herein.

herein.
2.
Plaintiff
of
GROUNDS. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from Defendant on the
grounds of
grounds of incompatibility.
3.
Joshi will
CHILD SUPPORT/ADULT CHILDREN'S EDUCATION. MrJoshi will not be
held
of
of
held responsible for the continuing education of the adult children of this marriage.
18
18
4.
4.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY/DEBT.
19
19
A)
A)
sole
Women's Wealth: The "women's wealth" at issue herein is the sole and separate
20
of
Plaintiff
property of the Defendant. Plaintiff is to contact any and all relatives who may
21
them
have this property and immediately ask them to return said property to the
22
Defendant as soon as possible.
23
B)
B)
Joshi's
Mr.Joshi's Vehicle: The 2005 Chevrolet Blazer shall be considered as Plaintiff's
24
sole and separate property and Plaintiffshall be responsible for the debt remaining
Plaintiff shall
25
thereon. Since the car is worth about $10,910.00 and there is $15,009.75 due and
there
26
Joshi's
of
owing on the vehicle, Mr. Joshi's assumption of this asset is to be considered as
27
of
of
an undertaking of community debt of approximately $4,100.00.
28
-2
-2-
C)
C)
Ms. Joshi's Vehicle: Ms. Joshi's

Ms. Joshi's Vehicle: Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered as her sole and separate
2
2
property and she shall be responsible

property and she shall be responsible for any debt remaining thereon. Since no
3
3
evidence was presented to

evidence was presented to the Court as to the value of the auto, either positive or
of
4
4
negative, there is no value for this community asset.

negative,
value
5
5
D)
D)
6
6
Son's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will not be divided
Son's Vehicle: This vehicle
among the community.
7
7
E)
E)
8
8
Daughter'S Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will not be
Daughter's Vehicle:
divided among the community.
9
9
F)
10
10
London Bank Account: There is no factual basis to support that this account exists
London Bank Account:
factual
this
and therefore it is not being considered a community asset.
11
11
G)
Community Bank Accounts: There is no factual basis to support that community

factual
12
12
bank accounts exist and therefore the same is not being considered a community
not
13
13
asset.
14
14
H)
H)
15
15
Computer: The computer which was purchased at Best Buy is awarded to Mr
Joshi.
Joshi.
I)
16
16
was
Best
Television: Ms. Joshi is awarded the television which was purchased at Best Buy.
17
17
Said
Said television is currently in Ms. Joshi's possession and shall be deemed her sole
18
18
and separate property.

J)
19
19
of
General Credit Card Debt: There is general debt of approximately
$15,650.00
20
20
has
Joshi has
which has been expended for community purposes. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be
21
responsible for this debt and the same shall be considered as his sole and separate
22
22
responsibility.
K)
K)
23
23
of
Buy
Card
Best Buy Credit Card Debt: There is an approximately balance of
$1,314.00
$1,314.00
24
ofthe
has
outstanding for the purchase of the television and computer. Mr. Joshi has agreed
25
25
to be responsible for this debt and the same shall be considered as his sole and
this
same shall
his
26
26
separate responsibility.
27
27
III
28
28
III
-3
-3-
L)
L)
Medical Debt: There is a debt due to St. Mary's Hospital for $6,735.00 and a debt to
2
2
Joshi
responsible
REMSA for $500.00. Mr.Joshi has agreed to be responsible for these debts and the
3
3
same shall be considered as his sole and separate responsibility.

responsibility.
M)
M)
4
4
Family Debt: There is a debt due to Ashik Nanaby and a $5,000.00 debt due to Rod
$5,
000.00
5
5
and Meena Fowler. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be responsible for these debts and the
Joshi
6
6
same shall be considered as his sole and separate responsibility.

responsibility.
N)
N)
7
7
General Community Debt: There was no evidence to establish community debt. Mr.
Community
Joshi
Joshi agreed to take the remaining community debt in his name that is outstanding
8
8
9
9
and the debt shall be his sole and separate responsibility. It should be noted that Mr.
responsibility.
10
10
of
of
Joshi
Joshi has likely incurred an unequal distribution of the community debt of the parties
11
11
compelling
and the Court finds his testimony to be a compelling reason for making an unequal
12
12
distribution of the community debt.

of
5.
13
13
Support:
Joshi
Joshi
the
Spousal Support: The Court has found that Mr.Joshi is 51 and Ms.Joshi is 46; the
14
14
Joshi has
parties earn roughly equivalent amounts; the parties have been married 21 years but Ms. Joshi has
15
15
always been employed during that time; Ms. Joshi has a college degree; both parties are able to
to
Joshi
16
16
of
taxes,
in
work; and after consideration of the net income, deduction of taxes,and the amount paid in
income,
17
17
of
be
Joshi,
community debt by Mr. Joshi, an award of alimony in the amount of one dollar ($1.00) shall be
18
18
awarded to Ms.Joshi pursuant to NRS 125.150, Woljfv. Wolff 112 Nev. 1355,929 P.2d 196,and
Joshi
125.150, Wolffv. Wolff,
196, and
19
19
Shydler v. Shydler, 194 Nev. 192, 196,954 P.2d 3 7,39 (1988).
(1988).
Shydler,
192,
37,
20
20
III
III
21
21
III
III
22
22
23
23
24
24
25
25
26
26
27
27
28
28
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
-4
-4-
JUDGEMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE

JUDGEMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
Plaintiff, ASHWIN JOSHI be,and he is, finally and absolutely divorced from Defendant,
JOSHI be,
is, finally
Plaintiff,
from Defendant,
BHARTIJOSHI, and that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Plaintiff ASHWIN
of
BHARTI JOSHI,
Plaintiff
JOSHI, and Defendant, BHARTI JOSHI, be,

are, dissolved,
JOSHI,and Defendant,BHARTIJOSHI,be, and they hereby are,dissolved, and the parties hereto
of
are restored to the status of single and unmarried persons.
7
7
2.
2.
ofBHARTI
There Defendant's name shall be restored to that of BHARTI R. DAVE.
3.
3.
matter,
The matter, as set forthin the preceding Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
of Fact,
Law,
9
9
of Divorce,
ratified, adopted,
Decree of Divorce, is hereby ratified, adopted, and approved, and the parties are
approved,
10
10
of
Ordered to comply with the terms of such.
11
11
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS SO ORDERED.

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS SO ORDERED.
12
12
13
13
Dated: JlUle
June
1 ~-;;;09.
1 -;;;09.
14
14
lui
15
15
.'
16
16
,1 \
/
/'~\'" . : L..~\
Lin M. Gardner
District Court Judge
Judge
17
17
18
18
19
19
20
20
21
21
22
22
23
23
24
24
25
25
26
26
27
27
28
28
-5
-5-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
1
2
3
4
54844
Zach Coughlin,
NV Supreme Ct. No.:_____
Petitioner,
District Ct. No.: DV08-01168
vs.
Electronically Filed
Oct 28 2009 08:49 a.m
Tracie K. Lindeman
8
9
The SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COURT of the State of Nevada, In and
10
For the COUNTY OF WASHOE and
11
the Honorable Linda Gardner , District
12
Judge,
13
Respondent
14
15
16
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
17
18
19
20
Petitioner
Attorney for Real Party in Interest
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

931 Forest St.
Reno, NV 89509
Nevada Bar No.: 9473

Reno, NV 89501
21
22
23
24
Real Party in Interest

Hon. Judge Linda Gardner
Second Judicial Dist. Ct. Dept. 14
Reno, NV 89501
1 S Sierra St
25
26
27
28
INDEX TO APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: Notice of Filing of Petition for Writ of Mandamus
APPENDIX B: Motion and Affidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
APPENDIX C: Affidavit of Zach Coughlin in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandamus
APPENDIX D: Petition for Writ of Mandate
APPENDIX E: Order After Trial
APPENDIX F: Petitioner Coughlin's Request for Reconsideration with Exhibits 1 and 2
APPENDIX G: Petitioner Coughlin's Reply to Opposition with Exhibit 1
APPENDIX H: Order Denying Request for Reconsideration
APPENDIX I: Order Denying Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
APPENDIX J: Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
1
2
3
4
Zach Coughlin,
NV Supreme Ct. No.:
Petitioner,
District Ct. No.: DV08-01168
6
VS.
7
The SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

9
COURT of the State of Nevada, In and
10
For the COUNTY OF WASHOE and
11
the Honorable Linda Gardner, District
12
Judge,
13
Respondent
14
15
16
17
18
19
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

Petitioner Zach Coughlin submits this PETITION FOR WRIT OF
MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION with the following Points and Authorities. This
20
Petition is brought pursuant to NRAP 21(a) for issuance of a writ of mandate

21
22
directing the district court to withdraw any sanctions against Petitioner. The issues
23
presented are whether the lower court's Order After Trial was appropriate with regard
24
to sanctioning Petitioner and whether it was sufficiently detailed in describing the
25
conduct sanctioned. The form of this Petition is summary in nature, with attachments
26
but without transcripts (though video of the entire trial does exist and may present a
27
28
more useful and economical approach for review). The relief sought is this Court's
Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Page 1
1
2
3
intervention by way of extraordinary writ, nullifying any sanctions issued against

Petitioner.
DATED this -26th
day of -October
2009.
4
5
6
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

931 Forest St.
Reno, NV 89509
Tel: 775 338 8118
Fax: 801 760 6207
10
11
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

12
13
14
15
1. STANDARD FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT

A writ of mandamus will issue to compel the performance of an act which the
law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, and where there is no
16
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Hickey v. District
17
18
Court, 105 Nev. 729, 782 P.2d 1336 (1989); NRS 34.160. A writ of mandamus is
19
available when the respondent has a clear, present legal duty to act, or to control an
20
arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman,
21
97 Nev. 601, 637 P.2d 534 (1981). The writ is the appropriate remedy to compel
22
performance of a judicial act. Solis-Ramirez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.

23
24
County of Clark, 112 Nev. 344, 913 P.2d 1293 (1996). Similarly, the purpose of a
25
writ of prohibition is not to correct errors, but to prevent courts from transcending
26
their jurisdiction, and they are issued to arrest the proceedings of a district court
27
exercising its judicial functions when those proceedings are in excess of the
28
Page 2
jurisdiction of that court; it also is to issue where there is no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy at law. Guerin v. Guerin, 114 Nev. 127, 953 P.2d 716 (1998);
Gladys Baker Olsen Family Trust v. District Court, 110 Nev. 548, 874 P.2d 778
(1994); NRS 34.320. The writ is the correct mechanism for prohibiting the use of
5
6
7
enforcement orders effectuating an underlying order that was issued without

jurisdiction. Golden v. Averill, 31 Nev. 250, 101 P. 1021 (1909). As to both varieties
of writs, they are intended to resolve legal, not factual disputes. Round Hill Gen. Imp.
Dist., supra. The Court may in its discretion treat a petition for writ of mandamus as
10
one for prohibition, or vice versa, or treat a notice of appeal interchangeably as a

11
12
Petition for a Writ. Messner v. District Court, 104 Nev. 759, 766 P.2d 1320 (1988);
13
In re Temporary Custody of Five Minors, 105 Nev. 441, 777 P.2d 901 (1989). In this
14
case, the essential facts are somewhat in disupte (although, as noted below, that some
15
of the lower court's commentary in dicta is arguably unsupportable), and the main
16
disputes are as to matters of law, going both to a duty to act, and a duty to refrain
17
18
from acting, both of which duties arguably have been violated by the lower court,
19
requiring an order by way of an extraordinary writ from this Court.
20
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
21
A Complaint for Divorce was filed by ASHWIN JOSHI (hereinafter Mr. Joshi),
22
23
by and through his attorney, JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ., on July 8, 2008. An
24
Answer and Counterclaim was filed by BHARTI JOSHI (hereinafter'Ms. Joshi'), by
25
and through her attorney of record, ZACHARY B.COUGHLIN, ESQ., on July 18,
26
2008. Argument was heard on March 12, 2009 and March 17,2009. Mr. Joshi was
27
28
present and represented by John P. Springgate, Esq.; and Ms. Joshi, was present and
Page 3
1
2
3
represented by Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., for Washoe Legal Services.

The District Court entered and Order After Trial on April 13th, 2009 sanctioning
attorney Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin ceased representing Ms. Joshi. Mr. Coughlin
filed a Motion for Reconsideration followed by an Opposition followed by a

5
6
7
Reply followed by a denial of Mr. Coughlin Motion for Reconsideration. The

District Court subsequently entered a Final Order (after Mr. Coughlin had ceased
representing Ms. Joshi) that awarded alimony. The District Court's Order After
Trial sanctioned Mr. Coughlin, at least in part, for seeking alimony.
10
11
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT' S ORDER AFTER TRIAL ISSUING

SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT STAND
12
Pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b), the court has authority to order attorney's fees
13
14
"when the court finds that the... defense of the opposing party was brought or
15
maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party." Further,
16
pursuant to NRS 7.085, if a court finds that an attorney has: (a) filed, maintained or
17
defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such action or
18
defense is not well-grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by an

19
20
argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or (b)
21
unreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court
22
in this State, the court shall require the attorney personally to pay the additional
23
costs, expenses and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
24
25
NRS 7.085 references NRCP 11.
26
Pursuant to Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Association, 116 Nev.
27
646, 5 P.3d 569 (2000), the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate manner
28
Page 4
in which to review a District Court finding of contempt as to an attorney was by writ
of mandate. The District Court's Order After Trial is not valid and is not in
compliance with Nevada law in that the Order directly violates NRS 18.010(2)(b),
and NRS 7.085, and NRCP 11 as it misstates the law and does not contain the facts
5
6
7
constituting the conduct in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge and
contains only conclusory, ad hominem, statements, and allowed no advance notice or
hearing. Further, the Order sanctioned the attorney for arguing for an award of
alimony, despite the fact that the same court awarded alimony in the court's Final
10
Order. Arguments set forth in Mr. Coughlin's Motion for Reconsideration and Reply
11
12
to Mr. Springgate's Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration are incorporated herein
13
by reference if its please the Court and in the interest of judicial economy and
14
reducing the volume of paper involved in this Petition for Writ of Mandate.
15
16
The District Court's Order After trial gives an explication of the basis for the
17
sanctions. Rather than try to summarize that basis for the District Court, this Petition
18
will merely respond, line by line, to the rationale and basis offered by the District
19
Court. The District Court's Order After Trial is set forth in bold, infra, in its entirety
20
with respect to the basis for the sanctions followed by Petitioner's own precedent and
21
analysis addressing the propriety of so sanctioning counsel.
22
At trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr. Coughlin had conducted no discovery
23
in this case. In addition, Mr. Coughlin failed to present one documentary piece
24
25
of evidence at trial on behalf of Ms. Joshi' s claims.
26
In adversary bankruptcy proceeding to have debt, which was incurred as result
27
of motor vehicle accident, declared nondischargeable, debtor would not be entitled
28
to attorney's fees where, although attorney for plaintiffs failed to present sufficient
Page 5
evidence to support finding that debtor was operating motor vehicle while legally
intoxicated, he did present evidence of at least colorable claim, in that claim had
some legal and factual support since debtor testified that he did consume alcohol
during evening preceding accident, and where attorney for plaintiffs was somewhat
5
6
7
limited as to evidence by prior order of court prohibiting plaintiffs from calling

any expert or other witnesses at trial, and from introducing at trial any
documentary evidence other than judgment of state court due to attorney's failure to
comply with pretrial order setting discovery deadlines, so that attorney for plaintiffs
10
did not act in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons in bringing
11
12
13
14
adversary proceeding. Re Coupe, (1985, BC ND Ohio) 51 BR 939.

Mr. Coughlin was seriously limited in what evidence he could produce by the
District Courts ruling, in response to a misstatement of Nevada law by Mr.
15
Springgate, that Ms. Joshi would not be allowed to admit any evidence whatsover
16
17
of domestic violence, for purposes of either a distribution of property/debt or
18
alimony calculation, despite the fact that Nevada law allows for such evidence to be
19
introduced (not for the purposes of a fault analysis but for earning capacity issues as
20
well as intimidation and control of finances arguments, amongst other reasons).
21
Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200 (1997);and "repetitive
22
23
acts of physical or mental abuse by one spouse "causing a condition in the injured
24
spouse which generates expense or affects that person's ability to work. Rodriguez
25
v. Rodriguez, 116 Nev. 993, 998-99, 13 P.3d 415 (2000).
26
Further, Mr. Coughlin did put on a multitude of evidence in support of Ms.

27
28
Joshi's claims. Ms. Joshi testified as to the factors in an alimony and or property
Page 6
distribution analysis so well that the District Court was moved to award her alimony
and a lesser portion of the community debt...after the the District Court had
sanctioned Mr. Coughlin for not putting on a colorable claim in either regard... The
District Court made the seemingly incongruous ruling in its Final Order awarding
5
6
7
Ms. Joshi alimony and a lesser debt apportionment after Mr. Coughlin had ceased
representing Ms. Joshi.
Mr. Coughlin argued incessantly with the Court throughout trial
The District Court ruled on several of Mr. Springgate's objections prior to
10
providing Mr. Coughlin any opportunity to respond. Responding to objections for

11
12
the record is is necessary for is one fails to state an argument for the record, the
13
issue is not preserved for appeal. Mr. Springgate introduced exhibit after exhibit
14
that did not comply with the District Court's own Pre-Trial Order and various court
15
rules (examined in detail in the Motion for Reconsideration). Counsel heeded the
16
17
common rule of thumb that continuing objections are generally not the best practice,
18
especially in light of the fact that many courts now require that objections be made
19
stating the specific ground of objection. Dickerson v. Com., 174 S.W.3d 451
20
(Ky.2005), Davis v. Com., 147 S.W.3d 709 (Ky.2004); Elwell v. State, 954 So. 2d
21
104, (Fla. 2nd DCA 2007) review granted, 963 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 2007). This was
22
23
especially difficult terrain to navigate in this case (balancing preserving issues for
24
appeal with attempting to avoid upsetting the District Court's pursuit of the orderly
25
administration of justice) given that some situations brought up issues of
26
foundation, hearsay, and procedure all at the same time.

27
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Finding, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to establish that
Page 7
a defense attorney had committed and intended to commit a wilful contempt, the
court in Connell v State ( 1907) 80 Neb 296, 114 NW 294 (ovrld on other grounds
State ex rel. Wright v Barlow, 132 Neb 166, 271 NW 282), reversed a lower court
judgment of contempt on two counts of addressing the court in what was variously
5
6
7
described as disrespectful, humiliating , and insulting language. The first count was
predicated upon the attorney 's comments after the trial judge had flatly overruled
an objection to a question propounded by the prosecutor to a witness . In taking an
exception to this ruling, the attorney stated that the point was one that he wanted to
10
present, but that if the court had made up its mind he would not go into it...With
11
12
reference to the charge of contempt based on this language , the court on appeal first
13
noted that the transcript of this and other incidents revealed that the judge had been
14
led into controversy and argument when nothing was required but a prompt
15
decision... Stating that such a remark as the attorney's initial reference to the judge's
16
having made up his mind would , when made in open court , ordinarily be regarded
17
18
as more or less offensive , the court reasoned that the implication plainly was that
19
the point was an important one which merited discussion , and the insinuation was
20
that the court had made an important ruling with a closed mind and without proper
21
consideration of the matter... the court pointed out that the judge , instead of taking
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23
measures to prevent such discussion, had continued it by a remark which could only
24
be calculated to produce the reply which followed.
25
Asking to please be allowed to state an objection for the record is not quite the
26
same thing as where an attorney used contumacious , contemptuous language and

27
28
court was justified in finding in contempt attorney who, after motion to vacate
Page 8
client's conviction was denied, told judge "You have exhibited what your
partisanship is. You shouldn't be sitting in court. You are a disgrace to the bench"
and continued arguing after being held in contempt. Kunstler v Galligan, (1991, 1st
Dept) 168 App Div 2d 146, 571 NYS2d 930, affd 79 NY2d 775, 579 NYS2d 648,
5
6
7
587 NE2d 286.

-and made sarcastic, derogatory remarks to the Court, Mr. Springgate, and
Mr. Joshi throughout trial. .."to refrain from making degrading remarks to
both Mr. Joshi and Mr. Springgate."
10
A defense attorney was held in contempt of court in Re Cohen (1973, DC NY)

11
12
370 F. Supp 1166, upon 13 incidents of misbehavior, including the use of sarcastic
13
and disrespectful language in addressing the court... the specifications of
14
misconduct were (1) expressions of dis-pleasure with the trial court's rulings in
15
language such as "this is ridiculous," "I have never seen anything like this circus,"
16
17
"this is a travesty," and "this is a farce"; (2) the attorney's use of a scatological term,
18
to wit, "a pile of sh*t," when the trial judge requested him to sit down; and (3) the
19
statement, made in what was characterized as a sarcastic and mocking response to
20
the judge's request that the attorney keep within the bounds in his summation,
21
"Would your Honor like me to discuss a burlesque show or a rodeo." In finding the
22
23
attorney in contempt, the court observed that what was presented was neither a case
24
of an isolated instance of contemptuous conduct which at times occurs under the
25
pressure of a trial where an attorney is carried away by misguided zeal in his client's
26
behalf, nor was it a case in which the attorney could plausibly claim that his acts or
27
28
conduct were triggered by or in response to the acts or attitude of the judge.
Page 9
Mr. Coughlin made no statements whatsoever that bear any resemblance to
those cited in the precedents set forth above. Further, the District Court makes
mention that Mr. Coughlin was "admonished approximately 15 times by the
Court to quit arguing, to ask specific questions , to discontinue asking questions

5
6
7
calling for a legal conclusion, and to refrain from making degrading remarks
to both Mr. Joshi and Mr. Springgate ...
A common thread amongst all these 15
alleged instances (that number estimate is believed to be high) is that they are either
9
not required by law (one is allowed to ask an open ended or general question, in
10
fact, it is a fairly useful tactic with some witnesses; further, it is pretty hard to garner
11
12
a statement against interest or admission if one is not allowed to ask a witness if
13
they were careless or if some item was bought to benefit to community, particularly
14
where consel has made clear he is not seeking a legal conclusion from the witness)
15
or not supported by anything other than the comparatively milqeutoast "like I am

16
17
opposing counsel's assistant.
It is quite telling that the District Court could not
18
manage to quote a single derogatory, insulting, or sacrcastic remark made during the
19
Trial. If something was said worth sanctioning it should not be that burdensome to
20
remember it or print it and the importance to the legal profession that decisions be
21
made in the sunshine of transparency call for such detail.

22
23
24
25
Comments made by defense attorney in criminal trial after trial court had
sustained prosecution's objections to attorneys' questions on cross examination and
in which attorney had stated "nobody seems to want to get to the truth here," and,
26
upon being asked by trial court whether he was accusing court of suppressing truth,
27
28
included "I may just have to do that later," did not tend to interfere with the court's
Page 10
business, and therefore did not constitute contempt. I (1978, La) 355 So 2d 1288. If
suggesting that there is a reason to anticipate needing to impugn the court's
credibility at a later point in a trial is not sanctionable , no statements in the District
Courts opinion is.

5
6
7
In re Mettler, ( 1915), 50 Mont. 299, 146 P. 747 an attorney's contempt

conviction for refusing to sit down at trial was overturned when the contempt order
was found fatally defective for failing to recite the complete factual basis of the
contempt, stating that mere general allegations of insolence will not suffice. In
10
addition to the statutory requirement of an order setting forth the facts of the
11
12
contempt, the contemnor must be granted an opportunity to explain or excuse
13
himself. Such opportunity allows the individual to potentially purge himself or
14
show no contempt was intended; again, general allegations of insolence, insulting or
15
contemptuous behavior, unsuported by any details in the lower court's sanction

16
17
order, would not provide a proper order of sanctions . Rankin v. District Court, 58
18
Mont. at 291 , 191 P . at 776. See, also, Palmieri v. Marean, 83 N.Y.S. 843, 843-44
19
(App. Div. 1903 ) (vacating a fifty dollar contempt fine against Palmieri in a
20
Manhattan civil trial for refusing to sit down);
21
At one point in the Trial, the District Court referred to Ms. Joshi's counsel as
22
23
"Mr. Zach . Such familiarity may strike some as untoward and dismissive,
24
however, it is entirely likely the Court was not guilty of some Freudian slip, but
25
rather made a simple linguistic inversion of counsel ' s first and last names. Further
26
Mr. Springgate surely meant no disrespect when arguing against admitting evidence
27
28
of domestic abuse when he stated that "while Mr . Coughlin was not practicing in
Page 11
those unfortunate days when fault was included in the calculation of alimony, I was
Whether or not opposing counsel had received a license to
and let me tell you...
practice law at the time a particular precedent was passed down is of dubious utility
in explaining this particular evidentiary issue.

5
6
7
The Court notes that there were well over 40 objections during four (4) hours
of trial. Mr. Springgate ' s objections were well-founded and continuously
sustained except in one instance. Mr. Coughlin was overruled on every
objection except one and argued with the Court over most rulings.
10
Again it would seem the nothing in the following ALR suggests that making an
11
12
objection once every ten minutes or so is sanctionable.
Conduct of attorney in
13
connection with making objections or taking exceptions as contempt of court, 68
14
A.L.R.3d 314. Further, the District Court' s statement regarding factual issues (such
15
as a rate of success arguing objections) is exaggerated.

16
17
The Court notes that at one point, after an exhibit had been admitted, Mr.
18
Coughlin could not find the copy provided by Mr. Springgate in discovery.
19
Mr. Coughlin demanded a copy be provided at trial , stating"am I supposed to
20
be rifling through my papers? My understanding is that you are supposed to

21
provide a copy." When asked if he had the copy of the document, Mr.
22
23
Coughlin stated, " I do not know. I could spend my time and mental energy
24
looking around for Mr. Springgate ' s document like I am his assistant, or we
25
could ask Mr. Springgate to provide a copy at the time he is seeking admission
26
like I believe the rule states ." Mr. Coughlin cited no rule and then proceeded
27
28
to interrupt the proceedings twice approximately five (5) minutes and twelve
Page 12
(12) minutes post ruling to re-argue the point. Mr. Springgate replied to the
arguments by referencing when exactly the copy had been provided to Mr.
Coughlin during discovery and where the copy could be located . The Court
had to admonish Mr. Coughlin to quit arguing the point and reiterate that the
5
6
7
exhibit had been admitted.

Opposing counsel should not be required to let Mr. Springgate lead in the
dance that is litigation. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Reply to
Opposition do thoroughly explicate exactly why Mr. Springgate's trial practice
10
violated several rules, partiuclarly with regard to attempting to admit exhibits that
11
12
had not been identified, marked, indexed, or propounded in violation of court rules
13
and the District Court's own Pre-Trial Order. Further, this situation relates to the
14
dangers of relying on continuing objections, as mentioned supra, particularly where
15
Mr. Springgate is seeking admission of hearsay in the form of a $5,000 community

16
17
debt to Mr. Joshi's friend in Tanzania supported by an email. Ms. Joshi repeatedly
18
and passionately implored counsel to fight to get her alimony, citing the difficulties
19
of supporting two twenty year olds trying to gain an education.
20
Mr. Coughlin filed an Answer and Counterclaim on Ms. Joshi ' s behalf that
21
included allegations unsupported by law;

22
23
24
25
Counsel's Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition provided pages of

support for the positions taken. Mr. Springgate has yet to provide any such support,
particularly for asking the court to award sanctions against opposing counsel taking
26
the majority position in American jurisprudence on a particular point of law.

27
28
Although an order granting or denying a motion for reconsideration is not itself
Page 13
appealable, the Supreme Court can consider arguments raised in the motion for
reconsideration so long as the District Court considers the motion on the merits, the
notice of appeal is filed after the order disposing of the motion, and the motion and
order are included in the record on appeal. Arnold v. Kip, 168 P.3d 1050 (Nev.
5
6
7
2007).
and filed an Opposition to the request for return of Mr. Joshi ' s passport
without any factual or legal basis. Further, at trial, Mr. Coughlin presented
almost no evidence to support Ms. Joshi ' s requests and claims. The most
10
troubling aspect of this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic and
11
12
disrespectful presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inability to understand a
13
balance sheet; his failure to conduct discovery ; and his lack of knowledge with
14
regard to the rules of evidence and trial procedure . All of this was
15
compounded with a continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that

16
17
resulted in a shift from a fairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce
18
trial lasting an excessive amount of time. For all these reasons, the Court finds
19
that Mr. Coughlin 's presentation of the case and arguments in support thereof
20
to be unfounded in fact, unwarranted by existing law, unreasonable, and
21
vexatious throughout this entire proceeding.

22
23
Judge Schumacher already made a Pre-Trial ruling with regard to the passport
24
issues, several months before the Trial in this case. No sanctions were issued, and
25
law of the case doctrine prevent the District Court from exhuming that issue to
26
autopsy the propriety of Mr. Joshi demanding the courts rush in and have all his
27
28
things delivered to him while he fails to make a single phone call for months and
Page 14
months (he was still promising to do so at the Trial) to help Ms. Joshi get that to
which their culture dictates is afforded her upon divorce, her ceremonial gold
"woman's wealth , traditionally held by the groom's family. How the District Court
is aware of exactly what discovery was conducted by either side's counsel is

5
6
7
unclear, but certainly Mr. Springgate did not present any more discovery request to
Ms. Joshi than her counsel did to Mr. Joshi. For some reason the District Court
provided no indication of how Mr. Springgate's violating the Pre-Trial Order and
various court rules results in sanctioning opposing counsel for not immediately
10
identifying the court rules pertaining to those transgressions. Further, this arguably
11
12
was not such a simple divorce case considering all the authority and precedent that
13
forms the Motion for Reconsideration. The fact that Petitioner was sanctioned for
14
arguing the majority view on an issue that is arguably without precedent in Nevada
15
(and which may present an opportunity for the Nevada Supreme Court to issue
16
some precedent that may curb the need to return to District Courts for additional
17
18
hearings to enforce property distribution rulings or modify alimony terms) is
19
inappropriate.
20
ABA Criminal Justice Standards, Special Functions of the Trial Judge,
21
Standard 6-4.3 (2d ed.1980) requires a clear warning if the conduct was not
22
23
"willfully contemptuous. Id. Standard 6-4.2(a) The District Court's Order After
24
Trial does not seem to contemplate any intent requirement, much less find counsel's
25
conduct willfully contemptuous. Thus, the Standards would require a warning in
26
this case and the Order After Trial makes no mention of such a warning.
27
28
VI. CONCLUSION
Page 15
A Writ of Mandate should be issued forthwith, directing the lower court to do
that which is required by law, and to cease doing that which is prohibited by law.
Further, Mr. Coughlin should be reimbursed for costs ($250 filing fee, $88 real party
in interest appearance fee, $250 supersedeas bond, $38 District Court filing fee, $150
5
6
7
copying costs) and time spent on this action (45.5 hours at $225 per hour).
DATED this -26th
day of -October
1 2009.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
9
10
931 Forest St.

11
Reno, NV 89509
12
Tel: 775 338 81118
13
Fax: 801 760 6207
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15
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Page 16
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2
3
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of October, 2009 I served the Petition for Writ of
Mandamus and Affidavit Of Zach Coughlin In Support Of Petition For Writ Of Mandate on
5
6
7
the above-captioned matter upon the following party by personal delivery by placing a true
and correct at their place of business, as follows:

10
11
12
Reno, NV 89501
13
14
15
Hon. Judge Linda Gardner

Second Judicial Dist . Ct. Dept. 14
Reno, NV 89501
16
1 S Sierra St
17
18
19
20
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
21
22
23
24
25
26
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Page 17
1
2
3
4

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document
does not contain the social security number of any person.
5
6
7
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

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Page 18
CASE S MMARY
CASE NO. RCRl012-065630
1500 00 Hond or Cash Ball Ball Condlllond &1 by lhe lIonoruble Scali Peurson
02127.2012
l\1anllatoJ) Status Conference (I ]0 PM) (JudIcIalOfficer Sthrocdcr, Jack)
02t2sn012
Case Transferred to Another Court

10 D C lflmOl1 PS)'CII
0)0212012
SurclY Bond Posted
0]/15/2012
Bond Exoncrated
0]n9/2012
CANCELED M:llldlIlOJ) Status Conference (I ;30 I'M) (Jullkial OrnCtr: L) nch, "atrlcl.)
V(lealt't/
OSnJ2012
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Motion Il('arln (830 AM) (JudICIal Officer SfcT11l7.1a, Peler)

PUrlle S Present
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08/2712012
Mallon Glanled (JudICIal Officer" SfertaJ'.2a, Peter)

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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

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THE STATE
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NEVADA
OF NEVADA,
Plaintiff,
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IN THE JUSTICE COURT

OF F-ENO TOWNSHIP
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RCR2011- 063341
v.
DEPT:
Defendant.
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OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CONTINUE

TRIAL DATE AND MOTION TO APPOINT CO-COUNSEL
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COMES NOW,
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the State of Nevada,
by and through RICHARD A.
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GAMMICK,
District Attorney of Washoe County,
and Zach Young,
Deputy
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District Attorney,
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Continue Trial Date and Motion to Appoint Co-Counsel.
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is made and based upon the attached Points and Authorities and any
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III
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III
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III
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III
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III
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III
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II I
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III
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III
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III
and hereby opposes the Defendant's Motion to

This opposition
oral
on this matter.
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and/or documentary evidence that may be presented at a hearing
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B. 030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding
document does not contain the social
DATED this
c' f\\\1\
day
\,
Ofc )t,,-,-, J.'O=-'
':
"
2012.
RICHARD A.
GAMMICK
District Attorney
Washoe County,
Nevada
/
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By
ZACH
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Depu9
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,
/! //t/
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"
'
Y'OUNG
Di
ict Attorney
Ie
On August 20,
Statement of the Case
2011,
Zachary Barker Coughlin
"the DefendantU)
misdemeanor count of Petit Larceny,
on or about August 24,
Criminal Complaint on August 25 ,
an Amended Criminal Complaint was filed,
count of Possession of Stolen Property.
was arrested for Larceny.
2011.
(hereinafter
He was charged with a
by way of a Criminal Complaint,
The Defendant was arraigned on the

2011.
On or about December 5 ,
2011,
al so all eging a misdemeanor

There have been mul tipl e pre-
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trial hearings set in this matter:
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2011i
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Defendant elected to exercise his constitutional
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Accordingly,
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approximately three months later on February 29 ,
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witnesses for the State of Nevada
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subpoenaed for said court
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accordingly.
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October 26,
2011i
September 9 ,
and November 28 ,
2011.
the matter was set for trial ,
On February 21,
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scheduled trial,
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requesting a continuance.
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through his attorney,
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appointed as co-counsel.
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the
right to trial.
scheduled to commence
2012.
All of the
have been
just eight days prior to the
III
III
the Defendant,
On this last date,
and arranged their work schedules
III
25
2012
October 12,
(hereinafter "the StateU)
III
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date,
2011;
through his attorney,
On that same date,
filed a motion
the Defendant,
again
filed a separate motion requesting that he be

The State now opposes both requests.
1
2
II
ARGUMENT
A. The Trial Should Not Be Cont inued as t he Defendant Has Failed t o

Est ablish Good Cause
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As the Defendant points out in his Motion,
continue a trial,
cause is shown.
fil ed by the Defendant's counsel,
Goodnight
a court may
cause.
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at the request of one of the parties,
when good
The State respectfull y submits that the affidavit
(hereinafter
"Mr.
Deputy Publ ic Defender Joe
Goodnight") ,
fails to establish good
The instant case has been languishing in the Reno Justice
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Court since the Defendant's arraignment on August 25,
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than six months prior to the schedul ed trial .
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numerous pretrial
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unable to resolve this matter through a plea negotiation.
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date was known to both the State and the Defendant for approximately
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three months,
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State issued subpoenas to its witnesses,
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their subpoenas and arranged their work schedules to attend.
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a full three months to prepare for trial,
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scheduled date,
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his Motion to Continue -
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settings,
2011 -
Further,
more
despite
the State and the Defendant have been
giving both ample time to prepare.
The trial
In that regard,
the
all of whom have returned

Despite
with ful l knowledge of the
the Defendant waited until February 21,
2012 to file
a mere eight days prior to the trial date.
The State respectfully submits that the bases for a
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continuance submitted by the Defendant do not rise to the "good
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cause"
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completely subjective belief;
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active and pending.
threshold.
His claim that he was "wrongfull y arrested"
Further,
is a
the case for which he was arrested is

the fact that he is a party to
protective orders has no bearing on the instant case.
Defendant,
protective orders,
it is the Defendant himself who initiated such activity.
in fact,
If the
is the person who sought and appl ied for such

that provides even less of a basis to continue,
Moreover,
as
the State does not understand how his claim that
he is a victim of domestic violence supports his request.
State is sympathetic to any victim of domestic violence,
Defendant fail s to show how his alleged victimization impacts the
instant case,
Mr.
While the
the
Goodnight's representation of the Defendant,
or the
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Defendant's ability to assist his counsel.
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unsure how the fact that his power was shut off has any effect on
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this case or a continuance thereof.
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As such,
Simil arl y,
the State is
the State opposes a continuance of the trial
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scheduled for February 29 ,
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B.
2012.
The Defendant Should Not Be Allowed to Act as Co-Counsel
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The State incorporates,
by this reference,
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Strike Fugitive Document,
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21,
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defendant elects to have counsel,
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himself. "
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instant case,
Mr.
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the Defendant
as co-counsel.
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line 19 -20
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Rhyne v.
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court denial of a defendant's request,
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co-counsel.
2012.
Specifically,
Layton v.
(Feb.
State,
its Motion to
which was filed in this case on February
and as set forth in that pleading,
State,
"If the
he has no right to represent
9 1 Nev.
36 3,
36 6
(19 75).
Further,
in the
Goodnight expressly objects to the appointment of
21,
118
2012).
Nev.
1,
See Motion to Appoint Co-Counsel,
p.
2,
Such a circumstance was addressed in
8 -9
(2002),
which cited a California's

opposed by counsel,
to act as
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Accordingl y,
the State opposes the Defendant's request to
be appointed as co- counsel.
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III.
The State respectfully requests that the Defendant's Motion

to Continue Trial Date and Motion to Appoint Co- Counsel be denied.
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B. 030
document does not contain the social security number of any person.
c,
CONCLUSION
DATED this
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II
:Y IJ,-A,v, "J
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day Of,
10
2012.
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RICHARD A.
GAMMICK
District Attorney
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Washoe County,
N,evada
// /;//
//1,/ I /,/j /
By
lei !.U
ZACH 10
Gf .
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Deput;y
i
Dlsitrlct Attorney
//
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0224RCR20110633414
,/
CERTIFICATE OF FORWARDING
I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Washoe County
District Attorney's Office and that,
copy of
mail,
the foregoing document,
addressed to:
PUBLIC DEFENDER
PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
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T
DATED this 27
I forwarded a true
through the Washoe County interagency
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on this date,
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2Ql2FEB 21 PH I: 31
CODE 2<)60
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THE JUSTICE COLIRT OF RENO roWNSHIP
IN AND FOR T il E COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE 01' NEV ADA
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
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Plaintiff,
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Case No. '(/...C'((. 1L
vs.
::
z.ac6aa~ 15 . ~~~ ):Y)
D~pt
0.
OC:::>':J(;30
_1
Dclcndant.
____________________1
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ORDER FOR
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cO~ lrETE NCY
[VALUATIONS
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Upon motion of wunsd lor Dcfendwl! herein nnd good cause appearing thcrcl,m;,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Ddcnd'Ult be examined by two psychiatrists,
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two psychologists, or one psychiatrist and one psychologist from Lake's Crossing fo r the purpose
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ufdetermining whether the Defeodant has the presen t abihty to :
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I . Understand the nature of the criminal charges against hun;
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2. Untkrst,md the nature and purpose of the coun pruceeull1gs; or
2)
3. Aid and assist his cuunscl In the defense" ith a reasonable degree of ratillnal
2-l
understailli ing.
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/,/
, "
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Ih"t th" Jd'~ndanl is lu J Pp~ar bdurc Ih~
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J
1
Hunorabk
E//,?'It
121Il!12
cvaluation
u f Ihe SI!cond JuJlcial Dislrict Court. Dcpartmcnt
30
h~aring.
DATED
...1'\
:2oo~, at Ih~ hour of
< '.5ZJ ~. m., for a competcncy
IhiS57~aYof \ ~
.20 / ,;)"
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1
JUST ICE OF 'I'll
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~~ \ 11\
EACE
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Document Code:
Zach Coughlin,Esq.
NV Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney for Pro Se Attorney Litigant
note: this was file stamped

2/27/12 by the RJC in
RJC REV2012-000374
disposed of by RJC Judge
Schroeder, on 3/15/12 on a default
basis where Coughlin was 8 minutes
late to the stacked docket hearing
JUSTICE COURT RENO TOWNSHIP

WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA
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coughlin, pursuant to wcso police was cuffed

PARK TERRACE TOWNHOMES ASSN
) CASE NO: and evicted at gunpoint
; WESTERN NEVADA MANAGMENT,
)
3 hours later.
INC., Gayle Agnes Kern, Esq. and Gayle A.
Kern. Ltd.; LANDLORD OR DULY
AUTHORIZED AGENT;
Landlord,
vs.
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ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN;

Tenant.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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DEPT. NO:
(JUDGE SFERRAZZA INDICATED they
WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS CASE FOR
HIS CALENDAR OR OTHERWISE HEAR
ANYTHING IN RELATION TO IT)
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
TENANT'S ANSWER AND TENANT'S
AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION TO 30 DAY
NOTICE TO QUIT; MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
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TENANT'S ANSWER AND TENANT'S AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION TO 30 DAY NOTICE TO

QUIT; MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
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Tenant/Defendant, Zach Coughlin, Esq., hereby files an Answer, or alternatively, an
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Amended Tenant's Answer to the 30 day NOTICE TO QUIT AND ANY SUBSEQUENT 5 DAY
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NOTICE TO QUIT UNLAWFUL DETAINER NOTICE,
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Tenant further moves for sanctions against landlord, pursuant to NRS 7.085, for the attorneys' fees
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tenant has needlessly
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-1Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim
incurred due to Park Terrace and ET AL's reckless uses of this court's processes. Park Terrace has not
complied with the requirements of the rules of civil procedure they seeks to invoke. His
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motion is fatally flawed and infirm as a matter of law.

This opposition and motion is based on the points and authorities below, the
above-referenced statute and rules of civil procedure, and all papers and pleadings on file
herein.
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NRS 40.310 Issue of fact to be tried by jury if proper demand made. Whenever an issue of fact
is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a jury, if proper demand is made pursuant to
the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure or the Justice Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
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COMES NOW, the undersigned Tenant and states:

1. I am the tenant of a rental united located at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, Reno 89512.
2. my rent is not subsidized by public housing authority or other governmental agency.
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Glazier v. Justice Court of Smith Valley Tp., 111 Nev. 864, 899 P.2d 1105 (Nev. Jul 27, 1995):
"Summary eviction statute allowing landlord to apply to justice's court for eviction
order based on default in payment of rent did not apply to unlawful detainer action
against tenant who never paid any rent nor was required to pay any and, thus,
summary eviction order was outside jurisdiction of justice's court. N.R.S. 40.253..On
March 1, 1993, Richard Fulstone, president of Fulstone, served Glazier with a thirtyday notice to quit the property. Glazier failed to vacate the premises,and on April 2,
1993, Fulstone served Glazier with a five-day notice. This notice expressly
threatened an action in justice's court for eviction, pursuant to NRS 40.253,FN1 the
summary eviction statute. FN1. NRS 40.253 allows a landlord to apply to the justice's
court for an eviction order based on default in payment of rent. If the tenant can
show, by affidavit, a legal defense to the alleged unlawful detainer, further
proceedings must be conducted pursuant to the more formal eviction procedures in
NRS 40.290 to 40.420. If, on the other hand, the tenant fails to show a legal defense
to the alleged unlawful detainer, then the justice's court may issue a summary order
for removal of the tenant. The justice's court held a hearing pursuant to the provisions
of NRS 40.253 and ordered that Glazier vacate the property within thirty days.
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Glazier then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before the district court, alleging
that the justice's court exceeded its jurisdiction under the summary eviction
provisions of the statute by, inter alia, inquiring into matters beyond the truthfulness
and sufficiency of the affidavits, and failing to dismiss the summary eviction
proceeding once a legal defense had been raised. The district court held a hearing on
the writ petition and denied the petition. On appeal to this court, Glazier argues that,
pursuant to NRS 40.253, once he raised the legal defense that he was a life tenant
under the grant of a life estate, the justice's court was obligated to dismiss the
summary proceeding and to require that the landlord prosecute his unlawful
detainer action under the plenary eviction proceedings provided for in NRS 40.290
to 40.420. **1106 Although Glazier's argument is logically sound, it is simply
irrelevant. It is clear that, despite all the proceedings below and the arguments of the
parties before this court, NRS 40.253 does not apply to this case. The statute is
applicable when the tenant of any dwelling [ ] with periodic rent reserved by the
month or any shorter period, is in default in payment of the rent. (Emphasis *866
added.) All parties to this action concede that Glazier never paid any rent, nor was he
required to pay any. It may be that Fulstone is entitled to have Glazier removed from
the property, but not pursuant to NRS 40.253. There was no case or controversy
before the justice's court based on NRS 40.253, and accordingly, the justice's court
exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the summary eviction order. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the district court and remand to the district court with
directions to grant the writ. Further, we order that the eviction order entered by the
justice's court be vacated. Nev.,1995. Glazier v. Justice Court of Smith Valley Tp.
111 Nev. 864, 899 P.2d 1105, See, also, Nev.,1996. Lippis v. Peters 112 Nev. 1008,
921 P.2d 1248"
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NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and exclusion of tenant
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for default in payment of rent. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, in addition to the
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remedy provided in NRS 40.2512 and 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of any dwelling,
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apartment, mobile home, recreational vehicle or commercial premises with periodic rent reserved by
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the month or any shorter period is in default in payment of the rent, the landlord or the landlords
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agent, unless otherwise agreed in writing, may serve or have served a notice in writing, requiring in
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the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the premises: (a) At or before noon of the
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fifth full day following the day of service; or (b) If the landlord chooses not to proceed in the manner
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set forth in paragraph (a) and the rent is reserved by a period of 1 week or less and the tenancy has
not continued for more than 45 days, at or before noon of the fourth full day following the day of
service. As used in this subsection, day of service means the day the landlord or the landlords
agent personally delivers the notice to the tenant. If personal service was not so delivered, the day of
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service means the day the notice is delivered, after posting and mailing pursuant to subsection 2, to
the sheriff or constable for service if the request for service is made before noon. If the request for
service by the sheriff or constable is made after noon, the day of service shall be deemed to be the
day next following the day that the request is made for service by the sheriff or constable. 2. A
landlord or the landlords agent who serves a notice to a tenant pursuant to paragraph (b) of
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subsection 1 shall attempt to deliver the notice in person in the manner set forth in paragraph (a) of
subsection 1 of NRS 40.280. If the notice cannot be delivered in person, the landlord or the landlords
agent: (a) Shall post a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the premises and mail the notice
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by overnight mail; and (b) After the notice has been posted and mailed, may deliver the notice to the
14
sheriff or constable for service in the manner set forth in subsection 1 of NRS 40.280. The sheriff or
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constable shall not accept the notice for service unless it is accompanied by written evidence, signed
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by the tenant when the tenant took possession of the premises, that the landlord or the landlords
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agent informed the tenant of the provisions of this section which set forth the lawful procedures for
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eviction from a short-term tenancy. Upon acceptance, the sheriff or constable shall serve the notice
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within 48 hours after the request for service was made by the landlord or the landlords agent. 3. A
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notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: (a) Identify the court that has jurisdiction over the
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matter; and (b) Advise the tenant: (1) Of the tenants right to contest the matter by filing, within the
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time specified in subsection 1 for the payment of the rent or surrender of the premises, an affidavit
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with the court that has jurisdiction over the matter stating that the tenant has tendered payment or is
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not in default in the payment of the rent; (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an
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unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
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providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order; and (3) That, pursuant to NRS 118A.390,
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a tenant may seek relief if a landlord unlawfully removes the tenant from the premises or excludes the
tenant by blocking or attempting to block the tenants entry upon the premises or willfully interrupts
or causes or permits the interruption of an essential service required by the rental agreement or
chapter 118A of NRS. 4. If the tenant files such an affidavit at or before the time stated in the notice,
the landlord or the landlords agent, after receipt of a file-stamped copy of the affidavit which was
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filed, shall not provide for the nonadmittance of the tenant to the premises by locking or otherwise. 5.
Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit
of complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwelling, apartment,
13
mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the
14
dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction
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over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the
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county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The affidavit must state or
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contain: (1) The date the tenancy commenced. (2) The amount of periodic rent reserved. (3) The
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amounts of any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in excess of the first months rent,
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by the tenant. (4) The date the rental payments became delinquent. (5) The length of time the tenant
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has remained in possession without paying rent. (6) The amount of rent claimed due and delinquent.
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(7) A statement that the written notice was served on the tenant in accordance with NRS 40.280. (8)
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A copy of the written notice served on the tenant. (9) A copy of the signed written rental agreement,
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if any. (b) Except when the tenant has timely filed the affidavit described in subsection 3 and a file-
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stamped copy of it has been received by the landlord or the landlords agent, and except when the
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landlord is prohibited pursuant to NRS 118A.480, the landlord or the landlords agent may, in a
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peaceable manner, provide for the nonadmittance of the tenant to the premises by locking or
otherwise. 6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless of the
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information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by
subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, after service of notice of the
hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice
providedfor in this section. If the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged
unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary
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order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant. If the court
determines that there is a legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer, the court shall refuse to
grant either party any relief, and, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, shall require that
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any further proceedings be conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive. The issuance of a
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summary order for removal of the tenant does not preclude an action by the tenant for any damages
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or other relief to which the tenant may be entitled. If the alleged unlawful detainer was based upon
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subsection 5 of NRS 40.2514, the refusal by the court to grant relief does not preclude the landlord
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thereafter from pursuing an action for unlawful detainer in accordance with NRS 40.251. 7. The
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tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and service of a motion, file a
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motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of the court, to dispute the amount of the
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costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory,
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moving and storage of personal property left on the premises. The motion must be filed within 20
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days after the summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises by the
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tenant, or within 20 days after: (a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and
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(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant, whichever is later. 8.
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Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a hearing on the
28
motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the motion. The court shall affix
the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriff,
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constable or other process server. At the hearing, the court may: (a) Determine the costs, if any,
claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs;
and (b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges determined to be
due or if no charges are determined to be due. 9. A landlord shall not refuse to accept rent from a
tenant that is submitted after the landlord or the landlords agent has served or had served a notice
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pursuant to subsection 1 if the refusal is based on the fact that the tenant has not paid collection fees,
attorneys fees or other costs other than rent, a reasonable charge for late payments of rent or
dishonored checks, or a security. As used in this subsection, security has the meaning ascribed to it
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in NRS 118A.240. 10. This section does not apply to the tenant of a mobile home lot in a mobile
14
home park or to the tenant of a recreational vehicle lot in an area of a mobile home park in this State
15
other than an area designated as a recreational vehicle lot pursuant to the provisions of subsection 6
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of NRS 40.215. NRS 40.280 Service of notices to quit; proof required before issuance of order to
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remove. 1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.253, the notices required by NRS 40.251 to
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40.260, inclusive, may be served: (a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, in the presence of
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a witness; (b) If the tenant is absent from the tenants place of residence or from the tenants usual
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place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at either place and
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mailing a copy to the tenant at the tenants place of residence or place of business; or (c) If the place
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of residence or business cannot be ascertained, or a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be
25
found there, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property, delivering a copy to a
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person there residing, if the person can be found, and mailing a copy to the tenant at the place where
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the leased property is situated. 2. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner as
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provided in subsection 1. 3. Before an order to remove a tenant is issued pursuant to subsection 5 of
NRS 40.253, a landlord shall file with the court a proof of service of any notice required by that
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section. Before a person may be removed as prescribed in NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, a
landlord shall file with the court proof of service of any notice required pursuant to NRS 40.255.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, this proof must consist of: (a) A statement, signed by
the tenant and a witness, acknowledging that the tenant received the notice on a specified date; (b) A
certificate of mailing issued by the United States Postal Service; or (c) The endorsement of a sheriff,
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constable or other process server stating the time and manner of service. 4. If service of the notice
was not delivered in person to a tenant whose rent is reserved by a period of 1 week or less and the
tenancy has not continued for more than 45 days, proof of service must include: (a) A certificate of
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mailing issued by the United States Postal Service or by a private postal service to the landlord or the
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landlords agent; or (b) The endorsement of a sheriff or constable stating the: (1) Time and date the
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request for service was made by the landlord or the landlords agent; (2) Time, date and manner of
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the service; and (3) Fees paid for the service. NRS 118A.100 Landlord defined. Landlord means
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a person who provides a dwelling unit for occupancy by another pursuant to a rental agreement. NRS
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118A.120 Owner defined. Owner means one or more persons, jointly or severally, in whom is
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vested: 1. All or part of the legal title to property, except a trustee under a deed of trust who is not in
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possession of the property; or 2. All or part of the beneficial ownership, and a right to present use and
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enjoyment of the premises. NRS 118A.150 Rent defined. Rent means all periodic payments to
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be made to the landlord for occupancy of a dwelling unit, including, without limitation, all reasonable
and actual late fees set forth in the rental agreement. (Added to NRS by 1977, 1331; A 1999, 984).
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This action is brought to address Federal Fair Housing or Nevada laws prohibiting discrimination. I
am being discriminated against based on impermissilbe characteristics. Further, my lease has not
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expired or terminated yet. NRS 118A.160 Rental agreement defined. Rental agreement means
any oral or written agreement for the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit or premises. (Added to
NRS by 1977, 1331)
NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited; remedies; exceptions. 1.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a
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tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential items or services required by
the rental agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an action for possession if: (a) The
tenant has complained in good faith of a violation of a building, housing or health code applicable to
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the premises and affecting health or safety to a governmental agency charged with the responsibility
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for the enforcement of that code; (b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord or a law
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enforcement agency of a violation of this chapter or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal
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penalty; (c) The tenant has organized or become a member of a tenants union or similar
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organization; (d) A citation has been issued resulting from a complaint described in paragraph (a); (e)
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The tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in
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which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this chapter respecting the
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habitability of dwelling units; (f) The tenant has failed or refused to give written consent to a
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regulation adopted by the landlord, after the tenant enters into the rental agreement, which requires
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the landlord to wait until the appropriate time has elapsed before it is enforceable against the tenant;
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or (g) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a
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fair housing agency or any other appropriate body of a violation of NRS 118.010 to 118.120,
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inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or has otherwise exercised
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rights which are guaranteed or protected under those laws. 2. If the landlord violates any provision of
subsection 1, the tenant is entitled to the remedies provided in NRS 118A.390 and has a defense in
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any retaliatory action by the landlord for possession. 3. A landlord who acts under the circumstances
described in subsection 1 does not violate that subsection if: (a) The violation of the applicable
building, housing or health code of which the tenant complained was caused primarily by the lack of
reasonable care by the tenant, a member of his or her household or other person on the premises with
his or her consent; (b) The tenancy is terminated with cause; (c) A citation has been issued and
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compliance with the applicable building, housing or health code requires alteration, remodeling or
demolition and cannot be accomplished unless the tenants dwelling unit is vacant; or (d) The
increase in rent applies in a uniform manner to all tenants. The maintenance of an action under this
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subsection does not prevent the tenant from seeking damages or injunctive relief for the landlords
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failure to comply with the rental agreement or maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition as
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required by this chapter. NRS 118A.380 Failure of landlord to supply essential items or services. 1.
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If the landlord is required by the rental agreement or this chapter to supply heat, air-conditioning,
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running water, hot water, electricity, gas, a functioning door lock or another essential item or service
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and the landlord willfully or negligently fails to do so, causing the premises to become unfit for
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habitation, the tenant shall give written notice to the landlord specifying the breach. If the landlord
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does not adequately remedy the breach, or use his or her best efforts to remedy the breach within 48
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hours, except a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, after it is received by the landlord, the tenant may,
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in addition to any other remedy: (a) Procure reasonable amounts of such essential items or services
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during the landlords noncompliance and deduct their actual and reasonable cost from the rent; (b)
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Recover actual damages, including damages based upon the lack of use of the premises or the
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diminution of the fair rental value of the dwelling unit; (c) Withhold any rent that becomes due
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- 10 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim
during the landlords noncompliance without incurring late fees, charges for notice or any other
charge or fee authorized by this chapter or the rental agreement, until the landlord has attempted in
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good faith to restore the essential items or services; or (d) Procure other housing which is comparable
during the landlords noncompliance, and the rent for the original premises fully abates during this
period. The tenant may recover the actual and reasonable cost of that other housing which is in excess
of the amount of rent which is abated. 2. If the tenant proceeds under this section, the tenant may not
proceed under NRS 118A.350 and 118A.360 as to that breach. 3. The rights of the tenant under this
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section do not arise until the tenant has given written notice as required by subsection 1, except that
the tenant may, without having given that notice: (a) Recover damages as authorized under paragraph
(b) of subsection 1 if the landlord: (1) Admits to the court that the landlord had knowledge of the lack
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of such essential items or services; or (2) Has received written notice of the uninhabitable condition
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caused by such a lack from a governmental agency authorized to inspect for violations of building,
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housing or health codes. (b) Withhold rent under paragraph (c) of subsection 1 if the landlord: (1)
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Has received written notice of the condition constituting the breach from a governmental agency
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authorized to inspect for violations of building, housing or health codes; and (2) Fails to remedy or
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attempt in good faith to remedy the breach within the time prescribed in the written notice of that
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condition from the governmental agency. 4. The rights of the tenant under paragraph (c) of subsection
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1 do not arise unless the tenant is current in the payment of rent at the time of giving written notice
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pursuant to subsection 1. 5. If such a condition was caused by the deliberate or negligent act or
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omission of the tenant, a member of his or her household or other person on the premises with his or
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her consent, the tenant has no rights under this section. (Added to NRS by 1977, 1339; A 1985, 1416;
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1987, 314; 1999, 1230; 2007, 1286; 2011, 237) NRS 118A.390 Unlawful removal or exclusion of
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tenant or willful interruption of essential items or services; procedure for expedited relief. 1. If the
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landlord unlawfully removes the tenant from the premises or excludes the tenant by blocking or
attempting to block the tenants entry upon the premises, willfully interrupts or causes or permits the
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interruption of any essential item or service required by the rental agreement or this chapter or
otherwise recovers possession of the dwelling unit in violation of NRS 118A.480, the tenant may
recover immediate possession pursuant to subsection 4, proceed under NRS 118A.380 or terminate
the rental agreement and, in addition to any other remedy, recover the tenants actual damages,
receive an amount not greater than $2,500 to be fixed by the court, or both. 2. In determining the
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amount, if any, to be awarded under subsection 1, the court shall consider: (a) Whether the landlord
acted in good faith; (b) The course of conduct between the landlord and the tenant; and (c) The
degree of harm to the tenant caused by the landlords conduct. 3. If the rental agreement is terminated
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pursuant to subsection 1, the landlord shall return all prepaid rent and security recoverable under this
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chapter. 4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 5, the tenant may recover immediate
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possession of the premises from the landlord by filing a verified complaint for expedited relief for the
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unlawful removal or exclusion of the tenant from the premises, the willful interruption of any
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essential item or service or the recovery of possession of the dwelling unit in violation of NRS
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118A.480. 5. A verified complaint for expedited relief: (a) Must be filed with the court within 5
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judicial days after the date of the unlawful act by the landlord, and the verified complaint must be
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dismissed if it is not timely filed. If the verified complaint for expedited relief is dismissed pursuant
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to this paragraph, the tenant retains the right to pursue all other available remedies against the
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landlord. (b) May not be filed with the court if an action for summary eviction or unlawful detainer is
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already pending between the landlord and tenant, but the tenant may seek similar relief before the
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judge presiding over the pending action. 6. The court shall conduct a hearing on the verified
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complaint for expedited relief not later than 3 judicial days after the filing of the verified complaint
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for expedited relief. Before or at the scheduled hearing, the tenant must provide proof that the
landlord has been properly served with a copy of the verified complaint for expedited relief. Upon the
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hearing, if it is determined that the landlord has violated any of the provisions of subsection 1, the
court may: NRS 118A.290 Habitability of dwelling unit. 1. The landlord shall at all times during the
tenancy maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition. A dwelling unit is not habitable if it
violates provisions of housing or health codes concerning the health, safety, sanitation or fitness for
habitation of the dwelling unit or if it substantially lacks: (a) Effective waterproofing and weather
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protection of the roof and exterior walls, including windows and doors. (b) Plumbing facilities which
conformed to applicable law when installed and which are maintained in good working order. (c) A
water supply approved under applicable law, which is: (1) Under the control of the tenant or landlord
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and is capable of producing hot and cold running water; (2) Furnished to appropriate fixtures; and (3)
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Connected to a sewage disposal system approved under applicable law and maintained
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in good working order to the extent that the system can be controlled by the landlord. (d) Adequate
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heating facilities which conformed to applicable law when installed and are maintained in good
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working order. (e) Electrical lighting, outlets, wiring and electrical equipment which conformed to
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applicable law when installed and are maintained in good working order. (f) An adequate number of
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appropriate receptacles for garbage and rubbish in clean condition and good repair at the
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commencement of the tenancy. The landlord shall arrange for the removal of garbage and rubbish
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from the premises unless the parties by written agreement provide otherwise. (g) Building, grounds,
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appurtenances and all other areas under the landlords control at the time of the commencement of
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the tenancy in every part clean, sanitary and reasonably free from all accumulations of debris, filth,
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rubbish, garbage, rodents, insects and vermin. (h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings
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maintained in good repair. (i) Ventilating, air-conditioning and other facilities and appliances,
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including elevators, maintained in good repair if supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord.
2. The landlord and tenant may agree that the tenant is to perform specified repairs, maintenance
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tasks and minor remodeling only if: (a) The agreement of the parties is entered into in good faith; and
(b) The agreement does not diminish the obligations of the landlord to other tenants in the premises.
3. An agreement pursuant to subsection 2 is not entered into in good faith if the landlord has a duty
under subsection 1 to perform the specified repairs, maintenance tasks or minor remodeling and the
tenant enters into the agreement because the landlord or his or her agent has refused to perform them.
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(a) Order the landlord to restore to the tenant the premises or essential items or services, or both; (b)
Award damages pursuant to subsection 1; and (c) Enjoin the landlord from violating the provisions of
subsection 1 and, if the circumstances so warrant, hold the landlord in contempt of court. 7. The
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payment of all costs and official fees must be deferred for any tenant who files a verified complaint
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for expedited relief. After any hearing and not later than final disposition of the filing or order, the
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court shall assess the costs and fees against the party that does not prevail, except that the court may
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reduce them or waive them, as justice may require.
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NRS 118A.170 Tenant defined. Tenant means a person entitled under a rental agreement to
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occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others. NRS 118A.200 Rental agreements: Signing;
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copies; required provisions; disputable presumptions; use of nonconforming agreement unlawful. 1.
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Any written agreement for the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit or premises must be signed by
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the landlord or his or her agent and the tenant or his or her agent. 2. The landlord shall provide one
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copy of any written agreement described in subsection 1 to the tenant free of cost at the time the
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agreement is executed and, upon request of the tenant, provide additional copies of any such
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agreement to the tenant within a reasonable time. The landlord may charge a reasonable fee for
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providing the additional copies. 3. Any written rental agreement must contain, but is not limited to,
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provisions relating to the following subjects: (a) Duration of the agreement. (b) Amount of rent and
the manner and time of its payment. (c) Occupancy by children or pets. (d) Services included with the
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dwelling rental. (e) Fees which are required and the purposes for which they are required. (f)
Deposits which are required and the conditions for their refund. (g) Charges which may be required
for late or partial payment of rent or for return of any dishonored check. (h) Inspection rights of the
landlord. (i) A listing of persons or numbers of persons who are to occupy the dwelling. (j)
Respective responsibilities of the landlord and the tenant as to the payment of utility charges. (k) A
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signed record of the inventory and condition of the premises under the exclusive custody and control
of the tenant. (l) A summary of the provisions of NRS 202.470. (m) Information regarding the
procedure pursuant to which a tenant may report to the appropriate authorities: (1) A nuisance. (2) A
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violation of a building, safety or health code or regulation. (n) Information regarding the right of the
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tenant to engage in the display of the flag of the United States, as set forth in NRS 118A.325. 4. The
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absence of a written agreement raises a disputable presumption that: (a) There are no restrictions on
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occupancy by children or pets. (b) Maintenance and waste removal services are provided without
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charge to the tenant. (c) No charges for partial or late payments of rent or for dishonored checks are
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paid by the tenant. (d) Other than normal wear, the premises will be returned in the same condition as
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when the tenancy began. 5. It is unlawful for a landlord or any person authorized to enter into a rental
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agreement on his or her behalf to use any written agreement which does not conform to the
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provisions of this section, and any provision in an agreement which contravenes the provisions of this
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section is void. (Added to NRS by 1977, 1333; A 2001, 1352; 2003, 2968; 2007, 1282) NRS
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118A.210 Rental agreements: Payment of rent; term of tenancy. 1. Rent is payable without demand
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or notice at the time and place agreed upon by the parties. 2. Unless the rental agreement establishes a
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definite term, the tenancy is from week to week in the case of a tenant who pays weekly rent and in
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all other cases the tenancy is from month to month. 3. In the absence of an agreement, either written
or oral: (a) Rent is payable at the beginning of the tenancy; and (b) Rent for the use and occupancy of
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a dwelling is the fair rental value for the use and occupancy. At your eviction hearing, tell the judge
your side of the story. Your job
is to convince the judge that you have a legal defense to the eviction. The Nevada Supreme Court
has determined that legal defense is when you have a genuine issue of material fact. Anvui, LLC
v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 163 P.3d 405 (2007) NRS 40.251
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Unlawful detainer: Possession of
property leased for indefinite time after notice to quit; older person or person with a disability entitled
to extension of period of possession upon request. NRS 40.251 Unlawful detainer: Possession of
property leased for indefinite time after notice to quit; older person or person with a disability entitled
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to extension of period of possession upon request. 1. A tenant of real property, a recreational vehicle
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or a mobile home for a term less than life is guilty of an unlawful detainer when having leased: (a)
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Real property, except as otherwise provided in this section, or a mobile home for an indefinite time,
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with monthly or other periodic rent reserved, the tenant continues in possession thereof, in person or
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by subtenant, without the landlords consent after the expiration of a notice of: (1) For tenancies from
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week to week, at least 7 days; (2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, for all other periodic
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tenancies, at least 30 days; or (3) For tenancies at will, at least 5 days. (b) A dwelling unit subject to
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the provisions of chapter 118A of NRS, the tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant,
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without the landlords consent after expiration of: (1) The term of the rental agreement or its
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termination and, except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2), the expiration of a notice of: (I)
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At least 7 days for tenancies from week to week; and (II) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
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2, at least 30 days for all other periodic tenancies; or (2) A notice of at least 5 days where the tenant
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has failed to perform the tenants basic or contractual obligations under chapter 118A of NRS. (c) A
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mobile home lot subject to the provisions of chapter 118B of NRS, or a lot for a recreational vehicle
in an area of a mobile home park other than an area designated as a recreational vehicle lot pursuant
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to the provisions of subsection 6 of NRS 40.215, the tenant continues in possession, in person or by
subtenant, without the landlords consent: (1) After notice has been given pursuant to NRS 118B.115,
118B.170 or 118B.190 and the period of the notice has expired; or (2) If the person is not a natural
person and has received three notices for nonpayment of rent within a 12-month period, immediately
upon failure to pay timely rent. (d) A recreational vehicle lot, the tenant continues in possession, in
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person or by subtenant, without the landlords consent, after the expiration of a notice of at least 5
days. 2. Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a tenant with a periodic tenancy pursuant to
paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection 1, other than a tenancy from week to week, is 60 years of age or
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older or has a physical or mental disability, the tenant may request to be allowed to continue in
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possession for an additional 30 days beyond the time specified in subsection 1 by submitting a
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written request for an extended period and providing proof of the tenants age or disability. A
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landlord may not be required to allow a tenant to continue in possession if a shorter notice is provided
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pursuant to subparagraph (2) of paragraph (b) of subsection 1. 3. Any notice provided pursuant to
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paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection 1 must include a statement advising the tenant of the provisions of
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subsection 2. 4. If a landlord rejects a request to allow a tenant to continue in possession for an
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additional 30 days pursuant to subsection 2, the tenant may petition the court for an order to continue
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in possession for the additional 30 days. If the tenant submits proof to the court that the tenant is
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entitled to request such an extension, the court may grant the petition and enter an order allowing the
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tenant to continue in possession for the additional 30 days. If the court denies the petition, the tenant
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must be allowed to continue in possession for 5 calendar days following the date of entry of the order
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denying the petition. NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
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Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials,
so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to
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the proceedings mentioned in those sections. NRS 40.340 Adjournments. The court or justice of the
peace may for good cause shown adjourn the trial of any cause under NRS 40.220 to 40.420,
inclusive, not exceeding 5 days; and when the defendant, or the defendants agent or attorney, shall
make oath that the defendant cannot safely proceed to trial for want of some material witness, naming
that witness, stating the evidence that the defendant expects to obtain, showing that the defendant has
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used due diligence to obtain such witness and believes that if an adjournment be allowed the
defendant will be able to procure the attendance of such witness, or the witnesss deposition, in time
to produce the same upon the trial, in which case, if such person or persons will give bond, with one
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or more sufficient sureties, conditioned to pay the complainant for all rent that may accrue during the
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pending of such suit, and all costs and damages consequent upon such adjournment, the court or
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justice of the peace shall adjourn the cause for such reasonable time as may appear necessary, not
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exceeding 30 days. NRS 40.350 Trial not to be adjourned when complainant admits evidence in
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affidavit would be given. If the complainant admit that the evidence stated in the affidavit mentioned
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in NRS 40.340 would be given by such witness, and agree that it be considered as actually given on
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the trial, or offered and overruled as improper, the trial shall not be adjourned.
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The landlord is trying to evict me for my exercising my rights as follows: complaining of habitability
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issues and violations of criminal laws and retaliation.
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I have a lease which has not expired and the landlord has not given me notice that they/she is
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terminating my lease. My lease allows me to use the premises for a hybrid purpose of a home law
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office, ie a commercial lease, as such the No Cause type of eviction is not available here, especially
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where, as her, my lease has not terminated by its terms as of yet.
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I have not received a notice from the landlord telling me to leave the premises. they can talk about
what they told "John Doe" to do, but...Aitken requires they change any "John Doe" notices to reflect
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my actual name one they were apprised of it. The were as early as January 5th, 2011 according to
Sue King, yet they failed to serve appropriate notice.. If I have ever owed the landlord any rent, I
have paid it all or have paid it within the time required by law.
Association's negligence vis a vis Laura and Chris's negligent andintentional torts committed against
me, which have resulted in thousands of dollars of damages. Please copy me on any and all
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correspondence via fax or email as the landlords and or their argents have been or arewithholding my
mail or otherwise interferring with my acces to it, and they have also done with respect to the
essential service of electricity.. Association's negligence vis a vis Laura and Chris's negligent
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andintentional torts committed against me, which have resulted in thousands of dollars of damages.
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Please copy me on any and all correspondence via fax or email as the landlords and or their argents
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have been or arewithholding my mail or otherwise interferring with my acces to it, and they have also
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d Written complaint to PTHOA'a employees or agents, causing PTHOA to retaliate against Coughlin
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was provide on January 8, 2012 in two separate writings, which alleged: "Pursuant to NRS 118A and
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NRS 40, I am hereby complaining in writing of yours and Laura Harrison's violation of the following
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criminal laws: A felony conviction for malicious destruction of private property under NRS 206.310
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and 193.155 must be CIVIL LIABILITY FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY NRS 205.980
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Determination of value of loss from crime; notice to victim; order of restitution deemed judgment to
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collect damages. CHAPTER 206 - MALICIOUS MISCHIEF NRS 206.005 Graffiti defined. NRS
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206.010 Destruction or damage of property by unlawful assembly. NRS 206.015 Destruction or
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damage of crops, gardens, trees or shrubs. NRS 206.040 Entering property with intention to damage
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or destroy property. NRS 206.125 Damage of property used for purpose of religion, for burial or
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memorializing of dead, for education, as transportation facility, as public transportation vehicle or as
community center; damage of personal property contained therein; penalties; restitution. NRS
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206.140 Nuisance in building; trespass upon grounds; disturbing assembly. NRS 206.150 Killing,
maiming, disfiguring or poisoning animal of another person; killing estray or livestock. NRS 206.160
Leading or driving horse away without authority. NRS 206.200 Posting of bills, signs or posters
unlawful. NRS 206.220 Removal, alteration or destruction of monuments or landmarks designating
boundaries. NRS 206.260 Fraudulent and malicious destruction of writings. NRS 206.270 Defacing
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proclamations and notices. NRS 206.280 Tampering with papers. NRS 206.290 Opening or
publishing sealed letter or telegram. NRS 206.300 False signals endangering cars, vessels or motors.
NRS 206.310 Injury to other property. NRS 206.320 Unlawful removal of petrified wood from
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posted or designated sites; duties of certain officers. NRS 206.330 Placing graffiti on or otherwise
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defacing property: Fines and penalties; parent or guardian responsible for fines and penalties if
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person violating section is under age of 18 years; suspension of drivers license. NRS 206.335
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Carrying graffiti implement at certain locations with intent to vandalize, place graffiti on or deface
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property. NRS 206.340 Graffiti Reward Fund created; administrative assessment to be imposed for
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certain violations; use of money in Fund. NRS 206.345 Person or entity to be paid if restitution is
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ordered for violation of NRS 206.125 or 206.330. Zach Coughlin, Esq." The second writing: "This is
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additional written notice pursuant to NRS 118A and NRS 40 complaining of and requesting repairs
22
and reimbursement for the following: no cgfi outlet near sink in upstairs bathroom. you broke the
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door to my room and the lock and failed to provide a key laura harrison slashed two of my tires,
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necessitating $150 in repairs. You threw hot coffee on me and ruined my htc G2 smartphone, a $400
26
phone you have breached are deal with respect to my being allowed to be new carpet over the very
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dirty carpet downstairs. You have repeatedly used force and threat of force to prevent me from
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accessing the washing machine downstairs for doing laundry and prevented my use of the kitchen
You admitted to changing the deadbolts on the front and back door's on New Years day at 12:30 am,
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locking me outside on a night with freezing temperatures, necessitating an expense of $60 for
alternate lodging that night. Further, you and Laura Harrison have unlawfully interrupted an essential
service, my electricity, repeatedly. NRS 118A.390. Please cure these issues or I intend to deduct them
from any future rent. I am complaining of yours and Laura Harrison's violations of criminal law
statutes My dog had chewing gum stuck in its hair in several places, in a manner that suggests it was
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purposefully done. I will remind you that abuse to animals is included in the Protection Order
Statutes. Further, you and Ms. Harrison are in violation of federal law in preventing my access to the
mailbox included in our agreement, as it was agreed that I would be afforded the opportunity to
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receive mail at the 1422 E. 9th ST. #2 Address and use of the mailbox. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin,
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Esq."
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Potential counterclaims in a residential eviction action vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
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Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1923.061. Some states restrict the counterclaims that a tenant may assert in a
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summary eviction proceeding. Iowa Code Ann. 648.19; Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. 8-402.4 (d).
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If a property owner used illegal self-help to remove a tenant prior to or during the course of an
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eviction action, the tenant may have counterclaims for illegal eviction, trespass, or harassment. The
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tenants prevailed on such a claim in Villeneuve v. Beane, 182 Vt. 575, 2007 VT 75, 933 A.2d 1139
22
(2007), where the tenant family struggled to pay their rent and purchase heating oil after the father's
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serious injury in an industrial accident left him unable to work. Despite the fact that the tenants owed
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back rent and the property owner had been forced to purchase heating oil to keep the furnace running,
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the property owner agreed to permit the tenants to remain in the residence for an additional month
27
after expiration of the lease if they paid the rent for that additional month. The tenants paid the rent
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for the additional month, but while the tenants were away at work and school one day, the landlord
began removing their personal property from the residence. When one of the tenants returned home
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from work unexpectedly, he had the police remove the property owner from the residence and the
tenants moved their property back into the residence. During the course of the eviction action filed by
the property owner, the tenants paid rent into court until they vacated the residence. However, the
property owner engaged in a campaign of harassment against the tenants while the eviction action
was pending, including having their utilities shut off and posting signs on the property owner's
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neighboring premises stating that the tenants would not pay rent and would not vacate the residence.
Based on these actions, the tenants asserted a counterclaim for harassment, illegal eviction, and
trespass. The appellate court upheld the trial court's award of $10,000 in compensatory damages and
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$2,000 in punitive damages against the property owner because the property owner's conduct was
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outrageous and a violation of the tenants' right to legal process. Villeneuve v. Beane, 182 Vt. 575,
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2007 VT 75, 933 A.2d 1139 (2007). One common counterclaim is breach of the warranty of
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habitability. Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich, 1 N.Y.3d 117, 769 N.Y.S.2d 785, 802 N.E.2d 135
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(2003) (tenant asserted a counterclaim for breach of the warranty of habitability in the landlord's
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eviction action); Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615 (2005) (tenant asserted a
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counterclaim for breach of the warranty of habitability in the landlord's eviction action). In certain
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cases, a breach of the warranty of habitability may allow reinstatement of the tenancy even if the
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property owner already obtained an eviction order. For instance, a Massachusetts provision permits a
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tenant to withhold rent due to conditions in the residence that materially impair or endanger the
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tenant's safety, health, or well-being. Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615
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(2005) (interpreting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 239, 8A). If a Massachusetts court renders judgment
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in favor of the property owner based on the nonpayment of rent, the tenant may reinstate the tenancy
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by paying the amount of the judgment into court within one week. Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App.
Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615 (2005) (interpreting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 239, 8A). However, such
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relief is not available unless the tenant proves that the property owner had prior notice of the
conditions endangering the tenant's safety, health, or well-being. Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App.
Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615 (2005) (denying a tenant's motion for reinstatement of her tenancy because
she failed to notify the landlord of the conditions allegedly endangering her health, safety, or well-
being prior to withholding rent). Failure to afford the property owner the requisite notice prior to
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withholding rent precludes the tenant from asserting the breach of warranty of habitability as a
defense to an eviction proceeding. Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615 (2005)
(affirming judgment in favor of the landlord for possession and back rent).Because a tenant's claim of
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retaliatory eviction is typically asserted as an equitable defense, the usual remedy for its successful
14
assertion is dismissal of the landlord's action for possession of the premises.[72] However, in some
15
cases the tenant may be entitled to damages.[ 73] This may include recovery of a rent abatement for a
16
period of uninhabitability,[74] compensatory damages,[75] damages for emotional distress caused by
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the retaliatory eviction,[ 76] and attorney's fees.[77] Most courts have held that punitive damages are
19
not recoverable on a claim of retaliatory eviction,[78] although a few courts have awarded punitive
20
damages in some instances.[79] It is the tenant's burden to prove damages. For example, in Paullin v.
21
Sutton,[80] a Nevada court found that the only evidence of damages consisted of testimony by the
22
tenant that, following her eviction, she purchased a condominium for $25,000 down and $1,552
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mortgage payment (plus $135 association fee) per month. The court held that as a matter of law,
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damages for retaliatory eviction do not include all or part of the purchase price of a new home by the
26
former tenant. Further, although the tenant's answers to interrogatories indicated that she did incur
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expenses in moving, she did not introduce any evidence at trial concerning the amount of these
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expenses. Because she failed to carry the burden to prove her damages, the court vacated a
compensatory damage award of $12,000. The court also reversed an $80,000 award of punitive
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damages because, said the court, punitive damages are not authorized without a valid award of
compensatory damages. The court further determined that while Nev Rev Stat 118A.510 clearly
prohibited the non-renewal of a month-to-month tenancy for a retaliatory purpose, the statute was
silent as to whether punitive damages were recoverable for a retaliatory eviction. In Gokey v.
Bessette,[81] a landlord's action for unpaid rent allegedly due when the tenant vacated the premises,
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the defendant tenants counterclaimed for damages based on retaliatory eviction and the landlord's
breach of an implied warranty of habitability. The parties had entered into an oral lease agreement for
rental of a mobile home starting in September 1985 at a monthly rent of $400. The tenants paid for
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electric service to the mobile home, but the landlord paid for the electricity for a nearby barn, in
14
which the tenants were allowed to store their freezer. The trial court found that during the tenancy a
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variety of problems developed, including water leakage into the home through the roof (which was
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repaired by the tenants), power failures due to a faulty transformer, and a furnace breakdown. More
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serious was a break in the sewer line, which caused unhealthy fluids to collect underneath the mobile
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home and a foul odor to pervade the premises. Despite numerous complaints to the landlord to repair
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the sewer line break, the problem remained unresolved from February to June 1986, and the tenants
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stopped paying rent as of June 1, 1986. The court found that final repair to the septic system came on
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June 17, 1986, only after the tenants prompted a visit from the town health officer. On June 6, 1986,
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prior to the repair, the landlord gave the tenants notice to quit, effective August 1, 1986. The trial
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court found that after the tenants stopped paying rent, the landlord locked the barn where the freezer
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was located and shut off the power, causing the loss of $300 worth of food. The tenants vacated the
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premises on October 31, 1986, approximately one month after the landlord had sold the mobile home.
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[FN78] See, for example, Pohlman v. Metropolitan Trailer Park, Inc., 126 N.J. Super. 114, 312 A.2d
888 (Ch. Div. 1973) (holding that state statute did not authorize recovery of punitive damages for
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retaliatory eviction); Paullin v. Sutton, 102 Nev. 421, 724 P.2d 749 (1986) (holding that state statute
did not authorize recovery of punitive damages for retaliatory eviction). [FN79] See, for example,
Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1st Dist. 1971) (holding that punitive
damages are recoverable in a retaliatory eviction action even if the actual damages are nominal). See
also Del Code Ann tit. 25, 5516(d) (allowing a successful tenant to recover three months' rent or
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treble damages, whichever is greater, plus attorney's fees). [FN80] Paullin v. Sutton, 102 Nev. 421,
724 P.2d 749 (1986). [FN81] Gokey v. Bessette, 154 Vt. 560, 580 A.2d 488, 23 A.L.R.5th 887
(1990). [FN82] Pursuant to 9 Vt. Stat. Ann. 4465. Section 23 Footnotes: [FN83] For a general
13
discussion on the use of interrogatories, see DiscoveryWritten Interrogatories, 4 Am. Jur. Trials 1.
14
For interrogatories to discover basic facts in tort actions, see Danner, Pattern Discovery: Tort Actions
15
(2d ed.). For checklists and discussion of the use of expert witnesses, see Danner, Expert Witness
16
Checklists. Regarding depositions, see Pattern Deposition Checklists (2d ed.). On state court practice
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with respect to interrogatories, see DiscoveryWritten Interrogatories, 4 Am. Jur. Trials 1. On
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written interrogatories in federal district court, see Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 26, 33; see
20
also Federal Procedure, L. Ed. 26:290 et seq.. 45 AMJUR POF 3d 375
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The landlord's Complaint fails to state facts which would allow him/her to evict me, further King and
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Western Nevada Management and Shiela Lester have admitted they received nothing pursuant to
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their arrangement with Allaback and Foreshee, as such the Nevada Supreme Court holding in Glazier
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makes inapplicable a summary eviction proceeding. Further, where, as here, my lease allows me to
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use the premises for a home law office, and the non-payment of rent has not been alleged, NRS
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40.253 makes inapplicable a summary eviction procedure under those circumstances, rather, a
plenary procedure is required. Regardless, a proper jury trial demand is hereby made.
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There is perhaps another person against whom this action should be brought, namely Erin Allaback
and Laure Forshee.
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I have not been properly named in the notices. Rather, the Notice purportedly posed on January
10th, 2012 only names a "John Doe" despite my numerous writings to Western Nevada wherein my
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name was madse clear. The Aitken case makes clear that the procedural and notice requirements of
summary eviction matters must be stricly adhered to, as such this "John Doe" notice is ineffective.
I have other defenses as follows: retaliation, discrimination, lack of allegation of nonpayment of rent,
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HOA admitted tenants were not obligated to pay rent, as such, under Glazier, summary eviction
14
procedures unavailable. IMPORTANT: In some cases, the Court has the power to give you time to
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find a new place to live even if you do not have any of the listed defenses. If you wish the Court to
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determine whether you are entitled to it, please check below:
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I have provided written request to landlord for an extension of 30 days in light of my disability.
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I am writing to request the 30 days extension based upon disability. I am invoking my HIPAA and other privacy rights
with respect to divulging anythign further about my disability.
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COUNTERCLAIM
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If you believe that you are entitled to a return of part of your rent payment or other damages from the
landlord, complete the statement below: I here by counterclaim in excess of $10,000 in damages. I
feel that I am entitled to this amount for the following reasons: damages to myself, my clients, and
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my practice in light of landlord's and landlord's agents actions. Laura and Chris being the
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Associations employees and therefore you guys or them wanted to settle with
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me on account of a respondeat superior theory of liability making your
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exposure significant enough to justify doing so. Association's negligence vis a vis Laura and Chris's negligent
andintentional torts committed against me, which have resulted in thousands of dollars of damages. Please copy me on
any and all correspondence via fax or
email as the landlords and or their argents have been or arewithholding my mail or otherwise interferring with my acces
to it, and they have also done with respect to the essential service of electricity.
FACTS
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NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited; remedies; exceptions.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a
tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential services required by the rental
agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an action for possession if:
(a) The tenant has complained in good faith of a violation of a building, housing or health code
applicable to the premises and affecting health or safety to a governmental agency charged with the
responsibility for the enforcement of that code;
(b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord or a law enforcement agency of a
violation of this chapter or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty;
(c) The tenant has organized or become a member of a tenants union or similar organization;
(d) A citation has been issued resulting from a complaint described in paragraph (a);
(e) The tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or
arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this chapter
respecting the habitability of dwelling units;
(f) The tenant has failed or refused to give written consent to a regulation adopted by the landlord,
after the tenant enters into the rental agreement, which requires the landlord to wait until the
appropriate time has elapsed before it is enforceable against the tenant; or
(g) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a
fair housing agency or any other appropriate body of a violation of NRS 118.010 to 118.120,
inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or has otherwise exercised
rights which are guaranteed or protected under those laws.
2. If the landlord violates any provision of subsection 1, the tenant is entitled to the remedies
provided in NRS 118A.390 and has a defense in any retaliatory action by the landlord for possession.
3. A landlord who acts under the circumstances described in subsection 1 does not violate that
subsection if:
(a) The violation of the applicable building, housing or health code of which the tenant
complained was caused primarily by the lack of reasonable care by the tenant, a member of his or her
household or other person on the premises with his or her consent;
(b) The tenancy is terminated with cause;
(c) A citation has been issued and compliance with the applicable building, housing or health
code requires alteration, remodeling or demolition and cannot be accomplished unless the tenants
dwelling unit is vacant; or
(d) The increase in rent applies in a uniform manner to all tenants.
The maintenance of an action under this subsection does not prevent the tenant from seeking damages
or injunctive relief for the landlords failure to comply with the rental agreement or maintain the
dwelling unit in a habitable condition as required by this chapter.
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Lost profits, lost goods, such as food, and the benefits of lost services, such as advertising, are
examples of losses that may constitute "actual damages" for illegal eviction. 14 M.R.S.A. 6014(2)
(A). Degenhardt v. Ewe Ltd. Partnership, 2011 ME 23, 13 A.3d 790 (Me. 2011). Being an attorney is
hard enough without dealing with all of Park Terrace's malfeasance. Perhaps if ET AL ever gathers
up the gumption to hang out his own shingle they will more fully appreciate that.
ANALYSIS
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Tenant's recovery of damages for emotional distress under Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
10
Act, 6 A.L.R.4th 528; Right of landlord legally entitled to possession to dispossess tenant without
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legal process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177; Recovery by tenant of damages for physical injury or mental anguish
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occasioned by wrongful eviction, 17 A.L.R.2d 936; 5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 375, Tenant's Rights
and Remedies Against Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord. 99 Am. Jur. Trials 289, Retaliatory Eviction
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Claims.
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Evidence supported finding that landlord's eviction of tenant was retaliatory for her complaints
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concerning persistent plumbing problems and condition of common areas. N.R.S.
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118A.510. Paullin v. Sutton, 1986, 724 P.2d 749, 102 Nev. 421.
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By way of analogy to eviction mills for landlords, consider For example, abuse of bankruptcy
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proceedings by renters became so widespread in the Central District of California that [i]n 1991, J.
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Clifford Wallace, Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, established an Ad Hoc
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Committee on Unlawful Detainer and Bankruptcy Mills to look into possible solutions to the practice
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of abusive filings to prevent eviction. Judge Geraldine Mund, Updated Report of Unlawful Detainer
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Task Force 1 (1992). The committee found that bankruptcy mills are a substantial cause of the
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abuse: They churn out large numbers of petitions (which result in an automatic stay, forestalling
eviction), but pursue no further action. Estimates suggest that in the Central District alone, some
20,000 to 40,000 such petitions are filed every year for the sole purpose of delaying the debtor's
eviction. See id. at 7. As those familiar with bankruptcy practice are only too painfully aware, this
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type of strategic manipulation isn't limited to renters' petitions. See generally Marcy J.K. Tiffany,
Crime and Bankruptcy, 24 Bankr.Ct.Dec. (CRR), at A1 (Sept. 2, 1993).
Awarding Attorney's Fees to Pro Se Litigants Under Rule 11, June, 1997, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2308,
Jeremy D. Spector. ET AL cites no authority on this or any other issue that lives anywhere beyond
form motion, template time, turn and burn practice of law. While ET AL did manage to cite the
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Seller's case, they quotes no language from it and seemingly makes not attempt to analyze its ruling.
they should have. Sellers speaks to awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties in civil actions. It
does not purport to speak to attorney's fees awards stemming from Rule 11 violation, a situation
13
where the granting of attorney's fees to an attorney pro se litigant is far more accepted throughout
14
American jurisprudence. Simply put, the Seller's case is inapplicable and ET AL should stop citing
15
cases where they clearly has a very shallow grasp of what they speak to.
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To wit:
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states that have considered whether an attorney proper person litigant may be
19
awarded attorney fees are divided, with a slight majority permitting such fees.
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Decisions approving fee awards to attorney proper person litigants generally do so
21
on the basis that an attorney is paid for rendering legal services, and if they renders
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such services on his own behalf, it results in as much pecuniary loss to him as if
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they paid another attorney to render the same services. So, if a losing party must
25
pay attorney fees anyway, it should make no difference whether the fees are to be
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paid to an attorney representing himself or another attorney employed by him. In
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short, "a lawyer's time and advice are his stock in trade."...We interpret NRS 69.030
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to require that all proper person litigants, whether attorney or non-attorney, be
obligated to pay attorney fees as a prerequisite for an award of prevailing party
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attorney fees. This interpretation gives effect to the Legislature's clear intent that the
prevailing party in justice's court be reimbursed by the losing party for out-ofpocket costs incurred to prosecute the suit. To interpret the statute otherwise would
require us to redefine what is meant by an attorney fee, which is commonly
understood to be the sum paid or charged for legal services. Because Matthews
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represented himself and did not pay or incur any obligation to pay attorney fees, the
justice's court exceeded its jurisdiction by awarding such fees. We therefore grant,
in part, the petition for a writ of certiorari. Sellers v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct., 119
Nev. 256, 71 P .3d 495 (2003).
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NRS 69.030 Prevailing party allowed attorney's fee to be taxed as costs in justice court. The
15
prevailing party in any civil action at law in the justice courts of this State shall receive, in addition to
16
the costs of court as now allowed by law, a reasonable attorney fee. The attorney fee shall be fixed by
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the justice and taxed as costs against the losing party. So, ET AL's big contribution to the legal
19
research required to rule on this case is to cite Seller's, which does not speak to whether a pro se
20
attorney can receive attorney's fees pursuant to a Rule 11 sanction. The statute involved does not
21
apply here, either, where a Rule 11 Sanction motion is in play. Further, even if it did apply, which it
22
doesn't, Coughlin did pay or incur any obligation to pay attorney fees as they has stated in the Fact
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section that they paid to and incurred such an obligation to himself. Where Matthews may have not
25
been exact enough in his pleadings, Coughlin has been.
26
Coughlin has actually, reasonably and necessarily incurred $5,000 in the preparation of the pleadings
27
they has put forth so far in this matter, and in dealing with ET AL's regrettable, declasse conduct in
28
this matter. ET AL should be sanctioned in that amount, plus any fees incurred in drafting a reply in
support of this motion, and preparing for and attending any hearing. Further, Coughlin hereby
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requests a hearing replete with A JURY (A RIGHT GUARANTEE BY THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT EVEN IN SUMMARY EVICTION MATTERS, AN THERE IS NO LONGER
JCRCP 106, SO I GET AN APPEAL TOO!) on this matter to avoid eviction. There are evidentiary
issues such as the amount of rent deductions agreed to, the amount of damages done by Park
Terrace's landscaping crew, thin skulled tenant issues, etc.
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WHEREFORE, tenant, Zach Coughlin, prays that this Court rule that a summary eviction proceeding
11
is unavailable to landlord here and award in excess of $10,000 damages to Tenant/Counterclaimant.
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Declaration made under penalty of perjury:
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I Declare, pursuant to NRS 53.045 that the foregoing is true and correct and made under
penatly of perjury
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain
the social security number of any person.
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Dated this: February 27th, 2012
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_/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin
Tenant/Counterclaimant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
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I, Zach Coughlin, declare:

