THE 41ST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE HUSSERL CIRCLE

Hosted by The New School for Social Research Theresa Lang Center 55 W 13th Street, New York City

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Discursive Power A lg i s M ic ku na s ( O hi o U n ive rs it y) Husserls Hermeneutic Phenomenology Ha rr y P. Re eder ( U ni v ers it y of Texa s a t A r li n gt o n) Fr o m W e t o I a n d B ac k: St i l l Le a r ning fr o m th e N e w Sc h ool T hr ee Les ter Em bre e ( Fl or id a A tla n ti c U n i ver s it y) P rax i s an d P ass i vi t y: A H i dd en N a t u rali st ic Ass u mp ti o n i n H uss er ls Tr an sce n de nt al P he n o me no l og y S tev en Cr o we ll ( Ric e U n ive rs it y) The Q ue sti o n of N at u r al i z i ng Ph en o me n olog y Ja me s M e n sc h ( S t. Fra nc is X a v ier U n ive rs it y ) be rs cha u a n d T he G i ve nn ess of Life i n H us ser ls P he n o me nol og y A ndr ea S ta i ti ( B os t on Co ll eg e) The H u sse rl i a n Pr oj e c t of Fo r ma l L og ic a nd In di vi du a ti on Ca rl o s L ob o ( Ca e n) 3 3 15 37

47 63 74 86

H uss e rl s N o ti o n of Le i b a n d t he Pri m a ry / Se co nd a r y Pr o pe r ties D i sti nc ti on 103 Em il ia n o Tr iz io ( H u ss erl A rc hi ve Pa r i s / P oi n ca r A r c hi ve Na n cy ) The Le be ns we l t : S ub j e cti vi ty a n d Ob jec ti vi t y i n H uss erl a n d Pa t o k a Lub ica U n k ( M urd oc h U n ive rs it y) H uss e rl s N o ti o n of th e P ri m al Eg o i n Lig h t of th e H e r me ne u tic al Cri tiq ue S a ul iu s Ge n iu sa s ( J a m es M a d i s on U ni ver si t y ) Re du cti o n to Ev i d en ce a nd I ts Lib e r ati ng F u nc ti on: H u sse rl s D i sc ov er y of Re du cti o n R ec on si de re d S h ige ru Ta guc h i ( Ya m a ga ta U n iv er si ty) Pha nta si e a nd H u sse rl s P he no me n olo g ic al I nq u ir y S ma ra nda A ld ea ( E m o ry U n ive rs it y) B ac k to S pa ce Lil ia n A l wei s s ( T ri n it y Co l le ge, D ub li n) H uss e rl s Ph en o me nol og i c al Id ea lis m an d t h e P r ob le m of Re alis m M a xi me D o ya n ( M c G il l U ni ver s it y) Ja n P a to k a s C a re f or t he S o ul i n th e N i hilis tic W o rl d Iva n C h va t k ( Ce nt er f or Th e ore ti ca l S tu di es, Pra gu e) 118 131

144 156

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Discursive Power
Algis Mickunas (Ohio University) The phenomenon of power is implicit in Husserl's critique of modern sciences and their methods, resulting in the crisis of rationality. Our analyses will follow two intentionalities, the vertical and the horizontal, showing that the modern scientific rationality assumes principles which exclude the vertical. Thus conception of the method as a way of mastering the material world intimates also a restriction of linguistic sign systems and uses to specific modes at the expense and exclusion of other forms. If not deliberate, there is a specific bracketing that was performed by the philosophies and sciences of the modern age that allotted the constitution of the primacy of power to linguistic articulations. The result of this development is manifested in the current claims by the semioticians and the deconstructionists that language or discourse is the primary power in all domains of human experience and praxis. While at first sight outlandish, this claim is well justified on the basis of our above analyses of modernity, with its ontology and scientific method. Our approach will trace out this bracketing and show what phenomena become discarded and what phenomena remain in order to be constitutive of power. It is hoped that the result of this investigation will reveal specific formations which belong to no one, are nowhere and yet comprise the very modalities of our modern awareness. What is meant here by awareness consists of specific noetic practices ruled by, and expressive of, a set of intentionalities. In addition, the noetic practices constitutive of power are also ruled by a specific form of transcendence lending such practices their freedom. The latter is expressed in numerous ways across various socio-political, economic and scientific formations, aims, and imageries. It lends an appearance of a total transcendental arbitrariness to the noetic practices at all levels. The phrase noetic practices encompasses what the human actually does in relationship to the world of objects of whatever type. 1. The Given The emergence of modern understanding of power rests on a specific constitution of the given seen as transcendence and inaccessible to direct intuition. The configuration of the given requires a precise deformation of qualitative awareness, its bracketing and hence its reduction to the immanence of the subject. This immanence is subsequently designated in terms of psychology and physiology.1 This form of bracketing can be called the Cartesian skepsis. As we have seen, the modern revolution deems reality to be a material extension of atomic parts that are not accessible to experience, although
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De n ne t, Co n si co us n es s Ex p la in ed .

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manageable by a method of mathematical manipulation. Following this, the entire modern view claims that what is beyond skepsis is a constitution of a precise reflective method offering univocal and indifferent approach to a specifically constituted objectivity. This is to say, the endless totality consists of an univocal rationality correlative to the precise requirements of methodology. There is a need to show the ways in which both, the methodology, and the objectivity are constituted and correlated. Husserl correctly points out that mathematics or quantitative procedures are seen not only as methodological, but founding for all theoretical thought. The specific composition of such procedures suggests that no intuitive content is correlated to them. They contain structures and rules which can be formulated without any relation to the intuitive, i.e. qualitative and essential domain of direct awareness. Moreover, any meaning such structures acquire is not dictated by these structures. This is to say, the meaning is a matter of will, but in such a way that the will is not compelled by such structures; they have no causal force. The implications of such non-necessary connections will be seen subsequently. In order for these procedures and structures to gain validity, the objective world must be constituted in accordance with these procedures. First, the procedures are indifferent with respect to perceptual intuition; they treat all events as if they were essentially homogeneous. Second, the perceptual domain of intuition, directly present to live awareness, is transcended in favor of theoretically-methodologically required homogeneity, i.e. posited in accordance with such requirements. Obviously, the transcendence in this context is minimally double: first, it is the transcendence to consciousness of the qualitative sphere, and second, the transcendence of the posited homogeneous world subtending the qualitative. In this sense, awareness has no access to the second transcendence apart from the theoretical and methodological positing of reality. This is the source of the Husserlian conception of mathematically idealized nature whereby nature becomes a homogeneous mathematical manifold.2 We should not be misled by the concept of homogeneity. The latter might seem to have geometric associations, and hence capable of being given in perceptual intuition; the problem lies in the practice of substituting geometric formations, the translation of the forms into a mathematical set of signs which do not offer any semblance or intuitive comparison to the geometric domain.3 The geometric understanding would still offer a field posited as matter, yet with mathematization of geometry, and if one were to take a next step toward formalization of mathematics, one would be able to regard the geometric as quanta, as numerical points, sums, and divisions, arranged in accordance with formal structures. Irrespective of the levels of quantitative-formal constitution, there is posited only one fundamental-transcendent reality. The problematics of
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Hu s ser l, Cri s is , ma t h em a tiz a ti o n S tr oek er, f o rma l iz a t i o n

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the constitutive processes both of the theoretical-methodological domain, and the transcendent domain, lead to a particular contradiction which cannot be solved within the parameters of the theoretical-methodological form. The method is proclaimed to be universal, all-inclusive, and thus able to subsume all phenomena objectively. Thus the subject who calculates, formalizes must be either subsumed under the method, or be the condition for the constitution of the method. If the former assumption is accepted, then the method must assume a position of supremacy over the subject, i.e. be objective; yet this very method permits only one kind of reality: homogeneous matter. The method is not matter but ideality and indeed a necessary ideality. And yet, if the latter is taken for granted, i.e. that the subject too is to be submitted under the method, then the ideality of the method has no place in the subject, since the subject must be contingent and thus cannot be a basis for the methodological mathematical and formal necessities. In either case, the theoretical-methodological composition is something other than the posited transcendent reality, and the latter is not something given. In fact, the morphologically constituted and directly given world, a world of shapes, pathways, axes for practical activity, multi-leveled interconnections is regarded as complex phenomena that are not identical with the strict homogeneous reality. This non-identity precludes the possibility of deriving the theoretical- methodological formations from the phenomenal-morphological composition of what Husserl called the lived world.4 As a result, the former are neither correlative to the intuited world of morphologically composed things and their interconnections, inclusive of the real subject, nor are they abstractable from the posited homogeneous world. On these terms, the transcendent world, the world of theoretical objectivity, is not given and cannot be a source of theoretical-methodological compositions. The morphological world is given, and yet it too is not a source for the understanding of the transcendent world, and neither can account for the theory and method of the modern sciences and the positing of the world of transcendent and perceptually inaccessible homogeneous world. And yet, the theoretical-methodological composition is regarded as given, and indeed with full evidential necessity. What kind of necessity? Purely quantitative and formal formations having their own rules and procedures, where the morphological or the material side is completely contingent and arbitrary. With respect to the rules of the formal domain, the morphological and intuitive side, such as sounds or marks, is arbitrarily selectable and changeable. This is one of the more fundamental and initial designations of the formal as necessary and the material as arbitrary. This suggests that the connection between them is not direct, not immediate or given,
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Hu s ser l, lif e wo rld

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but must be intended by an entirely different act. While there are many acts which can comprise the connection, a specific act is constitutive of power. Such an act has to be deciphered in its own right. Yet we are concerned in the conjunction between the domains which are radically distinct: the theoreticalmethodological and the transcendent. To repeat, the former is regarded as necessary and given, while the latter is regarded as transcendent, contingent and not given.

2. Formal Region As already noted, the theoretical-methodological, or termed otherwise, the quantitative-formal, are not within the domains of the contingent world, posited as transcendent. It is not found even in the directly intuited morphological composition of the lived world. It is regarded as different from these domains. Not having any other locus for the formal, the thinkers of the modern age invented a container called mind in which these quantitative and formal components reside. They belong to the immanence of the subject. The immanence assumes an ambiguous status: it is the container of the theoretical-methodological formal necessities, and yet it is factually contingent substance. This contingency is expressed in Cartesianism in two ways: first, the formal composition, with respect to a posited absolute being, cannot be regarded as necessary. This is to say, the absolute being can will different formal systems; this is an analogical expression of a conception which offers an initial indication as to the arbitrariness of the formal. Second, the formal is seen as capable of continuous analyses; any break in the analyses is a matter of decision. In this sense, the formal domain swings in the ambiguity between necessity and will, rules and choice. The importance of this indecision consists precisely in the option to either regard the formal as a priori given or as a construct of the subject. Various expressions are offered at the dawn of the modern age to indicate the shift toward the latter option. The notions of nature as created in accordance with mathematical laws comprise one expression. Coupled with the notion that even the mathematical-formal is decidable by an absolute will, the result is obvious: the stress is on the primacy of construction of the formal systems. They too are chosen, although they cannot be regarded as contingent in the sense of the contingency of the transcendent world. Their emergence requires unique intentions that have to be regarded as capable of formal construction and of arbitrary signification. Moreover, such intentionalities must include the possibility of extending and proliferating formal compositions and divisions at will, and of disregarding the perceptual, intuitive content. A brief analysis of this disregard will clarify the constructive intentionality, necessary for the understanding of the composition of power in the modern age at the level of signs. To note, while the conception of homogeneity of the

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transcendent reality can be described by geometrical structures, corresponding to the morphological and perceptually intuited world, the shift from the geometrical signification to the mathematical and formal abandons any kind of intuitive correspondence between the shapes of geometry and the morphological compositions of the lived world. Hence, any theory of representative correspondence, copy of the world in the mind substance, has to be abandoned. The signitive symbolism of quantitative and formal compositions do not offer any intuitive counterpart in the perceptual world apart from the sounds or marks, selected arbitrarily. But these marks, while part of the morphological world, in no wise resemble the theoretical-methodological composition; they simply provide the arbitrary means for perceptual expression. While there are many complexities in the constitution of the quantitative-formal modes of theoretical-methodological thought, in principle this thought does not offer any possibility of correspondence between theoretical- methodological compositions and the perceptual world of shapes and structures. The operations with signitive symbolismthe perceptual side of the quantitative-formaloffer themselves in a precise order: they must be arranged sequentially and uni-directionally. They must follow a temporal sequence and must be constructed as sequential. The perceptual intuition into the morphological side of such signitive processes offers an awareness of progression from a starting point to a finish. The problem of the finish is not to be taken in a finite sense: the formal procedures lend themselves to indefinite progression and articulation; hence what could be regarded as finish is a decision to stop the formal articulation of theoretical-methodological composition. As noted above, the quantitative and formal processes can be continued indefinitely; any cessation in our operations with them, as was already noted at the dawn of the modern age, is a matter of choice. Phenomenologically speaking, there appears a specific lack on the basis of the transformation from the morphological lived world, present to perceptual awareness, to the formal signitive symbolisms, expressed serially by arbitrary selected marks. The intentional direction toward the perceptual world, capturing the morphological constitution of the lived world, can be designated as vertical. The maintenance of the vertical intentionality requires the presence and continuity of the directly intuited morphology; this intuition can be unfolded horizontally, and if need be in horizontal performances composed of grammatically structured marks or sounds. Thus the morphological awareness of a particular object can offer a possibility of eidetic variation to yield a pure geometric figure, whereby the morphological awareness becomes an intuitive exemplification of a corresponding eidetic structure. Each morphological variant has a representing capacity, i.e. it can give an intuitive similarity to the eidetic structure, held by vertical intentionality. Yet the constitution of the

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mathematical-formal need no longer signify the object present to vertical intentionality. It becomes free from any morphological moorings and vertical intentionality and can be articulated on the basis of its own formal procedures. This is to say, it can progress uni-directionally, i.e. horizontally in a process of either increased formally analytic differentiations or an indefinite repetition of functions. The specificity of this horizontal process consists of the fact that the criteria of articulation, differentiation, and analyses are intrinsic to the formal discourses. This is quite fitting, since the criteria of the experienced world, the given morphological structures are no longer signified by the formal processes. After all, what the formal process signifies is its own arbitrary selection of means of expression. The formal can be still regarded as necessary and the selected expressive material as contingent (although with the previously mentioned ambiguity), yet what leads the process is the possibility of increased formalization of propositions, resulting in the concept of formal systems which can be differentiated into formal sub-systems and of splitting up of systems into distinct formal systems. Disregarding the morphological composition of the lived world, this process pretends to subsume under itself all domains of the world not on the basis of any intuitive content but on the basis of formal designations and differentiations. 3. Contingency The previously indicated problematic of the transcendent world emerges here in a new guise. The excluded morphological lived world yields, in accordance with formal systems, no visible necessity. The posited homogeneous world, transcending all perceptual and intuitive access does not offer any viable view which would make its necessity present. This is to say, it too must be regarded as contingent. Being inaccessible, it must be posited in accordance with the formal definitions and procedures whose necessity would provide a model of explanation not for the perceptual components, but of possible processes designated as material. The contingent is so designated because its necessity comes from another, and in two senses. First, from the formal articulations comprising the theoretical-methodological domain presumed to be correlative to the posited transcendent reality, and second, from a presumed act of an absolute creation (Galileo) such that the theoretical-methodological composition is the very way in which reality is created.5 This is the symbolic support designated to necessitate the functioning of this reality and to guarantee that our theoretical-methodological forms constitute adequate descriptions of reality. Thus the Galilean exclamation of our greatness.6 An analogous symbolic ploy
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S cha ber t, a bs o lu te cre a ti o n ibi d, Ga li ll eo , we a r e grea t