On February 27th, 2012, I, Mr. Zach Coughlin served the foregoing Tenant's Answer and
Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim by placing a true and
correct copy hereof in the usps mail, emailing, making all reasonable attempts at personally serving,
and faxing true copy thereof to:
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Park Terrace Townhomes HOA

c/o Gayle Agnes Kern, Esq. and Gayle A. Kern. Ltd.
5421 Kietzke Lane Suite 200
Reno , NV 89511
Tel: 775-324-5930
Fax: 775-324-6173
gaylekern@kernltd.com
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Park Terrace Townhomes Assn

c/o Western Nevada Management, Inc.
Residential, Commercial & Association Management
Sue King
President/Broker/Supervising CM
804 Mill Street, Reno, NV 89502
Ph: 775-284-4434
Fax: 775-284-4465
sue@westernnv.com
www.westernnv.com
18
info@westernnv.com
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Reno Justice Court, Civil Division

1 S. Sierra St.
Reno, NV 89501
Civil Division Fax
(775) 325-6715
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Dated this: February 27th, 2012

----------------------------Zach Coughlin, Tenant
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Kinkead, Catherine
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Baker, Robbin
Monday, February 27, 2012 8:55 AM
Kinkead, Catherine
FW Coughlin RCR2012-065630
Importance:
High
*****************************
Robbin Baker
Re 0 Justice Court
Deputy Court Clerk
(775) 3256535
(775) 3256510 (fax)
From: Dogan, Biray

Sent: Friday, February 24, 2012 2:49 PM
To: Baker, Robbin
Cc: Young Zach
,
Subject: FW: Coughlin RCR2012-065630

Importance: High
Hi Robbin,
The State and defense have agreed to continue this case out 30 days for another MSC. Thank you, b.
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Young, Zach
Friday, February 24, 2012 12:07
PM
Dogan, Biray
RE: Coughlin
Because this is the first MSC setting, I am okay with a 30 day continuance. I will NSN next set as well for MSC.
Thanks,
Zach
From: Dogan, Biray

Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2012 1:07 PM
To: Young, Zach
Subject: Coughlin
The MSC is Monday. Coughlin wants to get his case continued. What sayeth you?
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Reno Justice Court

Civil Division Fax (775) 325-6591
RE: RJC2012-074408
Emergency Communication regarding Hearing on Verified Complaint scheduled for 2/23/12 at 8:45
a.m.
February 21, 2012,
Dear Hon. Judge Lynch,
I am writing to inquire about your status as the Judge randomly assigned to RJC2012-074408.
Please see the attached collection of correspondences for explication in this regard. I believe that you
are supposed to be the Judge on this case, under JCRRT Rule 2, and further, that even if some court
policy or practice would result in a different Judge hearing this case in your stead for one or more
hearings, that the ancillary considerations detailed herein provide that, for the sake of appearances, this
case should remain in your Department and presided over by yourself.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1/1
Page 1 of 17
RE: cases being randomly assigned in RJC FW: attempt

to file prior to 5pm denied
From: Tuttle, Steve (stuttle@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Fri 2/17/12 10:40 AM
Cc:
Sferrazza, Pete (psferrazza@washoecounty.us)
Thatisyoursole,complexinterpretationofa(two)simplemeetingrequeststodiscusscourtstaff
relatedissues,whichyoudeclinedboth.
Steve Tuttle
Court Administrator
Reno Justice Court

Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 10:09 AM
To: Tuttle, Steve
Subject: RE: cases being randomly assigned in RJC FW: attempt to file prior to 5pm denied
Oh, you must be referring to when Ms. Stancil called and indicated you told her to tell me I would need
to come in and meet with you and the Bailiff prior to the RJC agreeing to set for the Hearing on Motion
to Contest Personal Property Lien?
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=c9614f81-5996-11e1... 2/22/2012
Page 2 of 17
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521,
and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent
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applicable privilege.
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:46:06 -0800
From: stuttle@washoecounty.us
Mr.Coughlin:
Iaminreceiptonyoursixpageemail,whichagainisriddlewithaccusationsandunfoundedclaims.I
donotseeanynewissuesthatnecessitateareply.However,Idofeelcompelledtoaddressone
accusationregardingyourperceptionofmymanagementresponsibilities.YouclaimIdidnotproperly
investigateyourallegationsofsexualassaultbecauseIdidnotinterviewyouthusbeinginviolationof
U.S.law.Pleasecheckyouremailsonorabout11/30/11whereyouwereaskedtwice(oncebyKaren
Stancilformeandoncebymedirectly)forameetingtodiscussyourissueswithcourtstaff.You
declinedbothinvitations.Steve
Steve Tuttle
Court Administrator
Reno Justice Court

Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2012 4:58 PM
To: Tuttle, Steve
Page 3 of 17
Dear Court Administrator Tuttle,
I feel that you have misunderstood my import. Please consider that you and
others in the court are only human, whereas Richard G. Hill, Esq. is clearly a
lycan, who has also somehow managed to fashion himself and his brethren
into a sophisticated commercial law firm capable of distorting reality in ways
not commonly seen absent the administration of extremely potent
psychotropic drugs. There were no "assertions regarding "Judges Sferrazza,
Clifton and the Court's integrity" in anything I wrote you. There is a
difference between an "appearance" and a "reality", however, I think you will
find that "appearances of impropriety" are given considerable attention in the
Rules of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the
Model Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees in the State of Nevada.
Further, I think you will find that, contrary to your retaliatory assertions, my
duty to my client includes making a reasonably diligent effort to attempt to
access justice, and any subsequent excusable neglect analysis may, in fact,
call for making an attempt to inquire with court personnel or Sheriff's
Deputies in an attempt to address my concerns vis a vis the doors locking.
While you indicate the videos are the property of the Sheriff (quite a bit of
power for the Sheriff alone to own those videos) you do not make clear how
it is that you are able to review them, while at the same time, seemingly
disclaiming any liability for the negligent hiring, training, or supervision of the
various Deputies you supervise and or work with at the RJC, especially, vis a
vis their propensity to tell litigants that they will have objects forcibly inserted
into their anuses should such litigants in any way question the cold, hard,
authority of these Sheriff's Deputie's jackboot.
What is not clear is why Judge Clifton would handle all the other cases on the
stacked docket of 2/13/12, beginning at 8:30, but then, after Chief Bailiff
Sexton came into the Court Room with Bailiff Reyes (whom I have been
forced to file for a Protection Order against just recently) and made some
phone calls, Judge Sferrazza replaced Judge Clifton. Further, while Judge
Sferrazza explained the non-appearance of Judge Lynch by indicating that
Judge Lynch was instead scheduled to do traffic court that day, Chief Civil
Clerk Stancil indicated today that, in fact, Judge Lynch was hearing matters
Page 4 of 17
on a criminal calendar.'
Regardless, I certainly have not impugned the credibility of any of the fine
judges of the RJC. However, your jumping to being "insulted" and failing to
ask me anything about these incidents involving threats to insert objects
inside of my anus leaves a bit to be desired, in my humble opinion, from the
perspective of a member of the public appearing in your court as a litigant.
You wrote: "You were not denied by this Court your right to file these
documents yesterday. You were, however, denied by Washoe County Sheriff
Court Security Unit access to the building after closing time; the same as
anyone else would be denied. You were not here before 5:00pm and trying
to gain access into the facility by coming through an exit only door is not
permissible."
I don't agree with your assessment, but I apologize for the annoyance this
seems to have caused. I hope you will consider that the date on which this
occurred was the last day to file a pre-trial motion (under NRS 174.125, such
motions, including a "motion to suppress" the fruits of an unlawful search by
law enforcement) in a matter for which I am a criminal defendant, and for
which a conviction could result in me being disbarred as an attorney, in
addition to fairly substantial criminal penalties, including incarceration. There
are a lot of things that can go wrong on the way to an innocent man being
convicted of a crime. One key area involves the failure to preserve for appeal
important issues. Such were the content of the documents I sought to filed
on February 14th, 2012. Additionally, only yesterday was I finally informed
by the RJC, criminal division, that I may file by fax. I have previously been
told that I may not file by fax. Further, today Ms. Stancil, Chief Civil Clerk,
informed me that I may also file by fax in the Civil Division. I am quite
certain I have requested permission to do this before in both the civil and
criminal divisions and have been told I may not every single time. This
relates to your recent commentary on "favoritism" and applying the rules
evenly to all litigants. I am sure I have heretofore been disallowed from filing
by fax. Indeed, I have spent countless hours of my time travelling out of my
way, down to the Reno Justice Court, to file each and every document that I
have filed in the few cases I have had in your court (and most any lawyer
Page 5 of 17
will tell you that their "time" is the only thing a lawyer is much able to sell to
anyone for the purpose of making a living, something which, I assure, has
been an enormous struggle for me this past few years). You are aware of
just how enormous the file is in RJC Rev2011-001708. I guess some would
say that is my fault, though I would counter that the law is rather clear that
NRS 40.253's summary eviction proceedings are forbidden against
commercial tenants where the non payment of rent is neither alleged nor
Notice of such is posted or served, as here.
Mr. Tuttle, you know as well as I do that there is a turnstile that only turns
one way that would obviously present any such attempt to gain access.
Further, the door you are referring to is not marked "exit only", and your
assertions that I was "trying to gain access to the facility" is so transparent
that it is disturbing considering your position with the court. I clearly knocked
on the window and waived to Deputies in an attempt to ask them my
questions. Surely, the video you reference easily show this. Additionally, you
do not mention exactly what time "after 5 pm" the video showed, and I find
that curious. Further, you do not mention any system in place to assure that
the time stamping on the video is in accord with the official United States
time at www.time.gov. Indeed, the RJC or the Sheriff are not the only one's
in the this world with cameras and clocks, and it might be very interesting to
see a documentary of several days worth of footage of just when exactly the
doors lock, synced to a visual time stamping verified to be accurate vis a vis
www.time.gov. If such a video did exist, you don't sound like you would be
too interested in seeing it. Please correct me if I am wrong.
You further wrote: "Because your actions could be consider trespassing is the
reason why Reno Justice Court Chief Bailiff Michael Sexton again asked you
to leave. Fair and equal access to justice applies not only to discrimination,
but also to favoritism. Allowing one party to file documents after a deadline is
unethical and without question unfair." Your interpretation of the crime of
"trespassing" is interesting. I guess, under your approach, Richard G. Hill,
Esq. would be guilty of trespassing where, at the 12/20/11 Hearin on
Tenant's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, after the Tenant invoked
the Rule of Exclusion, and Judge Sferrazza ordered Hill and other prospective
witnesses to leave the court room, where Hill surreptiously snuck back in the
court room, found time during a recess to announce to myself Bailiff Reyes
and Chief Bailiff Sexton that Hill too would like to "put his boot up Coughlin's
ass", and then manage to sneak back into the court room during the
proceeding, and have Bailiff Sexton pass post-it notes from behind the Bar to
Page 6 of 17
a struggling Casey Baker, Esq., whom was attempting to apply and unlawful
rent distraint under the guise of "reasonable storage" expenses.
At $30 a day for "reasonable storage" expenses, Judge Sferrrazza's Order

was more in line with what one gets in a room at the Sand's for a day,
complete with the full use and occupancy of the room, heat, plubming, light,
and premium cable television, and wi-fi access. $30.00 a day for "reasonable
storage" of that which could fit in a 10 by 30 foot storage shed (which
typically cost $125 per month, or about 1/8th of what Judge Sferrazza ruled
would be a reasonable daily storage charge, in the great Reno area). This
$30.00 a day storage charge is made all the more questionable by the fact
that the locations where all these items were being "stored" (and for which a
bill for $1,060 to "secure" this "storage" was filed with the RJC) was actually
burglarized on December 12th, 2011, while under Hill and Baker control, and
many valuable were stolen, though neither Hill nor Baker ever provided
anything close to a reasonable detailed inventory of what was there prior to
the burglary and what remained after the burglary. The did manage to notice
that a 62 inch Television was missing, though.
I agree with your assessment that it would be unethical and without question
unfair for the criminal division filing office to ask a "red headed step child"
litigant "who is calling" on the phone when they inquire with court personnel
as to whether the court will, in fact, remain open, all the way up to the
posted 5pm closing time, and then for the door's to the court to, ever so
curiously, be locked prior to 5 pm when said redhead presents to access
justice, and even more so where a court administrator and Chief Bailiff then
arrange a version of the facts to explain away their actions and decisions,
replete with menacing allusions to retaliatory prosecution, etc., etc. You are
right about that, Sir.
You further wrote "Informing Chief Bailiff Sexton of your intention to wait
outside for Reno Justice Court employees to leave so you could force them to
take your filings is a form of harassment and needs to stop immediately. If
this aggressive behavior continues, the Court will consider a protective order
against you, which will result in your ability or privilege to access Reno
Justice Court." Well, it does seem somewhat untoward that you are now
Page 7 of 17
threatening to file a protective order merely because a litigant asked to speak

with a supervisor regarding the court's doors locking prior to 5 pm. This is
particularly troublesome where you make accusations of such a litigant
engaging in "aggressive behavior" when, in fact, it is your own Chief Bailiff
Sexton and Bailiff Reyes who have both engaged in bullying behavior
towards litigants, replete with the ever so professional threats to forcibly
insert objects into a litigants anus, and other menacing commentary related
to a litigants "ass", particularly where such commentary occurred while said
litigant was attempting to access justice in the most basic way (by presenting
documents to be filed with the filing office, during hours for which the court
holds itself out as open for business).
You further wrote: "In addition, I have looked into your assertions of sexual
assault by the Reno Justice Court Bailiffs and found these allegations to be
without merit." However, in your "looking into" these "assertions of sexual
assault" you have neither met with me nor interviewed me or otherwise
conducted anything close to a reasonably diligent inquiry, something which
you may have a duty to perform with respect to any negligent hiring,
training, or supervision claim or other 42 USC Sec 1983 claim a member, or a
class of members of the public may have. But you seem to suggest that you
do not bare any responsibility for the actions of the WCSO Court Security
Unit's actions. However, if that is the case, one must wonder why you would
have "looked into your assertions of sexual assault by the Reno Justice Court
Bailiff's" or why you refer to said Bailiff's alternatively as "Reno Justice Court
Bailiffs", while elsewhere using the designation Washoe County Sheriff
Court Security Unit.
You went on to write in another recent correspondence: "1) The locking of

the front doors to the Courthouse is the responsibility of the Sheriffs Office,
so all your questions regarding this issue will need to be directed to them.
However, I will state that the surveillance videos, which are dated and time
stamped, clearly shows that you were here after 5:00pm on 2/14/2012."
Well, the videos may technically show I was "here after 5 pm", but it is
curious you do not write that the videos show that I "did not arrive until after
5 pm"...or otherwise get very specific.
Page 8 of 17
Please be aware that this correspondence places you on a LITIGATION HOLD

NOTICE with respect to any and all recordings made in conjunction with this
matter, and further, with regard to any recordings made concerning me
whatsoever. PLEASE PROVIDE ME WITH A COPY OF THE VIDEO YOU
REFERENCE, COMPLETE WITH THE TIME STAMPING AND A WRITTEN
ATTESTATION AS TO THE PRACTICE IN PLACE TO ASSURE THE ACCURACY
OF THE TIMESTAMPING.
You go on to write: "3) I am not sure what your question is regarding your
11/16/11 filing - Motion to Contest Personal Property." By all means, let me
elucidate this matter for you more clearly. Please see the attached 1/5/12
Reply to Opposition in the appeal from this matter, in CV11-03628 wherein
the RJC's liability for failing to appropriately carry out the dictates of black
letter Nevada law found in NRS 40.253(7)-(8) is quite clearly pronounced.
Further, I was never provided or served a copy of (until the filing of the
Record on Appeal, well after the 12/15 and 12/17/11 entries in the docket,
which preceded the 12/20/11 Hearing on Tenant's Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien) the two statements the RJC seemingly order Deputy
Clerk Jocelyn Jonas and Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil to place in the file in
RJC REV2011-001708.
In that Reply, in page 7 of 24, one' finds the following: 4. Funny thing about the
Reno Justice Court: when it comes to setting a hearing within 10 days of my filing Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien on November 16th, 2011, the RJC is all "oh, we needed your permission, Mr.
Coughlin, to set such a hearing, its your fault that we couldn't get it on within the 10 days required by
statute under NRS 40.253(7-8); however, when Coughlin went in to file something on November 3,
2011 at 4:58pm, RJC filing office Chief Clerk Karen Stancil didn't need no permission to serve personally
on Coughlin Notice of a Hearing to take place on Monday, November 7, 2011. Well, actually,
allegathetically, another clerk (Deputy Clerk Christine Erickson) had to sneak that Notice of the Hearing
on November 7, 2011 into a stack of papers she slipped Coughlin when she was pretending to be helpful
for a change, rather than sullen, and overly opinionated for someone who cares so little of the import of
the Whitman, Donoho, Byrant, and Sullivan decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court with respect to court
employees legislating from the filing office desk and refusing to accept filings because they just aren't
feeling it that day.... You see, somebody at the RJC figured out that it probably was not legal to hold on
to Coughlin last $2,275 on earth if it was not granting him a stay (especially where NRS 40.385 entitles
Coughlin to one, for his posting a bond as little as $250 (instead the RJC kept Coughlin's $2,275, and if
you believe Hill, did not grant a stay) as, in Judge Sferrazza's words, that would be "conversion". So,
how again is it Mr. Hill's outrageous allegations of Coughlin living here or there during this or that period
(something which Hill never bothers to support with anything other than his own bluster, hot air, and
conjecture, and apparent willingness to to incur NRCP Rule 11 sanctions if it means milking a willful
neurosurgeon good and dry in the process) are reasonably based in fact or law and therefore not worthy
Page 9 of 17
of NRCP 11 sanctions?
Regardless, the RJC did set a Hearing on Tenant's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, and Tenant
did show up for it, in face, he checked in with Chief Bailiff Sexton prior to that Hearing, which was set
for November 22, 2011. However, Tenant was the only one who showed up. Should that not yield a
default victory?
However, more troubling is the RJC's conduct in forcing two of its filing office personnel to sign
unsworned "statements", one month after some alleged conversation incident to a litigants visit to the
filing office, and further, where Deputy Clerk Jocelyn Jonas was called to testify by Judge Sferrazza,
would conducted a leading examination of the Court's witness, in a matter where the Court was not
even a party. Most troubling of all, however, it the fact that Ms. Jones, on cross-examination had to
admit matters that show here statement of December 15th, 2011 to be misleading, at best, and wholly
deficient in fulfilling the RJC's duty to maintain an appearance of impartiality towards all litigants. It is
simply impermissible for the RJC to have Ms. Jonas sign and unsworn "statement" (truly a new one to
me, being neither a notarized Affidavit, nor a Declaration made under "penalty of perjury" in lieu of an
Affidavit. However, when Ms. Jonas did get sworn in at the 12/20/11 Hearing, a few unpleasant truths
emerged. One, Ms. Jonas was forced to admit that she did recall having a discussion with Tenant
Coughlin in RJC REV2011-001708 about the requirement that the RJC comply with NRS 40.253(8) which
reads:
Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection

7, the court shall schedule a hearing on the motion. The
hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of
the motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to
the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by
the sheriff, constable or other process server. At the hearing,
the court may:
"NRS 40.253(8):
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord

pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 and any accumulating
daily costs; and
(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the
payment of the charges determined to be due or if no charges
are determined to be due.
One thing you may notice about the jurisdiction granted to the Court, above, in NRS 40.253(8), is that
there is decidedly not any language allowing for an Order "Resolving" Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien like that Judge Sferrazza entered on 12/21/11, and for which the RJC filing office has
refused to allow me to file a Notice of Appeal for, and has further refused to even mark as "received" my
attempts at so filing Such a Notice Appeal and Motion to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis (to the
extent that would even be necessary considering the previous IFP status given the Tenant in that
Page 10 of 17
matter, RJC REV201-001708). That 12/21/11 Order is included following this corrspondence.
Coughlin is also the Defendant in this criminal matter, which is also before Judge Sferrazza, RCR11063341....Judge Sferrazza is now seemingly being placed onto another landlord tenant matter where
Coughlin is a named party, despite JCRRT 2 calling for a random assignment of cases (Judge Lynch was
randomly assigned to the case originally, RJC2012-074408, Coughlin v. Park Terrace HOA, and, also,
Judge Sferrazza is now set to also take jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer matter that shall soon be
filed upon Coughlin filing a Tenant's Affidavit upon the proper service of a 5 day Unlawful Detainer
Notice to Quit). This is not about impugning Judge Sferrazza as a jurist. Its about criticizing and seeking
redress for the appearance of impropriety created where WCSO Bailiff's engage in conduct that is
impermissible (threatening to forcibly insert objects up a litigants anus) and then create an unduly
suspicious appearance of "judge shopping by Bailiff" (Why these Bailiff's seem to want to insult an
esteemed jurist like Judge Sferrazza, one who has an extraordinary depth and breadth of experience
throughout all three branches of government in Washoe County, is puzzling and unfortunate). It would
not take much for these Bailiff's to gather an opinion on which judges have which approach on landlord
tenant matters. It would be impermissible to allow Bailiff's go grudge based judge shopping to retaliate
against litigants asserting their consitutional rights, as Coughlin clearly does, much to their totalitarian
dismay. Judge Sferrazza has an approach to landlord tenants matters that is his own, as all judges
invariably will. That does not make him and impartial arbiter or imply any impropriety. However, to allow
RJC Bailiff's to "gerrymander" what is supposed to be a random assigning of cases, would clearly be
impermissible. Even if that is not what is occurring here, a reasonable person could concluded that the
appearance of such is evident. This is particularly true where Judge Clifton was on the bench and heard
every other case set for the 8:30 stacked docket in court room "B" on 2/13/12. Mr. Tuttle did not get
where he is by being foolish or dim. He must work day in day out with these Bailiffs. Mr. Coughlin is but
a minor occasional litigant/attorney in the Reno Justice Court. Reasonable minds may feel it would be
foolish for Mr. Tuttle to take any action which would appear to undermine his belief in the
reasonableness and justness of these Bailiff's actions, particularly where these brave men are called to
perform the heroic in truly dangerous circumstances at times. That is where rules get to be the "bad
guy" rather than judges or administrators. JCRRT 2 is the bad guy here, and it is only appropriate for
Judge Lynch to hear both this new Complaint for Unlawful Interruption of Essential Services, in addition
to any Summary Eviction and or Unlawful Detainer matter that may arise between those parties and
within a common nexus of circumstances and facts.
Also: "The justices' judgment obligation to pay attorneys' fees is based (1) on
their having followed a procedural rule (JCRCP 106) enacted by this court
and (2) on their having made several erroneous judicial decisions." Lippis v.
Peters, 112 Nev. 1008, 921 P.2d 1248 (Nev. Aug 16, 1996); G.C. Wallace,
Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, ex rel. County of Clark, 262 P.3d
1135, 1140+, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 64, 64+ (Nev. Oct 06, 2011) (NO. 56773) "
HN: 2,3,4 (P.2d) 2 Schneider v. Elko County Sheriff's Dept., 17 F.Supp.2d
1162, 1165 (D.Nev. Aug 06, 1998) (NO. CV-N-96-548-ECR) Mentioned 3
Cheung v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 124 P.3d 550,
552, 121 Nev. 867, 869 (Nev. Dec 15, 2005) (NO. 42212) HN: 1 (P.2d); "42
U.S.C. 1988 (1991). This federal statute permits the state courts to award
attorneys fees to successful civil rights litigants in civil rights actions brought
in the state courts under 1983. The cited code provision, section 1988,
Page 11 of 17
allows for an award of fees to the prevailing party when that party has
sued to enforce a provision of ... 42 USCS 19811983. Even if we were
to recognize the tenants as the prevailing party in this litigation, it is more
than clear that this action was in no way designed or pleaded to enforce a
provision of ... 42 USCS 19811983. In their points and authorities in
support of their application for *1015 attorney's fees the tenants agree that
[i]n order to state a claim under 1983, Plaintiffs must allege a person has
deprived him or her of a federal right and the person so depriving acted
under color of state law. In no instance did plaintiff tenants ever allege
[that] a person has deprived him or her of a federal right. Lippis v. Peters
112 Nev. 1008, 921 P.2d 1248.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.
2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended
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attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2012 09:46:45 -0800
CC: psferrazza@washoecounty.us
1)
Questionsregardingclocksaskedandanswered.
2)
Page 12 of 17
Assertionsofacountywideconspiracyareunfoundandinsulting.
3)
4)
5)
Casejudgeassignmentsarerandom,buthearingjudgeassignmentsareatthediscretion
ofthecourtandcaseswillbemovedforavarietyofreasons,mostlytoensurecontinuity
andcaseflowefficiency.
Statementsregardingyourassaskedandanswered.
AssertionsregardingJudgesSferrazza,CliftonandtheCourtsintegrityareunfoundand
insulting.
Steve Tuttle
Court Administrator
Reno Justice Court

Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:29 PM
To: Tuttle, Steve; Lynch, Patricia
Subject: cases being randomly assigned in RJC FW: attempt to file prior to 5pm denied
Dear Mr. Tuttle,

Would you please confirm that the clocks in the court are
accurate, and indicate how the doors are locked, and
how they were locked yesterday. It is my position that I
was there prior to 5 pm, further the appearance given by
the fact that the person I spoke with on the telephone
from the criminal division filing office (she made sure to
ask for my name, as though that would affect the content
of her answer to my questions-contrary to your a
ssertions, I am seeking no special privilege, but rather,
seeking to avoid any special prejudice) made sure to ask
Page 13 of 17
my name, and it was provided is troubling when viewed

in conjunction with the events before my 2/13/11
Hearing in the RJC in Coughlin V. Park Terrace
Townhomes HOA. As you know, JCRRT Rule 2 requires
cases be assigned randomly. However, though Judge
Lynch was assigned to hear my Complaint for
Interruption of Essential Services, shortly before the
hearing, the court room was popuplate by two different
Deputies who have both made menacing statements to
me involving my "ass", one of which involved forcible
putting an object up my "ass". Chief Deputy Sexton
entered the court room and made a few calls, and he is
one of the two Deputies to which I refer when
mentioning this "ass" situation. Next thing I know,
Judge Sferrazza is hearing the case, and now I am told
Judge Sferrazza is "attached" to the case instead of
Judge Lynch. While hearing the case, before it was
continued, Judge Sferrazza apparently granted a license
to practice law to a property manager on behalf of
another named party, the Park Terrace Townhomes
HOA. I feel this case should be heard by Judge Lynch.
This is not a statement against Judge Sferrazza, it is a
statement with respect to the appearance created by the
above facts. This, combined with the unexplained
October 19th, 2011 fax to Judge Clifton seeking an ex
parte Order allowing inspection of my law office by Casey
Baker, Esq. of the Law Offices of Richard G. HIll, Esq.,
despite Judge Clifton not being Chief Judge at that time
in consideration of JCRCP 84.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Page 14 of 17
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
To: stuttle@washoecounty.us
Subject: RE: attempt to file prior to 5pm denied
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2012 22:15:02 -0800
Dear Mr. Tuttle,

Your correspondence contains numerous inaccuracies that I am
too pressed for time to counter at this point. I appreciate your
response though. Can you confirm that the clocks in your court
are correct? Deputy Sexton agreed to get a supervisor and it
was agreed I would wait outside to speak to one. You, of
course, have been informed numerous times previously of WCSO
Court Security efforts to deny the access to justice prior to the
5pm closing time. I am still waiting for some response from you
regarding the various statements concerning my "ass" by those
you have some supervisory position over. Further, can you
please indicate why I was, apparently, provided some demand
whereby I would perform the duty placed upon the WCSO
incident to my 11/16/11 filing of a Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien vis a vis the service and scheduling dictates found
in NRS 40.253(7)-(8), especially considering the holding in Lippis
and NRS 42.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Page 15 of 17
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Subject: RE: attempt to file prior to 5pm denied

Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2012 15:57:32 -0800
CC: JGoodnight@washoecounty.us
Mr.Coughlin:
ThedocumentsthatyouemailedandfaxedtoRenoJusticeCourtat6:40pmonFebruary14,2012were
filedstampwithtodaysdate(February15,2012)andplacedinthefilefortheJudgesreview.Itwillbe
notedthatthesedocumentswerereceivedbytheCourtafternormalbusinesshoursonFebruary14,
2012.
YouwerenotdeniedbythisCourtyourrighttofilethesedocumentsyesterday.Youwere,however,
deniedbyWashoeCountySherriffCourtSecurityUnitaccesstothebuildingafterclosingtime;the
sameasanyoneelsewouldbedenied.Youwerenotherebefore5:00pmandtryingtogainaccessinto
thefacilitybycomingthroughanexitonlydoorisnotpermissible.Becauseyouractionscouldbe
considertrespassingisthereasonwhyRenoJusticeCourtChiefBailiffMichaelSextonagainaskedyou
toleave.Fairandequalaccesstojusticeappliesnotonlytodiscrimination,butalsotofavoritism.
Allowingonepartytofiledocumentsafteradeadlineisunethicalandwithoutquestionunfair.
Page 16 of 17
InformingChiefBailiffSextonofyourintentiontowaitoutsideforRenoJusticeCourtemployeesto
leavesoyoucouldforcethemtotakeyourfilingsisaformofharassmentandneedstostop
immediately.Ifthisaggressivebehaviorcontinues,theCourtwillconsideraprotectiveorderagainst
you,whichwillresultinyourabilityorprivilegetoaccessRenoJusticeCourt.
Inaddition,IhavelookedintoyourassertionsofsexualassaultbytheRenoJusticeCourtBailiffsand
foundtheseallegationstobewithoutmerit.
Lastly,yourpracticeoffilinghundredsofdocumentsonmultiplecasesandthenrepeatedlyaskingfor
copiesofthecasefilesfreeofchargewillnolongerbegrantedbytheCourt.RenoJusticeCourtwill
provideyouonefreecopyofyouroriginalcasefilesandonefreecopyofanyfuturefilings,butyouwill
bechargedappropriatelyforalladditionalcopies.
Steve Tuttle
Court Administrator
Reno Justice Court

Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2012 6:40 PM
To: Tuttle, Steve; Goodnight, Joseph W; Young, Zach; RJCWEB
Subject: attempt to file prior to 5pm denied
Dear Reno Justice Court Administration and Filing Office, DDA Young and DPD Goodnight,
Hello, I am emailing and faxing the document and one exhibit you will find herein as I was denied my
right to file it today. I presented to the court prior to 5pm today but was prevented from filing this
document (and today is the last day to file these pretrial motions absent receiving leave of court to do
so prior to the February 29th, 2012 Trial in Department 2 before Judge Sferrazza. Judge Sferrazza has,
in the past, expressed displeasure with regard to any attempt to file by email, and I do not wish to upset
Judge Sferrazza here, and accordingly am not copying him on this correspondence. However, I believe
the "excusable neglect"/"deprivation of rights under color of law" analysis may dictate that I promptly
attempt to make some record of my attempt to file and in that regard I am submitting this to you now.
Incidentally, I did call the criminal division RJC filing office today shortly before 5pm alerting them to my
imminent attempt to access justice and received confirmation that they would not close prior to 5pm.
HOwver, the doors of the court house were locked prior to 5pm. I have witness timers/clocks in the
court to be set approximately 5 minutes fast in that past. I attempted to ask a supervisor about this by
Page 17 of 17
alerting Chief Deputy Sexton, and while he initially refused to get a supervisor, he then finally indicated
he would, however, no supervisor ever appeared. Chief Deputy Sexton, along with another Deputy has
sexually assaulted me in that past, and as such, of course, the was a very unusual and uncomfortable
situation.
Additionally, I had another landlord tenant hearing involving myself on Monday, 2/3/12. AS per JCRRT
my case was randomly assigned to Judge Lynch. However, just prior to my case being heard, Deputy
Sexton entered the court room, made some calls, and Judge Sferrazza appeared to hear my case.
Judge Sferrazza then proceeded to grant a property manage a license to practice law on behalf of Park
Terrace Homeowners Associations (PTHOA). I, of course, am very uncomfortable having the Deputy
who sexually assaulted me appear in the court room at all my appeances, as Deputy Sexton seems to do
(in fact, he glowered over me at the 12/21/12 Hearing on my Motion to Contest Personal Property lien)
in such a menacing fashion that I was unable to think clearly, much to the detriment of my case.
Further, I am uncomfortable at the appearance given off by the curious changing of the Judge assigned
to my hearing after Deputy Sexton entered the court room and made a few calls. It may be
inappropriate to give off the appearance that Deputy Sexton is able to control the assignment of Judges
to certain cases rather than having cases randomly assigned pursuant to JCRRT. I believe this filing and
one exhibit you find herein should be accorded a filing date for 2/14/12, as I was prevented from
appropriately accessing justice, and in that regard, I don't believe this is a request to "bend" the rules or
allow a special exception, though I do believe one is able to file a motion seeking such an exception for
cause. Deputy SExton has sexually assaulted me in the past in similar situations where I attempt to use
all of the hours available to filing accorded to any other member of the public.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
....~.
_ _
Case No. II TR 26800 21

2
. -. . ' .... _ _
~.
_ _ _ _ __
-.-
. . . . " . . _ . . . _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ , _ _ " _ _ _ <0-- , _ _
FILED
RENO MUNICIPAL COURT

DEPT. NO.3
Dept. No.3
FEB 282012
~:E+>1:"'"
DOROTHY NASH HOLMES, JUDGE
S
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IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO
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CITY OF RENO,
Plaintiff,
II
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ORDER FINDING THE DEFENDANT

IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND
vs.
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Defendant.
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------------------~/
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A trial was held in Reno Municipal Court on Febrwuy 27, 2012 on a traffic citation
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issued to the defendant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN. He was initially charged with
17
three offenses alleged to have occulTed on November 15, 20 I I in the City of Reno. At the
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onset of the trial it was detennined that Failure to Provide Evidence of Security or Insurance
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(a violation of RMC 6.06.555(a) WId Failure to Provide Vehicle Registration (a violation of
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RMC 6.06.560(a) were both dismissed at arraignment after the defendant establislied that he
22
had complied with both code sections but simply had not carried the documentation with him
23
in the vehicle on that day.' The remaining charge, a Right of Way Stop Sign violation at WI
24
intersection, known as a "Boulevard Stop" (rolling through a Stop Sign WId not stopping
2S
completely), 8 violation of RMC 6.06.170(a), was the subject of the trial.
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we>
wutaaPiU.ax:a1
'Obllll:lO
_NY"'"
...
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The City of Reno was represented by Deputy City Attorney Alison Ormaas. The
I During trial. tlIc: officer also testified that he could hove cited the dcfendnnt wilb failure 10 cany his Ncvuda Driver's J..icense
In his possession but gave him a brenk by no1 citing rum for Ihnt. os well.
"'" ""
01810
1769
'T'
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. ' _ _ "T~~.T_'.
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'.......... --'-" ... __ .. -. - - - . - - - - - - . - - - .....- . - .
~-
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....... _ - _ __ _ . -
defendant, a licensed attorney, represented himself. Reno Police Sergeant John Toner was the
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sole witness. The court had the defendant sworn at the beginning of the trial, stating that the
court has found that most self-represented defendants tend to testilY a great deal as they cross-
4
examine opposing witnesses, so the defendant would be under oath from the start, too. No
exhibits were marked or admitted.
The matter was called at approximately 3 :00 p.m. and concluded without a verdict about
4:30 p.m. after the court held the defendant in criminal contempt of court for his behavior and
activities committed in the direct presence oflhis court dwing the trial.
10
The court finds that defendant's contemptuous conduct consisted of his rude, sarcastic,
II
12
inappropriate, insubordinate, disrespectful, antagonistic, deceitful, disruptive, argumentlltive
13
and childish behavior during trial, all of which appeared to be done to vex and annoy the
14
court, the witness, and the opposing party, and to disrupt the trial process. The court finds
15
that the following occurred, and constitute contempt: I) defendant's mime-like, clownish
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antics of making faces at the court; sagging down into his seat and banging his head; looking
17
behind himself and inside his coat as if searching for a better way to ask a question; rolling
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his eyes; and mimicking others words; 2) defendant's incessant arguing with the court,
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talking over the court, and interrupting !be court; 3) defendant's repeatedly restating matters
21
after being told by the court to "move on" or "ask the next question;" 4) defendant's
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repeatedly injecting allegations of bribery, pedury, and police reta1iation into the matter after
23
the court instructed him not to, and directed him to limit himself to issues pertaining to the
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facts of the "Boulevard Stop;" 5) defendant's repeatedly trying to insert "Richard Hill" into
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.....
..........""'"
.0..,.,.:0
his questions and statements when such person was not relevant to the proceedings and the
defendant had been ordered to stop discussing that; 6) defendant's disregarding the rules of
28
evidence and court procedure by continually posing improper questions after being directed
....
"-""
""'".,..
01811
1770
by the court to properly phrase his questions; 7) defendant's continually accusing the court
2
3
of denying him the right or ability to ask questions and telling the court to "give me a list of
questions you want me to ask;" 8) defendant's suggesting that the court "tell me what
4
would make you happy;" 9) defendant's lying to the court in response to direct questions
5
6
posed by the court with regard to his recording the proceedings; and 10) defendant's failing
and refusing to properly examine the witness, despite numerous admonitions by the court to
stop repeating questions, misstating answers, injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the
witness and mischaracterizing the testimony.
10
The court finds that the defendant's actions were intentional and done in utter disregard
II
and contempt for the court, and in the presence of the court, for purposes of disrupting and .
12
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delaying the proceedings and dishonoring the rule oflaw and this court, and constilute the
14
misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a violation ofNRS 22.010. Good cause appearing
15
therefore, the following sanctions are imposed:
16
IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to NRS 22.100, that the defendanl be incarceraled at the
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Washoe County Regional Detention Facility for the term of five (5) days, from the time he
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was laken inlo custody on this court's order on Februwy 27,2012, and thai sentence shall not
20
be reduced for any reason. In the alternative, the defendanl rnay pay a fme of$500 10 the
21
Reno Municipal Court.
22
Dated this 28th day of Februwy, 2012.
23
~~~
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"""
.0_111
_NV ....
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3
01812
1771
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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Reno Municipal

Court, Reno, Nevada, that I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the above
action, and that on this date, served a true and correct copy of the attached document
to the following as set forth below:
Alii Bon OnnaaB
Deputy Ctty Attorney

PO Box 1900
Reno NV 89606
Zachery Barker Coughlin. Esq,
121 River Rock
Reno NV 89509
..J.laclng said document in a sealed envelope and placed for collecting and
mailing by Unites States mail in Reno, Nevada, postage prepaid following ordinary
business practices.
Washoe County Jail
Court Services
-.L Facsimile (FFAX)

16
Inner-officemail following ordinary business practices
17
Parsonal Delivery.
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DATED: February 28,2012.
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rtment Three
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. . . _eo..t
'P.O. Oox 1800

.....
Dorothy Nah HoIma.

....... NV .....
(17.) 334-3822
01813
1772
Case No. 11
TR 26800 2I
Dept. No.3
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IN
THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO

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CITY OF RENO,
laintiff,
ORDER STRIKING
DOCUMENT FILED IN
ERROR ON OCTOBER 2, 2012
AND RETURNING
DOCUMENT
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vs.
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Defendant.
_______
FACTS
The history of this case shall not be recited herein because it is adequately set forth in
18
the court's previous Orders entered and filed in this court on February 28, 2012 (order
19
holding Defendant ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN in direct criminal contempt of court);
20
March 12,,2012 (order continuing and staying the traffic citation trial wherein the contempt
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occurred, arid referring the matter to the State Bar of Nevada); and March 13,2012. (Order
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Striking Fugitive Document Filed on March 7, 2012 and Sua Sponte Order Denying Relief
24
Sought in Improper Document).
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RENO
MUNICIPAL COllIn
P.O.lIllX IIJOO
Ucno, N V 89505
(1()2) 3J42290
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In one of the March 13th Orders, the court struck from the record defendant's 218-page
fugitive document entitled "Request for Audio Recording of February 2iil, 2012 Trial and for
Appt [sic] and to Waive Filing Fee and Transcript Fee for Appeal Counsel." It was
found to
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be a rambling,incoherent,nonsensical document which was not appropriate for

filing in this
court.
Also on March 13,2012,this court denied Zachary Coughlin all relief he had sought in
his second fax-filed,224-page rambling,incoherent and improper document,and further
provided that if he prepared and presented a correct and proper court motion,the court would
then consider his request for relief. In that Order,the court directed that Zachary Coughlin
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was not to be permitted to file any documents without review and pre-approval of the court to
ensure that they were not frivolous, incoherent or otherwise improper documents.
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FINDINGS
The defendant did not prepare and present a proper motion seeking leave to file. Instead,
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apparently on September 10,2012 he came to the Court Clerk and attempted to pay to file an
14
appeal. The Court Clerk retained the funds as Mr. Coughlin refused to accept them back.
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Then on October 2,2012,the defendant came to the Reno Municipal Court Clerk and
presented a I-page,hand-written,barely-legible document. (A copy of Mr. Coughlin's
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document is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit A). His
document is entitled "Motion for Leave or Permission to file this and Notice of RMC's
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Refusal to accept Notice of Appeal on criminal contempt conviction." Mr. Coughlin also
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attached to his document as "Exhibit 1" a sealed envelope on which the Court Clerk had
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noted that it was returning "$12.00 received on 9/10112 to file an appeal on a case in which
there has been no conviction." Mr. Coughlin has apparently hand-written on the envelope
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RENO
MUNICIPAL COURT
P.O. Box 1900
"10/2/12 I reported a criminal summary contempt conviction in 11 TR 26800 to the US PTO

(patents)" and another sentence stating "There is a right to appeal a summary criminal
contempt conviction (signed Zach Coughlin)."
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1. The envelope is sealed and has not been opened by the clerk or this court; it is returned to the defendant with this Order.
Reno, NV 89505
(702) 3342290
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This document was not presented to this court for review before it was filed by a deputy
clerk. Therefore,this court finds that said document is an improper and inappropriate
document that lacks compliance with procedural and court rules and the March 13, 2012
Order of this court. It was filed in error by the Deputy Court Clerk and shall be returned to
Mr. Coughlin, together with a copy of this Order.
IT IS ORDERED that the document discussed herein that was erroneously filed is
struck from the record and shall be returned by the court clerk to the defendant,together with
the unopened and still-sealed envelope (Exhibt 1).
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that if the defendant wishes to proceed with this matter, he
shall prepare and present,for the court's pre-filing review,a separate and proper Motion for
13
Leave to File Documents; said motion shall be legible,and contain proper formatting,
14
spacing, margins, and the proper request for permission, facts, argument,and conclusion.,and
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it shall not be filed by the Clerk of the Court,but only stamped "Received," unless and until
this court gives permission to file it.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if this court grants the defendant permission to file
a proper Notice of Appeal,using the correct paper,formatting and procedure which is known
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to Mr. Coughlin as he has been trained as a lawyer,then he shall prepare it,also properly
21
formatted as described above, and present it to the clerk for the court's pre-filing review.
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{#4
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E H ON. OROTHY NASH HOLMES

Reno Mun'cipal Judge
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RENO
MUNICIPAL COURT
P.O.O('lX 1900
Reno, NV &9S0.s
(702) 3)42290
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EXHIBIT "A"
NOTE by Coughlin: would it be crazy to think during that hour that Judge Nash Holmes Judicial
Assistant could not find her between about 2:00 to 3:00 pm on 2/27/12, just shortly after
RJC Judge David Clifton (whom told Chief Civil Clerk not to respond
to Coughlin's 10/30/12 SCR 110 Subpoena) transferred himself onto a case already assigned to Judge
Lynch
only to enter an Order for Competency
Evaluation for a vindictive WCPD Dogan
whom failed to appear for an arraignment on
a gross misdo, in violation of
NRS 178.397, then refused to do anything to seek to avoid Coughlin
being arrest for an FTA where Coughlin understanding was that Dogan
agreed to enter a plea for him at the 2/14/12 arraignment when they spoke on
2/8/13?
LEGAL ARGUMENT
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Argersinger v. Hamlin (407 U.S. 25) establishes that the right to the assistance of counsel,
whether retained or court appointed, is required in all prosecutions which may result in
imprisonment, unless a complete Faretta canvas has been completed and the request for waiving
counsel is granted.
While there is a time and place, perhaps for Orders finding Summary Contempt under NRS
22.030...perhaps, the greatest strength a judge can demonstrate is the ability to show a little weakness,
to demonstrate something other than ruling with an iron hand, to do something other than crush any
voice of dissent in his court room like Mike Singletary (former linebacker for the Chicago Bears in
the 1980's) would crush a running back going through the A gap. To strangle out of litigants the
13
freedom to zealously adovocate on their own or another's behalf (in the case of licensed attorneys) is
14
perhaps the most heinous, sad, and ugly thing a judge could do. A judge whom demonstrates an
15
ability to oversee that which makes him less than comfortable in his courtroom, that which he does
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not necessarily agree with, is a judge secure in his abilities and aware of the premium on restraint and
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patience called for in order for a judge and court to transcend from mere debt collector for the City
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Attorney to impartial arbiter of fact and law. To demonstrate otherwise may create an atmosphere
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where court employees overstep their bounds and begin to bully and harass those seeking to access
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justice, a true violation of the trust in which the public endows such public servants.
22
Now, apparently, Interim Court Administrator Cassandra Jackson is seeking to impart orders
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upon litigants carrying color of law by emailing them with her interpretation of what an Order
25
purports to require, even where that Order rules on matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Judge and
26
or Court making the Order. That is the case here. Ms. Jackson sent the undersigned an email on or
27
about January 10th, 2012 that impermissibly seeks to impose upon a litigant, and an attorney, a
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- 2 MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER AND NOTICE OF APPEAL OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER; and MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE HOWARD;
NOTICE OF INSUFFICIENTY OF RECORD ON APPEAL
restriction that would violate the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection class and further make unduly
burdensome upon the undersigned the right to file papers with the Reno Municipal Court. The
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undersigned should not be assigned a different set of rules for filing documents than the far better
funded Reno City Attorney's Office is.
RMCR Rule 3: Authorization to Represent Attorneys representing defendants shall
promptly serve written notice of their appearance with the City Attorney and file the
same with the Court. An attorney desiring to withdraw from a case shall file a motion
with the court and serve the City Attorney with the same. The court may rule on the
motion or set a hearing. RMCR Rule 5: Motions by Facsimile A. All rules and
procedures that apply to motions filed in person at the court shall also apply to motions
filed by facsimile, except as otherwise specified in this rule. B. All persons are eligible
to use motion-by-facsimile procedures. C. All motions filed by facsimile must be
accompanied by a cover sheet which must include the persons name, address, fax
number and telephone number. D. All facsimile motions filed by an attorney must
include the attorney's name, the firms name, address, fax number and telephone
number. In addition, the attorneys state bar number must be conspicuously displayed
on the cover sheet. E. All motions filed by facsimile must be accompanied by proof of
service.
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Wheres Defendant went to great lengths to demonstrate to Judge Howard and the RMC that
16
he is indigent, he, apparently, is not allowed to be so, so much so that this Court went against the
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Nevada Court of Limited Jurisdiction Bench Book of 2008 and its 2010 Supplement in denying the
18
undersigned the his Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel, set forth explicitly in several locations in
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the Bench Book and mandatory authority in the United States. Argersinger v. Hamlin, (407 U.S. 25).
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Nevada NRCP 60(b)(3) allows a party to move for relief from a judgment which is void, and
22
while motions made under NRCP 60(b) are generally required to "be made within a reasonable time"
23
and to be adjudicated according to the district court's discretion, this is not true in the case of a void
24
judgment. Necessarily a motion under this part of the rule differs markedly from motions under the
25
other clauses of Rule 60(b). There is no question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion
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is made under [this portion of the Rule]. Nor is there any requirement, as there usually is when
default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b), that the moving party show that he has a
meritorious defense. Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it is may well present
a difficult question, but when that question is resolved, the court must act accordingly. By the same
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token, there is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. . . . [E]ven the requirement that the
motion be made within a "reasonable time," which seems literally to apply . . . cannot be enforced
with regard to this class of motion. Understandably, the parties were not attuned to our recent Jacobs
decision during oral argument. Accordingly, it was determined at that time to allow the parties to
supplement their briefs in order to determine with certainty whether, in fact, no default had been
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entered against Garcia prior to the entry of the default judgment. Garcia's supplemental material
supplied additional evidence that no default was ever entered, including an affidavit by Clark County
Court Clerk Loretta Bowman attesting that no such filing exists in the case file. Respondents also
13
acknowledged that no default was ever entered but argue in their supplemental brief that Jacobs
14
should not be applied retroactively, noting that the default judgment at issue herein was entered prior
15
to our Jacobs decision. This argument is without merit. The court in Jacobs determined, consistent
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with law from other jurisdictions, that the default judgment entered in Jacobs was void. We
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accordingly ordered the district court to grant relief from the void judgment, despite the fact that the
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ruling in Jacobs was, of course, preceded by entry of the default judgment against Jacobs. If this case,
20
rather than Jacobs, were before us as a case of first impression, we would have reached the same
21
conclusion. A void judgment is void for all purposes and may not be given life under a theory based
22
upon lack of legal precedent. Garcia v. Ideal Supply Co., 110 Nev. 493, 874 P.2d 752 (Nev.
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5/19/1994). The defective service rendered the district court's personal jurisdiction over Gassett
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invalid and the judgment against her void. For a judgment to be void, there must be a defect in the
26
court's authority to enter judgment through either lack of personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction over
27
subject matter in the suit. Puphal v. Puphal, 669 P.2d 191 (Idaho 1983). In Price v. Dunn, 106 Nev.
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100, 787 P.2d 785 (1990). We now hold that the filing of a motion to set aside a void judgment
previously entered against the movant shall not constitute a general appearance. See, e.g., Dobson v.
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Dobson, 108 Nev. 346, 349, 830 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1992). Nonetheless, since the order was void, a
judgment based thereon would likewise be void.. Nelson v. Sierra Constr. Corp., 77 Nev. 334, 364
P.2d 402. Under NRCP 60(b) a motion to set aside a void judgment is not restricted to the six months'
period specified in the rule. NRCP 54(a) provides that the word "judgment" as used in these rules
includes any order from which an appeal lies. Therefore there is no merit to appellants' contention
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that the motion to vacate the judgment was not timely made. Foster v. Lewis, 78 Nev. 330, 372 P.2d
679 (Nev. 6/19/1962). A void judgment is subject to collateral attack; a judgment is void if the
issuing court lacked personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction; See 49 C.J.S. Judgments
13
401, at 792 (1947 & supp. 1991); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments 621-56 (1969 & supp. 1991).
14
Judge Howards December 16th, 2011 Order rules on matters outside Judge Howards
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jurisdiction and is therefore void for lack of jurisdiction. Further, it is impermissible for the RMC's
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Cassandra Jackson to attempt to rewrite RMC Rules (and it is not clear whethe she is doing this on
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her own accord or if she has been instructed to do so as Judge Gardner's Administrative Assistant or
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as the Interim Court Administrator, or in some other capacity). Further, it is inappropriate for
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Jackson to be copying Reno City Attorney (and very recent former coworker of RMC's Judge
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Gardner) and Robert Puentes (who recently asked to be granted a Motion to Withdraw from
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representing the undersigned because doing so actually required him to do some legal work, and that
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was hard for him) on her correspondence, which related to a filing in a traffic citation for which
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MR. Puentes has absolutely no connection and where Mr. Wong had not yet made an appearance.
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Mr. Wong did express a complete lack of concern to the undersigned when it was reported to him that
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a RPD Officer, Chris Carter, had admitted to the undersigned that the opposing counsel in RJC
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REV2011-001708 summary eviction from a commercial tenancy law office where non payment of
rent was not alleged (in violation of NRS 40.253's express dictate against such actions) had paid
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money to RPD Officer Carter to arrest the undersigned (a bribe). Mr. Wong indicated a complete
lack of consternation in this regard and expressed that he intended to conduct zero follow up with
respect to that troubling breach of the public trust, even though, as a Reno City Attorney, Mr. Wong
likely has a duty to do so and his failure to will augur strongly toward a finding that the Reno City
Attorney is liable for any RPD misconduct on a negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim and
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that the Reno City Attorney is aware of and, in fact, ratifies or endorses such bribe taking by the RPD
from Richard G. Hill, Esq, opposing counsel in that RJC eviction matter.
Under federal law, as well as the law of some states, the misbehavior that permits summary
13
action must in addition present an imminent threat to the administration of justice; it must
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immediately imperil the judge in the performance of his or her judicial duty or constitute an actual
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obstruction of justice. U.S. v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1987) (attorney's posing of single
16
question to witness about race of certain individuals, though in clear violation of verbal court order,
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did not so obstruct justice as to enable court to resort to summary procedure for contempt under
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b)); In re Holloway, 995 F.2d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (attorney
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pursued lines of questioning ruled out by judge).Witness's refusal to answer questions the court
21
orders him to answer is contumacious conduct which may subject witness to summary punishment
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for criminal contempt under Direct contempt justifying summary disposition is confined to
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exceptional circumstances involving acts threatening the judge, disrupting the hearing, or obstructing
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court proceedings. Rule 42. In re Boyden, 675 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1982). Because summary contempt
26
procedure fills a need for the immediate penal vindication of the dignity of the court, its application is
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confined to unusual situations where the court's instant action is necessary to protect the judicial
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institution itself. In re Gustafson, 619 F.2d 1354, 58 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (9th Cir. 1980), on reh'g, 650 F.2d
1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
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NRS 22. 030. Summary punishment of contempt committed in immediate view and
presence of court; affidavit or statement to be filed when contempt committed outside
immediate view and presence of court; disqualification of judge:
1. If a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge at
chambers, the contempt may be punished summarily. If the court or judge summarily punishes
a person for a contempt pursuant to this subsection, the court or judge shall enter an order
that:
(a) Recites the facts constituting the contempt in the immediate view and presence of the court
or judge;
(b) Finds the person guilty of the contempt; and
(c) Prescribes the punishment for the contempt...
154 ALR 1227, Necessity and Sufficiency of Making and Recording Subsidiary or Detailed
Findings Supporting Adjudication of Direct Contempt.
Statute providing that in all cases of contempt arising without immediate view and presence of
court, judge of court in whose contempt defendant is alleged to be, shall not preside at such
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trial over objection of defendant, is constitutional. N.C.L.1929, 8943. McCormick v. Sixth
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Judicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318. Contempt
17
For purposes of statute governing summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed
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in judge's presence, which requires court to enter an order, while a trial court's oral
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contempt order is immediately enforceable, a written order including the statute's required elements
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must be promptly entered. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of
Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544.
Appropriate remedy for attorney who had been found in direct contempt of court in divorce
proceeding in which he represented wife, where contempt order had been found to be insufficient
by Supreme Court, in that it did not contain a sufficient statement concerning what conduct
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was held to be contemptuous, was to permit trial court to enter amended order, given that
Supreme Court's opinion addressed issue of first impression and announced standard for contents
of written contempt order. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of
Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544.
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Judge Howard Summary Contempt Order relies in part on "continuing lines of inquiry after
told by the Court not to do so..." however any such alleged instances of this are explained away by
the fact that any such questions where not posed to prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather
for other permissible purposes (and this was pointed out to the Court at trial). Further, for Judge
Howard to rule that it is not relevant whether Wal-Mart's Asset Protection team had verbally
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threatened the accused or otherwise indicated they would retaliate against him for filming a
documentary related to Wal-Mart's continual practice of lying to customers about their Return Policy
and selectively enforcing it, despite its terms being part of a contract between the retailer and
consumers, it plain error.
A written summary contempt order, issued pursuant to statute governing summary contempt
proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence, must set forth specific facts
concerning the conduct found to be contemptuous. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
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County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Judge Howards Order is of the "check the box"
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variety, on a preprinted form, seemingly taken from the Bench Book, containing mere conclusory and
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circular statements about the purported contempt and in no way satisfies the above standard. Indeed,
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Judge Howard does not specify what "lines of inquiry" were continued, nor is it clear how a pro se
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defendant denied his Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel could reasonably know what is required of
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him to comply with Judge Howards vague and menacing contempt pronoucements while also
zealously advocating on the defendant's behalf.
Written summary contempt order finding attorney for wife in divorce proceeding in direct
contempt of court failed to indicate what particular comments by attorney were held to be
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contemptuous, and, thus, order was insufficient, under statute governing summary contempt
proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
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Court ex rel. County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544.
Other than indicating the defendant said Wow, Judge Howard's Order does little to comply
with the above standard. Further, Judge Howard makes allegations of laughter, however, and this
goes to the evident impartiality/Motion for Recusal, Judge Howard seemed to go to great lengths to
strike from the record the fact that Thomas Frontino, Wal-Mart Asset Protection Associate and
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witness for the City of Reno, was continually smirking and laughing on the stand, particularly while
he was committing perjury. Judge Howard makes no specific indication as to what the undersigned
supposedly laughed about, or at what time of the proceeding (the audio of which is recorded and
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preserved by the RMC's For The Record system). Even if laughter was present, it is not per se
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contemptuous and Judge Howard does not make clear how his attempt to prohibit such allows for a
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defendant to zealously advocate on his own behalf, or whether it is ever permissible, or even a skillful
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trial tactic, for a litigant to engage in laughter. Really, what Judge Howard seems to want the most
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is for those defendants that he wishes to find guilty to lay down and die a death of sorts in his
courtroom, and to thank the RMC for its wise crypt-keeping.
Regardless, with respect to Judge Howard's, December 16, 2011 Order, it attempts to rule on
matters far beyond the jurisdiction accorded to Judge Howard. The email address
renomunirecords@reno.gov is held out to the public in a number of instances. See, Exhibit 1:
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January 10th, 2012 email from RMC Interim Court Administrator Cassandra Jackson with Attached
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December 16th, 2011 Order of Judge Howard. The Order reads: Defendant Coughlin forwarded a
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communication to Judge Howard's personal electronic mail account. Defendant Coughlin is warned
27
that he must ccase and desist furthcr e-mail communication with Judge Howard, his stalTor any other
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employee of the Reno Municipal Court. However, it is not clear at all that that email address is a
personal email address. The email address gateway is that of one belonging to the City of Reno,
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not to a private citizen, and therefore it can hardly be said to be a personal email address, like
Hotmail, or Gmail address. It is an email address provided to a public servant, an elected or
appointed official, to be used in the course of official business and held out to the public as a valid
means for contacting that official. How an email is any different than a fax is something not at all
clear. Both means of correspondence convert the communication to a series of 1's and 0's for the
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purpose of transmitting date in a digital form. To hold these means of communication are
fundamentally different, is a distinction without a difference and arbitary and capricious. To required
litigants to accept such pronouncements where they are not supported by sound rationale or policy is
13
to engage in tyranny, something for which the American public has never had much of a taste.
14
The December 16th, 2011 Order goes on to hold that: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
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Defendant Coughlin shall not communicate via email with Judge Howard, his staff or any other
employee of the Reno Municipal Court. First, It is not clear whether a transcriptionist recommended
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or required by the RMC is a RMC employee. It is not clear is Marshal Roper is an RMC
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employee, or an employee of Washoe County, or the City of Reno. To be a valid Order such that a
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Contempt Order may issue from a violation of it requires that the Order be sufficiently detailed and
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clear such that one could be reasonably said to have an understanding of what is required of him to
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comply with it. The undersigned seeks clarification of the Order in this regard. Further, the Order
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does not contain any language purporting to make inapplicable to the undersigned the right enjoyed
by all other litigants before the RMC, ie, that contained in RMCR 5:
RMCR Rule 5: Motions by Facsimile A. All rules and procedures that apply to
motions filed in person at the court shall also apply to motions filed by facsimile,
except as otherwise specified in this rule. B. All persons are eligible to use motionby-facsimile procedures. C. All motions filed by facsimile must be accompanied by
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a cover sheet which must include the persons name, address, fax number and
telephone number. D. All facsimile motions filed by an attorney must include the
attorney's name, the firms name, address, fax number and telephone number. In
addition, the attorneys state bar number must be conspicuously displayed on the
cover sheet. E. All motions filed by facsimile must be accompanied by proof of
service.
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The undersigned is indigent. That might be hard for a public official making $180,000 a year
after benefits to conceptualize, but what it means it that requiring him to take an hour out of his work
day every time he wants to file something with the RMC is unduly burdensome, particularly where
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the Reno City Attorney acting as opposing counsel is not under a similar directive (and where that
Reno City Attorney making well over $100,000 after benefits are considered as well). It seems the
Court understands this, and that is why only email was expressly prohibited in the Order. Further, the
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Order would seem to be wisely curtailed to only matters relating to the case in which is was rendered.
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Yet, Ms. Jackson's email seems to capitulate and extend upon Judge Howard's Order by including the
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dicate that the undersigned cease partaking in the filing by facsimile expressly allowed by RMCR 5,
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and further, RMC Interim Court Administrator Jackson seeks to add to the Order and extend its
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already overbroad reach. In doing so, Jackson is engaging in impermissible conduct similar to that
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exhibited earlier in this matter by Judge Howard's Judicial Assistant Veronica Lopez. Ms. Lopez
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refused to provide a copy of the Judgement and Order of Conviction in 11 CR 22176 to Coughlin
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(actually she lied to Coughlin saying she would fax him a copy of it (though she never did) after
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berating Coughlin for losing him chance to get a copy at the conclusion of the 11/30/11 Trial when
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RMC Marshals demanded the undersigned sign some documents prior to having a chance to review
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them, whereupon these Marshals angrily took away the documents, smirking about how they would
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just put that you refused to accept the service thereof. However, upon being release from what may
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well be the one and only time (hopefully ever, past or future) that an attorney in this state, or any
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other, was summarily forced to spend three days in incarceration is is clear from jail property records
that Coughlin was not provided any copy of any Judgement of Conviction or Order from the
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November 30th, 2011 Trial in the RMC. Clearly, if the undersigned is in handcuffs, it is not for the
undersigned to decide whether or not a piece of paper will travel with him to jail and be there when
he is released. The RMC's conduct in subsequently refusing to provide or otherwise served a copy of
that Order is extremely troubling and reflects poorly upon the RMC. The same can be said for the
some extremely long time it took the RMC to provide the undersigned with an audio copy of the
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recording of the Trial and the indications RMC filing office staff gave the undersigned at first that he
would not be afforeded any access to such an recording, but rather, that he could pay some exorbinant
some to have one particular court reporter or transcriptionist favored by the RMC (Pam Longioni) to
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transcribe the recordings. Ms. Longioni, while driving and talking on the phone, actually hung up on
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the undersigned when his answers to her attempts to cross examine him with regard to when he filed
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his Notice of Appeal and when he was served this or that were not met with her approval. Longioni
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subsequently failed to return any phone calls or written correspondence from the udnersigned.
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During this three day incarceration was denied a single phone call or tier time by Sheriff's
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Deputies, resulting in much prejudice to his client's cases, for which Judge Howard indicated he was
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saddened, though he failed to allow for any measures to be taken to avoid such prejudice occurring
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to those who vote on whether or not he will be reelected, should he run opposed next time, in contrast
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to his last election) for saying Wow amidst saying Yes, Sir, and Your Honor about four
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hundred times throughout the course of a six hour trial, the denouement of which was apparently
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important enough to keep upwards of six court employees working until approximately 9 pm at night,
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receiving overtime wages in the process as a time in which the economy of Reno is markedly
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challenged and the budget of the Reno Municipal court is such that it has taken to laying off Court
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staff and cutting their pay (though elected officials are exempt from such measures) in addition to
curtailing the hours the Court is open to the public on Fridays to half a day.
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It is instructive to compare Jackson's interpretation of the Judge Howard's Order, and to

consider to extent to which she may be acting in a judicial capacity (unless this Court will provide
some indication of whether Jackson's email was done at the behest of any of the RMC Judges).
Whereas Judge Howards 12/16/11 Order holds: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant
Coughlin shall not communicate via cmail with Judge Howard, his staff or any other employee of
the Reno Municipal Court, Jackson's 1/10/12 email to Coughlin extends the reach of that Order,
directing Coughlin thus: "I have been informed that you continue to contact Reno Municipal Court
staff and attempt to file documents via e-mail. This is in violation of the Order issued by Judge
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Howard on December 16, 2011, which prohibits you from contacting Reno Municipal Court staff
14
via e-mail (see attached). Any correspondence you wish the court to consider and any documents
15
that you wish to file with the court must be filed through the Reno Municipal Court Clerk's
16
Office, via U.S. mail, messenger service or in person.
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First, Judge Howard's Order indicates that it applies to Defendant Coughlin, not citizen
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Coughlin. Thus, it does not apply to actions taken by Coughlin not within the scope of his
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appearance as Defendant Coughlin within that one particular matter 11 CR 22176. If citizen
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Coughlin wants to file something related to a traffic citation, Judge Howard's December 16, 2011
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Order has not application. For Jackson to rule otherwise indicates she lacks an appreciation for the
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judicial skill and temperance Judge Howard has developed since taking the bench in 1998. While
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someone without Judge Howard's acumen and expertise may purport to rule on matters far afield
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from the jurisdiction the law has vested them with, Judge Howard would not, I believe, as he takes
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the trust the citizens of Nevada have bestowed upon him far to seriously to so recklessly exceed the
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scope of that jurisdiction. The employees of the RMC (including Marshal Mentzel, Veronica Lopez,
and Cassandra Jackson) need to stop embarrassing the RMC Judges, with the abusive, overreaching
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approach they take to carrying out their duties and in relating to the public. While their behavior may
be completely acceptable in the private sector, they have a hire calling in being public servants
working in a court of law, where the equal and measured dispensation of justice must be delivered in
a manner that, at all times, comports with traditional notices of due process and substantial justice.
The undersigned was given express permission by RMC Filing Officer Supervisor Donna
Ballard to file documents by email This was requested in light of the undersigned belief that filing by
fax may unnecessarily tax the RMC's fax machine and or line. Further, Judge Howards 12/16/11
Order only purports to rule on the propriety of Coughlin's attempts to communicate via cmail with
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Judge Howard, his staff or any other employee of the Reno Municipal Court. It does not (as
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Jackson's email purports to interpet that Order to rule) that any documents that you wish to file with
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the court must be filed through the Reno Municipal Court Clerk's Office, via U.S. mail,
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messenger service or in person. An attempt to communicate is different from an attempt to file a
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document with the court. Further, communicating with Judge Howard, his staff or any other
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employee of the Reno Municipal Court is different than communicating something to or filing
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something with a general email address, RenoMuniRecords@Reno.gov, that is not attached
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specifically to Judge Howard, his staff, or any other employee (in the way Judge Howard mentions
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his own email address as his personal email address), which is held out to the public in numerous
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settings as the way to contact the Reno Municipal Court or City of Reno (included amongst these is
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the method for requesting records from the City of Reno, and the Reno City Attorney's Office, not
26
just the Reno Municipal Court). In so attempting to extend Judge Howard's Order, Jackson
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impermissibly attempts to assert an unequal application of RMCR 5 upon Coughlin, a deprivation of
28
equal protection and due process under the law that could arguably get the RMC and Jackson herself
held personally liable for violations of the undersigned's civil rights. However, the City of Reno will
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be liable if there is a custom and policy in place that encourages constitutional violations and that
policy is the standard operating procedure of the Reno Municipal Court or where the RMC had
knowledge of Jackson's deprivation of Coughlin's civil rights or otherwise engaged in negligent
hiring, training, and supervision of employees such a Jackson with respect to such deprviations.
Likewise, with the Washoe County Sheriff's Office and the County. See Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2s
1342, 1347 (9th Cir.1992).
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Motivational inspiration for the RMC and Mentzel, Lopez, and Jackson can be found in
Lippis v. Peters, 112 Nev. 1008, 921 P.2d 1248 (1996):
The judgment awarding fees in this case imposes upon two justices' courts and seven
justices of the peace an obligation to pay to the tenants' attorneys the sum of
$18,693.50. This judgment does present a problem when we start to think about how
these public officials and two courts of law might go about allocating the obligation of
$18,693.50. It would not appear that the courts themselves are subject to execution
process; and, therefore, the fee, if it were going to be paid, would have to be paid by
the individual justices, who would have to pay, if the matter were handled fairly,
$2,670.50 each. The justices' judgment obligation to pay attorneys' fees is based (1) on
their having followed a procedural rule (JCRCP 106) enacted by this court and (2) on
their having made several erroneous judicial decisions. We hesitate to get into the
thorny problems presented by this judgment, problems relating to execution upon
public property, relating to official immunity and judicial immunity and some other
similar problems that attend the enforcement of such a judgment... Lippis v. Peters,
112 Nev. 1008, 921 P.2d 1248 (1996): In their action challenging justice courts'
practice of denying appeals to district court in summary eviction actions, tenants did
not allege that they were deprived of federal rights, and therefore they could not claim
attorney fees under federal civil rights statute. 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, 1988.
Defendant may ultimately be forced to be so alleging such a deprivation and or claim such
26
attorney's fees; See, also, Cheung v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 124 P.3d
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550, 552, 121 Nev. 867, 869 (2005); Schneider v. Elko County Sheriff's Dept., 17 F.Supp.2d 1162,
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1165 (1998); G.C. Wallace, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, ex rel. County of Clark, 262
P.3d 1135, 1140+, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 64, 64+ (2011).
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Ms. Ballard actually agreed with this assessment and thanked the undersigned for the
consideration demonstrated. To the extent Judge Howard does not wish for the undersigned to file
(as opposed to just communicate) by email (and its not clear that the Order purports to rule on
situations outside of the case in which it was made, despite the implication's of Jackson's email), the
undersigned will, of course, respectfully comply with that dictate, especially to the extent that it is not
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expressly permitted by RMC Rules (though the distinction between facsimile and email is not always
the clearest and where facsimile seems to disadvantage those without the budget to have a separate
phone line to run a fax machine, etc.). However, the Record on Appeal in this matter is deficient in
13
several respects and the undersigned asks that it be corrected. To wit, prior to such time as the
14
express permission to so file by email could reasonably be said to have been withdrawn, the
15
undersigned file numerous documents with the RMC. However, not all of those are reflected in the
16
Record on Appeal Further, in that Record, the four pages per page attachments to the 12/13/11
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filing are illegible, though the undersigned file a completely legible one page per page version via
19
email with the RMC and feels that that legible version should be included in the Record on Appeal.
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The four page per page version was filed in hard copy (on top of the same being filed the night
21
before via email) in an abundance of caution given the importance of the filing (a, perhaps,
22
jurisdictional Notice of Appeal, and should the permission to file by email not be honored, the
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undersigned would have been severely prejudiced....) The undersigned filed the four page per page
25
version of the Exhibits to that 12/12/11 filing in that form because he lack the money to buy the paper
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and ink necessary to print those voluminous attachments out in the one page per page style that would
27
have been preferable. Exhibit 5: All emails from ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com to
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RenoMuniRecords@Reno.gov from 10/4/11 to present; citing to attached pdf filings that should be
included in the Record on Appeal, yet are not in some instances.
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Appealability of contempt adjudication or conviction. 33 A.L.R.3d 448 (Originally published in

1970); 12[a] GenerallyRule of appealability [Cumulative Supplement] Contempt proceedings
not characterized as criminal or civil have frequently been held or recognized to be appealable in the
absence of statutes other than those generally making final decisions appealable.US In re Ryan, 538
F.2d 435, 76 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 9518, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 5452 (D.C. Cir. 1976) Ala Uhls v Uhls
9
10
11
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(1989, Ala App) 551 So 2d 1065 Ex parte Boykin (1994, Ala Civ App) 656 So 2d 821 Alaska
Gillette v Coffer (1912) 4 Alaska 622 (recognizing rule) Cal LaBella v Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Inc. (1977) 72 Cal App 3d 499, 138 Cal Rptr 212 For California cases, see 16, infra Colo Hill
13
v Boatright (1994, Colo App) 890 P2d 180, reh den (Sep 15, 1994) and cert gr (Feb 20, 1995) DC 33
14
A.L.R.3d 448 Page 178 33 A.L.R.3d 448 (Originally published in 1970) For District of Columbia
15
cases, see 3[a], supra Fla State ex rel. Pearson v Johnson (Fla App) 334 So 2d 54 For Florida cases,
16
see 6[a], supra Ga Manning v MNC Consumer Discount Co. (1994) 212 Ga App 824, 442 SE2d
17
18
919, 94 Fulton County D R 1442 For Georgia cases, see 15, infra Ill People ex rel. Hinckley v
19
Pirfenbrink (1879) 96 Ill 68 (recognizing rule) Ex parte Smith (1886) 117 Ill 63, 7 NE 683
20
(recognizing rule) Lester v Berkowitz (1888) 125 Ill 307, 17 NE 706 (recognizing rule) People v
21
Gilbert (1917) 281 Ill 619, 118 NE 196 Hill v Thomas B. Jeffery Co. (1920) 292 Ill 490, 127 NE 124
22
People ex rel. Andrews v Hassakis (1955) 6 Ill 2d 463, 129 NE2d 9 But see People ex rel. General
23
24
Motors Corp. v Bua (1967) 37 Ill 2d 180, 226 NE2d 6, infra. And see Illinois cases limiting review to
25
question of abuse of discretion, 13, infra. Waste Management, Inc. v International Surplus Lines
26
Ins. Co. (1991) 144 Ill 2d 178, 161 Ill Dec 774, 579 NE2d 322 Almgren v RushPresbyterianSt.
27
Luke's Medical Ctr. (1994) 162 Ill 2d 205, 205 Ill Dec 147, 642 NE2d 1264, mod and reh den (Nov
28
15, 1994) Robinson v People (1906) 129 Ill App 527 Kelly v Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (1919) 213 Ill
App 296 (recognizing rule) People ex rel. Rusch v Kirgis (1936) 287 Ill App 378, 4 NE2d 894
3
4
5
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Tegtmeyer v Tegtmeyer (1937) 292 Ill App 434, 11 NE2d 657 (recognizing rule) People ex rel.
Rusch v Ferro (1942) 313 Ill App 202, 39 NE2d 707 Kemeny v Skorch (1959) 22 Ill App 2d 160, 159
NE2d 489 Maywood v Jackson (1963) 42 Ill App 2d 29, 190 NE2d 593 Koch v Mettler (1964) 49 Ill
App 2d 251, 199 NE2d 417 Re October 1985 Grand Jury (1987, 1st Dist) 154 Ill App 3d 288, 107 Ill
Dec 342, 507 33 A.L.R.3d 448 Page 179 33 A.L.R.3d 448 (Originally published in 1970) NE2d 6,
9
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11
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app gr (Ill) 113 Ill Dec 304, 515 NE2d 113 and vacated on other grounds (1988) 124 Ill 2d 466, 125
Ill Dec 295, 530 NE2d 453 Re Marriage of Ryan (1989, 2d Dist) 188 Ill App 3d 679, 136 Ill Dec 1,
544 NE2d 454 Testin v Dreyer Medical Clinic (1992) 238 Ill App 3d 883, 179 Ill Dec 56, 605 NE2d
13
1070, app gr 149 Ill 2d 661, 183 Ill Dec 872, 612 NE2d 524 In re Marriage of Dieter (1995, 1st Dist)
14
271 Ill App 3d 181, 207 Ill Dec 848, 648 NE2d 304 People ex rel. Hawthorne v Hamilton, 9 Ill App
15
3d 551, 292 NE2d 563 Md Droney v Droney (1995) 102 Md App 672, 651 A2d 415 Mich People ex
16
rel. Port Huron & G. R. Co. v Jones (1876) 33 Mich 303 Haines v Haines (1876) 35 Mich 138 Re
17
18
Bissell (1879) 40 Mich 63 (recognizing rule) Ross v Ross (1881) 47 Mich 185, 10 NW 193 See
19
People v Den Uyl (1949) 323 Mich 490, 35 NW2d 467. But see Michigan cases limiting review to
20
question of abuse of discretion, 13, infra. Minn For Minnesota cases, see 8[a], supra Miss For
21
Mississippi cases, see 15, infra Mo For Missouri cases, see 3[b], supra Neb Dunning v Tallman
22
(1993) 244 Neb 1, 504 NW2d 85 NY Watrous v Kearney (1880) 79 NY 496 (recognizing rule)
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Strong v Western Gas & Fuel Co. (1904) 177 NY 400, 69 NE 721 (recognizing rule) King v Ashley
25
(1904) 179 NY 281, 72 NE 106 Re Hayward (1899) 44 App Div 265, 60 NYS 636 (recognizing rule)
26
Moore v Moore (1910) 141 App Div 532, 126 NYS 412 Re Baker (1855) 11 How Pr 418
27
(recognizing rule); Re Percy (1868) 2 Daly 530 (recognizing rule); Richie v Bedell (1885, Sup) 22
28
NY Week Dig 563; Finck v Mannering (1887) 46 Hun 323; Re Anonymous (1887) 18 Abb NC 216
(recognizing rule); 33 A.L.R.3d 448 Page 180 33 A.L.R.3d 448 (Originally published in 1970)
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People ex rel. Post v Grant (1888) 13 NY Civ Proc 305, revd on merits 50 Hun 243, 3 NYS 142
(recognizing rule); Boon v McGucken (1893) 67 Hun 251, 22 NYS 424; Re De Long (1896) 25 Civ
Proc 363, 41 NYS 201; Siegel v Solomon (1905, Sup App T) 92 NYS 238 (recognizing rule).
McCredie v Senior (1834) 4 Paige 378 But see Mitchell's Case (1861) 12 Abb Pr 249. ND State v.
Zahn, 1997 ND 65, 562 N.W.2d 737 (N.D. 1997) Ohio For Ohio cases, see 15, infra Pa Scranton v
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People's Coal Co. (1922) 274 Pa 63, 117 A 673 State Grand Lodge v Morrison (1923) 277 Pa 41, 120
A 769 (recognizing rule) Re Aungst (1963) 411 Pa 595, 192 A2d 723 (recognizing rule) Re Myers &
Brei (1924) 83 Pa Super 383 Appeal of Reap (1926) 88 Pa Super 147 (recognizing rule)
13
Commonwealth v Morrisey (1942) 150 Pa Super 202, 27 A2d 446 DeMasi v DeMasi (1991, Pa
14
Super) 597 A2d 101 Commonwealth ex rel. Ziccardi v Hendricks (1964) 33 Pa D & C2d 419
15
(recognizing rule) But see Pennsylvania cases limiting review to question of abuse of discretion, 13,
16
infra. SC For South Carolina cases, see 13, infra Utah Smith v Kimball (1930) 76 Utah 350, 289 P
17
18
588, 70 ALR 101 (recognizing rule) Vt But see Vilas v Burton (1854) 27 Vt 56. Re Consolidated
19
Rendering Co. (1907) 80 Vt 55, 66 A 790, affd 207 US 541, 52 L Ed 327, 28 S Ct 178 (apparently
20
recognizing rule) Cutting v Cutting (1928) 101 Vt 381, 143 A 676 (recognizing rule) Socony Mobile
21
Oil Co. v Massena Iron & Metal Co. (1966) 125 Vt 403, 217 A2d 56 Va Street v. Street, 24 Va. App.
22
14, 480 S.E.2d 118 (1997) 33 A.L.R.3d 448 Page 181 33 A.L.R.3d 448 (Originally published in
23
24
1970) For Virginia cases, see 15, infra A judgment of contempt for publishing in a newspaper an
25
article critical of the judge in a pending case was held reviewable by writ of error, in People v Gilbert
26
(1917) 281 Ill 619, 118 NE 196. The court said that while the court against which the alleged
27
contemptuous matter is published passes on the question whether or not the published matter is
28
actually contemptuous, yet the decision of that court is not conclusive: a writ of error may be sued out
to review the judgment of the lower court. An order of commitment for contempt of court for
3
4
5
6
refusing to give a deposition was held to be a final, appealable order, in Hill v Thomas B. Jeffery Co.
(1920) 292 Ill 490, 127 NE 124. The court said that the order of commitment by the superior court
was a final judgment in the ancillary proceeding that was brought to enforce the interlocutory order
directing the plaintiff to appear and testify. While the purpose of that proceeding was connected with
and had its foundation in the main case, reasoned the court, it was a separate case prosecuted
9
10
11
12
independently to enforce a compliance with the order of the court. The court said that whether that
order to testify was interlocutory or final was immaterial: if it was lawfully made it was the plaintiff's
duty to obey it, and a judgment either that he was guilty of contempt or that he was not was a final
13
judgment. See, however, People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v Bua (1967) 37 Ill 2d 180, 226 NE2d
14
6, where the court said that while ordinarily a contempt adjudication is a final and appealable order,
15
this rule would not be followed where, instead of the traditional fine or imprisonment as punishment
16
for contempt, the defendant held in contempt was punished by having its answer to the amended
17
18
complaint stricken and judgment entered against it. The contempt was adjudged for failure to comply
19
with pretrial discovery orders, and while the court determined that the striking of pleadings and the
20
entry of a default judgment was permissible as a sanction for the nonproduction of documents under a
21
court rule authorized by the legislature, the court held that this could not be used to render an
22
interlocutory order final and appealable by the use of contempt language. The imposition of a fine or
23
24
imprisonment as a sanction for contempt is final and appealable because it is an original special
25
proceeding, collateral to and independent of the case in which the contempt arises, explained the
26
court, but the sanction imposed in this case did not directly affect the outcome of the principal action.
27
Therefore the court concluded that since the contempt order, in effect, determined liability without a
28
determination of damages, it was not yet final and appealable. While recognizing the right to appeal,
the court in People v Den Uyl (1949) 323 Mich 490, 35 NW2d 467, in considering an appeal from
3
4
5
6
one confined for contempt in refusing to answer certain questions before an examining magistrate,
ruled that the dismissal of the principal case (because the prosecution could not proceed without the
witness' testimony) abated the contempt proceeding and required the dismissal of the appeal. The
court, however, in the order dismissing the appeal, also dismissed the warrant of commitment under
which the witness was confined. A chancery decree adjudging a corporation to be in contempt of
9
10
11
12
court for disobeying a court order was held appealable in Socony Mobil Oil Co. v Massena Iron &
Metal Co. (1966) 125 Vt 403, 217 A2d 56, on the authority of an earlier case[2] that differed from the
case at bar only because it originated in the County Court rather than the Court of Chancery, and that
13
was held to be properly transferred to the Supreme Court by way of a bill of exceptions. An- 33
14
A.L.R.3d 448 Page 182 33 A.L.R.3d 448 (Originally published in 1970) other case,[3] which held
15
that an appeal would not lie from the decree of the
16
chancellor in matters of contempt, was relied upon to support a motion to dismiss the appeal, but the
17
18
court, pointing out that a 1941 statute provided that causes heard in chancery pass to the Supreme
19
Court in the same manner as appeals from County Court, said that the effect of this legislation was to
20
abolish appeals in chancery as they previously existed, and to substitute the statutes applicable to
21
obtain review of County Court proceedings. Therefore, concluded the court, the Vilas Case presented
22
no obstacle to the pending appeal. CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: To obtain appellate
23
24
review, subpoenaed party must defy district court's enforcement order, be held in contempt, and then
25
appeal contempt order, which is regarded as final. Dynegy Midstream Services v. Trammochem, 451
26
F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2006). Where securities trading corporation was adjudged in contempt for failing to
27
turn over tape recording as ordered by court, court had jurisdiction to review contempt order even
28
though imposition of sanctions was stayed and no sanctions were formulated prior to entry of stay. Re
Three Grand Jury Subpoenas (1988, CA2 NY) 847 F2d 1024. A district court's ruling on an
3
4
5
6
application for a contempt order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Frontier-Kemper Constructors,
Inc. v. American Rock Salt Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 520 (W.D. N.Y. 2002). Post-judgment orders of
contempt are within an appellate court's jurisdiction as reviewable "final orders." 28 U.S.C.A. 1291.
Berne Corp. v. Government of The Virgin Islands, 570 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2009). Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction of defendant's appeal of contempt order, although contempt order of itself did not
9
10
11
12
constitute a final order that could be appealed, where portion of order that included contempt finding
was complete and final. M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 289 Fed. Appx. 927 (6th Cir.
2008). When the disobeyed order would be independently appealable under an exception to the final-
13
decision rule, then the contempt citation also may be appealable. S.E.C. v. McNamee, 481 F.3d 451,
14
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 94172 (7th Cir. 2007). Grant or denial of contempt order is reviewed for
15
abuse of discretion, but order of contempt is reviewed more searchingly. U.S. v. Teeple, 286 F.3d
16
1047, 89 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-2102 (8th Cir. 2002). Contempt adjudication issued in postjudgment phase
17
18
of civil action was appealable whether contempt was considered to be civil or criminal, since
19
adjudication possessed attributes of operativeness and consequence necessary to appealability.
20
Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 84 F.3d 367, 34 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1550 (10th
21
Cir. 1996). Denial of motion for order to show cause why party should not be held in contempt is
22
final, appealable order. Thomas v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2010).
23
24
A contempt order is final and appealable when the opportunity to purge the contempt has passed and
25
the position of the parties has been affected by the contempt order. Seiko Epson Corp. v. NuKote
26
Intern., Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, in banc
27
suggestion declined, (Oct. 19, 1999). 33 A.L.R.3d 448 Page 183 33 A.L.R.3d 448 (Originally
28
published in 1970) A contempt order is a final, appealable order. Thelman v. State, 375 Ark. 116, 289
S.W.3d 76 (2008). Contempt judgment is reviewable final order. C.G.S.A. 5133. State v. Brescia,
3
4
5
6
123 Conn. App. 342, 1 A.3d 1145 (2010). Appellate Court will reverse a finding of contempt only if
the Court concludes the trial court abused its discretion. Dowd v. Dowd, 96 Conn. App. 75, 899 A.2d
76 (2006). Even if adjudication of contempt was considered final judgment, court was without
jurisdiction where notice of appeal was filed more than a month before sentencing. West v United
States (Dist Col App) 346 A2d 504. Order of family court in matrimonial action determining custody
9
10
11
12
of children demanding support payments, alloting personal property and finding party in contempt for
violation of prior order was final and appealable, notwithstanding continuing jurisdiction of family
court to modify order. Cleveland v Cleveland (1977, Hawaii) 559 P2d 744. A contempt order is
13
appealable under the same circumstances as any other order or judgment entered in a civil or criminal
14
action. Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 185, 125 P.3d 1061 (2005). Under rule that review of
15
already issued contempt order must be by writ of review or by appeal, writ of prohibition was not
16
proper remedy by which to contest order finding divorced wife in contempt for failure to grant
17
18
visitation rights to divorced husband. Dey v Cunningham, 93 Idaho 684, 471 P2d 71. Ordinarily,
19
adjudication in contempt proceeding is final and appealable because it is original special proceeding,
20
collateral to, and independent of, case in which contempt arises, where imposition of sanction does
21
not directly affect outcome of principal action, even though such adjudication does not dispose of all
22
issues in litigation. Earles v. Earles, 287 Ill. Dec. 400, 815 N.E.2d 1203 (App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2004). It is
23
24
appropriate for a party to request that a contempt order be entered against it so that party may seek
25
immediate appeal of a trial court's discovery order. Webb v. Mount Sinai Hosp. and Medical Center
26
of Chicago, Inc., 283 Ill. Dec. 185, 807 N.E.2d 1026 (App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004). When an individual
27
appeals from a contempt sanction imposed for violating, or threatening to violate, a discovery order,
28
the contempt finding is final and appealable and presents to the reviewing court the propriety of that
discovery order. Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 199 Ill. 2d 47, 262 Ill. Dec. 394, 765 N.E.2d 1002
3
4
5
6
(2002). Judgment of contempt against law firm for violating order to withdraw appearance after firm
was disqualified from representing defendant constituted final and appealable judgment and
presented to court for review propriety of court's order, even though suggestion that law firm refuse
to withdraw came from trial judge and underlying controversy was not certified for review. Index
Futures Group, Inc. v Street (1987, 1st Dist) 163 Ill App 3d 654, 114 Ill Dec 735, 516 NE2d 890. The
9
10
11
12
Court of Appeals will reverse a trial court's finding of contempt only where there is no evidence or
inferences from the record to support it. Deel v. Deel, 909 N.E.2d 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Contempt judgment for violation of an order of the court regarding child visitation was final and
13
therefore appealable. Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux, 748 So. 2d 1180 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999). 33
14
A.L.R.3d 448 Page 184 33 A.L.R.3d 448 (Originally published in 1970) Interlocutory judgment
15
finding exwife in contempt and ordering her to pay a fine and attorney fees threatened irreparable
16
injury, and thus, direct appeal could be taken. Ducksworth v. Ducksworth, 727 So. 2d 1254 (La. Ct.
17
18
App. 4th Cir. 1999). A party found in contempt has a right to appeal from that decision even though
19
the merits of the litigation in which the contempt order was entered have not yet been resolved.
20
Morris v. Walden, 856 So. 2d 705 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Appellate court will not reverse a contempt
21
citation where the chancellor's findings are supported by substantial credible evidence. Goodson v.
22
Goodson, 816 So. 2d 420 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Although separate issues of main petition and
23
24
contempt were addressed within same judgment, each portion of judgment was separately appealable.
25
STL Capital Management, LLC v. Brda, 207 S.W.3d 649 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2006). While contempt
26
orders generally are final and not appealable, exception exists for family law cases, in which appeals
27
are permitted. Heath v Heath (1995, Mont) 901 P2d 590. Although contemptofcourt orders issued
28
by District Court are final and usually unreviewable except by way of writ of certiorari or review,
exception exists for contempt orders made in dissolutionofmarriage proceedings. In re Marriage of
3
4
5
6
Boharski (1993) 257 Mont 71, 847 P2d 709. An appellate court, reviewing a final judgment or order
in a contempt proceeding, reviews for errors appearing on the record. Douglas County ex rel.
Douglas County Assessor's Office v. Kowal, 270 Neb. 982, 708 N.W.2d 668 (2006). Appellate court,
reviewing final judgment or order in contempt proceeding, reviews for errors appearing on record.
Klinginsmith v. Wichmann, 252 Neb. 889, 567 N.W.2d 172 (1997). A contempt order imposing a
9
10
11
12
punitive sanction is a final order and is reviewable on appeal. McDermott v. McDermott, 8 Neb. App.
860, 602 N.W.2d 676 (1999). Whether the trial court adhered to the requisite procedures in a criminal
contempt proceeding is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v.
13
Davey, 904 A.2d 652 (N.H. 2006). A finding of contempt, combined with a sanction for contempt,
14
forms a final appealable order. State v. Adams, 153 Ohio App. 3d 134, 2003-Ohio-3086, 791 N.E.2d
15
1045 (7th Dist. Harrison County 2003). A contempt proceeding, even though it grows out of another
16
proceeding, is ordinarily regarded as a collateral or separate action from the underlying case and is
17
18
separately appealable, with appellate review limited to the contempt order itself. Lerma v. Wal-Mart
19
Stores, Inc., 2006 OK 84, 148 P.3d 880 (Okla. 2006). Order of contempt is final and appealable when
20
the order contains a present finding of contempt and imposes sanctions. In re C.W., 2008 PA Super
21
254, 960 A.2d 458 (2008). A contempt order is appealable where the order constitutes a final one that
22
imposes sanctions upon the offending party. Takosky v. Henning, 2006 PA Super 237, 906 A.2d
23
24
1255 (2006). Superior Court will reverse trial court's determination as to contempt conviction only
25
when there has been plain abuse of discretion. Com. v. Haigh, 2005 PA Super 139, 874 A.2d 1174
26
(2005), reargument denied, (June 17, 2005). Contempt order preventing neighbors
27
28
from using property owners' pond was immediately appealable; it imposed cost of bond on
neighbors, and this sanction could not be purged. 33 A.L.R.3d 448 Page 185 33 A.L.R.3d 448
3
4
5
6
(Originally published in 1970) Wolanin v. Hashagen, 2003 PA Super 258, 829 A.2d 331 (2003). In a
case of contempt, the trial court may find a party in contempt and that party may appeal the finding of
contempt, but the party asking for the contempt may not, as it is not aggrieved. Borough of Slatington
v. Ziegler, 890 A.2d 8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). Since a contempt order is final in nature, an order
compelling discovery may be appealed only after a trial court holds a party in contempt. Tucker v.
9
10
11
12
Honda of South Carolina Mfg., Inc., 582 S.E.2d 405 (S.C. 2003). The finding of contempt is
immediately appealable. Ex parte Cannon, 685 S.E.2d 814 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). Circuit court's
remedy or punishment for contempt of court is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
13
Sazama v. State ex rel. Muilenberg, 2007 SD 17, 729 N.W.2d 335 (S.D. 2007). A trial court's finding
14
of contempt is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Flowers v. Tennessee Trucking Ass'n
15
Self Ins. Group Trust, 209 S.W.3d 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, (Oct. 30, 2006). A trial
16
court's sentence for contempt, like the exercise of its contempt power, is reviewable for abuse of
17
18
discretion. State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 124 P.3d 235 (Utah 2005). Trial courts have discretion to
19
issue contempt orders, and reversal of a contempt judgment is appropriate only if the trial court's
20
discretion was either totally withheld or exercised on grounds clearly untenable or unreasonable. In re
21
Duckman, 898 A.2d 734 (Vt. 2006). An adjudication of contempt is appealable if it is a final order or
22
judgment; i.e., the contumacy, the party's willful resistance to the contempt order, is established, and
23
24
the sanction is a coercive one designed to compel compliance with the court's order. RAP 2.2(a). In re
25
Estates of Smaldino, 212 P.3d 579 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009). Appeals from contempt orders are
26
one-judge appeals. W.S.A. 752.31(2)(h). In re Washington, 2006 WI App 99, 716 N.W.2d 176 (Wis.
27
Ct. App. 2006).
28
CONCLUSION
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Based upon the foregoing the undersigned respectfully requests that this Court set aside its
Order of December 16th, 2011, Set Aside the Summary Contempt Order) and any other relief this
Court deems just. Appellant Declares under
penalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 53.045, that the assertions in this document are true and correct.
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
Dated: February 22, 2012
12
13
/S/ Zach Coughlin________

Zach Coughlin, Defendant
14
15
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PROOF OF SERVICE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing document upon the
following party by faxing, emailing, dropping Rf at their office, and placing a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document in the us mail. addressed tp:
Pamela Roberts, Esq.
John Kadlic, Esq.
Reno City Attorney's Office - Criminal Divison
P.O. Box 1900 Reno , NV 89505

Tel: 775-334-2050 Fax: 775-334-2420
robertsp@reno.gov
Attorney for City of Reno
Reno Municipal Courth
10
11
12
13
14
Date this February 22, 2012:

/S/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Plaintiff
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19
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21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
INDEX TO EXHIBITS
2
3
4
5
1. Exhibit 1: January 10th, 2012 email from RMC Interim Court Administrator Cassandra Jackson
with Attached December 16th, 2011 Order of Judge Howard; Four (4) pages
and All emails from ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com to RenoMuniRecords@Reno.gov from 10/4/11 to
present; citing to attached pdf filings that should be included in the Record on Appeal, yt are not in
some instances; Forty Four (44) pages.
6
7
8
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15
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1 of 47
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=4b...
records request for incident report urgent please

Sent: Tue 10/04/11 3:10 PM
To:
renomunirecords@reno.gov
1 attachment
records request to reno city attorneys office oct 4.pdf (66.5 KB)
RenoMuniRecords@reno.gov
Dear Reno City Attorney Records Department.
My name is Zach Coughlin. I wish to obtain any and all records available
incident to an arrest at the E. 2nd St. Walmart by the Reno Sparks Indian
Colony Police on or about Saturday October 10th, 2011 at between
approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I want any and all records, video, audio,
paper documentation or otherwise that I have a right to. I am representing
myself. I have sought these records from the Reno Municipal Court's
Records Office and they kept telling me they didn't have them yet and that I
should return sometime soon. Finally, they admitted the do not keep these
records and they must be obtained from your office. The RSIC Police
refused to give me a copy of these records. This delay has unduly prejudiced
my case and I request that you provide these records to me at once, with no
delay, please. I believe this case should be dismissed.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin signed electronically and signed in attached PDF. I can come
pick the records up with identification if that is required or I hereby give you
permission to email them to me or mail them to the address below:
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not
the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you
have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the
contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
2 of 47
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE
This message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is
privileged, work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s),
you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on
the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not
the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in
any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client,
work product, or other applicable privilege.
records request
Sent: Tue 10/04/11 4:41 PM
To:
2 attachments
RMC subpoena.pdf (67.8 KB) , RECORD_REQUEST_Zach Coughlin to RMC.pdf (20.2 KB)
October 4, 2011
Dear Reno Municipal Court Records Division,
My name is Zach Coughlin. I have now been informed by both the Reno
Municipal Court and the Reno City Attorney's officer, and the Reno Sparks
Indian Colony none of these entities can provide my requested records. You
have them, I believe I have a constitutional right to them. If you feel
differently, please explain in writing why that is the case.
I wish to obtain any and all records available incident to IC110627 at the E.
2nd St. Walmart by the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police on or about
Saturday October 10th, 2011 at between approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
3 of 47
want any and all records, video, audio, paper documentation or otherwise that
I have a right to. I am representing myself. I have sought these records from
the Reno Municipal Court's Records Office and they kept telling me they
didn't have them yet and that I should return sometime soon. Finally, they
admitted they do not keep these records and they must be obtained from your
the Reno City Attorney's Office. At the RMC records window I spoke with a
supervisor named Karen. She denied my request for these records today.
This delay has unduly prejudiced my case and I request that you provide
these records to me at once, with no delay, please. The RS Indian Colony
Police refused to give me a copy of these records today when I spoke with
Sargent Avansino, who was polite and helpful otherwise. I believe this case
should be dismissed.
Signed electronically and signed in a signed attached PDF. I can come pick
the records up with identification if that is required or I hereby give you
permission to email them to me or mail them to the address below:
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the
intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have
received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents
of this information is strictly prohibited.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE
This message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
privileged, work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s),
you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on
the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not
the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in
any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client,
Reno Municipal Court appointment of counsel

Sent: Mon 11/28/11 11:42 AM
To:
ltaitel@sbcglobal.net; renomunirecords@reno.gov
Dear Mr. Taitel,

I understand you have been assigned to represent me in the Reno Municipal Court trespass Complaint against
me. Please note that my address has recently changed to:
Zach Coughlin
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
I have recently been evicted and it has caused enormous upheaval to my life, and I am indigent, as such, I believe a
continuance is necessary and ask that you seek one for the December 13th, 2011 "trial" that I only became aware of through
calling the Reno Municipal Court. Also, please provide me a copy of any motions or pleadings you have filed on my behalf
and any documentation that you have been provided by the court, opposing counsel, or anyone else. I prefer such
documentation be emailed, but I realize that may not be possible. I would like to obtain a copy of the Complaint and
Discovery, including the probable cause sheets and any witness statements as soon as possible.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
4 of 47
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
5 of 47
contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named
recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure
under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying,
distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited
and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the
sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone
other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable
privilege.
records request
Sent: Mon 11/28/11 2:30 PM
To:
1 attachment
RECORD_REQUEST_FORM_2010[1] rmc trespass 11 13 11 records request 11-22185.pdf (20.8 KB)
Zach Coughlin, 817 N. Virginia St. #2

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
FW: temporary address change and instruction to pursue a continuance

1/29/2012 8:46 PM
6 of 47

Sent: Tue 11/29/11 3:14 PM
To:
robertsp@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
1 attachment
Motion for Continuance to Reno City Atty Roberts RMC.pdf (448.9 KB)
Ms. Roberts and RMC Records Supervisor Donna,

I am forwarding this apology I sent to Judge Howard in response to his remonstration responding to my email to
him, in an abundance of caution to avoid ex parte communications with the court, outside your presence. Please
also find attach e a NRCP Rule 11 safe harbor filing ready sanctions motions I am hereby serving on you,
invoking the 21 day safe harbor, with a reservation that any misconduct you commit in the court's presence may
be punished sua sponte or subject to contemporaneous sanctions requests, particular with regard to you blase
dismissal of the official misdoncut, malicious prosecution, 42 USC Sec 1983 deprivations of civil rights under
color of state law and all those other things your office and Hartshorn, et all have been sued for over the years.
Please find attached my Motion for Continuance, being filed by fascimile today with the RMC.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Licensed in Nevada and USPTO
privilege.
To: howardk@reno.gov
Subject: RE: temporary address change and instruction to pursue a continuance
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 17:22:45 -0800
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
7 of 47
Dear Judge Howard,

My apologies Your Honor. I have had an unlawful rent distraint applied to all
my office equipment and the files necessary to defend this case and produce
motions, incident to a summary eviction stemming from a lease that was at
least in part commercial, had a rent escrow deposit forced upon me in
violation of Nevada Law, had all my computers printers, everything subject
to the distraint. I have a netbook it won't accept a printer and on and on. I
apologize. I do note that the RMC rules allow for filing by facsimile, though
I gather not to the fax number listed for yoru chambers at www.nvbar.org.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin,
request of cd of trial in 11 CR 22176 2I

Sent: Thu 12/08/11 4:00 PM
To:
Hello, I am writing to request a copy of the cd of the record of trial in 11 CR 22176 2I in addition to a copy of the Contempt
Order and any other orders made in that matter, in addition to a copy of the docket.
Please email these to me if possible. I will agree to pay the copying costs or the paper documents or the audio cd/dvd. I
need these as soon as possible please.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
8 of 47
privilege.
REQUEST FOR RECORDS CD/DVD OF TRIAL AND OTHER

DOCUMENTATION URGENT PLEASE
Sent: Thu 12/08/11 5:45 PM
To:
1 attachment
RECORD_REQUEST_FORM_2010[1] trial cd and orders to RMC 12 8 11 final.pdf (441.5 KB)
Please let me know right away if there is any problem opening the attached
pdf containing my URGENT records request. Please find attached my urgent
request for a tape of the trial held on November 30, 2011 (exigent concerns
related to my ability to filed relief from judgment motions with 10 days of
the Order, which was apparently made on 11/30/11 dictate that I be provided
a copy of the tape or cd/dvd of the hearing very quickly, please), any order or
findings in this case, the entire docket, any Contempt Order stemming from
the 11/30/11 trial, etc. I will pay all charges required, though I believe my
indigent status should yield an IFP or fee waiver, however, time is of the
essence and I cannot wait more than half a day to have an IFP ruled on, so
please proceed as though I will pay. Please let me know immediately, via
email preferably, or by fax (but not by phone or USPS mail) when these
materials are ready, in addition to providing me a written estimation of how
long it will be before they will be ready and made available to me.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
9 of 47

privilege.
signed REQUEST FOR RECORDS CD/DVD OF TRIAL AND OTHER

DOCUMENTATION URGENT PLEASE
Sent: Thu 12/08/11 5:56 PM
To:
1 attachment
RECORD_REQUEST_FORM_2010[1] trial cd and orders to RMC 12 8 11 signed.pdf (446.2 KB)
I am resending the Records and REcording of Trial request form, SIGNED, just in case that is necessary.
Thank You,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
10 of 47
privilege.
To: renomunirecords@reno.gov
Subject: REQUEST FOR RECORDS CD/DVD OF TRIAL AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION URGENT PLEASE
Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2011 17:45:27 -0800
Please let me know right away if there is any problem opening the attached
pdf containing my URGENT records request. Please find attached my urgent
request for a tape of the trial held on November 30, 2011 (exigent concerns
related to my ability to filed relief from judgment motions with 10 days of
the Order, which was apparently made on 11/30/11 dictate that I be provided
a copy of the tape or cd/dvd of the hearing very quickly, please), any order or
findings in this case, the entire docket, any Contempt Order stemming from
the 11/30/11 trial, etc. I will pay all charges required, though I believe my
indigent status should yield an IFP or fee waiver, however, time is of the
essence and I cannot wait more than half a day to have an IFP ruled on, so
please proceed as though I will pay. Please let me know immediately, via
email preferably, or by fax (but not by phone or USPS mail) when these
materials are ready, in addition to providing me a written estimation of how
long it will be before they will be ready and made available to me.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
11 of 47
privilege.
RMC said I could file this by email

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 7:28 PM
To:
1 attachment
12 11 11 final motion for new trial city of reno v coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176.pdf (12.9 MB)
Dear RMC,
I called an wrote earlier and received approval to file the attached pdf and
media files by email rather than fax or other submission. This filing is large,
as such, it must be broken down into segments. this is part one, part two will
be in the next email. I will pay whatever filing fee or bond or whatever I
have to pay to access justice in this here case.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 8950
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
12 of 47
privilege.
Motion for New Trial Etc. in RMC 11 CR 22176

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 7:40 PM
To:
fiskm@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 2217 part two Exhibit 1 pages 1-300 of Motion for New trail from 12 12 2011.pdf (8.6 MB)
I received approval to file by email from RMC

This is the second file in the filing. Please note, the file name of the attachment should actually have the correct
case number of RMC CR 22176. It is missing the 6 on the end in the file name of the attachment
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
13 of 47
privilege.
Motion for New Trial Etc. in RMC 11 CR 22176

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 7:57 PM
To:
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 22176 part three Exhibit 1 pages 301-600 of Motion for New trail from 12 12 2011.pdf (9.7
MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
RMC 11 CR 22176 part four Exhibit 1 pages 601-701 of Motion for New
trail from 12 12 2011 ey
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
14 of 47

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 8:23 PM
To:
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 22176 part four Exhibit 1 pages 601-701 of Motion for New trail from 12 12 2011 ey.pdf
(11.8 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
Sent: Mon 12/12/11 8:29 PM
To:
1 attachment
(14.4 MB)
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
15 of 47
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
To: fiskm@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
Subject: Motion for New Trial Etc. in RMC 11 CR 22176
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 19:57:50 -0800
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
16 of 47
privilege.
audio of the November 30th Trial in Judge Howards court

Sent: Mon 12/12/11 9:56 PM
To:
Dear Mr. Fisk and the RMC,

RMC 11 CR 22176. I really need to quickly get a copy of the audio
recording from that. I went to the filing office counter and the clerk said I
couldn't get it, but I could fork over a lot to have it transcribed, is that true. I
have IFP status, and filed a Motion for Transcription at Publice Expense, but
should I be able to pay the $30 or whatever and get a cd of the hearing? Here
is another copy of My Motion for new Trial/NOtice of Appeal/IFP thing:
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!1031&parid=root
Maybe that will be easier, that is where the exculpatory video evidence is sent to you as well, a continuation of
exhibit one. I appreciate the RMC allowing me to file via email this way as sometimes my fax service is clunky.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
17 of 47
privilege.
Sent: Tue 12/13/11 2:26 PM
To:
1 attachment
(11.8 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
privilege.
records request
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
18 of 47

Sent: Tue 12/13/11 4:02 PM
To:
renomunirecords@reno.gov; fiskm@reno.gov
2 attachments
RECORD_REQUEST_FORM walmart RMC 11 CR 22176 IC 110627 trial cd and orders to RMC 12 8 11
signed.pdf (453.4 KB) , RECORD_REQUEST_FORM_2010[1] rmc trespass 11 13 11 records request 11 CR
22185 City of Reno v Coughlin signed.pdf (510.9 KB)
Let this writing also werve as the cover letter called for in RMCR 5(D):
attorney's name,: Zach Coughlin, Esq.
the firms name: Zach Coughlin, Esq.
address, 817 N. Virginia St. #2
fax number 949 667 7402
telephone number: 775 229 6737
the attorneys state bar number: NV Bar No: 9473
Dear Mr. Fisk,

I really need a copy of the audio of the Trial in 11 CR 22176 and a copy of
both the Contempt Order and the Guilty Verdict (Veronica said she would fax
one and that the RMC never sent or served me a paper copy beyond shoving
some papers in my fax when I was being handcuffed then taking them away
from me separately in a huff when I stated that I might like to know what it
was I was to sign or read it (or 6th Amendment, etc). However, I have
received no fax of those Orders as Veronica said she would send me
yesterday. She said it in an angry unprofessional tone and I am hereby
complaining in writing about that and Marshall Monte's angry threatening
tone and language to me at the arraingment of October 11, 2011. Please
place a copy of this in their personnel files and the record in both of my CR
RMC cases.
I was told by a RMC filing office counter clerk yesterday that I was not
allowed to get a copy of the audio of my 11 30, 2011 hearing before Judge
Howard, that I would only be able to get a transcript after using the one
transcriptionist the RMC approves of and after paying her a substantial
amount of money up front, but that ultimately, the audio would never be
made available to me.
Is this the case? Please respond in writing or email me a copy of the audio
files and the pdf's or whatever file type the Contempt Order and Guilty
Verdict etc, in 11 CR 22176 are in, in addition please provide the Motion to
Withdraw and Notice of appearance in 11 CR 22185 by Taitel and then
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
19 of 47
Puentes. I sent you the video exhibits with the same mysterious Verint codec
that the RMC provided me. Why a simple .avi file needs some mysterious
codec that is about 13mb in size is truly a mystery to me.
12 11 11 Defendants Motion for New Trial, Set Aside, Vacate Judgment/Conviction of underlying crime and
Contempt in Court's Presence finding/ IFP Petition/ Motion for Reconsideration/Notice of Appeal, Case Statment
in case: city of reno v coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176; Records Request form Defendant and Request for
Transcription at Public's Expense and Request for a copy of the audio recording of the Trial of 11 30, 2011 1:45
pm to end in RMC 11 CR 22176.
Additionally, I never received service of any Notice of Appearance nor a Motion to Withdraw by Lew Taitel, Esq.
the attorney appointed to represent me as required by RMCR Rule 3: Authorization to Represent
A. Attorneys representing defendants shall promptly serve written notice of
their appearance with the City Attorney and file the same with the Court.
B. An attorney desiring to withdraw from a case shall file a motion with the
court and serve the City Attorney with the same. The court may rule on
the motion or set a hearing."
Further, RMCR state: "Rule 5: Motions by Facsimile

A. All rules and procedures that apply to motions filed in person at the
court shall also apply to motions filed by facsimile, except as otherwise
specified in this rule.
B. All persons are eligible to use motion-by-facsimile procedures.
C. All motions filed by facsimile must be accompanied by a cover sheet
which must include the persons name, address, fax number and
telephone number.
D. All facsimile motions filed by an attorney must include the attorney's
name, the firms name, address, fax number and telephone number. In
addition, the attorneys state bar number must be conspicuously
displayed on the cover sheet.
E. All motions filed by facsimile must be accompanied by proof of service.
Service may be accomplished by facsimile when the receiving party is a
governmental agency, an attorney, or with the consent of the receiving
party. If service of the motion is accomplished by facsimile the 3-day
allowance for mailing shall not be computed into the time for response.
F. A defense attorney filing a motion in the first instance must also file a
proper authorization to represent.
G. Any motion received by the court after 4:30 p.m. or on a non-court day
shall be filed on the following court day.
Rule 6: Continuances
No continuance shall be granted, including a stipulated continuance, except
for good cause. A motion or stipulation for continuance must state the reason
therefore and whether or not any continuance has previously been sought or
granted."
Let this writing also werve as the cover letter called for in RMCR 5(D):
attorney's name,: Zach Coughlin, Esq.
the firms name: Zach Coughlin, Esq.
address, 817 N. Virginia St. #2
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
20 of 47
fax number 949 667 7402

telephone number: 775 229 6737
the attorneys state bar number: NV Bar No: 9473
And: "Rule 9: Appeals to District Court
Except as otherwise provided in NRS 177.015 a defendant in a criminal action
tried before a Municipal Court Judge may appeal from the final judgment
therein to the Second Judicial District Court, at any time within 10 days from
the date that judgment is rendered."
Judge Howard informed me during his oral pronounce of his Contempt Order and Guilty Verdict on 11 30,2011
that he would afford me an additional 3 non judicial days to file a Notice of Appeal or any other Motion, Request
for Reconsideration, or other Motion seeking relief from his 11 30 2011 rulings on account of his sua sponte, with
no possibility of Stay or prior judicial review ordering his Marshalls to slam be into handcuffs and throw me into
Jail, kind of like in Houston v. 8th Judicial District Court, escept Judge Howard didn't cool down like Judge
Pomeranz did and Houston wasn't defending a criminal charge that carred a possibility of incarceration of
substantial length after being denied his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel. I am formally complaining about
Judge Howard;s conduct in that regard, please place a copy of this in his personnel file and let me know whether
you think a Complaint to the Judicial Discipline Commission would be appropriate, in your professional opinion.
I filed my Notice of Appeal in 11 cr 22176 yesterday with the RMC via email, as previously given permission to do
by the RMC. To the extent that was ineffective, let this writing act as a Notice of Appeal and agreement to pay
all charges required for such.
PROOF OF SERVICE:
I emailed a copy of this to Pam Roberts for the Plaintiff City of Reno on this date, a true and correct copy and
further email her a copy of all the 12 11 11 MOtion for New Trial, etc. yesterday to:
Pamela G Roberts
Company: Reno City Attorney's Office - Criminal Divison
Address: P.O. Box 1900
Reno
, NV
89505
Phone Number: 775-334-2050
Fax number: 775-334-2420
Email: robertsp@reno.gov
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
21 of 47
privilege.
IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION

Sent: Wed 12/14/11 12:22 AM
To:
ballardd@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
2 attachments
Coughlin IFP and Financial Inquiry Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 26405 2I.pdf (381.9 KB) , Coughlin
IFP and Financial Inquiry Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 22176 2I.pdf (372.0 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Ms. Ballard,
Please note, the gentleman I worked with at the filing office counter today informed me there were no
appeal fees, bonds, or other charges that I could pay (including transcription costs) as "all charges are
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
22 of 47
being taken from" my bail in the respective matters. Please email me the audio from the November
20th,2011 Trial in 11 cr 22176 2I and proof of service of any Contempt Order or Guilty Verdict/Order
in that matter. Please file this as well as a Opposition to Any Motion to Continue Trial in 11 cr 26405,
dept 2, and a Motion to Set Aside or Vacate any Order Granting Continuance in response to such an
Order Granting Continuance. Please email, fax, or mail me a copy of the Notice of Appearances by
both Taitel and Puentes and the Motion and Order Granting Withdrawal of Taitel, if it exists. I would
like a copy of the docket in both 11 CR 26405 2I and 11 CR 22176, despite your informing me today
that I would need to subpoena the docket to have any chance of seeing it and that I would not be
provided access to documents in the public record, including Orders in both of these cases.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
privilege.
RE: Message left on 12/13/2011

Sent: Wed 12/14/11 6:52 PM
To:
roperj@reno.gov; fiskg@reno.gov; ballardd@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
Dear Chief Marshal Roper, and the RMC,

Thank you for your quick reply. I actually requested a copy of some
documentation related to my complaints about both incidents with Marshal
Mentzel be placed in his employment or personnel file, not that you provide
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
23 of 47
me a copy of his file. I would like one, or a copy of any complaints against