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was used by Descartes to guarantee the necessity of the objective phenomena. This persistent insistence on securing symbolic assurances for necessity of the processes of the transcendent reality indicates a fundamental realization that left to itself such a reality is contingent, unless it acquires its necessity from elsewhere. This is to say that an appeal to an absolute geometrician is not an attempt to placate the ecclesiastics, but a symbolic effort to legitimate the necessity of an otherwise contingently construed reality and the correlative necessity of the presumed objective theory and method. If we were to exclude such a symbolism, we would be left with a contingent reality whose necessity would come from another and this is to say from the theoretical-methodology. Contingency excludes, at the same time essentiality, i.e. the possibility for a vertical intentionality to maintain something permanent with necessary characteristics, accessible to perception, or in case of induction, essentiality with universal validity in the sphere of ontology. The abolition of essentiality (the Greek notion of essential composition of something real) opens the door to the notion of an access to this reality in terms of possibility. This is to say, since what is cannot be perceived, and since its being posited as transcendent reality does not offer any necessity for its composition, then it can be accessed and dealt with in accordance with theoretical-methodological formal possibilities. This is precisely the juncture at which it becomes necessary to regard this transcendent reality in accordance with what it can possibly be. Before continuing this line of constitution, it is advisable to interject the first moment which offers itself through the awarenesses delimited until now. 4. Power The problematic of power have been discussed from ancient Far East all the way to modern political thought and even post modern semiotics. The last has admitted that power is not to be located anywhere, although its exercise is everywhere through discourse. Such an admission is well taken, but without a proper grounding in awareness. The task at hand is to indicate what grounds power in awareness and why it cannot be located. To recall the previous discussion and its basic composition: the lived world of morphologically constituted and intuitively accessible events and objects is bracketed under scientific skepsis; the posited transcendent and homogeneous reality is inaccessible to perception. The constitution of the theoretical-methodological formalisms has no intuitive counterpart, i.e. no vertical hold. They can be articulated horizontally in a serial, unilinear progression in accordance with their own intrinsic rules. The homogeneous transcendent reality is contingent and hence open to possibility. As a result, there is no necessary connection between the theoretical-methodological formalisms, or their signitive functions, and the

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transcendent reality. The connection is arbitrary. This is to say, it requires a specific intentionality which is not necessitated by any real compulsion or law to connect the formal signitive factors to the posited reality. The arbitrariness appears under various guises: the application of theory to praxis, the most lyrically stressed intoxication that the purpose of all science is its reshaping of the environment in accordance with human designs, the humanistic efforts to humanize nature and the human animal, the aims at improving nature, the fascinating pronouncements that if god is dead, then everything is permitted, the exclamations that something is good because we say it is good in accordance with our own prescripts, etc. In principle, the intentional connection between the formally constituted domain and the posited reality has no hold in anything, and it need not respect any prescription and qualitative composition of the lived world. And yet it is a required nexus between the theoretical and the real. After all, the signitive formal compositions do not point to anything that would be intuitively similar to such compositions. Arbitrary selection of formal components for possible correlation to the homogeneous quantified world offers no other option apart from the imposition of the formally constituted methods on the real. While this might seem obvious, there appears an unnoticed requirement for this correlation: concrete activity. The formal compositions, not having any similarity to anything intuitively present to perception, cannot be correlated to anything perceptual; hence by excluding the perceptual, the correlation requires an active intervention and construction of the posited homogeneous world in accordance with the formal requirements. In this sense, the formal requirements comprise possibilizing arrangements which lead the construction of the real or the real in accordance with formal requirements. This is to say that the intention to control the environment under whatever guise is not a power aim of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Buffon, the capitalists or the Marxists, but the constitution of the possibility of arbitrariness in the connection between theory and reality. Arbitrariness, as a ground for power, might run counter to the usual notions that only set restrictions comprise power, e.g. discursive practices of a tradition. Indeed, it is possible to extend the argument that the classical conceptions of human nature and essence, and indeed an essence of everything else, submitted nature to power under the guise of limits, restrictions and impositions; yet such restrictions were not external but comprised the very way of being without violation. It could be argued that a continuous or at least somewhat stable framework restricts activities and disallows violations without notice. Yet arbitrariness lends itself to an emergence of power without reason, or at best from psychological whim, enhanced, prompted, and fed by unlimited possibilities of formal and as a result material constructions. The intentionality emerging here between the theoretical and the real swings between two possibilizing structures: the formal possibilities, operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs, reach a point of realization that the formal

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processes are also arbitrarily constructed and hence can be reconstructed at will, purely empty significations without any immediate fulfillment in the perceptual intuition. These formally designed possibilities are also in a position to align the transcendent reality toward intuitive fulfillment by human intervention into the processes of the lived world and, by disregarding the given perceptual morphologies of that world, to shape the presumed underlying homogeneous matter in accord with the formal designs. This shaping comprises the source of both, the labor theory of value and lifethe primacy of homo laboransand technology, inclusive of the appearance of political technocracies which promise to redesign the environment and the human in line with the theoretical-methodological requirements: a world produced by science. Some scholars in fact suggest that the modern world has two intentional histories: one, a completely unstructured world of completely autonomous individuals, and two, a complete redesigning of the world in accordance with the formal designs we ourselves posit. Yet in either case arbitrariness is assumed and the intentionality that swings between the formal and the transcendent is the decisive arbitrator. This intentionality is not identical with Kantian autonomous will and with Nietzsche's will to power. Its engagement is with possibilizing constituents both at the formal and at the material levels. The possibilizing allows for formal variations and differentiations of processes into systems and sub-systems, until the sub-systems can become distinct sciences, carving out their fields and accessing the environment in accordance with their formal requirements. This simply means an increased refinement of application and fulfillment of the formal sphere in the material sphere. This is the technological process. As Husserl argues, technologization posits formal operations, with a total disregard or indifference to the meaning and truth of nature in the lived world. Such formalism, coupled with the presumed homogeneous and indifferent reality, results in two structural processes when introduced in the lived world. First, a complete disregard to the concrete meanings and their horizons, including their enactments in the lived world thus leading to increased contingency, and second, formal and technological detachment from the concrete intentionalities which tie the subject to the morphologies of the lived world. These two components constitute the problematic of the relationship between contingency, detachment and nature. Both, the formally designed systems and the transcendent material nature, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary correlation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point of detached formalism and regard qualitative and essential distinctions with indifference. As already suggested, the formal indifferent and disconnected constitution lends itself to a horizontal process of increased formalization of all propositions in such a way that there emerge increased formal differentiations of

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formal systems. While leading to more complex formal connections, it also includes increased differentiations. In this sense, the material reality can be increasingly differentiated and constructed along more complex and yet more distinct technical masteries and controls of the material. The increase of formal complexities and differences is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of the material processes, leading to more possible rearrangements of the indifferent material nature. As Jonas suggests, every refined and produced material process offers possibilities for further formal refinements and material rearrangements.7 The lateral differentiation of formal systems and their correlative material structuration provide a basis for disciplinary differentiations, each having its own formal approaches and each capable of possible construction of material fulfillment. While this process maintains its basic principles of formal and material detachments, it progresses toward a differentiated inclusion of all events, both natural and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally differentiated world where semi-independent spheres call for semi-independent functions and work. What is relevant in human life depends and is contingent upon the manner in which the formal constructs divide the human material: the human is economic, social, chemical, physiological, psychological, biological, etc. set of differentiated behaviors, each semi- independent of the others. It would be redundant to analyze the obvious: the power of these differentiations comprises also the separations of social functions and tasks, leading to a society of semi-independent groupings of expertise. Yet what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no necessary connection with other spheres. Hence the results of research in a specific domain can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts of each domain there is no recourse to any external criterion concerning the intentionalities which would correlate the results as possibilities in another domain. This is to say, the material, i.e. technically produced forces can be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social domains, such as politics for possible application. The lateral differentiation decentralizes responsibility thus increasing the contingency and arbitrariness, and the latter is increasingly unchained from any constraints. Every formal rule, and every material result made to fulfill the formal design, become totally arbitrary, offering possibilizing formal and material combinations without end. Each domain is released from the concrete lived world implications, each an expert in its own sphere, need not relate to any other sphere; each can claim that there is no such thing as conclusive evidence precisely because the formal systems and their fulfilled material arrangements are arbitrary designs and carry no necessity; they are, insofar as they make, and with the making they assume reality and hence increment power and prove their momentary success.
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It would be redundant to speak of needs since the latter are part and parcel of the possibilizing procedures and become at the same time needs and fulfillment. We can make it, therefore we want it, and we wanted, therefore we can make it. What this suggests is that the process of increased contingency and arbitrariness as sources of power comprises a self-referential domain. This means that there are no restrictions for the search for truth. After all, such a search has lost any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object. Even in social understanding, the relationships between the formal and material processes are determined by science, i.e. the very self articulation and production. One, thus, cannot find any trans-scientific criteria to check this process. And each domain has no built-in reason to stop the proliferation of its own form of knowledge and praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease making more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to stop the economic growth, no biological reasons to stop remolding of the living processes along new combinations, etc. Any limitation would be regarded as an infringement on the autonomy of research. Any science, which would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above. 5. Progress Given the key intentionality which swings without any essential necessitation between the theoretical-methodological and the transcendent homogeneous domains, there emerges the attendant factor which is permanent: progress. It must be without regression, without death, and all formal systems and all transformations of the lived world into calculatively remade world are enhancements, maintenances of this permanent structure. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no subject that would progress. Its aim and its subject is itself and thus it is self-referential. Progress is its own destiny. It constitutes its own increasing formal refinements, efficiencies and perfectabilities without of course attaining perfection. No attained construction is left without possibilizing and hence improvement. In this sense one could say semiotically, and yet on Husserlian basis, that the signifier and the signified are one. The question that arises in this kind of progress, and as pointed out, its proliferation of increasing arbitrariness with respect to all phenomena, is the appearance of crisis. What is immediately notable is the disproportion between the sub-system called science and the rest of the culture. The efforts by the theoretically-methodologically designed systems to master the material nature have become exponential. Let us be clear about this: there can be only one domain of progress, and this is the coded and formalized transmission of practices, techniques, or strategies. A culture can increase its mastery and

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practical control through the increase of formal differentiations and physical interventions in the environment, yet it cannot increase what the environment as a whole has to offer. There is no progress in nature. We cannot increase material resources, but only the efficiency of their uses. Only the latter can progress. And this is precisely the point of crisis: the sciences are entering human life on the basis of this use i.e. making humans function in accordance with the very prescripts that are imposed on the presumed physical world. Thus the question: is this a progress for human life, or is this the arbitrary treatment of the human and hence the subsumption of the human under arbitrariness and its opening up of power over the human? Obviously, the use and interference is inherent in the processes of modern science, requiring the intentionality which can connect the formal and the material. The human then is submitted to and subsumed under an arbitrariness which includes his own operations. That is, the human also functions in this modern intentionality and treats, or at least is exposed in principle to treat everything arbitrarily, i.e. violently. Arbitrariness is a power which opens an initial experience of violation. But this violation cannot be avoided within the context of modern understanding of theory and method and their application. The brief discussion of the emergence of power in the modern tradition resulted in sign systems as all encompassing eidos of power. Other traditions should be deciphered and variations performed in order to discover the complete noetic-noematic correlation constituting power. One notion seems to be warranted in the context of our discussion: it is not the discursive limits which exercise powerafter all, Greeks were capable of linguistic dance within a well designed formbut an arbitrariness which proclaims a homogeneity of a method and the material world which then can disregard not only the limits of qualitatively understood objects, but also the uniqueness of any individual. Arbitrary violation of limits is what will yield modern power. This now can open our understanding to political rhetoric and its power to make, and a broader grasp of the basis of discursive power.

Husserls Hermeneutic Phenomenology*

Harry P. Reeder (University of Texas at Arlington) 1. Introduction My title is perhaps triply unfortunate: first because Husserls phenomenology is thoroughly transcendental as well as 1 hermeneutic, although his transcendental phenomenology, and especially his transcendental reduction, are often misunderstood by hi s critics; second because Husserls transcendental phenomenology is usually contrasted with the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger and his followers; and third because the important linguistic and interpretational elements in phenomenological metho d elements that are sometimes (but only sometimes) missing from his own descriptions of the method, 2 but never missing from his phenomenological praxis seem to be at odds with his appeals to apodictic evidence. The hermeneutic elements are most evident i n his many descriptions of phenomenology as a science, with all the resultant linguistic and intersubjective problems, problems addressed by his comments on interpretation and communication of ones own and others phenomenological results (phenomenologica l descriptions). The present essay attempts to sketch some of these hermeneutic elements in phenomenological method as described and practiced by Husserl, and to suggest how these elements affect Husserls claims about apodictic evidence and knowledge. Onc e the hermeneutic elements of Husserls phenomenological method have been explicated (2) we will turn to a common critique of Husserl (3). Because of its clarity, the critique of Husserl by Paul Ricoeur, an outstanding representative of hermeneutic 3 phenomenology, will be used to frame the discussion of two critiques by hermeneutic phenomenologists critiques that continue to be repeated at present. At the center of this critique is what he refers to (1981: 102ff) as Husserls idealism, and the charge that Husserl lacks an account of the role of language in
* I wi s h t o tha n k Ke n ne th W il lif o rd f or s o me in s ig h tfu l a nd e xt rem el y he lpf ul co m me n ts o n a n ea rl ie r dra f t of t h is es sa y. 1 I ha ve pre se nt ed th i s vie w i n va ri o us pla ce s , e.g ., Ree der (1 9 9 0 , 2 0 0 9 a , 2 0 1 0 ). 2 S ee, e. g., ( 1 9 8 2 : 1 7 4 ; Hua I II /1 : 1 6 2 ) : th e ph en o me n o lo g ica l me t h od o pera te s exc lu si ve ly i n a c t s of r ef le ct io n. 3 T he ba si c tex t t ha t I wi l l u se fo r t hi s cr it i q ue i s R ic oe ur (1 9 8 1 , C ha p ter 3 ). T he sa me te xt a ppea r s in hi s ( 2 0 0 7 , C ha pte r 3 ). The q u ota ti o n s i n t he pre se nt e s sa y a re ta ke n f r o m t he f or mer w o rk.