any Marshals, but I realize a subpoena would likely be required to have any
chance at that. Negligent Training, Hiring, Supervision.
I never received a copy of the Contempt Finding and Guilty
Verdict/Judgment/ORder or whatever from the 11 30, 2011 Trial before Judge
Howard in 11 CR22176 2I, though "Veronica" (no one will tell me her last
name, but she works closely with the RMC Judges) said the only "service" of
those Orders that was ever attempted on me occured while I was handcuffed,
after which point some Marshalls (I did not catch their names and they
manhandled me roughly into handcuffs, refusing to even let me save my
notes on my laptop at the sudden conclusion of Judge Howards Order and
Contempt finding. This is truly reprehensible to not even let me save my
damn notes and act like I was some perp who just knocked of a god damn
liquor store with a firearm. Some people need to get a grip inside. Please
place a copy of this written complaint against whatever Marshals were
involved in that in their employment/personnel files as well. Please provide
me a copy of any complaints you have received against any Marshals.
I would like a copy of the 11 30, 2011 Order and the audio of the Trial. I
believe you have a duty to find out what those Marshals did with this
document that "Veronica" alleges they attempted to serve on me, though,
even 14 days after the Trial, the "docket" in the RMC filing office still
contains no Order, no mention of an Order, and certainly no Proof of Service
of anything of the sort, nor have they responded to any of my documentation
requests or a request of the audio of the Trial of 11 30, 2011, despite an
exigent need for such to prepare Relief from Judgment Motions that have
deadlines of 10-20 days from "service" of the "Order", and who knows how
that will be measure. Why it was necessary to cost the public a bunch of
overtime pay for the 5 or so Marshalls, and who knows how many court staff
to stay until nearly 9pm on 11 30, 2011 to complete this "Trial", and how it
was such a damn emergency, especially where Richard Hill was able to get a
continuance because he was going to be on vacation in the trespass case
against me 11 CR 22185 2I, despite the fact that Lew Taitel never receive my
consent to such a Motion for Continuance, and further Taitel was arguably
conflicted out of representing me considering his "association" with Nevada
Court Services and the torts the committed against me, which resulted in a
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
24 of 47
lawsuit being filed against them, or at least an IPF Petition and Proposed
Complaint in District Court, prior to Taitel's appointment and representation.
If the RMC can afford all that damn overtime for everyone, why couldn't it
appoint me a defense attorney in RMC 11 CR 22176, especially where Judge
Howard ruled, not 20 minutes into Trial that he was finding me in Contempt
of Court and would decide the sentence (which obviously included a
possibility of incarceration) at the conclusion of the Trial?
Further M. Mentzel clearly bumped Donna Ballard out of the way in his zeal
to establish dominance of me, a person who was providing absolutely no
resistance at the time. Mentzel went on to start order me to leave the
premises after my conversation with Ballard and the file clerk was done.
Duh, Mentzel, it was 5:00 pm or so "closing time" what do you think I am
going to do, hang out and chill with you guys? Look at the Notice of Hearing
or Docket in RMC 11 CR22176 2I (I am also hereby requesting a copy of
the audio or video of the hearing from the RMC) and the hand written
interlineations I made on the document M. Mentzel provided me in court on
10 11, 2011, where I mention the problems associated with asking questions
about my Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel where only the possibility of
jail time exists. I asked Mentzel at that time a question about the process and
he got very angry, threatening, and insulting with me, then later, criticized my
appearance before Judge Gardner, I believe he said I was "sarcastic" and or
rude to the Judge in the same way I had been to Mentzel himself. I submit
that citizens trying to access justice should not be taken as a personal affront
to RMC employees like Mentzel, and that he needs to strongly consider how
he comes across to the public when he acts the way he does, and carries a
firearm, color of law, a badge, and apparently, the blessing of the RMC in
carrying out behavior that seems more fitting for a nightclub bouncer than a
Marshal. Further, the video played at arraignments is overly hostile and
threatening in my opinion, especially the parts where Judge Gardner makes
statements on the "extremely" poor choice it would be to represent one's self
pro se and all these tones and words used that make it sound like pro se
defendants will be punished for not either copping a plea or going with one
of the "four former prosecutors" who are now drawing a paycheck from the
RMC/Citizenry to fulfill the Sixth Amendment. I am something completely
other than impressed with the work done by Lew Taitel, Esq. for me in RMC
11 CR 22185 2I, in that regard. Why shouldn't defendants in the RMC, after
viewing the arraignment video and receiving representation like that which I
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
25 of 47
received from Taitel, feel like lambs being led to slaughter? Baah,
baaaaaaaaah! Two other Marshals were there yesterday when Mentzel was
berating me, I would like their names, please.
Now, just awhile ago, "RMC Court Transcriptionist Pam Longoni" called me
on the phone ("while driving" according to Ms. Longoni) and informed me
that the RMC must permit her access to the audio files, and that, while she is
linked into "their system" (meaning the RMC's), the RMC must take some
additional step to allow Ms. Longoni to access the audio files and continue
with the process of tending ot a request for a Transcript on Appeal. I was
told by a female RMC counter clerk that I would not ever be provided a copy
of the audio recording of the 11 30, 2011 Trial, but that I may purchase from
Ms. Longoni an official transcript, and that "appeal transcripts are billed at
$4.10 per page" etc. and that a substantial deposit would be required, and that
"No Transcript is considered to be official ordered, and commencement of
transcription will not begin, until receipt of the required deposit..." I asked
Ms. Longoni to inform me of everything I must do or pay to have the
transcript deemd officialy ordered and she informed me that she could not tell
me that, despite the apparent hard and fast deadlines applied to ordering,
officially, such a transcript, with the RMC in an Appeal context, until the
RMC allowed Ms. Longoni to access the RMC "system" and view/hear the
audio of the 11 30, 2011 Trial in 11 CR22176 2I. Ms. Longoni angrily hung
up the phone on me and is now not returning my calls and has failed to
respond to my request that she inform me, in writing, as to where to send
money or a deposit or anything else required for the transcript. I have yet to
receive a fax from the RMC's "Veronica" (whose last name has repeatedly
been denied to me) despite her angry assurances on the phone on 12 12, 2011
that she would finally hae the RMC attempt to appropriately (or almost
appropriately) serve me a copy of the Contempt Finding and Guilty Order
stemming from the 11 30, 2011 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176 2I. Please have
this request and communication reiterated to whoever it concerns at the
RMC, and have such a copy of those documents emailed, faxed, and mailed
in the US Postal Service mail immediately. Further, please do the same with
respect to the audio of the 11 30, 2011 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176 2I, and of
course I will pay a reasonable cost for the cd to the extent my IFP is not
granted. The RJC and Washoe District Court charge about $30 per cd. The
also provide copies of the dockets in cases without demanding a subpoena
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
26 of 47
force them to first. Please ask the gentleman Ms. Ballard saw me working
with yesterday what he said in that regard about providing me a copy of
anything, much less the docket in either RMC 11 CR 22176 2I or RMC 11
CR 22185 2I.
I believe I am entitled to a copy of the audio recording quickly, whether or
not a transcript has been officialy ordered, for the purposes of appeal or for
any other purposes. I believe in something called "transparency" in
goverment. Sunshine.
Let me ask you a question: If a Judge told you to jump off a bridge, would
you? It is my belief that Judge Howard ordered everyone to clear the
courtroom, including a female, shortly after my 11 20, 2011 Trial began and
it became clear that I was not going to lay down meekly for the Court, or for
Wal-Mart, or for the Reno City Attorney. 2 million of my people starved to
death during a "Great Famine" between 1848-1850 in Ireland, despite being
surrounded by water and fish, where the English were arresting Irishmen who
attempted to save their families and their own live's by fishing. I will be
fishing here, gentleman. Deal with it. I want that recording, for, among
many other reasons, to see if Judge Howard merely asked those who might
be called as witnesses to leave or whether he demanded every member of the
public leave before he sent me off to Guantanamo, er, I mean the Washoe
County Detention Facility after the Military Tribunal, er, the Trial in RMC.
Interestingly, while at the Washoe County Detention Facility, I have been
made to strip naked while being videotaped, wear a green dress for days on
end, go without a toothbrush for days, refused any opportunity to make
phone calls to protect my clients cases from prejudice, forced to spread apart
my buttocks and allow an overly long look at my anus by Sheriff's Deputies,
and further, I was forced to submit to a position on my knees in the
immediate vicinity of two Sheriff's Deputies crotches in some sadistic forced
simulation of performing oral sex upon those men. Rico/Negligent Hiring,
Training, Supervision, 42 USC Sec. 1983 Deprivation of Civil Rights Under
Color of State Law, etc., etc. Qui Tam, Whistleblower. Mr. Roper, I doubt a
Federal Court Judge would require that I have come obtained a Statement
From you to complain about any Marshal's conduct. I am pretty sure this and
my other correspondences have placed you on notice.
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
27 of 47
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 16:26:47 -0800

From: RoperJ@reno.gov
To: ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: Message left on 12/13/2011
Mr. Coughlin,
I received your message that you left on my phone on December 13, 2011 in regards to a complaint against Marshal
Menzel. The Marshal Division takes all citizen complaints seriously and investigates all complaints received in writing or
verbally. However, I would need more information from you prior to moving forward with an investigation. I encourage
you to come to the court to obtain a statement form, or contact me directly should you wish to pursue this matter. As to
your request to obtain a copy of Marshal Menzel's personnel file, I am unable to provide that to you without a valid
subpoena or warrant.
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
28 of 47
You also stated you were attempting to obtain a copy of your Judgement of Conviction from Dept. 4, specifically Veronica
Lopez, you can reach her at 326-6673. I am aware that a copy of your Judgement of Conviction was provided to you and
booked into your property on the night you were arrested. You are entitled to another copy should you wish.
Thank you,
Justin Roper
Chief Marshal/Department of Alternative Sentencing
775-334-1254
RMC 11 CR 22176
Sent: Thu 12/15/11 11:59 PM
To:
howardk@reno.gov; ballardd@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; fiskm@reno.gov;

renomunirecords@reno.gov; lopezv@reno.gov
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
FAX COVER SHEET
DATE: December 15, 2011

TO: .RMC et al
FAX NO: RMC approved email ling
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
29 of 47
RE: . City of reno v Coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176 2I

Motion for New Trial,Notice of appeal and other issues
Dear RMC,
I do not mean to be disrespectful in contacting the court via email. I have been so stamped
out by the events of the last few months that its all I can do to try to protect my rights to get
information and media to the court in my attempts to access justice. Veronica Lopez told me on
the phone on Monday of this week that she would fax me a copy of the Order and Contempt finding from the 11
30, 2011 Trial, yet I have not received any such fax. I have not received any order in any form, not on my release
from the 3 days summary incarceration, not ever. The RMC confirmed there has been no Notice of Entry of any
order in their docket or anything, etc.
I believe the following should be added to record and presents a strong argument for a
conflict of interest or other 60(b) basis for setting aside the verdict and contempt Order in
RMC 11 CR 22176 2I. I did not plead guilty in that case, and any RMC record that
suggests that is completely inaccurate. Please let me know if your records indicate I plead
guilty in that matter. Further, I have never been provided a copy of the Guilty Verdict/Order
in this matter, I requested on to be emailed to me and sent in the USPS mail. Please serve
me a copy of the order, preferably by email and USPS mail. Further, the "RMC's official
court transcriptionist" informed me yesterday that she could not quote me or accept an
money from me for the transcript on appeal. Further I have been told by court staff that I
would never be provided access to the audio recording of the Trial of 11 30, 2011. I believe
I have a right to it, and need it on an exigent basis in connection with the various motions I
have, will, or intend to to file challenging the decision in this case. The RMC filing office
informed me there has been no Notice of Entry of Order in this matter at this point.
T
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
30 of 47
fax: 949 667 7402

Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
FW: RMC 11 CR 22176

Sent: Fri 12/16/11 12:00 AM
To:
howardk@reno.gov; ballardd@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; fiskm@reno.gov;

renomunirecords@reno.gov; lopezv@reno.gov
1 attachment
emergency filing rmc 11 cr 22176 12 15 11.pdf (260.9 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
31 of 47
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
To: howardk@reno.gov; ballardd@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; fiskm@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov;
lopezv@reno.gov
Subject: RMC 11 CR 22176
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 23:59:45 -0800
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
FAX COVER SHEET
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
32 of 47
DATE: December 15, 2011

TO: .RMC et al
FAX NO: RMC approved email ling
RE: . City of reno v Coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176 2I
Motion for New Trial,Notice of appeal and other issues
Dear RMC,
I do not mean to be disrespectful in contacting the court via email. I have been so stamped
out by the events of the last few months that its all I can do to try to protect my rights to get
information and media to the court in my attempts to access justice. Veronica Lopez told me on
the phone on Monday of this week that she would fax me a copy of the Order and Contempt finding from the 11
30, 2011 Trial, yet I have not received any such fax. I have not received any order in any form, not on my release
from the 3 days summary incarceration, not ever. The RMC confirmed there has been no Notice of Entry of any
order in their docket or anything, etc.
I believe the following should be added to record and presents a strong argument for a
conflict of interest or other 60(b) basis for setting aside the verdict and contempt Order in
RMC 11 CR 22176 2I. I did not plead guilty in that case, and any RMC record that
suggests that is completely inaccurate. Please let me know if your records indicate I plead
guilty in that matter. Further, I have never been provided a copy of the Guilty Verdict/Order
in this matter, I requested on to be emailed to me and sent in the USPS mail. Please serve
me a copy of the order, preferably by email and USPS mail. Further, the "RMC's official
court transcriptionist" informed me yesterday that she could not quote me or accept an
money from me for the transcript on appeal. Further I have been told by court staff that I
would never be provided access to the audio recording of the Trial of 11 30, 2011. I believe
I have a right to it, and need it on an exigent basis in connection with the various motions I
have, will, or intend to to file challenging the decision in this case. The RMC filing office
informed me there has been no Notice of Entry of Order in this matter at this point.
T
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
33 of 47
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
emergency filings
Sent: Fri 12/16/11 7:55 AM
To:
renomunirecords@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov
2 attachments
12 16 11 emergency filing with fax cover sheet rmc 11 cr 22176.pdf (330.0 KB) , fax cover sheet and
notice of denial of service clarification motion.pdf (202.1 KB)
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
34 of 47
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
FW: 121 River Rock

Sent: Sat 12/17/11 12:15 AM
To:
ballardd@reno.gov; howardk@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov; hazlettstevensc@reno.gov; puenteslaw@aol.com
Unbelievable. The idea that exculpating evidence is being withheld under some "lien" is transmitted into the
universe, next thing I know, my law office is broken in to and the Richard B. Hill gang is stil asserting a lien on
property that was stolen, in my opinion, as a result of their own negligence, leaving a window air conditioner unit
in a window, without even putting a window jam between the top of the sill and lower pain, facing a sidewalk a
block from the Lakemill Lodge and across from City Center Apartments, great. Great. And I still have not been
faxed or appropriately served the Order and Contempt Order I was told would be faxed to me.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
35 of 47

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
To: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com; knielsen@richardhillaw.com; sgallagher@richardhillaw.com
Subject: RE: 121 River Rock
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 15:43:38 -0800
Dear Mr. Baker,
I drove by the property recently and saw you had added boarding up the front door on very, very recently.
Unfortunately, your client and your firm, despite billing up some $1,060 for "securing" the property on top of
charging $900 for storage for what could fit inside a 10x20 foot storage shed, never once providing an inventory,
and contributing to a wrongful arrest and defamation causing me and my clients great damage, failed to take
even basic steps to secure the property, despite my making numerous written requests that you do so, including,
but not limited to, taking the damn window unit air conditioner out of the window facing the sidewalk on the
side of the house very close to the damn Lakemill Lodge, or even putting a strong stick in between the bottom
sliding window pain and the top of the sill to prevent someone from simply pushing in the window unit air
conditioner and pushing the window up to gain access. Further, a blanket that was on the orange circular couch
is clearly in the flower bed in front of the house. Additionally, there are reports that someone with your office
gave someone a mattress from the inventory of Coughlin Memory Foam (a Nevada licensed business located at
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
36 of 47
the property) and an expensive mattress platform has clearly been damaged and placed in the flower bed as
well, in addition to one of the wooden porch shades being removed from the front porch. You and your client
are, of course, liable for all of this.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
From: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
CC: rhill@richardhillaw.com
Subject: 121 River Rock
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 13:50:02 -0800
Mr. Coughlin:
The River Rock property has been broken into. We believe the break-in occurred sometime on Monday,
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
37 of 47
December 12, 2011. There appear to be items missing, including the TV in the living room, perhaps a computer
monitor, and perhaps some stereo equipment. I cant tell what else. The contents of the residence appear to
have been rifled through.
I am providing you with this information as a courtesy. This email does NOT constitute permission for you to go
to the River Rock property.
Casey D. Baker, Esq.

Richard G. Hill, Chartered
652 Forest Street
Reno, Nevada 89509
Phone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858
Email: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
CONFIDENTIAL: ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT; ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

This e-mail may contain legally privileged or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, please do not read, copy, use, or disclose this
communication to anyone other than the intended recipient. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender and delete the email message from
your system. Thank you.
Circular 230 Notice.
To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this communication (including any
attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting,
marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.
emergency
Sent: Mon 12/19/11 4:32 PM
To:
supplement to motion to set aside all orders, see attached exhibit, there is no initialing on
the filestampe for the order on the 11 30th, 2011
Tom said there was no docket entry or record of anything as of 12 13 11, i wans't provided copy of discovery for
over 30 days after arrest, rmc said it didn't have pc and witness satements but rec'd date indicates otherwise,
potentially, release sheets fromjail property inventory does not show 11 30 11 order, I declare under penalty of
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
38 of 47
perjury i did not refuse any order or the chance to have a physical copy of one.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
I will fax this to Ms. Roberts and the RMC as well, this is a courtesy copy
Sent: Mon 12/19/11 5:15 PM
To:
1 attachment
RMC 11 CR 22176 12 19 11 filing with 3 exhibits.pdf (9.1 MB)
I will fax this to Ms. Roberts and the RMC as well, this is a courtesy copy
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
39 of 47

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
privilege.
no reply from Transcriptionist

Sent: Wed 12/21/11 12:02 AM
To:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
40 of 47
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Dear RMC,
It is my understanding the Judge Howard's order regarding email does not extend to the
address to which I am sending this correspondence: renomunirecords@reno.gov which is
the email address filing office supervisor Donna Ballard indicated to me was acceptable for
sending correspondence and filings to the RMC in lieu of faxes. I am writing because the
email address I was provided for RMC "official transcriptionist" Pam Longoni yielded a
"return to sender/failed transmission" message when I wrote to the email address provided
for her: plongoni@charter.net. Further, please see the forwarded email below that I sent to
Ms. Longoni. I have not received a return call from her regarding my recent messages to
her. I was told by a RMC filing office counter employee that I must get the transcript
through Ms. Longoni, as she is the "official transcriptionist" for the RMC. Please confirm
that I am no able to have another certified court reporter or transcriptionist create the
official transcript and indicate by what date this must be done, how it must be done, etc.
I was told by RMC filing office staff, including Ms. Ballard, that the RMC would not accept
any filings fees, bonds, or any other payments from me in relation to the underlying case 11
CR22176 2I or the appeal of that matter given that the RMC was holding the bail money I
paid into the court. If this is not the case or if I must pay anything into the RMC to ensure
that my appeal goes forward, please indicate as much in writing and with particularity. If I
am able to use any other transcriptionists and or the RMC has a list of such with contact
information, please provide such in writing.
Sincerely,
/s/Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Defendant/Appellant
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
41 of 47
privilege.
To: plongoni@charter.net
Subject: where to pay and how much
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 22:44:37 -0800
Dear Ms. Longoni,

I have left you several messages. I wish to pay whatever it is I have to pay to get this
appeal transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr
22176. Further, I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible.
Please provide specific detailed instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything
else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
42 of 47
privilege.
proof of insurance and registration Affidavit/Declaration and supporting

documentation
Sent: Mon 1/09/12 5:58 PM
To:
renomunirecords@reno.gov; renodirect@reno.gov
1 attachment
Zach Coughlin license plate 838NER proof of insurance and registration for citations 544281 and
r47190389731.pdf (1737.4 KB)
Dear Reno Municipal Court Clerk's Office,
My name is Zachary B. Coughlin.

My vehicle and myself were appropriately insured, as verified by the attached Proof of Insurance for
my USAA automobile insurance at the time of both Traffic Citations No's: 544281 and R47190389731.
Copies of both citations are attached as well. My vehicle, at the time of both citations, was in
compliance with Nevada law with regard to vehicle registration. A true and correct copy of this
Affidavit and the attached copies of Traffic Citations No's: 544281 and R47190389731 and a true and
correct copy of the Proof of Insurance for the time of both citations from my USAA automobile
insurance (Policy Number 0098527 96C 7104 3) and a true copy of my DMV automobile Registration
Certificate for both 2011 and 2012 is attached hereto.
I attest that the assertions contained herein are true and make this Declaration under penalty of perjury
pursuant to NRS 199.145.
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
43 of 47
Please find attached a 6 page pdf with this Affidavit/Declaration and the accompanying copies of the
two citations and the proof of insurance at the time and date of both citations and the same for the
registration for the vehicle. I am disputing the "failure to come to a complete stop" part of the citation
in 544281 and understanding that I have a hearing in Reno Municipal Court on 2 6 12 at 8:30 am in
that regard, please correct me if that is not the correct date and time.
Also, I have called several times and keeping leaving messages about disputing the following parking
tickets, and do not believe any "additional fines" should have attached to the base fine where I have
communicated that I am disputing them and have not receive a response with regard to the date and
time of my hearing to dispute them:
Citation Details
Citation Number: 020146724
Amount Due: $60.00
Issue Date:
12/03/2011 10:30:00
Plate Number: 838NER
State:
NV
Related Citations
We have found the following additional outstanding citations for this license plate
number. Please check the box next to each additional citation that you would like to pay
for at this time.
Citation Number
Issue Date
Amount Due
020145322
11/03/2011 03:20:00 $55.00
Sincerely,
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
44 of 47
Zach Coughlin
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118

fax: 949 667 7402
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may
contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it
to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking
of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named
recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable
law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or
omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message
in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any
copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work
debt validation documentation request and dispute letter under FDCPA

to City of Reno et al
Sent: Mon 1/09/12 6:09 PM
To:
renodirect@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
Dear City of Reno,

This writing is written notice to you that I dispute the debt your office and the City of Reno
and or the Reno Municipal Court has recently sent me, alleging that I owe some debt for
either parking tickets and or traffic citations. Further, I request verification and
documentation in support of your contention that I owe such a debt pursuant to the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.
Sincerely,
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
45 of 47
Zach Coughlin1422 E. 9th St. #2

RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402

To: renomunirecords@reno.gov; renodirect@reno.gov
Subject: proof of insurance and registration Affidavit/Declaration and supporting documentation
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 17:58:47 -0800
Dear Reno Municipal Court Clerk's Office,
My name is Zachary B. Coughlin.

My vehicle and myself were appropriately insured, as verified by the attached Proof of Insurance for
my USAA automobile insurance at the time of both Traffic Citations No's: 544281 and R47190389731.
Copies of both citations are attached as well. My vehicle, at the time of both citations, was in
compliance with Nevada law with regard to vehicle registration. A true and correct copy of this
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
46 of 47
Affidavit and the attached copies of Traffic Citations No's: 544281 and R47190389731 and a true and
correct copy of the Proof of Insurance for the time of both citations from my USAA automobile
insurance (Policy Number 0098527 96C 7104 3) and a true copy of my DMV automobile Registration
Certificate for both 2011 and 2012 is attached hereto.
I attest that the assertions contained herein are true and make this Declaration under penalty of perjury
pursuant to NRS 199.145.
Please find attached a 6 page pdf with this Affidavit/Declaration and the accompanying copies of the
two citations and the proof of insurance at the time and date of both citations and the same for the
registration for the vehicle. I am disputing the "failure to come to a complete stop" part of the citation
in 544281 and understanding that I have a hearing in Reno Municipal Court on 2 6 12 at 8:30 am in
that regard, please correct me if that is not the correct date and time.
Also, I have called several times and keeping leaving messages about disputing the following parking
tickets, and do not believe any "additional fines" should have attached to the base fine where I have
communicated that I am disputing them and have not receive a response with regard to the date and
time of my hearing to dispute them:
Citation Details
Citation Number: 020146724
Amount Due: $60.00
Issue Date:
12/03/2011 10:30:00
Plate Number: 838NER
State:
NV
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
47 of 47
Related Citations
We have found the following additional outstanding citations for this license plate
number. Please check the box next to each additional citation that you would like to pay
for at this time.
Citation Number
Issue Date
Amount Due
020145322
11/03/2011 03:20:00 $55.00
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118

fax: 949 667 7402
1/29/2012 8:46 PM
.~~--
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Case No. II TR 26800 21

2
Dept. No.3
3
4
5
6
IN TIlE MUNICIPAL COURT OF TIlE CITY OF RENO

7
8
9
10
11
CITY OF RENO,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
12
13
14
15
ZACHARYBARKERCOUGHL~,
Defendant.
------------------,
March 12, 2012 was the time set for the resumption of the tmffic citation trial of
16
Defendant ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN who, as member No. 9473 of the Nevada Bar,
17
is an attorney representing himself, the defendant. The trial was continued on February 27,
18
2012, when, after approximately an hour and a half, the defendant was held in criminal
19
contempt by the court for his antics and misconduct during that trial. His behavior is DOted in
20
21
detail in the COU!1'S Order entered on February 27,2010.
22
Today, Mr. Coughlin failed to appear to complete this trial. He has Dot contacted this
23
court to explain or excuse his absence. Deputy City Attorney Alison Ormaas appeared arid
24
was prepared to proceed. She informed the court thot she had no contact with Mr. Coughlin
25
26
27
..,..
poo-noo
_NY"'"
""""..",
28
The coun makes the following findings on the record:
"'" _nl.
I horuIIy COrtIIy IIIJa ... IIuo and ........
....,,~<Waf
01 ilia Rona I/IIIIIoIDaJ Coun
a"!!!!!. 0' III. _
In
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otIgJnaJ_Blld~~~;:"~2~U:::::
1
Br~mu~
01804
1773
_...__",_ ... __ ..."._ .. ,"" ... __....-c_. __ ~
-.~
_-... __ ..__ .. __' ...._,.._._ .. _._ ---.,--.. _...... -. - ... -..- _ _..__......"__ ..
.~~
After he served his five-day Contempt of Court sanction imposed by this court on
February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin fax-filed to this court l a 224-page document entitled "Notice
of Appeal of Summary Contempt Order; Motion to Return Personal Property Confiscated by
4
Reno Municipal Court and Its Marshals; Motion for New Trial and to Alter or Amend
Summary Contempt Order." The document purported to appeal this court's Order holding
him in direct criminal contempt. It contained a portion of one sentence on page 4 seeking a
continuance oftoday's hearing, but no further discussion of that topic. It also mentioned
being a ''tolling'' motion in an apparent afterthought. It did not address most of the other
10
II
pelSOnaJ life and this court's; his father's football career in college; dozens of pages of string
12
13
citations taken off the internet; documents from a prisoner online site; an article about a
14
"police state;" an article about Discovery; a website printout showing a police officer's salary;
15
and copy of court documents from a District of Columbia case.
16
It was a disjointed regurgitation of case law citations from a legal research online site
17
with little reference to, or argument about, the facts of his instant "Boulevard Stop" traffic
18
19
case. The document was WI incoherent and pathetic demonstration of what might once have
20
been legal and academic prowess tlmt appears to now be greatly damaged. Mr. Coughlin fax-
21
filcd another document in which he apparently took a Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis
22
[sic) in another case and typed over it "Request for Audio Rccording of February 27 111 , 2012
23
Trial and for Appt [sic) and to Waive Filing Fee and Transcript Fee for Appeal Counsel."He
24
had that filed in the instant case on March 7, 2012, even though it was dated November 22,
25
2011.
26
27
..,.,
....
,"""",,,"cam
,000001tal
'-"
Whereas Mr. Coughlin's efforts to conduct his own defense in his tmffie citation trial on
28
I
RMC Rules and Procedures S pennils fax filing of motions.
"'" ".""
01805
1774
- -....
... _ - " .... _
.. #-
' - _ . _ _ - - - , . - - -. . . . . .
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",--.-",,--,-~ . . -.--~-~- ..
-.
~.- . . . . - - - - - - - -
p-
February 27, 2012 disrupted Department 3 of this court and caused distress to this court and
2
3
its staff and marshals, as well as the prosecutor and the witness, and resulted in Mr. Coughlin
being held in contempt of court, his faxing and filing of these documents greatly disrupted the
4
5
operation of the entire Reno Municipal Court system, including the clerk's office and the
other departments, and necessitated that action be taken by the Court Administrator and
Administrative Judge.
8
9
Apparently beginning on March 9,2012 at 12:38 p.m., Mr. Coughlin again undertook
another massive fax-filing to Reno Municipal Court. This time it was a document that was
10
file-stamped by the clerk on March 12,2012 at 8:12 a.m. This second 218'page document
11
12
purported to be yet another motion in this case entitled "Motion to Return Cell Phones;
13
Motion to Set Aside Summary Contempt Order; and Notice of Appeal of SummllJ)' Contempt
14
Order." With scant discussion of, or relevance to, the above-captioned matter, said document
15
mostly argues against Judge Howard in a Department 4 ease and again contains more than
16
200 pages of string legal citations; lyrics to rocks songs; Mr. Coughlin's personal fwnily
17
18
19
history; discussion of an eviction case and another contempt ease; disjointed legal citations,
and other nonsensical matters that have no apparent relevunce to his traffic citation ease.
20
Both documents were massive and took up a great deal oftime because the court had to
21
review them to look for some connection to the case. This court has thc inherent authority to
22
maintain respect, order and decorum in the court, and to refuse to allow the court to be used
23
as 8 vehicle for the deranged rantings of 0 litigant.
24
25
The conduct of Mr. Coughlin has been inappropriate, biZ8lTC, dishonest, irrational and
26
27
"""
'nUllo'_
c ')&.D'ID
-~"'"
disruptive, to say the least. He has not practiced law in this case in a manner that
demonstrates his competence, professionalism, preparation, consideration for the court, the
28
witness, or his opposing cOWlSeI. He has been disrespectful to the court. He has failed to
WllH:al"Al. aMlr
XIrD
01806
1775
- ."-'-"- ._...--......
_. __
4.~_
......-...... '. ... ..... _.
appear or explain his absence to the court. Inasmuch as the court bas at least four different
2
3
addresses for him, it is unable to ascertain his exact whereabouts. He shows signs of mental
instability, ifnot serious mental illness.
'5
6
Based upon the total circumstances of this case, the in-court perfonnance of the
defcndant, as observed by this court, the written documents faxed to the court for filing by
this defendant, the statemcnts and behavior of this defendant and his overall conduct herein,
this court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Zachary Barker Coughlin, an attorney
licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, has committed numerous acts of attorney
10
misconduct, including, but not limited to, violating thc following Rules of Professional
II
12
Conduct:
\3
8.4(c~gaging
14
8.4 (d)-engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
15
3.3 (a)-lack of candor to the court by knowingly making false statements to a tribunal;
16
17
18
19
20
in dishonesty, fiuud, deceit or misrepresentation;
3.I---{!efending in a proceeding by asserting or controverting an issue without a basis in

fact and with matters that are known to be frivolous;
3.2-failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, and, in fact, taking
extreme measures to delay litigation;
3.4(e)-being unfair to opposing counsel by continually alluding to mlltters the lawyer
does not reasonably believe are relevant or supported by admissible evidence;
21
22
1.3-fniling to act with reasonable diligence and promptness; and
23
I.I-Iack of competence in his practice and nppearances before this court.
24
In addition, Zachary Barker Coughlin, likely nlso violnted Nevada Supreme Court Rule
25
229, section 2(b), as amended by ADKT 449 on August 1,2011, by surreptitiously reconling
26
the traffic citation triaJ of February 27, 2012 without the advance permission of this court and
27
-"'-
28
then lying to this court when Questioned about it and denying that he had done so.
""'"
""""'...
PO!b 110)
(JIq IJO-mo
01807
1776
.,
....----.....
-'~
,_ ...
-_.
__.. _._....---_..
.. ,_.
__.... _..........
_-~_.-
Whether or nol there are medical reasons 10 explain Mr. Coughlin's aclions is nol for
2
this court to decide. He has become nothing less than a vexatious litigant 10 Reno Municipal
Court due 10 his unorthodox, disruptive, bizarre and irrational methods and practices that go
4
5
6
beyond the pale of anything thaI is civil, elhical, professional or competent. Good cause
appearing therefore, the court onlers as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that this matter is continued, and all proceedings relating thereto are
lolled, unlil further order of this court, while the matter of attorney Zachary Barker Coughlin
is referred 10 the Slale Bar of Nevada;
10
IT IS ORDERED that no further Detion shall be taken by Ihe Reno City Attorney's
II
12
13
14
15
16
Office, or the clerks or staff of Reno Municipal Court, in the above-cntilled case, pending
further onler of this court;
IT IS ORDERED that Zachary Barker Coughlin is barred and forbidden from faxing,
emailing, delivering, having delivered, serving, presenting for filing, personally or otherwise,
any motion or docwnent 10 Reno Municipal Court, in the above-cntitled case, pending further
17
18
19
onler of lhis court.

Dated this 12th day of March, 2012.
20
21
The Hon. Do
y Nash Holmes
Reno M unic pal Judge
22
23
24
25
26
27
.......... ""'"
"'"
28
,.., "11eO
-~.""
{Jm,""'_
01808
1777
_ _ _ ' _ _ . _. __ ._ --. __ . ,..,.._ _
_4_'~"'~_"'M
-. -
~-.~
......... --._ ..-_ "' .
-.-.,.-~.-
...... .;........
. ., , .. ' . _ .
- -.-- ........ ---- .
1
2
3
4

Allison Onnaas
PO Box 1900
Reno NV 89505
Zachary Barker Coughlin, eaq.

1422 E. 9'" Street #2
10
11
12
13
Reno NV 89612
X Placing said document In a sealed envelope and placed for collecting and
mailing by Unites States mail in Reno. Nevada, postage prepaid following ordinary
business practices.
Washoe County Jail
Court Services
14
Facsimile (FFAX)
15
Electronic Mall (E-mail)
16
InneroOffies mell following ordinary business practiess
17
Personal Delivery.
18
19
DATED: March 12,2012.
20
21
artment Three
22
23
....... """"''''' Couo1
00t0tI1y ...... - .
Judge
P.O. Box 1900
Reno. NY 8R505
(775) 334-S8n
01809
1778
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: FOR SOME reason this Order by RMC Judge Holmes did not make King's list, and,
really, it does not appear the SBN was provided it by the RMC.
Case No. 11 TR 26800 2 1
Dept. No. 3.
FILED

DEPT. NO.3
,
MAR 08 2012
kk
DOROTHY NASH HOLMESI JUDGE
5
6
8
9
10
11
CITY OF RENO,
ORDER DENYING MOTION

FILED BY MARY BARKER
SEEKING REFUND OF FINE
SHE PAID FOR DEFENDANT
Plaintiff,
vs.
12
13
1
4
15

Defendant.
--------/
Petitioner, MARY BARKER,filed a motion on March 5,20 12 in the above-captioned
16
case of her son, Defendant Zachary Barker Coughlin,seeking a refund of One Hundred and
17
Three Dollars (
$10 3.00) she paid as part of his penalty for Criminal Contempt of Court. The
18
19
court held the defendant in contempt of court for actions he took in the direct and immediate
presence of the court during the trial of his traffic citation on February 2 7,20 12 in the above-
20
21
22
23
24
25
entitled matter. (See Order Finding Defendant in Contempt of Court and Imposing Sanctions,
filed February 27,201 2).
The defendant was ordered taken into custody to spend five (5) days in jail. He asked
the court to permit him to pay a fine instead,saying he had law clients and court matters to
attend to,and the court granted that request and said the contempt would be punished by
26
27
RENO
28
either five days jail,beginning immediately,or payment of $ 500 fine immediately..

The court's records indicate that the defendant attempted to post the $ 500 on a credit
MUNICIPAL COURT
P.O. Box 1900
({_,NV 5O'
(70l) 334-2290
1
2
3
card but the company refused his card, therefore, he was transported to the Regional
Detention Facility at 9
11 Parr Boulevard to serve his 5-day sentence. After he had served
four (4) days in j ail, Mary Barker contacted the court clerk to see if she could pay One
4
5
6
Hundred Dollars ( $1 00. 00) on the defendant's behalf, as a fine, in lieu of his fifth day in
incarceration on his contempt sentence. The court clerk inquired of this court and the court
approved that. Thereafter, Ms. Barker made the arrangements and paid the $1 00 toward the
fine, including a $3
.00 charge to pay by credit card. The jail was notified that the defendant
9
10
could be released on this case, and was, in fact released on this case.
Jail records further indicate that the defendant had been involved in a separate case in
11
12
Reno Justice Court prior to his traffic trial in this court. In the RJC matter, he apparently
13
posted a bond through Action Bail Bonds and had been released from custody. The records
14
show that the bonding company surrendered the bond. Therefore, immediately upon his
15
16
release in this case, Zachary Coughlin was re-booked and taken back into custody on the RJC
case. Any additional time he spent in custody, therefore, was on the RJC case, and not the
17
18
19
traffic case in this court.

Therefore, the court finds that the defendant satisfied his contempt sentence by serving
20
four (4 ) days in jail and his mother's payment of $100 in lieu of his fifth day of incarceration.
21
Petitioner is not entitled to a refund.
22
23
24
The motion is DENIED.
Dated this 8th day of March, 2 012.
25
26
The Hon. Dor y Nash Holmes

27
RENO
MUNICIPAL COURT
P.O. Box 1900
Rcqo, NV 19505
(70l) )342290
28
1
2
3
4
5
6
Allison Ormaas
.
PO Box 1900
Reno NV 89505
7
8
9

1556 E. 9th Street #2
Reno NV 89512
10
11
Mary Barker
945 W.12th
Reno NV 89503
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Placing said document in a sealed envelope and placed for collecting and
business practices.
Washoe County Jail

Court Services
Facsimile (FFAX)
;
Inner-office mail following ordinary business practices

Personal Delivery.
20
21
22
23
leno Municipal Court

)orothy Nash Holmes,
udge
'.0. Box 1900
teno, NV 89505
775) 3343822
'.;.
DATED: March 8, 2012.
Note by Coughlin: while Panel Chair Echeverria was quick to ask Coughlin how the appeals in the
trespass and petty larceny cases turned out, he was curiously reticent in that regard with respect to
Coughlin's attempts to get some sort of appellate review of the two contempt orders by the RMC.
THEM
IC[PAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
CITY OF RE
0,
PlaintifT.
v .

Defendant.
1
______
SUA SPO
TE OrWEll DE fYl
G RELIEF
OUGHT IN IM1)ROPER DOC ME IT
On March 7. 2012, at I :58 p.m., defendal1l Zachary Barker Coughlin, an attorney and
II
seltrepresel1led litigant in the instant traffic citation case, began fax-filing a 224-pagc
12
13
14
document to the Reno Municipal Court purporting
10
seek various and sundry types of relief
fTom this court on a "Boul 'vard SlOp" traffic citation matter. He labeled his do ument ,.
otice
15
16
17
of Appeal of Summary COl1lempt Order; Motion to Return Personal Property Confiscated by

Reno Municipal
ourt and Its Marshals; Motion for New Trial and to Alter or Amend
Summary COl1lempt Order.' Said document was filed by the Clerk of the Court. after much
18
19
20
di ruption to the court's operations.

The court herein issues this Order slIa sponte to prcvel1l the plaintiff, Reno CilY
21
Altorney. from devoting any additionaltimc or resource to this documelH, and to relieve the
22
plaintiff from any burden of attempting to respond to said document. Likewise. the court stafT
23
is relieved of any obligation to further deal with this aberrant document.
24
25
26
The court tinds that lhe defendant has failed
10
foll ow proper legal procedure in
preparing and filing a Notice of Appeal, or Illotion Wilh appropriate citation to the record. lhe
27
....
,
MUJo.'lC1PAl COURT
'"0 fb. 1'00:
a-..NV
1""U11I' !l"JtI
facts and the applicable law. and argument thereof. and has blatantly abused the COUrt' s fax-
28
filing process offered for the convenience of parties appearing in this court. Furthermore, the
000181
document filed by Mr. Coughlin appears to contain a eries of disjointed legal rambling
2
3
plucked from online resources that are neither relevant nor applicable to the matters in this case.
IT IS ORDERED that any and all relief sought by the defendant Zachary Barker
5
6
7
8
9
Coughlin in the above-described document is denied; at such time as Mr. Coughlin files a
correct and proper motion or notice, his legal document will be considered by the coun.
IT IS F
RTHER ORDERED that Zachary Barker Coughlin shall refrain from, and i
hereby barred and prohibited from faxing any documents to Reno Municipal Coun.
IT I
ALSO ORDERED that if Zachary Barker Coughlin wishes
10
file documents in
10
II
12
Reno Municipal C01il1 on any matter assigned to Department 3. he must present signed
originals only. in appropriate legal form and format. limited to no more than 15 pages in length.
13
and before they are filed. the clerk of the coun shall present them to this coun for review in
14
chambers. and this coun will make a pre-filing detemlination iflhey can be filed by the clerk.
15
16
IT r
0 ORDERED
Dated thi
13th day ofMarch, 20 12.
17
T:Z
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
2'
26
27
"""
MI 1o'1CfPAl cOll.r
pn aa. f9CO
!<o'\.
o,I IJ IN!)
28
000182
2
3
4
5
6
Allison Ormaas

PO Box 1900
Reno NY 89505
Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq,
1422 E. 9" Street #2

Reno NY 89512
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Placing said document in a sealed envelope and placed for collecting and
business practices.
Washoe County Jail
Court Services
Facsimile (FFAX)
Personal Delivery.
DATED: March 13, 2012.
20
21
22
23
Reno MunICIpal Court

Dorothy NasI'! Holmes.
Judge
:>
0 Box 1900
eno, NV 89505
775) 33822
000183
IN THE M
2
CO
ilCIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RE 0

TY OF \VA HOE, TATE OF,
EVADA
3
FILED

o. II TR'25mJOIO. 3
Case
Dept. 3
C/TYOF RE 0
Plaintiff,
vs.
MAR 1 3 2012
TIME
\~
BY C/~ _______
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHL

Defendant.
DOROTHY NASH HOLMES, UDGE
--------------------_1
S /I. SPONTE ORDER DENYING RELlEF SO GHT TN IMPROPER DO CUMEI T
10
On March 9, 2012, at 12:38 p.m., defendant Zachary Barker Coughlin, an attorney and
I1
self-represented litigant in the instant traffic citation case, began fax-filing a 218-page
12
13
document to the Reno Municipal Court purporting to seek various and sundry types of relief
14
from this court on a "Boulevard top" traffic citation matter. He labeled his document "Moti on
1-
to Return Cell Phone' Motion to et A ide ummary Contempt Order; and

of ummary Contempt Order."
otice of Appeal
aid document was filed by the Clerk of the Court, on Monday
1arch 12.2012, after causing much di ruption to the coun's operations.

The court herein i ue this Order sua sponte to prevent the plaintiff, Reno City
19
nom y. from devoting any additional time or resources to this documelll, and to relieve the
plaintiff from any burden of attempting to respond to said document. Likewi e, the court staff
is relieved of any obligation to further deal with lhis aberrant document.
The court frods that the defendant has failed to follow proper legal procedure in
preparing and filing hi motions and purported
Co
olice of Appeal. The court also finds that Mr.
. has blaLantly abu ed the court's fax -filing process offered for the convenience of
2-
.....-v_
--
50
'Cl'ltPf
'0"'1_
parties appearing in this court. As with his previous, mostly incoherent document, this
28
document filed by Mr. Coughlin appears to be a recitation of family grievances, lyrics to rock
songs, disjointed legal ramblings, citations and argument in another case with another judge in
2
3
a different department of Reno Municipal Court and, is, thus, even more irrelevant to the
instant case than the 224-page document previously filed by Mr. Coughlin.
rr
I ORDER ED that any and all relief sought by the defendant Zachary Barker
6 Coughlin in the above-described document is denied.

7
8
9
tTl F RTHER ORDERED that Zachary Barker Coughlin shall refrain from, and is
bereby barred and prohibited from fax ing any documents to Reno Municipal Court.
IT L ALSO ORDERED that if Zachary Barker Coughlin wishes to file documents in
S
10
Reno Municipal Court on any matter assigned to Department 3, he must present signed
II
12
original 001 ,in appropriate legal form and format, limited to no more than 15 page in length,
13
and before they are filed, the clerk of the court shall present them to this court for review in
14
chambers. and this court will make a pre-filing determination if they can be filed by the clerk.
IT L
0 ORDERED
Dated this 13th day of March, 2012.
23
24
...,.....
_
-""....
...-....
'O"ltDO
....""
1
2
3
4

Court, Reno , Nevada , that I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the above
action , and th at on th is date, served a true and correct copy of th e attached document
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Allison Ormaas
PO Box 1900
Reno NV 89505
Reno NV 89512
X Placing sa id document in a sealed envelope and placed for collecting and
mailing by Unites States mail in Reno, Nevada , postage prepaid following ordinary
business practices.
Was oe County Jail
Court Services
Facsimile (FFAX)
Inner-office mail following ordin ary business practices
Personal Delivery.
DATED: March 13, 20 12.
20
21
22
23
"-_Coun
"""""Y ,",sh HaOnes.

Judge
PO Box 1900
Reno,
89505
(775) 33<-3022
artment Three
REC EIVED
Case
o. II TR 26800 21
Dept.
0.3
APR 13 2012
Reno ~~ , Court
8Y _ I~
~~";:D:-e-u -C '-erkp -IY -
I.:;
FILED
'W'1'CIPh L COURT
"I ..' ... \ "0

IU lid .:,
I)
':;L ,:, .j\....
1: I I
0
II ' ~
loCURT
BY
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENODEPUTY
4
5
CO
TY OF WASHOE STATE OF
EV ADA
6
7
8
CITY OF RENO,
Plaintiff,
9
10
ORDER RELEASING PROPERTY
vs.
11
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLm,
12
13
14
Defendant.
----------------------,
IT I
ORDERED that the" ashoe County Sheriffs Office shall release to the
Defendant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLm, three items taken from him on February 27,
201 2 at the
ashoe County Regional Detention Facility, during his booking for incarceration
pursuant to impo ition of a 5-day jail sentence for Contempt of Court in the above-entitled
19
case, to wit: one amsung Cell Phone; one T-Mobile Cell Phone; and one Braun Electric
20
Razor, as identified in Case
umber WC 12-1805 and referred to under Control # C-47951 .
21
22
23
_4
25
6
.....
_...
--
.....,...."'"'"
PQ~I
28
Dated this 29 th day of March, 2012.
D!!:;rz~~
"-
CERTIFICATE OF SER VlCE
3
4
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Reno Municipal Court, Reno,
INevada, that I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the above action, and that on this date,
served a true and correct copy of the attached document to the following as set forth below:
Washoe County Detention Facility

911 Parr Blvd.
Reno, NY 89512
8
9
Allison Orrnaas
P.O. Box 1900
Reno, evada 89505
10
11
Za hary Barker Coughlin, Esq.

1422 E. 9'" Street #2
Reno, e ada 89512
Fax; (949) 667-7402
12
13
15
16
X
By placing said document in a sealed envelope and placed for collecting and mailing by United
States mail in Reno, evada, postage prepaid following ordinary business practices.
17
Fa imile (FAX)
18
19
_ _ _ Inner-Office mail following ordinary business practices
20
_ _ _ Personal Delivery
21
22
DATED this 30'" day of March, 2012 .
23
24
25
26
27
28
Coon Office Manager
... -.......
-~
,.---..- --.... . .- ... - -- ..._-
,.-
..
-,-",--",~".--.~-~'
..
.-......_--_ _-----
.......
.....
~--.-----------.------.-.
-,
.....i
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
Fcbruary 14,2012
600 .:0111 Owk101on Bhrd.
I.u Vo:zu. NY B9IO-1.ISb'
,.,... 7OZ.JBl.1200
..., .... 800.2~.lm
Zach Cou!hlin, Esq.

1422 E. 9 Street
Reno, NV 89512
RE: Grievance File lING 12-0204 I Richard G. Hill
i..
7Ol.)8US78
9<4\6 llouhk R RlvtI .. Src. H

Reno. NY 89~21Sm
fI-w 77\..'19.4100
(.. 77S.)~"'.O\l2
Dear Mr. Coughlin:

The Office of Dar Counsel has received the enclosed correspondence from Richard G.
Hill, Esq., which alleges professional misconduct on your pan. As such. a grievance file has
been opened.
Please respond in writing to this grievance within ten (10) days from the datc of this letter
and kindly direct your response to the State Bar's Reno office. Your response should addrcss
each allegation contained within Mr. Hill's grievance and, whenever possible, all applicabl~
documcntation in suppon of your response should be included.
If you intend to supplement your response. plea.~e indicate an expectcd date of receipt for
the some in your response. If you have any questions. please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,
Patrick O. King
Assistant Bar COllnsel
POKllp
Enclosurc
02983
1779
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: IS THIS THE GRIEVANCE IN NG12-0204 THAT KING CLAIMS

COUGHLIN FAILED TO RESPOND TO IN VIOLATION OF RPC 8.2? WHO KNOWS?
KING, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, DID NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE LETTING ANY SUCH
EMAILED, UNSIGNED "GRIEVANCE" FROM NNDB MEMBER HILL SEE THE LIGHT OF
,J/?"/I(Ip(/ r5 "y(;/ :::tl,/
DAY.
"C
NJ)I, /flU
,1,,/1 " r" h,I/ ,I/"I!""
illoPlI(',;jJ al ,'::fUll'
"
H/(II
( {\fl' J) IHAFR
"II lt.",, 1/. l"mlll,I/,," " ""
f 1 IH_II. ,",
J-I\ ,"JI J.J\Ii.\H
_' f'"rnl \rr../
N,-""
,m',
\,-\,,,1,/
1\1;11'1
"II" ru h"re/h.II"" om
/,,,,, (JIf;, t' H". -' ; II

\\I_IUI
H,',,.,_ \,'\,,,/,/
'illl) Ii {;111Hilf'R /,,,,,11,,,./,,,,,

'1,','//"1.:/0.., ,I'" ;',11,/1"/0'",, ",,,..
'>"FRRI f. If/IJ. L...,'/ {"/lI,1'1I
,lull ,I n, hd"III1fi.,,,
,,,m
A IHf\ I \IF/Sf\ {.I,'"/I",,"ur'

k,".'I",, ,III, h,mll!!I1"" ,om
,January 14, :!i)I:.!

\' I. \ E:\ tAl L ON l.Y pOI (rick"Co !l\ha Lor!;,
Palri(;k King, Esq .

. \ssbt llIt Bar COllIISl'!
Stat..: Bar of :\'1:'\,1(1<1

9<-\56 Dou hle R. Bhd.
Rello. :"Jl'v;lda H95:.! I
Rc:
Zal'h;lI'Y B. CouJ.;hlin. E (l.

Nevada Hal' No. ')47:1
\Ir. f.\ing:
You and I h;1\ t' p n." ' iously discllssed "Ir, Coughl ill,
Ir. Coughlin, due tu
h is mental in!'>lahilit , la<:k of integrity, :lIld cOlllpletc inColllpctCIH.:e, con!'>titutl's a danger

to the public if ll c i!'> allo \\'\:d 10 l'Ontinu t! 10 praL'lice law, This letter is written to
di..,<:h:lrgc m
and Illy a.., ()t'iatc's rcporlin,l!, obligation s under RPC R,3, l'lea!lc wl1 idl'r
t hl' follo\\ ing :
I, U iss(m(' L', (,('.-;sill, ('\' I 0-0 1 :!4 I, .\Ith ough not ;!lllong I r. Cough ! i n's
llIo!'>1 ..,ignificdnI t.-'Ih it.:.d \ 'iola l ions. i I pl'l' '>l'lI b a good III il.:roctl 1ll of his dercl id iOI1!l, I r.
C".':->!'>in \\'iI!'! a dit.'nt of our oH'i('e, Ill' ddrauded the plallllifr. as i!'> his /IIUe/IIS opel'ulJ(/i in
'
.
dl'aling with \\ omen, Approximatl'ly ont \ car .1 flel' judgllll'nt \\ as 1..'1l1crcu a ud the GI'>e
coni..'lutlt.' d, :,\11', Co u ghli n intcl'j t'l' lt.'d hilll'>df in the <:;!se 011 hl'half of Gl'ssin. trying In
<:ollcrt 011 a sanction award ;I)!,aill.'>t oppOSlllg coullsei. II lurns out Ihat ht.'C'IUSl' he had
,
'
filed hankrupll'Y, (;/,',>,>11l nn longl ]" o\\'ns this dallll. If -{)\I look o tt the fik', you \\ill St'. t.'
Ih,lt Coughlin ,tPPt'il]'t'd ,!nd Iltl'nlilt'd;t hlltIIT\: "pal'li;,1 \, it h drawal" dOl'IIIllt.'llt 011
.
Dt'l'l'mlwr H. :.!Oll.
Ll'tter to Patrit'k King, E. q.

...
. Ianuary q, :::!()1;!
Page :.!
Sub cqllcnt to that timf.' . Coughlin has heen ghost\\ riting documents that
purport to be frolll Gessin. individually. and e liling thclll for Gc'!'sin. lie is lIsing the
"Is/" for Gessin's ... ignatul'I.!. Thcse arc dearly lIot doculllcnts that arc
pn.:pared by
iglll;:d or
Ir. (;essin, and the fal'! that o lllchody (Coughlin) t! fil('s thl'm confirms he
is gho')t\\ riting \\it 1I0ut !he required discloslll'l. In addition. it appears that Coughlin
..
has fat :ilitatc d Ihc liling of \\ hat Illay hl' a fr:llldlllcnt hankruptcy Oil behalf of Gessin.
Coughlin\ lack of cOlllpelelU.:e is til'lIIollstrated ill till' Ces i!l else hy the fact that he
.
does not understand Ihe dfed on the 0\\ !ler hip of Gc!' in\ IXltelltial d ail1 l<; from
eLl'. . the claims now bL'long to the hankruptcy trustee,
Gcssin hav ing filed a hankruptcy,

not Gcssin.)
As with all uf the m;ltters refef('nccd helm". 1 strollbly SUAAcst that you
l'on!al'l the Second Judicial Oislrit;t Court and get e filiJlg access to the tases mentioned
so you tan look at the docllments yourself. (;1:1(\(' 'Iall. Esq. . is opposing counsel in that
ca (' and lIIay be of help to you.
:.!.
':U1I informed and Iwlicvc that ;\1r. Coughlin was re cently convicted of a
theft crime in 1{l.'IlO ).Iunieip;t i Court. I am further infurmed that Ihe malleI' arises Ollt of
shoplifting al Walmar!. ThaI case is presently Oil appeal to the district court in case
number CR11 :.!()64.
I r. Coughlin is n..:pre cnting himself.
3. ;\1r. Coughlin is prl....lntly fadng criminal ehaq.!,cs I't'garding the theft of

.
an iPod. Thill is pt..nding in Reno .Ju ticc Co urt as l'ase numher RCR:.!OIIo63341. I
h,I\e reviewed the file.
'
Ir. Coughlin got into ome sort ()f;lr lIment with his public
deft..'IHkr. :-\ a ['eslllt, he was rcfCITl.'d Oilt for a com pdlllt:)' eva IliaIiOIt.
.
I{'rliss, a ph ... il.'ian from Chi/o. C;llifornia.
Dr. :'\Icrliss O\\'JlS the propel'l) al I:.!I Ri\ 'er Rock SIred. Reno, ;.Je\ada. Beginning in
Ia n.:h :.!OIO, Ihl' property was leased to I['. Coughlin and his thcngirlfriend. The lcase
4 \\'t' I'l.'prl. '...ent Dr.
Iatlhc\\'
expired in Fehruar) mII. The girlfriend left the eommunity in appro\illl:tlt.:I)

:.
Iay:.w II.
Dr. ;\Ierlio;... cunl.lded us in appro:\illlatdy :\\lgu 1 2011 10 assi 1 in e \ it..: t ing Ir.
Coughlin. Coughli n had not paid rcnl or utilitics ...int..c ;\1:1)'. lie tOlltcnded that there
were habitability iS llt: s wilh the property that justified his with holding ren!. All of his
daims \\'l'I't.' t!etidt..d ad \l' 1''';l.'I) to Iii... po-;ition at the evil'tion hcari11).;. ,Jlistin' of the
Peace Pl'll'r Sfl'rM"I ortiel't.'d CO I I ).\ h I in l.'\ il'ted from Ihe pn'lH ise-; effecti\'c :-Jo\ 'cmbel' I.
:.!Oll. 011 thdt datl', the Wa!ihoc COllllt) Shcrifrs Department performed their llol'ln,iI
c\ictioll procedllrl': locks wcre chall ed and the e\ idion notice \\a... po:-.ted Oil thl! front
d oor. \\'t' \ idl. otapl'd the hOllle <lnd it..; l'Illltl.nts .It thilt Inlle. Upon IIIspeltion over the
'
lIe:\1 ft'\\' days, It IWc:lIHe apparent Ih<ll "solllebody" \\as hn'aking into the home Oil a
.
fl',t!,ul.lr h;l is.
On Sunday,
f)\l'ml1t'r IJ, :'!OII. Ik
krliss came to lo \\ n . and I met him
.11 the hUIIll.' tin Rl\er Rock Stred . .h \\l.' \\;llked through thl' homt:. it \1;Is OhVUlUS that
Ll'Itt.'r to Patrid" King, E::.q.

,January q, :..!Ol:..!
Pagc
SOIlH'Ollt' had bel'n in thl.'rc ::.illt'\! [ had last bccll in scvcral da s befort'. Dr.
lcrli'is
discO\l'[wl that thc baselllcnt door \\'a barrit"adt'u (nol lol'kcd) from the inside. The
RCIIO Polil'e Dcpartlllcnt was SUIIIlllo[H.:d. Thcy tried to l'O:!X whoc\cr \\a in the
'
ha::.t.'nH..'llt out, \\ithIHlt succesS. Aftcr Dr.
Ierliss had tl) kick the door down, it was
di l'O\'l'rcd that ;\11', Coughlin had hroken ill and was 1i\illg in the hasement. lie \\3S
arrc::.ted and is presently facing criminal trespass l'harge in Reno
ll1nicipal Com\. See
case no. [I CR 2(q()S :!I. lie is also fad II.):; a t"ontclIlpt lIlotioll ill frollt of,Judge Sfer:tna
ill the c\'ktion ca:-.c..Judge Sferal.la has sta)ed that mattcr pending the resolution of the
tTiminal trial. That lrial wa sc.:heduled for January 10. :!Ol:l, hut W:IS continued at the
re(llIc t of Ir. Cuughlill' ncw attorney.
s. The eviction order is now Oil ;tppeal to the Second ,Judicial District
Court. Sec c.:ase ('\'11(J: 6:!8. pending in I)clxlrtlllent 7. A, part \ If t he eviction pro('css,
;, licll \\a asscrkd again t the per onal property that Coughlin left bchind at the home.
011 :'\!ovclllber 16,
OI1. Coughlin filed a motion to contesl thc landlord's licll ill the Reno
,Ju"tit'c Court. The l;ourt tried to promptly set a hearing, hut Coughlin refused to
cooperate in :,ctting the matter, ilild the court took it uff calendar. Coughlin then rl'
illitiatl'd that prol'l!SS and a hearing was Ill 'lll in Ikn:JIlber. <1( which time tilt.! court heard
l'\ idclH'c of Coughl in 's lack of l'oopt.'ration in ::'t.,tling the :-.Jo \'elllher hearing. You ma
also \\ant lo t'Ont;u:t RCllo ./ustil'l' Court staff. alit! ill particular, c.:hidderk Karcn St;\Ilcil.
Ir. Coughlin's ahu i\l trealmcnt of hcr and her staff. Aftt.'r the hl 'aring, thc court
iS lIed all Order granting Coughlin a two-day time window to rCIllO\'C his personal
ahout
propcrty. The first day was ThurSliay, Dcccmber :!:!, 20 I I . Aftcr Coughlin was allowed
into the home that first day, hc sCllt Otlt an ('-mail to the dfect that becau c he had
appealed .Judge Sferal..L.a's order, he Has entitled to a stay of proc.:ccdings and wasgoing
to reSUJlle livingin the hllllle, :\s a result, he did very little to remuve any of his persoJlal
properly that day, 011 Friday. Dec.:c/Ilber ::!3, :.WII, after he learncd, again, that his stay
had heell denied. Coughlin a...scmbled a small c.:rcw and tllt.,\, were able to I'l'!lIO\'e a
'
LJb t;tntial.I111()llnt of hi pcrsonal propcrly. (YOII Ill'eu to understand that Ir.
Coughlin is a hoarder. \Ve have the photo!' anu \idl'oS if you wOlild like \0 sec thCIlI,)
'
Ilowe\l'r. :,\11'. Coughlill did lIot get all nf his propcrty out. For c:\amplc, I c.:ollllied [3l';!r
seats th;tt he had 'iomehow managed (0 get <10\\n into the hasemcilt.
11;[\ing failed to remo\'e all of his bdoll),\ings, i\lr. C(Hlghlin thell tllovt'd
hdort. ' .J IIdge Fla naga n for ;1 telll porary re tra iIIin!; order to prC\'l'JIt Ihe d i p(lo;a I of hi
"baIlllc)[It:.'J PI'OI)L' rt\ in accordillll'C \\ itII ,I udge SfCr:lU;l'S order. . \tt:lc.:llcd i :\ Ir.
Coughllll' s mot ion, Illy officl'" opposi (ion, and Ir. CoughIiII's rl'pl). The l' lIncu \llellts
demonstrate i\lr. Coughlin's i.:olllpll,tl' ,IIU!lIl1l'[' ilH.:ompetellce as:ln attorney.
OIl .J.ll1l1ar II, :!Ol:.!, Judge I'lanagan dt'nil 'd Ir. Coughlin's l'l'qUi..':-.1 for ,I
tl'llIpOr,tn rl' t['ailll\lg onll'l'. On,l.tllll,try I :! , :!Oll, the contrat"tor hirl'd to c.:!L'.IJl tht:.'
hOll l' l'OIllIlll'llcl'd \\()["k, :'\.11'. Coughlin !lagged the contral.'lor dowlI in traffic \\hen hl'
(tIll' cOJltractor) \\,\'> 011 hb \\;t) to tht.' dump \\ilh the abandoned propt.'rt) from the
hOIllt'. ( olighlill l':tl i ed tIlt.' polin.', who drri\l'd at tht:.' tran:-.fer statioll. Coughlin \\'a,
LilSt'l\ aS i..'rting th.1I till' contral'tor had tried to run him Inl'\'. lie also told the polict'
.
'
I.etter to Patrick King, Esq .

.January 14. 201:!
Page 4
that the conlrador had "tolen his possessions. Aftel' [ presented the court orders to the
police. the contra(tol' was :lIlo\\'e(\ to proceed. At their instrlldion, I h:l\ e now had a '['PO
i,,:-;uf..d :l)!,ainst Cou)!,hlin b) Rello Ju!:>ti...:e Court.
[Iowe\ l'r, bdore the lontra...:tor L'OlIld )!,et balk to the River Ro...:k house,
Coughlin was there. J Ie had his \ ideo camera and \\as walking, up and down the street
sl.:rcalllin)!, and ) elling at the polil:e, at the ('ontrador. and at mc. when I arrived. ).1r.
Coughlin ended up being :lrre:,ted and taken to jail. The police informed me that
hl.'L'ause of the number and types of contad thc)' h:1\ e had ",ith him, he is 110 longer
d igiblc for L'itaIions in t he ('veilI of infrad ions.

Enclo l'd ()II \\ill find a copy of a supplemental document filed by ).11'.
Coughlin 011 .Janll:ll 1:3. :.:012, and sent to my staff and I hy em:'!il frolll Coughlin Ihal
tIIorniug. Please note that the atturney designation Oil the first page indicates that it is
being t1led by Coughlin as 'lppellant. You will note that the captioll is from a differellt
casc, It is IIlldcilr ill which L'a:-,c ).11'. COll)!,hlin intended 10 file this document. although,
bel:<llIse of the else tllllnbl'r and the caption, it appcar to ha\'e ultimately heen routed 10
the Carpentier ...:use
(C\'u
OI709)
and not the eviction appeal case
(CVII o: 628).
I am
told that ('(lulls....1 in thc captioned casc llIay also be in the prOl:CSS of filing a har
complaint "WI in", Coughlin.
n. \\'hl'll the hOllse was sel:ured after Coughlin 's arrest. \\'C found a crack
pipe alill a hag of what apPl.'ared to he marijuana. The l:Olltral'lor also reported findill)!, a
hox of pills and a \ ial uf some sort. We understand Coughlin has un lIcccssflllly tried
till' I.;nn l. r::; Concerned for I.a\\ yel'''' progl'mn. und th:lt he has a hbtorv of suhstance
.
prohk'n;:-;,
), 11'. Coughlin has filed t\\O la\\'suits again!:>t his fOl'lller el11plo) er,
\\'a:-.hol' IA.'gal Ser\'ice . Ill' has ::illed all of the hoard of diret:lol's and t he management of
IIIt'l.'Olllpany. Both cases h:l\'e nuw heen disll1isst'd. Both cases demonstrate his lack of
l'ompt.'It.'IIL'C. I suggest
oIlC()tllacl.J()scph Garin. E,"'q., itl Las \'eg:ls, :IS he was cOlIll el
for thl' defendant:-; in thatC<lSt.'. You may want to cunlad Paul Elcano. Esq., Ihe direclor
of \Va" hOl' I.l'g'!I St.'I'\'iL"l' .
K. ).Ir. COIl hlin has a hahit of iniliating ca es and a:-;king to pmcceti ill
-'orllll/ })(I1II)('l'i:>. Ill.' has dOlll':-;O in cases against I11l. m)' office, m)' dien!, and WaslH>l'
I.lgal Sl'rvi...cs. You will find thCl1l if you run a search for Coughlin Z 011 the Second
.Juciil.'ial Dj.,trict Court \\('h:-.itc. The courts that howe rcvicwcd the documents ha\'e
gl'lIl'l'ally lh.'nied his n. qlll... IS. What is of note is th.lt his reprcselltatiolls in the
p plicat io tiS to pron'('d i/I );"'/I/a 1)(1II11C't'is a t'i i ll"':ollsi:-;tl'lI t \\ itIt and cunlra I'V to 11lL'
..
'
npl'l....clliation'i th:11 lit' lIa... made to .Judgl. FbnaJ!,an III the nHllt:\t of sl'l.'kin .1
tlmpoJ'ar.' rl...tr<linin onkr. Un 11lL' OIh,' hand. he tells lile (:Olll't he i ... hl'Oke and has lIll
propel'ty lIId on tIll' other hand, he IS tdlill)!, the ('ollrt that he has a gl'l':lt deal of
\ ,tllIOlhle propcrty :11 Ihe home that tleeds to hl.' protccll'd. This delllonstratcs a gro ...
tHk of cilndor \\ith till' lrihun:ds with \\ hidl he <.leak
a
l.ettl'r tt) Patl irk King. :I "-'q.

. January 14. :..!Ol:..!
Page .')
9. COll h1in has also tried to file a casc against me. my as ol'iate. my dient.
.lIld others, including the Reno .]u!'!licc Court. It is I1lso to he found Oil tht! \\'L'bsite.
.JudgL' Stclnheimcr has ruled that he did not comply with
10.
RCP 8.
Coughlin's hch:1\ior was unusual to !)tart, and has become more and
more hi 1.:1l"J"e during thL' lime we havL' hL'en dealing with him. lie scl'\cs p:'pcrs hc dOl'!'t
not filt'. ;lnd lites papers he ducs nol SCI"\"C. Ill' I.:onsistenlly SigiiS l'l.'rtifiealcs of service
that he has mailed tu u!). but we have
received all\lhing from him by mail. Ill.' has
posted videos of Ihe evil:! ion service attempts and parts of the trial on YouTuhe.
including some rel.:onlings he secrdly made ill court with his ccllphnne.
II.
Another example of his incompetence is that he does nol understand
whal orders arc. :l.Ild arc 1101. apPf'alahle. ! Ie does not understand I h:lt filing a notice of
appeal di\e!)ts the 10\\'e!" court of jurbdil:!iotl.
I am confident Ihat once you look into this matter, )OU \\ill ':lgn.:c that ,\11'.
Coughlin !)hould nOI he pral'licing Ia\\. Ill' is a danger to the comlllllllity.
Sillcel"ely.
lSI
Richard G. Iii!!
RGII:kn
Enclosures:
-Coughlin .\lIlcllllcd Emergency .\Iolion for Restraining Order
-:\lcrliss Oppositiull to .\Iolion forTRO
-Coughlin Reply ttl Opposition to .\lotioll fOl" TRO
Supplemental Reply tu Opposition dated l/q/12
To, IlllfddHJlHhc-819.-18cl9ld
...
Froa: ucbcuuqbl1n
Zach Coughlin. E.'q_

Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E_ 9th 81. 112
RENO, NV 89"2
101: ns 338 8118
ns 328 604S fax: 9496677402
ZachCoughlin@holJl'lail.com
...
,,,~-,-.-,,-.--,,,,,,.,
]-01-1/
6dlJII
..............-- -..
p_ I
of!
RECEIVED
MAR 13l!h?
STATE BAR Of NEVADA
RENO OffiCE
Sl8le Bor of Nevada

P.O_ Box SO
Las Veg"", NV 891 H-OOSO
600 E_ Chorloslon BI.d_
La. Vegas, NV 89104
sent by fax and emoil only 10:
Reno Offic.: ns 329 OS22
Las Vog"" OIIico: 702 38S 2878
DavidC(il)nvbar.org, PatrickK@nvbor_ors. GlcnnM@nvbar.org
Morch 9,2012,
Dear Bar Counsel Clark, Assistanl Bar Counsel King and Assistanl Bar Counsel Machado,
I only just now r""oivod the leller, dated Fe1muuy 14th, 2012 thol Assistnnl Bar Counsel King
.enl me, wherein the grievance filed by Richard G_ Hill. Esq. i. set forth. Mr_ KinS wrote, "ple..e
retpond in wriling 10 this grievance within len (10) days from the dale of this leller_"
I am requosling IUl extension of limo \0 respond 10 this mallor_ Ililomlly just received this
mailinG from you within the Insl hour, IUld was ""aware ofthi. prior 10 thal Further, I hope I can
demonslmle 10 you and the Sl8le Bar of Nevada that circumstances alleasl somewhat beyond my
control have prevenled me from receiving my mail in 1111 orderly and consistenl fashion_ The
circumstlll1cos rcsuUod in two different Dom""tic Violence Proteclion Orders being granled 10 me
againsl my fo"""r housemales by Master Edmondson of Ibe Second Judicial District Court in I'V 1200188 and FV 12-00187_ Further, the electricity 10 my location was inlerrupted from one week (though
I alIempled 10 get NV Energy \0 accept payment from me for service.,) from February 3rd 10 February
20th, 2012, incident 10 one oftha individuals against whom 0 protection order w.. issued alIempting \0
prevent me from obtaining electrical servicc. Additionally, the same individuals against whom these
protection ordcrs were issued interfered with my access \0 my mail from Ihe USPS, and il h.. takcn
some lime 10 get the USPS Postalln.peclolll 10 rele ..e my mail 10 me and or allow me 10 receive mail
01 my localion.
Please nole thai I did recently send Oar Counsel David Clark and Assistant Dar Cuunsol GI.nn
Machado. wrillen reque.t tho! tho Siale Bor of Nevada pi case help me in remaining .wore of any
112
02981
1780
To, 1111fddl'!llI-lS,,m.'18cI91d
Fra: ucbcDUQbllD
......
correspondence being sent me from the Slate Bar while I work to get my mailbox situation settled
(please s.. below):
On February 22m!, 2012 1 wrote to Bar Counsel Clorl< III1d A.. is\Ql1t Bar Counsel M""hodo that
"I had to move recently and moved in with two individuals who 1 ultimately wound up gening
Protection OnICrll against. and they have interfered with my ability to receive my mail with absolute
cortuinly (I have receivw much of my mail. and have pending oorrespondenceslrequests with the
PosllnlUter for Reno. NV to obtain a permanent and newly rckeyed lock WId koy to ace."" my
mailbox .. .! have been informed by USPS Reno Postmaster agent nomed Mr. lIeistcrthol if 1fax him
proof or my location at 1422 E. 9th SI. /fl. he will then oIlow me to get a mailbox key made ...! faxed
him proof and will call him again tomorrow to see how much longer I must wait.. .. if its much longer I
will make oIternale nrrWlgments, however. 1am an electronic filer in both courts thol 1 am appearing in
(NVB and WCDC) ... ). I om wddgR to ftlk that any wnnpogdenn/gotkeo ok. thot you orth.
Stote Bar or Nemda may haye ror me or mAy have moPed to me be. Ir possible. gpln! to me yla
my fBI uprober QremolladdR,VL"
I reel strongly thai Mr. Hill'. allegation. are ones I will wish 10 contest vigorously. and 1 hope I
am a!forded an opportunity to do so. There i. a lot more to this situa1ion than Mr. lIill indicoles.
Sincerely.
y-~
Zach Coughlin
02982
1781
NOTE BY COUGHLIN
NOTE: DUE TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OBSTRUCTION OF THE RECEIPT OF HIS MAIL
BY HIS FORMER HOUSEMATERS, AND THE COMPLICITY THEREIN BY THE GOLDEN
VALLEY
USPS STATION
AND THE INTERFERENCE BY WNM'S SUE KING AND GAYLE KERN, ESQ.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
USPS Postal Inspector
Reno, NV
faxed to: (602) 258-4995
Pete Zegarac
Pete Zegarac
(Primary)
Inspector in Charge
Phone Numbers
Toll Free Toll Free
(Primary)
(877) 876-2455
March 13, 2012,

Dear Inspector Zegarac,
I am writing to request a key for the metal mailbox for the location I am at, 1422 E. 9th St.,
Reno 89512. I believe I requested such a key within the "30 days" that a supervisor at the Golden
Valley postal station indicated I must do so within to avoid a $40 key making charge. I was told that I
was being retaliated against for questioning the decisions of your big powerful federal agency and that
that agency did not have to conern itself with my insignificant little state law based concerns, especially
if I got and "attitude" with the supervisor, both Buck Hyde and Mrs. Passot. I mean no disrespect to
anyone with your organization. Rather, getting my mail is an extremely exigent concern to me,
particularly where the failure to receive it has a prejudicial impact on my client's cases. I do not
believe I should be forced to pay this $40 key making charge, nor should I be retaliated against by Mr.
Hyde or Ms. Passot.
Some of my mail was taken and held at the downtown post office next to the Siena Hotel and
Casino. However, other items of my mail were held at the Golden Valley post office, despite Mr. Hyde
originally telling me there was nothign there for me. Further, several items of Christopher Erin
Allabacks mail was given to me by the counter clerk, however, I hand them back to her. I have a
protection order against this gentleman in FV12-0188 in the Second Judicial District Court. Mr. Hyde
told me that the protection order I was granted by Master Edmondson really didn't mean much of
anything to him and had no signficance to this situation. I disagree. Further Mr. Hyde alternately
1/2
indicated that my mail would be returned to sender and or various other things would be done with it.
Until I can get some indication from you or another inspector as to whether I will be allowed to have a
key made, one, and two, whether I will be forced to pay the $40 key making fee even where I
sumbitted a timely request for such a key in a manner that typically is not met with any such charge, I
have filed a new change of address for my mail to go to a PO Box, but th USPS Online Change of
Address system indicated to me that it would take one week for that to take effect. In the meantime,
will you make it so that my mail is not returned to sender, but held for me to pick up at the the station
(with some indication of which one that would be, hopefully)?
PLEASE NOTE: My address prior to the one at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, Reno 89512 was at a weekly hotel
that I stayed at for nearly two months, the Silver Dollar Motor Lodge at 817 N. Virginia St. Reno, NV
89503 (though I have seen the zip listed at 89501 in some places). I was in unit #2, I believe, however,
the mail was always just all delivered to the main office and the managers would alert the residents of
any mail they received. I made numerous attempts to file a change of address from that location,
however, there was a problem in light of the fact that that address is listed for the business Silver Dollar
Motor Lodge (or, perhaps, NANA Motel, etc). Please help me arrange to overcome that obstacles so
that mail bearing my name (Zach Coughlin, Zachary B. Coughlin, etc.) or the name of my solo law
office Zach Coughlin, Esq. or the name of my business Zach Coughlin's Memory Foam or Coughlin
Memory Foam, can be forward on to me. I would prefer to ultimately get a key to the mailbox for
1422 E. 9th St. #2. If I have to pay for it, I will, however, I believe I met the deadline for which to
request a key sufficient to avoid paying the $40.00 fee. However, until that situation can be sorted out,
I have changed my address with the State Bar of Nevada and submitted an online Change of Address
with the USPS, such that they address will be PO BOX 60952, Reno, NV 89506. Due to a problem
with trying to change my address as listed with my bank (and therefore, the debit/credit card for which
I made payment online of the $1.00 fee for the USPS Change of Address...) the USPS site indicated to
me that a 7 day period must pass because the address listed for my debit card was different than the one
I was changing from. My address listed with Bank of America in my online banking is the older 817
N. Virginia St. Reno 89503 address (again, the correct zip may be 89501....), rather than the more
recent 1422 E. 9th St. #2 (where I am still located at, but for which supervisor Buck Hyde at the
Golden Valley post office in Reno has made contradictory indications as to whether he or Ms. Passot
will allow me to get a key, whether I pay for it or not, sufficient to necessitate that I just have my mail
sent to the PO Box 60952 in the meantime, as the State Bar of Nevada will require of me to be able to
receive my mail in a consisteny manner that does not prejudice my client's interests.
I appreciate any help you can provide.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
2/2
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=9f5...
From: U.S. Postal Service (AddressChange@usps.gov)

Sent: Sat 12/31/11 1:34 AM
To:
To ensure you receive your USPS mail forwarding
notification emails, please add
AddressChange@USPS.gov to your address book
now. If you're having trouble viewing this email,
you can view it in your browser
Dear Zach Coughlin Esq,
December 31, 2011

Confirmation Code:
1136-5900-0039-0580
Please look for your Official Change of

Address Confirmation to arrive by mail at
your new address within 710 business days of
your move date and retain it for your records.
Please make sure to notify other important
parties of your change of address. Mail
forwarding only covers certain classes of mail for
a period of up to 12 months. Government
agencies and mailers are not automatically
notified of your new address, so it is important
that you inform parties directly.
View, update or cancel

your order
This is your official

receipt for the $1
identity verification
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6060 PRIMACY PKWY STE 101

MEMPHIS TN 381880001
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CHANGE OF ADDRESS REQUEST -- REMINDER
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Dear Zachary,
March 13, 2012

Confirmation Code:
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20 of 24
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22 of 24
3/13/2012 11:11 AM
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
USPS Postal Inspector
Reno, NV
faxed to: (775) 788-0692
March 13, 2012,
Dear Inspector Heister or Hawthine (sorry for any mispelling),
I am writing to request a key for the metal mailbox for the location I am at, 1422 E. 9th St.,
Reno 89512. I believe I requested such a key within the "30 days" that a supervisor at the Golden
Valley postal station indicated I must do so within to avoid a $40 key making charge. I was told that I
was being retaliated against for questioning the decisions of your big powerful federal agency and that
that agency did not have to conern itself with my insignificant little state law based concerns, especially
if I got and "attitude" with the supervisor, both Buck Hyde and Mrs. Passot. I mean no disrespect to
anyone with your organization. Rather, getting my mail is an extremely exigent concern to me,
particularly where the failure to receive it has a prejudicial impact on my client's cases. I do not
believe I should be forced to pay this $40 key making charge, nor should I be retaliated against by Mr.
Hyde or Ms. Passot.
Some of my mail was taken and held at the downtown post office next to the Siena Hotel and
Casino. However, other items of my mail were held at the Golden Valley post office, despite Mr. Hyde
originally telling me there was nothign there for me. Further, several items of Christopher Erin
Allabacks mail was given to me by the counter clerk, however, I hand them back to her. I have a
protection order against this gentleman in FV12-0188 in the Second Judicial District Court. Mr. Hyde
told me that the protection order I was granted by Master Edmondson really didn't mean much of
anything to him and had no signficance to this situation. I disagree. Further Mr. Hyde alternately
indicated that my mail would be returned to sender and or various other things would be done with it.
Until I can get some indication from you or another inspector as to whether I will be allowed to have a
key made, one, and two, whether I will be forced to pay the $40 key making fee even where I
sumbitted a timely request for such a key in a manner that typically is not met with any such charge, I
have filed a new change of address for my mail to go to a PO Box, but th USPS Online Change of
Address system indicated to me that it would take one week for that to take effect. In the meantime,
will you make it so that my mail is not returned to sender, but held for me to pick up at the the station
(with some indication of which one that would be, hopefully)?
PLEASE NOTE: My address prior to the one at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, Reno 89512 was at a weekly hotel
that I stayed at for nearly two months, the Silver Dollar Motor Lodge at 817 N. Virginia St. Reno, NV
89503 (though I have seen the zip listed at 89501 in some places). I was in unit #2, I believe, however,
the mail was always just all delivered to the main office and the managers would alert the residents of
1/2
any mail they received. I made numerous attempts to file a change of address from that location,
however, there was a problem in light of the fact that that address is listed for the business Silver Dollar
Motor Lodge (or, perhaps, NANA Motel, etc). Please help me arrange to overcome that obstacles so
that mail bearing my name (Zach Coughlin, Zachary B. Coughlin, etc.) or the name of my solo law
office Zach Coughlin, Esq. or the name of my business Zach Coughlin's Memory Foam or Coughlin
Memory Foam, can be forward on to me. I would prefer to ultimately get a key to the mailbox for
1422 E. 9th St. #2. If I have to pay for it, I will, however, I believe I met the deadline for which to
request a key sufficient to avoid paying the $40.00 fee. However, until that situation can be sorted out,
I have changed my address with the State Bar of Nevada and submitted an online Change of Address
with the USPS, such that they address will be PO BOX 60952, Reno, NV 89506. Due to a problem
with trying to change my address as listed with my bank (and therefore, the debit/credit card for which
I made payment online of the $1.00 fee for the USPS Change of Address...) the USPS site indicated to
me that a 7 day period must pass because the address listed for my debit card was different than the one
I was changing from. My address listed with Bank of America in my online banking is the older 817
N. Virginia St. Reno 89503 address (again, the correct zip may be 89501....), rather than the more
recent 1422 E. 9th St. #2 (where I am still located at, but for which supervisor Buck Hyde at the
Golden Valley post office in Reno has made contradictory indications as to whether he or Ms. Passot
will allow me to get a key, whether I pay for it or not, sufficient to necessitate that I just have my mail
sent to the PO Box 60952 in the meantime, as the State Bar of Nevada will require of me to be able to
receive my mail in a consisteny manner that does not prejudice my client's interests.
I appreciate any help you can provide.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
2/2
FILED
Electronically
01-31-2012:11:32:10 AM
Clerk of the Court
CASE NO. FV12-00187

Date, Judge, Officers
of Court Present
January 23, 2012
The HONORABLE
S. EDMONDSON
COURT MASTER
Dept. No. DM1
J. MCKAY,
Clerk
Reporter-JAVS
G. MAIR,
Bailiff
Completed By:
J. MCKAY 01-31-12
ZACHARY COUGHLIN VS. CHRISTOPHER ALLABACK
APPEARANCES/HEARING
HEARING- TO ISSUE
Applicant was present pro per. Adverse Party was present pro per and in
custody. Both parties were sworn to testify. Upon inquiry by the Court, Adverse
Party testified he was not in custody for anything related to Applicant. Adverse
Party was cautioned about making any statements possibly incriminating himself in
any pending criminal matter. The Court explained the nature of proceedings. Upon
inquiry by the Court, Applicant reaffirmed his application and testified in support of
an extension. Applicant confirmed Adverse Party is physically aggressive towards
him and is afraid he might be injured by him. Upon inquiry by the Court, Adverse
Party testified he opposed the order. Adverse Party testified Applicant tries to push
his buttons and further denied the specific allegations read by the Court. Adverse
Party admitted to throwing hot coffee and water from his dogs bowls on Applicant.
Upon inquiry by the Court, Adverse Party waived any objection to the 45 day rule.
Upon testimony, the Court granted an extension for 4 months, reviewed the terms
with the parties, and entered the following:
COURT ORDERED:
YOU ARE PROHIBITED, either directly or through an agent, from threatening, physically
injuring or harassing the Applicant and/or the minor child(ren).YOU ARE FURTHER
PROHIBITED from selling, damaging, destroying, giving away, or otherwise disposing of,
or tampering with, any property owned by the Applicant, or in which Applicant has an
interest; YOU ARE PROHIBITED from any contact whatsoever with the Applicant,
including but not limited to, in person, by telephone, through the mail, through electronic
mail (e-mail), facsimile or through another person; 1. YOU ARE EXCLUDED AND
ORDERED to stay at least 100 yards away from Applicants residence located in
WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA,
CONFIDENTIAL, at
1422 E.9TH STREET
RENO or any other place that Applicant may reside. YOU shall not interfere with
Applicants possession and use of residence, including utilities, phones, leases and other
related residential services; 10. YOU ARE PROHIBITED, either directly or through an
agent, from physically injuring or threatening to injure any animal that is owned or kept by
the Applicant, the minor child(ren), or YOU. (b) 1 YOU ARE PROHIBITED, either directly
or through an agent, from taking possession of any animal owned or kept by the Applicant or
the minor child(ren). The following provisions and exceptions are made a part of this Order:
A. Adverse Party waived any objection to the 45 day rule. THIS ORDER WILL REMAIN
IN EFFECT UNTIL 11:59 P.M. ON THE DATE SET FORTH ON PAGE 1, UNLESS
THIS COURT ORDERS OTHERWISE.
FILED
Electronically
01-18-2012:08:00:36 AM
Clerk of the Court
fv12-00187
DM
Note by Coughlin: this application has been truncated, nothing of any import has been left out,
though.
RE: Contact
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 1:39 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; clarkd@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org
1 attachment
THE 2 11 12 email to WCSO RPD Reno City Attorney Hill NPUC
Hill et al b.pdf (137.8 KB)
Mr. King,
I have not sent you my Reply to the Grievance. You gave me until
today, and I am finishing it up. Additionally, I was subject to what
I believe is a wrongful eviction yesterday, and would like
additionaly time to respond to Richard HIll's grievance, which he
appears to be filing on behalf of various third parties, and his
associate, who doesn't bother to sign it. Basically, Mr. HIll
constantly seeks to leverage courts, police, and now, Bar Counsel,
to further his nefarious approach to litigation, rather than roll up his
sleeves and find some law in favor of his positions and apply actual
facts to them, rather than make up things or quote to third parties
and other hearsay (I never made contact with or touched Mr. Hill, I
never climbed on anyone's truck, Mr. Hill is not a licensed mental
health professional, yet he sounds like a walking DSM-IV when he
writes of me). I will submit something to you today in response to
Hill's grievance, with the caveat that I am requesting more time, in
part due to the fact that the Washoe County Sheriff's Deputies
have just yesterday, minutes before my hearing in Judge Beesley's
courtroom, unlawfully stormed into my location at 1422 E. 9th St,
#2, with guns drawn and pointed at me, without previously
identifying themselves as law enforcement in any way, and
demanding I grab a few things in a couple minutes and leave. This

unlawful eviction was pursuant to an eviction hearing held that
morning by Reno Justice Court Judge Jack Shroeder, the
same Judge who screamed at me "do you want to go to jail" when I
attempted to address in any way whatsoever Richard Hill's abuse of
process in getting a Order of Protection from Judge Schroeder in a
scant 40 minutes, and having me arrested on 1/12/12 (two days
before Hill's grievance was sent to you), at the extension hearing on
January 31, 2012, where Hill admitted he didn't have a good reason
for seeking an extension and withdrew his application. I wanted to
address Hill's abuse of process for the record, Judge Schroeder
decided to scream at me instead. It was reminscent of Judge Nash
Holmes telling me, on the record, in Reno Municipal Court case
11 TR 26800 that she would have me arrested and placed in jail if I
said Richard G. Hill's name one more time. I cross examined RPD
Sargent Tarter about whether he had a retaliatory motive in
ticketing me outside Hill's office on 11/15/11 after Hill refused to
give me my driver's license, and I reported to Sargent Tarter that
RPD Officer Chris Carter had admitted to taking bribes from
Richard Hill.
Actually, there is some footage of the "terror" Richard G. Hill was
exposed to that necessitated him seeking a Protection Order (the
"RPD made him" do it, honest): http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=gBu9zflGALE
I don't know why Sargent Sifre (whom makes more money than a
District Court Judge) should be so upset with lawyers like me, who
work in the foresclosure defense field (you might see if Geof Giles,
Esq. thinks I am quite the "Yosemite Sam" caricature of a cartoon
villian that Richard G. Hill paints me to be, or if Thomas J. Hall
thinks that much of Rich and his "tactics", which are like those of a
malignant frat boys armed with daddy's pleadings). After all,

Sargent Sifre has benefitted from foresclosure defense work:
http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2011/01/29/nevada-dist-courtquiet-title-viable-sifre-v-wells-fargo-bank/
Regardless, I have not "ghostwritten" any pleadings for Mr. Gessin
or anybody else. I am listed as attorney of record on adversary
proceedings for Gessin, though the only things I ever filed for him
clearly indicated that I was not appearing as attorney of record and
that the Answers to the Complaints in those two adversary
proceedings were being submitted on an "unbundled services"
arrangement. The bankruptcy court nonetheless listed me as
attorney of record and I have been and am in the process of having
that changed. I have communicated with clerk Holly Estes and
filing office supervisore Debbie Gallagher in those regards.
I need more time to research and investigate the other allegations
Hill makes, though I do not wish you to infer and admission on my
part to any allegation by Hill.
I have researched this service of eviction Order issues extensively,

it relates to the Hill matter, and I believe the WCSO and Hill are
not following the law.
I am not sure why you wrote what you did at 9:09 am this morning
considering you granted me until 3:00pm today to file my response,
which I intend to along with a request for more time to supplement
it:
From:Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Mon 3/12/12 9:15 AM
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org); Glenn Machado

(GlennM@nvbar.org)
March 12, 2012
To: Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I am in receipt of your e-mail below, requesting additional time to respond. Please be advised that your
response to the grievance, including the e-mail letter below, become part of the record and may
eventually be reviewed by a disciplinary panel. With that said, it is important that we receive your
response. Pursuant to your request, you are granted until Friday, March 16, 2012 by 3:00pm to deliver
your written response to the State Bar Office in Reno.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel

Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 5:45 PM
To: Patrick King; Glenn Machado; David Clark
Subject: response to grievance from NV Attorney
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
775 328 6045 fax: 949 667 7402
State Bar of Nevada

P.O. Box 50
Las Vegas, NV 89125-0050
600 E. Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas, NV 89104
sent by fax and email only to:

Reno Office: 775 329 0522
Las Vegas Office: 702 385 2878
DavidC@nvbar.com, PatrickK@nvbar.com, GlennM@nvbar.com
March 9, 2012,
Dear Bar Counsel Clark, Assistant Bar Counsel King and Assistant Bar Counsel Machado ,
I only just now received the letter, dated February 14th, 2012 that Assistant Bar Counsel King sent me,
wherein the grievance filed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. is set forth. Mr. King wrote, "please respond in
writing to this grievance within ten (10) days from the date of this letter."
I am requesting an extension of time to respond to this matter. I literally just received this mailing from
you within the last hour, and was unaware of this prior to that. Further, I hope I can demonstrate to you
and the State Bar of Nevada that circumstances at least somewhat beyond my control have prevented me
from receiving my mail in an orderly and consistent fashion. These circumstances resulted in two
different Domestic Violence Protection Orders being granted to me against my former housemates by
Master Edmondson of the Second Judicial District Court in FV12-00188 and FV12-00187. Further, the
electricity to my location was interrupted from one week (though I attempted to get NV Energy to accept
payment from me for services) from February 3rd to February 20th, 2012, incident to one of the
individuals against whom a protection order was issued attempting to prevent me from obtaining
electrical service. Additionally, the same individuals against whom these protection orders were issued
interfered with my access to my mail from the USPS, and it has taken some time to get the USPS Postal
Inspectors to release my mail to me and or allow me to receive mail at my location.
Please note that I did recently send Bar Counsel David Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel Glenn Machado a
written request that the State Bar of Nevada please help me in remaining aware of any correspondence
being sent me from the State Bar while I work to get my mailbox situation settled (please see below):
On February 22nd, 2012 I wrote to Bar Counsel Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel Machado that "I had to
move recently and moved in with two individuals who I ultimately wound up getting Protection Orders
against, and they have interfered with my ability to receive my mail with absolute certainty (I have
received much of my mail, and have pending correspondences/requests with the Postmaster for Reno,
NV to obtain a permanent and newly rekeyed lock and key to access my mailbox...I have been informed
by USPS Reno Postmaster agent named Mr. Heister that if I fax him proof of my location at 1422 E. 9th St.
#2, he will then allow me to get a mailbox key made...I faxed him proof and will call him again tomorrow
to see how much longer I must wait....if its much longer I will make alternate arrangments, however, I am
an electronic filer in both courts that I am appearing in (NVB and WCDC)...). I am writing to ask that any
correspondences/notices etc. that you or the State Bar of Nevada may have for me or may have mailed to
me be, if possible, copied to me via my fax number or email address."
I feel strongly that Mr. Hill's allegations are ones I will wish to contest vigorously, and I hope I am
afforded an opportunity to do so. There is a lot more to this situation than Mr. Hill indicates.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin"
To: lstuchell@washoecounty.us; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov;
cdbaker@richardhillaw.com; jboles@callatg.com; bbuckley@lacsn.org; daolshan@yahoo.com;
jsoderlund@nlslaw.net; jdelikanakis@swlaw.com; jgoodnight@washoecounty.us;
jbosler@washoecounty.us; bdogan@washoecounty.us; mechols@maclaw.com; mclarkson@puc.nv.gov
Subject: Evictions RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 12:14:01 -0800
Subject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served"

Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
Mr. Coughlin
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was
personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the
Order to the residence. The residence was unoccupied at the time.
WCSO Civil Section

To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva,
Roxanna; kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com;
jamesandreboles@msn.com
Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of
11/1/2011
I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am
respectfully requesting that you confirm with Deputy Machem that
he did, in fact, "personally serve" the Summary Eviction Order on
me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on November 1, 2011 at
4:30 pm, in connection with performing the lockout. It is my
position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure
out whether Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase
"personally served" means something other than what I believe it
means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an
Affidavit of Service filed by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with
respect to the service of a Order Granting Summary Eviction
against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent was not
alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent
escrow deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6),
especially where a stay of eviction was not granted even while the
RJC held on to most all my money...).

My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service
indicates that he "personally served" me, which kind of reminds me
of all that robo-signing and MERS fraud I come across in my day
job (and do you wonder how many attorneys in the foreclosure
defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?),
which includes being a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it?
Did Machem "personally serve" me the Summary Eviction Order?
Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in
compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the
"usual custom and practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the
"usual custom and practice of the WCSO? I hear a lot about this
"within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some black letter law
to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe
Legal Services, the people you guys had such trouble actually
serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may have actually helped
improved legal services in this community, if they were not
dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even where
the IFP required the WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway,
back to the "within 24 hours" phraseology: "
This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an
order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the
tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order... is inapplicable
to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary Eviction was
signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found in
situations inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2),
and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only sections of NRS 40 where this
within 24 hours language occurs, and those situations only apply
where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2

must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines
that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue
a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing
for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after
receipt of the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The
landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of
complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which
the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are
located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located,
whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. The court may
thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being
carried out in Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience
and violates Nevada law. There is not basis for effectuating a
lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this case. The
above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt
language are inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the
present circumstances, where the Tenant did file an Affidavit and
did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To require
Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of
receipt of the order (what does that even mean? The use of terms
like rendition, rendered, notice of entry, pronounced, is
absent here, and this receipt of the order language is something
rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV statutory
citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a
Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a

situation which follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing
receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not shown, by
applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the days
for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.).
In Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114
(1st Cir. 2009), the record did not reflect when the plaintiff
received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November
24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced
on November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after
excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under
either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative
remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter.
See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80
L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting plaintiff an additional three days for
mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... ...
Dear Washoe County Sheriff's Office,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_of_process
"Substituted service
When an individual party to be served is unavailable for personal
service, many jurisdictions allow for substituted service.
Substituted service allows the process server to leave service
documents with another responsible individual, called a person of
suitable age and discretion, such as a cohabiting adult or a

teenager. Under the Federal Rules, substituted service may only be
made at the abode or dwelling of the defendant.[4] California, New
York,[5] Illinois, and many other United States jurisdictions require
that in addition to substituted service, the documents be mailed to
the recipient.[5] Substituted service often requires a serving party
show that ordinary service is impracticable, that due diligence has
been made to attempt to make personal service by delivery, and
that substituted service will reach the party and effect notice.[5]"
I am pretty sure "personally served" means you served the person
in person, not that a person named Machem went and posted a
notice on a door, personally himself. See, I think you guys are
thinking of the "person" in the word personally as applying to the
server, when in all instances I have ever seen it used in the law, the
"person" part of "personally" applies to the person being served.
Help me out here, Mary.
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!1897&parid=root
Also, does the WCSO have a position on what type of service is