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phenomenological method (both common criticisms of Husserl). In replying to these critiques and opening the way to an interpretation of Husserls phenomenology that undercuts a fairly standard critique of his work by hermeneutic phenomenologists even today, I rely on an interpretation of his work that is shared by, among others, Jos Huertas-Jourda, Algis Mickunas, Daniel Herrera Restrepo, and myself, according to which his thought displays a remarkable u nity of focus from the late 1880s to his death in 1938. 4 Instead of seeing Husserls phenomenology as sharply divided into periods (such as a realistic period, idealistic period, etc.) we see it as a unified but developing and progressing investigatio n of the implications of the intentionality of consciousness for the solution to philosophical and methodological problems that arose from the historical development of philosophy and science from Modern philosophy to positivism. 5 In this growth and develo pment, Husserls published works focus upon different elements of intentional experience and its role in the rigorous science of phenomenology, e.g., the essential objects of logical thought in the Logical Investigations , the constituting transcendental eg o in Ideen I , and the intersubjective critique endemic to scientific method in Cartesian Mediations and Crisis . I wish to be clear that I am not suggesting that Husserls thought did not go through changes, but that his basic insights as to the field and m ethod for phenomenological inquiry remained stable, without the sort of large-scale rejections of his earlier views that are famous in philosophers like Russell and Wittgenstein. For example in shifting from static to genetic phenomenology, Husserls focus shifts from the unchanging objects of intentional acts (1970c: I, 109f, 351f.; Hua XVIII: 86f., Hua XIX/1: 9f.) to the temporal and constitutive elements of these acts at the levels of psychological and transcendental (inner) time (1970b, 1991; Hua VI, X) , and he calls attention to his gradually deepening understanding and practice of phenomenological reduction (1970c: I, 43 46; Hua XVIII: 8 11; 1970b: 234f, 243; Hua VI: 237, 246). However Husserl never rejects his earlier static descriptions, but suppleme nts them, even continuing to value descriptions from his pre -phenomenological Philosophie der Arithmetik . 6 In particular, the appeal to a combination
S ee H uer ta s - J o urd a ( 1 9 6 9 ) , M ic k una s (1 9 9 7 ), Her rera Re s trep o (1 9 6 4 ), a n d Re eder ( 2 0 1 0 ) . Cf . a l s o R iz z o Pa tr n (2 0 0 2 ), p p. 2 2 1 f. 5 Fo r a bri ef di sc u ss i o n o f t hi s i n t er ms of Hu ss erl s a cc ou n t of the r ela ti o n bet we en f o r ma l a nd tr a n sce nde n ta l l o gi c, se e R eede r (2 0 0 9 a ). 6 Hu ss erl ( 2 0 0 3 ) . O n t he c o nt i nu it y bet wee n t h i s w o rk a nd h i s ph en o me n o lo g ica l w or ks see Hu erta - Jo u rda , (1 9 6 9 ). T he o n e we ll - k n o wn
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of intuition and to intersubjective elements of the phenomenological method including language, preunderst anding, interpretation and critique will be shown to be present from the Logical Investigations to the Crisis . Perhaps the roles in phenomenological method of intuition and critique are nowhere as evident as in Husserls appeals to apodictic evidence, be cause Husserl so modifies this concept as to make it scarcely resemble its traditional sense. Nonetheless many of his critics fail to take into account this radical alteration of sense. Let us, then, address this issue at some length in order to prepare fo r a brief reply to common hermeneutic critiques of Husserls phenomenology. 2. Apodictic Evidence and the Phenomenological M ethod Husserl uses this concept in various contexts in the Logical Investigations : in the Prolegomena as he replies to various f orms of sceptical relativism (1970c: I, 153f., 222; Hua XVIII: 140 142, 227); in the Third Investigation in discussing the nature of pure law and pure genus (1970c: II, 446; Hua XIX/1: 243); in the Fourth Investigation in discussions of the a priori laws governing ideal meanings (1970c: II, 517; Hua XIX/1: 334) and combinations of meanings (1970c: II, 511; Hua XIX/1: 326); and in the Fifth Investigation in contrasting psychological with phenomenological evidence (1970c: II, 607; Hua XIX/1: 456). Husserls c ritics may perhaps be forgiven when they point to such passages, because in them he is focusing on the relatively (indeed, ideal) stasis of apodictic evidence, and it may sound as if he were claiming that when we experience such evidence it is absolutely c ertain in the traditional sense of apodictic evidence, according to which, as in Descartes or Kant, certainty resides in an immediate encounter with a particular mental or psychological presence. I frankly wish that Husserl had given up the term, as his use of it is so modified as to distinguish it radically from its traditional sense, and determining this new sense from his writings scattered over decades requires patient and sympathetic reading. However Husserl tends to remain very conservative in his u se of traditional terms (e.g., ego, transcendental, apodictic), although they have led, then and now, to grave misunderstandings of his thought. Husserls terminological conservatism has its origin in his view of phenomenology as a
exce pt i on t o t h is u n it y i s Hu s ser l s re c og n it i on of a pu re e g o i n t h e se c on d edi ti o n of th e Log i cal I nv e st ig at io ns (1 9 7 0 c: I, 4 9 ; H ua XV III : 1 5 ).

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historical development o f philosophys ethical and hermeneutic task of humanity struggling to understand itself (1970b: 14; Hua VI: 12); accordingly he tends to use traditional terms (in order to locate his phenomenological discoveries within ongoing philosophical developments) but modifies their sense. He comments frequently on this use of terms taken from ordinary language and from philosophical usage and the modification of their meanings required by insights achieved through phenomenological investigations. 7 Of course, due to his discoveries of new facets of lived experience that had hitherto been undiscovered, Husserl also was forced to introduce new terms, such as protention, retention, noema and noesis. Part of Husserls motivation for retaining the term apodictic is his desire to reply to scepticism and relativism. In the Logical Investigations Husserl describes the phenomenological method as taking a zig - zag path, moving back and forth between exemplary individual intuitions of experiences and the intersubjective p rocess of employing insights based in these subjective intuitions as data in an intersubjective descriptive fixation of the contemplated essences into pure concepts, through a systematic clarification that removes conceptual obscurities, a process of clarification that mustmake use of all the concepts we are trying to clarify. 8 Thus, the appeal to intuition does not exempt the phenomenologist from interpretation (1964:50; Hua II: 62), from the hermeneutic difficulties of establishing concepts in co mmon usage with one s scientific peers, or, as he notes in the Introduction to the 1913 edition of the Logical Investigations , from the dangers of projections in the viewing of these intuitions: For more than three decades all of my work has been in the a rea of immanent, intuitive experience. I have learned, laboring under unprecedented difficulties, to see and to keep projections ( Einlegungen ) away from that which I see. 9 During phenomenological description there is a zig -zag movement between, on the one hand, a focus upon its de facto epistemological foundation in transcendentally reduced experience (the subjective
S ee, e.g., 1 9 7 0 c : I, 2 6 0 f .; Hua XI X /1 : 2 2 2 f.; 1 9 8 2 / Hua I II /1 : 3 4 , 6 4 , 6 6 ; 1 9 7 0 a : 1 3 f.; H ua I : 5 4 f .; 1 9 7 0 b / Hua VI: 5 9 . 8 1 9 7 0 c: I, 2 6 0 f ; H ua X IX /1 : 2 2 f. O n t he rela ti o n b et wee n w or ds a nd co n cep ts , see Ree der ( 2 0 0 9 b) . Ge nd li n (1 9 8 2 ) p ro vi des a c og en t a cc o u n t of va r i ou s her m en eu ti c ele me n ts in p he n o me n ol o gi ca l descr ip ti o n, s uc h a s wor d ch o ice a nd it s ef f e ct up o n t he d es cri pt i o n a s a n int e rp ret ati on of t he d e f acto li ved enc o u nte r wi t h t he p h en o me na . 9 1 9 7 5 : 5 7 , cf . 5 8 ; 1 9 3 9 : 3 3 5 , cf . 3 3 6 . Hus ser l a ls o refe rs t o t h is da n ger i n te r ms of na tura l pre j udi ce s ( nat rl ich e Vo r m ei nu ng e n ) (1 9 6 4 : 4 1 ; H ua II: 5 1 ) . T h is cri ti ca l pr oce s s b ri n gs to m i nd Ba c on s i do l s.
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conscious presence of individual and eidetic intuitions) and, on the other hand, the interpretation and refinement of insights gleaned from this foundation through the de jure epistemological foundation of the hermeneutic fitting of words (and concepts) to those transcendental elements in order to produce an accurate description that is to be shard with ones scientific peers: In addition to t his difficulty of reaching firm results, capable of being self -evidently reidentified on many occasions, we have the further difficulty of stating results, of communicating them to others. 10 This description, like any presentation of scientific evidence, i s shared with ones scientific colleagues (in lectures and publications), and then is subjected to the processes of intersubjectively critical validation (that is, of interpretation and argumentation). Husserl refers to this process of validation in variou s contexts, as mutual criticism (1970a: 5; Hua I: 47), and reciprocal correction (1970b: 163; Hua VI: 166), stressing (1969: 176; Hua XVII: 184) that in scientific disciplines evidence of every sortshould be reflectively considered, reshaped, analyze d, purified and improved; andafterwards it can be, and ought to be, taken as an exemplary pattern, a norm. Just as we are reciprocally corrected by others in everyday life: Likewise as a transcendental ego (as living in the absolute attitude [that is, u nder the reduction]), I find myself as determined from the outside (1969: 276; Hua XVII: 282). Husserl explicates this external determination of the ego by others in transcendental intersubjectivity as follows:
It i s ob vi o us t ha t, tra n sce nd en ta ll y sp ea k i ng , I ca n b e c o nd it i o ned by so m et hi n g ex ter n a l , b y s o me th i ng t ha t go es b ey o nd m y se lf co n ta i ned o w n ne s s, o nl y if it ha s t he se n se , s o me o ne e l se , a nd , in a th or o u gh l y un der sta nda bl e ma nn er, ga i ns a nd le gi ti ma te s in me i ts a cc ep ta n ce a s bei n g a n ot h er tra ns ce nde n ta l e go . S ta rt i n g f ro m h ere, t he p o ss ib i li ty a nd t he se n se, no t o n ly of a p lu ra l it y of co- ex i st i ng a b s ol u te su bj ect s ( m o na d s ), b u t a l s o o f s ub je ct s wh o aff ect o ne an ot h er tr a n sce nde n ta l l y a nd, i n c o ope ra t ive a ct s, co n st it ut e c o m mu n it y - pr o duc t s [ G em ei n sh aft sg e b ild e ] a s t he ir w or ks, be co m es cl ea r. 11

Whether as phenomenologists or as everyday humans we are

1 9 7 0 c: I, 2 5 5 ; Hua XI X /1 : 1 5 . On th e n ot i o ns of t he d e fact o a nd d e j u r e fo un da t i on s of p he n o me n ol o g ica l c la i ms se e Hue rta s - J o urda (1 9 8 3 ). Hu erta s Jo urda s tre s ses th e ep is te m ol o gi ca l na t ure o f the se f ou nda ti o n s, b ut t he y a l s o me t ho do l o gica l ly f o u n d h is re gi o na l o nt ol o g y. 11 1 9 6 9 : 2 7 6 , my bra ck et s; Hua X VI I: 2 8 2 . Cf. 1 9 8 2 / Hua II I/1 : 1 4 5 .
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corrected by others. Despite the differences between the community - product of everyday truths (such as the number of trees in a glade or houses on a block), or of scientific truths (such as the atomic weight of hydrogen or the noesis -noema structure of intentional acts), in both cases the objective community - truths rely upon the public critique of claims based in experience, experience that typi cally becomes public through language and discourse. It is in this sense that each individual, as a transcendental ego, is surrounded by co -subjects that present themselves as transcendental in my transcendental life, in the transcendental we -community which is co - presented[in] transcendental intersubjectivity . 12 Otherwise stated, whether in the natural attitude or in the reduced, transcendental attitude, each of us as an ego is reciprocally corrected by others (largely through language), testing our de facto individual experiences through critical, de jure discourse (and behavior) with others, through a process of establishing both pre -scientific and scientific evidence. We may therefore see scientific evidence as a more rigorous but parallel version of t he critical process of objective validation that is already an important feature of the role of prescientific Lebenswelt, and phenomenological evidence as a form of scientific evidence that requires the further critical process of phenomenological reductio n. In phenomenological description a significant transformation of the sense of terms taken from ordinary language and from the philosophical tradition is made necessary by the break with naivete
1 9 8 9 : 4 2 1 ; Hua V: 1 5 3 . A f u l l a c co u nt of t he co n st i tu ti o n of tra ns ce nde n ta l in ter s ub je ct iv it y wo u l d ta k e u s t o o fa r a fi el d. A t ba se it in v ol ve s dem o n str a t in g tha t in t he exp l ica t i o n of th e va ri o us s tru ctu re s of t he tra n sce n den ta l e go i s dis c ove red t o i nc lu de ot her t ra n sc en de nta l ego s: w i th i n m y sel f, wi t hi n t he li m it s of my tra ns ce nde n t a l l y red uce d p u re c on sc i ou s lif e, I e x p e ri en c e t he w or ld ( i nc lu di n g o t he rs) ( 1 9 7 0 a : 9 1 ; H ua I : 1 2 3 ); the re a re tra n sce nd en ta ll y co n st it ut ed i n me, t h e tra n sc en de nta l e g o, n o t o nl y o t her eg o s bu t a l so ( a s co n st it ut ed, i n tu rn , by t h e tra n sce nd en ta l in ter s ub jec ti vi t y a cc rui n g t o me tha n k s to tha n k s t o th e co n st it u ti o n i n me of o th er s) a n Ob jec t ive wo rl d co m m o n t o u s a ll ( 1 9 7 0 a : 8 4 ; H ua I: 1 1 7 ). A nd t hi s t ra n sce nd e nta l in ter s ub je ct iv it y ha s a n int e r su b je ctiv e s ph ere o f o w nn es s, in w hi ch it co n st it ut es t he Ob jec ti ve w or ld (1 9 7 0 a : 1 0 7 ; H ua I : 1 3 7 ) c o nn ect ed i n a n o pe n com m un it y of m on ad s , wh ic h we de s ig na te a s tra n sc e nd e nta l i nt e rs u bj ec tiv i ty (1 9 7 0 a : 1 3 0 ; Hua I: 1 5 8 ) . T hu s se lf - exa m i n a ti o n a s it pr o gre s se s, it ta kes on th e fo rm of t ra ns ce nde n ta l in te rs ub j e ct i ve se lf - e xa mi na ti o n, wi t ho ut a n y es se nt ia l c ha ng e i n i ts s ty le (1 9 6 9 : 2 7 6 ; H ua X VII : 2 8 2 ). I n pa r t, t hi s is exp la i ne d b y t h e i n t en ti o na l i ty, of c o ns ci ou s ne ss , a cc o rdi n g t o w hi ch t he tra d it i ona l d is ti nc t io n be t wee n s ub j ect iv e a n o b jec ti ve (i nc lu di n g t h e ob je ct iv it y of o t her s) i s see n to be ba sed i n a fa u lt y ca rte s ia n i n te rpre ta t i on of th e e g o: spea ki n g e xpe rie nt ia ll y, t here i s n o eg o wi t h ou t ot he rs.
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brought about by the transcendental -phenomenological reo rientation, that is, by the phenomenological reduction, 13 and the resultant methodological confrontation of terminology first with the data of phenomenologically reduced intuition and then with intersubjective interpretation and critique. Husserl describes this first confrontation in several places, e.g.:
We i ns pec t [ m e nta l p roc es se s E rl e bn i ss e ], a nd w h il e i ns pec ti n g th e m we ca n o bs erv e t he ir e s se nce , t he i r c on s ti tu ti o n, t he ir in tr i ns ic cha ra c ter, a n d we ca n ma k e ou r s p eec h c o nf or m in a p ur e mea su re to w ha t is se en i n i t s fu l l c la r it y. 14