required of eviction orders prior to the WCSO or whoever does it,
being able to conduct a lockout?
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/nrcp.html
NRCP RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER... (c)
Default Judgments: Defendant Not Personally Served. When a
default judgment shall have been taken against any party who was
not personally served with summons and complaint, either in the
State of Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, and who has not
entered a general appearance in the action, the court, after notice
to the adverse party, upon motion made within 6 months after the
date of service of written notice of entry of such judgment, may
vacate such judgment and allow the party or the partys legal
representatives to answer to the merits of the original action.
When, however, a party has been personally served with summons
and complaint, either in the State of Nevada or in any other
jurisdiction, the party must make application to be relieved from a
default, a judgment, an order, or other proceeding taken against the
party, or for permission to file an answer, in accordance with the
provisions of subdivision (b) of this rule.
Okay, so, really, you guys do this for a living, right...you serve
people things....and sign Affidavits under penalty of perjury and
stuff, and you are telling me you believe "personally served" can
included situations where the person was not there? Okay.....You
do know that, like, a Summons and Complaint need to be
"personally served" in the sense that, say Machem, would need to
see that person and serve it on them (I don't think they have to take
the paper, they don't need to agree to accept service, but Machem
does need to see that person, in person, personally when he is
swearing under penalty of perjury that he "personally served"
somebody. Usually "personally served" is only done in the case of
the first thing filed (unless there is an IFP) in a case, the Summons
and Complaint. Thereafter, typically, people just effect "substituted
service" because its cheaper, less of a hassle, and "personal
service" is only required for serving the pleadings that start a case,
the Summons and Complaint. Wow....Okay, so this is my whole

point, these state sponsored lockouts under color of state law
should not be being done so fast, unless you guys "personally
serve" the tenant, I feel the law is quite clear, you have to effect
"substituted service" which, under NRCP 6(a) and NRCP 6(e) and
NRCP 5(b)(2) (and NRCP, not JCRCP is applicable to eviction
matters according to NRS 118A) the tenant cannot be deemed to
have received or constructively received the Order until the 3 days
for mailing has passed.
Personal service by process server

Personal service is service of process directly to the (or a) party
named on the summons, complaint or petition. In most lawsuits in
the United States, personal service is required to prove service.
Most states allow substituted service in almost all lawsuits unless
you are serving a corporation, LLC, LLP, or other business entity;
in those cases, personal service must be achieved by serving (in
hand) the documents to the "Registered Agent" of a business
entity. Some states (Florida) do not require that the documents
actually be handed to the individual. In California and most other
states, the documents must be visible to the person being served,
i.e., not in a sealed envelope. If the individual refuses to accept
service, flees, closes the door, etc., and the individual has been
positively identified as the person to be served, documents may be
"drop" served, and it is considered a valid service. Personal service
of process has been the hallmark for initialing litigation for nearly
100 years, primarily because it guarantees actual notice to a
defendant of a legal action against him or her. Personal service of
process remains the most reliable and efficacious way to both

ensure compliance with constitutionally imposed due process
requirements of notice to a defendant and the opportunity to be
heard. [2]^ The National Law Review: The Continuing Relevance
of Personal Service of Process
And even if something indicates Coughlin "knew" about the Order,

much like in the case of Coughlin's that was dismissed where the
Washoe County Sheriff's didn't manage to get the "personal
service" of the Summons and Complaint done in time, or
"sufficiently", opposing counsel in that matter could tell you that
"actual notice" is not a substitute for compliance with the service
requirements.
Which is nice because folks like Richard G. Hill, Esq. have less of
an opportunity to game the system and swoop in with lockout then
assert a bunch of hooey about NRS 118A.460 "reasonable storage,
moving, and inventorying expenses" subjecting the tenant's
personal property to a lien. Richard G. Hill insisted on throwing
away the last thing my beloved grandmother gave me before she
died 2 years ago in the town dump. He and his contractor lied
about so many things, including the fact that they used my own
damn plywood to board up the back porch of the property, then
submitted a bill to the court in an exhibit for $1,060 for "securing"
the property (which doesn't really apply to NRS 118A.460's
"reasonable storage moving and inventorying expenses" like it is
required to...further, the charged me $900 a month for storage and
sent me a bill for such prior to my arrest for trespassing at the 121
River Rock location,...well if they charged me $900 to have a home

law office there, then how is it someone could be trespassing if
they are being charged the full rental value for "use and occupancy
of the premises"? Further, even if it was a storage situations, there
are sections of NRS 118A devoted to evicting someone from a
storage facility, not arresting them for trespass, and certainly not a
custodial arrest where the RPD Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez
admit they never issued a warning to me or asked me to leave prior
to conducting a custodial arrest (which required $800 of bail,
great!, and 3 days in jail, no less). This is especially poor form
where Officer Carter admitted to me that he takes bribes from
Richard Hill. Hey, if Officer Carter did not say that to me, go ahead
and sue me, my man....I'm waiting.....that's what I thought.
He can say he was joking all he wants, but it ain't no joking ass
situation to me when you are arresting me and causing a google
search result for my name to show an arrest....that's damaging the
only thing I have of monetary value (my professional reputation
and name). It ain't no stand up hour when you are putting me in
cuffs, bro. And Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to
properly query Hill as to whether he had sent me, prior to the
trespassing arrest, a bill for the "full rental value" of the property, a
value that, at $900, was the same charge for the full "use and
occupancy" of the premises. And Richard G. HIll, Esq. was too
busy chortling and filling out the Criminal Complaint to bother
setting them straight, despite my cues, I guess.
Now, add to that malfeasance the fact that Judge Sferrazza let
Casey Baker, Esq. prepare the Order, which means faithfully put to
writing what the Judge announced, not attempt to steal $2,275 for
your Californian Beverly Hills High School graduate neurosurgeon
client by slipping in something the judge never said, ie, that the
neurosurgeon gets to keep the $2,275 that Judge Sferrazza order
the tenant to pay into the Reno Justice Court as a "rent escrow"
deposit required to preserve the right to litigate habitability issues.
Now, nevermind the fact that Judge Sferrazza actually did not have
the jurisdiction to require that (there is not JCRLV 44 in Reno,
that's a Vegas rule, and if Reno wants a rule like that of its own
JCRCP 83 requires the RJC to publish it and get it approved by the
Nevada Supreme Court first....period.). Okay, so, to take it a step
even further, Baker's order goes on to say "but the $2,275 won't be
released to the neurosurgeon yet, "instead that sum shall serve as
security for Coughlin's cost on appeal, pursuant to Nevada JCRCP
73...". But wait, doesn't that mean Coughlin then gets a Stay of
Eviction during the pendency of the Appeal? Isnt' that was a
security that large must be for? Because the "Appeal Bond" is set
by statute at only a mere $250....so holding on to 10 times that
much of Coughlin's cash must have been for the "Supersedeas
Bond" mentioned a yielding one a Stay of Eviction in NRS 40.380
and 40.385.
I know, I know, its confusing because actually those sections force

the landlord, his attorneys and the RJC to choose between viewing
Coughlin as a residential tenant whose rent is less than $1,000, and
whom therefore is only required to post a measly supersedeas bond
of $250 (and remember, a supersedeas bond equals a stay of
eviction equals not trespassing) or the the other choice is to view
Coughlin as a commercial tenant, which would allow charging a
higher supersedeas bond (except for that pesky part about his rent
being under the $1,000 required by the statute to do so, his rent
being only $900), except, darn it, old Richard G. Hill, Esq. and
Casey Baker, Esq. elected to pursue this summary eviction
proceeding under a No Cause Eviction Notice, which is not
allowed against a commercial tenant (ie, you can't evict a
commercial tenant using the summary eviction procedures set forth
in NRS 40.253 unless you alllege non payment of rent and serve a
30 Day Non Payment of Rent Notice To Quit, which they didn't
because they "are just taking the path of least resistance here, Your
Honor (insert their smug chuckling and obnoxious/pretentious "can
you believe this guy?" laughter and head shaking...).
NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within
10 days, appeal from the judgment rendered. But an appeal by the
defendant shall not stay the execution of the judgment, unless,
within the 10 days, the defendant shall execute and file with the
court or justice the defendants undertaking to the plaintiff, with
two or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed by the court or
justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount of the
judgment and costs, to the effect that, if the judgment appealed
from be affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay
the judgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use and
occupation of the property, and damages justly accruing to the
plaintiff during the pendency of the appeal. Upon taking the appeal
and filing the undertaking, all further proceedings in the case shall
be stayed.
So, why on earth is the City Attorney's Office still trying to try
Coughlin on the trespass charge for which he endured a custodial
arrest and for which old Richard Hill is still filing Motion's to Show
Cause on in the appeal of the summary eviction matter in CV1103628? Why, oh why? Does the Reno City Attorney's Office have
some sort of vested interest in keeping Coughlin down, busy,
besotted, encumbered, or otherwise? It, why, it couldn't be because
Coughlin has a really good wrongful arrest cause of action against
the Reno Police Department, could it?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
And, well, yeah the Washoe County Sheriff's Office didn't quite get
those Summons and Complaints served in that one case Coughlin
was suing his former employer in, the one where Coughlin was
granted an Order to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which required the
Washoe County Sheriff's Office to serve the Summons and
Complaints....But what does that have to to with the 6 days
Coughlin spent in jail on the arrest shown in the youtube video
above? Its not like the Washoe County jailed videotaped a scene
where they were forcing Coughlin to get naked and put on a green
dress. What's that? It is? They did do that? Really? No...What?
They also forced him to simulate oral and anal sex with deputies, in
the guise of some ridiculous "procedure" necessary to insure
Deputy safety? Oh, wow. And they retaliated against him for
failing to answer their religious preference interrogation questions
by placing him in an icy cold cell for hours at a time, refusing him
medical care despite his plaintive cries for help, while wearing a
thin t-shirt? Wow. They didn't jam a taser needle in his spine for
extended periods of time, though, did they? Your kidding! Whats
next, your going tell me Sargent Sigfree of the Reno PD ordered a
custodial arrest on Coughlin for "jaywalking" while Coughlin was
peacefully filming, from a public spot, Richard G. Hill's fraudulent

contractor Phil Howard destroying and taking to the town dump
items of enormous sentimental value to Coughlin that he was
prevented from retrieving from the property during the scant time
he was allowed to (after he paid $480 worth of a lien for what he
knew not, because, despite, ol' Contractor Phil's fraudulent $1,060
bill for "securing" the back porch (with screws facing the outside,
inexplicably, and a window unit a/c left in the window facing the
sidewalk near the Lakemill Lodge, secured by nothing but duct
tape
It is kind of a combo neon sign that says "Burglarize this Place,
Everybody!"), Coughlin's former home law office was burglarized
on December 12, 2011 while Richard G. Hill was holding its
contents (including, tackily, Coughlin's client's files, like the ones
for the foreclosure defense actions, etc.), asserting his "lien". A lien
for "storage" where the charge for storage, $900, was the same as
the charge for "full use and occupany" was. However, that $900 a
month for "storage" also included another $1,060 charge for
"securing" (and that bill actually listed "fixing a leak in the
basement...neither of which seem to have much to do with the
"reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying" expenses such a
lien is provided for under NRS 118A.460....). Jeez, your probably
going to tell me Sargent Sigfree ordered another custodial arrest on
Coughlin just two days after the jaywalking arrest, for the same
fact pattern that Master Edmondson granted Coughlin's
applications for Protections Orders against based upon the battery
and assaults that his former housemates committed. Because,
Sargent Sigfree thinks its "misuse of 911" for Coughlin to call when
he returns home at night and his dog has mysteriously disappeared,
and his housemates make menacing commentary about it. Surely,
Coughlin, a former domestic violence attorney would have nothing

helpful to add to Sargnet Sigfree's expert opinion that "animal
abuse is not domestic violence" (tell that to NRS 33.010, Sarge)
and that its, rather, "a matter for animal control" and that Sargent
Sigfree was "trying to help" Coughlin by arresting him, again, and
necessitating the $1,500 bail associated with the gross
misdemeanor charge, "Misuse of 911" because, as Sargent Sigfree
told Coughlin "you keep putting yourself in situations where you
are victimized" so it was necessary to arrest Coughlin in that
regard.
But hey, at least NV Energy hasn't refused to let Coughlin get any
electrical service for the past week since those with the Protection
Orders against them cancelled the service and NV Energy shut it
off, without providing any notice to Coughlin, right. Nevermind.
But...but surely when NV Energy shut of the power to Coughlin's
home law office on October 4th, 2011, just hours prior to the bad
faith "inspection" with videographer of Coughlin' s home law office
that Casey Baker, Esq. thought so very necessary one day before
Coughlin's Tenant Answer was due...surely NV Energy did not
leave the back gate to Coughlin's home law office open and speed
off, Coughlin's beloved mountain bike suddenly missing (the one
the parents of his girlfriend of 5 years gave him)? Well, NV Energy
is probably not retaliating against Coughlin for complaining about
that by refusing him electric service for the past seven days, you
would have to assume....
NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who
retains possession of premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an
appeal from an order entered pursuant to NRS 40.253:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of

execution may be obtained by filing with the trial court a bond in
the amount of $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal. A surety
upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the appellate court and
irrevocably appoints the clerk of that court as the suretys agent
upon whom papers affecting the suretys liability upon the bond
may be served. Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond
may be released, on motion in the appellate court without
independent action. A tenant of commercial property may obtain a
stay of execution only upon the issuance of a stay pursuant to Rule
8 of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the posting of a
supersedeas bond in the amount of 100 percent of the unpaid rent
claim of the landlord.
2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises that are the
subject of the appeal during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to
the landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying contract
between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. If the
tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new
proceedings for a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a
new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
NRS 40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings
for want of form. In all cases of appeal under NRS 40.220 to
40.420, inclusive, the appellate court shall not dismiss or quash the
proceedings for want of form, provided the proceedings have been
conducted substantially according to the provisions of NRS 40.220
to 40.420, inclusive; and amendments to the complaint, answer or
summons, in matters of form only, may be allowed by the court at
any time before final judgment upon such terms as may be just; and
all matters of excuse, justification or avoidance of the allegations in
the complaint may be given in evidence under the answer.
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure
relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as they are
not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420,
inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
But, back to the Sheriff's Office. And, I am not really buying the
idea that you guys don't know NRCP 4 through 6 like the back of
your hand, but....hell, maybe you don't. But, clearly the language in
NRS 40 about how the Sheriff may "remove tenant from the
property within 24 hours of receipt of the Order" do not apply
where the Tenant filed a Tenant's Answer and showed up to the
Hearing and litigated the matter. Especially where, as here the
lease had not terminated, by its terms, but was rather renewed. This
is particularly true where NRS 118A prevents so terminating a
holdover tenant's lease for a retaliatory or discriminatory purpose.
I would hate to see people start to think the Washoe County
Sheriff's Office is cutting corners on the whole "personally served"
thing (just so a landlord could get what they want quicker), just like
I would hate for people to think the Reno Municipal Court is letting
the bottom line get in the way of providing that whole Sixth
Amendment Right To Counsel where jail time is even a possibility
thing. And, hey, if the RMC denies an indigent attorney the Sixth
Amendment Right To Counsel, the finds him guilty of NRS 22.030,
Summary Contempt Commited in the Presence of the Court, and
the puts him in cuffs when the Trial ends, summarily sentencing
him to 3 days in jail for violating NRS 22.030, well....that's no big
deal, right, I mean, the RMC technically kept its promise that the
underyling charge, though technically it could result in
incarceration would not...because the incarceration was for a whole
dang different charge, ie, Summary Contempt in the presence of
the Court....and so what if the whole zealous advocate thing and
the denying the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel thing and the
Summary Contempt thing don't go so well together....Or if 6 court
employees had to stay til 9pm getting paid overtime at the RMC to
get 'r done...
NRCP 4: "(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and

complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the
person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service
shall be made by delivering a copy of the summons attached to a
copy of the complaint as follows:...(6) Service Upon Individuals. In
all other cases to the defendant personally, or by leaving copies
thereof at the defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to
an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process. [As amended; effective January 1, 2005.] (e) Same: Other
Service. (1) Service by Publication. (i) General. In addition to
methods of personal service, when the person on whom service is
to be made resides out of the state, or has departed from the state,
or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or by
concealment seeks to avoid the service of summons, and the fact
shall appear, by affidavit, to the satisfaction of the court or judge
thereof, and it shall appear, either by affidavit or by a verified
complaint on file, that a cause of action exists against the

defendant in respect to whom the service is to be made, and that
the defendant is a necessary or proper party to the action, such
court or judge may grant an order that the service be made by the
publication of summons. Provided, when said affidavit is based on
the fact that the party on whom service is to be made resides out of
the state, and the present address of the party is unknown, it shall
be a sufficient showing of such fact if the affiant shall state
generally in such affidavit that at a previous time such person
resided out of this state in a certain place (naming the place and
stating the latest date known to affiant when such party so resided
there); that such place is the last place in which such party resided
to the knowledge of affiant; that such party no longer resides at
such place; that affiant does not know the present place of
residence of such party or where such party can be found; and that
affiant does not know and has never been informed and has no
reason to believe that such party now resides in this state; and, in
such case, it shall be presumed that such party still resides and
remains out of the state, and such affidavit shall be deemed to be a
sufficient showing of due diligence to find the defendant. This rule
shall apply to all manner of civil actions, including those for
divorce"
I guess it don't matter much to me which one of you pays me my
damages for the wrongful eviction, illegal lockout, whether its the
landlord, his attorney, or the Sheriff's Office. Your money is always
good with me.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Subject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served"

Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
Mr. Coughlin,
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was
personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the
Order to the residence. The residence was unoccupied at the time.
WCSO Civil Section

To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva,
Roxanna; kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com;
Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of
11/1/2011
I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am
respectfully requesting that you confirm with Deputy Machem that
he did, in fact, "personally serve" the Summary Eviction Order on
me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on November 1, 2011 at
4:30 pm, in connection with performing the lockout. It is my
position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure
out whether Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase
"personally served" means something other than what I believe it
means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an
Affidavit of Service filed by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with
respect to the service of a Order Granting Summary Eviction
against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent was not
alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent
escrow deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6),
especially where a stay of eviction was not granted even while the
RJC held on to most all my money...).
My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service
indicates that he "personally served" me, which kind of reminds me
of all that robo-signing and MERS fraud I come across in my day
job (and do you wonder how many attorneys in the foreclosure
defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?),
which includes being a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it?
Did Machem "personally serve" me the Summary Eviction Order?

Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in
compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the
"usual custom and practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the
"usual custom and practice of the WCSO? I hear a lot about this
"within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some black letter law
to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe
Legal Services, the people you guys had such trouble actually
serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may have actually helped
improved legal services in this community, if they were not
dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even where
the IFP required the WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway,
back to the "within 24 hours" phraseology: "
This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an
order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the
tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order... is inapplicable
to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary Eviction was
signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found in
situations inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2),
and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only sections of NRS 40 where this
within 24 hours language occurs, and those situations only apply
where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2
must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines
that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue
a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing
for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after
receipt of the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The

landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of
complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which
the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are
located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located,
whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. The court may
thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being
carried out in Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience
and violates Nevada law. There is not basis for effectuating a
lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this case. The
above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt
language are inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the
present circumstances, where the Tenant did file an Affidavit and
did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To require
Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of
receipt of the order (what does that even mean? The use of terms
like rendition, rendered, notice of entry, pronounced, is
absent here, and this receipt of the order language is something
rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV statutory
citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a
Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a
situation which follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing
receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not shown, by
applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the days
for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.).
In Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114
(1st Cir. 2009), the record did not reflect when the plaintiff
received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November
24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced
on November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after

excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under
either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative
remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter.
See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80
L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting plaintiff an additional three days for
mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal
Services may say about this 24 hours and the applicability of the
JCRCP to cases like these, NRS 40.400 Rules of practice, holds
that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions,
appeals and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the
proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such NRCP 6(a),(e)
applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy
Machem alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally
served" upon me on November 1, 2011. That is a lie by Mr.
Machem, unless "personally served" is defined in a rather
impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally different
understanding of the definition of "personally served", which may
be the case. Or, perhaps the Sheriff's Office is busy and doesn't
want to wait around to "personally serve" every tenant it wishes to
evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three days" rule in
NRCP 6(e)...the landlord's might not like it, but they can use that
frustration as an incentive not to jump to litigating every
disagreement about habitability that a tenant brings to them. You
may not realize how ridiculous some landlord's get. In my case, I
offered to fix basic things that clearly implicated the habitability
rules in NRS 118A.290 and the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly

Hill High School graduate landlord balked and complained then
hired and attorney four days into a dispute.....at which point the
rules against contacting represented parties prevented much in the
way of real settlement discussion, particularly where opposing
counsel has continuously demonstrated a complete indifference to
pursuing settlement (why would he at the rates he bills hours at?). I
just don't think the Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or
damage the citizen tenants of Washoe County in the name of
pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss or Richard G. Hill, Esq.
I AM REQUESTING, IN WRITING, THAT BOTH OF YOUR
OFFICES INVESTIGATE THIS AND PROVIDE A SWORN
AFFIDAVIT FROM MR. MACHEM THAT ADMITS THAT I
WAS NOT PERSONALLY PRESENT WHEN HE SERVED THE
ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION IN RJC REV2011-001708
ON 11/1/12 AT 4:30 PM (ACCORDING TO HIS AFFIDAVIT OF
SERVICE). YOU NEVER KNOW, I MIGHT HAVE
IRREFUTABLE PROOF THAT I WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT
THAT TIME, SO, BE CAREFUL. There simply is not anything
specific in Nevada law addressing how such Summary Eviction
Orders are to be served and carried out. The sections dealing with
NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary
eviction and exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent....
6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in
subsection 3, regardless of the information contained in the
affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by
subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a
hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to
determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice
provided for in this section. If the court determines that there is no

legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer and the tenant is
guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order
for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the
nonadmittance of the tenant....
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to
the filing and service of a motion, file a motion with the court, on a
form provided by the clerk of the court, to dispute the amount of
the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS
118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory, moving and storage of
personal property left on the premises. The motion must be filed
within 20 days after the summary order for removal of the tenant
or the abandonment of the premises by the tenant, or within 20
days after:
(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to
the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court
shall schedule a hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held
within 10 days after the filing of the motion. The court shall affix
the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy served upon
the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other process server. At the
hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to
NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of
the charges determined to be due or if no charges are determined to
be due...."
I also want to know why NRS 40. 253(8) was not followed with
respect to my November 17th, 2011 filing of a Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien. Why didn't the WCSO serve notice, as
required by NRS 40.253(8) upon the landlord's attorney Richard
Hill? Why didn't I get a hearing within the 10 days called called for
by that section (to get back my client's files no less), but rather, I
had to wait a full 33 days to get a hearing, and service of notice of
the hearing was not effectuated, as required by NRS 40.235(8), by
the WCSO. Why?
Please provide an indication, in writing, of the names and case
numbers for the last 20 incidences when the WCSO has served
notice of a hearing set pursuant to NRS 40.253(8). What's that?
The WCSO has NEVER served such notice? Yet the WCSO is
there with bells on (or Machem is) to lie in Affidavits of Service to
lock out the citizen tenants of Washoe County impermissilby early
vis a vis NRCP 5(b)(2) and NRCP 6(e)? Why is that? Is it a
conspiracy? Does money talk? When I was arrested for trespassing
on November 12th, 2011 by RPD Officer Chris Carter and Sargent
Lopez, Carter admitted to me that "Richard Hill pays him a lot of
money and therefore he arrests whom Richard Hill says to and does
what Richard Hill says to do...." Both Carter and Sargent Lopez
refused to investigate, despite prompting, whether Richard Hill has
sent the tenant/arrestee a bill or demand letter in bill for the full
rental value of the property, $900 per month, under some
interpretation of the "reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying
expenses" collectable by a landlord under a personal property line
set forth in NRS 118A.460 (one could also interpret such a bill as
Hill's withdrawing or eradicating the Order of Summary Eviction
itself, which was not "personally served" by the Washoe County
Sheriff (despite what their Affidavit of Service says...I wasn't even
there at the time they changed the locks...and so the Summary

Eviction Order was not properly served under NRCP 6, and despite
the Reno Justice Court impermissibly converting $2300 of my
money under a "rent escrow" Order its required I comply with in
order to litigate habitability issues in a summary eviction
proceeding under NRS 40.253, despite NRS 40.253(6)'s express
dicate against such an Order (unless, pursuant to JCRCP 83, a
justice court gets such a rule, like Justice Court Rule of Las Vegas
(JCRLV) Rule 44, published and approved by the Nevada Supreme
Court, which the RJC has not, rather, the RJC applies all these
insidious secret "house rules" (like forcing tenants to deliver
themselves to the filing office to submit to personal service notice
of a summary eviction hearing within, like, 12 hours of the Tenant
filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit in response to an eviction
Notice, rather than the service requirements of such notice
following NRCP 6 (days for mailing, etc., etc., in other words, in
the RJC everything is sped up imperissilby to help landlord's out,
and the NV. S. Ct ruling in Glazier and Lippis clearly contemplate
personal liability against the Court and or Judges themselves for so
doing)....A Qui Tam action or something a la Mausert's in Solano
County, I believe, in California, would be very interesting...Still
haven't heard anything from the Reno PD about the various
complaints I have filed with them in writing related to the wrongful
arrests, excessive force and other misconduct committed against
me, though they did arrest me the other day for calling 911incident
to some domestic violence for which I was granted to Extended
Protection Orders against my former housemates....old Sargent
Sigfree ordered that arrest, as he did two days prior when he
ordered a custodial arrest of me for "jaywalking".
Funny thing, I never heard anything back from the RPD about
complaints like the following one:

From:
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:
Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT
HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON
TO THE OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE
ADDRESSED.
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
What is interesting there is that at least I was provided the name of
an officer, a "Wozniak" (though I have been unable to confirm the
existence of
or whether " THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF

COMPLAINT HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND
PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL
BE
ADDRESSED."
What is more strange is that I submitted several online police
reports to the Reno PD (a couple of which asserted complaints
against various Reno PD officers, or asked why RDP Officer
Carter, whom admitted taking bribes from Richard G. Hill, Esq. at
the time of my custodial arrest for trespassing (the one where
Richard Hill signed a Criminal Complaint for trespass, then Officer
Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to follow up on my imploring
them to ask Hill whether he has recently sent me a bill for the "full
rental value" of the property, the same amount that had been
charged for the "use and enjoyment" of the premises, $900, in
comparision to what NRS 118A.460 may deem "reasonable
storage" expenses for which a lien is available to a landlord, though
NRS 118A.520 has outlawed rent distraints upon tenant's personal
property....Regardless, between January 8 - 12th, 2012, and was
arrested twice by the Reno PD shortly after submitting these
written complaints to the Reno PD.
Actually, upon being released from jail on November 15th, 2011,

incident to the custodial trespass arrest, I went to Richard HIll's
office to get my wallet and driver's license. He refused to provide it
to me until late November 22nd, 2011. Hill called the Reno PD on
the 15th (or maybe I did because he was withholding my state
issued ID, the one I would need to rent a room, drive my car, and
my wallet, which is kind of useful in such situations....). Anyways,

Sargent Tarter of the Reno PD showed up, he went inside Hill's
office with Hill for quite some time and the result was Tarter telling
me to leave. I did, but while driving down St. Laurence towards S.
Virginia (Hill's office is at 652 Forrest St. 89503 and would have
required turning down the wrong way of a one way street, Forrest,
to go back to Hill's Office (so clearly I was not headed to Hill's
office) Sargent Tarter began tailing me, then he pulled me over,
then he gave me a ticket, in retaliation if you ask me for reporting
RPD Officer Carter admitting that he takes bribes from Hill to
Sargent Tarter minutes earlier. Uh, well, anyways, another Sargent
calls me later that night, taking the "good cop" role. But upon
informing him of what RPD Officer Carter told me about Hill
paying him money to arrest people during the 11/12/11 trespassing
arrest, that Sargent immediately informed me that, despite this
being the first he heard of that, he was sure that was not
happening....I guess RPD Officer Carter is trying to explain away
his comments about Richard Hill paying him money to arrest
people by dismissing them as sarcasm, a joke, said in jest,
whatever....but I don't see how that situation (a license attorney
getting arrested for a crime, a conviction for which would result in
that attorney being required to report said conviction to the State
Bar of Nevada under SCR 111, etc., and possibly resulting in a
suspension of that attorney's license to practice law, or worse...) is
all that jocular of a situation. Combine that with the too quick to
dismiss my reports of bribery by Richard Hill to officer Carter to
the RPD Sargent who called me on 11/15/11 regarding the
retaliation by Sargent Tarter that I complained of, and I don't think
it is all that unreasonable for anyone to take RPD Officer Carter at
his word regarding Richard G. Hill, Esq. paying him money to
arrest whom Hill says to arrest. Add to that Sargent Sigfree
ordering my arrest for jaywalking (by a trainee RPD Officer) on
January 12th, 2011 (custodial arrest, bail of $160 emptied my bank

account out, or pretty close to it) while I was peacefully filming
from a public spot Richard G. Hill, Esq's contractor Phil Howard,
whom had submitted bills in courts records and filings under the
lien for "reasonable storage moving and inventorying" found in
NRS 118A.460, even where old Phil used my own plywood at the
property to board up the back porch (curiously leaving the screws
holding up the plywood exposed to exterior of the property where
anyone could easily unscrew them, and also leaving in a window
unit ac secured only by ducttape in a window facing a sidewalk by
the LakeMill Lodge....which resulted in $8,000 at least of my
personal property being burglarized from my former home law
office on Decmeber 12th, 2011 while Hill was asserting a lien on all
my personal property found therein (and my client's files, which
arguably are not even my property, but rather, the client's
property). Hill went on to place what he believes to be my social
security number in court records, on purpose, despite his signing an
Affirmation pursuant to NRS 239B.030 that that was not the case
(attaching a two page report to the RPD as an Exhibit). Then Hill
and his contractor Phil Howard both committed perjury when the
signed Declarations attesting that I had climbed on the contractors
truck or ever touched Hill. Hill lies constantly, whether under
penalty of perjury or now, so I don't have time to rebut every little
lie he makes (he makes me out to comes across as a Yosemite Sam
caricature of a human being in his filings when he describes me...).
Further, why am I arrested for trespassing and not those from
Nevada Court Services where they went behind closed gate the the
backyard of my home law office and banged on window extremely
loudly for 40 minutes at a time 3 times a day, one guy ringing the
doorbell, one guy moving around all other sides of the property
banging on the windows, peering in closed blinds, and affecting a

phony "color of law" tone, resemblance, and verbal
communications, misleadingly announcing that they were "Court
Services, come out now!", wearing their pretend Sheriff outfits, big
equipment saddled belts (including firearms, I believe, and radios),
etc. ,etc.
Add to that that Nevada Court Services Jeff Chandler drives by in
his Monster Truck baring his personalized "NCS" license plate
while I am in the RPD squad car, handcuffed, outside my former
law office at 121 River Rock, at the time of the 1/12/12 jaywalking
arrest and the appearances are troubling. Now, add to that that Lew
Taitel, Esq. was my court appointed public defender in the Reno
Municipal Court in the trespass case, and that Judge Gardner had
refused to provide me the names of prospective appointed defense
counsel (I wanted to run a conflicts check) at my arraignment
(where Marshal Mentzel barked at me in a threatening tone, using
menacing language), whereupon Taitel was appointed as my
defense attorney and filed a notice of appearance, and received my
confidential file, pc sheet, arrest reports, ssn, etc....only its turns out
that Taitel shares and office and a receptionist with Nevada Court
Services and they list him and his picture on their website as
"associated with" their Process Server corporation, despite the
prohibition lawyers face against fee sharing with non-lawyers.
Then, Taitel somehow manages to get out of defending my case
without filing a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, despite that being
required by the Reno Municipal Court Rule 3(B):
RMCR Rule 3(B): Authorization to Represent (B): An attorney
desiring to withdraw from a case shall file a motion with the court
and serve the City Attorney with the same. The court may rule on
the motion or set a hearing.
But, perhaps most troubling of all is the implication that the Reno
City Attorney's Office, which defends actions against the City of
Reno Police Department and its Officers, has a vested interest in
discrediting me in advance of the wrongful arrest lawsuit that the
Reno City Attorney's office knew was imminent at the time of all
of the above incidents, relating to the following August 20th, 2011
wrongful arrest by RPD Officer's Duralde and Rosa.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0 So, that's what
attempting to coerce a suspect's consent to an impermissible search
sounds like? Add to that that the trespassing case is before Judge
Gardner, whom most recently was employed with the Reno City
Attorney's Office.
And, you know what is funny? Officer Del Vecchio cuffed me and
placed me in his squad car last summer after he terrified me and
another gentleman who had bicycles. He veered across the road
and screeched his squad car to a halt, jumped out, and did some
other stuff, then demanded my name and ID...and the lawyer in me
didn't like that that much, and he didn't like me not wanting to give
it to him. This occurred right in front of my home law office in the
summer of 2011. He cuffed me and told me I was going to jail for
something about a light on the front of my bicycle (the one NV
Energy likely stole when the shut off my power, unnoticed, on
October 4, 2011) despite my bike actually having such a light....but
then Del Vecchio's partner did him a solid and talked some sense
into him, and I humbled it up for Del Vecchio and we both let it go,
and I didn't go to jail....Until Del Vecchio was present supervising
some Officer's training at the scene of my custodial (9 hour)
jaywalking arrest) on 1/12/12. But Del Vecchio, I guess either

didn't want to or wasn't able to talk some sense into Sargent
Sigfree.....and then Sargent Sigfree (the spelling is likely off) had
me arrested and charged with a gross misdemeanor, "Misuse of
911" just two days later, on January 14th, 2011 when I called 911
to report that my roommates were laughing menacingly when I
asked them why my dog was missing (I had also been chased up to
my room numerous times since moving in with these people,
something I had to do because so much of my money had been
taken up with bail or lost earnings due to all these wrongful arrests
and abuse of processes mentioned above...also these housemates
had chased me with a ten inch butcher knife, two of my tires were
slashed, I was locked out all night on New Years Even when these
changed the locks at around midnight, had my furniture thrown in
the street, property stolen, coffee thrown on me, destroying my
smart phone in the process, etc., etc...And despite the housemate
having an outstanding arrest warrant, and animal abuse being listed
amongst the elements of domestic violence, Sargent Sigfree told me
he was arresting me because I "keep putting yourself in these
situations", like, where I am a victim, and that he was "trying to
help you", he said with a smirk and a laugh to his fellow RPD
Officers, whom then proceeded to use excessive force against me. I
guess he was helping me by saddling me with a gross misdemeanor
with a $1,500 bail, especially where its been arranged for Court
Services, or pre-Trial Services to forever deny me an OR, despite
my meeting the factors for such set forth in statute (30 year
resident, entire immediate family lives here, licensed to practice
law in Nevada, etc., etc)...I guess it should not be too much of a
surprise to me that Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts failed to
address the perjury of all three of her witnesses or that her fellow
Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens lied to me about
whether or not the Reno City Attorney's Office even had any
documentation related to my arrest or whether it would in the

month before my arraignment, despite that fact that subsequent
productions of discovery tend to indicate that the Reno City
Attorney's Office did have those materials at the time. I could be
wrong about some of this...But that would require and awful lot of
coincidences.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
Subject: Contact
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 16:10:24 +0000
March 16, 2012
Zachary Coughlin
Dear Zach,
Thank you for sending me your reply to the grievance filed by Richard Hill. From
your explanation it is clear that things are not as they should be. Please call me ASAP
so that we can take the appropriate action to help you and to stop these types of
disturbing complaints.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel (775) 328-1384
__ ._ ..
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. __ ,_. __ .. _. ___ ,... _._.......... _... ______.4_ ....... _.... . , ___ .....__ . _ _ _ _____.__ ...
~
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1101'11. JAV D. DILWORTII
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Court AdminiWDtOr
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1101'11. WII.LlAM L CARDrIlER

Deportm"" 2
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MAR 1 .: 21112
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KENN~'l1
R.IIOWARD
STATE BAR OF NEVADA

RENO OFFICE
Dcpanmtnl4
March 14,2012
Mr. David Clark, Esq.

Office of Bar Counsel
State Bar of Nevada
9456 Double R Blvd., Suitc B
Reno, NV 89521
CONFIDENTIAL
Re: Zachary Barker Coughlin, Nevada Bar No. 9473

Dear Mr. Clark:
This leuer constitutes a fonnal complaint of allomey misconduct and/or disability against
Zachary Barker Coughlin. The accompanying box of materials demonstrates some of the
problems with the practice of this auomey being experienced by myself and the other three
judgcs in Reno Municipal Court. My two most recent Orders in what should be a simple troffic
citation case are self-explanatory and an: included, together with copies of massive documenls
Mr. Coughlin has fax-filed to our courl in this case. Audio recordings of two of my hearings in
this mailer are also included. lie failed to appear for the second one this past Monday.
I have another traffic case pending trial with him that was re-assigned to me based on our
Department I judge being out for surgery. We have mUltiple addresses for Mr. Coughlin and
can't seem to locate him between cases very easily. We are selling that case for trial and
allempting to serve him at the most recent address we have (1422 E. 9'" SI. 112, Reno NV 89512),
nllhough I heard today he may be living in his vehicle somewhere. We do have an address for
his mother, however, as she recently posted part of a fine for him.
Judge Ken Howard, Department 4, had a case on Mr. Coughlin late last year that is now
on appeal to the Second Judicial District Courl. Judge Bill Gardner, Department 2, also has a
mailer currcntly pending in his co uri with Mr. Coughlin os the defendant I have enclosed some
copies of documents from those mauers, in chronological order, simply because they appear to
demonstrate that he is quickly decompensating in his mental status. Our statTalso made you
some audio tapes of COUllhi in hearings in Departments 2 and 4 so you can hear for yourself how
this allomey acts in courl. You can sec his behavior in my traffic citation case does nol appear to
be an isolated incident.
P.O. 80_ 1900. Rft10, NV 89505-1900. t Soulh Slur. Sired.. Reno. NV

Telephone: 77!1-JJf-U90. FacsImile: 77S-JJ.a..18Z4
www,[f"gmun!slp.'rgunrnm
~I
EXHIBIT
t?
02959
1782
Mr. David Clark

March 14,2012
Page 2
It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a maller pending on this attorney.
My Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public Defender in Fehruary when I had Mr.
Coughlin jailed for Contempt of Court and they stated that they represent him in a Gross
Mistlemeanor mailer in RJC. I have no uther information on thaI.
You will have the full cooperation uf myself, the other judges, and the staff of Reno
Municipal Court in your pursuit of this maller. Mr. Coughlin has positioned himself as a
vexatious litigant in our court, antagonizing the staff WId even our pro temp judges on the mosl
simple traffic and misdemeanor mullers. I do think this is aeuse of some urgency, WId I
apologize for taking two days to get this package to you; our IT person was ill and could nol
make the copies of the audios of Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today, and I felt it was importanl
that the audios he included in the materials 10 be considered by Ihe Slate Bar. On February 27,
2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively practicing law and had appointments with clients. I
do not know if that was true, but if so, he could be causing serious harm to Ihe practice of law in
Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's freedom or property interests.
Please contact me if vou need any other information. My direct line is
and
my cell phone is .
'.not for public dissemination). My email is HolmesD@reno.gov
My Judicial Assistant is Marilyn Tognoni and she can reach me at any time. Her number is 775334-3822 and her email is TogniniM@reno.!!ov .
Thank you for your allention to this mailer.
Yours truly,
~?~~#-L~
The Hon. Dorothy Nosh Holmes
Reno Municipal J udlle
encs.
P.O. On 1900. Reno. NV 89~1900. I Soulb Sinn Slru Rrno. ; V

..
Trltphone: 77~-JJ.a...2l90. FIt'!JlmiJe: 115-JJ4.J81.c
www... nomunlcfpc9urt.(Om
Rq~1
02960
1783
S TAT E B A R O F N E VA D A
600 East Charl$[on BI.d.

L... Veg NY 89104 1 %3
phone 702.382.2200
March 1 6, 20 1 2
.nD (,"
800.2S4.2797
f.. 702.385.2878
Double R Blvd. St. B

8952 1 5977
phon, 775.329.4 100
f.. 77S.329.0S22
94S6
Sent Via U.S. Mail, Certified Mail and via E-Mail
Reno. NV
Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq.

1 422 E. N inth Street, #2
eno, NV 895 1 2
www.nvbar.or
g
RE: Attorney Discipline

Dear Mr. Coug h li n :
The Office of B a r Counsel h a s received several grievances concerni ng your
conduct as a lawyer. The grievances include supporting evidence in the form of:
audio of your conduct in court proceedings and copies of pleadings and documents
prepared and filed by you in Justice and District Court. Together these grievances
raise serious q uestions regarding your competency and ability to practice law.
These concerns are serious and the Office of Bar Counsel is considering the
necessity of seeking a Petition to Determine Competency p u rsuant to Supreme
Court Rule 1 1 7.
I am enclosing with this letter copies of a grievance letter, from the Municipal
Court and a copy of an Order from District Court. Please respond to allegations
pertaining to your conduct. I will make available for your review and inspection the
supporting documents nd audio recordings
'
U S Postal Ser v ice
CE'RTI FI ED MA IL " RE CE IPT
I have left phone messages
of the drafting of this letter you ha' cO
that we can discuss this i mportant

you . Aga i n , please call me at you r .Jl
Sincerely,
-jJz;(
Patrick King
Assistant Bar Counsel
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RE: my attempt to be provided access to the

grievances filed today
Sent: Mon 4/02/12 3:57 PM
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I have opened 3 disciplinary files against you. They are identified by number below:
NG12-0204 Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. Bar No. 9473 (2005) Mr. Hill
NG12-0435 Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. Bar No. 9473 (2005) Judge Holmes
NG12-0434 Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. Bar No. 9473 (2005) Judge Gardner
You have received the grievance from Mr. Hill and also the grievance from Judge
Holmes. The Grievance from Judge Gardner relates to her Order After Trial in the
case of Ashwin Joshi v Barti Joshi, Case Number DV08-01168, wherein she describes
your conduct at pages 12 and 13. I have received certified copies of the contempt
orders, a certified copy of the conviction at Wal-Mart, and an incident report from
Marshals Thompson and Coppa regarding your conduct on March 22, 2012. I also
have the recordings of the court proceedings at issue.
At this time, I do not expect to be providing you with any additional information. If
you have additional information that you want me to be made aware of in response
to the grievances identified above please feel free to mail them to me.
Sincerely,
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel

Sent: Monday, April 02, 2012 2:39 PM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: my attempt to be provided access to the grievances filed today
Mr. King,
I need for basic procedural due process protections to be afforded before any
consideration of any arrangement you have in mind would be appropriate. It is
my understanding that we are still in the stage of the process where you are
providing me indication of the allegations against me and documentation in
support and explanation thereof, and that there is still additional materials and
complaints which you have so far chosen not to allow me access to, even to
view upon my responding to your stipulation that I could only so view such
materials upon visiting the Reno office of the State Bar of Nevada in person.
Such as, please answer the questions I have posed you in my recent emails,
especially with regard to providing copies of and information related to these
"other different judges" supposedly submitting written complaints about me to
you. Further, please explain whether you requested materials from Judge
Nash Holmes, as her letter to you appears to indicate, in her statements that
she "apologizes for taking two days to get these materials to you" that you
requested such materials rather than she sending them to you on her own
accord? Please explain.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
RE: my attempt to be provided access to the

grievances filed today
Sent: Tue 3/27/12 9:24 AM
March 27, 2012
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Perhaps you are not fully aware of your behavior. At our brief meeting yesterday I
perceived you as very hostile and even threatening. Under those circumstances I
felt it better to terminate the meeting.
If it was not your intent to appear hostile or to attempt to intimidate me then you
might consider how I perceived your conduct. I had intended to try to listen to you
and determine how my office could best
help you address the grievances that I have received. You said you did not have
time and simply wanted to argue about your receipt of e-mail or mail. I did not say
that I did not care if you received the
information I sent to you, I said I did not care how your received it, so long as you
received it. I do care that you receive the information that I send to you. As I
attempted to explain, I will be meeting with a panel
to have them make a determination about the grievances that have been made
against you by Mr. Hill and the Judge from Department 3 that you read at my office.
I have asked for a written response to those
grievances. In response I received many e-mails with attachments. I will soon be

sharing the grievances with a disciplinary panel and will advise them of your
responses to date.
I will keep you advised of the panels determination.
Sincerely,
Patrick King

To: Patrick King; Glenn Machado; David Clark
Subject: my attempt to be provided access to the grievances filed today
Dear Mr. King,

This correspondence is sent to confirm that I visited the Double R Blvd. offices of the State Bar of Nevada today
and attempted to be provided access the the various "other different judges" grievances that I, prior to last
Friday, was completely unaware of. I have sent you several written correspondences detailing the tampering
and other problems with my USPS mail incident to the two domestic abuser attacks I have been subject to since
approximately 1/1/12, and ask that you copy my on all correspondences or document production via email and
fax. Today, you showed me a two page letter from Judge Nash Holmes. Did you interpret it to be a
"grievance"? How is that designation arrived at? You refused to identify the names of any other judges from
whom you have received any other similar such materials and further refused to allow me to view and such
items. I asked for a copy of the large box of documents, and other FOIA request materials and you refused.
Further, you told me you didn't care I received anything you sent me and stated that I did not have a right to
review such complaint letters, grievances, or other materials, prior to being questioned by you and before any
such meeting. I informed you that I am considering different attorneys to represent me right now, and indicated
I need these materials to prepare for any future meeting with you. My records incidate that your letter of
3/16/12 is inaccurate to the extent it indicates that I was copied on that letter via email on that date. Please let
me know if you received any sort of "return to sender" letter for that mailing.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
.. --... - .......
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NOTE BY COUGHLIN: THIS IS ONE OF THE BIGGEST EXAMPLES OF THE SBN'S FRAUD
FILED
CONSIDER THE EXCISING OF PAGE 1 OF THIS
:;l:im MLItIlCI!'.6.L CIlUK1
(
3/7/12 FILING BY COUGHLIN, AND THAT
lOIZMAR-1 PH 2: 1&
ALLEGATIONS BEING DONE BY A
"1'
REVIEW OF SUCH .PAGE 1
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FOLLOWING THIS ;-SIi.ii. oiNIwada
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(PiiUName);do-hereby''''''' QauIii pclWlyofperj\IIY
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.
ESPECIALLY WHERE
.~ ":~tlio.~.~of'-IIii:I'~~~'~,~~~~.i~.~~~~~jo~cee.t.: : -:
SUCH BARES THE
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SBN'S BATES
ii' . ~
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STAMPING FROM '.
::9:
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THE 11/7/12 io " ,:.iuId rlm~tO.a1ve_tY.tb~jhsco#i',IPII:illniiaUilJmiUii-
SCR 105(2)(c)f ;
.' 3,
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EXHIBIT
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1784
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Court, Reno, Nevada, that I am over thlt age of 18 years and not a party to the above
action, end that on this date, 8ltrved a true end correct copy of the attached document
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
10 Ihe following as set forth below:
Alllaon Orma..
Deputy City Attorn.y
PO BOil 1900
Reno NV 89S0S
Zachary Barker Coughlin, lI.q,

1422 E. 9'" Street .2
Reno NV 89812
X Placing said document In a .ealed envelope and placed for collecting and
mailing by Unites States mall In Reno, Nevada, postage prepaid following ordinary
business practices.
Washoe County Jail
Court Services
Facsimile (FFAX)
Personal Delivery.
20
21
22
23
Rono MuticfPD' CoUtt

Dorothy N..h
ttotme .
.IU<I{Io
po.
BOI lVOO
Rano, NY Blil505
1775) J14.J812
01700
1786
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: NOW, HOW FRAUDULENT IS SBN KING'S FHE9 UPON VIEWING
THIS COMPLETE COPY OF RMC HOLMES' 3/13/12 ORDER (WHICH IS A REAL PIECE
OF WORK ITSELF) WHERE THE PAGE 1 OF 3 OF COUGHLIN'S FILING DISPROVES THE
SBN'S
ALLEGATIONS
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: THE BATES STAMPING IS FROM THE 3,100 PAGE PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS BY THE SBN TO COUGHLIN ON 11/7/12 IN LIEU OF SCR 105(2)(c)
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: HAVING THIS PAGE 1 OF 3

INCLUDED REALLY STEALS THE SBN COMPLAINT'S
THUNDER, WHERE IT CLEARLY REVEALS COUGHLIN IS
AN ATTORNEY, WHICH THE RMC KNEW FULL WELL
ANYWAYS, BUT
WHATEVER, ITS SANDBOX TIME WITH
THE SBN, JUICEBOXES FOR EVERYONE.
NOTE BY COUGHLIN: WHAT COURT FILE STAMPES

ALL THREE PAGES OF A THREE PAGE
FILING? THE RMC.
. 1
1
2
3
4
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Allison Ormaas
PO Box 1900
Reno NV 89505
Reno NV 89612
X Placing said document in a sealed envelope and placed for collecting and
business practices.
Washoe County Jail
Court Services
14
Facsimile (FFAX)
15
16
17
Personal Delivery.
18
19
20
21
22
23

Dorothy Nash Holmes,
Judge
P.O. Box 1900
Reno, NY 89505
(775) 334-3822
01803
.:
..\. I ;" '.
F I LED
Case No. 11CR 22176
..
Dept. 4
DEC 15 2011
~~CQurt-Detlt4
By
DeputrOledl

6
COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA

7
CITY OF RENO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ORDER
10

11
Defendant.
12
----------------------~/
13
14
On November 30, 2011, Defendant Coughlin was found guilty of the

offense of Petit Larceny, a violation of RMC 8.10.040. Thereafter, Appellant filed his
15
Notice of Appeal on December 13, 2011. Additionally, Defendant Coughlin filed a

16
17
Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside, Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Recusal
18
and Motion for Publication of Transcript at Public Expense. Appellant Coughlin
19
requested that he be provided the trial transcript at public expense on the basis that
20
he was indigent. On November 14, 2011, Oefendant Coughlin filed a Motion to

21
22
Proceed In Forma Pauperis wherein he seeks a waiver of certain fees due to his
23
asserted indigence.
24
A. FAILURE TO PROPERLY SERVE CITY ATIORNEY
25
Written motions are to be served upon each of the' parties.
NRS
26
27
178.582.
28
1'0
01830
1787
.. '
Appellant has chosen to serve the City Attorney with these various
1
pleadings via electronic mail. There is no provision in the Nevada Revised Statutes or
the Rules of Court which denotes electronic mail as an appropriate means of service
3
of process. This alone is a basis for non-consideration/denial of Appellant's various

5
requests.
B. MOTION FOR PUBLICATION OF TRANSCRIPT AT PUBLIC EXPENSE and

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
8
9
Defendant Coughlin cites to NRS 12.015 as authority for allowing him to

issue "any, necessary writ, process, pleading or paper without charge, with the
10
11
12
13
exception of jury fees because I lack sufficient financial ability to proceed without this
waiver".
Appellant Coughlin's reference to NRS 12.015 is misplaced as that
provision refers to civil procedure. He cites no other authority for his request.
15
16
This case has gone to verdict and the defendant was found guilty. It is
17
difficult to see what additional costs will be incurred by Appellant Coughlin other than
18
the trial transcript. This is not a complex case with numerous factual or legal issues.
19
Mr. Coughlin is a licensed attorney-at-law who implied during trial that
20
his incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients. Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in
21
22
his "affidavit of poverty" does not indicate any income from his practice of law. Of
23
note, Mr. Coughlin posted cash bail during the litigation of the instant matter.
24
This Court has not been provided sufficient information to determine Mr.
25
Coughlin's indigency status and will not grant him carte blanche authority to continue
26
27
the fishing expedition he conducted during the trial of this matter. Appellant's motion
28
to further pursue this matter at public expense is denied.

2
01831
1788
..
'
C. MonON TOVACATE AND/OR SET ASIDE, MonON FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION FOR RECUSAL
These motions will not be addressed as Defendant Coughlin has not
submitted a basis for their consideration.

5
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Coughlin's Motion to Proceed
6
7
In Forma Pauperis and Motion for Publication of Transcript at Public Expense is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORRDERED that the Motion to Vacate and/or Set

10
11
12
Aside, Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Recusal are presently DENIED.
DATED this
/S
l:R
day of December, 201 .
''''---f.
13
15
16
18
20
21
22
23
21
25
26
27
28
01832
1789
'j
1
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I wn an employee of the Reno MuniciJllI Court,
Reno, Nevada, and that on this date I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document,
3
ORDER on the party(ies) set forth below:

5
6
7
Placing said document in a sealed envelope placed for collecting and mailing in the
United States mail, at Reno, Nevada, postage prepaid, following ordinary business
practices.
Facsimile to :
Reno/Carson Messenger Service.
Federal Express or other overnight delivery.

10
11
12
Inner-officemail following ordinary business pmctices.

Personal Deli very.
13
15
16
City AHomcy's Office

Reno, Nevada 89509
DATED this
JlL
Zachary Coughlin
817 N. Virginia Street, #2
Reno, Nevada 89501
day of De
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
01833
1790
3/9/13
Note by Coughlin: the SBN and RMC need

to answer for whom presented the three
different IFP Motion/Affidavits in
support by Coughlin in the manner in
which they were
presented in an effort to cook up some
phony misconduct charge against
Coughlin in that regard, and this
email to Ballard must be considered in
the context of how such various IFP
Motions or just the pages 2 and 3
thereof were presented.
IFP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION

Sent: Wed 12/14/11 12:22 AM
To: ballardd@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
2 attachments
Coughlin IFP and Financial Inquiry Application RMC 11222011 11
CR 26405 2I.pdf (381.9 KB) , Coughlin IFP and Financial Inquiry
Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 22176 2I.pdf (372.0 KB)
NOTE BY COUGHLIN NOTE IN ORIGINAL EMAIL: THE SBN AND PANEL SO

DESPERATE TO MANUFACTURE SOMETHING TO SUPPORT THEIR FRAUDULENT,
MALEVOLENT, CORRUPT, IMMORAL AGENDA SOUGHT TO AMEND AT THE LAST
MINUTE KING'S COMPLAINT TO INSTEAD OF ALLEGING COUGHLIN FAILED TO
IDENTIFY HIMSELF AS AN ATTORNEY (WHICH KING still attempted to do
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
in his fraudulent presetation in FHE9 (and, really RMC Donna
Ballard and company putting filing stamps on each individual page
of a three page motion is rather fishy, and Ballard's fraud
previously manifested itself in her indicating to Coughlin, in
Reno, NV 89501
writing, that he could file by email in 11 CR 22176 (60838) only
to have her then manipulate the ROA transmitted to the 2JDC in
tel: 775 229-6737
CR11-2064 in the most fraudulent of ways. Ballard seems to have
an utter lack of training as a Court Clerk and a complete lack of
fax: 949 667 7402
understanding of any of the duties that attach to such a
position).
SBN King's maniuplation of the 3,100 page production in lieu of obeying SCR
Nevada Bar No: 9473 105(2)(c) seeks to obscure just whose 24 Exhibit "thing" or "presentation"
or...who knows, there is no cover letter, no caption, King failed to adhere
to his promise to reveal the names of those on the screening panel (he
claimed to have no remembrance of any of them...Judge W. Gardner indicated a
violation of SCR 123(3) during the 4/10/12 trial in 11 CR 26405
when he indicated he had inside information as to when the Bar and the
Ms. Ballard,
Screening Panel would be taking action (including on his sister's grievance
against Coughlin...appearance of bias, and impropriety much?). See 61901.
Please note, the gentleman I worked with at the filing office counter today informed me there were no
appeal fees, bonds, or other charges that I could pay (including transcription costs) as "all charges are
being taken from" my bail in the respective matters. Please email me the audio from the November
20th,2011 Trial in 11 cr 22176 2I and proof of service of any Contempt Order or Guilty Verdict/Order in that
matter. Please file this as well as a Opposition to Any Motion to Continue Trial in 11 cr 26405, dept 2, and
a Motion to Set Aside or Vacate any Order Granting Continuance in response to such an Order Granting
Continuance. Please email, fax, or mail me a copy of the Notice of Appearances by both Taitel and
Puentes and the Motion and Order Granting Withdrawal of Taitel, if it exists. I would like a copy of the
docket in both 11 CR 26405 2I and 11 CR 22176, despite your informing me today that I would need to
subpoena the docket to have any chance of seeing it and that I would not be provided access to
documents in the public record, including Orders in both of these cases.
https://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=95689645-bb96-411a-b0aa-dca3e2fd37c1,m&isSafe=false&FolderID=66666666-6666-6666-6666-6
1/2
3/9/13
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on
the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named
distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is
prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please
notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately.
Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or
other applicable privilege.
https://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=95689645-bb96-411a-b0aa-dca3e2fd37c1,m&isSafe=false&FolderID=66666666-6666-6666-6666-6
2/2
This bates stamped, 01965, page from the 3,100 pages the OBC's King had delivered to Coughlin
four judicial days before the 11/14/12 hearing is an index to 24 Exhibits, such collection is
included with absolutely no indication as to whom put it together, for what purposes, whether it
was something presented to the Screening Panel (the collection appears to be from right around
the 4/11/12 time frame in which the various statements made by Susich (in his 60975 SCR 117
Petition), RMC Judge W. Gardner (on the record in 11 CR 26405 on 4/10/12 where he admits to SCR
Page Nos.
Exhibit
Description
1.
Order filed December 16, 2011
1-3
Order AffIrming Ruling of the Reno Municipal Court
4-7
2.
3.
Order for Summary Punishment of Contempt Committed in the
4.
Amended Criminal Complaint filed December 5, 2011, Case No. RCR
8-9
Immediate View and Presence of the Court
NOTE: comments
in different
font by
Coughlin
10-14
2011-063341
5.
Criminal Complaint filed January 23,2012, Case No. RCR 2012-065630
15-18
6.
Notice of Appearance, Entry of Plea of Not Guilty, Waiver of Right to
1 9-2 6
Arraignment; Motion to Dismiss filed February 21, 2012, Case No. RCR
2012-065630
7.
Criminal Complaint, Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause

entered November 14,2011 in Case No. 11-22185
8.
Order Suspending Proceedings filed April 10,2012, Case no. 11 CR
9.
Notice of Appearance as Co-Counsel and Motion to Dismiss filed March
27-31
32
26405
33-72
5, 2012, Case No. 11 CR 26405
Order (#1) filed March 20,2012, Case No. 11 CR 26405
11.
Order (#2) filed March21, 2012, Case No. 11 CR26405
73-74
12.
Order Finding the Defendant in Contempt of Court and Imposing
77-80
10 .
13 .
14 .
75-76
Sanctions filed February28, 2012, Case No. 11 TR 26800 21

Order filed March 12,2012, Case No. 11 TR 26800 21
Financial Inquiry Application and Motion to Proceed Infonna Pauperis
81-86
never seen a
Certificate of
Service of FHE11
87
filed December 14,2011, Case No. 11 CR 2640521

15.
Affidavit of Poverty in Support of Motion to Proceed Infonna Pauperis
88-89
filed December 14, 2011, Case No. 11 CR 26405 21

16.
Order filed December 15,2011, Case No. l1CR22176
90-93
17.
Affidavit of Matthew Thompson w/attached Marshall's report
94-97
18.
Affidavit of Scott Coppa w/attached Marshall's report
] 9.
Affidavit of Daniel Casillas, Court Specialist
108-]09
Affidavit of Cassandra Jackson, Court Administrator for Reno Municipal
110-111
2b.
98-107
Court
21.
Notice of Appearance, Motion for Continuance, Etc. filed November 30,
112-255
2011, Case No. 11 CR 22176 21

22.
Notice of Appeal of Summary Contempt Order; Motion to Return
256-479
Personal Property Confiscated By Reno Municipal Court and its

Marshals; Motion for New Trial and to Alter or Amend Summary
Contempt Order filed March 7, 2012, Case No. 11 TR26800
23.
Motion to Return Cell Phones; Motion to Set Aside Summary Contempt
480-697
Order; and Notice of Appeal of Summary Contempt Order filed March
SCR 121(3)
24.'
12,2012, Case No. 11 TR 26800
2009, Case No. DV08-01 1 68

Order After Trial filed AQril13,
698-711
SCR 123(3) violations and extra-judicial communications in another tacky display and cheap attempt
at intimidation (we get it, she's your sister, enough already; how he can possibly keep a straight
face when professing to not understand how the appearance of bias, impartiality, or impropriety
might attach to his steadfast insistence that he is the only municipal court judge whom could
possibly preside of Coughlin's criminal trespass matter is truly intriguing...however, clearly,
nearly every word he uttered on the record in the official certified transcript thereof reveals a
terribly one-sided display of jurisprudence that is embarrassing, and bookends King's ridiculous
allegation in his )
Complaint that a Motion to Dismiss filing by Coughlin of 3/5/12 is somehow, on its face,
01965
evidence that Coughlin is unfit as an attorney, where, actually, Coughlin broke the scandal of the
WCSO burglarizing tenants, depriving 24 hours from tenant receipt of summary lockout order.
. _ _ _ _ _ _~. _ _ _ 4_' __ ' ___ ' _
.___
___
_ '-0 - - _ _ , __ , - - - -
...... --.~ .. ' - - - - , - - ... - . -
- - - - - - - - - - . - - . - - - - .. - - - -... - - - -
NOMUNICIPALCOURTF ,
CIorIl 01Il10 Cowt
WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA
Plaintiff,
10
Dept. 4
vs.
ZACHARY COUGHLIN,
8
9
NOV 302011
Oeputy Clerk .
CITY OF RENO,
LED
Court Oept. 4
Defendant.
ORDER FOR SUMMARY

PUNISHMENT OF CONTEMPT
COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE
VIEW AND PRESENCE
OF THE COURT
I
---;;W"'~""IE'"R=EA"S"'N""R=S""2"'6"'6"".S"'7"'0"'d'-ec-;i'""ares-=that municipal judge may punish for contempt for
the same acts or omissions, in the same manner nod with the same effects as provided for
judges in Chapter 22 of Nevada Revised Statute, nod
II
12
13
14
15
WHEREAS NRS 22.030 declares that when a contempt is committed in the immediate
view nod presence of the Court or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for
which an order shall be made, reciling the facts as occurring in such immediate view and
presence, adjudging that the person p'roceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt and that
he/she be punished as therein prescnbed. and
WHEREAS, on the 30'h day of November, 20 II, the above named defendwlt appeared
before this court.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
NAME: ZACHERY COUGHLIN, who is a DEFENDANT

_ _ _ _ _ Party;
Witness;
Spectator, and
WHEREAS such individual committed the following oct(s) in the immediate view nod
presence of the Court:
Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while he is

holding court, or engaged in his judicial duties at chambers,
To wit: Refusing to obey directives of the .Judge,continuing lines ofinguiry after
bein advised b the Court t re In from doln s Demea in the Court with
statements such a8 0
n resnonse to court rulfngsi Laughing during
testimony and further gue..tioning the court Rnd its 8 thority ..
A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence of the
Court, or in its immediate vicinity. tending to intemlpt due to the course of the trial or other
judicial proceeding,
Refusing to be sworn or answer 09 a witness.
27
....
.. 1."ItlC:V',,1.10&<.,
'0",_
-.-.\,.n ....... N
_ _ _ _ Disobeying a lawful writlorder/rule/process issued by the Court/judge at

chwnbers. and WHEREAS such conduct:
_ _ _ _ Demeaned the Court
28
_ __ _ Derogated the authority of the Court

",..,_--.:V"""::...._ Intcrfcrcd with the Ilrd~r1y administration of jllstice and rc'luir.'tl immcdiat~
vindication by the Coun to preserve order and respect.
01692
1791
Based upon the above finding ZACHARY COUGHLIN is Guilty of Direct
2
3
4
5
Contempt.
The Contemnor, when asked if4iilJshe had anything to say as to why sentence should
not be pronounced", replied:
.s.~~
&ceao
6
7
8
9
10
Therefore,lT [S HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the

contemnor is hereby sentenced to the following punishment:
A fine in the amount of($500 or less).
Imprisonment for (25 days or less), NO ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING.
II
12
13
DEFENDANTTOBERELEASEDon
I:L-
:i-II
.rf- 6 fm.
,2011.
A fine in the amount of _ _ _ _ ($500 or less) and imprisorunent for _ _
14
DA YS WASHOE COUNTY JA[L - No alternative sentencing.
15
Release on Own Recognizance revoked, bail set al: __
16
Defendant is hereby remanded into the custody and will be seen in video
17
8ITIIigrunents on _ _ _-', 20 II, at 8:30 a.m. NO BAIL HOLD PENDING
18
19
20
21
22
SENTENCING.
DATED this 30lh dayofNovember. 2011.
Veronica Lopez refused to provide a copy of
this Order to Coughlin after she lied
in indicating she would fax it to him.
NOTE BY Coughlin: this Order was not served on Coughlin or in any way provided to
him on the night of his summary arrest on 11/30/11 (notice the lack of a time stamp
24 compared to where Judge Nash Holmes' 2/28/12 summary contempt Order does include a
3:47 p.m. date and time stamping...the RMC has never served a Notice of Entry of
25
this Order on Coughlin, and Judge Howard's statements on the record, in absentia of
26 the prosecutor, reveal an intent to mislead Coughlin into thinking he would not be
able to appeal this summary contempt Order, especially where Judge Howard then
27
points out that he was remiss not to indicate on the record earlier when rendering
28 his judgement, that Coughlin had a right to appeal the petty larceny conviction.
Judge Howard did manage to mention how he was "saddened" by the damages his
r ....
refusing a stay of any sort to then practicing attorney Coughlin would result in to
.'-1111+,"
Coughlin's clients, but, hey, when a municipal court judge wants to summarily
never mind.... incarcerate an attorney for saying "Wow", what are you gonna do, right? At least
he didn't brazenly abuse his contempt power, violate the Sixth Amendment in denying
one qualifying on a per se basis as an indigent under the 2008 Indigent Defense
01693
Order (which he willfully ignores in an brazen act of judicial misconduct,
whilst also countenancing prosecutorial misconduct where the Reno City Attorneys prosecute
continuously on arrests they know are made in violation of Nevada
1792
law where the Indian Colony Wal-Mart's tribal police violate NRS 171.1255 in making misdemeanor
arrest for thefts allegedly occurring outside their presence.
23
_..
~
.,.",nr"LII:~"
I_
If you think that it is possible that former prosecutor turned RMC Judge Howard was perhaps reacting
to Coughlin's attaching articles on prosecutorial misconduct to his Motion for Continuance submitted
the day before the 11/30/11 trial, you could be forgiven. Especially, where Coughlin touched on
Marshal Menzel's bullying, hostile approach to Coughlin upon Coughlin seeking the names of
prospective court appointed defenders for the purpose of doign a
conflicts check which
former prosecutor turned RMC Judge W. Gardner, brother to former prosecutor turned judge 2JDC Judge
Linda Gardner, refused to provide to Coughlin, which led to
Coughlin being appointed Lew Taitel,
Esq., whose unauthorized practitioners of eviction law business partners Nevada Court Services,
Coughlin was Z Zach Coughlin, Esq.
suing at just
3
Reno, NV 89501
that time in
Tele: 775-338-8118
CV11-03126.
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney for Defendant Coughlin
IN TI-IE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO

STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR
TIIE COUNTY OF WASHOE
8
9
10
11
CITY OF RENO;
12
Plaintiff.
13
v.
14
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

Defendant.
15
Case No:ll CR 2217621

ept No: Judge Howard
E
16
17&-__________________________________
18
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
l'
28
21
22
23
24
2S
26
Z7
It is important to state again here that the Bailiffwsa threatening and retaliatory
when the undersigned appeared before Judge Gardner on October 10, 2011, including
making intimidating statements to the undersigned seemingly in a retaliatory fashion
and designed to prevent the undersigned from seeking court appointed representation.
The Bailiffs name might have been "Monte" or something similar, however, the
records of that interaction are being held under an impermissible rent distraint by an
opposing attorney. Obviously, such actions, when combined with the lack of a PD at
the arraignment, an arraignment video being shown by the court which contains
threatening statements and overly ominous tones when advising litigants against
appearing pro se, the City of RenolReno Municpal Court's alleged practice of only
hiring "fanner prosecutors" to be court appointed counsel, in conjunction with the
failure to allow the defendant access to the PC sheet and discovery for over 1 month,
much less 48 hours from the arrest, combine to make a fair trial impossible in this
28
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE: MOTION FQ&~~4bilG correct copy

Page 1
the records of the Reno Municipal Court. RenO,

Nevada, and that the Clerk of the Court II the ~=~~
original record and that I am a
make In
MUNICI~~~n
01707
ABA Section ofLitigation Annual Conference, April J6 - J8, 2008:

Crossing the Line: Responding to Prosecutorial Misconduct
Crossing the Line:

Responding to ProsecutorialMisconduct
INTRODUCTION
Among lawyers, a prosecutor is in a unique position. Normally a lawyer is free to-indeed, expected
to-zealously advocate on behalf of his or her client. Prosecutors, however, are not simply advocates
for the government. They are also ministers of justice whose aim is not to "win a case, but that justice
shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78. 88 (1935). As such, "[iJt is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one." Id; see generally Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor:r
Duty to Truth, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 309 (2001).
By now, the actions of Michael Nifong, the fonner District Attorney of Durham County, North
Carolina, that led to his disbarment are well known. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke
Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice", 76
Fordham L. Rev. 1337 (2007). Some argue that the situation involving Nifong is an isolated case. Yet
prosecutorial overreaching has been an issue well before this headline-grabbing case came along.
A recent report issued by the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice referred to a
study that reviewed 2,130 California appeJlate C8!es in which a claim ofprosecutorial misconduct was
raised. Cal. Comm'n on the Fair Admin. of Justice, Report and Recommendations on Professional
Responsibility and Accountability of Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers (2007), available at
http://www.ccfaj .org!documents/reports/prosecutoriaIJofficiaVofficial
report
on
reporting
misconduct.pdf. Of those 2,130 cases, 443 resulted in findings that prosecutorial misconduct actually
occurred. . In 53 of the 443 cases, a reversal of conviction was the result-the rest concluding that the
misconduct was harmless error. Perhaps the most disturbing statistic is that a follow-up study looking
at half of the cases resulting in a reversed conviction concluded that the prosecutor was not referred to
the California State Bar for discipline, which is required under California law. If there is a positive
aspect to the Duke Lacrosse saga, it is that Nifong's actions and ultimate disbatment have served to
highlight the important issue of prosecutorial misconduct and the need for effective remedies.
Few would claim that any prosecutor intentionalIy sets out to seek the conviction of an innocent
person. Rather, it is argued that prosecutorial misconduct stems from a "win at all cost" mentality
underlying the desire to further a career, or a firm belief in the defendant's guilt notwithstanding
admissible evidence. See Joseph F. Lawless, Prosecutorial Misconduct 1:06, at 1-15 (3d ed. 2003).
Regardless of the causes, the effects of prosecutorial misconduct are distressing. Two different studies
of persons exonerated by DNA evidence have shown that prosecutorial misconduct played a role in
convicting an innocent person nearly half of the time. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
01739
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Jon Sands
Federal Public Defender
Phoenix, Arizona
Steven Kalar
AFPD
San Francisco; California
Geoffrey Hansen
Chief Assistant Public Defender
San Francisco, California
Chris Miles
R&W Attorney, FPD
San Francisco, California
Peter Davids
Associate
Jones Day
Jonathan Katchen
Assistant Attorney General
State of Alaska, Dept. of Law
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor- indeed, he
should do so. But. while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Berger v. United States. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)
... it is the responsibility of the United States Attorney and his senior staff to create a
culture where 'win-at-any-cost' prosecution is not permitted. Indeed, such a culture must
be mandated from the highest levels of the United States Department of Justice and the
United States Attorney General. It is equally important that the courts of the United
States must let it be known that. when substantial abuses occur, sanctions will be imposed
to make the risk of non-compliance too costly.
United States v. Shaygan, 661 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1292 (S.D.Fla. 2009)
"The Court finds [the government's] explanation wholly incredible."

United States v. Stevens, 593 F.Supp.2d 177, 181 (D.D.Ct. 2009)
Prosecutorial Misconduct
01752
Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................. 3
1.
Policing the Prosecutors .................................................. 3

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
II.
Ethical Immunity Before 1998 ..................... . ......... . .. 3

The Citizens Protection Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. 530B .............. 5
The Hyde Amendment .............. . ......................... 7
Criminal Contempt ........................................... 9
Case Remedies - Mistrial, Dismissal, Jury Instruction ............... 9
Winning-At-All-Costs: Prosecutorial Misconduct During Various Phases of a Criminal

Prosecution ............ . .............................................. 10
A.
Pre-Indictment Investigation and The Grand Jury ..... . ..... . ...... 10

1.
2.
3.
4.
Subpoenas to Defense Counsel .................... 10

Pre-indicttrtent Contact with Represented Witnesses .,. 11
Exculpatory Evidence Before the Grand Jury ......... 12
Miscellaneous Prosecutorial Misconduct Within the Grand
Jury ................. . ......... . ... . .. . ... . ... 13
B.
Brady, Due Process, and State Ethical Rules on Discovery ........ . . 14
C.
Prosecutorial Misconduct During Trial .......................... 19

1.
2.
3.
4.
D.
III.
Misconduct During Jury Selection ................. 19

Improper Conduct During Opening Statements ....... 19
Ethical Problems with Government Witnesses and Trial
Evidence ..................................... 20
Improper Closing Arguments ...... . .............. 21
Broken Promises: Breached Pleas at Sentencing ................... 26
Normalizing Justice ............ . . . ....... .. . . .. . ......... . ............. . 27

A.
The Proposed Expansion of Rule 16 and DOl's Opposition .. .. , ... . . 27
B.
For the Defense - Commentators' Opinions and Recommendations . .. 29
Parting Thoughts .... . .......................... . .................. . ........ . . 32

Appendices
Prosecutorial Misconduct
01753
..
F I LED
elecltOnicaUy
03-15-2012:08:21:48 PM
Joey Orduna HasHng.

Cletlc oIlhe Court
r~"dI,," 2829788
J
4
5
6
IN THE SECOND JUDiCIAl DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
8
9
ZAO-tARY BAkeR COUGHUN,
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Appellant,
case No.:
Dept No.:
vs.
CRl1-2064
10
em OF RENO, a munldpal corporation,

Respondent.
- - - - - - - - - -______________~I
ORDER AfFIRMING RUUNq or THI! RIINO MUNIQPAl COURI

Presently before the Court Is an Appeal from a ruling o( the Reno Munldpal Court,
"led by Appellant ZACHARY BAKER COUGHUN (hereafter "Appellant") on December 23,
2011. Following, on February 7, 2012, Appellant tiled his Opening Brief on Appeal.
19
20
Thereafter, on February 23, 2012, Respondent
cm OF RENO (hereinafter "Respondent")
"led Its Answering Brie'. The matter I, now before the Court 'or Its consideration.
21
22
This matter comes before the Court on a criminal appeal from the Reno Munldpal
Court. On November 3D, 2011, Appellant was convicted of Petit Larceny, a violation
ot
RMC 8.10.040. Thereafter, on December 13, 2011, Appellant tiled a Notice ot Appeal with
the Court.
23
24
2S
Although Appellant's arguments on appeal are unclear, Appellant raises a wide
26
variety o( issues, Including, inter aI/iT. thaI he was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to
27
Counsel, that the MuniCipal Court erred In railing to grant him a conttnuance, that the
28
prosecution engaged In misconduct, that he was refused an opportunity to lesH"" on his
'I
1.
I ho,..". eonItt IhEa 'II llUI and correct eot:It' 01 rhe Of

Ihl ''lOO~ 01 !ft, Reno MunJcIoaI C'xlft. ReftQ. w~
Newecta. .1nd rtlGI rfle cr. 01"'1 eoul! I. 11'1. oustodlul
'~1I1"ftIOOId
I_1M "'ft:Irtud '0 P'!" . . . . ,ltier.'..."".,....
""NIt
co
03087
1793
_ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _
___
'1
2
3
4~
______
.-,- ......... -
-----
------ ------ ------ ---
.......
own behalf, that certain evidence should have been suppressed

pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment of the United Slates Constitution, that hiS conviction
Is not supported by
suffldent evidence, and that "[t}urth er Improprlelles and due proces
s delldendes"
occurred.
Unfortunately, Appellant neither supports his arguments with relevan

t authority nor
dtatfons to relevant portfons of the record. Most Importantfy, Appell
ant has railed to
provide this Court with a copy of the
transcrtpt of relevant proceedings In the Reno
8 Munldpal Court. llIe Nevada Supreme Court has held that an "[ajpp ellant has
the ultima
9
10
11
12
13
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
responsibility to provfde this court with 'portions of the record essent

fal to detennlnatfon of
Issues raised In appellant's appea l: 7'1Iom4I If, State, 120 Nev.
31 n. 4, 83 P.3d 818
(2004) (citing NRAP 30(b)( 3). Further, NRAP 28(e) provfdes that
"[eJvel'f assertion In
briefs regarding matters In the record shall be supported by a referen
ce to the page of the
transcript or appendix where the matter relied on Is to be found.
"
While Appellant did provide this Court with iI Compact Disc contain
ing a recording
0'
the Munldpal Court proceedings, Appellllnt did not dte to the POrtion
s of the Compact Disc
that he 'elt supported his arguments, and It Is not the responsibility
of this Court to guess
which portions of the Compact Disc might support Appellant's argum
ents. In short,
Appellant did not satlsf'y his responsibility to supply ilnd cite to relevan
t portfons of the
record merely by producing a Compact Disc recording of the entfre
Munldpal Court
proceeding.
21
22
2J
24
In light of Appellant's failure
to provide this Court with an adequate appellate
record, and Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a record

, this Court Is unable
to conduct a meaningful review Appellant's appeal. Thus, Appell
ant has failed to meet
0'
/II
25 /II
26 1/1
27 1/1
28 /II
03088
1794
'-.
1 his burden In providing an adequate appellate record, and this Court must affirm the ruling
0'
the Reno Munldpal Court. I
3
NOW, THI!RI!FORE, IT IS HI!RI!BY ORDI!RED that the ruling
4 Municipal Court Is AfFIRMED.
0'
the Reno
5
IT IS FURTHER ORDERID that this matter Is remanded back to the Reno
6 Munldpal Court 'or all further proceedings.
7
8
9
.."'.... -'2....,,, ..."" ,..,~

~_
10
P.EWOTT
DIstrict Judge
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
L8
L9
20
21
2l
23
24
25
1 It Is..o.tn notlnlllha!, pursuant to NItS ~.~10(1). '(tJI>e lees rer transcrtpts and copies (01 municipal court
proceedings) must be paid by the party ordering them. In a cJvll case Ihe preparation 01 the transcrtpt need
not commence until the leeo hav" been deposited with the deputy derlo
the court. ACCD<dlnglV. NRS
189.030.....hlch requires the muniCipal court 10 transmit yarlous paPIn to the district court upon appell. doe.
not require IcIIon un~1 such lees have been paid. Here. it appears that Appellant never paid the requlolte
I... to secure the tran5Cl1pUon 01 the Proceedln\lS. For this reason. the appellate record Is Incomplete
26
0'
27
28
,
II
.J.
I.
03089
1795
... _.. ____ . ___ . . __ . . . . . . __. ._._._4._ . _______.

_~.
~.
CeRnfiCATI OF MAILING
2
I hereby certll'y that I electronically med the foregoing with the Oertc of the Court by
3 using the ECF system
whlc~ served the follOwing parties electronically:
4 ZACHARY COUGHUN, ESQ. for ZACHARY COUGHUN

5 PAMELA ROBERTS, ESQ. for CITY OF RENO
6
7
DATED this
15
~~M_~
. E IHO
10
Judicial AsSistant
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
.....
03090
1796
RECEIVED 09/1012e12 B7:e1

09J'l0 / :!OU 08:10 FAl
776 SU ""'8
7753488859
RG HILL Ofln
Cr1.ina! D1vhloD
1II0001/ 000S
-"""""-
NOTE by Coughlin: if you think it is inappropriate and

FILE D
tacky for the Reno City Attorney to be faxing Richard G.
Hill, Esq. this Order from the 2JDC, then for Hill to
08-272012:10:10:50 AM
deliver it to the SBN, where Hill himself burglarized
CforkClfh Coud
Coughlin's former home law office, then lied to and with
Tra~ 113178051
the Reno Police Department to effectuate a wrongful
arrest on Coughlin that led to the trespass conviction in
61901
to permanently disbar Coughlin, even where it
for which the NNDB Panel alleges is a basis to
was Hill whom burglarized Coughlin's former home
permanently disbar Coughlin, despite the collateral bar
IN 1HE SEOJNO JUDIOAL DISlRICT COURT OF1liE STAlE OF tllNNJA
6
presented by the SBN only filing an SCR 111(4) Petition,
IN AND RlR lHE aJUNIY OF WASHOE law office then lied to and with
7
you are not alone.
the RPD in effecting a wrongful custodial arrest
8
for trespassing on Coughlin at Hill's direction,
9
then a wrongful custodial arrest for jaywalking
10
again at Hill's direction two seven weeks later.
11
Case No.: 0112-1262
12
Dept. No.: 10
13
14 arv OF RBl, a mlllidpal
~.
IS
Q)fJ)OI1IIfon,
16
17 II-----------------~I
18
19
20
21
22
23
ORDER GIWIJIJHi RESpONDENTS MOTION TO C!JSHJS!!!PfAI
Plesently beft>... tile Coort, Is a Motion to DIsmiss Appeal flied by Respondent 01Y
OF ReID ('_dent") 00 July 31,2012 FoIowfng, 00 August 14, 2012, Respondent
IiIed _ _ for SUbmission, thereby submitting the . . - fi>< the Court's ~.

On August 15, 2012, AjlpeIIont ZAOIARY IW<ER CXlUGHLIN ('AppoIIant") tiled an
0pp00ItiDn to Motion 10 _ _
24
25
26
On
_be< 13, 2011, AppoIIant _ d1aI!Je<I wlIj T~ under Reno
MooIdpaI Code, Section 8."10.010 by way of cnnInai Complaint upon arrest. On Jme 18,
27
2012, AppeIant .... fOund gully or trespassing by the Honorable Y.1l1Jam _
28
Reno M'-paI
Of the
Coon. On Jutv 18, 2012, AppeRant!lled NotIce or Appeal In II1Is moiler.
-1-
01677
------..-...--.--- .._ .. .._.- ---_.....-.--- _.- -- -- -._

..
---RECEIYD
O\)I'l O/ tOU: 08:10 FAI
89/1812912 87:81
7715 Ut " ~8
. ..
RG HILL OiTD
77!534B8858
cr1.1Ul Dlyll10n
..
...
IiIOOGI/OOO,
Respcndeltftles this InstInt Hollon IX> Dismiss AA>eaI based on AppoI/3rfi untimely
tiling pun;uan: IX> NItS 189.010. NRS 189.010 esGlbIlsheS the ~me WithIn _
DeIendont In. atminalaclfoo b10d _ . Justice d tile peace may oppeoI from the ftnal
on appeoI
3 fit"". M\ndpIII Court must bellied. I n _ pert,. Nf\S 189.010 _ _ a
5 judgment therein IX> the cI5trtct court. . , lit any time wMI1In 10 days from the Ilme d tile
6
7
renditicn d the judgrnert.

Jr.,Jt,s considering the papers .n:f plea dings on fie
8 that Appellant wotAd have IX> have _

9
10
11
12
13
herefn~
his Appeal 00 or _
<lid oot file hiS //OIIce 01 AppeoIlIlIIt July 18, 2DU, after the
this CDUrt haG detennIned
_no
June 28, 2012. Appellant
had passed.
'AcconfIn9Iv, Respcndelt's mellon ~ grlO1Ied.

NOW, THI!II!FORE,. IT IS HERSIY 0ItDUED!hat Res!>OOcfenI's _
IX>
0ISnB Is GllAlf'lliD_
14
15
dovd~2oI2.
~~
16
17
STCVeNP.
DIsIr1ct Judge
18
19
20
21
22
23
2.
25
2li
27
28
-2
01678
__
_ .... '
_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _. _ _ _
. ORIUt zOn 08:10 PAl
__
. __ .... _ _ _ _ M.' ... '
RECEIVED a9/18/2812 87:81

77534a8858
17' 334 "11
Cr1a1nal D1vhlon
_ _ _____ __ _ _ _ __
RG HILL CHTD
llIooo"/OOO"
.RK11I'IC6TE OF 'Mil JIG
1
2
....,.. ~
I hereby aortily tI1at I eIecIJOnlaIIIy ftled the roregoIng wfth the 0er1< d the Qlurt by
using the ECf system WhIdlserved the rOllowlng parttes eIedronIcaIly:
4 ZJCIWl.y COUGHUN. ESQ. for ZACHARY OOUGKJN

5 0iRIS HAZLElT-STEVelS. ESQ. for aTY OF RENO
6 lnL DRAkE for CI1Y OF RENO
7
DATEP tillS
.;.
10
11
12
13
I'
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
:!Ii
27
28
-3-
01679
---_._._..
'"
F I LED
Eleclronically
08-272012:10:10:50 AM
Joey Orduna Hasllngs
Cler1c 01 the Court
TronsaCllon" 3176051
2
3
4
5
6
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAl DI5T1UCT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
9
10
ZACHARY BAKER COUGHUN,
11
Appellant,
12
13
14
15
16
vs.
case No.:
Dept. No.:
CR12-1262
10
CITY OF RENO, a munldpal
corporation,
Respondent
- - - - - - -_ _ _ _ _~I
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS MODON TO DISMISS APPEAL
Presently before the Court, Is a Motion to Dismiss Appeal flied by Respondent
cm
OF RENO ("Respondent") on July 31,2012. folloWing, on August 14, 2012, Respondent

flied a Request for Submission, thereby submitting the matter for the Court's conslderatfon.
On August 15, 2012, APpellant ZACHARY BAKER COUGHUN ("Appellant") flied an
Opposltfon to Motfon to Dlsmlss.
2S
On November 13, 2011, Appellant was charged witt) Trespassing under Reno
26
Municipal Code, Sectlon 8.10.010 by way of Criminal Complaint upon arrest. On June 18,
27
2012, Appellant was found guilty of trespassing by the Honorable WIlliam Gardner of the
28
Reno Municipal Court. On July 18, 2012, Appellant flied a Notice of Appeal In this matter.
(-.3
03061
1797
Respondent flies this Instant Motion to Dismiss Appeal based on Appellant's untimely
filing pursuant to NRS 189.010. NRS 189.010 establishes the time within which an appeal
from a Municipal Court must be flied. In relevant part, NRS 189.010 states that a
Defendant In a almlnal action tried before I Justice of the peace may appeal from the flnal
judgment therein to the district court. .. , at any time within 10 days from the time ot the
rendition
8
9
10
11
12
13
ot the judgment.
Alter consldertng the papers and pleadings on file herein, this Court has determined
that Appellant would have to have flIed his Appeal on or before June 28, 2012. Appellant
did not flle his Notice
ot Appeal until July 18, 2012, after the deadline had passed.
Accordingly, Respondent's motion Is granted.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's Motion to

Dismiss Is GRANTED.
14
IS
DATeD this ;;)
If
day of August, 2012.
16
17
18
District Judge
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-2-
03062
1798
CERDFICATE OF MAJUNG
2
3
I hereby certify that I electronIcally filed the foregoIng with the aerie of the Court by
uSIng the ECF system whIch served the followtng parties electronIcally:
4 ZACHARY COUGHUN. ESQ. for ZAOiARY COUGHUN

5 CHRIS HAZlETT-ST1:VENS. ESQ. for CITY OF RENO
6 Jill DRAKE for CITY OF RENO
7
8
DATED this
c:(
9
HEJDIHOW
10
Judicial Assistant
11
12
13
14
15
NOTE by Coughlin, consider the following excerpt from the

transcript of the 11/14/12 formal hearing for the following FHE14.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 304:1 to 304:15) MR. KING:
In
16 other words, everything Mr. Coughlin sent, oftentimes with

17 these multiple captions where he's sending them to many
18 people, he might caption as a pleading, it doesn't make it
19 a pleading. It has to be something that was sent to us,
20 filed in, and that would be a pleading. And if there was

such a thing as file stamped with the supreme court, it
21
will go up. MR. VELLIS: That is my question. It doesn't
22
have to be necessarily be brought up here, but if it was
23 submitted and file stamped as being submitted, then it's
24 part of the record that goes up, whether it was mentioned
25 here or not? MR. KING: Correct. That would be my
26 understanding. Only if it was properly filed, timely
27 filed, stamped in by the court
28
3-
03063
1799
,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4 _ _ _ _ _ _
______ ._,
NOTE By Coughlin: why isnt' this 10/31/12 filing with the SBN by Coughlin anywhere in the 2/13/13
ROA? Who gave Laura Peters permission
to remove it from the ROA?
';'/
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INCIDENT INFORMATION
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T12007703
THEFT TYPE
LOCATION TYPE
DATE/TIME ENDED
DATE/TIME REPORTED
09/21/2012 07:55 PM
09/21/2012 08:09 PM
APPROVED BY
7750 West 4th Street, 431, Reno, NV

METHOD OF ENTRY METHOD OF EXIT
R2273/Carol Starks
PT OF ENTRY PT OF EXIT
ENTRY LOC
PERSON LISTINGS
3(5621 /,67,1*6
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Zach
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DOB
***
EYE COLOR
RACE
HAIR COLOR
SEX
AGE
*
HEIGHT
DRIVER LIC NO
WEIGHT
LIC ST
CELL PHONE
EMAIL
RESIDENCE ADDRESS
HOME PHONE
EMPLOYER NAME
***
BUSINESS ADDRESS
***
WORK PHONE
TYPE
LAST NAME
MIDDLE NAME
SUB
SSN
grant
***
INITIAL X DATE/TIME STARTED

SUPP
09/21/2012 10:55 AM
LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE
Storage Shed
5HWDLO 6WRUH
INCIDENT CODE INCIDENT TYPE

TRESPASS
Trespassing
REPORT FILED FROM
TRACKING NUMBER
'2%
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FIRST NAME
matt
ETHNICITY
RESIDENT
DOB
EYE COLOR
RACE
HAIR COLOR
SEX
AGE
HEIGHT
DRIVER LIC NO
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LIC ST
CELL PHONE
RESIDENCE ADDRESS
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***
BUSINESS ADDRESS
***
WORK PHONE
Marvin Dye Jr
EMAIL
superior.storage@yahoo.com
EMPLOYER NAME
***
1$55$7,9(
NARRATIVE
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Please place a copy of this complaint of police harrassment by Officer Alan Weaver in his personnel file. I already spent 18
days in jail incident to his wrongful July 3rd, 2012 arrest in 12 cr 12420, and his and Sargent Dye's fraudulent and succesful
to have my bail raised impermissbly on July 5th, 2012. Further, please do the same for Sargent Oliver Miller and Ltn. Kevin
Brown as they threatened me with criminal trespass where I still had a valid lease at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Northwinds
Apartments. Now today, they are up to it again at Superior Mini Storage. Pursuant to an agreement of August 28th, 2012, I
am a sublesse to Derek Swanson, some might say, and have 30 days thereunder to use the facility, whereupon contractual
interpretation need be done as to whether that is a reoccuring monthly agreement/obligation. See Soldal v Cook County for
the proposition that it is a 42 USC Sec 1983 violation for OFficer Weaver to seek to play landlord tenant Judge. Weaver was