The inspection here is not passive but critical and vocationally driven by the role that the phenomenologist intends this inspection of Erlebnisse to play in the science of phenomenology (1970b: 136f.; Hua VI: 139 f. ). The data of reduced consciousness are not irrefutable evidence encountered in an instant of subjective experience, but rather irrefutably given experience that is to be used as data for phenomenological description, a description that is intended to resolve, modify, clarify or otherwise aid in dealing with a philosophical problem, in confrontation with scientific peers, through discourse, interpretation and argumentation. These linguistic and hermeneutic elements of Husserls phenomenological method seem to be ignored by many of Husserls critics. 15 Husserl again characterizes the relation between what is here
1 9 7 0 b/ H ua V I: 5 9 . C f . 1 9 7 0 c: I, 2 3 8 ; Hua X VII I: 2 4 6 . 1 9 6 4 : 2 4 , my bra c ke ts ; Hua II : 3 1 . Cf. 1 9 8 2 / Hua I II /1 : 8 4 , 8 5 , 1 2 4 ; a nd 1 9 7 7 : 6 6 f.; Hua I X: 9 0 . Da ue n ha u er ( 1 9 7 6 : 7 6 ) n o te s tha t t he q ue st f or a pod ic t ici t y or in du bi ta b il i ty a t t he p redi ca t ive leve l i s re n dered s e nse fu l by w h a t is gi ve n i n pa s si ve e xpe rie n ce. Th e re nd ered se n s efu l h ere refer s t o th e i n tu it iv e evid e nce up o n w h ic h th e p he n o me no l o gica l desc ri pt i on is ba s ed. A cc ord i ng to th e pre se nt d is cu s si o n, Da ue n ha uer s c la i m n eed s cla r if ica ti o n: (a ) here t he ph ra se pa ss iv e e xpe rie nc e ref er s t o t he d e fac to gi ve n ne ss o f exp er ie nce, h o weve r t hi s pa s si v e gi ve n ne ss is a c h i eved th ro u g h a n a c t ive sc ie nt if ic pur s ui t tha t h or iz o na l ly dr ive s t he c o nfr o nt a ti o n w it h t hi s ev ide n ce a s a pa r t of th e v oca ti o n of p h en o me n ol o g y t o p ut t hi s i n He ide g ger ia n ter m s, t h e ph en o me n o lo g is t see ks t he Be i ng of X (w he re X i s t he th e me of t h e ph en o me n o lo g ica l in v est i ga t i on ), ye t mu s t let t he Be i ng of X a p p ea r, i.e. n o t pr oj ect o r ot her w i se i nt erf er e wi t h t he l ive d ev ide nc e; a nd ( b) a n ot he r la ye r of th e re nd eri n g se n sef u l of a p h en o me n o lo g i ca l d es cri pt i o n ta ke s pl a c e i n t he in ter s ub je ct ive d is cu s si o n a n d cri ti q ue of th e ph e no m en o l og ica l descr ip ti o n it se lf. 15 S ee, f or i ns ta nce, M urra y ( 1 9 8 8 : 5 0 3 , 5 1 1 ), M a g nu s (1 9 8 8 : 3 ), a nd Der rida (1 9 7 3 : 9 f , 8 6 ) .
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called de facto experience and de jure critique in science in general in 5 of the Cartesian Meditations:
t h e s cie n ces a i m a t pred ica ti o n s tha t e x pre ss c o mp let el y a nd wi t h ev ide n t f i t nes s w ha t is be hel d pre - pr edica t ive ly O w i n g t o th e i n sta bi l it y a nd a mb i gu it y of c o m m o n la n g ua g e a nd i t s mu c h to o grea t c o mp la ce n cy a b o ut co m pl ete ne ss of e xpr es s io n, we [ ph en o me n o l og is t s] r eq ui re, eve n w he re we u se it s mea n s of expr es si o n, a ne w le gi ti ma ti o n of s i g nif ica ti o ns by o rie n ti n g th e m a cco rd in g to a ccr ued i ns i g ht s, a nd a f ix in g o f w ord s a s exp re ss i ng th e s i g nif ica ti o n s t h us le gi ti ma ted. 16

The zig-zag between these two foundations as it occurs specifically in phe nomenology is discussed in 13 of Cartesian Meditations: the scientific efforts for which we found the collective name, transcendental phenomenology, must proceed in two stages. 17 The first of these stages refers to the role of intuition, of appeal to the de facto evidence revealed by the transcendental phenomenological reduction: In the first stage the realm accessible to transcendental self -experience must be explored. Even in this first stage, the exploration of transcendental self -experience is far from a mere passive encounter with absolutely certain data of consciousness; it is active and critical, guided by what philosophical hermeneutics calls preunderstanding . 18 In phenomenology the horizonal preunderstanding that methodologically guides the thematic focus of intuition includes problems arising from the history of philosophy (e.g., the problem of psychologism that led to the Logical Investigations , the problem of first beginnings that inspired the Cartesian Mediations ), the personal interests of a particular phenomenologist (e.g., Husserls focus upon phenomenology as a rigorous science a focus rejected by many hermeneutic phenomenologists), and the vocational interest of professorial life. 19 In the methodological second stage the transcend ental evidence derived from the first step is subjected to de jure intersubjective
1 9 7 0 a : 1 3 f .; Hua I : 5 4 , m y bra c ke ts . It s ho u ld be n ot ed h ere t ha t th e na tu ra l a nd s oc ia l sc ie nc es a ls o r e qu ire a ne w le gi ti ma ti o n of si g ni fica t io n s b y or ie nt i ng t he m a cc ord in g t o a c cru ed i n si g ht s [ et c.], b ut tha t p h en o me n ol o g y ha s a u n i qu e f or m of l eg it i ma t io n ba sed i n t he p he no m en o l og ica l r educ t io n. 17 1 9 7 0 a /H ua I: 1 3 . Th e qu o ta t i o ns i n t h is a nd t he f ol l o wi n g t wo pa ra g ra p h s a re fr o m p p. 2 9 f ( H ua I: 6 8 f .) , u nl es s o th er wi se n ot ed. 18 S ee Ri co eur ( 1 9 8 1 : 9 0 ) . 19 1 9 7 0 b: 1 3 6 f .; Hua V I: 1 3 9 f . O t her p he n o me n ol o g is ts ha ve t he ir o w n pa rt ic u la r in ter es t s, e. g., Hei de gg er s f oc us o n Be i ng , S a rtre s o n t h e i ma gi na ti o n, a nd M erl ea u - P o nt y s o n t h e b od y.
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critique: The second stage of phenomenological research would be precisely the criticism of transcendental experience and then the criticism of all transcendental cognition . Such critique requires language, communication, argumentation and individual and collective interpretation all elements central to hermeneutic philosophy, but in phenomenology used to critique transcendental experience, resulting in unique problems of i nterpretation and of the meaning of terms. This de jure critique extends (through criticism of all transcendental cognition) to what Husserl calls the phenomenology of phenomenology. According to Husserl the intersubjective critique of transcendental ex perience constitutes A science whose peculiar nature is unprecedented. This new form of science is a transcendental critique precisely because its two stages connect the appeal to subjective, transcendental experience with its on -going intersubjective cr itique in scientific discourse, discourse with both logical and hermeneutic elements (argumentation and interpretation), that follows a zig -zag (two -stage) path between subjective experience and intersubjective critique. The Epilogue to Ideen I warns that neither the intersubjective critique of phenomenology as a rigorous science nor its sense as a science built on an ultimate foundation can be understood without the full (two- stage) systematic elaboration of the method of questioning back into the ultim ate conceivable presuppositions of knowledge that Husserl characterizes as transcendental subjectivity (an old term given a new sense) (1989: 406; Hua V: 139). The Idea of Phenomenology describes the relation between the self -given apodictic data of c onsciousness and the hermeneutic component of fitting language to the data in order to produce a phenomenological description:
t h e p os s ib il it y of a cri ti q ue of c og n it i o n de pe nd s o n t he dem o n str a t io n of a bs o lu te da ta wh ic h a r e di ffere nt f ro m eve n th e red u ced cog it at io ne s . To v ie w t he ma t ter m ore pre ci se l y, in t h e su b jec t - pr edi ca t e j ud g me n ts w hi ch we ma ke co nce r ni n g t he m, we ha v e a lrea d y g o ne be y on d th e m. If we sa y : t h is p he n o me n o n of ju dg m en t u nde rl ie s t h is or t ha t p he n om e no n of i ma g i na t i o n, t hi s perc ept u a l p he no m en o n c on ta in s t h is or t ha t a spe ct, c o l or c on te n t, etc., a n d e ve n if , ju s t for t he sa ke of a rg u me n t, we ma ke t he se a ss ert i o ns i n t he m o st exa ct c onf o rm i ty w it h t he g ive n ne s s of t he cog it a t io , t he n t he l og i ca l f or m s w hi ch w e e mp l oy , a nd w hi ch a re ref le ct ed i n t he li n g ui st ic e xpr es s io n s t h em se lve s, a lrea d y g o bey o nd t he mere cog it ati on e s . A s om et h i n g m ore i s i nv ol ve d

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w hi ch d oe s n o t a t a l l co n si s t of a me re a gg l o mera ti o n of ne w cog it a t io n e s , w h ic h a re jo i ned t o t h o se c o nce rn i ng w hic h we ma de th e a s se r ti o n s, nev er th ele s s t he y a re n ot w ha t c o n st it ut e t he pred ica ti o na l f a c t s w hi ch a re t he ob je c ti ve co rre la t es o f th e a ss ert i o ns. Tha t c o g ni ti o n, w h ic h ca n br i n g t o a bs ol ut e s el f - g iv e nn e s s no t o n ly pa rt ic ula rs, b ut a l s o u niv e r sal s, u n iv e r sa l o bj ect s, a nd un iv er sa l st at e s of a ffa i r s , i s m or e ea si l y co n cei va b le, a t lea st f or a n y o ne w h o ca n a ss u me th e p os i ti o n of pu re s ee in g a nd ca n h ol d a l l na tu ra l pre ju di ces [ n at r lich e r V or m e i nu ng en ] a t a rm s le n gt h. T hi s co g ni ti o n i s of dec is iv e si g nif ica nc e f o r t he p o ss i b i li ty of ph en o me n o lo g y. F or i ts s pec ia l c ha ra c ter c o ns i st s i n t he fa c t t ha t it is t he a na ly si s of e ss en ce a nd t he i n ve st i ga t i on i nt o es se nc e i n th e a rea of p ure see i n g t h o ug h t a nd a bs o lu te sel f - g iv en ne s s. 20

The something more that is added in fitting the experience into propositional form for a phenomenological description does not , however make language primary or productive in the description, because the pre-predicative experience supplies the data guiding the description (which involves choosing terms, based upon reflective judgments about the experience):
We mu s t di s ti n gu is h th e j ud g me nt i n t he broa de st se n se a n d evid e nce i n t he br oa d est se n se fr o m pre - pre dica ti ve ju dg me n t a nd f ro m p re - p red ica ti ve evid e nce r es pec ti ve ly. Pred ica ti ve in cl ude s pre - p red ica ti ve e vi de nce . t he ex pre ss i o n a s s uc h ha s it s o w n co mpa ra t iv el y g oo d o r ba d wa y of f it ti n g w ha t i s mea nt o r i t sel f gi ve n ( 1 9 7 0 a : 1 1 ; H u a I: 5 2 )

This good or bad way of fitting a phenomenological description to the things themselves is the resu lt of analysis and investigation, as noted at the end of the quote above from The Idea of Phenomenology . Thus the hermeneutic interpretational procedure of fitting words to what is being described is active and guided by the preunderstanding of the phenome nological researcher and by the choice of words and sentences, the creation of neologisms and metaphors, etc. The two-stages of this zig -zag are both included in the full phenomenological method, despite the fact that many discussions of the method by Husserl and others tend to focus only on the role of subjective experience and leave unmentioned the many hermeneutic and argumentative elements of the scientific discourse of phenomenology. Nonetheless Husserl also insists on the need for
20 1 9 6 4 : 4 0 f .; Hua II : 5 0 f . Cf . 1 9 8 2 / Hua II I/1 : 6 .

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mutual study and mutual criticism in this science, 21 a science that he characterizes as a science of concrete subjectivity, as given in actual and possible transcendental experience, and the science of Objective subjectivity (1970a: 30 Hua I: 68); the subjective aspect of this science is the stage of appeal to inner experience, and the objective aspect is that of intersubjective critical discourse. Because for Husserl phenomenology is a science we can see that even his appeal to apodictic evidence itself methodological ly involves both transcendental elements (conscious de facto presence of experience, with its temporal and vocational horizons) and hermeneutic elements (linguistic and intersubjective critical discourse); this is a far cry from the traditional concept of absolute knowledge stemming from Descartes. 22 Partially in response to this erroneous traditional understanding of apodicticity, Husserl explains the interplay between the de jure foundation of phenomenological evidence and its de facto foundation in The Idea of Phenomenology , where he establishes first that The method of the critique of cognition is the phenomenological method (1964: 1; Hua II: 3); and then notes that this method begins with de facto founded evidence: The cogitationes are the first abs olute data. 23 In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl notes the untenability of the traditional concept of apodictic evidence precisely due to its failure to consider the horizonal features of both temporal mooring and preunderstanding:
The c o nt in ua l o b sta cl e t ha t ma y ha ve bee n s e ns ed d ur in g th i s exp o si ti o n i s ow i n g so le l y t o t he us ua l , fu nda me nta ll y wr o ng , in ter pre ta t i o n of e vi d enc e, a n i nte rpr eta ti o n ma de p o ss ib le b y t h e ut ter la ck of a s eri o u s phe n o me n ol o gi ca l a n a ly s is of t he eff ect iv e perf or ma nce c o mm o n to a l l ev ide n ce. T hu s it ha ppe n s t ha t evid e nce i s u s ua l ly co nc ei ved a s a n a b s ol u te a p od ic ti ci t y, a n a bs o lu te s ec uri t y a ga i n st d ece pt i on s a n a p od ic ti ci ty q ui te in c om pre h en s ib ly a s c rib ed t o a s in g le me n ta l pr oc es s t or n fr o m

1 9 7 0 a : 5 , 6 4 n. 1 ; Hua I: 4 7 . The n ote o n p. 6 4 of t he E ng li s h tra n sla ti o n d oe s n ot a ppea r i n t he H us s erl ia na ed it i o n. 22 It i s i nt er e st i n g to n ote her e th a t eve n th e em pi ri ci st s L oc ke ( An Es say Co nc e rn i ng H um an U n d e rst and i ng , B oo k I , Cha pte r II , 1 9 ) a nd Berk ele y ( A Tr eat is e Co nc e rn ing t h e Pr i ncip l es o f H um an Kn ow led g e, I n tr od uct io n, 2 2 2 5 ) see m t o ho ld t ha t i nt u it ive ev ide nc e i s i nc o r ri gi ble , a v ie w r ej ec te d b y H u ss erl (1 9 7 5 : 5 6 f .; 1 9 3 9 : 3 3 5 f . ) . 23 1 9 6 4 : 1 f .; H ua II : 3 f .. Cf . ( 1 9 8 2 : 1 2 6 ; Hua II I /1 : 1 1 8 ), w her e H u ss e rl ref er s t o th e a bs o lu te [de fact o ] p he n o me n ol o gica l da t u m y ie l ded by th e ph en o me n o lo g ica l re d uct i o n.
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th e c on cre te, e s se nt i a ll y u n i ta ry, co n tex t of s ub je ct iv e m en ta l li vi n g. ( 1 9 6 9 : 1 5 6 f ; Hu a X VII : 1 6 5 )