harrassing me again today and threatened to make another baseless custodial arrest of me, then subsequently returned to
Superior Storage in an attempt to influence another private citizens, similar to the Milan Krebs "distrubing the peace" arrest of
July 3rd, 2012, to sign another baseless criminal complaint at Weaver's urging. His lack of professionalism is appalling.
Further, he an Sargent Dye attempted to intimidate me as a witness, Dye finding me thirty minutes after midnight in a parking
lot the night before trial, Weaver by making menacing jestures in court the mornign of Trial. Superior and Matt and Ken Grant
admit to illegally locking out tenants for 14 years by disablign the gate code if rent not paid by the 10th day of the month,
which violates NRS 108, further if the disagree to the arrangment I have with Swanson, they need pursue a civil rememdy,
not have Officer Weaver embarass the force some more.
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Page 1 of 1
Page 1 of 2

INCIDENT INFORMATION
INCIDENT CODE INCIDENT TYPE
INITIAL
LOCATION TYPE
DATE/TIME STARTED
SUPP X 09/21/2012 08:45 PM

LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE
TRESPASS
Trespassing
REPORT FILED FROM
TRACKING NUMBER
T12007705
THEFT TYPE
DATE/TIME ENDED
DATE/TIME REPORTED
09/21/2012 08:45 PM
09/21/2012 08:49 PM
APPROVED BY
7750 West 4th Street, 431, RENO, NV

METHOD OF ENTRY METHOD OF EXIT
R2273/Carol Starks
PT OF ENTRY PT OF EXIT
ENTRY LOC
Storage Shed
PERSON LISTINGS
TYPE
LAST NAME
VIC
SSN
coughlin
zach
ETHNICITY
FIRST NAME
MIDDLE NAME
RESIDENT
DOB
***
EYE COLOR
RACE
HAIR COLOR
SEX
AGE
*
HEIGHT
DRIVER LIC NO
WEIGHT
LIC ST
CELL PHONE
EMAIL
RESIDENCE ADDRESS
HOME PHONE
EMPLOYER NAME
***
BUSINESS ADDRESS
***
WORK PHONE
***
NARRATIVE
Matt Grant opened up my box of personal property and filmed it with her video camera despite my expressing my refusal to
allow her permission to do so. Violation of privacy, reported to RPD, did nothing but allow Alan Weaver and O. Miller to
harrass me some more and Welch to threaten to arrest me if I didn't not move my stuff right then.
Page 2 of 2
1814
Page 1 of 1
Print
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1816
10/01/12
10/01/12
p.02
p.03
(5) The client fuils substantially to fulftll an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's
services and has been given rea!lonable warni ng that the lawyer will withdraw unless the
obligation is thlfilled;
IN THE MUNICIPAL COU RT OF THE CITY OF RENO

COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA
aTY OF RENO, Plaintiff
(6) The representation wi\! result in an unreasonable financial burden on the

been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
ZacharyCoughlin Defendant
Name (First, Mlddl.... !.ilst)
or
has
(7) Other g{)od causef{)r lVithdrawal exists.
(emphasis added)
PO Box 3961 Reno Nv.89505

City. State. Zip
HENRY SOTELO. ESQ., sl.ates sufficient rea.'Ions eKist for permitting HENRY SOTELO. ESQ., to w;thdrllw
from representation at th is
MOTIQN
HENRY
Comes now the undersigned and here make the following request:
MOTION TO BE RELIEVEDASCOUNSEL
HENRY SOTELO.
ESQ., has
in that regard.
rpresented ZACHARY COUGHUN since
considers repugnant and with which the
and
has petformed
difference of opini on and deterioration of the
us fo ll ows:
1. Upon consent of the
him to provide sultlble and
the client insists
upo n taking
a course
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.
SOTELO, ESQ. are unable to engage
In
eompetent
of action that the lawyer
addition, ZACHARY
in the type of open communication that would
reasonable chance
of
in Reno
Court now stands, ZACrlARY COUGHLIN is being charged with
Municipal
proper representation by HENRY SOTELO, ESQ.
traffic violation: Unsecured Load, RMC 6.14,.130.
Disturbing the Peace have been dismissed by the City
since ZACHARY COUGHLIN is
at any time before .judgment
as
The
more
Al10mcy at the last
serious charges of Trespassing
trial date on 812312012. Thus.
not facing any jail ti me for the minor traffic violation, a
COURT
APPOINTED Legal Defender is not necessary.
attorney, approved by the client.
or fina! deternlination,
time upon the attorney's filing
an
attorney may withdraw
lIS
attorney
of record at
Finally. ZACHARY COUGHLIN will

been reset,
any
HENRY SOTELO, ESQ,. moves this C ourt to issue an Order allowing the withdrawal
not yct been a final determination in this case, th erefore, the Court's permissioo is
necessary, Nevada Rules ()f Professional Conduct 1.16(b) states'
(emphasis added).
stated in paragraph (c), a la wyer may withdraw fi'om re presenting a client if
(I) Withdrawal cM be accomplished without material adverse effeet on th.: interests of the
pending a Competency
ZACHARY COUGHLIN
withdrawal, with or without the client's consent.
counsel. There has
(0) Except as
in providing
minor vehicle
and
2. !.!lmnJ,h_!2.ffiLQ[J;jll..Qt!..1l:!!UillJ7.1..9.f.1h!1Jl.tQI!l\1)c orthe client.

t
After judgment
be helpful
HENRY
Furthermore, as the ease
Nevada Supreme C()urt, Rule 46 pro vi des:
The attorney in an action or special proceeding may be chan ged

or final determination
August 13, 2012,
developed which have led to the breakdown of
communications between Attorney and the Client,

Attorney/Client relationship.
for ZACHAR Y COUGHLIN
COUGHLIN and
Circumstances have
time.
SOTELO. ESQ. asserts it would be impossible for
representation
This Motion is based on the following:

legal services
lawyer
enough
not
be adversely ,,!l'ected by thi s
Hearing in Reno Justice Coun on
withdraw,
as
his no new trial date has
October 15, 20 12,
l'his allows
time to retain new legal counsel.
of
Accordingly, HENRY SOTELO, ESQ" requests
withdraw
from
an
legal representation of ZACHARY
order from this Court permitting him to immediately
COUGHLIN. This Motion is not made for the purposes of
delay, Deputy City Attorney Brian Sooud; has been notified of this
Motion and has NO OBJECTION to the
above request.
client;
(2) The client persists in a coul'1le of action involving the lawyer's services that tbe lawyer
rea.w nably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(3)
The cliem has used the lawyer's
services to
perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(4) A client insists upon taking action tltat tlte Imvyt!r CONsiders 1Y!pugnotlt or witlt which
tit... lawyer Itasfu"Jamel'tal dbutcreement;
10/01/12
p.04
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
September 4. 2012
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT rs HEREBY ORDERED that the motion be:

Zach Coughlin
P.O. Box 3961
Granted __Dellied___Other
600 wtChlIlcston Blvd.
Reno. Nevada 89521
LuVcglS,t\'\'S910+1;63
p,,.-Ol.32.2100
l, OO.25 ....r9...
... -02.385.28-8
DATED THIS
.;[day of...,
RE:
2012
G rievance I Keith Loomis. Esq.

Reference No. 12-1354
9;56 DoublcRBh-d.. Stc.B

Rcno.V89;21;9-
Dear Mr. Coughlin:

Please allow this letter to acknowledge receipt of your August 28.2012,
cl-.aM-S.329.4100
lVWw.11vbar.org
grievance to the State Bar of Nevada regarding attorney Keith Loomis, Esq.
A review of court records and the information provided indicates that your
grievance im'olves issues best addressed in the appropriate court settings. The
Office of Bar Counsel and the disciplinary boards of the State Bar are not
substitutes for the court system. The State Bar has no authority to take any action
which could affect the outcome of an)' c"'il disputes or litigation. Accordingly.
your allegations are. at this time. more appropriately handled in the proper judicial
forum.
Therefore, the grievance has been dismissed. As such, please consider this
matter closed.
If a court makes any findings that clearly establish professional
misconduct, you may submit that infornlation with any supporting documentation
for reconsideration.
Thank you for bringing this matter to the attention of our office.
Sinc\:rely.
;--0' a/7
Patrick O. King
Assistant Bar Counsel
POK/vh
1817
1818
1819
1820
present
The State now seeks to amend the charge to a misdemeanor
offense of
Resisting,
or Obstructing a Public Officer in
Delaying,
199.280(3). See Proposed Amended Complaint,
violation of NRS
Hereto as Exhibit
Plaintiff,
II.
A court may,
ZACHA.l<Y BARKER COUGHLIN,
ARGUMENT
in its discretion,
allow for an amendment to a
charging document upon proper motion. Viray v.
Defendant.
162 (2005).
NRS
Attached
1.
173.095(1)
State,
121 Nev. 159,
provides:
"The court may permit an indictment or information to be
MOTION
10
FOR LEAVE OF
COMES NOW,
11
District
COURT
12
GAMMICK,
13
District Attorney,
14
granting the State's Motion for Leave
15
This
16
papers and pleadings on file herein,
17
presented to this Court.
Motion
is
Attorney
of
by and through RICHARD A.
Washoe County,
and
ZACH
YOUNG,
Deputy
and moves this Honorable Court for an Order
based
upon the
18
Points
and
Authorities,
all
and any oral arguments to be
I.
13
STATEMENT

with Use
21
charged
22
Perceived Emergency Exists,
OF
207.245. To the charge,
24
several continuances,
25
hearing on August
26
When No
Actual
is
or
a gross misdemeanor in violation of NRS
// /
the Defendant has pled not guilty;
2012,
12
Further,
at which time no witnesses will
of the original
Finally,
charge,
level.
was alleged in the original charge. The State does this in the
in fact,
set in this matter is a hearing
without
III.
interests of justice,
1,
after
be
15
defined by statute,
22
what charge to file or bring before a grand
125 Nev.
"so
long
as
the prosecutor has
the accused committed an offense
the decision whether or not to prosecute,
23
and
generally rests
entirely in his discretion").
24
jury,
/ //
25
Of
note.
the
State has not requested any of
the continuances in this matter.
emergency existed and/or continued to call the 911 emergency system

when no actual or perceived emergency existed after having been warned
defendant,
among other things,
to wit:
during the calls,
the said
falsely reported that officers on scene
were shining a flashlight in his face,
asked for law enforcement
assistance when law enforcement officials were already on scene,
used
profane and otherwise inappropriate language when speaking with 911

emergency dispatchers,
grant its
so that this matter
10
public officers,
requested to lodge various complaints against
'vas argumentative with and failed to cooperate with
11
document does not contain the social security number of any person.
day of
2012.
questions asked by 911 emergency dispatchers,
12
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B 030
that
or otherwise advised not to so call,
a misdemeanor.
this
and that
State,
telephone calls to the 911 emergency system when no actual or perceived
DATED
See Stromberg v.
"a prosecutor has broad discretion in
21
he would be subject
The State hereby respectfully requests that this Court
14
(acknowledging that
probable cause to believe
CONCLUSION
proceed to trial
(2009)
and such is permissible based on the State's
in charging cases.
charging a defendant"
the only hearing currently
11
discretion
20
witnesses.
Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Complaint,
12
The proposed charge essentially alleges the same misconduct
vested
which is a gross
10
13
thereby resolving the case at the Justice Court
16
this proposed amendment is timely and being
made well in advance of trial -
the State seeks to amend the charge
15
only to criminal punishment of a misdemeanor rather than the harsher
misdemeanor.
instant matter,
14
such an amendment does not prejudice the
as under the proposed amended charge,
potential sentence
In the
if
not prejudiced."
to a misdemeanor,
26
Defendant,
before verdict
19
"the Defendant")
the matter is currently set for a status
6,
time
additional or different offense is charged and
18
THE CASE
(hereinafter
of the 911 Emergency System
23
substantial rights of the defendant are
17
20
amended at
11
13
of Court to Amend Complaint.
following
any
or finding if no
10
TO AMEND COMPLAINT
the State of Nevada,
13
DATED this
in Reno,
_
I'lashoe County,
day of
and/or hung up on 911

Nevada.
_______,
2012
14
15
16
16
17
RICHARD A.
GAMMICK
17
18
18
19
19
20
__
_____________
B y__
ZA
21
strict Attorney
22
22
23
23
24
24
PCN RPD1200020C
District Court Dept:
Bailed:
Defense
Custody:
25
25
26
20
21
0727436377DPB
Warrant:
26
0727436377Adpb
District Attorney:
Bail
Attorney:
10
YOUNG
__
_
__
Restitution:
J
1821
DA
436377
RPD RP12-000974
EXHIBIT 1
IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF
RENO TOWNSHIP
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ltIASHOE,
Proposed Amended Complaint

(DO NOT FILE)
STATE OF NEVADA

RCR 2012-065630
Plaintiff,
DEPT:

[PROPOSED)
10
11
ZACH YOUNG of
AMENDED
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
Defendant.
the County of Washoe,
State of
Nevada,
verifies and declares upon information and belief and under penalty
12
of perjury,
13
has committed the crime of:
14
that ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN,
RESISTING,
DELAYING,
15
violation of NRS 199.280(3),
16
the
defendant
above-named,
OR OBSTRUCTING A PUBLIC OFFICER,
wit:
a misdemeanor in the manner following,
That the said defendant on or
17
18
January,
2012 and the 14th of January,
19
the County of Washoe,
State of Nevada,
between
2012,
the
12th
day of
at Reno Township,
within
did willfully and unlawfully
officers,
20
resist,
21
DEPARTMENT OFFICERS JASON SCHAUR,
22
AND/OR OTHER RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS AND/OR RENO POLICE
delay,
or obstruct public
namely,
SCOTT HEGLAR,
RENO POLICE
TIMOTHY BROADyIAY,
23
DEPARTMENT SERGEANTS PAUL SIFRE AND/OR CARLOS !-1.ADRID AND/OR CITY OF
24
RENO EMERGENCY DISPATCH SUPERVISOR KARIANN BEECHLER
25
EMERGENCY
26
EXHIBIT 1
to
legal duty of
telephone calls to the 911 emergency system when no actual or perceived
DISPATCHERS,
in
discharging
their office, in that
Pursuant to NRS 174.234,
AND/OR
or attempting to
OTHER RENO
discharge
the said defendant made one
or more
the following are the names and
emergency existed and/or continued to call the 911 emergency system
addresses of such witnesses the State intends
when no actual or perceived emergency existed after having been warned
chief,
or otherwise advised not to so call,
RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT
defendant,
among other things,
to wit:
during the calls,
the said
falsely reported that officers on
were shining a flashlight in his face,
to call in its case in
OFFICER JASON SCHAUR

OFFICER TIMOTHY BROADWAY
asked for law enforcement
SERGEANT PAUL SIFRE

SERGEANT CARLOS MADRID
assistance when law enforcement officials were already on scene,
used
RENO EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
profane and otherwise inappropriate language when speaking with 911

KARIANN BEECHLER
requested to lodge various complaints against
10
public officers,
11
questions asked by 911 emergency dispatchers,
12
emergency
was argumentative with and failed to cooperate with
dispatchers,
DATED
this
in Reno,
Washoe
County,
10
NRS
174.234
also requires the defendant,
at least five
Nevada.
2012
11
judicial days prior to the trial date,
12
and/or hung up on 911
to file and serve upon the
prosecuting attorney a written notice containing the name and last
13
known address of any witness the defendant intends to call during
14
14
his/her case-in-chief.
15
15
of the witness.
16
16
13
da y
of
_______ ,
Failure to do so may result in the exclusion
17
17
18
18
document submitted for recording does not contain the social security
number of any person or persons pursuant to NRS 239B.230.
The party executing this document hereby affirms that this
19
19
20
20
RICHARD A. GAMMICK
District Attorney
21
21
Washoe County,
22
22
23
23
PCN
RPD1200020C
24
Custody:
25
Warrant:
26
Nevada
Bailed: X
0727436377 Adpb
District Court
Dept:
District Attorney:
Defense Attorney:
10
YOUNG
24
25
BY
ZAC=H.YOUNG----
Deputy District
Attorney
i" ti'-o-n--tu-' :
- :
-26
1822

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1826
.\tlr he sen;"d his tiv..:- day Con tempt of Court santiun imposd by thtS (ourt on
f'ebnl:lf)' 17. 2012 Jis rupt ed Departme nt J of I his court Jnd caused distress til t hi s coun ,md
well
the prosecutor:md the witness, and resultd in \Ir. Coughlin
Febnl:lf)' 27,2012, :-"Ir. Coughlin f:lx-tiled to this court I a 224-pagc document enti t kd ";-.J oti,
its statT:md marshals,
of '\ppe:lI of Summary Contempt Order; Iotion to Return Personal Property Cunti>catcd by
being hdd in contempt of court, his faxing:md ti ling of these docu m ent s greatly Jisru pted the
as
as
Reno \Iunicipal Court:md Its \Ianhals; Motion for :-.lew Trial :md to Alter or "mnd
operation of the entire Reno M un ici pal Court system, including the ckrk's oflice! and the
Summary Conlempt Order." rhe document purported to appe:l1 this court's Order holding
other Jepartm"nt5, and n"essitatcd thut nction be taken by the Court Administrator and
him in direct criminal contempt. It I: o ntuin cd a po rtion of one s en t ence on page s eeking
Administrative JuJge.
,\ pparently begi nning on I arch 9, 2012 at 12:38 p.m., Mr. Coughlin Jgain underto"k
continuance oftoday's hearing, but no further di s cussi on of that topic. It also mentioned
:mother massive t;u-tiling to Reno Municipal Court. This ti me it was
b<:ing a "tolling" motion in:m apparent afterthought. It did not address most of the other
10
II
12
personal life and this court's; his father's footbal l career in college; dozens of pages of string
\-fotion to St Aside Summary Cont emp t Order; and Not ic e of Appeal of Summary Cuntempt
Order." With scant discussion of, or relevance to, the above-captioned matter. s:lid document
15
mostly argues a gainst Judge Howard in a Department 4 case Jnd agoin contains more than
and copy of court uoc um ents from a District of Columbia case.
18
19
It
was a
disjointed re gurgit ation of case law citations from a legal research online site
with little referncc to, llr a rgument about, Ihe fact s of his instant "noulevaru Stop" trartie
Glse. The JoclIln<!nt
was on
purported to be yet another motion in this case entitled "Motion to Return Cell Phones;
IJ
15
17
d ocument that was
prisoner online site; an nrticie :!bout a
<:itations t:!ken off the internet: uocumen t s rrom

"police state;" an a rt ic le about Discovery;
16
II
12
tile-stamped by the clerk on Iarch 12,2012 at 8: 12 a . m . This second 2lB-pnge document
website printout showing a polke offker's snlary;
13
14
10
incoherent .nd plhetic Jcmons trat i on of wlut might onc have
16
17
18
19
200 pages of st ring l egal citotions; lyrics to ro c ks songs; Mr. Coughlin's personal family
hi "tory; discussion of an
c\
ielion
case
anu another contempt case; d i sj o i n kd legal citations,
:!nd other nonsensical matters lhat have no a pparen t relevance to his traffic ci tation C lse.
Both do cu m ents
massi ve anu took up
gr e at deal of lime because the c ourt haJ 10
b<:cn kgal and a cade mi c prowess that Jpp ears to now he g reatl y uamageu. \Ir. C ou gh li n r;1X-
20
21
tileu anolh<:r document in '. hich he a p paren tly took
21
review them to look for some connection to the cose. This court has the inherent nuthority to
12
[';iel ill ,lJhlthcr
21
tnaintoin respect, ( lrde r and <.keorJm in I he coun, ,Ind
10
c;L'"
Motion to Prncecd Il1forma I'Juperis
,1I1d Iyped uvcr it "Request (or ,\udio Rec<lruing of fchnury
_'h,
ell 12
wac
I"
refuse to ,llIow the
court 1<)
be Ihed
23
2J
I) I I.
,,
'J
Whether or not t h ere are medical reasons to explain \Ir. Coughlin's actions is not for
.lppe:u llr cxpbin his abs<!nc to the court. InJsmuch JS the COll11 has at least four dirferent
,lddres5cs for him, it is unabIc to ascert ain his ex act whereabouts. He shows signs of mental
this cour1 to decide,
instability, if not serious mntal illness.
Court dUI! to his unorthodo, disruptive, bizarre and irrati onal methods and pra cti ce s that go
IT IS ORDERED that this matter is continued, :md:l11 proceeu ings relating thereto are
tolled, until further order of this court, "'hile the matter ofnttomey Zachary !3:uker Cou!o:hlin
this court tinds, by clear and convincing viJence, tha t Zachary !3arker Coughlin, an attornt:y
is referred to t he State Bar of Nevada;
licensed to practice law in the State o f :" cv ada, has eommittcd nume r ous acts of attorney
12
misconduct, il1c1uding, but not limited to, violati ng the following Rules of Professional
Conduct:
10
II
12
13
R.-l(e)-engJging in di5honsty, froud, dceit or misrepresentation;
13
14
8.4 (d}-engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the adm inistrotion of j us tic e;
14
J.J (a}-Iack of candor to the court by knowingly making falSe! statmcnts to" tribunal;
15
15
16
J.I-<I"fending in
proceeuin g by ass erting or controverting
an
i ssue without
17
fact and with mat ters that ar e known to be frivolous;
18
basis in
3.2-failure to make re aso n able efforts to e xpeuite litigotion, J nd, in fJct, taki n g
19
20
21
extreme measures to delay litigotion;
docs nllt rcasonably helie ve
nrc
re l e v ant
16
17
18
19
JA(e)-heing unt"3ir to opposing counsel by continually alluding to lI1atters the 1,l\")'er

or
.s uppo l1 e d by a d m i s si b le evidence;
vexatious litig:mt to Reno \funicipal
nppc:uing therefore, the court orders as follow,:
this Jefendnnt, the statements and behavior of this de fenda n t and his overall c onduc t he rei n,
II
beyond t he pnle of anything th:lt is civil, ethical. professional or com pet e nt. Good cause
[hscd upon the total circumst:mccs o f t hi ! cnsc, th e in-Cal rt performance! ufthe
ddend:m t, .15 obServed by t his COUr1, Ihe written docu ments i':l.xed t o the court for til in g by
10
lie ha, becom e nOlhing les, th:m
20
21
12
IT IS ORDERED that no further action shall be taken by the Reno City Attorney's
Office, or the clerks or staiTof Reno M un i ci pal COUr1, in the above-entitkd case, pendin g
further o rder of this court;

IT IS ORDERED that Zachary Barker Coughlin is barred and forbidden from faxllI,
em:!iling, dclivaing, having delivered, se rving, presenting for tiling, personally or othef',ise,
any motion or u O l: ument to Reno Municipal Court, in the above-entitled case, pending further
oruer of this court .
Dateu this 12th UJY of \tlarch, 2012.
/;)/-tt7"4 }6r{/fr'i(L-/
rhe lion. DOy<thy :-.lash fl()lmc

Reno .\ I u n i c lpnl JIIJC
1827
1828

!! " #!
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note: this was file stamped

2/27/12 by the RJC in
RJC REV2012-000374
disposed of by RJC Judge
Schroeder, on 3/15/12 on a default
basis where Coughlin was 8 minutes
late to the stacked docket hearing
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1831
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
, --1 -1 5 +
Zach Coughlin
"keithloomis@earthlink.net"
FW: rmc 11 cr 26405 you are appointed counsel? for puentes ne taitel?
Monday, February 27, 2012 8:00:00 AM
4

Hi Keith,
5 ) C . ! !, ! 4 :
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75A <. - 9 <. - 9 1
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$
%&
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Thank,s
Keith Lloyd Loomis Company: No information provided Address: 9468 Double R Blvd.
Suite A Reno , NV 89521 Phone Number: 775-853-7222 Fax number: 775-853-0860 Email:
keithloomis@earthlink.net Website: No information provided Admit Date: 12/31/82 Law
School: McGeorge Specialization: None Professional Liability Insurance:
0F ' ' D

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From:
ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ.
NV BAR NO 8473
=
1422 E. 9TH ST. #2

RENO, NV 89512
2

= =
" " "
$ %&,
= = )*

?&> !&(+ &
$
Did you attend law school with or work with or work at the same place (though maybe not at
the same time) with anyone working at the RMC or the Reno City Attorneys Office. We
had some conflicts checks problems with Taitel, and RMCR 5 was not followed, STILL.
Hoping to avoid anything further like that.
TEL: 775 338 8118

FAX 949 667 7402
ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM
) C . ! !, !
(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

'
( ! (
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To:
Subject: rmc 11 cr 26405 you are appointed counsel? for puentes ne taitel?
hi, i guess Mr. Loomis was appointed as my 3rd defense attorney in RMC case 11 cr 26405. I have
not heard anything about this case, and the RMC indicated they had nothing scheduled. Please
communicate with me only via email or fax please, having issues with my mail incident to domestic
violence committed against me my fax is 949 667 7402. thanks,

, .
=
' @

Zach Coughlin
1832
,. '
. i
I
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
2Ql2FEB 27 PH I: 31
CODE 2<)60
!.E
Rdo"UilT
BY
EII,c>1t
HUllorablc
DEPUT'(
ufth c Sl!ond
the defen,lant
JuJ"ial
tS
tu JPpar bd'urc t h
Distnct CuUr1, Dcpar1l11cl1t
\"'100, at the hour of g,.m., fur a competency
/llO;JZ
IHI
,201;;1.
IN THE JUS rICE COURT OF RENO roWNSHIP
IN
,\ND FOR TilE COUNTY
THE STATE OF
Plaintiff,
NEVADA
OF WASHOF., STA rE Or
EVADA,
Cas\! No.
Lac6aay J). ):Y)
Dept
YU:::((. \ L Oc",5"3C>
u. _
Dcl"nu.ml.
ORDER FOR CO,"PETENCY [VAL ATIONS
Up"n mution uf wunsd lor Ddenuanl herein
two
psychulogists . or one psyc hiatrist nnd one psychologist
Ill' dct<rrnintng
I.
2S
'
,
good
C,III
appearing there lim:,
3.
two psydua t rists.
Irom lake's C rossi ng lor
the purpose
whcUlt!r the Defenu.lllt has the present ability to:

Understand
the nature of the criminal
Untlorstand the
charges against hlln;
nnture and purpose of Lhe coun procCUll1gs;
Aid and assist hiS cllunsd
unJf)t :lIld i ng.
Ii
anu
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED U13t the Ddcndant be c}(amint'd by
In the ,kfnse "ith a reasonable
or
degre\! ofratlulhti
26
FILED
IN
ZG!2 MAR - 7 AI 8' 0:>
,
(
.
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STA!E,OF NE"s

roR THE COUN:,::,:::::
_",_eM",'"' AND
PLAINTIFF
CASE
Vs
Matt Merliss
DEFENDA NT
No
11
CVII03628
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
.
11 NOV -1 AM 10: 52
IN THE RENO JUSTICE COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE STEJUVUCEI'RI
.
RENO '''' Dtitlf""
.
Matt Merliss
Civil File Number:
PLAINTIFF
11013461 D",PUT
CASE No. REV20II00 1708
Vs
DEFENDANT
.)
v
BY---t'--, -;";"-,"-
I
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF NEVADA
COUNTY OF WASHOE
STATE OF NEVADA
COUNTY OF WASHOE
18 years of age, not a party to the within entered action, and that in the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, personally
John Machen, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That affiant is a citizen of the United States, over
18
Pernon served:
Date:
1 S. Sierra St. Reno.

2127/2012
Time:
1:25PM
121
River Rock Street Reno, NY 89501
Po.ted:
Date:
111112011
Location:
RMC
deposes and says: That affiant is a citizen of the United States, over
served the described documents upon:
served the described documents upon:
Location:
Joba Machen. being first duly sworn,
years of age, not a party to the within entered action. and that in the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, personally
NV
Time:
4:30PM
The document(s) served were: EVICfION ORDER: FINDINGS OF FACf, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICfJON; ORDER REQUIRING INSPECfION OF REAL PROPERTY
The document(s) served were: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
G Hill Esq
PO Box 2551
MICHAEL HALEY, SHERIFF
652 Forest Street

Reno, NV 89505
Richard
By:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me before me this
QId
Sheriffs
orizedAgent
Richard
G Hill Esq
PO Box 2551
652 Forest Street
Reno, NY 89505
MICHAEL HALEY, SHERIFF
SUBSCRmED AND SWORN to me before me . his
By:
J2--
Sheriff'
utllOri
ed
..
ARPUBLIC in and IDaid State of Nevada,
NOT
County of Washoe
ROX;A :..siLVA............
L
Notary Public, State of Navada 1

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....
il!II'lllIlIfI"llllIltI'lllllmll"111I11""IIIII=I!'!'I,j
911 PARR BOULEVARD
RENO, NV 89512-1000 (775) 328-3310
911 PARR BOULEY ARD
RENO, NY
89512-1000
(775) 328-3310.
1833
FILED
Electronically
01-20-2012:02:35:37 PM
Clerk of the Court
1834
1835
FILED
Electronically
01-20-2012:02:35:37 PM
Clerk of the Court
1836
FILED
Electronically
01-20-2012:02:35:37 PM
Clerk of the Court
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03-30-2012:04:14:37 PM
Clerk of the Court
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Close
RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of

11/1/2011
From: Stuchell, Liz (LStuchell@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Tue 2/07/12 11:40 AM
Cc: Kandaras, Mary (mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us)
Mr. Coughlin,
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a
copy of the Order to the residence. The residence was unoccupied at the time.

WCSO Civil Section

To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna; kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com;
lstuchell@washoecounty.us mkandara@da.washoecounty.us

file:///R|/...nd%20from%20Stuchell%20lstuchell@washoecounty.us%2026405%201708%2026800%2001896%2060302.htm[10/29/2012 2:26:41 AM]
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service filed
by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order Granting
Summary Eviction against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent was not
alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent escrow deposit
was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of eviction was
not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
"personally served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and MERS
fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys in the
foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and witness
the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being a
foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me the
Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in
compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom and
practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
phraseology: "
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of
the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary
Eviction was signed by October 27th , 2011. That language is only found in situations
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b) Advise
the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order
and,
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of
the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in Reno
Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There is not
basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this case. The
above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language are
inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the
Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To
require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a Complaint
within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which follows NRCP
5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not
shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the days for
mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did not reflect
when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November
24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30,
2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order
to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter. See
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S.
147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting plaintiff an additional
three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services may say about
this 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like these, NRS 40.400
Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
1840
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to
40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such
NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy Machem
alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on November 1,
2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem, unless "personally served" is defined in a rather
impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally different understanding of the
definition of "personally served", which may be the case. Or, perhaps the Sheriff's
Office is busy and doesn't want to wait around to "personally serve" every tenant it
wishes to evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three days" rule in NRCP
6(e)...the landlord's might not like it, but they can use that frustration as an incentive
not to jump to litigating every disagreement about habitability that a tenant brings to
them. You may not realize how ridiculous some landlord's get. In my case, I offered
to fix basic things that clearly implicated the habitability rules in NRS 118A.290 and
the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly Hill High School graduate landlord balked and
complained then hired and attorney four days into a dispute.....at which point the rules
against contacting represented parties prevented much in the way of real settlement
discussion, particularly where opposing counsel has continuously demonstrated a
complete indifference to pursuing settlement (why would he at the rates he bills hours
at?). I just don't think the Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or damage the
citizen tenants of Washoe County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss
or Richard G. Hill, Esq.
I AM REQUESTING, IN WRITING, THAT BOTH OF YOUR OFFICES
INVESTIGATE THIS AND PROVIDE A SWORN AFFIDAVIT FROM MR.
MACHEM THAT ADMITS THAT I WAS NOT PERSONALLY PRESENT WHEN
HE SERVED THE ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION IN RJC REV2011-001708
ON 11/1/12 AT 4:30 PM (ACCORDING TO HIS AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE). YOU
NEVER KNOW, I MIGHT HAVE IRREFUTABLE PROOF THAT I WAS
SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THAT TIME, SO, BE CAREFUL. There simply is not
anything specific in Nevada law addressing how such Summary Eviction Orders are
to be served and carried out. The sections dealing with
NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and
exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent....
6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3,
regardless of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord
of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall
hold a hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the
truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in this section. If
the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer
and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order
for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the
tenant....
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and
service of a motion, file a motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of
the court, to dispute the amount of the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant
to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory, moving and storage of personal
property left on the premises. The motion must be filed within 20 days after the
summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises by the
tenant, or within 20 days after:
(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall
schedule a hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after
the filing of the motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to the motion
and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other
process server. At the hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460
or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges
determined to be due or if no charges are determined to be due...."
I also want to know why NRS 40. 253(8) was not followed with respect to my
November 17th, 2011 filing of a Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien. Why
didn't the WCSO serve notice, as required by NRS 40.253(8) upon the landlord's
attorney Richard Hill? Why didn't I get a hearing within the 10 days called called for
by that section (to get back my client's files no less), but rather, I had to wait a full 33
days to get a hearing, and service of notice of the hearing was not effectuated, as
required by NRS 40.235(8), by the WCSO. Why?
Please provide an indication, in writing, of the names and case numbers for the last 20
incidences when the WCSO has served notice of a hearing set pursuant to NRS
40.253(8). What's that? The WCSO has NEVER served such notice? Yet the WCSO
is there with bells on (or Machem is) to lie in Affidavits of Service to lock out the
citizen tenants of Washoe County impermissilby early vis a vis NRCP 5(b)(2) and
NRCP 6(e)? Why is that? Is it a conspiracy? Does money talk? When I was arrested
for trespassing on November 12th, 2011 by RPD Officer Chris Carter and Sargent
Lopez, Carter admitted to me that "Richard Hill pays him a lot of money and therefore
he arrests whom Richard Hill says to and does what Richard Hill says to do...." Both
Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to investigate, despite prompting, whether Richard
Hill has sent the tenant/arrestee a bill or demand letter in bill for the full rental value
of the property, $900 per month, under some interpretation of the "reasonable storage,
moving, and inventorying expenses" collectable by a landlord under a personal
property line set forth in NRS 118A.460 (one could also interpret such a bill as Hill's
withdrawing or eradicating the Order of Summary Eviction itself, which was not
"personally served" by the Washoe County Sheriff (despite what their Affidavit of
Service says...I wasn't even there at the time they changed the locks...and so the
Summary Eviction Order was not properly served under NRCP 6, and despite the
Reno Justice Court impermissibly converting $2300 of my money under a "rent
escrow" Order its required I comply with in order to litigate habitability issues in a
summary eviction proceeding under NRS 40.253, despite NRS 40.253(6)'s express
dicate against such an Order (unless, pursuant to JCRCP 83, a justice court gets such a
rule, like Justice Court Rule of Las Vegas (JCRLV) Rule 44, published and approved
by the Nevada Supreme Court, which the RJC has not, rather, the RJC applies all
these insidious secret "house rules" (like forcing tenants to deliver themselves to the
filing office to submit to personal service notice of a summary eviction hearing within,
like, 12 hours of the Tenant filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit in response to an
eviction Notice, rather than the service requirements of such notice following NRCP 6
(days for mailing, etc., etc., in other words, in the RJC everything is sped up
imperissilby to help landlord's out, and the NV. S. Ct ruling in Glazier and Lippis
clearly contemplate personal liability against the Court and or Judges themselves for
so doing)....A Qui Tam action or something a la Mausert's in Solano County, I believe,
in California, would be very interesting...Still haven't heard anything from the Reno
PD about the various complaints I have filed with them in writing related to the
wrongful arrests, excessive force and other misconduct committed against me, though
they did arrest me the other day for calling 911incident to some domestic violence for
which I was granted to Extended Protection Orders against my former
housemates....old Sargent Sigfree ordered that arrest, as he did two days prior when he
ordered a custodial arrest of me for "jaywalking".
Funny thing, I never heard anything back from the RPD about complaints like the
following one:
From:NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent: Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER THIS
REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR
AND IT WILL BE ADDRESSED.
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
What is interesting there is that at least I was provided the name of an officer, a
"Wozniak" (though I have been unable to confirm the existence of
or whether " THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT
HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE
OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE
ADDRESSED."
What is more strange is that I submitted several online police reports to the Reno PD
(a couple of which asserted complaints against various Reno PD officers, or asked
why RDP Officer Carter, whom admitted taking bribes from Richard G. Hill, Esq. at
the time of my custodial arrest for trespassing (the one where Richard Hill signed a
Criminal Complaint for trespass, then Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to
follow up on my imploring them to ask Hill whether he has recently sent me a bill for
the "full rental value" of the property, the same amount that had been charged for the
"use and enjoyment" of the premises, $900, in comparision to what NRS 118A.460
may deem "reasonable storage" expenses for which a lien is available to a landlord,
though NRS 118A.520 has outlawed rent distraints upon tenant's personal
property....Regardless, between January 8 - 12th, 2012, and was arrested twice by the
1841
Reno PD shortly after submitting these written complaints to the Reno PD.
Actually, upon being release from jail on November 15th, 2011, incident to the
custodial trespass arrest, I went to Richard HIll's office to get my wallet and driver's
license. He refused to provide it to me until late November 22nd, 2011. Hill called
the Reno PD on the 15th (or maybe I did because he was withholding my state issued
ID, the one I would need to rent a room, drive my car, and my wallet, which is kind of
useful in such situations....). Anyways, Sargent Tarter of the Reno PD showed up, he
went inside Hill's office with Hill for quite some time and the result was Tarter telling
me to leave. I did, but while driving down St. Laurence towards S. Virginia (Hill's
office is at 652 Forrest St. 89503 and would have required turning down the wrong
way of a one way street, Forrest, to go back to Hill's Office (so clearly I was not
headed to Hill's office) Sargent Tarter began tailing me, then he pulled me over, then
he gave me a ticket, in retaliation if you ask me for reporting RPD Officer Carter
admitting that he takes bribes from Hill to Sargent Tarter minutes earlier. Uh, well,
anyways, another Sargent calls me later that night, taking the "good cop" role. But
upon informing him of what RPD Officer Carter told me about Hill paying him money
to arrest people during the 11/12/11 trespassing arrest, that Sargent immediately
informed me that, despite this being the first he heard of that, he was sure that was not
happening....I guess RPD Officer Carter is trying to explain away his comments about
Richard Hill paying him money to arrest people by dismissing them as sarcasm, a
joke, said in jest, whatever....but I don't see how that situation (a license attorney
getting arrested for a crime, a conviction for which would result in that attorney being
required to report said conviction to the State Bar of Nevada under SCR 111, etc., and
possibly resulting in a suspension of that attorney's license to practice law, or worse...)
is all that jocular of a situation. Combine that with the too quick to dismiss my
reports of bribery by Richard Hill to officer Carter to the RPD Sargent who called me
on 11/15/11 regarding the retaliation by Sargent Tarter that I complained of, and I
don't think it is all that unreasonable for anyone to take RPD Officer Carter at his
word regarding Richard G. Hill, Esq. paying him money to arrest whom Hill says to
arrest. Add to that Sargent Sigfree ordering my arrest for jaywalking (by a trainee
RPD Officer) on January 12th, 2011 (custodial arrest, bail of $160 emptied my bank
account out, or pretty close to it) while I was peacefully filming from a public spot
Richard G. Hill, Esq's contractor Phil Howard, whom had submitted bills in courts
records and filings under the lien for "reasonable storage moving and inventorying"
found in NRS 118A.460, even where old Phil used my own plywood at the property to
board up the back porch (curiously leaving the screws holding up the plywood
exposed to exterior of the property where anyone could easily unscrew them, and also
leaving in a window unit ac secured only by ducttape in a window facing a sidewalk
by the LakeMill Lodge....which resulted in $8,000 at least of my personal property
being burglarized from my former home law office on Decmeber 12th, 2011 while
Hill was asserting a lien on all my personal property found therein (and my client's
files, which arguably are not even my property, but rather, the client's property). Hill
went on to place what he believes to be my social security number in court records, on
purpose, despite his signing an Affirmation pursuant to NRS 239B.030 that that was
not the case (attaching a two page report to the RPD as an Exhibit). Then Hill and his
contractor Phil Howard both committed perjury when the signed Declarations attesting
that I had climbed on the contractors truck or ever touched Hill. Hill lies constantly,
whether under penalty of perjury or now, so I don't have time to rebut every little lie
he makes (he makes me out to comes across as a Yosemite Sam caricature of a human
being in his filings when he describes me...).
Further, why am I arrested for trespassing and not those from Nevada Court Services
where they went behind closed gate the the backyard of my home law office and
banged on window extremely loudly for 40 minutes at a time 3 times a day, one guy
ringing the doorbell, one guy moving around all other sides of the property banging on
the windows, peering in closed blinds, and affecting a phony "color of law" tone,
resemblance, and verbal communications, misleadingly announcing that they were
"Court Services, come out now!", wearing their pretend Sheriff outfits, big equipment
saddled belts (including firearms, I believe, and radios), etc. ,etc.
Add to that that Nevada Court Services Jeff Chandler drives by in his Monster Truck
baring his personalized "NCS" license plate while I am in the RPD squad car,
handcuffed, outside my former law office at 121 River Rock, at the time of the
1/12/12 jaywalking arrest and the appearances are troubling. Now, add to that that
Lew Taitel, Esq. was my court appointed public defender in the Reno Municipal Court
in the trespass case, and that Judge Gardner had refused to provide me the names of
prospective appointed defense counsel (I wanted to run a conflicts check) at my
arraignment (where Marshal Mentzel barked at me in a threatening tone, using
menacing language), whereupon Taitel was appointed as my defense attorney and
filed a notice of appearance, and received my confidential file, pc sheet, arrest reports,
ssn, etc....only its turns out that Taitel shares and office and a receptionist with Nevada
Court Services and they list him and his picture on their website as "associated with"
their Process Server corporation, despite the prohibition lawyers face against fee
sharing with non-lawyers. Then, Taitel somehow manages to get out of defending my
case without filing a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, despite that being required by
the Reno Municipal Court Rule 3(B):
RMCR Rule 3(B): Authorization to Represent (B): An attorney desiring to withdraw
from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the
same. The court may rule on the motion or set a hearing.
But, perhaps most troubling of all is the implication that the Reno City Attorney's
Office, which defends actions against the City of Reno Police Department and its
Officers, has a vested interest in discrediting me in advance of the wrongful arrest
lawsuit that the Reno City Attorney's office knew was imminent at the time of all of
the above incidents, relating to the following August 20th, 2011 wrongful arrest by
RPD Officer's Duralde and Rosa. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
So, that's what attempting to coerce a suspect's consent to an impermissible search
sounds like? Add to that that the trespassing case is before Judge Gardner, whom
most recently was employed with the Reno City Attorney's Office.
And, you know what is funny? Officer Del Vecchio cuffed me and placed me in his
squad car last summer after he terrified me and another gentleman who had bicycles.
He veered across the road and screeched his squad car to a halt, jumped out, and did
some other stuff, then demanded my name and ID...and the lawyer in me didn't like
that that much, and he didn't like me not wanting to give it to him. This occurred right
in front of my home law office in the summer of 2011. He cuffed me and told me I
was going to jail for something about a light on the front of my bicycle (the one NV
Energy likely stole when the shut off my power, unnoticed, on October 4, 2011)
despite my bike actually having such a light....but then Del Vecchio's partner did him
a solid and talked some sense into him, and I humbled it up for Del Vecchio and we
both let it go, and I didn't go to jail....Until Del Vecchio was present supervising some
Officer's training at the scene of my custodial (9 hour) jaywalking arrest) on 1/12/12.
But Del Vecchio, I guess either didn't want to or wasn't able to talk some sense into
Sargent Sigfree.....and then Sargent Sigfree (the spelling is likely off) had me arrested
and charged with a gross misdemeanor, "Misuse of 911" just two days later, on
January 14th, 2011 when I called 911 to report that my roommates were laughing
menacingly when I asked them why my dog was missing (I had also been chased up to
my room numerous times since moving in with these people, something I had to do
because so much of my money had been taken up with bail or lost earnings due to all
these wrongful arrests and abuse of processes mentioned above...also these
housemates had chased me with a ten inch butcher knife, two of my tires were
slashed, I was locked out all night on New Years Even when these changed the locks
at around midnight, had my furniture thrown in the street, property stolen, coffee
thrown on me, destroying my smart phone in the process, etc., etc...And despite the
housemate having an outstanding arrest warrant, and animal abuse being listed
amongst the elements of domestic violence, Sargent Sigfree told me he was arresting
me because I "keep putting yourself in these situations", like, where I am a victim, and
that he was "trying to help you", he said with a smirk and a laugh to his fellow RPD
Officers, whom then proceeded to use excessive force against me. I guess he was
helping me by saddling me with a gross misdemeanor with a $1,500 bail, especially
where its been arranged for Court Services, or pre-Trial Services to forever deny me
an OR, despite my meeting the factors for such set forth in statute (30 year resident,
entire immediate family lives here, licensed to practice law in Nevada, etc., etc)...I
guess it should not be too much of a surprise to me that Reno City Attorney Pam
Roberts failed to address the perjury of all three of her witnesses or that her fellow
Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens lied to me about whether or not the
Reno City Attorney's Office even had any documentation related to my arrest or
whether it would in the month before my arraignment, despite that fact that subsequent
productions of discovery tend to indicate that the Reno City Attorney's Office did
have those materials at the time. I could be wrong about some of this...But that would
require and awful lot of coincidences.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1842
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RE: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law;

landlord tenant case
From: Stuchell, Liz (LStuchell@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Mon 12/05/11 12:32 PM
electronic versions I sent and serve them in a manner that the opposing attorneys will not respond to by filing
"Motions to Dismiss" based upon illegibility or bad copying/printing. They object to the 9 pages per page
stuff...In an ideal world your office would serve one page per page of these things, after you print them out,
etc...If you can do that, I would of course be extremely grateful, if you can't, I am of course let to scratch and
claw my way through this lawsuit like every other thing in my life as an IFP who can seemingly be curbstomped
by the older richer attorneys whenever they feel like it (and who have some dubious help in doing so). One
interesting thing is that one of the employment cases, etierh cv11-01955 or cv11-01986 (whichever was filed on
June 27th with an IFP) has to be served within 120 days of WHEN? The docket seems to suggest the Complaint
in that IFP case was only entered on or around August 11th, 2011, which would obvioulsy changed the 120 days
calculation, however, whether the filing date relates back to the IFP is something I have never been able to get a
clear answer on anywhere....
Thank You,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Mr. Coughlin,
Per your demand stated in the e-mail received from you on November 7th, all document packets that were provided by
you were assembled and served by November 16 th . Affidavits of Service were sent to your new address that you
provided on November 30 th . Affidavits with case numbers were sent directly to the court. Last week copies of those
were sent to you free of charge. You also will receive original Affidavits of Service of documents that did not have case
numbers.
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 25102521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an
agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that
any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This
message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney
work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that
any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this
information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s),
please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt
by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable
privilege.
Any further inquiries should be made to our Civil Attorney, Mary Kandaras at the District Attorneys Office.
Subject: RE: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law; landlord tenant case
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2011 08:52:29 -0800
From: RSilva@washoecounty.us
Liz Stuchell
You and I are the only ones who got this. Is he asking us to serve more docs?
WCSO Civil Section

Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2011 2:53 AM
To: Silva, Roxanna; Stuchell, Liz
Subject: RE: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law; landlord tenant case
Dear Ms. Stuchell and Ms. Silva,

I don't mean to be a jerk, I am under inordinate stress right now (not that that is anybody's problem but mine).
The citation below would tend to indicate that your office might, MIGHT, have a duty to photocopy the

Sent: Wednesday, November 30, 2011 6:37 AM
To: Silva, Roxanna; Stuchell, Liz
Subject: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law; landlord tenant case
"The defect in service (that the photocopy of the complaint provided was too
faint) was not attributable to the plaintiff, but to court personnel, who are
responsible for making copies of the initial pleadings for IFP litigants".
McKENZIE v. AMTRAK M OF E, 777 F.Supp. 1119.
Please serve a full, one page per page copy of each complaint to each defendant in all of
the matters for which I have provided you IFP proof, summons, and complaints.
PLEASE NOTE I HAVE A NEW ADDRESS.
Sincerely,
****** IMPORTANT NOTICE - READ THIS INFORMATION *****

PROOF OF SERVICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
A filing has been submitted to the court RE:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and
may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you
are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted
to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in
error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any
copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client,
CV11-03628
Judge:
PATRICK FLANAGAN
Official File Stamp:
02-08-2012:16:34:48
Clerk Accepted:
02-08-2012:16:35:22
Court:
Second Judicial District Court - State of Nevada
Case Title:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN VS. MATTHEW

MERLISS (D7)
Document(s) Submitted:
Ord to Show Cause
Filed By:
Kathryn Sims
You may review this filing by clicking on the
following link to take you to your cases.
This notice was automatically generated by the courts auto-notification system.
If service is not required for this document (e.g., Minutes), please disregard the below language.
The following people were served electronically:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ. for ZACH
COUGHLIN
CASEY BAKER, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
RICHARD HILL, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
The following people have not been served electronically and must be served by traditional
means (see Nevada electronic filing rules):
1843
****** IMPORTANT NOTICE - READ THIS INFORMATION *****

PROOF OF SERVICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
A filing has been submitted to the court RE:
CV11-03628
Judge:
PATRICK FLANAGAN
02-10-2012:13:49:40
Clerk Accepted:
02-10-2012:13:50:37
Court:
Second Judicial District Court - State of Nevada
Case Title:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN VS. MATTHEW

MERLISS (D7)
Document(s) Submitted:
Notice of Entry of Ord
Filed By:
RICHARD HILL, ESQ.
- **Continuation
You may review this filing by clicking on the

following link to take you to your cases.
This notice was automatically generated by the courts auto-notification system.
If service is not required for this document (e.g., Minutes), please disregard the below language.
The following people were served electronically:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ. for ZACH
COUGHLIN
CASEY BAKER, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
RICHARD HILL, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
The following people have not been served electronically and must be served by traditional
means (see Nevada electronic filing rules):
1844
1845
1846
1847

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https://bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=0da9f039-...
RE: RJC trial date - RCR 2011-066341
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Sent: Thu 6/07/12 11:48 AM
To:
jgoodnight@washoecounty.us; jrains@washoecounty.us;
enovak@washoecounty.us; phalstead@da.washoecounty.us;
chicks@da.washoecounty.us; dgammick@da.washoecounty.us; coe@gbis.com;
keith@leelawoffice.net; judgemcgee@msn.com; geofgiles@hotmail.com;
nvlawcom@gmail.com; davidc@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org;
patrickk@nvbar.org; jboles@callatg.com; molezzo@hardylawgroup.com;
lkdesq@aol.com
12 attachments
Harvard Law Review The Law of Finders.pdf (106.1 KB) , Abandoned, lost, or
mislaid property alrs.pdf (922.1 KB) , alrs on lost larceny.pdf (303.1 KB) , alrs on
lost property larceny.pdf (96.8 KB) , larceny lost.pdf (948.6 KB) , 20120605_204307
cory goble flicks cigarette at coughlin hits coughlin's left shoulder.mp4 (5.5 MB) ,
VID_20110820_232413 you are all on tape now.3gp (2.9 MB) , 911 call by Coughlin
on August 20th, 2011 were Goble et al issue threats p00 Start_Time = Saturday,
August 20, 2011 23-26-45 Source_ID = 50.avi (201.0 KB) , 234 k16 k. Property lost
or mislaid. nrs nevada.pdf (2.8 MB) , 234 k16 k. Property lost or mislaid..pdf (6.7
KB) , 911 call by Goble lying about Coughlin being super aggressive but wait, not
that's it, he is trying to get away to, contradictory lies p00 Start_Time = Saturday,
August 20, 2011 23-22-52 Source_ID = 50.avi (390.5 KB) , Goble 911 call alleging
aduult just socked a minor p00 Start_Time = Saturday, August 20, 2011 23-26-20
Source_ID = 49.avi (226.5 KB)
Dear District Attorney Gammick, DDA Young, et al,

I am respectfully submitting these materials to you for your consideration. I
would stipulate to a Disturbing the Peace charge or some other similar charge
which would not seem to require reporting to Bar Counsel under SCR 111,
with credit for the 7 days served in jail (I served a bunch of other days in jail
this year, for things like asserting my privacy rights vis a vis my medical
records in connection with the competency evaluation that was ordered, but I
don't know whether credit can be applied accross cases like that....) and if it
will auger toward the District Attorney's Office entering such a plea deal, I
could agree to pay some fine, however, I am indigent, seriously, there is a real
possibility my law license will be taken away or suspended, etc., etc., and I just
would hope that a fine could be avoided given my extreme indigency at this
1 of 10
point. Bar Counsel and the Supreme Court of Nevada are aware of the arrest
in this case (well, the Supreme Court has been provided documentation related
to it, whether they are "aware" of it I could not really say...).
Then, at the 1 minute 7 second mark Goble says:

Goble: "Dude, just give me my phone, its right in his pocket just get it out. I
am about to grab it out of his pocket"
Then at 1 minute 57 second mark Goble reiterates:
Goble: "He is just getting super aggresive with us, grabbed my phone, I swear,
and he will not give it back ...He grabbed my phone, I swear, its in his pocket,
dude...I was right here, my Jeep was right here, my fucking Jeep was right
there!".
So, which is it Goble? Were you skateboarding and stuff, or in your Jeep?
Why does your written Witness Statements from that night indicate you were
only fifteen feet away from where you set your phone down when Coughlin
allegedly walked right up and grabbed it? Doesn't "he just grabbed it" sound a
bit more like someone "grabbing" an item by force from someone, in a big
hurry, and attempting to run away, rather than, what Nicole Watson says
happened, ie, that an unidentified man picked the phone up,held it aloft,
announced he would throw it in the river, etc....
On his other 911 call, Goble makes like the Jon Lovitz liar character from the
1980's Saturday Night Live sketches...the "wait, yeah, that's the ticket..."
catchphrase. Goble starts the call indicating that Coughlin "just stole his
phone" and "is being super aggressive and given us all sorts of trouble" but
then Goble decides, "wait, no, yeah, that's it, he is trying to get away too!". So
which is it? Super aggressive and giving you all sorts of trouble or trying to
get away? Any why are Goble and his associates listed in the 911 and dispatch
text reports as the one's yelling? Why is Goble heard on a 911 call screaming
"give me my phone or I am going to threaten you right now!". Why are Goble
and his associates the one's reaching into Coughlin's short's pocket, attempting
to take Coughlin's dog and bike?
So, why should the District Attorney's Office countenance Goble and his
associates obvious attempts to leverage the police force through trick and
deception?
Next, on the video of the battery upon me and attempts to dissuade my
testimony by Goble, on June 5, 2012 (still no word on whether he has been
arrested...) Goble is heard massaging his story back and forth. I
But, best of all, on Goble's 911 call of August 20th, 2011 at 23:22:52 at the 31
second mark, the wise 911 operator asks
operator (O): "how did he end up with your cell phone?".
8/8/2012 12:48 AM
Goble: "my phone was just sitting on the ledge and I was just skateboarding
and stuff, and he just picked it up. Everyone saw him pick it up." Lies, lies,
lies. What about the unidentified man holding the phone aloft and indicating
he would shortly throw the phone in the river? In the background on that same
call Goble's associates can be heard menacingly commenting on taking and
touching Coughlin's dog and bike. Coughlin can be heard exclaiming "you just
assaulted me!".
I feel that the recordings of the 911 call by Goble further demonstrate the
extent to which he and his compatriates, including Zarate, were willing to lie to
the police to accomplish their goal...to achieve the return of that which Goble
arguably was no longer entitled to, or that which would be in the river were it
not for the intervention of a third party, or to enable Goble et al to avoid
pursuing a civil remedy or otherwise dealing with a difficult to sustain criminal
charge given the actual facts at hand by spicing up their story to include
allegations that:
on one of his 911 calls, Goble allegations that "someone just socked a
minor"...apparently indicating that I punched the 17 year old kid seen in the
videos. Clearly, no one is saying that now, however, it was definitely useful
for Goble to say that to the 911 operators (who likely relayed it to the
police...and I believe the textual record provided of the calls and dispatch
reports includes a citation to this allegation of physical violence too...). The
operator and the police hear that "someone just socked a minor" and it gets
their attention and skews the approach by the police immeasurably.
2 of 10
8/8/2012 12:48 AM
z: who are you?

cg: I'm over it, its all good. Remember? We went to court together. Its all good
zc: Yeah. Oh, its all good for you? Oh, good, I'm going to lose my career.
3 of 10
1856
8/8/2012 12:48 AM
cg: I'm sorry that sucks.

zc: Yeah, what's your name, Cory?
cg: Yeah
zc: Hey, how are you guys?
some early twenties brunette female: Wonderful, how are you
early twenties Asian male: you can film us all you want.
zc: Hey, did you lie to the police?
cg: Do?
zc: Yeah, Did you guys say I just ran up and grabbed the phone?
cg: That's basically what you did. (then he says something unintelligible)
zc: Okay, is that basically it or is that what I did? And what did you tell the
police?
cg: That's exactly what you did.
brunette female: He's...he's...he fucking has a camera.
zc: What did...are you a little high? You got...you've got "fuck" tattoed on your
hand (spelled out on his four knuckles)
brunette: we don't do drugs, your're a crazy person, excuse me, excuse me...just
cuz someone's talking to you.... (actually Goble, Zarate, and Colton
Templeton's social networking website postings are very clearly that they
smoke marijuana quite a bit...)
cg: I was just saying I was over it...
brunette: windows up
zc: Oh, wonderful, you're over it.
cg: (flicks lit cigarette at me from about 2 to 3 feet away at a high rate of
speed. The lit cigarette hit my suit jacket at my left shoulder and the tip
exploded into sparks, then fell to the ground. This is shown right before the 52
second mark of the attached video, my camera jerks right when I was hit with
the lit cigarette, which was projected at me by Goble flicking it in a propulsive
manner between his middle and index fingers and his thumb...it actually got
traveling at a fairly high rate of speed and the flicking and cigarette darting
through the air, and the cigarette hitting my should and exploding are all very
discernible in this video, especially the audio of those sounds, particularly
when considering that the camera jerking coincides exactly with the exploding
sound).
zc: Oh, you just did me such a big favor, guy.
witness, myself, and wish to press charges in addition to the assault and
battery. It really is not clear to me how it is just that Goble and his party
basically attacked me as a gang last August 20th, 2011 (that is shown in videos
on Youtube.com and provided to DDA Young and the 911 calls, one of which
was made by myself...Goble and his gang attempted to grab away my dog from
me, to pull my mountain bike away from me, and to reach into my shorts
pocket...Officer Duralde dismissed my reports of their assaults and batteries by
indicating that he viewed them as a "citizen's arrest"...well, I guess I could have
physically detained Goble on June 5, 2012 as a citizen's arrest too...but I
instead told him I was calling the police to report his battery and that he should
remain at the scene. He chose to leave (I suspect he and his party got out of the
Lexus RX300 they were in and departed in a Toyota Prius, with the brunette
female no longer being in the driver's seat for a couple reasons...one, they may
have had contraband in the Lexus and felt getting pulled over was about to
become a very real possibility...and or two, the brunette female knew she
would likely face a DUI or at least a sobriety test, so someone less impaired
needed to drive a different car).
A video just prior to the August 20th, 2011 petit larceny arrest, wherein I made
a 911 call and reported the assault and battery that Goble and his gang were
committing upon me, shows me explaining to Goble et al that reaching into my
pockets was a very poor choice and that everyone involved need to relax, settle
down, be peaceful, etc. and I referenced the tragic consequences of failing to
do so that had, at that time, just recently been seen in the death of 25 year old
Stephen Gale during an armed robbery of a female's purse on California
Avenue. The partial video of Goble et all assaulting and battering me is linked
to here, and the audio of the 911 calls wherein Goble lies about "someone just
socked a minor" and where I call and report their violent and threatening
behavior is attached:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=74aEVkgA5MA&feature=plcp
But, to get back to the lying that Goble, Zarate, and all engaged in...They lied
to the 911 operator and the officers on the scene to get me arrested, placed in
cuffs, searched etc. It was only after all that was accomplished that Zarate
realized he better put something a bit more truthful down on paper, and that is
when the unidentified man who held the iphone aloft and announced to the
denizens of the skate plaza that he would "throw it in the river if someone
doesn't claim it immediately". Goble, in his written statement, continued to
I am reporting the conduct of Goble and his party as an attempt to dissuade a
4 of 10
8/8/2012 12:48 AM
5 of 10
individuals I requested be made to testify. Goodnight also admitted that he had

failed to even once look at the ALR, AmJur and CJS selections that I had
provided him that detail cases wherein lost, mislaid, or abandoned property is
or is not the subject of larceny.
Nicole Watson admitted hearing say that he would throw the phone in question
"in the river" if it wasn't claimed immediately (http://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=to_UOFIccLw at the four minute ten second mark of the video just
linked to Nicole Watson admits to hearing and seeing this man exclaim that he
would throw the iPhone in the river...so Goble's own friend, Nicole Watson
admits that Goble's phone would have been in the river anyways...
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

PO Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel: 775 338 8118
Fax; 949 667 7402
Then, Goble gets to eat up over 9 months of District Attorney's resources

prosecuting this case, where his damages were apparently that he was without
his phone for about ten or fifteen minutes? He gets to have me arrested and
spend six and a half days in jail? Then he gets to assault and batter me by
flicking a lit cigarette at me from 2 to 3 feet away, and apparently, escaping
any arrest or prosecution for doing so?
To denneym@reno.gov, jgoodnight@washoecounty.us, zyoung@da.washoecounty.us

From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 6/06/12 1:36 AM
To: denneym@reno.gov; jgoodnight@washoecounty.us; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us
Dear Officer Denney and the Reno Police Department, DDA Young, and DPD
Goodnight,
Goble and his two still unidentified accomplices who initially approached me
(Novak and Goodnight claim to have investigated this matter and interviewed
Goble and Zarate, Further, Goodnight and Novak were unable to locate
material witness Nicole Watson, whom admitted on video tape that she was
there and heard and saw the unidentified man hold aloft the phone and
announce he would "throw it in the river". Goodnight admitted that he failed to
view the video provided to him of Nicole Watson stating this during a client
interview just minutes before the Trial that was to take place May 7th,
2012...at which DDA Young managed to subpoena and have appear Duralde,
Zarate, and Goble, yet DPD Goodnight et al refused to subpoena any of the
8/8/2012 12:48 AM
8/8/2012 12:48 AM
lie, however. Goble wrote that he set his phone down and was only 15 feet
away from where he set it...However, if that were true, then why didn't Goble
claim the phone from the unidentified man? Why did it take over 90 seconds
for Goble and his two associates to approach me? Could it be that Goble was
trying to minimize the extent to which he had carelessly set down a smartphone
on concrete, unattended, not in a bag, just by itself, bare, then went off
skateboarding,, talking to girls and his friends and doing who knows what
else? So, this drunken, high 24 year old skateboarder who rides around in
newish Lexus's with cans of Pabst Blue Ribbon beer falling out, who flicks lit
cigarettes at attorneys who are only 2 to 3 feet away, even though he knows he
is being video recorded...he gets to massage the truth, get Officer Duralde into
a mess, have my arrest reported to Bar Counsel (courtesy of a letter to Bar
Counsel by opposing counsel, Richard Hill, Esq., in the wrongful eviction from
my former home law office, in which Hill billed $50K to his neurosurgeon
client to procure a summary eviction order against a commercial tenant where
the non payment of rent was not alleged and the Eviction Notice was a No
Cause Eviction Notice...something that is expressly forbidden under NRS
40.253, the summary eviction proceeding statute...basically Hill performed a
"wrong site surgery" for his surgeon client...just that it took place in a
courtroom rather than the OR.
6 of 10
This is the supplement to the report of the battery that Cory Goble committed
upon me last night, June 5th, 2012.
lexus rx300 brownish color license plate 073xyf brunette female early twenties
behind the wheel, indicated the lexus belonged to her early twenties blonde
female friend. Cory Goble sat on the passenger side in the back seat. Asian
man early twenties in front passenger seat.
Reno Police Department case number 12-10761 for incident occurring at
7 of 10
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8/8/2012 12:48 AM
approximately 8:44pm in parking lot of Imperial Lounge on Arlington and 2nd

Street.
the night of the grand larceny arrest of Coughlin by the RPD, at the behest of
Goble and Zarate on August 20th, 2011.
911 call made announcing Toyota Prius (license plate number provided during
911 call) was the getaway vehicle for Goble and his three associates when
Coughlin announced he was calling 911 to report the battery by Cory Goble.
In the video from June 5, 2012, Cory Goble is seen with the word "FUCK"
tatooed on the knuckles of his left hand in large font and black ink. He appears
highly intoxicated. A Pabst Blue Ribbon beer can was seen under the section
of the Lexus RX300 that Goble was seated in.
I was at the Washoe County Law Library until Nikki Britt, law librarian told
me it was time to go at 7:30pm. She let me stay after the usual 7:00pm closing
time because she is nice and because the "Lawyer in the Library" program was
running late, so she was going to be there anyway. I left my car parked in the
court house's lot and decided to go for a walk in the entertainment corridor
downtown between arlington and sierra streets and First and Second Streets. I
don't have much money right now and so I was more watching to big screen
television replays of the Heat Celtics game than anything else through the
window in the imperial parking lot. I didn't go in because I don't have much
money to spend, the place looked kind of dead anyways, and I was getting
tired anyways after doing legal research for several hours. While watching the
sports highlights I heard a young man's voice kind of clowning me about my
wearing a suit. Then the voice exclaimed that I was "the guy who stole my
phone". At that point I turned on my smart phone recorder and that is where
the tape starts, with Goble repeating that he was "over it" now and, apparently,
no longer upset about the situation, which was somewhat puzzling considering
he did not lose the use of his phone for anything more than a few minutes at the
most back on August 20th, 2011, and also considering that the still unidentified
man that Nicole Watson admitted hearing say that he would throw the phone in
question "in the river" if it wasn't claimed immediately
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=to_UOFIccLw at the four minute ten
second mark of the video just linked to Nicole Watson admits to hearing and
seeing this man exclaim that he would throw the iPhone in the river...so Goble's
own friend, Nicole Watson admits that Goble's phone would have been in the
river anyways....)
The early twenty somethings appeared to feel it rather necessary to switch cars,
and possibly drivers. The excuse profered later, apparently by a shaggy brown
haired taller early twenty something male that the RPD interviewed, and whom
was very threatening to Coughlin in the parking lot, seems thin. The excuse,
that these four switched cars because Coughlin was blocking the egress of their
Lexus seems particularly suspect considering the merely switched to a Toyota
Prius parked some 3 parking spaces away. Why, if Coughlin was truly
preventing them from leaving he couldnt' have just blocked the Prius, is
unclear.
What is clear is that no forcible "citizen's arrest" was made by Coughlin.
Coughlin made the decision to allow Goble and his associates to leave
peaceably (though they likely presented a danger to others on the road
considering they all seemed intoxicated). However, in the video of the August
20th, 2011 arrest of Coughlin, wherein Goble signed a criminal complaint,
RPD Officer Duralde cheerfully dismisses Coughlin's protestations that
Coughlin himself called 911 in light of the skater youth's violent and
threatening behavior (attempting to steal Coughlin's pekingnese puppy and
Coughlin's bike, attempting to reach into Coughlin's shorts pocket, gleefully
exclaimign the lack of culpability one of their cohorts would face given he was
"only 17 years old and still a minor". Officer Duralde is hear in the video
dismissing Coughlin's account of the assaults and batteries this gang of skater
youth committed by deeming their behavior a "citizen's arrest".
Coughlin, however, chose not to utilize any of the force or threat utilized by
the skater youth's in the video of the August 20th, 2011 arrest of Coughlin for
grand larceny (Duralde cheerfully explained to Coughlin that he was
purposefully charging it as a "felony" and went on to detail the advantages to
Duralde in doing so and the disadvantages to Coughlin that that decision by
Duralde would present.
Joe Goodnight never watched that video linked to, despite the fact that it was
provided to him and qualifies as exculpatory evidence. Goodnights admits that
he failed to utilize or watch that video. The other individual providing a
witness statement, Nate Zarate, is seen in the videos attempting to dissuade
Nicole Watson from providing any insight into what she actually eye witnessed
8 of 10
8/8/2012 12:48 AM
9 of 10
8/8/2012 12:48 AM
https://bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=5a5315ae-b...
Notification of Electronic Filing in IN RE: DISCIPLINE OF

ZACHARY COUGHLIN, No. 60838
I am reporting this battery by Goble within 48 hours of it taking place. As

such, he should be arrested. I swear, under penalty of perjury, that Goble
flicked his lit cigarette directly at me, from about 3 feet away and that it hit me
in the left should area of my suit jacket and the sparks and ash exloded from the
tip of the lit cigarette when it hit my left shoulder of my suit jacket.
From: efiling@nvcourts.nv.gov
Sent: Thu 6/07/12 3:23 PM
To:
The attached video reveal Goble flicking his lit cigarette at me and it hitting
my left should at the 51 second mark. For a couple seconds afterwards I was
literally to shocked to say anything, as it was such a phenomenally stupid thing
for him to have done, especially considering that his female friend had only just
a few moments before made sure to announce that I, Coughlin, was obviously
recording and or filming the interaction. The group admits that Goble started
the conversation with me and they also readily acknowledge that his conduct
invited the interaction.
Supreme Court of Nevada

NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
Notice is given of the following activity:
Date and Time of Notice:
Jun 07 2012 03:22 p.m.
Case Title:
IN RE: DISCIPLINE OF ZACHARY COUGHLIN
Docket Number:
60838
If you choose to make an arrest, locating Goble should not be that difficult.
Goble's parents are apparently located at 2480 Montego Dr_ Pamela and
Timothy Goble. The Criminal Complaing by DDA Young list Cory Goble's
address as 5020 Las Brisas Blvd in Reno, NV.
Case Category:
Bar Matter
Document Category:
Filed Order of Temporary Suspension and Referral to Disciplinary Board."We refer this
matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing . . . .
We hereby temporarily suspend attorney Zachary B. Coughlin from the practice of law in
Nevada, pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceedings."
Sincerely,
Submitted by:
Issued by Court
Jun 07 2012 02:05 p.m.
Filing Status:
Accepted and Filed
Docket Text:
Filed Order of Temporary Suspension and Referral to Disciplinary Board."We refer this
matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing . . . .
We hereby temporarily suspend attorney Zachary B. Coughlin from the practice of law in
Nevada, pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceedings."
I appreciate your attention to this matter.
Zach Coughlin
The Clerk's Office has filed this document. It is now available on the Nevada Supreme Court's E-Filing website. Click here
to log in to Eflex and view the document.
Electronic service of this document is complete at the time of transmission of this notice. The time to respond to the
document, if required, is computed from the date and time of this notice. Refer to NEFR 9(f) for further details.
Clerk's Office has electronically mailed notice to:
10 of 10
8/8/2012 12:48 AM
1 of 2
1858
8/8/2012 12:45 AM
https://bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=5a5315ae-b...
Zachary Coughlin

No notice was electronically mailed to those listed below; counsel filing the document must serve a copy of
the document on the following:
Patrick King
This notice was automatically generated by the electronic filing system. If you have any questions, contact the Nevada
Supreme Court Clerk's Office at 775-684-1600 or 702-486-9300.

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1859
Jan 29 2010 5:53PM
HP
FlSERJET FAX
--'
"'-....-.
Carm~n
Smitll
p.33
DOB: 07112/1948
-'
DOV: 01127/2010
HISTORY: She is 61 Yelars old. She .is a widen.".
PRESENT MEO!CAL PROGRAM: Azar, an antihypertensive pill, 5/20 mg that I have not found it in my
drug baok. Also) she is on zolpidem 10 mg (Ambien 10 mg) plus vitamins and no other therapy,
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: She has valvular problems, cardiac problems (twa leaky valves), and
hypertonsion. AII>O, hepatitis C for nine years and has not had-conventional therapy for it. She has not ha.d
diagnostic work for the hepatitis C in the recent years though, There have been no counts in the recent
years, now we will have to do and also a liver blood test will be done. The patient had surgery and bled for
quite a long time after that t probably had over 60 units of blood, therefore picked up hepatitis C in that
process, this WaS ;t'l 1970.
SYSTBM HISTORY: CV: She has a history of valvular disease giving her ttlunnurs and most likely it is a
result ofrhel.lmatic fever. GENITOURINARY: Negative. NEUROMUSCULAR: The patirm1 fell and
injured her rlgbt arm, shoulder. and two disks In her neck B.Jld thJs is proven by x-ray. No problems had
resolved and it is expressed as really d.egenerative disk disease but those records will be forthCOming for
oomplete delineation of what this problem is. She does have radiation down both ArulS and was not prior to
the accident. She had physiotherapy for about a year. Orthopedic surgery did want to operate on her,
cervical spine and right shoulder opera.tions were suggClstcd but she refused. The patient stopped therapy
about a week ago from this date but stilt ha.ving problems. Also, she has a least osteopenia but sbe described
it as osteoporosis. The last bone dlensity was four years ago and anotlJer was necessary. She thinks she is Ii
least osteopenic. She is taking vitamin D dose is not known but I have recommended 1000 International
units a.long with 500 mg of calcium three times a day. She is allergic having had sever pain WI a result ofche
bisphospnonate. Therapy WII8 given primary care consultant by name of Dr. Govindz Kokado at Family
Medioine, GYN: l'egatlve. RESPIRATOR.Y: Positive for dyspnea on exertion but she does bave vslvulnr
problems and that has to be detennined.
DICT AnON ENDS ltBRE ABRUPTLY,
'1
1860
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(disclaimer, some of this has been dicated to a transcription software and not proofread
nearly enough...but that is by design, as clearly King and the Panel wish to run this unbifurcated
Hearing along at warp speed considering all the departures from SCR 105(2)(c) and other attendnat
due process deprivations designed to make Coughlin's work product here as rushed an unnoticed as
possible) Zach Coughlin representing himself submits the above titled filing on his own behalf.
I, Zachary B. Coughlin, do hereby declara, pursuant to nrs 53.045, under penalty of perjury, that the
following is true to the best of my knowledge, for which i have percipient recollections of, except for
those matters which are stated upon information and belief:
Pat King informed Coughlin in a telephone discussion on Friday, November 9th, 2012 that it
is the standard practice, done in every disciplinary case, for the Bar to send out the DowSoe, prior to
ti empaneling of the Panel, in violation of SCR 105(2)(c) (further Coughlin disputes the legal
contention hill makes that SCR 106 somehow insulates anyone with the Panel or Bar from having to
answer a subpoena or submit to sworn questioning...that rule speaks to suing such people, not
eliciting testimony or discoverable materials), however (and Laub allows for citing to such things) the
recent Disciplinary matter involving Stephen R. Harris, Esq. reveals that King's contention vis a vis
the order of the empaneling of the Panel and the filing by the Bar of its Designation of Witnesses
and Summary of Evidence are, as is King's wont and established practice, quite wrong, to the point
of being fraudulent and seeking to exercise some impermissible control over the Panel, and to steal
Coughlin's due process from him like a rat stealing some cheese. King apparently has to operate
that way because he is completely unaware of how to use a computer (admitting that he thinks
emails are sent from "the Bar's web site" rather than from, say, the account associated with an email
address), is a terrible hunt and peck typist, totally eschews legal research or citation to authority,
cannot manage to throw together an Index to Exhibits in his filings, and otherwise operate in a totally
fraudulent, back room, old boys club way, having his buddy Dan Wong from back in their days at the
AG's Office testify (so designated in the due process raping DowSoE) rather than City Attorney
Allison Ormaas, Esq. regarding 11 TR 26800, the Richard G. Hill, Esq. traffic citation matter wherein
Judge Nash Holmes cooked up a stew comprised of all different types of contempt statutes
(summary, plenary, civil, contempt, misdemeanor, etc....choosing the bits and pieces of each that
provided the least due process to Coughlin, whilst enabling Judge Nash Holmes to achieve her
pretextual goals as expeditiously as possible and with as little requirement that she back up her
ruling with any actual facts, Affidavits, evidence, due process, or specificity) (well, both Ormaas and
Wong indicated to Coughlin that she would not notate in any way or follow up in any way on
Coughlin's reporting to them both the admissions made by RPD Officer Chris Carter, Jr. to Coughlin
incident to Coughlin's custodial arrest upon Richard G. Hill, Esq. signing a criminal complaint for
criminal trespass at Coughlin's former home law office incident to an impermissible summary eviction
proceeding only on a No Cause Basis where the non-payment of rent was neither pled nor noticed.
the in that, in that matter (57507) Harris (whom admitted to misappropriating $750,000 from clients
and whom, as noted in an email to Coughlin, upon Silverman demonstrating the giving back to the
profession that he is known for in reviewing and offering constructive criticism of Coughlin's August
13th, 2012 filing in 61426 and 60838 (which the Bar still has not managed to respond to) by one of
the most respected attorneys in the state, Gary Silverman, Esq., that
"This disciplinary action was commenced on July 7, 2010. I ROA 1. The
Complaint alleged that attorney Stephen R. Harris violated two ethical rules. I ROA
3:22-24. Harris answered the Complaint on July 29, 2010. I ROA 12. Harris, who had
- 2/31 EMERGENCY EX PARTE MOTION TO DISMISS, VACATE, RESET OR POSTPONE THE 11/14/12 HEARING
OR OTHERWISE RECOGNIZE THE LACK OF JURISDICTION TO HOLD IT GIVEN THE NUMEROUS
VIOLATIONS OF SCR 105(2)(C) BY THE PANEL AND THE SBN; INSUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS,
INSUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS, MOTION FOR MISTRAIL DUE TO FRAUD BY BAR COUNSEL, etc....
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self-reported to Bar counsel eight months earlier, admitted each of the allegations in the
Complaint, and provided a statement in mitigation. I ROA 12-13; Exh. 1, pp. 12-13.
The case was assigned to a panel of the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board on
October 1, 2010. I ROA 19; Exh. 1, p.130. The Bar filed its Designation of Witnesses
and Summary of Evidence on October 7, 2010. I ROA 23-24; Exh. 1, pp. 133-34. The
Bar filed its Trial Brief on November 1, 2010. I ROA 27-36; Exh. 1, pp. 17-27. Harris
filed his Prehearing Brief on November 3, 2010. I ROA 38-50; Exh. 1, pp. 28-41. An
evidentiary hearing was held on November 9, 2010. II ROA, Tr., p. 5. Harris
acknowledged that his actions violated Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct (NRPC)
1.15 (safekeeping property) and NRPC 8.4(c) (misconduct; engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), so the Panel's primary task
was to determine the appropriate discipline to be imposed, based on the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. I ROA 28; Exh. 1, p. 18; Tr. 132:17-133:1."
So, this hearing can no way go forward on 11/14/12. If it does, this Panel will look AWFUL.
First off...I have been trying to take Pat King up on his "come down to the Bar's Office and inspect
the materials" thing since March 2012. Pat either storms off with his box of materials (takes his ball
and goes home) or sends me the cd's finally (after I had already spent money I needed for other
things giving the RMC $35 per audio of a hearing), but refuses to give me the other stuff (like, how
did the April 2009 Order of L. Gardner materialize at the SBN? Then, the Order of 10/30/12 comes
out, and
-Check out the attached USPS "Track & Confirm" for the certified mailing of the NOtice
of Hearing (and the certificate of mailing on that document does not indicate that it includes
the DowSoE, and the DowSoe is not date stamped in the "file" I got in a big box from Sierra
Document Management mentioned as the "copy of the file" (sounds like their was some ex
parte back and forth over how to deal with Coughlin and not wanting him at the SBN Office,
plus Panel Chair Echeverria's Office or the Echeverria Group is about 200 feet from the SBN's
Double R Blvd Office, and SBN Clerk of Court Peters is signing Chair Echeverria's Certificat e
of Mailings?....The only thing Chair Echeverria has ruled in Coughlins "favor" on so far has
actually had the effect of limimting Coughlin's rights under SCR 105(3)(c) to "inspect the file"
at the SBN's office "up to 3 days prior to" the 11/14/12 Hearing (and given that the SBN is
closed on Monday, November 12th, 2012...but anyways, Pat King has repeatedly refused to
allow Coughlin to inspect the file at the SBN before and since 10/31/12...plus, okay, so what,
the SBN says and the ORder decrees Coughlin gets the file (and granted, its nice to get a
fresh copy in a box, even if Coughlin suspects he will ultimately be billed for it somehow, in
one way or another)...but what of the materials new to the file between 10/31/12 and "up to 3
days" prior to the hearing? Where is the access? Further, it took quite some time for that
"copy of the file" to get to Coughlin, whom received it on the first delivery attempt:
70112970000443659543 Priority Mail Delivered November 07, 2012, 3:38 pm RENO, NV 89512
Expected Del ivery By: November 6, 2012 Certified Mail Arrival at Unit November 07, 2012,
7:59 am RENO, NV 89506 Dispatched to Sort Facility November 05, 2012, 4:42 pm RENO, NV
89510 Acceptance November 05, 2012, 10:48 am RENO, NV 89510.
plus, if you look at the certificat of mailing for the Notice of Hearing (which the big box file, at
least, indicates contained a non file stamped DowSoE (Designation of Witnesses and
Summary of Evidence) as pages 2 and 3 (despite the cert of mailing indicating only that the
Notice of Hearing was sent) of it and that says it was mailed on October 12, 2012 (so what, is
the SBN and Panel going to say "yeah, but Pat King says "Zach knew about the 11/14/12 date
because I emailed it to him or called him or something"...all while the SBN's Clerk Peters is
adding Coughlin to her "blocked sender's list" (so she doesn't have any more duties to
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actually investigate Richard Hill, etc. arise in light of somethign Coughlin sends her, like an
exculpatory video? real professional, Clerk Peters...or is the SBN or the Panel going ot say
"oh, we are moving for default because you technically, in our view, didn't get a "verified"
response on file by the 11/9/12 date we order on 11/1/12 (meaning at the earliest, under the 3
days constructive service nrcp 6(e) application under SCR 119(3), that Coughlin would have
all of a couple days to whip one together or comply with the order? With all that, is the SBN
and Panel going ot say "oh, zach, that motion or designation didn't make it into the record
because we don't don't seem to have a hard copy of it received in the dropbox or
mail....sorry...even though the Order (which came before the 5 days Coughlin had under
NRCP ...it actually didn't even hit the usps facility until 10/16/12, and it wasn't even availabe
for pickup by Coughlin until 10/22/12, and Coughlin signed for it on 10/27/12....so
on August 7th, 2012 at 3:38 pm...So
Really funny how in the SBN King Index to the Hearing red book thing Pat leaves out
the whole green tag certified mail thing, or the fact that Laura Peters sworn to Coughlin on
the phone (and maybe in writing by email...and the Affidavit of Peters that Coughlin was only
just privvy to upon getting the big box on 11/7/12 says Pat recognized that Peters gave
Coughlin an indication he was entitled to rely upon vis a vis the returned to the SBN
purported 8/23/12 certified mailing of the Complaint (and, supposedly, the First Designation).
But you know what? Even if the SBN could show the "first class" mailing of that was
recieved by Coughlin? Tell it to 60302 where Garin got Coughlin's whole wrongful term suit
dismissed despite a video of the service, multiple different service attempts, receipt of the
summons and complaint by a multitue of WLS peeps...and exteremely suspect "illegibility"
arguments....topped off by that case that says "actual notice is no substitute for technical
compliance with the rules" regarding service and notice....and even though Pat King and
Laura Peters know that the only envelope they ever mailed to Coughlin (for some weird
reason they departed from what the big box shows to be some practice where they basically
send everythign twice (one certified, once first class at the same time, typically) was a
certified large manilla envelope that Tim of the Vassar Station USPS didn't find the when
previously Coughlin appeared to get it (and certified mail is a big pain in the neck to go get
for us solos when we are in the office when the mail comes...we don't have "staff" to accept
things...so its an hour burned driving down to the post office station". When the Vassar
station finally did notice the large manilla 10/9/12 certified mailin to coughlin in whatever box
it was sitting in, it was then not given to Coughlin because it only had about $1.25 in postage
printed on it in the SBN's red Pitney Boews method...."insufficient postage" return to send.
Coughlin has very, very little money right now. Ridiculously little money, and so requests
this Panel and the Bar to further memorialize that which as already been expressly
permission give to Coughlin for (waiver of subpoena and subpoena duces tecum fees) or that
which has by a combination of express indication and implict permission being accord (for
emailing/fax filing and King's recent indication that everythign Coughlin files in a non email
manner to the SBN is copied to all five Panel members, even the cd/dvd
attachments....couhlin here is essentially requestin and IFP. If Pat or Laura is really serious
about not wanting Coughlin showing up at the SBN...then give a more explicit indication that
e-filing by email will be recongized. Otherwise, given how jammed up Coughlin has been by
the due process SCR 105(2)(c) etc violations here, Coughlin cannot rely on mailign things, at
this poitn he has to shorten the delivery time to get his file stamp and preserve arguments.
And that is not the only marked difference between the "pay David Grundy, Esq." a grip of
cash and kick down $50K to the client security fund" approach in 57507...(don't get me wrong, I like
Stephen R. Harris, Esq. he's good in the Thursday Night Group of lawyers who care and stuff about
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other attorneys...even if he thought I was a newcomer and I'm like, "guy, I been coming to this deal
since '03...all you Johnny Come Latelies....Tom, make this guy put the coffee maker away...and I told
Stevie, just like they did me: "you sit down and shut up and don't say anything for a year,
period...Nobody cares what you think...your best thinking got you here, jackhole, and, no, I don't
wanna be your sponsor, get me all coverd in your loser dust"...and nobody was prouder than me
when the Court just put him back in the game on 11/8/12, bravo. And, its cool, I get convicted on a
"candy bar and some cough drops" rap and get a temporary suspension. Steve? no temporary
suspension. Gary's like: "WTF?". But, clearly from the above, Stevie got his DowSoE sent a full
week after the Panel was announced. My DowSoE was mail 18 days before the Panel was even
announced....Kind of like saying, "hey, we know we are doing a hit piece on you, so we aren't even
going to pretend to follow the dictates of SCR 105(2)(c): "
But, look here, I'm tellin' you I'm coldest when I'm down in the winter, I have exhibits ready to drop
that are going to change this here whole game. Have you ever wondered what would happen if you
Honigsberg gridded all bar members names or ssn's against a "landlord's tenant checker outer "
service, then did a really detailed analysis of how Bar Counsel treated each paticular conviction,
especially vis a vis what sort of SCR 111 Petition was filed (SCR 111(4), or a "serious offense" under
SCR 111(6)?), and what if you added a deeper level of prcessing to see what the original charge
was, then considered the plea bargain and conditions? then what if that was available publicly?
that analysis. Let's do this, SBN. Honestly, I personally think our profession is just brutal on
lawyers, just completely ridiculous the extent to which people get raked over the coals, or at least
certain people. Its way too political how its done. Or maybe not. Maybe its a meritocracy, where if
you have the dough to sick David Grundy on them (and really, Dave's approach seems mostly to be
the "Hey, I want all your medical records five seconds after meeting you, here sign this release,
okay, here's what I want you to do whether you are guilty or not....do the mea culpa then argue
mitigation/coerced confession" tact, whereas I favor more of a "what part of being an attorney means
you don't have rights?" style interaction with the SBN) or you have the skill and tenacity to keep Pat
King honest and not stick you for your due process....the you get a better result. I got a completely
terrible ridiculous result in 2002-2005. Never again will I have an attorney who is not myself. Never.
All I know, is some guys go to 180 AA meetings in 180 days and LAP still rejects them, whereas if
your Beckett, DA, something it turns out a bit different...
(As to the client security fund, granted, is a legitimate thing...and, despit e the fact that I absolutely
went to the wall for my clients throughout all of this stuff, there were instances were their cases were
likely prejudiced due to the impact this stuff has on me (I'm talking to arrests, the evictions, etc., etc.),
and who knows, maybe that client security fund arranged for Paul Freitag, Esq. to take over for me in
Eason v. Eastman. Personally, after reading Paul's letter to me about how he tried to contact me
(something about contacting Hot Mail and Roberto Puentes and Dan Wong...Paul, how about the
contact info listed on www.nvbar.org? Wait, that's right, many people treat the WCBA Directory like
it is the licensing body deciding who is or is not a lawyer in Washoe County (I always cheap out
when it comes to sign up for it...) (whose 1979 letter to the AG yielding an Advisory Opinion I would
like for the RMC Judges to see), but if you saw the reams and reams of westlaw research I did for
Eastman, you might think I stood a good chance of delivering just as, if not more, a compelling work
product...
1. Pat King, Bar Counsel, told Coughlin on September 25th, 2012, when Coughlin showed
up for the hearing that the SBN had calendared, agreed to and noticed, that: "Things don't go your
way becaue you don't take responsibility for your actions". Well, well, well, Pat "Salieri" King. now,
now. How about your responsibility to supervise whoever it was at the SBN who didn't put the
correct postage on that large manilla envelope that apparently contained the only copy of the
October 9th, 2012 Notice of Intent to Take Default (and, upon information and belief, some other
documentation? coughlin swears that he did not received that certified mailing (and the SBN's
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certificate of mailing, that Coughlin only received on November 7th, 2012 when the certified mailing
of the sierra legal duplicating copy of the "filed" (a consolation by the Chair Echeverria to Coughlin in
exchange for excising one of the very, very few rights Coughlin has here, set forth in SCR 105 ("right
to inspect up to three days before"....so what of inspecting the file between it being sent to the
printers on November 1, 2012, as admitted to on October 31st, 2012 by Peters when she refused to
let Coughlin inspect it and again by King in writing on November 1st, 2012, and several times
thereafter in writing and verbally, in violation of SCR 105(2)(c). It is outright appalling the extent to
which PEters, King, and the Chair Echeverria are violating the law and showing no respect at all for
due process. The SBN has filed not proof of service of the summons and complaint sufficient to
satisfy SCR 109 in view of the representations made by the State Bar of Nevada, including those by
Laura Peters on the phone and in writing to Coughlin and found in Peters Affidavit on file in this
matter. The first alleged certified mailing of 8/23/12 is not sufficient to show service where Peters
herself (and this is spoken to in her affidavit) represented that the SBN would not be attempting to
use it to proof service of any sort of the Complaint, but rather, Peters would send, soon after
September 11th, 2012 a certified mailing copy of the SCR 105 SBN v zach Coughlin complaint to
Coughlins SCR 79 address, and that the complaint would not be deemed served or by the SBN, nor
would the SBN attempt to represent in any way that it had been served, until zach coughlin had
signed the return receipt requested and or certified letter signature card and it had been received by
the SBN.
2. Coughlin might call the Godfather of Family Law in Nevada, Don Gary Silverman, Esq. (and
Maybe Marshal Willick, Esq. if I can get him (but really, the lack of bifurcation here and the scatter
shot carpet bombing copy and pasting of the RPC and the multitude of Claiborne and 37 cfr 11.25(3)
(a) and (c) (applied by analogy, IN Re schaeffer and STufphh) basis for attackign the various
"convictions" here makes scant the amoutn of time availabe (especially given the Chairs avowed
intention to get 'r done in one day (funny, did Steve R. Harris's deal take one day only? or must one
hire David Grundy to get that sort of time with the SBN and Panel?:
Gary Robert Silverman Company: Silverman, Decaria & Kattelman, Chtd. Address: 6140 Plumas St.
Ste. 200 Reno , NV 89519 Phone Number: 775-322-3223 Fax number: 775-322-3649 Email:
silverman@silverman-decaria.com Website: http://www.silverman-decaria.com Admit Date: 11/02/70
should the 11/14/12 hearing go forward, which it clearly should not, at least not in its current
unbifurcated, due process violating, unnoticed, no service of the 10/9/12 NOtice of INtent to Take
Default, no "at least 30 days" service of the Designation of Witness and Summary of Evidence BY
THE PANEL, NOT BY THE SBN, BAR COUNSEL, OR THE CLERK OF THE SBN, under SCR
105(2)(c). SBN also told Coughlin he would not have to pay any witness or subpoena fees and that
Respondent's never have to in these Disciplinary Hearings.
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Vanity Fair doing a hit piece on Sarah Palin thinks the way this thing has been run so far is a bit
uneven-handed. Ann Coulter writing about the shortcomings of a minority immigrant lesbian victim
of domestic violence disabled single mother whistleblower who was retaliated against's shortcomings
thinks the way this thing has been run so far lacks sensitivity.
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Coughlin incorporates by reference: The Notice filed 11 9 2012 in in the case involving WLS's Paul
Elcano and State Bar of Nevada's Ethic's Committee Member Joseph Garin, Esq. and it is truly
interesting that the SBN and the Panel seek to plungE headlong into the 11/14/12 hearing that
violates absoltuely every section of NR 105(2)(c) (one of the very, very few provisions of the
Supreme Court Rules speaking to the due process requirements of these disciplinary hearings
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(which some watching Coughlin circa 2002-2005 might say often devolve into kangaroo courts
where some corrupt bully (some might say Strip Club Spearmint Rhino owner Kevin Kelly, Esq.,
decade long member of the State Bar of Nevada's Character and Fitness Committee, whose club
allegedly funnels $10 million a year to Vegas cabbies to direct tourists to its doors Coe Swobe
making' calls there too, just like in 60302 where he is calling Coughlin and his father seeking to do
WLS's and Elcano's bidding) who chips off his friends (Peter Christiansen, Jr. Esq.) despite saying
the representations would be pro bono (despite receiving $5,000, Christiansen still, on the record,
misled the Character and Fitness Committee into think he was appearing pro bono...the proceeded
to make it clear that the sum and sumbstance of the work he or his office would do for the $5K was
for him to file a six page, rather tepid arrangement worth of a Pre Hearing Brief (containing