The key phrase here is torn from the concrete, essentially unitary, context of subjective mental living. What can this mean in light of the phenomenological method? Here it essential ly implies two distinct things: first, every lived experience occurs in a now that must be conceived as only an ideal limit, something abstract, which can be nothing by itself (1991: 42; Hua X: 40), with the result that any lived evidence that is to se rve as an epistemological foundation for a phenomenological description or argument appears embedded in its horizons, including the living temporal flow of a particular ego with its methodological preunderstanding. In order to isolate, remember and communi cate the nature of this lived evidence in the vocational time of phenomenology (1970b: 136f; Hua VI: 139f.), one begins from an instance of lived evidence that occurs, as an event, at a certain time and to a certain person. Second, the vocation of phenom enology also includes the relation between the moment of phenomenologically reduced reflection (e.g., to me, now) and its role in the scientific method of phenomenology: it is essentially intersubjective because, as evidence achieved through analysis and investigation guided by preunderstanding and critique, it is essentially a shared, linguistic, public and objective feature of a science. The same may be said of any scientific evidence, except that only in phenomenology does transcendental intuition play its key role. This scientific method of intersubjective critique removes Husserls phenomenology from any idealistic interpretation of phenomenological evidence, and requires a radical reinterpretation (if not rejection) of the traditional concept of apod ictic evidence. Thus Husserl af firms that, Even an ostensibly apodictic evidence can become disclosed as deception, and in that event, presupposes a similar evidence by which it is shattered (1969: 156; Hua XVII: 164). If new evidence may unseat an ear lier ostensibly apodictic evidence can this new evidence itself be apodictic? Can any new evidence be immune from deception and criticism? If one wishes (as I do not) to retain the traditional term apodictic evidence some further clarification is necess ary. Husserl supplies such a clarification in Ideen I :
Evid e nce i s, i n f a c t, n ot so m e s ort of c on sc i ou s ne ss - i nde x a tta c he d to a j udg m en t ( a nd u sua ll y o ne s pea ks of su ch ev ide nce o n ly i n th e ca se of jud g me n t ) , ca l li n g t o us l ik e a m ys ti c v oi ce fr o m a bet ter w or ld: Her e i s th e tr u th ; a s t h o ug h suc h a v oi ce wo u ld

HARRY REEDER
ha v e so m et h in g t o sa y t o fr ee sp ir it s l ik e us a nd w o uld n ot ha v e to s ho w i t s ti t le t o le gi ti ma cy. We no l on g er ne ed t o a rg ue wi t h sk ep tic i s m, n o r ta ke i nt o c o n sid era ti o n o b je cti o n s of t he old ty pe w hi ch ca nn o t ove rc o me t he t he or y of e vi den ce w hi ch re so rt s t o in di ces a nd f ee li n g: w he th er a n e vi l ge n iu s (th e Ca rt es ia n fic ti o n) or a f a tef ul c ha nge in t he fa ct ua l c o ur se of th e w or ld co u ld ma ke it ha ppe n t ha t j u st a n y fa l se j ud g me nt w o uld be o ut fi tte d wi t h th i s i nd ex, t hi s f e eli n g of i nte l lec tua l nece s si t y, of t h e tra ns ce nde n t ou g ht ne s s; a nd t he li ke. 24

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The reference to the Cartesian fiction of self -evidence is clear here: phenomenological evidence, not being the evidence of an isolated and worldless ego, must be subjected to intersubjective critique, and thus linguistically formulated to make this critique possible, both elements that Descartes ignored. But perhaps it is not as clear that Husserl has Kant (among others) in mind in his reference to a fatef ul change in the factual course of the world that could alter, e.g., the pure concepts of the understanding, if they were moored in a human consciousness that has not been subjected to phenomenological reduction and on -going critique, resulting in the all- important distinction between Kants idealistic construction and Husserls non - idealistic constitution the source of Husserls accusation that Kant is species relativist, guilty of anthropologism (1970c: I, 138; Hua XVIII: 122). Landgrebe echoes this critique of the traditional concept of apodictic knowledge in the introduction to Experience and Judgment , when he notes that philosophers of this tradition believed that they could measure every other item of cognition against ideal, absolute, apodict ically certain knowledge, while remaining unclear about the occasioning of self -evidence (1973:18; 1948: 10). Nonetheless Husserl was clear that his rejection of absolute knowledge did not
Hu ss er l ( 1 9 8 2 / H ua I II /1 : 1 4 5 ). T he c on t ext a nd c o n te nt of t h is q u ota ti o n ju s tif y i n ter pre ti n g h i s c om m en t s o n ev ide nce here to be ta ke n a s c om m en t s o n a t ra di t io n of a p o dic ti c ev ide n ce. Ca r r (1 9 8 5 ) tra ces t hi s n o ti o n t o Ka n t, n ot i ng h o w a n a na l y si s of t he ver y c on c e pt s sur r ou nd i ng t he is su e of t he str uc tu re of c og n it i o n a nd ex per ie nc e (2 1 ) wi l l na tu ra l ly lea d i n a rela t iv is t ic dire ct i on ( 2 0 ) , s i nce su ch a na ly s is w il l [re nde r] re la t iv is m pla us ib le (2 1 , my bra c ket s) . Our f oc us h ere up o n d e j ur e fo u nd a ti o n i ndi ca t es h o w tr a n sce nde n ta l ph en o me n o lo g y ma y perf or m s uc h a na l ys es w it h o ut be in g for ced i nt o rela ti vi s m; t her e i s a nec es sa r y s ub je ct ive f ou n da t io n i n li ved ev ide nc e, eve n th o ug h i t need s to be s u bj ect ed to i nt e rs ub jec ti ve cri t i que . H ow eve r n o sc ie nt if i c c la i m i s f r ee f r o m w ha t Fe li x Ka u fma n n ca l l s t he Pr i nci pl e of Per ma ne n t C o nt ro l, a c cor di n g t o w h ic h sci e nt if ic cla i ms a re a lwa ys s ub je ct t o bei n g ove rt ur ned i n li g ht of f ur t her ev ide nc e (1 9 3 6 : 1 2 5 ; 1 9 3 8 : 4 4 6 , 4 4 8 ).
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41ST ANNUAL HUSSERL CIRCLE MEETING relativism, since there are cases of

result in scepticism or indubitable knowledge:

In i nd iv id ua l ca se s t h e flux of se n se - e xpe rie nce , or a l s o of s pec if ic me n ta l ex per ie nce s, ma y v er y we ll lea ve ro o m f or d ou bt : t h i s is n ot p o ss i ble i n a ll c a se s. W he re diff ere nc es a re gr os s, a s elf evid e nce i s a t ta i na bl e w hi ch re nde rs a l l d o u bt u nj u st ifia bl e. 25

Thus we are sometimes warranted to claim that, at least for now, a claim is immune from criticism, although no claim can be completely and permanently free from deception and correction based on further information, evidence or ana lysis. It is in this context that Husserl (1975: 60; 1939: 338) compares the production of phenomenological descriptions to the exploration of a new territory, in which one relies upon active seeing and describing that is in need of intersubjective corre ction: One will then find some smaller or larger errors to correct just as a second explorer, who follows the footprints of his predecessor and sees the same objects, will consider some improvements to be necessary. This was Husserls way of accepting th e finite fallibility of humans while rejecting skeptical-relativistic interpretations of this human condition: the affects of long -term critique need not result in the paralysis or death of science (1982/Hua III/1: 79). As Husserl points out (1975: 56f.; 1939: 335), inner seeing is on a par with outer seeing: neither is transparent or without the risk of interpretive projection or faulty interpretation (here one thinks Bacons Idols), but nonetheless we can and must rely upon this evidence: Granted that there are deceptions in phenomenological seeing because of interpretative projections ( deutende Einlegung ), but are there any fewer in the case of external seeing? Is the description of no value because there are deceptions in description? Whether such a c oncept of evidence merits the adjective apodictic is another question. With this discussion of phenomenological method in mind, let us now turn to a common form of criticism of Husserls phenomenology by hermeneutic phenomenologists (and others). 3. Ric oeurs Critique of Husserls Idealism: the D etour through Signs In his Phenomenology and Hermeneutics Ricoeur characterizes Husserls phenomenology in terms of five theses, that I paraphrase as follows: (a) The ultimate justification of phenomenology is of a
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Hu ss er l ( 1 9 7 0 c: I, 4 1 9 ; Hua XI X /1 : 2 1 0 ).

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different order than that of the sciences (1981: 102); (b) Phenomenologys foundation is in intuition: to found is to see (1981: 103); (c) Immanence alone is indubitable: This is the central thesis of Husserlian idealism (1981: 103); (d) Subjec tivity is (due to c) promoted to the r ank of the transcendental not empirical consciousness (1981: 103); (e) The awareness which sustains the work of reflection develops its own ethical implications: reflection is thus the immediately self -responsible a ct (1981: 104). Because of these criticisms of phenomenology Ricoeur holds that phenomenology cannot constitute itself without a hermeneutical presupposi tion (1981: 101), since we understand ourselves only by the long detour of the signs of humanity d eposited in cultural works (1981: 143). Thus Ricoeur (1977: 105 14) feels that phenomenologys focus upon intuition ignores or does not do justice to the role of language in forming that intuition, preferring to attribute a reflective capacity to language itself, 26 and insisting that Husserlian idealismsuccumbs to the hermeneutical critique (1981: 102). In replying to this critique I will discuss (a) -(d), and leave aside (e), a separate but related issue. In replying to Ricoeur I find it necessary to say what I often say in answer to my students questions: Definitely yes and no! This is because many times I find in Ricoeurs criticisms an element of truth or correctness, but also an element of falsehood or misinterpretation. Thus, before responding more negatively I will attempt to be fair to Ricoeur and mention instances in which there is an element of truth in his criticisms. Ad (a): For Husserl justification in phenomenology is certainly of a different order than it is in the sciences. This is the wh ole point of his rejection of naturalism, based in his identification of the need
R ic oe ur ( 1 9 7 7 : 3 0 4 ) . I f i nd R ic oe ur s c o m m en t l es s t ha n c lea r, a s I d o n t see h o w la n g ua g e ca n ref lec t. Li ke w ise , w he n He ide gg er wr i tes t h i n gs l i ke I n it s es se nce la n g ua ge is ne it he r expr es s io n n or a n a ct iv it y of m a n. La ng ua ge spea k s ( 1 9 7 1 b: 1 9 7 ) , la ng ua g e s pea k[ s] it se lf a s la n gua ge o r We hea r la n g ua g e sp ea k i ng ( 1 9 7 1 a : 5 9 , 1 2 4 ) it is cl e a r tha t t hes e a re po et i c sta te me nt s n ot i n te nded t o be t a ke n li tera l ly. I n s uc h pa s sa ge s He ide gg er a n d R ic oe ur expr es s t he m se lve s t hi s wa y i n pa r t t o r esi s t t he v e r y a ppea l to su b jec ti ve refle ct i o n t ha t i s s o ce ntra l to H us se rl s ph en o me n o l og y; h o we ver w her e me t ho do l o gy i s c o nce rne d cla r it y i s pref era ble t o p oe ti c li ce ns e. Th is d oe s n o t mea n, of c ou rs e t ha t He ide gg er a nd Ric o eu r a re n ot per m it ted p oe ti c li ce n se w he n n o t a ddre s si n g me t ho do l o gy. No n et h ele ss su c h vie w s a s t he se a re oft en expr es sed a s me t h o do lo g ica l cr i ti q ue s of th e Hu ss er l s i dea l is m or Ca rte s ia ni s m : i n s uc h ca se s t h is cri ti q ue i s m is gu id ed, a c c ord i ng t o t he a rg um e nt s of t h e pr es en t e ssa y.
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for the transcendental -phenomenological reduction. In Part I of Crisis Husserl describes this need as resulting from the crisis in the sciences caused by the narrow positivis m of facts that resulted from philosophical developments stemming from Modern philosophy. However, Husserl also argues in that text and in his discussion of the theory of science in the Prolegomena of Logical Investigations that phenomenology is a fulfil lment of a more traditional ideal of science dating back to ancient Greece. In the Prolegomena he describes science as essentially a coherent system of grounded validations (1970c: I, Prolegomena, 6, 7, 63; Hua XVIII). This is the sense in which Husserl (1965; Hua XXV) sees phenomenology as a rigorous science. According to this view, all science requires justification that in part includes a phenomenological account of the nature of de facto lived evidence ( Erlebnis ); thus even the natural sciences re quire a phenomenological step or stage in their self -understanding the step cut off by positivisms decapitation of philosophy. 27 Nonetheless phenomenology shares with any genuine science the de jure foundational role of intersubjective critique, with all i ts hermeneutic features. Ad (b): To be sure, it is fair to say that for Husserl phenomenologys foundation is in intuition, or to found is to see, since it is the de facto confrontation with the lived evidence of transcendentally reduced consciousness th at provides the basic data for phenomenological description: Ultimately, therefore, all genuine, and, in particular, all scientific knowledge, rests on inner evidence: as far as such evidence extends, the concept of knowledge extends also (1970c: I, 61 ; Hua XVIII: 29). But, as we have seen, it is not fair to suggest that this is the sole foundation for phenomenology as a science. Husserl is aware from the start that a science or a scientific philosophy like phenomenology requires careful attention to la nguage; in the introduction to the Volume II of the Logical Investigations he insists that linguistic discussions are required as a preparation for pure logic and the pure phenomenology of experience (judgements stemming from higher intellectual regions, and in particular from the regions of science, could barely arise without verbal expression 1970c: I, 250; Hua XIX/1: 8), and that such discussions must not be merely empirical and grammatical but epistemological, in order to bring the objects of intuition to expression in descriptions of essential concepts
1 9 7 0 b: 9 ; H ua V I: 7 . Hu s ser l pr oba b ly ha d i n m i nd her e t he p os i ti vi s m of Co m te, M a c h a nd Ca r na p. Of c o ur se n ot a l l po si t iv is ts a re a l ik e, a nd s o me see m im m u ne t o t h is cr it ic is m.
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(1970c: I, 249; Hua XIX/1: 6). Having expressed this fundamental requirement Husserl devotes the first four of the six Logical Investigations to central features of language and its role in scientific and philosophical investigation, such as meaning -acts and the problem of universals (Investigations I and II), the conceptual relations of wholes and parts (Investigation III), and the a priori deep structure (not in Chomskys sense) of grammar (Investigation IV). With all this attention to language in the founding work of the phenomenological movement, it is indeed odd that many critics and friends alike of Husserls phenomenology still regard him as having paid scant or no serious attention to language and its central role in philosophy. Another feature of this phase of Ricoeurs hermeneutic critique is his rejection of Husserls very empiricism: is it not astonishing that in spite of (and thanks to) the critique of empiricism, experience in the stric t empirical sense is surpassed only in an experience? (1981: 103). One must say two things in response: first, Ricoeur seems to ignore the widened or deepened sense of empirical data that is the source of Husserl critique of traditional empiricism (see Ad (d), below); second, to what else besides experience can philosophers appeal? Here Husserl would apply Kantian - and Berkeleyan-style arguments to the effect that philosophers cannot appeal to anything else, or at least not if they speak with evidence (1970a: 12f.; Hua I: 52 54). This is the point at which Ricoeur and Heidegger seek to make language itself the subject of active verbs, e.g., language reflects, language speaks. This hardly seems helpful if we are truly speaking of philosophical evidence and argument as distinct from philosophical speculation or musing . 28 Ad (c): To say that for Husserl immanence alone is indubitable appears to fit with Husserls discussions of apodicticity in some of the passages from the Logical Investigations mentioned in 2 above. But there and elsewhere Husserl stresses the on -going and historical role of scientific discourse, and, as we have seen, rejects the notion that immanence is ever permanently immune to deception and criticism. In science immanence is a necessa ry but never a sufficient condition of evidence, and is thus not indubitable except as a stage or pole of evidence. Some things do indeed seem, after long critical investigation, to be indubitable and beyond further critique. Nonetheless one must realize t hat it is unwise to assume
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S ee n o te 2 6 , a b ov e.

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dogmatically that there could be no future discovery or evidence against even seemingly indubitable claims. 29 Ad (d): When Ricoeur claims that for Husserl subjectivity is (due to c) promoted to the r ank of the transcendental not empirical consciousness (1981: 103), he is again in a sense correct. Certainly for Husserl the methodological core of phenomenology i s the shift from ordinary or nai ve consciousness the consciousness forming the foundation of traditional empiricism, accor ding to which the existence of the world, and of human mental states as part of that world are unproblematic to transcendentally reduced consciousness. However, for Husserl transcendental phenomenology is a newer and truer form of empiricism (1970b: 249; H ua VI: 252f.), and thus we [phenomenologists] are the genuine positivists (1982: 39; Hua III/1: 45), because, unlike traditional forms of empiricism, Husserl (following Brentano) allows the living evidence of consciousness (in all its richness, including the phenomenological explication of the constitution of others in mutually correcting transcendental intersubjectivity) also to serve as empirical evidence a form of evidence that traditional empiricism had (after Hume) treated as increasingly suspect, un til it was wholly rejected by positivism (Comte), psychology (behaviorism, stimulus -response theory) and analytic philosophy (as broadly as in Carnap, Quine, Popper and Wittgenstein, who all wish to shift philosophical focus from experience to language and logic, in the name of avoiding the subjective). In addition, some layers or strata of scientific discourse open up hermeneutic problems even at the traditional empirical level, including communication, interpretation, language games, etc. problems that many analytic philosophers continue simply to ignore because of their refusal to address subjectivity. 4. Conclusion Our investigation has shown that Husserls phenomenological method involves both appeals to the immediate de facto experience of transcendentally reduced consciousness, and also to the on -going intersubjective critique of scientific discourse, with the hermeneutic problems of fitting words to the transcendental experience, of communicating ones phenomenological descriptions to others, and of the argumentation concerning the adequacy (and indeed sometimes apodicticity, in a new sense of the term) of a
Eve n i n t he a p ri o ri s ys te m s of ma t h ema t ic s t he re a r e ne w d i s c ov erie s t ha t, a s in t he ca se of G de l s pr o of, re q uir e ra d ica l re - t hi n k in g of l o ng - s ta n di n g a ss u mp ti o n s.
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phenomenological description as an element of scientific evidence. Thus phenomenology is not in need of a long detour of signs because its method already includes careful attention to the roles of language, interpretation and critical discourse. Having shown that, from early to late, Husserls phenomenological method includes two strata, stages or levels, one transcendental and one hermeneutic , we may say that according to Husserl himself phenomenology is indeed a transcendental-hermeneutic discipline. Bibliography Carr, David (1985) Phenomenology and Relativism, in W.S. Hamrick ed., Phenomenology in Practice and Theory , (Phaenomenologica, no. 92), (The Hague: Nijhoff), pp. 19 -34. Dauenhauer, Benard (1976) Husserls Phenomenological Justification of Universal Rigorous Science, International Philosophical Quarterly 16: pp. 63-80. Derrida, Jacque (1973) Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserls Theory of Signs , tr. David B. Allison, (Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press). Gendlin, Eugene (1982) Two Phenomenologists Do Not Disagree, in Ronald Bruzina and Bruce Wilshire, edd., Phenomenology: dialogues and bridges , (Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, 8), (Albany: State University of New York Press), pp. 321 -335. Heidegger, Martin (1971a) On the Way to Language, tr. Peter D. Hertz, (N.Y.: Harper & Row Publishers). Heidegger, Martin (1971b) Poetry, Language, Thought, tr. Albert Hofstadter, (N.Y.: Harper & Row Publishers). Hererra Restrepo, Daniel (1964) El pensamiento husserliano anterior a las Ideas. Franciscanum. Revista de la s Ciencias del Espritu (Bogot: Universidad de San Buenaventura) VI, no. 18 (Septiembre -Diciembre), pp. 207 -35. Huertas-Jourda, Jos (1969) On the Threshold of Phenomenology: a Study of Edmund Husserls Philosophie der Arithmetik, Ph.D. Dissertation. New York University. Huertas- Jourda, Jos (1983) On the Two Foundations of Knowledge According to Husserl, in Lester Embree ed., Essays in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch , (Current Continental Research, 007), (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in

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Phenomenology and University Press of America), pp. 195 -211. Husserl, Edmund (1964) The Idea of Phenomenology , tr. Wm. P. Alston and George Nakhnikian, (The Hague: Nijhoff). Hua II. Husserl, Edmund (1965) Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, ed. and tr. Quentin Lauer, in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, (N.Y.: Harper Torchbook), pp. 71 147. Hua. XXV, pp. 3-62. Husserl, Edmund (1969) Formal and Transcendental Logic . Tr. Dorion Cairns. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). Hua. XVII. Husserl, Edmund (1970a) Cartesian Meditations : An Introduction to Phenomenology. Tr. Dorion Cairns. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). Hua. I. Husserl, Edmund (1970b). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology : An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Tr. Dav id Carr. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press). Hua. VI. Husserl, Edmund (1970c) Logical Investigations , 2 vols., tr. J. N. Findlay (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul). Hua. XVIII, XIX/1, XIX/2. Husserl, Edmund (1973) Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic , rev. & ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, tr. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press). Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik , (Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts, 1948). Husserl, Edmund (1975) Introduction to the Logical Investigations. Tr. P.J. Bossert and C.H. Peters, ed. Eugen Fink. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). Originally published as Entwurf einer Vorrede zu den Logischen Untersuchungen (1913), Tijdschrift voor Philosophie I (1939), pp. 106 133; continued under same title in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie I (1939), pp. 319 339. Husserl, Edmund (1977) Phenomenological Psychology , tr. John Scanlon, (The Hague: Nijhoff), pp. 66 -67. Hua. IX. Husserl, Edmund (1982 ) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book; General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology . Tr. Fred Kersten. (Edmund Husserl: Collected Works, II) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). Hua. III/2, III/2. Husserl, Edmund (1989) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution , tr. Richard Rojcewicz and Andr Schuwer, (Edmund Husserl: Collected Works, Volume III), (Boston: Kluwer Ac ademic Publishers). Hua.IV.

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Husserl, Edmund (1991) On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Tr. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers). Hua. X. Husserl, Edmund (2003) Husserl, Edmund. Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations with Supplementary Texts from 1887 1901 . Tr. Dallas Willard. (Edmund Husserl: Collected Works, Volume X), (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers). Hua. XII. Kaufmann, Felix (1936) Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften , (Vienna: Verlag Julius Springer). Kaufmann, Felix (1938) The Significance of Methodology for the Social Sciences, Social Research 5, pp. 442 -463. Kaufmann, Felix (1941) The Structure of Science, Journal of Philosophy 38, pp. 281-292. Magnus, Bernd (1985 ) The End of The End of Philosophy, in Hugh Silverman and Don Ihde edd., Hermeneutics and Deconstruction , (Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, 10), (Albany: State University of New York Press), pp. 2-10. Mickunas, Algis (1997) Life - world and History, in Burt C. Hopkins, ed., Husserl in Contemporary Context: Prospects and Projects for Phenomenology , (Contributions to Phenomenology, Volume 26), (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), pp. 189 208. Murray, Michael (1988)Husserl an d Heidegger: Constructing and Deconstructing Greek Philosophy, Review of Metaphysics 41(March), pp. 501-518. Reeder, Harry P. (1990) Hermeneutics and Apodicticity in Phenomenological Method, Southwest Philosophy Review , Volume 6 no. 2, (July): pp. 43 -69. Reeder, Harry P. (2009a) El flujo heraclteo y sentidos parmendeos, in Acta Fenomenolgica Latinoamericana, Volume III, (Actas del IV Coloquio Latinoamericano de Fenomenologa), Crculo Latinoamericano de Fenomenologa , (Lima, Peru: Pontificia Univers idad Catlica del Per and Morelia, Mexico: Universidad Michoacana de San Nicols de Hidalto), pp. 67 77. Reeder, Harry P. (2009b) Living Words and Concepts: Semantic Space and Semantic Texture, Phenomenology 2005: Selected Essays from North America , (Bucharest: Zeta Books), pp. 535 559.

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Reeder, Harry P. (2010) The Theory and Practice of Husserls Phenomenology, 2nd Enlarged Ed., (Pathways in Phenomenology, Vol. II), ( Bucharest: Zeta Books), in press, expected publication April, 2010. Ricoeur (1977) The Rule of Metaphor: Multi -disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in language , tr. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press). Ricoeur, Paul (1981) Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays o n language, action and interpretation . Ed. and tr. John B. Thompson, (New York: Cambridge University Press). Ricoeur, Paul (2007) From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II , ed. Richard Kearney, tr. Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson. (Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press). Rizzo Patrn de Lerner, Rosemary (2002) Gnesis de las Investigaciones lgicas de Husserl: Una obra de irrupcin, Signos Filosficos 007(enero-junio), Distrito Federal, Mxico, pp. 221 244. Vargas Guilln, Germn and Reeder, Harry P. (2009) Ser y Sentido: Hacia una fenomenologa trascendental -hermenutica , (Coleccin Textos de Filosofa), (Bogot: Editorial San Pablo).

From We to I and Back: Still Learning from the New School Three
Lester Embree (Florida Atlantic University) ABSTRACT: After a sketch of the New School phenomenology led by Dorion Cairns, Aron Gurwitsch, and Alfred Schutz in the 1950s and 60s, I follow Cairns and Schutz on how phenomenological reflection begins from intersubjectivity and the first person plural , moves by the egological reduction and other procedures to individual subjectivity and the first person singular, and finally moves from there to intersubjectivity and me mbership in social groups on the transcendental as well as worldly levels. It makes a great difference in the clarity of the phenomenological analyses when the phenomenologist sees whether he is presupposing transcendental intersubjectivity or presupposin g only his own subjectivity in its status as prior to the transcendental intersubjectivity. 1 1. Introduction: Some Historical Context The New School Three are Dorion Cairns (1901 -1973), Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973), and Alfred Schutz (1899 -1959). They taught phenomenology on the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research during what I call the Golden Age. Schutz began teaching Methodology of the Social Sciences in philosophy as well as sociology in 1951, C airns started at the school in 1954, and Gurwitsch came from Brandeis to replace the just deceased Schutz in 1959. Cairns retired in 1968, but taught two courses after that. Both he and Gurwitsch died in 1973. Complementing these three was Werner Marx, who taught the late Heidegger as well as Aristotle and German Idealism and went on to the Husserl -Heidegger chair at Freiburg i. Br. Subsequently, J. N. Mohanty tried valiantly to get the tradition continued and later there were Thomas Seebohm and other visit ing teachers, e.g., David
1 D or i o n Ca ir n s in Le ste r E m bree , D ori o n Ca i rn s a n d A lfre d S ch utz o n t he Eg ol o gi ca l Re du ct i on , in Hi sa s hi Na s u, L est er E mb ree, Ge or ge Psa t ha s, a nd Il ja S r uba r, e ds . Al f r ed S ch ut z and h is I nt el l ect ual P ar tn e r s (K o ns ta nz : U V K , 2 0 0 9 ), p.2 0 1 ; he rea f t e r t hi s so ur ce wi l l be cit ed tex tua ll y w it h mer el y pa ge nu m ber s.

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Carr and Robert Sokolowski, but the program was no longer unique in bringing phenomenology to the USA because it was also being established at Duquesne University, and elsewhere. While the New School Three had learned their pheno menology directly from Edmund Husserl at Freiburg during the 1920s and 30s and organized themselves under Marvin Farbers leadership in relation to Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research just before the war, later importers of the orientation also st udied other figures, especially Heidegger, Merleau -Ponty, and Gadamer, in Europe after the war. The 1960s was the time in the USA of founding various book series, journals, and professional societies devoted to phenomenology, the Husserl Circle included. S ome New School students remained in contact with one another over the years after graduation. In philosophy they chiefly included Maurice Natanson, Fred Kersten, Richard Zaner, Lester Embree, Giuseppina Moneta, Jorge Garca -Gomez, William McKenna, Osborne Wiggins, Gilbert Null, and Robert Jordan and in sociology Thomas Luckmann and Helmut Wagner. New School phenomenology has typically three features: (1) while phenomenology in Europe after the war shifted its focus to existentialism and hermeneutics, Husse rls central concern with Wissenschaftslehre, i.e., the theory of science, was continued by the New School Three and some of their students; (2) while most others have considered phenomenology exclusively a philosophical school of thought, Cairns and Gurwi tsch followed Schutz with multidisciplinary interests in the social sciences and especially psychology; and (3), while much of the needed scholarship in the forms of translating and commentary has always been done by New Schoolers, what was conspicuously e xemplified has been the fundamental task of continuing phenomenological investigation. But today when most soi-disant phenomenology is merely history of a tendency in early 20 t h century thought, i.e., an area of scholarship, and what is most needed is on going investigation, i.e., of reflective analysis of encounterings and things -as-encountered. There is now too much philology and not enough phenomenology. Speaking now of myself, I confess that in research I have contributed chiefly to scholarship on phe nomenology through, among other things, currently leading works editions of Cairns, Gurwitsch, and Schutz, but I have also always produced phenomenological investigations and increasingly do so of late under the heading of reflective analysis. 2
2 An li s is r ef l ex iv o . U na p rim e ra int rod uc ci n a l a F e nom e nol g ic a / Re fl ec tiv e

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What I wish to tell about in this essay is what I have recently learned from two of the New School Three now practically 40 years after receiving my degree. This learning occurred chiefly while interpreting some letters and manuscripts as well as texts under the he ading, Dorion Cairns and Alfred Schutz on the Egological Reduction. What I learned pertains to the theory of the cultural sciences and thus to a frame of reference I have from Schutz, who considered his work an extension to the social and cultural scienc es of Husserls science theory. 3 I had read Gurwitschs The Common Sense World as Social Reality A Discourse on Alfred Schutz 4 just before I began at the school in summer 1962 and had first read Schutzs Collected Papers, vol. I 5 during the summer of 196 3. Having also sat in on a course on Schutz jointly taught by Gurwitsch and Luckmann and then taken one on him by Luckmann, I read the English translation of the Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (1932). 6 My interest in the theory of the cultural scie nces began at
An aly si s. A F i r st I n t r od uct io n to Ph en om en o log y , tra n s. i n t o Ca s t il ia n by L u is Ra m n Ra ba na q ue ( M ore l ia : Ed it or ia l Ji t a n j f ora , 2 0 0 3 , 5 4 3 pp.) Or ig i na l En gl i sh a s R e fl ect iv e An aly si s (B uc ha re st : Ze ta Bo o k s, 2 0 0 6 , 1 9 6 pp.); . , tra ns . Vic t or M o l tc ha no v ( M o sc ova : Tr i q ua dra ta , 2 0 0 5 , 2 2 3 pp .); [ Ts uka e r u G e n sh o g aku , us ef u l p he n om e n ol o gy ] (To k y o, 2 0 0 7 ); Ana li za r ef l ek sy j n , ( Wa r sa w , 2 0 0 7 );