admissions that Coughlin did not make related to things Coughlin did not do) and showing up for the
dog and pony show hearing (wherein, after his friends having been paid, C&F Committee Strip Club
Spearmint Rhino ownin' Kevin Kelly, Esq. took a remarkably different tact with applicant for
admission Coughlin (whose admission was delayed despite never having been convicted of a single
crime, based largely on some retaliation that Mark Tratos, Esq. largely admitted to, along with Mary
Lafrance (send me "another" copy of you paper..."what was it about" the "name of the case
involved" (gee Tratos, kind of sounds like you had the version Coughlin submitted with only his
social security number (in compliance with the Boyd School of Law's blind grading policy, which
would have been particulary apt where your own summer associate, Don Prunty, was taking your
July 2001 Cybe law class (as was Coughlin, following his second year of law school, wherein at the
same time he took and passed the July 2001 Nevada Bar Examination, while taking another summar
school class as well) (http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?documentError=1229552%3A+This+document+is+currently+unavailable.+If+you+need+a+copy+of+this+document
%2C+please+contact+Clerk%27s+Office+at+%28775%29684-1600.&csIID=28466
MOTION SHOWING GOOD CAUSE TO ALLOW COUGHLIN TO SUBMIT A RESPONSE

OR ANSWER TO WHATEVER EXTENT THE PANEL FEELS HE HAS NOT ALREADY
DONE SO AND OR INTENDS TO CALL THIS A "PROCEED ON A DEFAULT BASIS"
SITUATION, WHERE COUGHLIN DISPUTES.
to whatever exten the sbn or panel purprts that coughlin has defaulted here, Coughlin
submits thats not the case particularly where the sbn has not filed an valid proof of service of
the complaint, particulary given the admission as to the representations and indicatiosn made
by the sbn, king and peters...further, the notice of intent to take default was only mailed by
certified mail. and the postage was deficient, and the usps wouldn't give it to coughlin, though,
curiously the cerified mailing number for that mailign is not in the big box that strangely
enough...took form november 1, 2012 to november 7th, 2012 to get copied and transported to
coughlin (not exactly blazing speed, huh...and coughllin reported the insufficient postage issue
to king and the sbn in the interim, so...draw your own conclusions...but pat is refusing to amend
any return of service thereto the complaint and or the DowSoW (see attached showing the first
certified scanning of it being in usps possession is from october 16th, 2012, not 10/12/12, and
that the earliest it was presented to coughlins' po box was 10/22/12, through no fault of coughlin
(who complied with scr 79 here...)sbn EMPLOYEE "paula" admitted to Coughlin that Pat
King locked the SBN door "a couple minutes" prior to 5 pm on a day when Coughlin sought to
present someting for filing that arguably could be deemed a "response" (verified to whatever
extent required, under protest, as this situation, where coughlin si representing himself presetn,
arguably a unique circumstances, and coughlin herein incorprates allt eh arguments made in
his recent 61901 filing vis a vis making self represented defenandts subject to such an
impermissible "sworn testimony" view of their own advocacy...But arguably, especially
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Coughlin's file stamped 10/31/12 Pre-Hearing MOtion to Dismiss/summary

judgment/memorandum of law should be view as just such a "response", verified to whaver
Spevack considering extent is required of a self represented respondent here, and where King
and the SBN should be made to more spcifically set forth that allegations (fairness to opposing
counse? in what way? Judges Nash HOlmes Order is beyond cursory in that regard, and
utterly devoid of a single fact to support such copy and pasting of the RPC...other than to
suggest asking questions about retaliation is so dilatory as to support a "fairness to opposing
counse" rpc violation worthy of a scr 105 complaint....uh....
"We nevertheless conclude that discipline orders appearing in the Nevada Lawyer may be cited to
this court for the limited purpose of providing examples of the discipline imposed in similar fact
situations. This approach has also been taken by several other courts. n22
n22 See. e.g., Berman v. City of Daly City, 21 Cal. App. 4th 276, 26 Cal. Rptr, 2d 493, 496 n.5 (Ct.
App. 1993); Marez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 286, 289 n.2 (Colo. 1981); Manderfeld v. Krovitz,
539 N.W.2d 802, 807 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995): Leisure Hills of Grand Rapids v. DHS, 480 N.W.2d
149, 151 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)." In Re Laub.
Plus on the sufficiency of the servie and proces and servic of process thing (kings exhibits are blurry
and not well scanned, and printed on both sides of the page in some instances, which Garin got a
dismissal for based on arguably less in 60302)...
I am not so sure Judge McGee didn't have something to do with my temporary suspension. Or
District Attorney Gammick (both of whom I like and consider friends). I emailed them both about five
hours before I got the efile notice from the Court of the suspension on June 6th, 2012. And like my
friend Gary Silverman, Esq. said in an email to me on August 13th, 2012 when Gary, as is his wont,
took time out of his day to read my ridiculously long (well Grundy's breif for Stevie was 55 pages,
so....and Judge McGee's suggestion to me that mine should be no more than 3 pages is just
insulting. lawyers drone on for 60 pages about widgets but a career of mine that took a lifetime to
build is worth 3 pages? Please. seriously, lawyer's need a Player's Union. And it ain't the Bar.
There's a really big problem in our Bar right now, and I think we all now what it is...Player hatin'.
That's right, I said it. Hell, look at this deal. Here, the Bar is basically the Bench's Rent-aThug...enter Pat "Salieri" King. it is just plain puke worthy the extent to which Patty has covered his
ears, put a blindfold over his eyes, and muzzled himself in his pursuit of cloaking himself in his tired
old mantra "a conviction is indisputable proof of wrongdoing (not according to Claiborne and
Montiero says King seeking to screw up a pending criminal prosecution in 11 cr 063341 is just wrong
where King purports to include it in this Complaint herein (and Coughlin shoudl get and moves for a
continuance of this Bar hearing on 11/14/12 on that basis as well...Its just ridiculous to expect
Coughlin to appear representing Himself at this bar hearing on 11/14/12, then do the same in the
alleged "lost mislaid abandoned" property as larceny case 063341 to pretend like that is fair
(especially where kIng has rigged this deal so that Coughlin's SCR 105(2)(c) rights have all been cut
by about 709%...which is prosecutorial misconduct, and under SCR 119 hopefully something the
Court will address (but also as "possession of stolen property" according to dda young, despite
Staab, double jeopardy and duplicative charges issues, and the fact that the Complaint in that case
fails to allege "from another" or to allege anything with any specificity whatsoever, which is
something Biray Dogan is sure doesn't matter. despite Biray getting $8,000 raises in some of the
worst fiscal years in our nation's history...connection? uh, no comment. so I don't have to
undertake any investigation or ask the Board member Richard G. HIll, Esq. (whose best friend is also
a Board Member, David Hamilton, Esq.,and its pretty unseemly for Board members to be using their
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membership as a club....and when I say "club" I mean like a shiv or shank or something one might
reach for if ish starts to popov in the 'yard...not like a "group" or "committee"...if that is what Hill is
doing here, which is not for me to say. just sayin' you know what I'm sayin? You know what I'm
sayin. But this Board, funny thing...its comprised of individuals...and they don't always see things the
same. Look at 57507, Harris's deal. The Chair there was like "oh, hell naw"....) any uncomfortable
questions....like how Hill lied to get Coughlin arrested (Coughlin hereby incorporates by reference all
his filings in the last 18 months publicly available on the Nevada Supreme Court's website, especially
those in 60838, 61901, 61426, 60302, 60331, 61383, 60630 (which should just be a Mandamus
Petition requiring Longoni and the RMC to quit breaking the law and instead comply with the NRS
189.030 requirement that the RMC Order the transcript prepared and the ROA sent to the District
Court within 10 days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal (and Judge Kenneth Howard's statement on
the record after Coughlin was brought back in in cuffs on 11/30/11 in 11 CR 22176 (and that whole
conviction is completely devoid of any sniff of due process, much less the fact that tribal police are
not allowed to make misdemeanor arrests in Nevada under NRS 171.1255and the "confidential"
60975 (aint so confidential where the publicly available case participant search research show a
SCR 117 "confidential" Disability Petition has been filed against Coughlin, now is it? Also, Coughlin
submitted to the Court on May 24th, 2012 an Opposition to King's May 10th, 2012 SCR 111(6)
Petition on the Walmart and its not in line with what was done in the Noel Gage case (he submitted
an opposition) and there is not a rule that says the Clerk can refuse to file the Opposition Coughlin
submitted on May 24th, 2012 or otherwise make it so some shallow AP article is printed about
Coughlin the day after the Court's Order comes down suspending Coughlin (kinda sounds a bit fed
to that writer, doesn't it? Also, Coughlin's recent filings in 61901 and some other cases (not 60302
though, featuring SBN Ethics Committee member Joe Garin (can I get King's complaint here
dismissed on Garin style "illegible" service of process arguments that are later reclassified as
insufficiency of "process" rather than the previous arguments as to insufficiency of "service" of that
process? King's exhibits (which you just know under the Mirch case will mean all that those Judge's
Order attached as exhibits (and hell, it'll prolly be the case that orders mentioned in those orders
(like Judges Sferrazza's 10/27/11 Findings of Fact, etc. in rjc rev2011-1708 will be thereby
incorporated too, right...except, like in the 11 cr 26405, they will only be relevant to the extent the
prosecution needs 'em...once Coughlin starts referencing them, Chair Echeverria will be on it in a
second with a Judge Howard/Nash/L. and W. Gardner style "how is this relevant" "it's not relevant"
"move on!" "you keep it up and you are going to add to your little record there" (that last one from
Judge Nash Holmes, although she'll tell you no extra judicial communication affected her ability to
preside over that matter, or resullt in the Richard G. Hill gets Coughlin arrest again this time for
jaywalking case in 12 cr 00696 (in the video which coughlin transcribed Hill is seen lying to RPD
Officer Hollingsworth that, on 1/11/12 Coughlin had "lost his appeal" (you mean the one not decided
until 3/30/12, Rich? Kind of like Hill lying to RPD Chris Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez (see
Coughlin work in 11 cr 26405's recent filigns in the last month, both of which shouldbe essentially
reproduced in N. S. Ct. 61901, but only one of which is (no matter, all that was relevant enough to
put most of it in 60302) being transferred to her on 2/27/12 (lot happened on that day here) purport to
rule on will be deemed "notice" or pled to Coughlin (which doesn't make sense considering there are
3 grievance number on the complaint, yet the 8/23/12 stamped Complaint speaks to things not
mentioned in any of those grievances...)...and speaking of, oh. look there's Keith Loomis, Esq. on the
SBN's fee dispute Committee...sure is interesting who winds up on all these Committees for the
SBN....Kevin Kelly, Esq., owner of the megalithic Las Vegas outpost of multinational strip club chain
Spearmint Rhino has been puttin' in work on the Character & Fitness Committee for ever, great
friends with Peter Christiansen, Jr.) and as a "verified response" (to whatever extent this Panel
intends to hold that Coughlin has to do what Judge Nash Holmes tried to do (ie, swear in the self
representing defendant at the outset, thereby hamstringing them with an impermissible condition that
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the Muni Court Judges are, curiously, not putting on their, er, the Municipalities prosecutors (and
believe me, Allison Ormass, Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Pamela Roberts, Dan Wong, et al don't
want know part of everything that comes out of their mouths in court being sworn. And the testify
plenty while trying their cases, in fact, they are really good at it, especially during their closing
arguments about facts not in evidence and which are not reasonably directed toward admissible
subject matter to begin with, but rather just cheap shots calculated to render a prejudicial
effect...right Hazlett-Steven's, what with your repeated "pajamas and slippers" blast....Don't see
Judge Nash Holmes talking threatening trash at him from the bench (Judge Holmes couldn't decide
during the 2/27/12 preceding if everything Coughlin said that day was "sworn testimony" or
not...alternately seeming to want it to be, only to constantly interrupt Coughlin during his cross of
Sargent Tarter to say things like "when you testify you can get into that" or "you are not testifying he
is" (and Ormaas's statements in court that day about whether the report or charge sheet or whatever
that had the officer that Sargent Tarter called in to fill out the form (why on earth does Sargent Tarter
need to call someone in to fill out a report, then indicate Tarter signed it, and that didn't deprive
Coughlin his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation or justifying a continuance? Maybe there is a
sensitive reasons why Tarter can't write in his own hand or something (in which case, I mean no
disrespect), or, maybe, his callign in a officer with no percipient recollection indicates some
impermissible action or motive by Tarter (and Tarter testified that he normally give people a warning,
but that Coughlin was being uncooperative (which is something every RPD Officers seems to be
trained to recite from rote along with "well my training and experience indicated to me a search was
appropriate).
Regarding the apparent greater "due process" accorde to David Grundy's client STephen R. Harris
(which reminds me....Coe Swobe should not be making calls to Coughlin's father, Dr. Timothy D.
Coughlin, nor should WLS's Paul Elcano seeking to "help" Coughlin (if by "help Zach" they mean
"hey, Tim, don't let Zach give Elcano any problems, okay? We need you to lean on Zach, Tim."
Yeah, no, Paul and Coe...Coe doesn't need to tell Zach Coughlin "well you really shit on Elcano
there". Not quite Coer (he calls me "Zacker" , it was his call in 2002 that funneled me to Peter
Christiansen, Jr. (and Coe probably didn't know much of anything about Pete...and arguably made
up for any negligence or untoward involvement in that regard where he and Keith Lee, Esq. (founder
of the C&F) got it done in 2004 (after Christiansen and Sanft made it abundantly clear that they
weren't going to get out of bed for less than another $5K, not in so many words...but when Eichman
is like,uh...yeah, your "attorney of record" doesn't seem too "into it" so, um...why don't you prepare a
Notice of Intent to Seek Reconsideration" or something when the abeyance expires in Sept 2003
(which Coughlin did, yet Eichman decided not to submit to the Court...and, to be fair, it probably
would have not had the best chance (although, come to think of it, its was the "two or three pages"
that Judge McGee seemed to suggest Coughlin's recent Motino to Dissolve should be....yet Eichman
just basically unilaterally failed to forward it on to the Court? And if you had Mike Rowe writing you
nasty threatening letters t sit down and shut up like Rowe did in January 2003 to Coughlin...you
probably woudn't be too squeeky a wheel either...which would cost you another year and half of your
career and professional development (why is it only deputy prosecutors get all the trial
experience...and Coughlin gets fired where he attempts to get some in 54844 (incorporate that case
too into Coughlin's respond to Kings Complaint to the extent one is being coerced out of Coughlin
and the Motion to Dismiss or Motion for More definite STatement is not accorded to approriate
NRCP process (clearly Panel Chair Echeverria doesn't believe in waiting to read a Reply to King's
Opposition to bifurcate, as the Chair enters his orders before the 5 days to file one has even run
(consider nrcp 6(e) and the fact that King doesn't email or fax his Opposition to the bifurcate
motion..mailed it on 10/24/12 and the Chair rules on 10/30/12...just like RMC Judge Howard ruling
on Coughlin's various post-trial motions before the City Attorney's office even responds to
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them...nothing says "due process" quite like that. well, except for Judge Howard announcing at trial
that he was refusing to grant Coughlin a continuance in 11 cr 22176 (resulting in 60838) because
Coughlin failed to appear at the 11/14/12 original trial date. Despite City Attorney roberts having
agreed to a continuance of the 11/30/12 trial date in writing before hand, come trial time she refused
to, then claimed it was up to Judge Howard anyways. The RMC granted the city attorney a
continaunce in 11 cr 26405 because Board member Rich Hill need to go on vacation for six weeks
(lew taitel, conflict, rmc defender, took coughlin's case, shouldnta...coughlin was suing his business
partners, who are committing the unauthorized practice of law, that judge pearson and judge
schroeder found permissible in rjc rev2012-001048, which not only wrongfully evicted coughlin, but
resulte in two wrongful arrests of coughlin by the rpd in 12 cr 12420 and rcr2012-067980 (when
Judges fail to follow what the legislature sets out in nrs 40.253, there is a real human cost, and,
apparently, it costs Dan Wong and the bar and the courts, and lots of other people their
relationships, time, judicial resources, etc., etc. Our states landlord tenant law are the harshest
towards tenants to begin with...when Judges "remix" those laws or choose not to faithfully enforce
them (and its particularly suspect where that is done by former prosecutors turned judges where
Coughlin's orientation to the County Sheriff and RPD at this poitn arguably calls for an "alternate
public prosecutor) to be appointed in all past and existing prosecutions of Coughlin, beginning with
the rcr2011-063341 arrest that started all of this off (with a little help from a wrongfull summary
eviction that remixed summary and plenary and went all "JCRLV Rule 44" (despite the RJC not
having complied with JCRCP 83 in fashioning such an application....and don't tell Coughlin he "sh&t
on" Washoe Legal Services". Coughlin, in the last year, has more than paid it forward to the legal
services community in Nevada through his guerilla, impromptu, performance art, improvisational
tenant's rights, prosecutorial and police misconduct addressing advocacy, all gratis, natch. Well, you
can go ahead and thank his momma, Very Special Arts of Nevada's Mary Barker Program Director
(and Obama's staunchest supporter, at least in the Western States, for sure.. caring on the Ruth
Barker legacy of adovacy) for that advocacy, because is has in large part been funded through
generous grants from her, on her $21 an hour paycheck. But you can't thank Marc Ashley, Esq.,
WLS's landlord tenant attorney. YOu could maybe thank Jon Sasser, Esq. some. And Tik
Segerblom. But you can't thank Paul Elcano or the Muni Court Judges for that. Thank Mary
Barker. And you can thank Bo Barker, Esq. too, famed construction defect gure in the State of
Washinton (www.BarkerMartin.com). Haven't heard too much from Robert Coughlin, Esq. (last thing
heard bout him he was prosecutin' defendants denied their Sixth Amendment Right to counsel for
Huber Heights. http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/defendants-tried-without-lawyersin-huber-heights-/nM9sD/ (http://www.zoominfo.com/#!search/profile/person?
personId=282794556&targetid=profile whom Coughlin hereby supplements to the SBN as included
in his Designation of Witnesses...especially where all the sudden Judge Beesley and Paul Elcano
are being supplemented (Judge Beesley to excuse, apparently, King's reckless and not true
attestation (if it were true, then how did Coughlin file on 6/10/12 something in Cadle Co. v. Keller
(funny, the excellent motion work Coughli did for Keller and Gessin in the NVB adversary
proceedings didn't find its way into the ginormous bate stamped collections of "pleadings created by
Zach Coughlin" in the SBN's files (nor was anything from Coughlin's very, very sold work in the two
Dana Harris cases, the one before Judge Doherty featuring a NRCP 60(b)(4) void for lack of
jursidiction where home state under the UCCJEA was procured through fraud motion that Coughlin
was probably paid, consdiering everything, something liek $50 for....or the work in the Carpentier v.
Aames funding (which Judge Flanagan managed to issue yet another rather suspect sanction
against Coughlin in to go alogn with his apparenlty record setting attorney's fees award agains that
which he had deemed a commercial tenant (at least implicilty, to the extent the summary eviction
where NO Cause all that was pled was upheld) in the richard hill eviction case.. (those sanctions
bring it to the point where any Temporary Restraining Order that Couglin and Flanagans former
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employer may be entitled to prior to Coughlin unloading some "privilege of the participant" laden
testimony directed toward, lets just say, hypotehticaly, an associate getting let go because "not a
good fit" a couple weeks after an office managers assistant broke up with the new litigation lateral
hire equity partner, the the assistant asks the junior associate out, cue the sudden need for an
"assignement" to be done for the same Seinfeld character swarming around Trish's departure, even
though that partner way off in transactional land....and add to that the awkwardness of junior
associate pointing out to new lateral equity hire that us supreme court ruling on a post whatever
whatever cause of action under something something being mandatory authority, for which the
SCR's hold there is a duty to disclose, and you have what? you have an associate booted 'round
christmas time just after developing gastroenteritis incident to the southern pseudo military academy
atmosphere found at that firm...Not sue how that wouldn't kind of call for recusal (Judge L. gArdner
herself signed an ORder of recusal in the next case coughlin appeared as atty on before her, citing,
in her 8/16/11 ORder of Recusal NCJCR 2.11(A)(1) (that's the one where the Judge just flat out
admits they have an actual bias or prejudice, right? we aren't even talking perceived or possiblewe
are talkin' flat out "I am biased and prejudiced against you" admission resulting in recusal (and the
comment is instructive consdering what happened during the settlemen conference in that April 2009
JOshi case: "[3]Judges must be mindful of the effect settlement discussions can have, not only on
their objectivity and impartiality, but also on the appearance of their objectivity and impartiality.
Despite a judges best efforts, there may be instances when information obtained during settlement
discussions could influence a judges decision making during trial, and, in such instances, the judge
should consider whether disqualification may be appropriate. See Rule 2.11(A)(1)."...also " Third
degree of relationship includes the following persons: great-grandparent, grandparent, parent,
uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew, and niece. See Rule 2.11.
NCJCR's on terminology sections"
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...as the basis for her doing so...that same rationale arguably applies to have required her brother to
recuse himself in the criminal trespass prosecution.. Guess its nice of Judge L. Garner to just flat out
admit it in her recusal order in Bell v. Greer wherein she cites: Rule2.11.Disqualification.
(A)A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judges impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:
(1)The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a partys lawyer, or
personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding." But to then go on and be
involved in the ghost greivancing here (in the "big box" of the file delivered to Cogulin on 11/7/12
(wow, only 8 days before this huge hearing wherein King has told Coughlin he will get him disbarred,
Mirch-style, coughlin finally gets some access to some of the materials...in violation of the right to
inspect "up to 3 days" in SCr 105(2)(c), and Coughln had been seeking that permission to inspect
continuously all along here, and it is impermissilbe for King to violate the "courthouse sanctuary"
doctrine and purport to impinge on coughlin's inspect right under scr 105(2)(c), especially by shoving
documents into coughlin's jacket upon pulling at the lapel (and its King and Peters that are no
adopting the "Duluth Model" "Power and Control Wheel" abuser style tactics of "playing the victim"
(replete with Peters's "this is harrasment! I am getting a protection ORder whenever her apparent
misconduct resulting in a curtailing of Coughlins' due process rights is broached....ditto for King...see
his baseless and unsupported, devoid of specifics (gee, don't think Paula would quite put it like that
KIng...just because she admitted that king leaves the office early, thereby locking up the "filing office"
prior to "The close of business at 5pm" under NRCP doesn't make Coughlin's conduct as justifying
some "stay away" letter, Pat. get a grip.
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Rule 2.11. Disqualification. (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
the following circumstances: (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party or a partys lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judges spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the
third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is:
(a) a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of
a party; (b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (c) a person who has more than a de minimis
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or (d) likely to be a material witness in
the proceeding. (3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judges
spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judges family residing in the
judges household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding. (4) [Reserved.] (5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to
commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or
controversy. (6) The judge: (a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy or was associated
with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association; (b)
served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated personally and substantially
as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity
an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy; (c) was a material witness
concerning the matter; or (d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court. (B) A
judge shall keep informed about the judges personal and fiduciary economic interests and make a
reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the judges spouse or
domestic partner and minor children residing in the judges household. (C) A judge subject to
disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose
on the record the basis of the judges disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to
consider, outside the presence of the judge and court staff, court officials and others subject to the
judges direction and control, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties
and lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court staff, court officials and others subject
to the judges direction and control, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may
participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding.
COMMENT [1] Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judges impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1)
through (6) apply. For example, if a judge were in the process of negotiating for employment with a
law firm, the judge would be disqualified from any matters in which that law firm appeared, unless the
disqualification was waived by the parties after disclosure by the judge. [2] A judges obligation not
to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a
motion to disqualify is filed. [3] The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For
example, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or
might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing
on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In matters that require immediate action, the
judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts
to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable. [4] The fact that a lawyer in a
proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not itself
disqualify the judge. If, however, the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned under
paragraph (A), or the relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be
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substantially affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(c), the judges disqualification is
required. [4A] The filing of a judicial discipline complaint during the pendency of a matter does not of
itself require disqualification of the judge from presiding over the litigation. The judges decision to
recuse in such circumstances must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. [5] A judge should
disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might
reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge
believes there is no basis for disqualification. (Judge W. Gardner only did this upon Coughlin
prompting for it...) A judge making such a disclosure should, where practicable, follow the
procedure set forth in Rule 2.11(C). [6] Economic interest, as set forth in the Terminology section,
means ownership of more than a de minimis legal or equitable interest (Coughlin's law license is a
14th amendment property right, and Judge L. Gardners reputation as a jurist, to whatever extent she
felt is impinged by 54844, may invoked this provision here). Except for situations in which a judge
participates in the management of such a legal or equitable interest, or the interest could be
substantially affected by the outcome of a proceeding before a judge, it does not include: (1) an
interest in the individual holdings within a mutual or common investment fund; (2) an interest in
securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization in which the
judge or the judges spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a director, officer, advisor,
or other participant; (3) a deposit in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge
may maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or similar proprietary
interests; or (4) an interest in the issuer of government securities held by the judge.
.probably wouldn't be such an issue if there weren't $5K sanction for filing motions that do point out
"gee, yeah, that might be kind of important if RCS/QLS is owned by the law firm on the case, and
they are sending out the summary judgment motions to one who is no longer attorney of record or
doing so in the bankruptcy matrix or listing the wrong court and or case number in the caption (funny,
anything like that by Coughlin gets a WDCR 10 rejection by Matheus, not to mention that WDCR 37
or whatever that sets for exactly the court lines on the caption have to say basis, and wDCR r 17 or
18 or whatever) (especially given the great possibilities int eh BK setting for making the bank/lender
prove standing, Rule 3001 or whatever) .that, while not formatted that great, did manage to set out
the exact method to win that case, some rather elegant points of law that many would miss (and
Couglin wouldn't have gotten there were it not for the initial assist from Michael Lehrners, and some
general shaman meets arms dealer by way of Mecca direction from one Geoffrey Lynn Giles, Esq.)
to king's Boss, David Clark, and, upon information and belief, Coughlin's then client, Peter Eastman,
prior the the May 10th, 2012 filing by King, regarding matters still requiring King's non comment to
Eastman under SCR 121 (how is it that Eastman and King are the only two people in the world who
makes comments to Coughlin about "the b#n#r*p#c# Court won't let you" do this or that in the first
couple days of May 2012 if King isn't violating SCR 121 to Eastman (who magically was able to
afford Freitag all the sudden, despite having failed to pay Coughlin anything on the $3,500 flat fee to
represent Eastman in CV11-00820 - EASON INSURANCE VS. PETER EASTMAN. ETAL (B6).
Whether there is some connection to the Zach Coughlin v. Jeff Nichols case in the RJC, and whether
Nichols just told lie after lie at the hearing (and, whether that is easily provable, Jeff...keep smilin',
buddy....and whether Coughlin was punched in the face by somebody on or around March 30th,
2012, whether that somebody is a former WCSO Deputy, and whether Nichols and he not only
managed ot get Nichols about 6 hours of high end research for free (well, not according to the deal)
on the whole gift/loan $130K unsecured promissory loan form the older english professor family
friend thing...resulting in some, an attorney subject to yet another wrongful eviction (its fraud to post
a No Cause Eviction notice then file a tenant's affidavit alleging non payment of rent on the day of
the hearing, Gayle...and Sue...just because the attorney's pre hearing mOtion pointed out all the
terrible obstacles you would be facing in proceeding under a no cause notice (and if the eviction
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order in rjc 2012-000374 is faxed to the RJC, as Casey Baker, Esq. testified on 6/18/12, that all such
orders are (and contrary to RJC indications....even private attorenys rely on the RJC to fax those
lockout orders to the Sheriff's...and if the 3/15/12 lockout order in that summary eviction (the one the
attorney was subject to about 5 hours after the hearing, where a default was granted for a hearing
notice as starting at 8:30 am, despite the fax header on the eviction order indicatign the signed
Lockout Order was faxed to the Sheriff at 8:24 am....? Which brings up the question...since Baker's
testimony is that even landlord's with high end private attorney's like Hill rely on (as that is the usual
course and custom according to RJC Karen Stancil, for such orders to be faxed to the wCSO the day
they are entered, or the next day at the latest)...then where, oh where, is the proof of when the RJC
faxed teh 10/25/11 Eviction Decision and Order that Judge Sferrazza signed in rjc rev2011-001708
and which Deputy Machen lists as having "personally served" Coughlin, on 11/1/11 at 4:30
pm...despite Machen (who made the arrest in rcr2012-06798, on june 28th, 2012, despite judge
schroeder and the rjc being well aware of the deficiency of the notice under 40.253 in that the
unauthorized practicioner of law (the call themselves an "eviction consulting and process serving
company"...isn't that cute?) Nevada Court services, biz partners with Lew Taitel (the RMC court
appointed defender who appeared for Coughlin the trespass case before Judge W. Gardner (brother
to the L. gardner who recused herself from a randomly assigned case that Coughlin was atty of
record on on 8/10/11 in Case Description: FV11-02864 - ROBERT A BELL VS JESSICA F GREER
(D11) -. Filing Date: 10-Aug-2011...which coincidentall (god shot,anyone?) just so happens to not
only establish that (and this was done in so many, many other ways regardless) that Coughlin held
himself out and was a commercial tenant at 121 River Rock ST., practicing law (and a mattress biz
to boot, Coughlin Memory Foam) HIll's summary eviction of commercial tenant Coughlin on a NO
Cause notice was jurisdictionally void (to whatever extent the october 18th, 2011 filing by Coughlin of
a notice of appeal and depositing that $2,275 didn't divest Judge SFerrazza, under Mack v. Mack
Manley of jurisdictio nto hold the "Trial" on 10/25/11 that he noticed in writing ("the use of the term
"Trial" was unfortunate, You Honor" said HIll's associate Casey Baker, who has now hightailed it on
back to Kentucky now that he and HIll are about to have some serious 'splainin' to do)...And as to the
"verified response or Answer" Echeverria and kIng are so keen on....is yours a verified Complaint,
Pat? Are the Judges oRders verified? Does Judge Nash HOlmes's pastiche of what she likes best
of the differetn types of contempt in NEvada and beyond based upon some Affidavit by a marshal as
to some restroom hapennings? Were is that "not in the immediate presence" not "under the court's
watchful eye" affidavit. and Judge Howards tack on 3 minutes of trial audion in 11 cr 22176 seeks to
mislead Coughlin not only as to who has to pay up front or not for the transcript attendnat to an
appeal fo the petty larceny conviction (which is void anyways given it stems from an arrest by a tribal
police officer, violative of nrs 171.1255 (and at the trial wal-mart's Thomas Frontino and the RSIC
officers Braunworth and Crawford admitted that no citizen's arrest was effectuated upon Coughlin,
with Frontino making especially clear (it seemed he had been coached to do so, likely to help his
employer wal-mart in seeking to avoid any "wrongful shopkeeper's arrest" lawsuits by just letting the
tribal police take whatever fall might stem from something like that (not likely, right?....but the price to
pay for that, City of Reno, Walmart, and RSIC is that nrs 171.1255 rears its ugly head makes that
whole arrest, and therefore conviction, null and wrongful, and there's some question that need be
asked of Roberts et al about prosecutin' based upon such arrests made in violation of Nevada law.
Much less Roberts putting on the perjured testimony of Frontino and Crawford, and maybe
Braunworth, to the extent he could remember anything more than his name while testifying at trial, or
understand a single question asked of him that day (and Judge HOward refused to allow Coughlin to
testify in his own behalf in that regard, an inviolable right....after expecting Coughlin to cheerfully face
the same "can you repeat the question" that cause Judge Howard to boil over and deny Coughlin his
right to testify, when Braunworth greeted every question asked by Coughlin with that same "can you
repeat the question?". , which, given she is an attorney (to borrow from the approach taken with
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Coughlin by the three RMC Judges with Coughlin, even when he was "Not an attorney" under King's
view (Coughlin as suspended on 6/7/12, which W. Gardner admitted to being apprised of prior to the
6/18/12 trial in the trespass matter (all of this is great stuff under Claiborne and 37 CFR 11.25(a) and
(c)....
BUT YEAH, TO BE CLEAR, COULD TAKES ADVANTAGE OF THE FULL RANGE OF SPEVACK,
WHILST ALSO HEREBY SUPPLEMENTING HIS PREVIOUS ANSWER OR RESPONSE MADE
UNDER PROTESTT (GIVEN THE BASIS FOR A DISMISSAL AND OTHER DUE PROCESS,
SERVICE NOTICE DEFICIENCIES) TO INDICATE, AS HIS OWN ATTORNEY (DID STEVE
HARRIS HAVE TO FILE A VERIFIED ANSWER OR RESPONSE TESTIFYING UNDER OATH AS
TO EACH AND EVERY ALLEGATIONS OR DID DAVID GRUNDY GET TO ADOVATE ON HIS
BEHALF UNDER A NRCP 11 STANDARD? (WELL, OKAY Harris apparently admitted the two RPC
violations he was charged with...but, hey, that brings up, how is it, under the Mirch notice arguments
that will undoubtedly be made, Coughlin is not subject to the "copy and paste the entire contents of
the rpc then issue a general and competely vague ruling/laundry list recitation of how coughlin
violated every one of the (but Judge Nash Holmes contradicts her "clear and convicing" findings by
commenting "there certainly seems to be an issue of whether he violated that", with regard to pretty
much all of the RPC violations/allegations/suggestions of a violation....). How is it Harris is charged
with only two RPC's, yet Coughlin is apparently, in an unbifrcuated hearing, expeted to defend
against the "copy and paste every RPC in the book" incident to the "convictions" in Judge Nash
Holmes Order (and you know king will argue all her orders are incorproated by reference to whatever
extent his complaint doesn't specificaly pled them...)? oH, wait, the SBN's King will say Coughlin
can't even "Relitigate" Jduge Nash Holmes "convictions" of Coughlin (even the ones she made in
violation of the 10 day rule to make sua sponte nrcp 59(a) alterantiosn or amendments to her void
anyways 2/28/12 Order (she takes a second swing at the bat on in her 3/12/12 ORder purporting to
re-rule on things she already issued a "misdemeanor criminal contempt conviction" on in her 2/28/12
ORder...in her 3/12/12 order (nrs 178.405, nrs 5.010 precluded even holding that hearing anyways),
and all those orders seek to transmogrify a traffic citation trial into a Summary Disciplinary SCR 105
Hearing...."wow", indeed.
judge Howard is known for having contempt for defendants before him who went to Reno High
School. this is known. judge howard himself went to Reno High before becoming the first Student
Body President at Hug High, then playing football for a year at UNR. Coughlin has been told by
various people that Judge Howard is especially predisposed to take a draconian approach to a
certain type of defendant who went to Reno High....and so when Coughlin filed a motion on 11/29/11
in 11 cr 22176 citing the Duke Lacrosee rape case as a parallel to pamela roberts, esq.'s approach
in that petty larceny prosecution...well...(About that "failure to appear' on 11/14/12, Judge Howard,
was wrong about that, Coughlin certainly did appear, in "jail reds" and cuffs, as he was in custody
incident to the lies of Dr. Merliss and Hill and the RPD resulting in the criminal trespass arrest and 3
days in jail in 11 cr 26405...the jail brought Coughlin to court on 11/14/12...but didn't bring him into
the courtroom for trial (no one is sayin' why...maybe it was because Coughlin was in "reds" (the type
of jail scrubs one wears indicates some things..."reds" basically means "mental case" or something
and the jail has always put coughlin in "administrative segregation" ...meaning fo th 46 days Coughlin
spent in jail since August 2011 (various stints of about 7, 1, 3, 3, 1, 3, 5, 8, 1, and 18 days each (3 for
"summary contempt" by Judge Howard despite Howard going against his own Bench Book in failing
to grant counsel to Coughlin...even though Aigersinger is mandatory authority and even though
Howard's pre trial order did not expressly preclude the possibility of jail time...it merely indicated that
jail time was not involved in the "standard sentence"...which is not the same thing as saying there
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was "no possibility of jail time" sufficient to preclude the attachment of the Sixth Amendment. and
judge howard.
http://medboard.nv.gov/newsletters/vol24.htm:
"...And Dr. Timothy D. Coughlin, MD, former President of the Nevada Health Professionals
Assistance Foundation and instrumental in the Diversion Program, Dr. Coughlin has more than
fifteen (now twenty-five, but its not a competition) years of experience in identifying, intervening, and
monitoring physicians with chemical dependency, dual diagnosis, and disruptive behaviors. We feel
very fortunate to have him as our new president...." did mention that his son's character, "is bedrock"
at the June 2002 resumption of the C&F Committee Hearing (wherein Coughlin was more
preapproved given his going along with the one attorney (Kelly said "we will give you a list of three
attroney's who will reprresent you pro bono" (Coe Swobe called with one name and one name
only...Peter Christiansen, Jr. (who may have some things to update his admission application about
from his Wyoming days) who, while taking $5K up front and without any fee agreement or other
details as to the scope of representation upon announcing, when first meeting with Coughlin "this
ain't no pro bono deal, man" ) only to then show up at the June 2002 hearing an mislead the
Committee into think his 6 or so page Pre Hearing Brief and "advocacy" that day was done "pro
bono" (and thus partially excusing was what a rather tepid arrangement at best...to say nothing of all
the failing to send this or that to Eichman and the Bar and otherwise dropping every ball possible
along the way between 2002-2005 when finally Christiansen, Sanft, and the de facto attorney on the
case, legal assistant Kelly Huff (and the microtelco fax confirmations prove both they and Eichman
recieved the Reconsideration filing Coughlin prepared and submitted in compliance with Eichmann's
directions, yet, which Eichmann later admitted she unilaterally decided not to forward on to the
Nevada Supreme Court for consideration at the end of the abeyance period incident to that Court's
December 2012 deferral Order )(what do you do when you are 25? not go with the attorney the Bar
calls you up and directs you to?and that "it takes fire to make steel" (being an SEC fullback with
tailback speed on scholarship from Dayton, Ohio for Tulane from 1965-1968, then going straight to
medical school, and doing a residency at Duke has given "Tim" (just kidding, Dad) a sort of gruff
charm all his own) in a hearing before a Spearmint Rhino Strip Club owning Character and Fitness
Committee Member, Kevin Kelly. Esq.. Kelly was then a member, and subsequently Chairman at
points in his decade long run on that Committee, and took Coughlin on a three hour tour of
moralizing in the first February 2002 insufficiently notice "Hearing" (Dean Morgan shows up to
testify, unnoticed to Coughlin, and by the time the change of address got the notice ot Coughlin he
had about 6 days advance notice of the hearing....(at that February 2002 Hearing, then C&F
Committee Chairman Mike Rowe joined in with his aghast horror at the treatment poor 'lil Mark
Tratos was exposed to in "snippy" email between he and Coughlin upon Tratos "losing' Coughlin
term paper in the summer 2001 Cyber Law course, and see attached materials detaling Rowes
subsequently threatening letters to, basically, go along with the Christiansen/Kelly,
uh..."arrangement"...."how much money does your father make? What kind of car do you drive?"
asks Kelly at the February 2002 credit application interview, er, C&F Committee Hearing (and Jon
Bailey, at the informal conference weeks previous thereto made Bryant Gumbel's pretentious style
seem downright folksy in comparision.)(that Coughlin was taking along with and ADR course during
the summer following his second year of law school, during which time he was one of two people
that year to pass the Nevada Bar Examination as a second year law student. Coughlin was tenth in
his class at Boyd, graduatin in December 2001 (didn't go to the graduation ceremony and had to nix
plans for his 88 year old second wave on Omaha Beach D-Day Normandy veteran grandfather
James Theodore Coughlin to attend given Phil Burns, law school dean who didn't go to law school
Christine Smith, and Mary LaFrance/Mark Tratos dragging on an "investigation" into academic
propriety that predictably turned up jack (actually, now Assemblyman William Horne was one of the
students who saw Coughlin turn his paper in that day, along with another couple students signing
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affidavits to that fact, and its ironic, given Mr. Horne and fellow BSL early days alumn Jason Frierson
were, along with Segerblom and WLS's Sasser so instrumental in adding the requirement in NR
40.253 that the landlord must list the forum to file the tenant's affidavit, especially consdiering the
arrest in rcr2012-067980 and the summary eviction by "eviction consulting and process service"
company Nevada Court Services in RJC rev2012-001048). Coughlin is also know to have some
idea of the chances of a shot or argument going in, as well as how to get to the free throw line:
http://www.niaa.com/sports/bkb/2012-13/releases/Basketball-_Boys_(2012).pdf
http://www.nfhs.org/recordbook/SearchResults.aspx?criteria=coughlin
and its a complex rich relationship with Coe Swobe, who is, indeed, as Mr. Silverman says "the grey
immanence" of that segment of the Bar....and Gary should know, as he himself, as you all know, is
the "Yellow Grandeloquence"....coughlin tries to be the Chartreuse Exuberance, but often must settle
for being the Burgandy Deliberance. )...Mr. Silverman's assessment of this Panel's approached is
succinty stated in the follow email to Coughlin (which is generously gave his time to write after
reviewing Coughlin, incorporated by reference into this proceeding 60838 and 61426 filing with the
N.S. Ct on 8/13/12, in Mr. Silverman writing:
re: FW: please find enclosed my Petition under SCR 102(4)(d) and SCR111(7)
Gary Silverman (silverman@silverman-decaria.com)Add to contacts 8/13/12 To:
Zach Coughlin From:
Gary Silverman (silverman@silverman-decaria.com)
This sender is in your safe list. Sent:
Mon 8/13/12 11:28 AM To: Zach
Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) I think this is waaaaay too complex and
detailed. Give them a procedural history and whether there is a final judgment in the
crim case and point out that your temporary suspension is akin to a permanent
death of your practice. Or, if true, say you....(redacted) now have access to your
meds and are ok. I can't think this pleading is going to help you much...it is too long,
repetitive and does not seem to deal with why the temp suspension is simply wrong
or harsh. If you can't make your case in 3-5 pp, you can't make your case in 35.
You do seem to be a good lawyer, however. At bottom, Steve Harris took
hundreds of thousands of dollars and had no temp suspension; you stole a
candy bar (at worst). WTF. " Stephen R. Harris, Esq. was reinstated to the
practice of law by Order of the Nevada Supreme Court (upon the SBN waiving its
SCR 116 appeal rights by stipulation) on November 8th, 2012.
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As to Coughlin's 6/7/12 temporary suspension ORder, only three justices signed it (one of
whom has recused himself from another case, 60302 or 60317 between Coughlin and Washoe Legal
Services, and Garin's, SBN Ethics Committee Member's REspondent Brief of 10/22/12 will make
Coughlin's arguments regarding service and process and due process deficiciencies herein seem
magnanimous by comparison), one of whom was Chuck's (and Chuck is a dear friend...and a
disclaimer...all this criticism of Judges is coming from one who could never imagine the stress and
burden that being a Judge must entail...it must literally weigh on one like a thousand pounds
everyday...but Coughlin is the son of a Judge Whisperer and only doing that which comes naturally
to him...and he's going to love these Judges through this...because this is where the healing starts,
and we got their bags packed (their spouses were more than willing to help with that, no surprise,
there) and a plane ticket to Biloxi, and the car is runnin' outside, and when they come back, better
than ever, they are going to be just as welcome as the flowers in May...as long as they take this
"come to Jesus" talk to heart and proceed accordingly) very, very close friend..., whose old law clerk
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used to find his way to Thursdays , who had some dealings with noted "Judge Whisperer" Dr.
Timothy D. Coughlin, MD, and who some used to see once in a while on thursday, but not so much
anymore since he got on with the NNDB...but just be honest with what you are doing what you do
over. Dont say its to help someone when its really to issue a beat down for those with power. Look
at the Beckett case. Look at Harris's. When you start mixing medicine and mental health into
disciplinary contexts, the tryants first leverage is "concern" and "treatment". In my time as a
domestic violence attorney (which is by far the best training any young attorney could possibly get,
thanks Paul Elcano and Caryn Sternlicht) Typically the hardest people to win over or please when in
situations like mine are those in recovery. They are extra, extra hard on you, preacher's daughter,
coaches son, theme. And often they are zealots who lack perspective. And Pat King and other bar
counsel's of the past say things that indicate they see me as this young man and how a 5 or 6 year
suspension would really just be a blip in my career in the grand scheme of things. I went an had an
sit down with King for a couple hours a week ago, and generally it was pretty positive, but clearly
King has no intention of moving the process along (he is banking on me signing on to a SCR 117
petition and actually expects me to believe the bar will succeed in having me permanently disbarred
over a candy bar so soon after Steve Harris's deal, which I found out some new salacious details
about, from Pat King, no less...), the suspension was June 7th, 2012, and the Order called for a
formal hearing before the Disciplinary Board, yet no mention of one being scheduled some 2 months
later, I call to schedule one and the say the first available hearing date is 2 months out,....you see
where this is going...its going to be a suspension of over 6 months requiring an Order of the
Supreme Court for reinstatement under SCR 116 as opposed to something like Drakulich got when
he had a DUI hit and run (10 day suspension).
I listen to Chuck, just not exactly to what he says to me about what I should do, I more listen to the
actions than the words. I learned from watching him 'bout five years agoor whenever it was the the
Temporary Pro's committee thing was all over his case, and he was just battling back at them,
counterpunches. Because there is room in the law for that, and any doctrine that says you have to
confess to show mitigation is just such a perversion of our system of justice...whether this is a
"privilege with conditions" or not...Cardozo....
I am not real pleased with Judge William Gardner. I currently have a I just had to write the United
States Patent and Trademark Office a letter reporting my conviction for trespass. This could get
ugly for Judge W. Gardner as well if I have to litigate the crap out of that conviction (reciprocal
discipline rules with the USPTO allow for a showing that, basically, if the proceeding from which the
conviction stems was so wholly devoid of due process, then the USPTO does not have to follow suit
with reciprocal discipline....). I was in the Associated Press about the Wal-Mart candy bar thing on
June 8th, 2012, and still he manages to find me guilty of criminal trespass incident to a civil eviction
proceeding (even where Sferrazza completely departed from the express dictates of NRS 40.253(6)
by ordering me to deposit $2,275 worth of rent escrow into the Justice Court in a summary eviction
proceeding a week before the hearing, then continued to have the RJC hold onto that money for
another 12 days, during which I was supposed to somehow hire movers and rent a moving truck and
move a home office full of property, while also allowing Richard Hill in for an inspection....and
Sferrazza further kept 10 times the amount of money required for a stay on appeal whilst denying the
stay....then Richard Hill gets Sferrazza to sign an Order that transfers the right to that rent escrow
deposit of $2,275 to Hill's client despite the fact that Sferrazza's Order as orally pronounced
indicated the money would remain mine, but retained by the RJC in the meantime as an appeal
bond...and I get suspended for allegedly consuming a candy bar while shopping for an paying for
$83.82 of groceries?). And Judge W. Gardner ruled all of that was irrelevant, while also refusing to
recuse himself despite his providing the RMC and Judge Nash Holmes his sister's Order for
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Sanctions ($1,000 worth of attorney's fees in a divorce case from March 2009 under NRS 7.085),
which, apparently, the RMC promptly provided to Pat King and the State Bar and which is now the
subject of a formal complaint or grievance against me....and, further, Judge W. Gardner worked for
the Reno City Attorney as a prosecutor as recently as two years ago and there is (hopefully not)
reason to believe their is "impending litigation" given the extent to which my professional career has
arguably been ruined by the misconduct of both the Reno City Attorney prosecutors (putting on
testimony they know to be false by both the Wal-Mart associate and the RSIC Police, given the
testimony about Coughlin's not provided a driver's license and that allegation supposedly providing
the rationale or probable cause for effecting a custodial arrest for a misdemeanor occurring outside
the officer's presence...despite the fact that the surveillance video from Wal-Mart's interrogation
room, dispatch reports, and jail intake inventory records, and the officer's own arrest reports (which
the video clearly shows him copying information from Coughlin's driver's license onto) all clearly
establish that the office was provided Coughlin's Nevada driver's license, despite his sworn
testimony to the contrary, and therfore, a Fourth Amendment violating impermissible search
occurred, and the fruit of the poison tree should not be the main basis for innuendo leading to
Coughlin's petty theft conviction of cough drops, particulary where the testimony of both Wal-Mart's
Frontino and RSIC Officer Crawford was expressly disproved with hard evidence (comparing the
receipt of $83.82 worth of groceries purchased with the UPC from the receipt Wal-Mart prepared
containing the UPCs of the allegedly stolen cough melts clearly shows that the UPC of the cough
melts does, in fact, appear on that receipt for $83.82, whereas both of those witnesses testified that it
did not and that Coughlin did not have any such cough melts rung up or paid for).
Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Rule2.4.External Influences on Judicial Conduct.
(A)A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.
(B)A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or
relationships to influence the judges judicial conduct or judgment. (RMC Judges admit to
stragegy sessions vis a vis "adding to your little record, there" to quote a menacing
commentary by Judge Nash Holmes in the conext of her sound byte: "i don't care about
retaliation, I don't care about corruption, I don't care about bribery...all that is relevant is the
Bouldevard Stop...")
(C)A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression that any person or
organization is in a position to influence the judge.
COMMENT
[1]An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases according to the law and facts,
without regard to whether particular laws or litigants are popular or unpopular with the public, the
media, government officials, or the judges friends or family. Confidence in the judiciary is eroded if
judicial decision making is perceived to be subject to inappropriate outside influences.
Member of the judges family means a spouse, domestic partner, child, grandchild, parent,
grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship.
See Rules 3.7, 3.8, 3.10, and 3.11.
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/scr_cjc.html
Impending matter is a matter that is imminent or expected to occur in the near future. See Rules
2.9, 2.10, 3.13, and 4.1.
Impartial, impartiality, and impartially mean absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against,
particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues
that may come before a judge. See Canons 1, 2, and 4, and Rules 1.2, 2.2, 2.10, 2.11, 2.13, 3.1,
3.12, 3.13, 4.1, and 4.2.
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Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Rule2.11.Disqualification.

personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
(2)The judge knows that the judge, the judges spouse or domestic partner, or a person within
the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person
is:
(a)a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or
trustee of a party;
(b)acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(c)a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by
the proceeding; or
(d)likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(3)The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judges spouse,
domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judges family residing in the judges
household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding.
(4)[Reserved.]
(5)The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than in a
court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach
a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.
(6)The judge:
(a)served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy or was associated with a lawyer who
participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association;
(b)served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated personally and
substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in
such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy;
(c)was a material witness concerning the matter; or
(d)previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court.
(B)A judge shall keep informed about the judges personal and fiduciary economic interests and
make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the judges
spouse or domestic partner and minor children residing in the judges household.
(C)A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under
paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basis of the judges disqualification and may ask
the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court staff, court
officials and others subject to the judges direction and control, whether to waive disqualification. If,
following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court
staff, court officials and others subject to the judges direction and control, that the judge should not
be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated
into the record of the proceeding.
COMMENT
[1]Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judges impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (6)
apply. For example, if a judge were in the process of negotiating for employment with a law firm, the
judge would be disqualified from any matters in which that law firm appeared, unless the
disqualification was waived by the parties after disclosure by the judge.
[2]A judges obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies
regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed.
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[3]The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For example, a judge might be
required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or might be the only judge
available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a
temporary restraining order. In matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the
record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to
another judge as soon as practicable.
[4]The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the
judge is affiliated does not itself disqualify the judge. If, however, the judges impartiality might
reasonably be questioned under paragraph (A), or the relative is known by the judge to have an
interest in the law firm that could be substantially affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)
(c), the judges disqualification is required.
[4A]The filing of a judicial discipline complaint during the pendency of a matter does not of itself
require disqualification of the judge from presiding over the litigation. The judges decision to recuse
in such circumstances must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
[5]A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their
lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge
believes there is no basis for disqualification. A judge making such a disclosure should, where
practicable, follow the procedure set forth in Rule 2.11(C).
[6]Economic interest, as set forth in the Terminology section, means ownership of more than a
de minimis legal or equitable interest. Except for situations in which a judge participates in the
management of such a legal or equitable interest, or the interest could be substantially affected by
the outcome of a proceeding before a judge, it does not include:
(1)an interest in the individual holdings within a mutual or common investment fund;
(2)an interest in securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic
organization in which the judge or the judges spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a
director, officer, advisor, or other participant;
(3)a deposit in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge may
maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or similar proprietary
interests; or
(4)an interest in the issuer of government securities held by the judge.
Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Rule3.10.Practice of Law.Unless otherwise permitted by
law, a judge shall not practice law. A judge may act pro se and may, without compensation, give
legal advice to and draft or review documents for a member of the judges family but is prohibited
from serving as the family members lawyer in any forum.
COMMENT
[1]A judge may act pro se in all legal matters, including matters involving litigation and matters
involving appearances before or other dealings with governmental bodies. A judge must not use the
prestige of office to advance the judges personal or family interests. See Rule 1.3.
Rule1.3.Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office.A judge shall not abuse the prestige
of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow
others to do so.
COMMENT
[1]It is improper for a judge to use or attempt to use his or her position to gain personal
advantage or deferential treatment of any kind. For example, it would be improper for a judge to
allude to his or her judicial status to gain favorable treatment in encounters with traffic officials.
Similarly, a judge must not use judicial letterhead to gain an advantage in conducting his or her
personal business.
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[2]A judge may provide a reference or recommendation for an individual based upon the judges
personal knowledge. The judge may use official letterhead if the judge indicates that the reference is
personal and if there is no likelihood that the use of the letterhead would reasonably be perceived as
an attempt to exert pressure by reason of the judicial office.
[3]Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection by cooperating with appointing
authorities and screening committees, and by responding to inquiries from such entities concerning
the professional qualifications of a person being considered for judicial office or by submitting on
official letterhead letters to such entities endorsing or opposing the person.
[4]Special considerations arise when judges write or contribute to publications of for-profit
entities, whether related or unrelated to the law. A judge should not permit anyone associated with
the publication of such materials to exploit the judges office in a manner that violates this Rule or
other applicable law. In contracts for publication of a judges writing, the judge should retain sufficient
control over the advertising to avoid such exploitation."
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Showing out for one's sister is arguably "advancing the personal or economic interests of the
judge or others" in violation of NCJCR 1.3. And some might, for similar reasons (especially in light of
the 2011 scandal wherein the Reno Muncipal Court attributed some $700K that went missin' to "data
entry errors" and stuff) that Judge Nash Holmes put Coughlin on blast with her 2/28/12 Contempt
Order and Issuance of Sanctiosn in 11 TR 26800 (and somehow, despite it not being within 10 days,
and therefore outside her jurisdiction to alter or amend the civil contempt finding that Judge Nash
HOlmes base her 2/28/12 order on (NRS 22.100 is a civil statute, ie, its not the criminal contempt
misdemeanor that Judge Nash Holmes remixed it to be a la NRS 199.340: (NRS 199.340 Criminal
contempt. Every person who shall commit a contempt of court of any one of the following kinds shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior committed during the
sitting of the court, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority; 2. Behavior of like character in the presence
of a referee, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing pursuant to an order of court, or in the
presence of a jury while actually sitting in the trial of a cause or upon an inquest or other proceeding
authorized by law; 3. Breach of the peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the
proceedings of a court, jury or referee; 4. Willful disobedience to the lawful process or mandate of a
court; 5. Resistance, willfully offered, to its lawful process or mandate; 6. Contumacious and unlawful
refusal to be sworn as a witness or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory;
7. Publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of its proceedings; or 8. Assuming to be an
attorney or officer of a court or acting as such without authority.)
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Uh...no on the ghostwriting gessin allegations. as to the richard g. hills unsigned, unsworn
grievance, need more clarification as to the variosu allegatiosn hill makes, until then, a blanket
denial. blanket denial of all allegations against coughlin in any way pled in King's SCr 105 complain
at issue here.
correct to Coguhlin's Deisgnation of Wtiness...it was error to whatever extent any suggstion was
made that coughlin fails to oppose judge nash holmes, or anyone testiying by phone, period.
absolutely not agreeing to that.
Both Judge W. and Judge L. Gardner should be required to testify, along with Judge Nash Holmes
as to what letterhead was used, the passing of the April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin from
Judge L. to her brother, Judge W. Gardner, and his passing that Order to "the other RMC Judges",
which Judge W. Gardner appears to have admitted to having done, on the record, during the 4/10/12
Hearing in the trespass matter 11 CR 26406, as the RMC's Administrative Judge, to the other RMC
Judges (including Judge Howard, who had Coughlin's 11 CR 22176 before him then, and Judge
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Nash Holmes, who had Coughlin's 11 TR 26800 before her, and whom was transferred from D1, by
Judge W. Gardner, Coughlin's 12 CR 00696 on 2/27/12 (very curious date and timing for such a
transfer given all the other things that occured on 2/27/12 with Coughlin's Appeal in the Judge Elliot
case involving Washoe Legal Services (CV11-01955), more eflex rejections thereof by Lori Matheus,
(there is just a lof of Judges whom are former prosecutors seemingly issuing a beat down of
Coughlin here, in part on behalf of Washoe Legal Services and Paul Elcano (whom holds himself out
as a close personal friend of Judge L. Gardner, District Attorney Gammick (Elcano announced this in
anticipation of WLS being awarded the ECR Program contract, which arguably violates the Sixth
Amendment...basically, Washoe Legal Services is an entity that holds itself out as one thing...but
there sure are a lot of prosecutors and former prosecutors working that marionette's strings). (RMC
Judge W. Garder is the brother of the Judge Linda Gardner who was apparently extremely upset that
Coughlin not only didn't came to her and Springgate's coercive "settle or else" onslaught minutes
before the Trial on April 12, 2009 (Judge L. Gardner, during an impromptu Settlement Conference
angrily hissed at Coughlin's client, Bharti Joshi "don't listen to your attorney!", and, with Joshi by his
side, snapped at Coughlin "shut up!", the proceeding to say she was offering Coughlin suggestions
on how to try his case in the Trial, only to explode in rage at Coughlin when he thanked her for his
suggestions but indicated he needed to try the case in a manner that aligned with zealously
adovcating for his client's interests, and not with an overly weighted concern for Mr. Springgate's
profit margin or the Court's intentions regarding the doling out of its judicial resources. Coughlin
filed the Mandamus Petition against her in 54844 (containing inflammatory material related to the
coercive practices with with Judge L. Gardner sought to extract an agreement to John Springgate,
Esq's illusory settlement proposal (Springgate's proposal was not fraudulent or anything, but it is not
accurate or fair to suggest that Coughlin was being vexatious to meet the NRS 7.085 standard that
the Legislature created with med mal cases in mind (if they only could have imagined the perverted
applications to which it is put these days...basically there is a lot of gang bangin' people out of their
due process goin' on these days under the rubric of some feigned cry of "vexatiousness!". Please.
Further, it is beyond supportable the extent to which Judge Howard, Nash, and Gardner make
rulings on relevancy based upon an impermissible goal, to quote Keith Loomis, Esq. (RMC court
appointed defender, whose "work" in the jails must be seen to be believed (Loomis does nothing that
a laminated poster couldn't do, sort of like a "hey, here are your Workplace Rights" laminated deal in
the breakroom...well actually, Loomis does not even do that much, he actively and aggresively sets
the table for the prosecutor's from the Reno City Attorney's Office. They have a real routine goin'
down there. Further, then Master Linda Gardner was apparently rather upset that Coughlin pointed
out that she seemed to be overstepping her jurisdiction a bit, outside of that accord her in NRS
33.018 in a TPO wherein another local attorney, Richard Molezzo, Esq. line up opposite Coughlin, in
FV08-03380 - BRENDA SANTIAGO VS XRHSTOS VAXEVANIS Filing Date: Tuesday , September
09th, 2008) 30-OCT-2008 04:47 PM Obj to Master's Recommendation Entry: APPLICANT'S
OBJECTION TO MASTER'S RECOMMENDATIONS 08-JAN-2009 11:46 AM Application for Setting
Entry: Obj. to Master's Rec re TPO; 2/23/09 @ 9:00 am 23-FEB-2009 09:39 AM Heard ... Entry:
MASTER'S RECOMMENDATION AFFIRMED. nm/cd 23-FEB-2009 09:41 AM ***Minutes Entry:
2/23/09 OBJECTION HEARING - Transaction 611628 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 02-232009:09:41:22 24-FEB-2009 01:29 PM Ord After Hearing... Entry: DENYING OBJECTION TO
MASTER'S RECOMMENDATION. The February 23rd, 2009 Hearing on the Objection to Master
Gardner's Recommendations that Coughlin filed (relating to Master Gardner giving a car and or that
car's title to the individual Coughlin's client sought protection from, despite their apparently having a
shared interest therein, and there being a legitimate dispute as to the documentation, and the fact
that a TPO Hearing is not the appropriate setting for such subject matter, especially where Master
Gardner lacked jurisdiction to rule as she did. Perhaps Coughlin's firing from WLS in 60302 is why
WLS"s landlord tenant attorney Mark Ashley, Esq. regularly refuses to advocate with any zeal on
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behalf of this tenant client's, as Coughlin observed on March 15th, 2012 when Coughlin appeared to
content the eviction brought against him in (again, in another No Cause Eviction against Coughlin
where he was arguably a commercial tenant and the Notice served was a No Cause Eviction Notice
only, though there is some indication, at least from a docket entry in that matter RJC rev2012000374, that Gayle Kern, Esq. and or Sue King (unauthorized practitioner of law property manager
for Western Nevada Management, Inc.) responded fraudulently to Coughlin's Pre-Hearing Brief in
that matter that pointed out the difficulties ahead for their client, Park Terrace Town Home's HOA in
light of various problems with the Notice and matters pled by PTTHOA (basically, the Notice was No
Cause and non-payment was not alleged (until, perhaps the day of the Hearing, a review of the
Landlord's Affidavit is necessary, as is the proof of service thereof, and the proof of service of Judge
Schroeder's Orders in that matter and an inquiry into why the RJC failed to file Coughlin's Notice of
Appeal thereof on March 16th, 2012 (the implication is that Gayle Kern and, some might say, the
RJC went out of their way to avoid a repeat of the Merliss v Couglhin eviction case involving Richard
Hill and Casey Baker (RJC Rev2011-001708). When Coughlin appeared for the summary eviction
proceeding in the RJC on March 15th, 2012 his case was already decided against him on a default
basis, despite the fact that the Hearing was to start at 8:30 am, and the fax sheet of the Eviction
Order signed by Judge Schroeder indicates a time of 8:24 am. Nonetheless, Coughlin sat around in
court to observe Ashley's advocacy (Coughlin was able to listen to Ashley and his Paralegal,
Christine Saito, conduct business as the Landlord Tenant attorney and paralegal at Washoe Legal
Services for 18 months, having offices within whispering distance of each other, from September
2007 to Coughlin's firing by WLS Executive Director Elcano in May 2009 (See Elcano's attached
letters detailing that the firing was solely predicated upon Judge L. Gardner's April 2009 Order
sanctioning Coughlin in the Joshi divorce matter DV08-01168 (that spawned the Mandamus Petition
by Coughlin against Judge L. Gardner 54844). Judge L. Gardner recused herself from the next case
she had Coughlin appearing on assigned to her, Bell v Greer, FV11-04268...which arguably
presented the same basis for her brother to recuse himself inthe criminal trespass prosecution of
Coughlin. attached my Emergency Ex Parte Motion (perhaps not "ex parte" given Bar Counsel was
provided it). Also, please note, the October 9th, 2012 certificate of mailing by the SBN for the Notice
of Intent to Take Default was never served on me in any way shape or form until I received the copy
of the "entire" file form Sierra Legal Duplicating. The State Bar of Nevada knows this. They put the
wrong postage on the certified mail envelope containing the Notice of Intent to Take Default. When I
went to pick it up "Tim" USPS counter attendant at the Vassar Postal Station here in downtown Reno
refused to allow me to pick up that certified mailing given that is was about $5.00 deficient in
postage. I did not have $5.00 and it is not be responsibility to pay it, as far as I know. In fact, I have
asked the Bar and this Panel to allow me to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter, and am doing
so again here (I am flat broke, I have a 1996 Honda Accord, rent a room for $300 a month, have less
than $200 in my bank account, no stocks, no bonds).
Also King is attemptign to do something really weasely here (nothing new for King) in backtrackign
on what he told Coughlin Bar Counsel Clark had given Coughlin authority to do (ie, issue subpoenas
despite being a suspended attorney...King is now trying to argue some necessarily ultra redundant
interpreation fo that wherein he was merely relaying a message from Clark that, yes, Coughlin had
authority to have SBN Clerk of Court Peters (whom King constantly plays marionette master to,
despite whatever he says when the lights are on that conduct) issue supboenas which Coguhlin
could then have served (and Peters told Coughlin he didn't have to pay witness or subpoena fees,
and in fact, that now Respondents do in these matters.
I have been mislead or lied to by the SBN in numerous ways in this proceeding. I was told I could issue subpoenas despite
being a suspended attorney (and there is case law that says even when suspended, one is still an "attorney"). I was told I
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would not be required to pay subpoena fees. I was told the August 23rd, 2012 certified mailing would absolutely not be
used to prove proof of service of the Complaint in this matter, SBN v. Coughlin. Yet a review of the files reveals that the
SBN and Panels only Return of Service (and see SBN Ethics Committee Member Joseph Garin's recent Brief in 60302
seeking to dismiss my entire wrongful termination lawsuit against Washoe Legal Services) for a real ironic example of
just why the hearing on November 14th, 2012 must not go forward. It is fraudulent for the State Bar of Nevada to stipulate
with me that the August 23rrd, 2012 certified mailing of the Complaint is alleges was sent and that Clerk of Court Peters
admits to having received back on September 10th, 2012 would never be cited to as effecting service of the Complaint
upon me or otherwise put forward as proof of return of service etc. Now the SBN seeks to get around the inconvenient
fact that, instead of holding my hearing on September 25th, 2012 (Clerk Peters told me it was on the calendar, I was
noticed of it in writing, I agreed to that date for the Hearing amongst a choice of dates, etc..) Bar Counsel King attempted
to shove a document he alleges was the Complaint in my suit jacket, then persisted in ordering Clerk of Court Peters
(whom King alternately claims to have separation from and no authority over with ordering her not to file my Motion to
Dismiss, attempting to reneg on stipluations and representations made by the SBN, etc). Further, it is wrong for Clerk of
Court Peters to be signing the certificates of mailing for both the SBN and for the Panel Chair. Additionally, under SCR
105(2)(c), it is the Panel that must send the Respondent the Notice of Hearing "at least 30 days" prior to the Hearing date,
and that Notice must include with it the Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence, and it must be served in the
same manner as the Complaint. It is impermissible for Pat King to attempt to mail out the Notice of the Hearing and
Designation of Witnesses weeks before the Panel is even announced (how can you possibly be pretending to take your
duty as a Panel member seriously when you are essentially showing up the day of the first game, skipping all the practices
and pre-season games....we all saw how that turned out for Bret Farve in his last season. It is appalling to me that you
intend to hold this hearing given these blatant violations of SCR 105(2)(c), but when you add to that the fraudulent
conduct of Pat King, in failing to amend his and or Clerk of Court Peters certificate of mailiing or return of service for the
purported certified mailing (and, contrary to the SBN's established practice detailed in the certificates of mailing I have
review upon finally being granted a copy of the "file", though, the rule says I get to go to the SBN's offices and review
certain things "up to three days"...not have Pat King and Laura Peters manufacture some nonsense about why I am not
allowed at the building or otherwise violating my rights (which is something King and Peters do everytime they get
caught violating the rules.) Further, I have been (and some might say this was largely by design) jammed into having this
Disciplinary Hearing on November 14th, 2012 in impermissible proximity to the petty larceny trial in rcr2011-063341
(see Montiero for why it is not even appropriate for King to be seeking to force me to prejudice my defense in that matter)
on November 19th, 2012, in Department 2, before Judge Sferrazza, whom presided over the summary eviction/unlawful
detainer "Trial" from my former home law office that the criminal trespass arrest, jaywalking arrest (King's Complaint
doesn't manage to specify that the January 12th, 2012 arrest was for jaywalking outside my former home law office
shortly after my collecting video evidence revealed the fraud attendant to Hill's contractor havig used my own plywood to
board up the back porch of the property....Hill, also, at that time, went and got a TPO that was based largely upon an
outright lie, ie, that I "climbed up on" the contractor Phil Stewart's truck). I believe this Panel should review (I cannot
affor the $35 to $70 for the video of the two hearings on Hill's Motion for Order to Show Cause of January 20th, 2012 (the
Order to Show Cause was served by RMC Marsm hal Harley, despite what WCSO Deputy Machen said he personally
served in his affidavit (Machen also lied about personally serving the eviction lockout order for HIll, and HIll lied at the
trespass trial when he testified that Machen "posted it on the door becaues you ran away", Hill also lied at trial when he
alleged the Reno PD announced themselves as law enforcement and issued a lawful order to emerge form the basement
prior to the landlord kicking in the door, and Hill also lied about whether anyone that day warned Coughlin to leave the
property prior to Hill's signing the criminal complaint to affect a custodial arrest for criminal trespass).
Additionally. I moved recently, and updated my SCR 79 address in compliance with that Supreme Court Rule well within
the 30 days of my moving. Further, I filed an official Change of Address with the USPS, and that caused delays in
receiving my mail incident to the typical forwarding procedures of the USPS, and I have the yellow stickers on the
envelopes to prove it. Further, besides submitting an official Change of Address form to the Vassar Station on October
5th, 2012, Coughlin wrote the SBN on October 14th, 2012, and provided his new 1471 E. 9th St. mailing and physical
address, in addition to updating the online portal and the NV CLE Board even prior to that, all in compliance with SCR
79.
I do not consent to service or notice of anything electronically in this proceeding, but I do appreciate
being copied on such things via email and fax)
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Bar Counsel Patrick O. King has clearly become very intimidated by the Panel, and especially it's
Chair, John Echeverria, indicating a real withering desire for proceeding with this case but helpless in
the face of a command from higher up, and arguably outside of the permissible authority or exertion
of influence of those from which it emanates. King has been especially critical of the NNDB and
Panel for its actions in connection with the recent reinstatement of Stephen R. Harris, Esq.,
(reinstated to the practice of law on November 8th, 2012) as has Gary Silverman, Esq.:
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intersting that the SBN and the Panel seek to plung headlong into the 11/14/12 hearing that violates
absoltuely every section of NR 105(2)(c) (one of the very, very few provisions of the Supreme Court
Rules speaking to the due process requirements of these disciplinary hearings (which some
watching Coughlin circa 2002-2005 might say often devolve into kangaroo courts where some
corrupt bully (some might say Strip Club Spearmint Rhino owner Kevin Kelly, Esq., decade long
member of the State Bar of Nevada's Character and Fitness Committee, whose club allegedly
funnels $10 million a year ot Vegas cabbies to direct tourists to its doors..Coe Swobe making' calls
there too, just like in 60302 where he is calling Coughlin and his father seeking to do WLS's and
Elcano's bidding) who chips off his friends (Peter Christiansen, Jr. Esq.) despite saying the
respresentations would be pro bono (despite receiving $5,000, Christiansen still, on the record,
for him to file a six page, rather repid arrangment worth of a Pre Hearing Brief (containing
dog and pony s how hearing (wherein, his friends having been paid, C&F Committee Strip Club
crime, based largely on some retatliation that Mark Tratos, Esq. largely admitted to, along with Mary
Lafrance (don't recall Jessica Wolf, Esq. (one of two students name in an email about missig papers
in that summer 2001 cyber law class, and Anderson and Morishita indicate, as past patent attorney
in Tratos's firm, that Tratos had "lost" other students papers before too..something tratos had to
admit under oath in 2007) send me "another" copy of you paper..."what was it about" the "name of
the case involved" (gee Tratos, kind of sounds like you had the version Coughlin submitted with only
his social security number (in compliance with the Boyd School of Law's blind grading policy, which
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Judge W. Gardner made some extremely curious statements during the proceedings in the criminal
trespass case. Included amongst these was a statement that he "could not remember" or "was not
sure" if he ever saw or was aware of the formal complaint filed by the RMC and or RMC Judge Nash
Holmes against Coughlin with the State Bar of Nevada and whether or not that submission to the
State Bar included a copy of the April 2009 Order by Judge W. Gardner's sister, Family Court Judge
L. Gardner, sanctioning Coughlin $1,000 for "vexatious conduct" incident to Coughlin representing a
domestic violence victim on behalf of a legal aid organization (in Nevada Supreme Court case
number 54844, Coughlin v. District Court) wherein Coughlin was actually arguing a position that is
clearly the majority viewpoint throughout American jurisprudence:
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/case View. do?csll 0=22746
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Then Judge W. Gardner indicated, on the record, while insisting upon proceeding with Coughlin's
criminal trespass trial, despite Gardner's fellow RMC Judge Nash Holmes filing a complaint with the
State Bar of Nevada seeking to have Coughlin declared incompetent or disabled and, therefore,
unable to practice law, that various Order by RMC Judge Nash Holmes and other materials which
Judge W. Gardner admitted to reviewing and or being aware of did not bring into question Coughlin's
competency. Further, Gardner's Order of Conviction finding Coughlin guilty of criminal trespass, as
announced in open court in RMC 11 CR 26405, as announced from the bench on June 18th, 2012,
indicated it rested upon clearly inappropriate or irrelevant facts or matters not in evidence (Gardner
supported his Order by referring to emails allegedly from the landlord's attorney that were not
introduced into evidence, supposedly providing the warning necessary for a trespass conviction
under RMC 8.10.010, despite testimony that Coughlin was repeatedly issued written warnings to the
landlord's counsel that Coughlin did not agree to accepting seNice or notice of anything incident to
the summary eviction proceeding via electronic means. This contrasts sharply with Judge Gardners
ruling that he would not consider Coughlin's argument that the Reno Justice Court, in the summary
eviction proceeding in RJC REV2011-001708 was actually divested of jurisdiction by Coughlin filing
a Notice of Appeal following an initial hearing (see attached NRCP 60(b) Motion to Set Aside
Eviction Order) or deem an evidence thereof to have been put into evidence despite Coughlin's
seeking to do so and despite Coughlin's court appointed Counsel, Keith Loomis, prior to his
withdrawal, arguing in court at a preliminary hearing, that such a divesting of jurisdiction did in fact
vitiate the import of any such Order of Summary Eviction. Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 1349
(2006), Sarpy v. de la Houssaye, 217 SO.2d 783 (1969).
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Now, consider all that in conjunction with Coughlin spending 18 days in jail from July 3, 2012 to July
21 st 2012 incident to a non-noticed bail hearing wherein Judge W. Gardner raised Coughlin's bail for
an arrest for disturbing the peace, proof of car insurance, and failure to secure a load on one's
vehicle (proof of insurance was provided via a pdf on a Coughlin's smart phone to the arresting
officer, and the disturbing the peace charges relates to conduct allegedly occurring outside the
officer's presence, and where that conduct is misdemeanor, Nevada law prohibits a custodial arrest
being made". so the Reno Police Department is left justifying the decision to make a custodial arrest
based upon a traffic citation carrying a $175 fine (failure to secure a load on one's vehicle)
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Just sayin'. Someone starts effing with my USPTO license, that's federal, what am I supposed to do,
not question the adequacy of the due process provided in the proceeding leading to my convictions
and therefore suspension of my law license and damage to my professional reputation? 37 CRF
11.25(3)(a) and 11.25(3)(c) call for me to do just that.
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o license in t
, Esq. and firing up
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S.
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proof of service/celtificate of mailing
i-~~~~ECt]~~~LE~B~rm~~~~~~~~
i zach coughlin placed this
Challenge Sufficiency of Service and of Process, of Complaint and Notice of Intent to Take Default
and DoWSoE; and Preserving for Appeal Objection to All other Due Process Violations; and
UNDER PROTEST. .. RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT in the mail with postage, and or transmitted a
digital copy to all of those who have either expressly or implicitly agreed to service via digital
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transmission (plus Pat "Salieri" King told me the SBN takes anything I file and provides a stamped
copy to all 5 member of the Panel immediately and that r could rely on that), in the mail for pickup ...
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- 3013 I EMERGENCY EX PARTE tvlOTION TO D[SM[SS, VACATE, RESET OR POSTPONE THE 11114112 HEAR[NG
OR OTHERW[SE RECOGNIZE THE LACK OF JURISDICTION TO HOLD ['I' GIVEN THE NUMEROUS
VIOLATIONS OF SCR 105(2)(C) BY THE PANEL AND THE SBN; INSUFF[CIENCY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS,
INSUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS, MOTION FOR MISTRAIL DUE TO FRAUD BY BAR COUNSEL ctc ....
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index to exhibits:
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?"
--<-
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1890
FILED
CASE NUMBER: ngI2-0204 ng-0435 ng-0434

2
NOV 13 2012
STATE ~\R OF NEVADA
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
TATE BAI~ OF NEVADA.

ETITIONER
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_ACH COUGHLIN.
V BAR 9473
ESPONDENT
)
)
) ng 12-0204 ng-0435 ng-0434

)
)
)
EXHIBIT
; /k;z
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GaO' Silverman. Esg. cmail to Coughlin 8113112: "Vou do seem tu be a good lawyer. howcycr.
At hullum. Stc,'c Harris took hundrcds oftho .. s"nds o(do!larn ilnd had no tcmp suspension;
)'ou stole II candy bar lat w"rnt!. WTF. "
- 1/31EMERGENCY EX PAllTE MOTION TO DISMISS. VACATE. RESET 01\ POSTPONE TilE 11/14/12 IIEARING
OR UTIIERWISE RECOGNIZI; TilE 1.ACK OF JURISDICTION TO IIU1.1> IT GIVI;N THE NUMEIWUS
VI01.ATIONS OF SCR 105(2)(CI BY TilE PANEl. ANI> THE SAN: INSUFFICIENCY OF SI,RVICE OF PROCESS.
INSUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS. MOTION FOR MISTI\AIL DUE TO FRAUD BY IlAI\ COUNSEL. clc ....
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(disclaimer, some of this has been dicated to a transcription software and not proofread
nearly enough...but that is by design, as clearly King and the Panel wish to run this unbifurcated
Hearing along at warp speed considering all the departures from SCR 105(2)(c) and other attendnat
due process deprivations designed to make Coughlin's work product here as rushed an unnoticed as
possible) Zach Coughlin representing himself submits the above titled filing on his own behalf.
I, Zachary B. Coughlin, do hereby declara, pursuant to nrs 53.045, under penalty of perjury, that the
following is true to the best of my knowledge, for which i have percipient recollections of, except for
those matters which are stated upon information and belief:
Pat King informed Coughlin in a telephone discussion on Friday, November 9th, 2012 that it
is the standard practice, done in every disciplinary case, for the Bar to send out the DowSoe, prior to
ti empaneling of the Panel, in violation of SCR 105(2)(c) (further Coughlin disputes the legal
contention hill makes that SCR 106 somehow insulates anyone with the Panel or Bar from having to
answer a subpoena or submit to sworn questioning...that rule speaks to suing such people, not
eliciting testimony or discoverable materials), however (and Laub allows for citing to such things) the
recent Disciplinary matter involving Stephen R. Harris, Esq. reveals that King's contention vis a vis
the order of the empaneling of the Panel and the filing by the Bar of its Designation of Witnesses
and Summary of Evidence are, as is King's wont and established practice, quite wrong, to the point
of being fraudulent and seeking to exercise some impermissible control over the Panel, and to steal
Coughlin's due process from him like a rat stealing some cheese. King apparently has to operate
that way because he is completely unaware of how to use a computer (admitting that he thinks
emails are sent from "the Bar's web site" rather than from, say, the account associated with an email
address), is a terrible hunt and peck typist, totally eschews legal research or citation to authority,
cannot manage to throw together an Index to Exhibits in his filings, and otherwise operate in a totally
fraudulent, back room, old boys club way, having his buddy Dan Wong from back in their days at the
AG's Office testify (so designated in the due process raping DowSoE) rather than City Attorney
Allison Ormaas, Esq. regarding 11 TR 26800, the Richard G. Hill, Esq. traffic citation matter wherein
Judge Nash Holmes cooked up a stew comprised of all different types of contempt statutes
(summary, plenary, civil, contempt, misdemeanor, etc....choosing the bits and pieces of each that
provided the least due process to Coughlin, whilst enabling Judge Nash Holmes to achieve her
pretextual goals as expeditiously as possible and with as little requirement that she back up her
ruling with any actual facts, Affidavits, evidence, due process, or specificity) (well, both Ormaas and
Wong indicated to Coughlin that she would not notate in any way or follow up in any way on
Coughlin's reporting to them both the admissions made by RPD Officer Chris Carter, Jr. to Coughlin
incident to Coughlin's custodial arrest upon Richard G. Hill, Esq. signing a criminal complaint for
criminal trespass at Coughlin's former home law office incident to an impermissible summary eviction
proceeding only on a No Cause Basis where the non-payment of rent was neither pled nor noticed.
the in that, in that matter (57507) Harris (whom admitted to misappropriating $750,000 from clients
and whom, as noted in an email to Coughlin, upon Silverman demonstrating the giving back to the
profession that he is known for in reviewing and offering constructive criticism of Coughlin's August
13th, 2012 filing in 61426 and 60838 (which the Bar still has not managed to respond to) by one of
the most respected attorneys in the state, Gary Silverman, Esq., that
"This disciplinary action was commenced on July 7, 2010. I ROA 1. The
Complaint alleged that attorney Stephen R. Harris violated two ethical rules. I ROA
3:22-24. Harris answered the Complaint on July 29, 2010. I ROA 12. Harris, who had
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self-reported to Bar counsel eight months earlier, admitted each of the allegations in the
Complaint, and provided a statement in mitigation. I ROA 12-13; Exh. 1, pp. 12-13.
The case was assigned to a panel of the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board on
October 1, 2010. I ROA 19; Exh. 1, p.130. The Bar filed its Designation of Witnesses
and Summary of Evidence on October 7, 2010. I ROA 23-24; Exh. 1, pp. 133-34. The
Bar filed its Trial Brief on November 1, 2010. I ROA 27-36; Exh. 1, pp. 17-27. Harris
filed his Prehearing Brief on November 3, 2010. I ROA 38-50; Exh. 1, pp. 28-41. An
evidentiary hearing was held on November 9, 2010. II ROA, Tr., p. 5. Harris
acknowledged that his actions violated Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct (NRPC)
1.15 (safekeeping property) and NRPC 8.4(c) (misconduct; engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), so the Panel's primary task
was to determine the appropriate discipline to be imposed, based on the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. I ROA 28; Exh. 1, p. 18; Tr. 132:17-133:1."
So, this hearing can no way go forward on 11/14/12. If it does, this Panel will look AWFUL.
First off...I have been trying to take Pat King up on his "come down to the Bar's Office and inspect
the materials" thing since March 2012. Pat either storms off with his box of materials (takes his ball
and goes home) or sends me the cd's finally (after I had already spent money I needed for other
things giving the RMC $35 per audio of a hearing), but refuses to give me the other stuff (like, how
did the April 2009 Order of L. Gardner materialize at the SBN? Then, the Order of 10/30/12 comes
out, and
-Check out the attached USPS "Track & Confirm" for the certified mailing of the NOtice
of Hearing (and the certificate of mailing on that document does not indicate that it includes
the DowSoE, and the DowSoe is not date stamped in the "file" I got in a big box from Sierra
Document Management mentioned as the "copy of the file" (sounds like their was some ex
parte back and forth over how to deal with Coughlin and not wanting him at the SBN Office,
plus Panel Chair Echeverria's Office or the Echeverria Group is about 200 feet from the SBN's
Double R Blvd Office, and SBN Clerk of Court Peters is signing Chair Echeverria's Certificat e
of Mailings?....The only thing Chair Echeverria has ruled in Coughlins "favor" on so far has
actually had the effect of limimting Coughlin's rights under SCR 105(3)(c) to "inspect the file"
at the SBN's office "up to 3 days prior to" the 11/14/12 Hearing (and given that the SBN is
closed on Monday, November 12th, 2012...but anyways, Pat King has repeatedly refused to
allow Coughlin to inspect the file at the SBN before and since 10/31/12...plus, okay, so what,
the SBN says and the ORder decrees Coughlin gets the file (and granted, its nice to get a
fresh copy in a box, even if Coughlin suspects he will ultimately be billed for it somehow, in
one way or another)...but what of the materials new to the file between 10/31/12 and "up to 3
days" prior to the hearing? Where is the access? Further, it took quite some time for that
"copy of the file" to get to Coughlin, whom received it on the first delivery attempt:
70112970000443659543 Priority Mail Delivered November 07, 2012, 3:38 pm RENO, NV 89512
Expected Del ivery By: November 6, 2012 Certified Mail Arrival at Unit November 07, 2012,
7:59 am RENO, NV 89506 Dispatched to Sort Facility November 05, 2012, 4:42 pm RENO, NV
89510 Acceptance November 05, 2012, 10:48 am RENO, NV 89510.
plus, if you look at the certificat of mailing for the Notice of Hearing (which the big box file, at
least, indicates contained a non file stamped DowSoE (Designation of Witnesses and
Summary of Evidence) as pages 2 and 3 (despite the cert of mailing indicating only that the
Notice of Hearing was sent) of it and that says it was mailed on October 12, 2012 (so what, is
the SBN and Panel going to say "yeah, but Pat King says "Zach knew about the 11/14/12 date
because I emailed it to him or called him or something"...all while the SBN's Clerk Peters is
adding Coughlin to her "blocked sender's list" (so she doesn't have any more duties to
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actually investigate Richard Hill, etc. arise in light of somethign Coughlin sends her, like an
exculpatory video? real professional, Clerk Peters...or is the SBN or the Panel going ot say
"oh, we are moving for default because you technically, in our view, didn't get a "verified"
response on file by the 11/9/12 date we order on 11/1/12 (meaning at the earliest, under the 3
days constructive service nrcp 6(e) application under SCR 119(3), that Coughlin would have
all of a couple days to whip one together or comply with the order? With all that, is the SBN
and Panel going ot say "oh, zach, that motion or designation didn't make it into the record
because we don't don't seem to have a hard copy of it received in the dropbox or
mail....sorry...even though the Order (which came before the 5 days Coughlin had under
NRCP ...it actually didn't even hit the usps facility until 10/16/12, and it wasn't even availabe
for pickup by Coughlin until 10/22/12, and Coughlin signed for it on 10/27/12....so
on August 7th, 2012 at 3:38 pm...So
Really funny how in the SBN King Index to the Hearing red book thing Pat leaves out
the whole green tag certified mail thing, or the fact that Laura Peters sworn to Coughlin on
the phone (and maybe in writing by email...and the Affidavit of Peters that Coughlin was only
just privvy to upon getting the big box on 11/7/12 says Pat recognized that Peters gave
Coughlin an indication he was entitled to rely upon vis a vis the returned to the SBN
purported 8/23/12 certified mailing of the Complaint (and, supposedly, the First Designation).
But you know what? Even if the SBN could show the "first class" mailing of that was
recieved by Coughlin? Tell it to 60302 where Garin got Coughlin's whole wrongful term suit
dismissed despite a video of the service, multiple different service attempts, receipt of the
summons and complaint by a multitue of WLS peeps...and exteremely suspect "illegibility"
arguments....topped off by that case that says "actual notice is no substitute for technical
compliance with the rules" regarding service and notice....and even though Pat King and
Laura Peters know that the only envelope they ever mailed to Coughlin (for some weird
reason they departed from what the big box shows to be some practice where they basically
send everythign twice (one certified, once first class at the same time, typically) was a
certified large manilla envelope that Tim of the Vassar Station USPS didn't find the when
previously Coughlin appeared to get it (and certified mail is a big pain in the neck to go get
for us solos when we are in the office when the mail comes...we don't have "staff" to accept
things...so its an hour burned driving down to the post office station". When the Vassar
station finally did notice the large manilla 10/9/12 certified mailin to coughlin in whatever box
it was sitting in, it was then not given to Coughlin because it only had about $1.25 in postage
printed on it in the SBN's red Pitney Boews method...."insufficient postage" return to send.
Coughlin has very, very little money right now. Ridiculously little money, and so requests
this Panel and the Bar to further memorialize that which as already been expressly
permission give to Coughlin for (waiver of subpoena and subpoena duces tecum fees) or that
which has by a combination of express indication and implict permission being accord (for
emailing/fax filing and King's recent indication that everythign Coughlin files in a non email
manner to the SBN is copied to all five Panel members, even the cd/dvd
attachments....couhlin here is essentially requestin and IFP. If Pat or Laura is really serious
about not wanting Coughlin showing up at the SBN...then give a more explicit indication that