( Ta i wa n, 2 0 0 7 ; a ls o fr o m Pe ki n g U ni v ers it y Pre ss ,
2 0 0 7 ); A nal iz a Re fl ex i v ( C lu j Na p oca : Ca s a C r i i de t ii n , 2 0 0 7 ); A naly s e r f lex iv e, t ra n s. M a t h ie u Tr ic he t, ( Bu cha re st: Ze ta B o ok s, 2 0 0 9 ) a nd Env i r onm e nt, Tech no log y , J u st i fi cat io n. B uc ha re s t: Ze ta B o ok s, 2 0 0 9 , a l s o t o be p ub li s hed Ca s ti lia n, C hi ne se , a n d J a pa ne se. 3 To H u ss erl s l i st I w ou ld l ik e t o a dd a s oc i a l s ci e nce w h ic h, w hi l e l i mi ted t o th e s oc ia l s p here , is o f a n eide ti c cha ra c ter. The ta s k < of s uc h a s o cia l sc ie nce > w ou ld b e t he i nte n ti o na l a na ly s is of th o se ma nif o ld f or m s o f h i g her - le ve l s oc ia l a ct s a nd s oc ia l f o r m a ti o ns wh ic h a re f o u nde d o n t he a lrea d y e xec ut ed co n st it ut i o n of t he a lte r e g o. T hi s ca n b e a c hi eve d in s ta t ic a nd ge net ic a na l y se s, a nd s uc h a n in ter pre ta t i o n w ou l d a cc ord i n gl y ha v e t o d e m o n st ra te th e a pr i or is ti c str uc tu res of t he s oc ia l sc ie n ces. Of n ece ss i ty t he prec ed in g exp o si ti o n s a re ra t her i nc o mp le te and u nf ort u na t el y of te n i ne xa c t. Nev ert he le s s, t hey ma y ha v e c o n ve yed t o t h e rea d er a n i dea of t he fu nda me n ta l si g nif ica n ce of H u ss e r l s i n ve st iga ti o n s n ot o nl y f or pu re p h il o s o ph y b u t a l s o for a l l th e hu ma n sc i enc es [ G e ist e sw i ss e n sc h aft en ] a nd e s pec ia l l y fo r t he s o cia l sc ie nce s. A lf r ed S c h u tz , Co ll ect ed P ap e r s, v o l. I V (1 9 9 6 ), p. 1 6 4 . 4 So cia l R es e ar ch , Vo l. X XI X , S p ri n g 1 9 6 2 a nd rep r i nt ed a s I n t rod uc ti o n t o A lfre d S c h utz , Co ll ect ed P ap e r s, ed. I lse S c h utz (T he Ha gu e: M a rt in u s Ni j h off, 1 9 6 4 ). 5 Ed. M a u ri ce Na ta n so n ( T he Ha gu e: M a r ti n us Ni j h off, 1 9 6 2 ) ; h ere a fter c i ted a s CP I. 6 A lfred S c h utz , Ph e no m e nol og y of th e So cia l Wo rld , tra ns . Ge or ge Wa l sh a nd

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2. Reductions from Intersubjectivity A distinction became clear for Cairns on the last day he saw Husserl:
S pea k i n g a f te rwa rd s wi t h F i nk , I ob ser ve d tha t I t ho u g ht t ha t Hu s ser l d oe s no t d is ti n gu is h e g o lo g ica l fr o m p ri m ord i a l red uc ti o n a s F in k d oe s i n h is E n t wu r f [dra ft] f or t he S ix th M ed i tati on . I sa w th en f r o m F i nk s re pl y tha t th ere ha s b ee n o n m y pa r t a fa il ure t o dis t in g ui s h te r mi n ol o gi ca l ly : eg o l og ica l re d uct i o n s o fa r a s I see, is th e red uc ti o n of t h e ful l i n ter su b jec ti ve w or ld t o i ts sta t us a s th e co rre la te of m y a c ts, i n cl ud in g t h os e i n wh ic h I i nt en d ot h er sel ve s a nd t hei r c o ns t it ut ive a ct iv i ty. Pr i m ord ia l red uc ti o n is a n a bs tra c ti ve r edu ct i on of th e e go l o gi ca l ly r educ ed w orl d t o t ha t pa rt of it w h ic h i s n ot th e c or r ela te of th e c o ns ti t ut ive a ct iv it y of ot he r - s el ve s- a s- i nt en d ed - i n- m y- a c ts. I ha v e pre vi o us ly trea ted th es e t w o r edu ct i o ns i n a lu m p a nd ca l led t he w h ol e e g ol o gi ca l or pr im o rdia l i ndif f ere nt ly . 7

On this account, Husserls egological reduction is at l east part of what can be said to be Schutzs recourse to so -called methodological individualism, which in the first part of his Aufbau he praised in Georg Simmel and Max Weber for introducing into social science and himself practiced thereafter. This con trasts with so- called methodological collectivism of Talcott Parsons, for example, who begins with the group rather than the individual member. What I had not recognized previously is that prior to adopting the attitude that Schutz recommended, we are i n an attitude that Husserl called intersubjective. This signifies that we are each subjectivities alongside one another and share the world that is for us objective or, better, public together. In yet other words, we are first of all members of a We. One also often hears it put these days that phenomenology relies on the first person perspective, but one should then ask whether this terminology adapted from linguistics needs to be qualified as singular or plural. Both Cairns and Schutz hold that we must start from intersubjectivity or in the first person plural perspective when we begin to reflect. This would originally be in everyday life and thus
Fred er ic k Le h ner t ( E va n st o n, ILL : N or t h we st er n U ni ver s it y Pre ss , 1 9 6 7 ); her ea fte r c it ed t ex tua l ly a s PS W. 7 Do ri o n Ca ir ns , C onv e rs at i on s w ith H u s s er l and F in k (T he Ha g u e: M a rt i nu s Ni j h off , 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 1 0 2 .

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the natural practical attitude, but it first holds after transcendental phenomenological epoch , reduction, and purification has been performed, which Cairns emphasizes. Thus, already in his Introduction to Husserls Phenomenology (1934), certainly the first course on phenomenology taught at the New School, Cairns writes as follows in his lecture s cript:
Thr o u gh t he tra n sc en den ta l red uct i o n w e bec o me a wa re of t he tra ns ce nde n ta l sp her e a s a s ph ere of i nt er su bj ect iv i ty. I a s tra ns ce nde n ta l eg o i n te nd th e w orl d a s s o me t hi n g w hic h o t her tra ns ce nde n ta l e g os i nt en d. M y tra ns ce nde nta l a wa re ne ss ha s fo r me a s tra n sc en de nta l eg o t he se n se of be i n g o ne tra n sce nd en ta l eg o a m o ng o t her s ( p . 1 7 9 , cf. pp. 2 0 1 , 2 0 2 , 2 0 4 ).

For me previously and it seems for many other Husserlians, it had been taken for granted that one begins in the first person singular and assumes th at the individual was a concretum. This knee jerk individualism, as I am tempted to call it, seems part of Eurocentrism in contrast with the alleged tendency in East Asian cultures to consider persons as always already members of groups. Perhaps it is presupposed in the so - called Cartesian Way in Husserlian phenomenology as well. For me this lesson has led to some reconfiguration of my understanding of Schutzian science theory. Before presenting that, however, it needs to be said that Cairns notes on conversations with Schutz in New York in 1937 report Schutz considered the reduction to the primordial sphere and the egological reduction in the Meditations a trick, an illegitimate procedure and that then Schutz maintain[ed] that the transcendental reduction is an egological reduction and that therefore there is no second, egological reduction (p.189). Hence Schutz does not offer a conventional interpretation. In 1941 Schutz then asked Cairns to comment on the section in the manuscript for his essa y, Schelers Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego published the next year. Due to Cairns comments, Schutz substitutes my own peculiar sphere for the primordial or pure egological sphere (p. 195 n. 19), Cairns also obje cting that primordial and egological are not synonyms in Husserl (ibid., n. 20). Schutz then summarizes Husserl as follows:
Ha v i ng p erf or med t he tra n sc en de nta l red uc ti o n a n d a na lyz ed t he co n st it ut i o na l p ro bl e m s of t he co n sc i ou s ne ss bu il t u p by th e

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a cti vi t ies of t he tra ns cen de nta l su bj ec ti vi ty , [H us ser l] si n g les o ut wi t hi n t he tra n sc en de nta l f ie ld w ha t he ca ll s m y o w n pec ul ia r sp her e by e li m i na t i n g th e c o n st it ut iv e a cti vi t ies w hi ch a re im m edia te l y or me dia tel y rela ted t o t he s ub jec t iv it[ ie s] of O th er s. Th is i s d o ne by a bs tr a cti n g fr o m a ll t he mea n in g s ref err i ng t o Ot he rs a nd c o n se qu en tl y b y w it h dra wi n g fr o m s urr ou n di n g Na t ure it s c ha ra c ter o f in ter s ub jec t iv it y. Na tur e i s t he n no l o ng er co m m o n t o u s a ll . Wh a t re ma i ns i s st ri ct ly m y p ri va te wo rld i n t h e m os t ra di ca l s e nse . Wi th i n t hi s m y o w n pec u lia r sp her e, h o wev er, certa i n o b jec ts e me r ge w h ic h b y pa ss i ve s y nt he si s ca lle d Pa i ri n g ( ac co up l em en t ) o r c ou pl i n g a re i nt erp ret ed a s a na l o g ou s to m y o wn bo dy a nd a r e t he ref or e a ppe rce ive d a s o th er pe op le s bo die s ( p. 1 9 5 ) .

Cairns responds to some of Schutzs objections. First, it is hard to understand how the abstraction from all meaning referring to Others could be performed in the required radical manner in order to isolate my own particular sphere, si nce it is exactly the non reference to the Other which constitutes the line of demarcation of the sphere of what is peculiar to my own concrete transcendental ego (p. 197) Cairns responds, But Husserl goes on to elaborate the positive characteristics of what is my own a characterization that in no way presupposes the concept of an other. The indirect characterization as non - other is not primary or fundamental but secondary and derivative. I believe that in light of these considerations, Schuetzs fi rst difficulty may disappear (p. 197 n. 29). Schutz has difficulties with transcendental intersubjectivity throughout, 8 but does not consider them important for his science theory. This is because, while his friends Cairns and Gurwitsch were interested in the ultimate transcendental grounding of the world and the positive sciences, Schutz repeatedly asserts that constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude, i.e., phenomenological psychology, is sufficient for founding the cultural sciences. This is something like the positivistic position whereby physics is used to found astronomy, chemistry, and biology without the realism presupposed in positivism being justified. There is, however, an issue in Schutz concerning the relation of subjectivity and i ntersubjectivity within the natural theoretical attitude that the discussion with Cairns of the egological reduction helps to clarify. Just after the Appended Note of Part I that was
8 Cf. A lf red S c h utz , T he Pr o bl em of T ra n sce nd e nta l In ter s u bj ect iv it y i n Hu s ser l ( 1 9 5 7 ) , tra n s. F rede ri ck Ker s te n wi t h A r o n G ur w it sc h a nd T h o ma s Luc k ma nn , re pri n ted i n A lf red S c hu tz , Co ll e cted P ap e r s , vo l. III , e d. Il se S c hu tz (Th e Ha g ue: M a rt i nu s Ni j h of f , 1 9 6 6 ).

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added during the reading of the proofs of his Aufbau , Schutz draws on Bergson as well as Husserl on the phenomenology of inner time in reflectively analyzing the stream of mental life of the solitary ego, i.e., the self totally without any reference to Others. The question then is how he is able to do this. While he only had ac cess to the Mditations cartsiennes (1931) during proofreading, he had previously studied the Formale und transzentale Logik (1929), where there is discussion of egological phenomenology, but he does not characterize his approach in the Aufbau, Part II as egological, much less as involving reduction to the primordial sphere. And after getting into contact with Husserl, Schutz still makes no allusion to his own approach even though he writes such things as the following in his review of the Mditations cartsiennes.
Hu s ser l ha d a lrea d y d eve lo ped hi s met h od of p he n o me n ol o gi ca l redu ct i on i n h is I d ea s p er tai ni ng t o a Pu r e Ph e nom e nol og y a nd to a Ph e nom e nol og i cal Ph i lo sop h y . W it h its hel p H us ser l now sy s te ma t ica ll y exp l ore s i n t he f ir st f our m edi ta t i on s t he f i eld s of tra n sce n de nta l eg o lo g ica l exp eri e nce i n its d ua l st ru ct ure of f ie ld of f l o wi n g e xper ie nce s of t he w or ld a nd a s ha bi tua li t ies (p. 181).

Schutzs approach gets clearer when he later writes in his Scheler essay that the transcendental reduction has left nothing but the unified stream of my consciousness. This stream is, so to speak, closed; open only for my inner experience and my reflective glance a monad without a window (p. 197; Cairns countered by suggesting that Husserls monads have windows th rough which one can look out upon the world [ibid., n. 31]). This conception from 1942 of the transcendental reduction suggests that the same conception in the Appended Note of 1932 is not a product of haste. While Schutz seems to have relied on this tra nscendental reduction, it is still not clear how he transitioned from intersubjectivity to the solitary ego. This is the first person singular perspective of methodological individualism in the extreme form that disregards relating to Others. Most interes tingly, it is something he relies on repeatedly in his American period. Thus he later writes of a fictitious abstraction by which one can consider the isolated stream of consciousness of a single individual, as if the wide-awake man within the natural attitude can be thought of as separated from his fellow - men (I 2198, cf. I 167), and he also writes repeatedly of a supposedly isolated individual. 9 Furthermore, he
9 A lfred S c hu tz , Re fl ec t io ns on th e P ro b lem o f R e lev an ce , ed. R ic ha rd M . Za n er

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says that we proceeded as if the world were my private world and as if we were entitle d to disregard the fact that it is from the outset an intersubjective world ... because we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being understood by them (I 10, cf. I 53, I 306, & RPR 134). The practice of social scientists to speak of members rather than individuals thus seems appropriate. In short, it did not occur to me until quite recently that the phenomenological reduction that Schutz employed for Part II of his Aufbau was actually by an abstraction of the member from her necessary participation in intersubjectivity. Individuals are abstractions. 3. Return to Intersubjectivity It is highly general to say that subjectivities are always already inserted in intersubjectivity an d even that they are not concreta but abstractions. Regarding intersubjectivity, Schutz describes, however, how Others belong to regions and are members of groups. Thus the major accomplishment of the Aufbau is the distinction of four regions of Others for each self. Consociates share space and time and can be encountered prepredicatively as well as predicatively in face -to-face relationships and interaction. It is in this world of directly experienced social reality that data collection in the social s ciences through participatory observation can be practiced. Contemporaries in the strict signification share only time and are capable of only indirect unilateral and reciprocal understanding and influencing in prescientific life and rely exclusively on predicative experience and inferential reasoning. Nevertheless, contemporaries make up the subject matters of ethnology, linguistics, political science, sociology, etc. Predecessors can be understood to the extent that there are relevant texts and trace s available, but they cannot be influenced. They are the subject matter of the historical sciences, e.g., art history, which interpret such data. Finally, there are Others who are successors, who will live after a self dies, whom she can influence by such things as writing a last will and testament, but whom she cannot understand empirically, but only can feign and conjecture about. Within such regions, there are many groups of which one may be
(Ne w Ha ve n a nd L on d o n: Ya le U n iver s it y Pr es s, 1 9 7 0 ), p. 1 7 3 , cf. 7 3 . Cf. I 3 4 7 .

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a member, including those one is born into, such as a family , social class, language, and ethnicity and those one joins or changes, such as a marriage, business partnership, or a political party. Despite Schutzs emphasis on social psychology and individual members, he outlines how much can be done in the way of de scribing collectivities, which always involve experiencing Others through ideal types. An example of the most original experiencing of a group is that of card game. One could ignore the group participation to focus on an individual consociate, but one can also say that They are playing a game of poker. This statement will apply to each individual player only to the extent that the course -ofaction type poker game corresponds to a series of conscious experiences in his mind and stands in a subjective me aning-context for him. In this way the action of each player will be oriented to the rules of poker (PSW 186) . Beyond this, there can be ideal types expressed as the United States Senate, the state, the press, the nation, the people, and the working class. And such collectivities can occur in the regions of ones contemporaries, predecessors, and successors. Thus the subject matter of the cultural sciences quickly gets complicated when Schutzs abstraction of the solitary ego from intersubjec tivity is relaxed.