e-filing by email will be recongized. Otherwise, given how jammed up Coughlin has been by
the due process SCR 105(2)(c) etc violations here, Coughlin cannot rely on mailign things, at
this poitn he has to shorten the delivery time to get his file stamp and preserve arguments.
And that is not the only marked difference between the "pay David Grundy, Esq." a grip of
cash and kick down $50K to the client security fund" approach in 57507...(don't get me wrong, I like
Stephen R. Harris, Esq. he's good in the Thursday Night Group of lawyers who care and stuff about
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other attorneys...even if he thought I was a newcomer and I'm like, "guy, I been coming to this deal
since '03...all you Johnny Come Latelies....Tom, make this guy put the coffee maker away...and I told
Stevie, just like they did me: "you sit down and shut up and don't say anything for a year,
period...Nobody cares what you think...your best thinking got you here, jackhole, and, no, I don't
wanna be your sponsor, get me all coverd in your loser dust"...and nobody was prouder than me
when the Court just put him back in the game on 11/8/12, bravo. And, its cool, I get convicted on a
"candy bar and some cough drops" rap and get a temporary suspension. Steve? no temporary
suspension. Gary's like: "WTF?". But, clearly from the above, Stevie got his DowSoE sent a full
week after the Panel was announced. My DowSoE was mail 18 days before the Panel was even
announced....Kind of like saying, "hey, we know we are doing a hit piece on you, so we aren't even
going to pretend to follow the dictates of SCR 105(2)(c): "
But, look here, I'm tellin' you I'm coldest when I'm down in the winter, I have exhibits ready to drop
that are going to change this here whole game. Have you ever wondered what would happen if you
Honigsberg gridded all bar members names or ssn's against a "landlord's tenant checker outer "
service, then did a really detailed analysis of how Bar Counsel treated each paticular conviction,
especially vis a vis what sort of SCR 111 Petition was filed (SCR 111(4), or a "serious offense" under
SCR 111(6)?), and what if you added a deeper level of prcessing to see what the original charge
was, then considered the plea bargain and conditions? then what if that was available publicly?
that analysis. Let's do this, SBN. Honestly, I personally think our profession is just brutal on
lawyers, just completely ridiculous the extent to which people get raked over the coals, or at least
certain people. Its way too political how its done. Or maybe not. Maybe its a meritocracy, where if
you have the dough to sick David Grundy on them (and really, Dave's approach seems mostly to be
the "Hey, I want all your medical records five seconds after meeting you, here sign this release,
okay, here's what I want you to do whether you are guilty or not....do the mea culpa then argue
mitigation/coerced confession" tact, whereas I favor more of a "what part of being an attorney means
you don't have rights?" style interaction with the SBN) or you have the skill and tenacity to keep Pat
King honest and not stick you for your due process....the you get a better result. I got a completely
terrible ridiculous result in 2002-2005. Never again will I have an attorney who is not myself. Never.
All I know, is some guys go to 180 AA meetings in 180 days and LAP still rejects them, whereas if
your Beckett, DA, something it turns out a bit different...
(As to the client security fund, granted, is a legitimate thing...and, despit e the fact that I absolutely
went to the wall for my clients throughout all of this stuff, there were instances were their cases were
likely prejudiced due to the impact this stuff has on me (I'm talking to arrests, the evictions, etc., etc.),
and who knows, maybe that client security fund arranged for Paul Freitag, Esq. to take over for me in
Eason v. Eastman. Personally, after reading Paul's letter to me about how he tried to contact me
(something about contacting Hot Mail and Roberto Puentes and Dan Wong...Paul, how about the
contact info listed on www.nvbar.org? Wait, that's right, many people treat the WCBA Directory like
it is the licensing body deciding who is or is not a lawyer in Washoe County (I always cheap out
when it comes to sign up for it...) (whose 1979 letter to the AG yielding an Advisory Opinion I would
like for the RMC Judges to see), but if you saw the reams and reams of westlaw research I did for
Eastman, you might think I stood a good chance of delivering just as, if not more, a compelling work
product...
1. Pat King, Bar Counsel, told Coughlin on September 25th, 2012, when Coughlin showed
up for the hearing that the SBN had calendared, agreed to and noticed, that: "Things don't go your
way becaue you don't take responsibility for your actions". Well, well, well, Pat "Salieri" King. now,
now. How about your responsibility to supervise whoever it was at the SBN who didn't put the
correct postage on that large manilla envelope that apparently contained the only copy of the
October 9th, 2012 Notice of Intent to Take Default (and, upon information and belief, some other
documentation? coughlin swears that he did not received that certified mailing (and the SBN's
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certificate of mailing, that Coughlin only received on November 7th, 2012 when the certified mailing
of the sierra legal duplicating copy of the "filed" (a consolation by the Chair Echeverria to Coughlin in
exchange for excising one of the very, very few rights Coughlin has here, set forth in SCR 105 ("right
to inspect up to three days before"....so what of inspecting the file between it being sent to the
printers on November 1, 2012, as admitted to on October 31st, 2012 by Peters when she refused to
let Coughlin inspect it and again by King in writing on November 1st, 2012, and several times
thereafter in writing and verbally, in violation of SCR 105(2)(c). It is outright appalling the extent to
which PEters, King, and the Chair Echeverria are violating the law and showing no respect at all for
due process. The SBN has filed not proof of service of the summons and complaint sufficient to
satisfy SCR 109 in view of the representations made by the State Bar of Nevada, including those by
Laura Peters on the phone and in writing to Coughlin and found in Peters Affidavit on file in this
matter. The first alleged certified mailing of 8/23/12 is not sufficient to show service where Peters
herself (and this is spoken to in her affidavit) represented that the SBN would not be attempting to
use it to proof service of any sort of the Complaint, but rather, Peters would send, soon after
September 11th, 2012 a certified mailing copy of the SCR 105 SBN v zach Coughlin complaint to
Coughlins SCR 79 address, and that the complaint would not be deemed served or by the SBN, nor
would the SBN attempt to represent in any way that it had been served, until zach coughlin had
signed the return receipt requested and or certified letter signature card and it had been received by
the SBN.
2. Coughlin might call the Godfather of Family Law in Nevada, Don Gary Silverman, Esq. (and
Maybe Marshal Willick, Esq. if I can get him (but really, the lack of bifurcation here and the scatter
shot carpet bombing copy and pasting of the RPC and the multitude of Claiborne and 37 cfr 11.25(3)
(a) and (c) (applied by analogy, IN Re schaeffer and STufphh) basis for attackign the various
"convictions" here makes scant the amoutn of time availabe (especially given the Chairs avowed
intention to get 'r done in one day (funny, did Steve R. Harris's deal take one day only? or must one
hire David Grundy to get that sort of time with the SBN and Panel?:
Gary Robert Silverman Company: Silverman, Decaria & Kattelman, Chtd. Address: 6140 Plumas St.
Ste. 200 Reno , NV 89519 Phone Number: 775-322-3223 Fax number: 775-322-3649 Email:
silverman@silverman-decaria.com Website: http://www.silverman-decaria.com Admit Date: 11/02/70
should the 11/14/12 hearing go forward, which it clearly should not, at least not in its current
unbifurcated, due process violating, unnoticed, no service of the 10/9/12 NOtice of INtent to Take
Default, no "at least 30 days" service of the Designation of Witness and Summary of Evidence BY
THE PANEL, NOT BY THE SBN, BAR COUNSEL, OR THE CLERK OF THE SBN, under SCR
105(2)(c). SBN also told Coughlin he would not have to pay any witness or subpoena fees and that
Respondent's never have to in these Disciplinary Hearings.
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interesting that the SBN and the Panel seek to plungE headlong into the 11/14/12 hearing that
violates absoltuely every section of NR 105(2)(c) (one of the very, very few provisions of the
Supreme Court Rules speaking to the due process requirements of these disciplinary hearings
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(which some watching Coughlin circa 2002-2005 might say often devolve into kangaroo courts
where some corrupt bully (some might say Strip Club Spearmint Rhino owner Kevin Kelly, Esq.,
decade long member of the State Bar of Nevada's Character and Fitness Committee, whose club
allegedly funnels $10 million a year to Vegas cabbies to direct tourists to its doors Coe Swobe
making' calls there too, just like in 60302 where he is calling Coughlin and his father seeking to do
WLS's and Elcano's bidding) who chips off his friends (Peter Christiansen, Jr. Esq.) despite saying
the representations would be pro bono (despite receiving $5,000, Christiansen still, on the record,
for him to file a six page, rather tepid arrangement worth of a Pre Hearing Brief (containing
dog and pony show hearing (wherein, after his friends having been paid, C&F Committee Strip Club
crime, based largely on some retaliation that Mark Tratos, Esq. largely admitted to, along with Mary
Lafrance (send me "another" copy of you paper..."what was it about" the "name of the case
involved" (gee Tratos, kind of sounds like you had the version Coughlin submitted with only his
social security number (in compliance with the Boyd School of Law's blind grading policy, which
MOTION SHOWING GOOD CAUSE TO ALLOW COUGHLIN TO SUBMIT A RESPONSE

OR ANSWER TO WHATEVER EXTENT THE PANEL FEELS HE HAS NOT ALREADY
DONE SO AND OR INTENDS TO CALL THIS A "PROCEED ON A DEFAULT BASIS"
SITUATION, WHERE COUGHLIN DISPUTES.
to whatever exten the sbn or panel purprts that coughlin has defaulted here, Coughlin
submits thats not the case particularly where the sbn has not filed an valid proof of service of
the complaint, particulary given the admission as to the representations and indicatiosn made
by the sbn, king and peters...further, the notice of intent to take default was only mailed by
certified mail. and the postage was deficient, and the usps wouldn't give it to coughlin, though,
curiously the cerified mailing number for that mailign is not in the big box that strangely
enough...took form november 1, 2012 to november 7th, 2012 to get copied and transported to
coughlin (not exactly blazing speed, huh...and coughllin reported the insufficient postage issue
to king and the sbn in the interim, so...draw your own conclusions...but pat is refusing to amend
any return of service thereto the complaint and or the DowSoW (see attached showing the first
certified scanning of it being in usps possession is from october 16th, 2012, not 10/12/12, and
that the earliest it was presented to coughlins' po box was 10/22/12, through no fault of coughlin
(who complied with scr 79 here...)sbn EMPLOYEE "paula" admitted to Coughlin that Pat
King locked the SBN door "a couple minutes" prior to 5 pm on a day when Coughlin sought to
present someting for filing that arguably could be deemed a "response" (verified to whatever
extent required, under protest, as this situation, where coughlin si representing himself presetn,
arguably a unique circumstances, and coughlin herein incorprates allt eh arguments made in
his recent 61901 filing vis a vis making self represented defenandts subject to such an
impermissible "sworn testimony" view of their own advocacy...But arguably, especially
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Coughlin's file stamped 10/31/12 Pre-Hearing MOtion to Dismiss/summary

judgment/memorandum of law should be view as just such a "response", verified to whaver
Spevack considering extent is required of a self represented respondent here, and where King
and the SBN should be made to more spcifically set forth that allegations (fairness to opposing
counse? in what way? Judges Nash HOlmes Order is beyond cursory in that regard, and
utterly devoid of a single fact to support such copy and pasting of the RPC...other than to
suggest asking questions about retaliation is so dilatory as to support a "fairness to opposing
counse" rpc violation worthy of a scr 105 complaint....uh....
"We nevertheless conclude that discipline orders appearing in the Nevada Lawyer may be cited to
this court for the limited purpose of providing examples of the discipline imposed in similar fact
situations. This approach has also been taken by several other courts. n22
n22 See. e.g., Berman v. City of Daly City, 21 Cal. App. 4th 276, 26 Cal. Rptr, 2d 493, 496 n.5 (Ct.
App. 1993); Marez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 286, 289 n.2 (Colo. 1981); Manderfeld v. Krovitz,
539 N.W.2d 802, 807 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995): Leisure Hills of Grand Rapids v. DHS, 480 N.W.2d
149, 151 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)." In Re Laub.
Plus on the sufficiency of the servie and proces and servic of process thing (kings exhibits are blurry
and not well scanned, and printed on both sides of the page in some instances, which Garin got a
dismissal for based on arguably less in 60302)...
I am not so sure Judge McGee didn't have something to do with my temporary suspension. Or
District Attorney Gammick (both of whom I like and consider friends). I emailed them both about five
hours before I got the efile notice from the Court of the suspension on June 6th, 2012. And like my
friend Gary Silverman, Esq. said in an email to me on August 13th, 2012 when Gary, as is his wont,
took time out of his day to read my ridiculously long (well Grundy's breif for Stevie was 55 pages,
so....and Judge McGee's suggestion to me that mine should be no more than 3 pages is just
insulting. lawyers drone on for 60 pages about widgets but a career of mine that took a lifetime to
build is worth 3 pages? Please. seriously, lawyer's need a Player's Union. And it ain't the Bar.
There's a really big problem in our Bar right now, and I think we all now what it is...Player hatin'.
That's right, I said it. Hell, look at this deal. Here, the Bar is basically the Bench's Rent-aThug...enter Pat "Salieri" King. it is just plain puke worthy the extent to which Patty has covered his
ears, put a blindfold over his eyes, and muzzled himself in his pursuit of cloaking himself in his tired
old mantra "a conviction is indisputable proof of wrongdoing (not according to Claiborne and
Montiero says King seeking to screw up a pending criminal prosecution in 11 cr 063341 is just wrong
where King purports to include it in this Complaint herein (and Coughlin shoudl get and moves for a
continuance of this Bar hearing on 11/14/12 on that basis as well...Its just ridiculous to expect
Coughlin to appear representing Himself at this bar hearing on 11/14/12, then do the same in the
alleged "lost mislaid abandoned" property as larceny case 063341 to pretend like that is fair
(especially where kIng has rigged this deal so that Coughlin's SCR 105(2)(c) rights have all been cut
by about 709%...which is prosecutorial misconduct, and under SCR 119 hopefully something the
Court will address (but also as "possession of stolen property" according to dda young, despite
Staab, double jeopardy and duplicative charges issues, and the fact that the Complaint in that case
fails to allege "from another" or to allege anything with any specificity whatsoever, which is
something Biray Dogan is sure doesn't matter. despite Biray getting $8,000 raises in some of the
worst fiscal years in our nation's history...connection? uh, no comment. so I don't have to
undertake any investigation or ask the Board member Richard G. HIll, Esq. (whose best friend is also
a Board Member, David Hamilton, Esq.,and its pretty unseemly for Board members to be using their
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membership as a club....and when I say "club" I mean like a shiv or shank or something one might
reach for if ish starts to popov in the 'yard...not like a "group" or "committee"...if that is what Hill is
doing here, which is not for me to say. just sayin' you know what I'm sayin? You know what I'm
sayin. But this Board, funny thing...its comprised of individuals...and they don't always see things the
same. Look at 57507, Harris's deal. The Chair there was like "oh, hell naw"....) any uncomfortable
questions....like how Hill lied to get Coughlin arrested (Coughlin hereby incorporates by reference all
his filings in the last 18 months publicly available on the Nevada Supreme Court's website, especially
those in 60838, 61901, 61426, 60302, 60331, 61383, 60630 (which should just be a Mandamus
Petition requiring Longoni and the RMC to quit breaking the law and instead comply with the NRS
189.030 requirement that the RMC Order the transcript prepared and the ROA sent to the District
Court within 10 days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal (and Judge Kenneth Howard's statement on
the record after Coughlin was brought back in in cuffs on 11/30/11 in 11 CR 22176 (and that whole
conviction is completely devoid of any sniff of due process, much less the fact that tribal police are
not allowed to make misdemeanor arrests in Nevada under NRS 171.1255and the "confidential"
60975 (aint so confidential where the publicly available case participant search research show a
SCR 117 "confidential" Disability Petition has been filed against Coughlin, now is it? Also, Coughlin
submitted to the Court on May 24th, 2012 an Opposition to King's May 10th, 2012 SCR 111(6)
Petition on the Walmart and its not in line with what was done in the Noel Gage case (he submitted
an opposition) and there is not a rule that says the Clerk can refuse to file the Opposition Coughlin
submitted on May 24th, 2012 or otherwise make it so some shallow AP article is printed about
Coughlin the day after the Court's Order comes down suspending Coughlin (kinda sounds a bit fed
to that writer, doesn't it? Also, Coughlin's recent filings in 61901 and some other cases (not 60302
though, featuring SBN Ethics Committee member Joe Garin (can I get King's complaint here
dismissed on Garin style "illegible" service of process arguments that are later reclassified as
insufficiency of "process" rather than the previous arguments as to insufficiency of "service" of that
process? King's exhibits (which you just know under the Mirch case will mean all that those Judge's
Order attached as exhibits (and hell, it'll prolly be the case that orders mentioned in those orders
(like Judges Sferrazza's 10/27/11 Findings of Fact, etc. in rjc rev2011-1708 will be thereby
incorporated too, right...except, like in the 11 cr 26405, they will only be relevant to the extent the
prosecution needs 'em...once Coughlin starts referencing them, Chair Echeverria will be on it in a
second with a Judge Howard/Nash/L. and W. Gardner style "how is this relevant" "it's not relevant"
"move on!" "you keep it up and you are going to add to your little record there" (that last one from
Judge Nash Holmes, although she'll tell you no extra judicial communication affected her ability to
preside over that matter, or resullt in the Richard G. Hill gets Coughlin arrest again this time for
jaywalking case in 12 cr 00696 (in the video which coughlin transcribed Hill is seen lying to RPD
Officer Hollingsworth that, on 1/11/12 Coughlin had "lost his appeal" (you mean the one not decided
until 3/30/12, Rich? Kind of like Hill lying to RPD Chris Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez (see
Coughlin work in 11 cr 26405's recent filigns in the last month, both of which shouldbe essentially
reproduced in N. S. Ct. 61901, but only one of which is (no matter, all that was relevant enough to
put most of it in 60302) being transferred to her on 2/27/12 (lot happened on that day here) purport to
rule on will be deemed "notice" or pled to Coughlin (which doesn't make sense considering there are
3 grievance number on the complaint, yet the 8/23/12 stamped Complaint speaks to things not
mentioned in any of those grievances...)...and speaking of, oh. look there's Keith Loomis, Esq. on the
SBN's fee dispute Committee...sure is interesting who winds up on all these Committees for the
SBN....Kevin Kelly, Esq., owner of the megalithic Las Vegas outpost of multinational strip club chain
Spearmint Rhino has been puttin' in work on the Character & Fitness Committee for ever, great
friends with Peter Christiansen, Jr.) and as a "verified response" (to whatever extent this Panel
intends to hold that Coughlin has to do what Judge Nash Holmes tried to do (ie, swear in the self
representing defendant at the outset, thereby hamstringing them with an impermissible condition that
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the Muni Court Judges are, curiously, not putting on their, er, the Municipalities prosecutors (and
believe me, Allison Ormass, Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Pamela Roberts, Dan Wong, et al don't
want know part of everything that comes out of their mouths in court being sworn. And the testify
plenty while trying their cases, in fact, they are really good at it, especially during their closing
arguments about facts not in evidence and which are not reasonably directed toward admissible
subject matter to begin with, but rather just cheap shots calculated to render a prejudicial
effect...right Hazlett-Steven's, what with your repeated "pajamas and slippers" blast....Don't see
Judge Nash Holmes talking threatening trash at him from the bench (Judge Holmes couldn't decide
during the 2/27/12 preceding if everything Coughlin said that day was "sworn testimony" or
not...alternately seeming to want it to be, only to constantly interrupt Coughlin during his cross of
Sargent Tarter to say things like "when you testify you can get into that" or "you are not testifying he
is" (and Ormaas's statements in court that day about whether the report or charge sheet or whatever
that had the officer that Sargent Tarter called in to fill out the form (why on earth does Sargent Tarter
need to call someone in to fill out a report, then indicate Tarter signed it, and that didn't deprive
Coughlin his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation or justifying a continuance? Maybe there is a
sensitive reasons why Tarter can't write in his own hand or something (in which case, I mean no
disrespect), or, maybe, his callign in a officer with no percipient recollection indicates some
impermissible action or motive by Tarter (and Tarter testified that he normally give people a warning,
but that Coughlin was being uncooperative (which is something every RPD Officers seems to be
trained to recite from rote along with "well my training and experience indicated to me a search was
appropriate).
Regarding the apparent greater "due process" accorde to David Grundy's client STephen R. Harris
(which reminds me....Coe Swobe should not be making calls to Coughlin's father, Dr. Timothy D.
Coughlin, nor should WLS's Paul Elcano seeking to "help" Coughlin (if by "help Zach" they mean
"hey, Tim, don't let Zach give Elcano any problems, okay? We need you to lean on Zach, Tim."
Yeah, no, Paul and Coe...Coe doesn't need to tell Zach Coughlin "well you really shit on Elcano
there". Not quite Coer (he calls me "Zacker" , it was his call in 2002 that funneled me to Peter
Christiansen, Jr. (and Coe probably didn't know much of anything about Pete...and arguably made
up for any negligence or untoward involvement in that regard where he and Keith Lee, Esq. (founder
of the C&F) got it done in 2004 (after Christiansen and Sanft made it abundantly clear that they
weren't going to get out of bed for less than another $5K, not in so many words...but when Eichman
is like,uh...yeah, your "attorney of record" doesn't seem too "into it" so, um...why don't you prepare a
Notice of Intent to Seek Reconsideration" or something when the abeyance expires in Sept 2003
(which Coughlin did, yet Eichman decided not to submit to the Court...and, to be fair, it probably
would have not had the best chance (although, come to think of it, its was the "two or three pages"
that Judge McGee seemed to suggest Coughlin's recent Motino to Dissolve should be....yet Eichman
just basically unilaterally failed to forward it on to the Court? And if you had Mike Rowe writing you
nasty threatening letters t sit down and shut up like Rowe did in January 2003 to Coughlin...you
probably woudn't be too squeeky a wheel either...which would cost you another year and half of your
career and professional development (why is it only deputy prosecutors get all the trial
experience...and Coughlin gets fired where he attempts to get some in 54844 (incorporate that case
too into Coughlin's respond to Kings Complaint to the extent one is being coerced out of Coughlin
and the Motion to Dismiss or Motion for More definite STatement is not accorded to approriate
NRCP process (clearly Panel Chair Echeverria doesn't believe in waiting to read a Reply to King's
Opposition to bifurcate, as the Chair enters his orders before the 5 days to file one has even run
(consider nrcp 6(e) and the fact that King doesn't email or fax his Opposition to the bifurcate
motion..mailed it on 10/24/12 and the Chair rules on 10/30/12...just like RMC Judge Howard ruling
on Coughlin's various post-trial motions before the City Attorney's office even responds to
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them...nothing says "due process" quite like that. well, except for Judge Howard announcing at trial
that he was refusing to grant Coughlin a continuance in 11 cr 22176 (resulting in 60838) because
Coughlin failed to appear at the 11/14/12 original trial date. Despite City Attorney roberts having
agreed to a continuance of the 11/30/12 trial date in writing before hand, come trial time she refused
to, then claimed it was up to Judge Howard anyways. The RMC granted the city attorney a
continaunce in 11 cr 26405 because Board member Rich Hill need to go on vacation for six weeks
(lew taitel, conflict, rmc defender, took coughlin's case, shouldnta...coughlin was suing his business
partners, who are committing the unauthorized practice of law, that judge pearson and judge
schroeder found permissible in rjc rev2012-001048, which not only wrongfully evicted coughlin, but
resulte in two wrongful arrests of coughlin by the rpd in 12 cr 12420 and rcr2012-067980 (when
Judges fail to follow what the legislature sets out in nrs 40.253, there is a real human cost, and,
apparently, it costs Dan Wong and the bar and the courts, and lots of other people their
relationships, time, judicial resources, etc., etc. Our states landlord tenant law are the harshest
towards tenants to begin with...when Judges "remix" those laws or choose not to faithfully enforce
them (and its particularly suspect where that is done by former prosecutors turned judges where
Coughlin's orientation to the County Sheriff and RPD at this poitn arguably calls for an "alternate
public prosecutor) to be appointed in all past and existing prosecutions of Coughlin, beginning with
the rcr2011-063341 arrest that started all of this off (with a little help from a wrongfull summary
eviction that remixed summary and plenary and went all "JCRLV Rule 44" (despite the RJC not
having complied with JCRCP 83 in fashioning such an application....and don't tell Coughlin he "sh&t
on" Washoe Legal Services". Coughlin, in the last year, has more than paid it forward to the legal
services community in Nevada through his guerilla, impromptu, performance art, improvisational
tenant's rights, prosecutorial and police misconduct addressing advocacy, all gratis, natch. Well, you
can go ahead and thank his momma, Very Special Arts of Nevada's Mary Barker Program Director
(and Obama's staunchest supporter, at least in the Western States, for sure.. caring on the Ruth
Barker legacy of adovacy) for that advocacy, because is has in large part been funded through
generous grants from her, on her $21 an hour paycheck. But you can't thank Marc Ashley, Esq.,
WLS's landlord tenant attorney. YOu could maybe thank Jon Sasser, Esq. some. And Tik
Segerblom. But you can't thank Paul Elcano or the Muni Court Judges for that. Thank Mary
Barker. And you can thank Bo Barker, Esq. too, famed construction defect gure in the State of
Washinton (www.BarkerMartin.com). Haven't heard too much from Robert Coughlin, Esq. (last thing
heard bout him he was prosecutin' defendants denied their Sixth Amendment Right to counsel for
Huber Heights. http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/defendants-tried-without-lawyersin-huber-heights-/nM9sD/ (http://www.zoominfo.com/#!search/profile/person?
personId=282794556&targetid=profile whom Coughlin hereby supplements to the SBN as included
in his Designation of Witnesses...especially where all the sudden Judge Beesley and Paul Elcano
are being supplemented (Judge Beesley to excuse, apparently, King's reckless and not true
attestation (if it were true, then how did Coughlin file on 6/10/12 something in Cadle Co. v. Keller
(funny, the excellent motion work Coughli did for Keller and Gessin in the NVB adversary
proceedings didn't find its way into the ginormous bate stamped collections of "pleadings created by
Zach Coughlin" in the SBN's files (nor was anything from Coughlin's very, very sold work in the two
Dana Harris cases, the one before Judge Doherty featuring a NRCP 60(b)(4) void for lack of
jursidiction where home state under the UCCJEA was procured through fraud motion that Coughlin
was probably paid, consdiering everything, something liek $50 for....or the work in the Carpentier v.
Aames funding (which Judge Flanagan managed to issue yet another rather suspect sanction
against Coughlin in to go alogn with his apparenlty record setting attorney's fees award agains that
which he had deemed a commercial tenant (at least implicilty, to the extent the summary eviction
where NO Cause all that was pled was upheld) in the richard hill eviction case.. (those sanctions
bring it to the point where any Temporary Restraining Order that Couglin and Flanagans former
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employer may be entitled to prior to Coughlin unloading some "privilege of the participant" laden
testimony directed toward, lets just say, hypotehticaly, an associate getting let go because "not a
good fit" a couple weeks after an office managers assistant broke up with the new litigation lateral
hire equity partner, the the assistant asks the junior associate out, cue the sudden need for an
"assignement" to be done for the same Seinfeld character swarming around Trish's departure, even
though that partner way off in transactional land....and add to that the awkwardness of junior
associate pointing out to new lateral equity hire that us supreme court ruling on a post whatever
whatever cause of action under something something being mandatory authority, for which the
SCR's hold there is a duty to disclose, and you have what? you have an associate booted 'round
christmas time just after developing gastroenteritis incident to the southern pseudo military academy
atmosphere found at that firm...Not sue how that wouldn't kind of call for recusal (Judge L. gArdner
herself signed an ORder of recusal in the next case coughlin appeared as atty on before her, citing,
in her 8/16/11 ORder of Recusal NCJCR 2.11(A)(1) (that's the one where the Judge just flat out
admits they have an actual bias or prejudice, right? we aren't even talking perceived or possiblewe
are talkin' flat out "I am biased and prejudiced against you" admission resulting in recusal (and the
comment is instructive consdering what happened during the settlemen conference in that April 2009
JOshi case: "[3]Judges must be mindful of the effect settlement discussions can have, not only on
their objectivity and impartiality, but also on the appearance of their objectivity and impartiality.
Despite a judges best efforts, there may be instances when information obtained during settlement
discussions could influence a judges decision making during trial, and, in such instances, the judge
should consider whether disqualification may be appropriate. See Rule 2.11(A)(1)."...also " Third
degree of relationship includes the following persons: great-grandparent, grandparent, parent,
uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew, and niece. See Rule 2.11.
NCJCR's on terminology sections"
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...as the basis for her doing so...that same rationale arguably applies to have required her brother to
recuse himself in the criminal trespass prosecution.. Guess its nice of Judge L. Garner to just flat out
admit it in her recusal order in Bell v. Greer wherein she cites: Rule2.11.Disqualification.
personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding." But to then go on and be
involved in the ghost greivancing here (in the "big box" of the file delivered to Cogulin on 11/7/12
(wow, only 8 days before this huge hearing wherein King has told Coughlin he will get him disbarred,
Mirch-style, coughlin finally gets some access to some of the materials...in violation of the right to
inspect "up to 3 days" in SCr 105(2)(c), and Coughln had been seeking that permission to inspect
continuously all along here, and it is impermissilbe for King to violate the "courthouse sanctuary"
doctrine and purport to impinge on coughlin's inspect right under scr 105(2)(c), especially by shoving
documents into coughlin's jacket upon pulling at the lapel (and its King and Peters that are no
adopting the "Duluth Model" "Power and Control Wheel" abuser style tactics of "playing the victim"
(replete with Peters's "this is harrasment! I am getting a protection ORder whenever her apparent
misconduct resulting in a curtailing of Coughlins' due process rights is broached....ditto for King...see
his baseless and unsupported, devoid of specifics (gee, don't think Paula would quite put it like that
KIng...just because she admitted that king leaves the office early, thereby locking up the "filing office"
prior to "The close of business at 5pm" under NRCP doesn't make Coughlin's conduct as justifying
some "stay away" letter, Pat. get a grip.
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Rule 2.11. Disqualification. (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
the following circumstances: (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party or a partys lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judges spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the
third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is:
(a) a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of
a party; (b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (c) a person who has more than a de minimis
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or (d) likely to be a material witness in
the proceeding. (3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judges
spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judges family residing in the
judges household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding. (4) [Reserved.] (5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to
commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or
controversy. (6) The judge: (a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy or was associated
with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association; (b)
served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated personally and substantially
as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity
an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy; (c) was a material witness
concerning the matter; or (d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court. (B) A
judge shall keep informed about the judges personal and fiduciary economic interests and make a
reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the judges spouse or
domestic partner and minor children residing in the judges household. (C) A judge subject to
disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose
on the record the basis of the judges disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to
consider, outside the presence of the judge and court staff, court officials and others subject to the
judges direction and control, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties
and lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court staff, court officials and others subject
to the judges direction and control, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may
participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding.
COMMENT [1] Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judges impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1)
through (6) apply. For example, if a judge were in the process of negotiating for employment with a
law firm, the judge would be disqualified from any matters in which that law firm appeared, unless the
disqualification was waived by the parties after disclosure by the judge. [2] A judges obligation not
to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a
motion to disqualify is filed. [3] The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For
example, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or
might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing
on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In matters that require immediate action, the
judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts
to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable. [4] The fact that a lawyer in a
proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not itself
disqualify the judge. If, however, the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned under
paragraph (A), or the relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be
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substantially affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(c), the judges disqualification is
required. [4A] The filing of a judicial discipline complaint during the pendency of a matter does not of
itself require disqualification of the judge from presiding over the litigation. The judges decision to
recuse in such circumstances must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. [5] A judge should
disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might
reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge
believes there is no basis for disqualification. (Judge W. Gardner only did this upon Coughlin
prompting for it...) A judge making such a disclosure should, where practicable, follow the
procedure set forth in Rule 2.11(C). [6] Economic interest, as set forth in the Terminology section,
means ownership of more than a de minimis legal or equitable interest (Coughlin's law license is a
14th amendment property right, and Judge L. Gardners reputation as a jurist, to whatever extent she
felt is impinged by 54844, may invoked this provision here). Except for situations in which a judge
participates in the management of such a legal or equitable interest, or the interest could be
substantially affected by the outcome of a proceeding before a judge, it does not include: (1) an
interest in the individual holdings within a mutual or common investment fund; (2) an interest in
securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization in which the
judge or the judges spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a director, officer, advisor,
or other participant; (3) a deposit in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge
may maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or similar proprietary
interests; or (4) an interest in the issuer of government securities held by the judge.
.probably wouldn't be such an issue if there weren't $5K sanction for filing motions that do point out
"gee, yeah, that might be kind of important if RCS/QLS is owned by the law firm on the case, and
they are sending out the summary judgment motions to one who is no longer attorney of record or
doing so in the bankruptcy matrix or listing the wrong court and or case number in the caption (funny,
anything like that by Coughlin gets a WDCR 10 rejection by Matheus, not to mention that WDCR 37
or whatever that sets for exactly the court lines on the caption have to say basis, and wDCR r 17 or
18 or whatever) (especially given the great possibilities int eh BK setting for making the bank/lender
prove standing, Rule 3001 or whatever) .that, while not formatted that great, did manage to set out
the exact method to win that case, some rather elegant points of law that many would miss (and
Couglin wouldn't have gotten there were it not for the initial assist from Michael Lehrners, and some
general shaman meets arms dealer by way of Mecca direction from one Geoffrey Lynn Giles, Esq.)
to king's Boss, David Clark, and, upon information and belief, Coughlin's then client, Peter Eastman,
prior the the May 10th, 2012 filing by King, regarding matters still requiring King's non comment to
Eastman under SCR 121 (how is it that Eastman and King are the only two people in the world who
makes comments to Coughlin about "the b#n#r*p#c# Court won't let you" do this or that in the first
couple days of May 2012 if King isn't violating SCR 121 to Eastman (who magically was able to
afford Freitag all the sudden, despite having failed to pay Coughlin anything on the $3,500 flat fee to
represent Eastman in CV11-00820 - EASON INSURANCE VS. PETER EASTMAN. ETAL (B6).
Whether there is some connection to the Zach Coughlin v. Jeff Nichols case in the RJC, and whether
Nichols just told lie after lie at the hearing (and, whether that is easily provable, Jeff...keep smilin',
buddy....and whether Coughlin was punched in the face by somebody on or around March 30th,
2012, whether that somebody is a former WCSO Deputy, and whether Nichols and he not only
managed ot get Nichols about 6 hours of high end research for free (well, not according to the deal)
on the whole gift/loan $130K unsecured promissory loan form the older english professor family
friend thing...resulting in some, an attorney subject to yet another wrongful eviction (its fraud to post
a No Cause Eviction notice then file a tenant's affidavit alleging non payment of rent on the day of
the hearing, Gayle...and Sue...just because the attorney's pre hearing mOtion pointed out all the
terrible obstacles you would be facing in proceeding under a no cause notice (and if the eviction
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order in rjc 2012-000374 is faxed to the RJC, as Casey Baker, Esq. testified on 6/18/12, that all such
orders are (and contrary to RJC indications....even private attorenys rely on the RJC to fax those
lockout orders to the Sheriff's...and if the 3/15/12 lockout order in that summary eviction (the one the
attorney was subject to about 5 hours after the hearing, where a default was granted for a hearing
notice as starting at 8:30 am, despite the fax header on the eviction order indicatign the signed
Lockout Order was faxed to the Sheriff at 8:24 am....? Which brings up the question...since Baker's
testimony is that even landlord's with high end private attorney's like Hill rely on (as that is the usual
course and custom according to RJC Karen Stancil, for such orders to be faxed to the wCSO the day
they are entered, or the next day at the latest)...then where, oh where, is the proof of when the RJC
faxed teh 10/25/11 Eviction Decision and Order that Judge Sferrazza signed in rjc rev2011-001708
and which Deputy Machen lists as having "personally served" Coughlin, on 11/1/11 at 4:30
pm...despite Machen (who made the arrest in rcr2012-06798, on june 28th, 2012, despite judge
schroeder and the rjc being well aware of the deficiency of the notice under 40.253 in that the
unauthorized practicioner of law (the call themselves an "eviction consulting and process serving
company"...isn't that cute?) Nevada Court services, biz partners with Lew Taitel (the RMC court
appointed defender who appeared for Coughlin the trespass case before Judge W. Gardner (brother
to the L. gardner who recused herself from a randomly assigned case that Coughlin was atty of
record on on 8/10/11 in Case Description: FV11-02864 - ROBERT A BELL VS JESSICA F GREER
(D11) -. Filing Date: 10-Aug-2011...which coincidentall (god shot,anyone?) just so happens to not
only establish that (and this was done in so many, many other ways regardless) that Coughlin held
himself out and was a commercial tenant at 121 River Rock ST., practicing law (and a mattress biz
to boot, Coughlin Memory Foam) HIll's summary eviction of commercial tenant Coughlin on a NO
Cause notice was jurisdictionally void (to whatever extent the october 18th, 2011 filing by Coughlin of
a notice of appeal and depositing that $2,275 didn't divest Judge SFerrazza, under Mack v. Mack
Manley of jurisdictio nto hold the "Trial" on 10/25/11 that he noticed in writing ("the use of the term
"Trial" was unfortunate, You Honor" said HIll's associate Casey Baker, who has now hightailed it on
back to Kentucky now that he and HIll are about to have some serious 'splainin' to do)...And as to the
"verified response or Answer" Echeverria and kIng are so keen on....is yours a verified Complaint,
Pat? Are the Judges oRders verified? Does Judge Nash HOlmes's pastiche of what she likes best
of the differetn types of contempt in NEvada and beyond based upon some Affidavit by a marshal as
to some restroom hapennings? Were is that "not in the immediate presence" not "under the court's
watchful eye" affidavit. and Judge Howards tack on 3 minutes of trial audion in 11 cr 22176 seeks to
mislead Coughlin not only as to who has to pay up front or not for the transcript attendnat to an
appeal fo the petty larceny conviction (which is void anyways given it stems from an arrest by a tribal
police officer, violative of nrs 171.1255 (and at the trial wal-mart's Thomas Frontino and the RSIC
officers Braunworth and Crawford admitted that no citizen's arrest was effectuated upon Coughlin,
with Frontino making especially clear (it seemed he had been coached to do so, likely to help his
employer wal-mart in seeking to avoid any "wrongful shopkeeper's arrest" lawsuits by just letting the
tribal police take whatever fall might stem from something like that (not likely, right?....but the price to
pay for that, City of Reno, Walmart, and RSIC is that nrs 171.1255 rears its ugly head makes that
whole arrest, and therefore conviction, null and wrongful, and there's some question that need be
asked of Roberts et al about prosecutin' based upon such arrests made in violation of Nevada law.
Much less Roberts putting on the perjured testimony of Frontino and Crawford, and maybe
Braunworth, to the extent he could remember anything more than his name while testifying at trial, or
understand a single question asked of him that day (and Judge HOward refused to allow Coughlin to
testify in his own behalf in that regard, an inviolable right....after expecting Coughlin to cheerfully face
the same "can you repeat the question" that cause Judge Howard to boil over and deny Coughlin his
right to testify, when Braunworth greeted every question asked by Coughlin with that same "can you
repeat the question?". , which, given she is an attorney (to borrow from the approach taken with
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Coughlin by the three RMC Judges with Coughlin, even when he was "Not an attorney" under King's
view (Coughlin as suspended on 6/7/12, which W. Gardner admitted to being apprised of prior to the
6/18/12 trial in the trespass matter (all of this is great stuff under Claiborne and 37 CFR 11.25(a) and
(c)....
BUT YEAH, TO BE CLEAR, COULD TAKES ADVANTAGE OF THE FULL RANGE OF SPEVACK,
WHILST ALSO HEREBY SUPPLEMENTING HIS PREVIOUS ANSWER OR RESPONSE MADE
UNDER PROTESTT (GIVEN THE BASIS FOR A DISMISSAL AND OTHER DUE PROCESS,
SERVICE NOTICE DEFICIENCIES) TO INDICATE, AS HIS OWN ATTORNEY (DID STEVE
HARRIS HAVE TO FILE A VERIFIED ANSWER OR RESPONSE TESTIFYING UNDER OATH AS
TO EACH AND EVERY ALLEGATIONS OR DID DAVID GRUNDY GET TO ADOVATE ON HIS
BEHALF UNDER A NRCP 11 STANDARD? (WELL, OKAY Harris apparently admitted the two RPC
violations he was charged with...but, hey, that brings up, how is it, under the Mirch notice arguments
that will undoubtedly be made, Coughlin is not subject to the "copy and paste the entire contents of
the rpc then issue a general and competely vague ruling/laundry list recitation of how coughlin
violated every one of the (but Judge Nash Holmes contradicts her "clear and convicing" findings by
commenting "there certainly seems to be an issue of whether he violated that", with regard to pretty
much all of the RPC violations/allegations/suggestions of a violation....). How is it Harris is charged
with only two RPC's, yet Coughlin is apparently, in an unbifrcuated hearing, expeted to defend
against the "copy and paste every RPC in the book" incident to the "convictions" in Judge Nash
Holmes Order (and you know king will argue all her orders are incorproated by reference to whatever
extent his complaint doesn't specificaly pled them...)? oH, wait, the SBN's King will say Coughlin
can't even "Relitigate" Jduge Nash Holmes "convictions" of Coughlin (even the ones she made in
violation of the 10 day rule to make sua sponte nrcp 59(a) alterantiosn or amendments to her void
anyways 2/28/12 Order (she takes a second swing at the bat on in her 3/12/12 ORder purporting to
re-rule on things she already issued a "misdemeanor criminal contempt conviction" on in her 2/28/12
ORder...in her 3/12/12 order (nrs 178.405, nrs 5.010 precluded even holding that hearing anyways),
and all those orders seek to transmogrify a traffic citation trial into a Summary Disciplinary SCR 105
Hearing...."wow", indeed.
judge Howard is known for having contempt for defendants before him who went to Reno High
School. this is known. judge howard himself went to Reno High before becoming the first Student
Body President at Hug High, then playing football for a year at UNR. Coughlin has been told by
various people that Judge Howard is especially predisposed to take a draconian approach to a
certain type of defendant who went to Reno High....and so when Coughlin filed a motion on 11/29/11
in 11 cr 22176 citing the Duke Lacrosee rape case as a parallel to pamela roberts, esq.'s approach
in that petty larceny prosecution...well...(About that "failure to appear' on 11/14/12, Judge Howard,
was wrong about that, Coughlin certainly did appear, in "jail reds" and cuffs, as he was in custody
incident to the lies of Dr. Merliss and Hill and the RPD resulting in the criminal trespass arrest and 3
days in jail in 11 cr 26405...the jail brought Coughlin to court on 11/14/12...but didn't bring him into
the courtroom for trial (no one is sayin' why...maybe it was because Coughlin was in "reds" (the type
of jail scrubs one wears indicates some things..."reds" basically means "mental case" or something
and the jail has always put coughlin in "administrative segregation" ...meaning fo th 46 days Coughlin
spent in jail since August 2011 (various stints of about 7, 1, 3, 3, 1, 3, 5, 8, 1, and 18 days each (3 for
"summary contempt" by Judge Howard despite Howard going against his own Bench Book in failing
to grant counsel to Coughlin...even though Aigersinger is mandatory authority and even though
Howard's pre trial order did not expressly preclude the possibility of jail time...it merely indicated that
jail time was not involved in the "standard sentence"...which is not the same thing as saying there
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was "no possibility of jail time" sufficient to preclude the attachment of the Sixth Amendment. and
judge howard.
http://medboard.nv.gov/newsletters/vol24.htm:
"...And Dr. Timothy D. Coughlin, MD, former President of the Nevada Health Professionals
Assistance Foundation and instrumental in the Diversion Program, Dr. Coughlin has more than
fifteen (now twenty-five, but its not a competition) years of experience in identifying, intervening, and
monitoring physicians with chemical dependency, dual diagnosis, and disruptive behaviors. We feel
very fortunate to have him as our new president...." did mention that his son's character, "is bedrock"
at the June 2002 resumption of the C&F Committee Hearing (wherein Coughlin was more
preapproved given his going along with the one attorney (Kelly said "we will give you a list of three
attroney's who will reprresent you pro bono" (Coe Swobe called with one name and one name
only...Peter Christiansen, Jr. (who may have some things to update his admission application about
from his Wyoming days) who, while taking $5K up front and without any fee agreement or other
details as to the scope of representation upon announcing, when first meeting with Coughlin "this
ain't no pro bono deal, man" ) only to then show up at the June 2002 hearing an mislead the
Committee into think his 6 or so page Pre Hearing Brief and "advocacy" that day was done "pro
bono" (and thus partially excusing was what a rather tepid arrangement at best...to say nothing of all
the failing to send this or that to Eichman and the Bar and otherwise dropping every ball possible
along the way between 2002-2005 when finally Christiansen, Sanft, and the de facto attorney on the
case, legal assistant Kelly Huff (and the microtelco fax confirmations prove both they and Eichman
recieved the Reconsideration filing Coughlin prepared and submitted in compliance with Eichmann's
directions, yet, which Eichmann later admitted she unilaterally decided not to forward on to the
Nevada Supreme Court for consideration at the end of the abeyance period incident to that Court's
December 2012 deferral Order )(what do you do when you are 25? not go with the attorney the Bar
calls you up and directs you to?and that "it takes fire to make steel" (being an SEC fullback with
tailback speed on scholarship from Dayton, Ohio for Tulane from 1965-1968, then going straight to
medical school, and doing a residency at Duke has given "Tim" (just kidding, Dad) a sort of gruff
charm all his own) in a hearing before a Spearmint Rhino Strip Club owning Character and Fitness
Committee Member, Kevin Kelly. Esq.. Kelly was then a member, and subsequently Chairman at
points in his decade long run on that Committee, and took Coughlin on a three hour tour of
moralizing in the first February 2002 insufficiently notice "Hearing" (Dean Morgan shows up to
testify, unnoticed to Coughlin, and by the time the change of address got the notice ot Coughlin he
had about 6 days advance notice of the hearing....(at that February 2002 Hearing, then C&F
Committee Chairman Mike Rowe joined in with his aghast horror at the treatment poor 'lil Mark
Tratos was exposed to in "snippy" email between he and Coughlin upon Tratos "losing' Coughlin
term paper in the summer 2001 Cyber Law course, and see attached materials detaling Rowes
subsequently threatening letters to, basically, go along with the Christiansen/Kelly,
uh..."arrangement"...."how much money does your father make? What kind of car do you drive?"
asks Kelly at the February 2002 credit application interview, er, C&F Committee Hearing (and Jon
Bailey, at the informal conference weeks previous thereto made Bryant Gumbel's pretentious style
seem downright folksy in comparision.)(that Coughlin was taking along with and ADR course during
the summer following his second year of law school, during which time he was one of two people
that year to pass the Nevada Bar Examination as a second year law student. Coughlin was tenth in
his class at Boyd, graduatin in December 2001 (didn't go to the graduation ceremony and had to nix
plans for his 88 year old second wave on Omaha Beach D-Day Normandy veteran grandfather
James Theodore Coughlin to attend given Phil Burns, law school dean who didn't go to law school
Christine Smith, and Mary LaFrance/Mark Tratos dragging on an "investigation" into academic
propriety that predictably turned up jack (actually, now Assemblyman William Horne was one of the
students who saw Coughlin turn his paper in that day, along with another couple students signing
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affidavits to that fact, and its ironic, given Mr. Horne and fellow BSL early days alumn Jason Frierson
were, along with Segerblom and WLS's Sasser so instrumental in adding the requirement in NR
40.253 that the landlord must list the forum to file the tenant's affidavit, especially consdiering the
arrest in rcr2012-067980 and the summary eviction by "eviction consulting and process service"
company Nevada Court Services in RJC rev2012-001048). Coughlin is also know to have some
idea of the chances of a shot or argument going in, as well as how to get to the free throw line:
http://www.niaa.com/sports/bkb/2012-13/releases/Basketball-_Boys_(2012).pdf
http://www.nfhs.org/recordbook/SearchResults.aspx?criteria=coughlin
and its a complex rich relationship with Coe Swobe, who is, indeed, as Mr. Silverman says "the grey
immanence" of that segment of the Bar....and Gary should know, as he himself, as you all know, is
the "Yellow Grandeloquence"....coughlin tries to be the Chartreuse Exuberance, but often must settle
for being the Burgandy Deliberance. )...Mr. Silverman's assessment of this Panel's approached is
succinty stated in the follow email to Coughlin (which is generously gave his time to write after
reviewing Coughlin, incorporated by reference into this proceeding 60838 and 61426 filing with the
N.S. Ct on 8/13/12, in Mr. Silverman writing:
re: FW: please find enclosed my Petition under SCR 102(4)(d) and SCR111(7)
Gary Silverman (silverman@silverman-decaria.com)Add to contacts 8/13/12 To:
Zach Coughlin From:
Gary Silverman (silverman@silverman-decaria.com)
This sender is in your safe list. Sent:
Mon 8/13/12 11:28 AM To: Zach
Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) I think this is waaaaay too complex and
detailed. Give them a procedural history and whether there is a final judgment in the
crim case and point out that your temporary suspension is akin to a permanent
death of your practice. Or, if true, say you....(redacted) now have access to your
meds and are ok. I can't think this pleading is going to help you much...it is too long,
repetitive and does not seem to deal with why the temp suspension is simply wrong
or harsh. If you can't make your case in 3-5 pp, you can't make your case in 35.
You do seem to be a good lawyer, however. At bottom, Steve Harris took
hundreds of thousands of dollars and had no temp suspension; you stole a
candy bar (at worst). WTF. " Stephen R. Harris, Esq. was reinstated to the
practice of law by Order of the Nevada Supreme Court (upon the SBN waiving its
SCR 116 appeal rights by stipulation) on November 8th, 2012.
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As to Coughlin's 6/7/12 temporary suspension ORder, only three justices signed it (one of
whom has recused himself from another case, 60302 or 60317 between Coughlin and Washoe Legal
Services, and Garin's, SBN Ethics Committee Member's REspondent Brief of 10/22/12 will make
Coughlin's arguments regarding service and process and due process deficiciencies herein seem
magnanimous by comparison), one of whom was Chuck's (and Chuck is a dear friend...and a
disclaimer...all this criticism of Judges is coming from one who could never imagine the stress and
burden that being a Judge must entail...it must literally weigh on one like a thousand pounds
everyday...but Coughlin is the son of a Judge Whisperer and only doing that which comes naturally
to him...and he's going to love these Judges through this...because this is where the healing starts,
and we got their bags packed (their spouses were more than willing to help with that, no surprise,
there) and a plane ticket to Biloxi, and the car is runnin' outside, and when they come back, better
than ever, they are going to be just as welcome as the flowers in May...as long as they take this
"come to Jesus" talk to heart and proceed accordingly) very, very close friend..., whose old law clerk
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used to find his way to Thursdays , who had some dealings with noted "Judge Whisperer" Dr.
Timothy D. Coughlin, MD, and who some used to see once in a while on thursday, but not so much
anymore since he got on with the NNDB...but just be honest with what you are doing what you do
over. Dont say its to help someone when its really to issue a beat down for those with power. Look
at the Beckett case. Look at Harris's. When you start mixing medicine and mental health into
disciplinary contexts, the tryants first leverage is "concern" and "treatment". In my time as a
domestic violence attorney (which is by far the best training any young attorney could possibly get,
thanks Paul Elcano and Caryn Sternlicht) Typically the hardest people to win over or please when in
situations like mine are those in recovery. They are extra, extra hard on you, preacher's daughter,
coaches son, theme. And often they are zealots who lack perspective. And Pat King and other bar
counsel's of the past say things that indicate they see me as this young man and how a 5 or 6 year
suspension would really just be a blip in my career in the grand scheme of things. I went an had an
sit down with King for a couple hours a week ago, and generally it was pretty positive, but clearly
King has no intention of moving the process along (he is banking on me signing on to a SCR 117
petition and actually expects me to believe the bar will succeed in having me permanently disbarred
over a candy bar so soon after Steve Harris's deal, which I found out some new salacious details
about, from Pat King, no less...), the suspension was June 7th, 2012, and the Order called for a
formal hearing before the Disciplinary Board, yet no mention of one being scheduled some 2 months
later, I call to schedule one and the say the first available hearing date is 2 months out,....you see
where this is going...its going to be a suspension of over 6 months requiring an Order of the
Supreme Court for reinstatement under SCR 116 as opposed to something like Drakulich got when
he had a DUI hit and run (10 day suspension).
I listen to Chuck, just not exactly to what he says to me about what I should do, I more listen to the
actions than the words. I learned from watching him 'bout five years agoor whenever it was the the
Temporary Pro's committee thing was all over his case, and he was just battling back at them,
counterpunches. Because there is room in the law for that, and any doctrine that says you have to
confess to show mitigation is just such a perversion of our system of justice...whether this is a
"privilege with conditions" or not...Cardozo....
I am not real pleased with Judge William Gardner. I currently have a I just had to write the United
States Patent and Trademark Office a letter reporting my conviction for trespass. This could get
ugly for Judge W. Gardner as well if I have to litigate the crap out of that conviction (reciprocal
discipline rules with the USPTO allow for a showing that, basically, if the proceeding from which the
conviction stems was so wholly devoid of due process, then the USPTO does not have to follow suit
with reciprocal discipline....). I was in the Associated Press about the Wal-Mart candy bar thing on
June 8th, 2012, and still he manages to find me guilty of criminal trespass incident to a civil eviction
proceeding (even where Sferrazza completely departed from the express dictates of NRS 40.253(6)
by ordering me to deposit $2,275 worth of rent escrow into the Justice Court in a summary eviction
proceeding a week before the hearing, then continued to have the RJC hold onto that money for
another 12 days, during which I was supposed to somehow hire movers and rent a moving truck and
move a home office full of property, while also allowing Richard Hill in for an inspection....and
Sferrazza further kept 10 times the amount of money required for a stay on appeal whilst denying the
stay....then Richard Hill gets Sferrazza to sign an Order that transfers the right to that rent escrow
deposit of $2,275 to Hill's client despite the fact that Sferrazza's Order as orally pronounced
indicated the money would remain mine, but retained by the RJC in the meantime as an appeal
bond...and I get suspended for allegedly consuming a candy bar while shopping for an paying for
$83.82 of groceries?). And Judge W. Gardner ruled all of that was irrelevant, while also refusing to
recuse himself despite his providing the RMC and Judge Nash Holmes his sister's Order for
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Sanctions ($1,000 worth of attorney's fees in a divorce case from March 2009 under NRS 7.085),
which, apparently, the RMC promptly provided to Pat King and the State Bar and which is now the
subject of a formal complaint or grievance against me....and, further, Judge W. Gardner worked for
the Reno City Attorney as a prosecutor as recently as two years ago and there is (hopefully not)
reason to believe their is "impending litigation" given the extent to which my professional career has
arguably been ruined by the misconduct of both the Reno City Attorney prosecutors (putting on
testimony they know to be false by both the Wal-Mart associate and the RSIC Police, given the
testimony about Coughlin's not provided a driver's license and that allegation supposedly providing
the rationale or probable cause for effecting a custodial arrest for a misdemeanor occurring outside
the officer's presence...despite the fact that the surveillance video from Wal-Mart's interrogation
room, dispatch reports, and jail intake inventory records, and the officer's own arrest reports (which
the video clearly shows him copying information from Coughlin's driver's license onto) all clearly
establish that the office was provided Coughlin's Nevada driver's license, despite his sworn
testimony to the contrary, and therfore, a Fourth Amendment violating impermissible search
occurred, and the fruit of the poison tree should not be the main basis for innuendo leading to
Coughlin's petty theft conviction of cough drops, particulary where the testimony of both Wal-Mart's
Frontino and RSIC Officer Crawford was expressly disproved with hard evidence (comparing the
receipt of $83.82 worth of groceries purchased with the UPC from the receipt Wal-Mart prepared
containing the UPCs of the allegedly stolen cough melts clearly shows that the UPC of the cough
melts does, in fact, appear on that receipt for $83.82, whereas both of those witnesses testified that it
did not and that Coughlin did not have any such cough melts rung up or paid for).
Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Rule2.4.External Influences on Judicial Conduct.
(A)A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.
(B)A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or
relationships to influence the judges judicial conduct or judgment. (RMC Judges admit to
stragegy sessions vis a vis "adding to your little record, there" to quote a menacing
commentary by Judge Nash Holmes in the conext of her sound byte: "i don't care about
retaliation, I don't care about corruption, I don't care about bribery...all that is relevant is the
Bouldevard Stop...")
(C)A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression that any person or
organization is in a position to influence the judge.
COMMENT
[1]An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases according to the law and facts,
without regard to whether particular laws or litigants are popular or unpopular with the public, the
media, government officials, or the judges friends or family. Confidence in the judiciary is eroded if
judicial decision making is perceived to be subject to inappropriate outside influences.
Member of the judges family means a spouse, domestic partner, child, grandchild, parent,
grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship.
See Rules 3.7, 3.8, 3.10, and 3.11.
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/scr_cjc.html
Impending matter is a matter that is imminent or expected to occur in the near future. See Rules
2.9, 2.10, 3.13, and 4.1.
Impartial, impartiality, and impartially mean absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against,
particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues
that may come before a judge. See Canons 1, 2, and 4, and Rules 1.2, 2.2, 2.10, 2.11, 2.13, 3.1,
3.12, 3.13, 4.1, and 4.2.
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Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Rule2.11.Disqualification.

personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
(2)The judge knows that the judge, the judges spouse or domestic partner, or a person within
the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person
is:
(a)a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or
trustee of a party;
(b)acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(c)a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by
the proceeding; or
(d)likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(3)The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judges spouse,
domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judges family residing in the judges
household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding.
(4)[Reserved.]
(5)The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than in a
court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach
a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.
(6)The judge:
(a)served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy or was associated with a lawyer who
participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association;
(b)served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated personally and
substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in
such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy;
(c)was a material witness concerning the matter; or
(d)previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court.
(B)A judge shall keep informed about the judges personal and fiduciary economic interests and
make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the judges
spouse or domestic partner and minor children residing in the judges household.
(C)A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under
paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basis of the judges disqualification and may ask
the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court staff, court
officials and others subject to the judges direction and control, whether to waive disqualification. If,
following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court
staff, court officials and others subject to the judges direction and control, that the judge should not
be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated
into the record of the proceeding.
COMMENT
[1]Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judges impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (6)
apply. For example, if a judge were in the process of negotiating for employment with a law firm, the
judge would be disqualified from any matters in which that law firm appeared, unless the
disqualification was waived by the parties after disclosure by the judge.
[2]A judges obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies
regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed.
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[3]The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For example, a judge might be
required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or might be the only judge
available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a
temporary restraining order. In matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the
record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to
another judge as soon as practicable.
[4]The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the
judge is affiliated does not itself disqualify the judge. If, however, the judges impartiality might
reasonably be questioned under paragraph (A), or the relative is known by the judge to have an
interest in the law firm that could be substantially affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)
(c), the judges disqualification is required.
[4A]The filing of a judicial discipline complaint during the pendency of a matter does not of itself
require disqualification of the judge from presiding over the litigation. The judges decision to recuse
in such circumstances must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
[5]A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their
lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge
believes there is no basis for disqualification. A judge making such a disclosure should, where
practicable, follow the procedure set forth in Rule 2.11(C).
[6]Economic interest, as set forth in the Terminology section, means ownership of more than a
de minimis legal or equitable interest. Except for situations in which a judge participates in the
management of such a legal or equitable interest, or the interest could be substantially affected by
the outcome of a proceeding before a judge, it does not include:
(1)an interest in the individual holdings within a mutual or common investment fund;
(2)an interest in securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic
organization in which the judge or the judges spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a
director, officer, advisor, or other participant;
(3)a deposit in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge may
maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or similar proprietary
interests; or
(4)an interest in the issuer of government securities held by the judge.
Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Rule3.10.Practice of Law.Unless otherwise permitted by
law, a judge shall not practice law. A judge may act pro se and may, without compensation, give
legal advice to and draft or review documents for a member of the judges family but is prohibited
from serving as the family members lawyer in any forum.
COMMENT
[1]A judge may act pro se in all legal matters, including matters involving litigation and matters
involving appearances before or other dealings with governmental bodies. A judge must not use the
prestige of office to advance the judges personal or family interests. See Rule 1.3.
Rule1.3.Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office.A judge shall not abuse the prestige
of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow
others to do so.
COMMENT
[1]It is improper for a judge to use or attempt to use his or her position to gain personal
advantage or deferential treatment of any kind. For example, it would be improper for a judge to
allude to his or her judicial status to gain favorable treatment in encounters with traffic officials.
Similarly, a judge must not use judicial letterhead to gain an advantage in conducting his or her
personal business.
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[2]A judge may provide a reference or recommendation for an individual based upon the judges
personal knowledge. The judge may use official letterhead if the judge indicates that the reference is
personal and if there is no likelihood that the use of the letterhead would reasonably be perceived as
an attempt to exert pressure by reason of the judicial office.
[3]Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection by cooperating with appointing
authorities and screening committees, and by responding to inquiries from such entities concerning
the professional qualifications of a person being considered for judicial office or by submitting on
official letterhead letters to such entities endorsing or opposing the person.
[4]Special considerations arise when judges write or contribute to publications of for-profit
entities, whether related or unrelated to the law. A judge should not permit anyone associated with
the publication of such materials to exploit the judges office in a manner that violates this Rule or
other applicable law. In contracts for publication of a judges writing, the judge should retain sufficient
control over the advertising to avoid such exploitation."
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Showing out for one's sister is arguably "advancing the personal or economic interests of the
judge or others" in violation of NCJCR 1.3. And some might, for similar reasons (especially in light of
the 2011 scandal wherein the Reno Muncipal Court attributed some $700K that went missin' to "data
entry errors" and stuff) that Judge Nash Holmes put Coughlin on blast with her 2/28/12 Contempt
Order and Issuance of Sanctiosn in 11 TR 26800 (and somehow, despite it not being within 10 days,
and therefore outside her jurisdiction to alter or amend the civil contempt finding that Judge Nash
HOlmes base her 2/28/12 order on (NRS 22.100 is a civil statute, ie, its not the criminal contempt
misdemeanor that Judge Nash Holmes remixed it to be a la NRS 199.340: (NRS 199.340 Criminal
contempt. Every person who shall commit a contempt of court of any one of the following kinds shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior committed during the
sitting of the court, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority; 2. Behavior of like character in the presence
of a referee, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing pursuant to an order of court, or in the
presence of a jury while actually sitting in the trial of a cause or upon an inquest or other proceeding
authorized by law; 3. Breach of the peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the
proceedings of a court, jury or referee; 4. Willful disobedience to the lawful process or mandate of a
court; 5. Resistance, willfully offered, to its lawful process or mandate; 6. Contumacious and unlawful
refusal to be sworn as a witness or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory;
7. Publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of its proceedings; or 8. Assuming to be an
attorney or officer of a court or acting as such without authority.)
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Uh...no on the ghostwriting gessin allegations. as to the richard g. hills unsigned, unsworn
grievance, need more clarification as to the variosu allegatiosn hill makes, until then, a blanket
denial. blanket denial of all allegations against coughlin in any way pled in King's SCr 105 complain
at issue here.
correct to Coguhlin's Deisgnation of Wtiness...it was error to whatever extent any suggstion was
made that coughlin fails to oppose judge nash holmes, or anyone testiying by phone, period.
absolutely not agreeing to that.
Both Judge W. and Judge L. Gardner should be required to testify, along with Judge Nash Holmes
as to what letterhead was used, the passing of the April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin from
Judge L. to her brother, Judge W. Gardner, and his passing that Order to "the other RMC Judges",
which Judge W. Gardner appears to have admitted to having done, on the record, during the 4/10/12
Hearing in the trespass matter 11 CR 26406, as the RMC's Administrative Judge, to the other RMC
Judges (including Judge Howard, who had Coughlin's 11 CR 22176 before him then, and Judge
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Nash Holmes, who had Coughlin's 11 TR 26800 before her, and whom was transferred from D1, by
Judge W. Gardner, Coughlin's 12 CR 00696 on 2/27/12 (very curious date and timing for such a
transfer given all the other things that occured on 2/27/12 with Coughlin's Appeal in the Judge Elliot
case involving Washoe Legal Services (CV11-01955), more eflex rejections thereof by Lori Matheus,
(there is just a lof of Judges whom are former prosecutors seemingly issuing a beat down of
Coughlin here, in part on behalf of Washoe Legal Services and Paul Elcano (whom holds himself out
as a close personal friend of Judge L. Gardner, District Attorney Gammick (Elcano announced this in
anticipation of WLS being awarded the ECR Program contract, which arguably violates the Sixth
Amendment...basically, Washoe Legal Services is an entity that holds itself out as one thing...but
there sure are a lot of prosecutors and former prosecutors working that marionette's strings). (RMC
Judge W. Garder is the brother of the Judge Linda Gardner who was apparently extremely upset that
Coughlin not only didn't came to her and Springgate's coercive "settle or else" onslaught minutes
before the Trial on April 12, 2009 (Judge L. Gardner, during an impromptu Settlement Conference
angrily hissed at Coughlin's client, Bharti Joshi "don't listen to your attorney!", and, with Joshi by his
side, snapped at Coughlin "shut up!", the proceeding to say she was offering Coughlin suggestions
on how to try his case in the Trial, only to explode in rage at Coughlin when he thanked her for his
suggestions but indicated he needed to try the case in a manner that aligned with zealously
adovcating for his client's interests, and not with an overly weighted concern for Mr. Springgate's
profit margin or the Court's intentions regarding the doling out of its judicial resources. Coughlin
filed the Mandamus Petition against her in 54844 (containing inflammatory material related to the
coercive practices with with Judge L. Gardner sought to extract an agreement to John Springgate,
Esq's illusory settlement proposal (Springgate's proposal was not fraudulent or anything, but it is not
accurate or fair to suggest that Coughlin was being vexatious to meet the NRS 7.085 standard that
the Legislature created with med mal cases in mind (if they only could have imagined the perverted
applications to which it is put these days...basically there is a lot of gang bangin' people out of their
due process goin' on these days under the rubric of some feigned cry of "vexatiousness!". Please.
Further, it is beyond supportable the extent to which Judge Howard, Nash, and Gardner make
rulings on relevancy based upon an impermissible goal, to quote Keith Loomis, Esq. (RMC court
appointed defender, whose "work" in the jails must be seen to be believed (Loomis does nothing that
a laminated poster couldn't do, sort of like a "hey, here are your Workplace Rights" laminated deal in
the breakroom...well actually, Loomis does not even do that much, he actively and aggresively sets
the table for the prosecutor's from the Reno City Attorney's Office. They have a real routine goin'
down there. Further, then Master Linda Gardner was apparently rather upset that Coughlin pointed
out that she seemed to be overstepping her jurisdiction a bit, outside of that accord her in NRS
33.018 in a TPO wherein another local attorney, Richard Molezzo, Esq. line up opposite Coughlin, in
FV08-03380 - BRENDA SANTIAGO VS XRHSTOS VAXEVANIS Filing Date: Tuesday , September
09th, 2008) 30-OCT-2008 04:47 PM Obj to Master's Recommendation Entry: APPLICANT'S
OBJECTION TO MASTER'S RECOMMENDATIONS 08-JAN-2009 11:46 AM Application for Setting
Entry: Obj. to Master's Rec re TPO; 2/23/09 @ 9:00 am 23-FEB-2009 09:39 AM Heard ... Entry:
MASTER'S RECOMMENDATION AFFIRMED. nm/cd 23-FEB-2009 09:41 AM ***Minutes Entry:
2/23/09 OBJECTION HEARING - Transaction 611628 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 02-232009:09:41:22 24-FEB-2009 01:29 PM Ord After Hearing... Entry: DENYING OBJECTION TO
MASTER'S RECOMMENDATION. The February 23rd, 2009 Hearing on the Objection to Master
Gardner's Recommendations that Coughlin filed (relating to Master Gardner giving a car and or that
car's title to the individual Coughlin's client sought protection from, despite their apparently having a
shared interest therein, and there being a legitimate dispute as to the documentation, and the fact
that a TPO Hearing is not the appropriate setting for such subject matter, especially where Master
Gardner lacked jurisdiction to rule as she did. Perhaps Coughlin's firing from WLS in 60302 is why
WLS"s landlord tenant attorney Mark Ashley, Esq. regularly refuses to advocate with any zeal on
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behalf of this tenant client's, as Coughlin observed on March 15th, 2012 when Coughlin appeared to
content the eviction brought against him in (again, in another No Cause Eviction against Coughlin
where he was arguably a commercial tenant and the Notice served was a No Cause Eviction Notice
only, though there is some indication, at least from a docket entry in that matter RJC rev2012000374, that Gayle Kern, Esq. and or Sue King (unauthorized practitioner of law property manager
for Western Nevada Management, Inc.) responded fraudulently to Coughlin's Pre-Hearing Brief in
that matter that pointed out the difficulties ahead for their client, Park Terrace Town Home's HOA in
light of various problems with the Notice and matters pled by PTTHOA (basically, the Notice was No
Cause and non-payment was not alleged (until, perhaps the day of the Hearing, a review of the
Landlord's Affidavit is necessary, as is the proof of service thereof, and the proof of service of Judge
Schroeder's Orders in that matter and an inquiry into why the RJC failed to file Coughlin's Notice of
Appeal thereof on March 16th, 2012 (the implication is that Gayle Kern and, some might say, the
RJC went out of their way to avoid a repeat of the Merliss v Couglhin eviction case involving Richard
Hill and Casey Baker (RJC Rev2011-001708). When Coughlin appeared for the summary eviction
proceeding in the RJC on March 15th, 2012 his case was already decided against him on a default
basis, despite the fact that the Hearing was to start at 8:30 am, and the fax sheet of the Eviction
Order signed by Judge Schroeder indicates a time of 8:24 am. Nonetheless, Coughlin sat around in
court to observe Ashley's advocacy (Coughlin was able to listen to Ashley and his Paralegal,
Christine Saito, conduct business as the Landlord Tenant attorney and paralegal at Washoe Legal
Services for 18 months, having offices within whispering distance of each other, from September
2007 to Coughlin's firing by WLS Executive Director Elcano in May 2009 (See Elcano's attached
letters detailing that the firing was solely predicated upon Judge L. Gardner's April 2009 Order
sanctioning Coughlin in the Joshi divorce matter DV08-01168 (that spawned the Mandamus Petition
by Coughlin against Judge L. Gardner 54844). Judge L. Gardner recused herself from the next case
she had Coughlin appearing on assigned to her, Bell v Greer, FV11-04268...which arguably
presented the same basis for her brother to recuse himself inthe criminal trespass prosecution of
Coughlin. attached my Emergency Ex Parte Motion (perhaps not "ex parte" given Bar Counsel was
provided it). Also, please note, the October 9th, 2012 certificate of mailing by the SBN for the Notice
of Intent to Take Default was never served on me in any way shape or form until I received the copy
of the "entire" file form Sierra Legal Duplicating. The State Bar of Nevada knows this. They put the
wrong postage on the certified mail envelope containing the Notice of Intent to Take Default. When I
went to pick it up "Tim" USPS counter attendant at the Vassar Postal Station here in downtown Reno
refused to allow me to pick up that certified mailing given that is was about $5.00 deficient in
postage. I did not have $5.00 and it is not be responsibility to pay it, as far as I know. In fact, I have
asked the Bar and this Panel to allow me to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter, and am doing
so again here (I am flat broke, I have a 1996 Honda Accord, rent a room for $300 a month, have less
than $200 in my bank account, no stocks, no bonds).
Also King is attemptign to do something really weasely here (nothing new for King) in backtrackign
on what he told Coughlin Bar Counsel Clark had given Coughlin authority to do (ie, issue subpoenas
despite being a suspended attorney...King is now trying to argue some necessarily ultra redundant
interpreation fo that wherein he was merely relaying a message from Clark that, yes, Coughlin had
authority to have SBN Clerk of Court Peters (whom King constantly plays marionette master to,
despite whatever he says when the lights are on that conduct) issue supboenas which Coguhlin
could then have served (and Peters told Coughlin he didn't have to pay witness or subpoena fees,
and in fact, that now Respondents do in these matters.
I have been mislead or lied to by the SBN in numerous ways in this proceeding. I was told I could issue subpoenas despite
being a suspended attorney (and there is case law that says even when suspended, one is still an "attorney"). I was told I
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would not be required to pay subpoena fees. I was told the August 23rd, 2012 certified mailing would absolutely not be
used to prove proof of service of the Complaint in this matter, SBN v. Coughlin. Yet a review of the files reveals that the
SBN and Panels only Return of Service (and see SBN Ethics Committee Member Joseph Garin's recent Brief in 60302
seeking to dismiss my entire wrongful termination lawsuit against Washoe Legal Services) for a real ironic example of
just why the hearing on November 14th, 2012 must not go forward. It is fraudulent for the State Bar of Nevada to stipulate
with me that the August 23rrd, 2012 certified mailing of the Complaint is alleges was sent and that Clerk of Court Peters
admits to having received back on September 10th, 2012 would never be cited to as effecting service of the Complaint
upon me or otherwise put forward as proof of return of service etc. Now the SBN seeks to get around the inconvenient
fact that, instead of holding my hearing on September 25th, 2012 (Clerk Peters told me it was on the calendar, I was
noticed of it in writing, I agreed to that date for the Hearing amongst a choice of dates, etc..) Bar Counsel King attempted
to shove a document he alleges was the Complaint in my suit jacket, then persisted in ordering Clerk of Court Peters
(whom King alternately claims to have separation from and no authority over with ordering her not to file my Motion to
Dismiss, attempting to reneg on stipluations and representations made by the SBN, etc). Further, it is wrong for Clerk of
Court Peters to be signing the certificates of mailing for both the SBN and for the Panel Chair. Additionally, under SCR
105(2)(c), it is the Panel that must send the Respondent the Notice of Hearing "at least 30 days" prior to the Hearing date,
and that Notice must include with it the Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence, and it must be served in the
same manner as the Complaint. It is impermissible for Pat King to attempt to mail out the Notice of the Hearing and
Designation of Witnesses weeks before the Panel is even announced (how can you possibly be pretending to take your
duty as a Panel member seriously when you are essentially showing up the day of the first game, skipping all the practices
and pre-season games....we all saw how that turned out for Bret Farve in his last season. It is appalling to me that you
intend to hold this hearing given these blatant violations of SCR 105(2)(c), but when you add to that the fraudulent
conduct of Pat King, in failing to amend his and or Clerk of Court Peters certificate of mailiing or return of service for the
purported certified mailing (and, contrary to the SBN's established practice detailed in the certificates of mailing I have
review upon finally being granted a copy of the "file", though, the rule says I get to go to the SBN's offices and review
certain things "up to three days"...not have Pat King and Laura Peters manufacture some nonsense about why I am not
allowed at the building or otherwise violating my rights (which is something King and Peters do everytime they get
caught violating the rules.) Further, I have been (and some might say this was largely by design) jammed into having this
Disciplinary Hearing on November 14th, 2012 in impermissible proximity to the petty larceny trial in rcr2011-063341
(see Montiero for why it is not even appropriate for King to be seeking to force me to prejudice my defense in that matter)
on November 19th, 2012, in Department 2, before Judge Sferrazza, whom presided over the summary eviction/unlawful
detainer "Trial" from my former home law office that the criminal trespass arrest, jaywalking arrest (King's Complaint
doesn't manage to specify that the January 12th, 2012 arrest was for jaywalking outside my former home law office
shortly after my collecting video evidence revealed the fraud attendant to Hill's contractor havig used my own plywood to
board up the back porch of the property....Hill, also, at that time, went and got a TPO that was based largely upon an
outright lie, ie, that I "climbed up on" the contractor Phil Stewart's truck). I believe this Panel should review (I cannot
affor the $35 to $70 for the video of the two hearings on Hill's Motion for Order to Show Cause of January 20th, 2012 (the
Order to Show Cause was served by RMC Marsm hal Harley, despite what WCSO Deputy Machen said he personally
served in his affidavit (Machen also lied about personally serving the eviction lockout order for HIll, and HIll lied at the
trespass trial when he testified that Machen "posted it on the door becaues you ran away", Hill also lied at trial when he
alleged the Reno PD announced themselves as law enforcement and issued a lawful order to emerge form the basement
prior to the landlord kicking in the door, and Hill also lied about whether anyone that day warned Coughlin to leave the
property prior to Hill's signing the criminal complaint to affect a custodial arrest for criminal trespass).
Additionally. I moved recently, and updated my SCR 79 address in compliance with that Supreme Court Rule well within
the 30 days of my moving. Further, I filed an official Change of Address with the USPS, and that caused delays in
receiving my mail incident to the typical forwarding procedures of the USPS, and I have the yellow stickers on the
envelopes to prove it. Further, besides submitting an official Change of Address form to the Vassar Station on October
5th, 2012, Coughlin wrote the SBN on October 14th, 2012, and provided his new 1471 E. 9th St. mailing and physical
address, in addition to updating the online portal and the NV CLE Board even prior to that, all in compliance with SCR
79.
I do not consent to service or notice of anything electronically in this proceeding, but I do appreciate
being copied on such things via email and fax)
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Bar Counsel Patrick O. King has clearly become very intimidated by the Panel, and especially it's
Chair, John Echeverria, indicating a real withering desire for proceeding with this case but helpless in
the face of a command from higher up, and arguably outside of the permissible authority or exertion
of influence of those from which it emanates. King has been especially critical of the NNDB and
Panel for its actions in connection with the recent reinstatement of Stephen R. Harris, Esq.,
(reinstated to the practice of law on November 8th, 2012) as has Gary Silverman, Esq.:
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intersting that the SBN and the Panel seek to plung headlong into the 11/14/12 hearing that violates
absoltuely every section of NR 105(2)(c) (one of the very, very few provisions of the Supreme Court
Rules speaking to the due process requirements of these disciplinary hearings (which some
watching Coughlin circa 2002-2005 might say often devolve into kangaroo courts where some
corrupt bully (some might say Strip Club Spearmint Rhino owner Kevin Kelly, Esq., decade long
member of the State Bar of Nevada's Character and Fitness Committee, whose club allegedly
funnels $10 million a year ot Vegas cabbies to direct tourists to its doors..Coe Swobe making' calls
there too, just like in 60302 where he is calling Coughlin and his father seeking to do WLS's and
Elcano's bidding) who chips off his friends (Peter Christiansen, Jr. Esq.) despite saying the
respresentations would be pro bono (despite receiving $5,000, Christiansen still, on the record,
for him to file a six page, rather repid arrangment worth of a Pre Hearing Brief (containing
dog and pony s how hearing (wherein, his friends having been paid, C&F Committee Strip Club
crime, based largely on some retatliation that Mark Tratos, Esq. largely admitted to, along with Mary
Lafrance (don't recall Jessica Wolf, Esq. (one of two students name in an email about missig papers
in that summer 2001 cyber law class, and Anderson and Morishita indicate, as past patent attorney
in Tratos's firm, that Tratos had "lost" other students papers before too..something tratos had to
admit under oath in 2007) send me "another" copy of you paper..."what was it about" the "name of
the case involved" (gee Tratos, kind of sounds like you had the version Coughlin submitted with only
his social security number (in compliance with the Boyd School of Law's blind grading policy, which
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Judge W. Gardner made some extremely curious statements during the proceedings in the criminal
trespass case. Included amongst these was a statement that he "could not remember" or "was not
sure" if he ever saw or was aware of the formal complaint filed by the RMC and or RMC Judge Nash
Holmes against Coughlin with the State Bar of Nevada and whether or not that submission to the
State Bar included a copy of the April 2009 Order by Judge W. Gardner's sister, Family Court Judge
L. Gardner, sanctioning Coughlin $1,000 for "vexatious conduct" incident to Coughlin representing a
domestic violence victim on behalf of a legal aid organization (in Nevada Supreme Court case
number 54844, Coughlin v. District Court) wherein Coughlin was actually arguing a position that is
clearly the majority viewpoint throughout American jurisprudence:
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=22746
Then Judge W. Gardner indicated, on the record, while insisting upon proceeding with Coughlin's
criminal trespass trial, despite Gardner's fellow RMC Judge Nash Holmes filing a complaint with the
State Bar of Nevada seeking to have Coughlin declared incompetent or disabled and, therefore,
unable to practice law, that various Order by RMC Judge Nash Holmes and other materials which
Judge W. Gardner admitted to reviewing and or being aware of did not bring into question Coughlin's
competency. Further, Gardner's Order of Conviction finding Coughlin guilty of criminal trespass, as
announced in open court in RMC 11 CR 26405, as announced from the bench on June 18th, 2012,
indicated it rested upon clearly inappropriate or irrelevant facts or matters not in evidence (Gardner
supported his Order by referring to emails allegedly from the landlord's attorney that were not
introduced into evidence, supposedly providing the warning necessary for a trespass conviction
under RMC 8.10.010, despite testimony that Coughlin was repeatedly issued written warnings to the
landlord's counsel that Coughlin did not agree to accepting service or notice of anything incident to
the summary eviction proceeding via electronic means. This contrasts sharply with Judge Gardners
ruling that he would not consider Coughlin's argument that the Reno Justice Court, in the summary
eviction proceeding in RJC REV2011-001708 was actually divested of jurisdiction by Coughlin filing
a Notice of Appeal following an initial hearing (see attached NRCP 60(b) Motion to Set Aside
Eviction Order) or deem an evidence thereof to have been put into evidence despite Coughlin 's
seeking to do so and despite Coughlin's court appointed Counsel, Keith Loomis, prior to his
withdrawal, arguing in court at a preliminary hearing, that such a divesting of jurisdiction did in fact
vitiate the import of any such Order of Summary Eviction. Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849
(2006), Sarpy v. de la Houssaye, 217 So.2d 783 (1969).
Now, consider all that in conjunction with Coughlin spending 18 days in jail from July 3, 2012 to July
21st 2012 incident to a non-noticed bail hearing wherein Judge W. Gardner raised Coughlin's bail for
an arrest for disturbing the peace, proof of car insurance, and failure to secure a load on one's
vehicle (proof of insurance was provided via a pdf on a Coughlin's smart phone to the arresting
officer, and the disturbing the peace charges relates to conduct allegedly occurring outside the
officer's presence, and where that conduct is misdemeanor, Nevada law prohibits a custodial arrest
being made...so the Reno Police Department is left justifying the decision to make a custodial arrest
based upon a traffic citation carrying a $175 fine (failure to secure a load on one's vehicle)
Just sayin'. Someone starts effing with my USPTO license, that's federal, what am I supposed to do,
not question the adequacy of the due process provided in the proceeding leading to my convictions
and therefore suspension of my law license and damage to my professional reputation? 37 CRF
11.25(3)(a) and 11.25(3)(c) call for me to do just that.
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1918
Dated this November 12th 2012:
__________________________
Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq. (Nevada law license temporarily suspended, USPTO license in tact,
and given permission to issue subpoenas by SBN Chief Bar Counsel David Clark, Esq. and firing up
that whole 11.25(b)(3) engine)
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1919
proof of service/certificate of mailing
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i zach coughlin placed this 11 12 12 Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss or Quash or Otherwise
Challenge Sufficiency of Service and of Process, of Complaint and Notice of Intent to Take Default
and DoWSoE; and Preserving for Appeal Objection to All other Due Process Violations; and
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UNDER PROTEST...RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT in the mail with postage, and or transmitted a

digital copy to all of those who have either expressly or implicitly agreed to service via digital
transmission (plus Pat "Salieri" King told me the SBN takes anything I file and provides a stamped
copy to all 5 member of the Panel immediately and that I could rely on that), in the mail for pickup...
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dated november 12th, 2012.
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____________
zach coughlin
respondent
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1920
indc.'I: to cshibils:
I. cshibil I: \'urious rcIC\'anl malerials (aiM) sec Ihe audio Ih ulilhe hcnrings Coughlin hos pre"iously pm\'ide on cd/J\'d
and vi:! electronic digilally \'l'1'itiahlc Ir..msmissi,m. especially Ihe Rl\,'IC ca'iCS and tL-h April 200t} Joshi Tmil fmm which
ng 12-04.35 stcms). 3.mO pugc.'i (3.083 pages, nnd pal king ha<.; been sending his eshbih in illegihle blurTY fonn. printeli on
buth sidc.1ii ol'lhe J't'JPcr)
2.
1~~hihil
2: anlllhcr hale stamped colll'Clion ufrcle\'unl Joeuml!nts
5
6
J.c:\:hihh J: fmm the nhig bos" ItlOn Sieml D,u:umcilt ccniliL"lI mailing by SBN deli\'ered 10 Coguhlin nn lirsillucmpi on
11/(,(12 from "Fmmal HC".uin,g File SIlN \'. Zachary A Coughlin" collection in rubber band.
4. Exhihil4: DVD l'ol1L-clinn of\'idL''US Hnd ulher materials
S
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IS
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- 31/31 EMERGENCY EX I'ARTE MOTION TO DISMISS. VACATE. IIESET Oil POSTPONE THE 11/14/12 IIEAlIING
OR OTIIEII\\'ISE II ECOGNIZE TilE I.ACI( OF JURISDICTION TO I lOLl) rr GIVEN TilE NUMEROIJS
VIOLATIONS OF SCR 105(2)(C) BY TilE PANEL AND Till, SBN: INSUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS.
INSUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS. MOTION FOR MISTRAIL I)UE TO FIIAUD III' BAIl COUNSEl.. cIC ..
1921

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2 13 13 0204 62337 ROA Digitized Versio of SBN&#39;s Bates 1373 to 1699 With 5 Transcript Pages Missing Taken Out Vol 7 to 9 0204 62337 11 14 12 Transcript and Formal Hearing Exhibits Bates 1373 to 1922 Hearing Transcript FHE1to16 Another

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.

NOTE BY COUGHLIN: THIS IS COUGHLIN'S VERSION OF THE SBN'S

THE TYPE OF BATES STAMPING THE SBN USED CONVENIENTLY OBSCURED

""''71\ u_ ......... u .. _'- __

John P. Echeverria, Esq., Chair

Zachary Coughlin, Esq.

NOTE BY COUGHLIN: THE VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT

SUNSHINE REPORTING - 775-323-3411

STATE BAR EXHIBITS

SUNSHINE REPORTING - 775-323-3411

RENO, NEVADA; WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14TH, 2012; 9:00 A.M.

This is the date set for the

disciplinary hearing en re Zachary B. Coughlin.

The hearing was originally noticed for 9:00

Last week on November 7th the panel met by

telephone conference, and given some issues to be dealt

with we issued an order requiring the hearing to start at

have information that he did phone the State Bar office

and said that he would be late.

Mr. Coughlin is not present.

The reason we're proceeding in the absence of

Mr. Coughlin is that one of the witnesses, Judge Beesley,

is in Las Vegas and can only testify between 9:00 and

9:30, and so we're commencing the hearing in the absence

of Mr. Coughlin, despite his absence, because the hearing

was noticed to commence at 8:45.

With that, does any panel member have any

other comments before we proceed with the testimony of

Could I ask the chairman for the

SUNSHINE REPORTING - 775-323-3411

record to introduce the panel members in attendance, and

Panel members for this

Johnson, and Karen Pearl.

And I'm the chairman, John

My name is Patrick King on behalf

of the State Bar of Nevada.

With the chairman's permission, I would like

Beesley, has information that I think the panel will find

relevant to Mr. Coughlin's hearing, and I would ask

permission to call him at this time.

The honorable federal Judge Bruce

Has Mr. Coughlin been

notified that Judge Beesley is an expected witness?

In candor, Mr. Coughlin has sent

I say hundreds of pages of e-mails.

e-mails he's protested my calling any witnesses,

proceeding with the hearing, and specifically protested

against having any judges not physically present testify

And in many of those

I had noticed that these people would be

SUNSHINE REPORTING - 775-323-3411

testifying via phone, which is why he's aware of that.

Unless any panel member has

an objection, that's so ordered.

I will now try to reach

(Placing call to Judge Beesley.)

Let the record reflect that

Mr. Coughlin, we're waiting to connect with

Judge Beesley who is the first scheduled witness to appear

between 9:00 and 9:30.

wasn't noticed until far too close in time --

I object to him appearing.

Can you speak

was appropriately noticed of the hearing, this hearing.

2 13 13 0204 62337 ROA Digitized Versio of SBN's Bates 1373 to 1699 With 5 Transcript Pages Missing Taken Out Vol 7 to 9 0204 62337 11 14 12 Transcript and Formal Hearing Exhibits Bates 1373 to 1922 Hearing Transcript FHE1to16 Another

2 13 13 0204 62337 ROA Digitized Versio of SBN's Bates 1373 to 1699 With 5 Transcript Pages Missing Taken Out Vol 7 to 9 0204 62337 11 14 12 Transcript and Formal Hearing Exhibits Bates 1373 to 1922 Hearing Transcript FHE1to16 Another

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