While I have known for decades that Schutz moves out in his theory of the cultural sciences from how a self unilaterally and reciprocally understands and influences individuals and groups of Others in the four regions of the social wor ld, I have also long pondered how Husserl says late in the Cartesianische Meditationen that, In respect of order, the intrinsically first of the philosophical disciplines would be solipsistically reduced egology, the egology of the primordially reduce d ego. Then only would come intersubjective phenomenology, which is founded on that discipline. 10 What I have learned from Schutz and Cairns regarding egological phenomenology, namely, that we must start from intersubjectivity and the public world of every day life, which is different from the eventually clarified philosophical disciplines and their order. Even the first attainment of transcendental epoch , reduction, and purification is transcendental intersubjectivity. Differently put, we are together in -the-world prior to any
10 Ed mu nd H u sse rl, Ca rt es ia n M ed it ati on s , tr a n s. D ori o n Ca i rn s ( The Ha g ue: M a rt in u s N i j ho f f , 1 9 6 0 ) , p.1 5 5 .

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reductions to how the world is for -us and then to how it is for -me and even abstractly it is for me without others. Schutz often cited Husserls Nachwort zu meinen Ideen on the parallelism between transcendental phenomenology and constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude in order to justify interpreting transcendental descriptions mundanely. Now I ponder whether Schutzs worldly descriptions analogously hold transcendentally.

Praxis and Passivity: A Hidden Naturalistic Assumption in Husserls Transcendental Phenomenology

Steven Crowell (Rice University) 1. Nature and Spirit In the 1920s Husserl turned his attention to issues that he would group under the heading Nature and Spirit. With Dilthey in mind, Husserl saw these investigations as contributions to the philosophical grounding of the natural and human sciences. Transcendental phenomenology would clarify the sense and achievement of these sciences, defending their rationality while refusing to grant them foundational status in the form of philosophical naturalism or historicism. These studies are among the richest in Husserls corpus, yet they produced a number of paradoxes most notably the paradox of subjectivity: the su bject is a being in the world one entity among others but is simultaneously the transcendental origin of that world, an absolute to which the world is relative. From the perspective of natural science the subject can be made to disappear. As a natural entity subjectivit y appears as psyche , a stratum of the animate organism which the science of psychology accounts for in terms of psychophysical conditionalities and ultimately natural causality. From the perspective of the Geisteswissenschaften, however, the subject is the Person, an entity that expresses itself in significant forms, the understanding of which is precisely the concern of such sciences. Thus the Person cannot be made to disappear. Here, then, the paradox becomes pressing: the Person is an entity in the world but is also that whereby the world has its ontic validity ( Seinsgeltung ). The Person must, therefore, be self- constituting. But Husserl believed that the Person could not be self constituting. For one thing, Persons are natural beings; for another, they depend upon traditions. Both nature and tradition belong to what Husserl calls the pregiven world, and a transcendental clarification of the ground of the human sciences must therefore be in a position to clarify the worlds pregivenness. The writin gs collected in Husserliana 39 devoted to this task provide us with new insight into the paradox of subjectivity. 1 In particular, they reveal a
Edm un d H us ser l, D ie Le b en s w elt: A u sl eg u ng en d e r v org eg e b en e n W elt und ih r e r Ko n stit ut io n. T ex t e au s d em N a ch la s s (1 9 1 6 - 1 9 3 7 ) , Hu s ser lia na X X XI X , ed. Ro c hu s S o wa ( D ordr ec ht : S pr i n ger, 2 0 0 8 ) . H e ncef or t h c it ed i n t he te xt a s Hua 3 9 .
1

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hidden naturalistic assumption that Husserl never properly identified. Once the naturalistic assumption is ident ified and bracketed, I will argue, there is no paradox in holding that the Person is transcendental (self - constituting) subjectivity. I will focus primarily on a series of texts that tacitly construct an argument against Heideggers approach to transce ndental subjectivity, an approach that emphasizes the practical character of the constitution of meaning. For Husserl, meaning -constitution could be approached only through the epoch , and, as he put it in a draft of the Encyclopaedia Brittanica article, under the epoch I am no longer human ego. To this Heidegger commented: or perhaps precisely such [an ego], in its ownmost miraculous existential possibility (Hua IX, p. 275). Part of what is at stake in this disagreement becomes evident precisely in Husserls rejection of the idea of practical, personalistic self -constitution. The context for this rejection is what Husserl calls the paradox of the pregiven world. 2. The Paradox of the Pre -Given World To say that the world is pregiven is to say t hat it is experienced as having already been there, in these and those ways, before I take up what is given to me to do . That is, the world is not just the given, or what is, but rather what is presupposed as being in these and those distinct ways in every sort of experience that I, as engaged in this world, have. The phenomenological task is to describe how the pregiven world, or Lebenswelt , shows itself in experience and to analyze its constitution. In carrying out part of this analysis in a text from 1931, Husserl describes an apparent paradox that seems to threaten the central thesis of transcendental phenomenology, namely, that there is for us no other world than the one that gains its Seinssinn in us and from out of our own consciousness (Hua 3 9, p. 444). The problem concerns what is to be understood by us and our own consciousness here. Less colloquially, how must we understand the subject of the pregiven world? Already from the language that he uses it is quite clear that Husserl has Heide gger in view. Husserl begins with Ich in meinem Sein als Ich , that is, with I who am conscious von meinem Dasein als Mensch in der Welt . Under the reduction I am Ich der reinen Akte , but how is such an ego to be described? One straightforward suggestion would be to describe it as Husserl typically describes the Person, namely as a practical ego. If we go that route, then Akte vollziehen ist sich beschftigen mit etwas , that is Handeln im weitesten Sinne (Hua 39, p. 438). Now in the third chapter o f Sein und Zeit

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Heidegger had sought to uncover the Weltlichkeit der Welt (Husserl: the Seinssinn Welt ) in just these terms. In its average everydayness Dasein is, like the Person, a practical subject whose actions disclose a normatively structured totality of signification, or world. But Husserl held that Heideggers account of the pregiven world remained anthropological, failing to reach the transcendental level. He had many reasons for seeing things this way, but here he tries to support the cl aim with an argument namely, that if we model constitution on acting ( Handeln ) an infinite regress results. In its simplest form the argument runs as follows. If the transcendental subject is practical, then constitution of meaning has the character of a n action. Now [ j ] ede Handlung erwirbt Seiendes auf dem Grund von schon Seiendem . But given the thesis o f transcendental constitution that being as such is an achievement [ Erwerb ]this leads to an infinite regress (Hua 39, p. 441). Transcendental constitution thus requires that there be a doing ( Tun ) that is not an acting:
D as S ei n d e r W elt f r un s i st i m m e r sch on S e in m it e in em S ei n ss i nn , d e r d u rch H a nd el n ko n st it u ie rt i st, und d o ch m u ss e s, d am it H and e l n nich t si n nl os in s U ne nd lich e a uf H a nd el n b e ru h e n s ol l, e in e r Ko n st it ut io n e nt sp ru ng en s e in, d i e n och ni ch t H and el n wa r ( Hua 3 9 , p. 4 4 4 ) . 2

How, Husserl asks, are we to clear up this paradox? In constructing this argument against Heidegger , then, Husserl simultaneously reveals his own reasons for holding that the Person cannot be the transcendental subject. Acting involves two aspects, each of which yields a regress. First, to act is to busy oneself with something ( sich beschftigen mit etwas ) for instance, Husserl mentions a hammer (Hua 39, p. 438). When I use a hammer, according to Husserl, it holds ( gilt ) for me in one or another ontic modality (it is real) and it holds as something (a hammer). Not every busying oneself with something is an action, however. The pencil I gnaw upon as I drive t he nail is not part of any action. Having to do with something is acting only if a second aspect is present: I must be trying to do something with it, Ich habe damit etwas vor . As Husserl defines it, Vorhaben means vor dem wirklichen Haben auf ein Hab en, das aber nicht schon wirkliches Haben
It i s in te res t in g to n o te t he ec h o es of F ic ht es Tath a nd lu ng here bu t w he rea s Fi ch te e mp ha siz ed t h e p ract ica l r ea so n s id e of t hi n gs (a s we wi l l do here) , Hu s ser l e mp ha s iz es t h e a s s ocia t io n is t ic ps yc h ol o gy .
2

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ist, gerichtet sein (Hua 39, p. 439). Trying ( Streben, Wollen ) thus involves something had in advance; I must have something definite in mind: to make a birdhouse , to draft environmental protection legislation . With the completion of the action, the having in advance becomes having itself ( Selbsthabe ): the birdhouse is there, the bill is put to a vote. Action thus yields a lasting achievement ( bleibender Erwerb ). This lasting achievement can then become the basis for further action: I can busy myself with the birdhouse under the Vorhabe of trying to make an environmentally friendly garden, which latter can in turn become a lasting achievement in Selbsthabe, and so on. This notion of a lasting achievement is the crux of Husserls argument that taking action to be the model for transcendental constitution involves an infinite regress. Both in that with which it busies itself and in what it is trying to do , action presupposes an already constituted lasting achi evement. Yet Husserl conceives action so broadly that it covers the entire sphere of the Personal world: not only is making or fabricating a case of acting; so too are perceiving, discoursing, and other forms of cognitive opinion formation. Indeed, all ontic meaning , all being ( Seiendes ) is, for Husserl, a lasting achievement of acting. Perception, for instance einfachste wahrnehmende Betrachtung is a kind of action (Hua 39, p. 440). Whether it occurs within a more encompassing action (as when, in ma king the birdhouse, I move to get a better look at a nail that I notice might be bent), or is done for its own sake (as when I am curious to know what the insides of my computer monitor look like), perceptual consideration is a kind of trying , ein handelndes Vorhaben , ... ein Hinstreben zu dem Seiendem selbst, es in seiner wahrnemungsmigen Selbstheit zu verwirklichen (Hua 39, p. 440). When perceptual consideration is complete, a lasting achievement has been established within the flux of my conscious life, an opinion to which I can return (Hua 39, p. 441). I now know that the nail is bent, I have it . But such Selbsthabe is possible only because I had it in my Vorhabe that is, my Kenntnis of this nail presupposes the Bekanntheit of nails as such. Perception is thus caught up in the regress of action: perceiving is not simply opening ones eyes; it is cognition as recognition. Seeing is always trying to see (better). The perceptually pregiven world is thus always a lasting achievement of action. B ut if perceptual meaning only arises on the basis of previously established meaning, what accounts for this prior meaning? A regress also appears if we consider that with which acting busies itself. In order to make a birdhouse I busy myself with a

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hammer; but this hammer has itself been made, and in that process the maker busied herself with wood and metal. These, in turn, are lasting achievements of certain processes of production, and so on. Now it might appear that this regress could be stopped at somet hing that was not itself the las ting achievement of an action mere matter, let us say but from the phenomenological point of view this wont work. What action busies itself with is never just something ; it is something in particular , something with a spe cific meaning or sense. Invoking matter will not suffice, since the regress concerns the immanent meaning -structure of the act itself, not the countless things that a third -person investigation could ascertain as being causally involved in acting. I cannot busy myself with mere matter. Were there such a thing it would do me no good in building my birdhouse. To do that I need hammers , which must be constituted as such; and to make hammers I need wood and metal. Nor is it enough that there merely be such things; to use them I must be able to recognize them as wood, metal, and hammers. And as in the case of perception, such recognition is possible only if I have prior familiarity with things of that type . When I act, a framework of general-typical familiari tes is always pregiven, and without it I could grasp no particular thing as anyt hing in particular. My acting my fabricating, perceiving, and cognizing adds to this framework by establishing lasting achievements of meaning. But this seems to lead to an in finite regress. As Husserl puts it: Dass immer Neues zu gestalten ist in infinitum macht hier nicht die Schwierigkeit, sondern dass das Neue immer schon Altbekanntes voraussetzt, also schon frher Erworbenes (Hua 39, p. 444). This issue, then, is this: I f the Person is transcendental subjectivity, meaning is constituted through action through perceiving, fabricating, and cognizing within an Umwelt of pregiven meaning, which in turn derives from previous perceiving, fabricating, and cognizing. From the per sonalistic perspective this is not a problem: the pregiven world is always already a world where meaning has been established. But if the transcendental subject is supposed to be the genetic ground of meaning, then the infinite regress in acting seems to s uggest that the Person cannot be the transcendental subject. The question for phenomenology thus becomes:
< Wi e ka n n > e in e u r s p r ng lich e E rw e r b ung v er st nd lich und a l s o not we nd ig e ing e s eh e n we rd e n, i n d e r S ach e und V o rh a b en nich t we lt l ich s ch o n si nd , s o nd e r n r ei n a us Q ue ll e n d e r S u bj ekt iv it t e r st

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we rd e n a ls U rst ift u n g d e r W elt lich k eit ? ( H ua 3 9 , 4 4 5 ).

For Husserl, the regress argument shows that transcendental constitution cannot be understood on the model of praxis not because practical constitu tion presupposes a pregiven perceptual world (the perceived world is constituted practically), but because praxis cannot be self -constituting. Being is constituted, yet always on the basis of being; meaning and normativity are possible only where there is already meaning and normativity. If that is so, then this whole pregiven world seems to point back to Vor-Seiendes und ein Tun, das Seiendes bekannt macht voraus (Hua 39, p. 444 -5). If we are not simply to posit some first meaning, in other words, but are to retain the thesis that all meaning is constituted, then within genetic phenomenology terms like Erwerben , Sache , and Vorhaben must change their meaning fundamentally.
D as E rw e rb e n v e rw ei st im m e r noch au f ei n Tu n, a b e r ei n wo ll e nd ab s eh end e s T un, ei n T u n g e wh nl ich e n S in n es (d as V o rh a b en, Z we ck e, v or- g e st el lt e u nd v or - g e s etzt e Z i el e, e be n g ewo l lte , v e rw i rkl ich t) k an n e s n ich t s ei n. S ei n M at e ri al ka nn al so n ich t e in e Sach e s ei n, e in e Sa ch e , d ie sch o n i st , we n n d a s S ei n se l b st sch on d e n S in n d e s E r w o r be n en h ab e n, e r st d u rch u r sp r ng l ich e E rw e rb u n g d en S in n se i end g ew in n e n sol l ( Hua 3 9 , p. 4 4 5 ).

However, this appeal to pre - being, and to a transcendental subject who does, but does not act, should give us pause. For it seems to land us in the t errain of a psychology of consciousness that is not fully open to phenomenological reflection. Before going down this road, then, we should recall that within the personalistic attitude the regress poses no problem. Meaning is constituted on the basis of revisions of prior meaning; norms (and with them the intentional implications that yield the Seinssinn of things) hold and are revised through our commitment to them as Persons engaged practically in the world. But if the infinite regress is not a problem from within the personalistic attitude, then what is it, exactly, that makes the concept of transcendental subjectivity appear paradoxical ? In the following section I shall argue that the problem lies in a hidden naturalistic assumption that informs Husserl s reflections on the relation between the Person and consciousness . 3. Diagnosing the Appearance of Paradox In the personalistic attitude the pregiven world is a world of meaning . Phenomenological reflection shows such meaning to be

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c onstituted by appe rceptions that is, what I busy myself with points beyond itself by way of intentional implications that prescribe which possible further experiences will cohere with my current and former experiences and which will not. Apperception is thus indicative of a system within first-person experience itself, one that is possible only because such experience is normatively ordered. What distinguishes transcendental phenomenology from other philosophical approaches is not that it recognizes the normative ordering of experience but that it shows how such order is grounded in subjectivity . In a text from 1916, Husserl spells this out: Das Ich aller gegenstndlichen Apperzeptionen verschiedener Stufenlagen ist von vornherein ein Vermgens - Ich, ein Subjekt des Ich kan n . More particularly, jeder Grundart von Apperzeptionen entspricht einen eigenen Schicht im Vermgens -Ich (Hua 39, p. 422 -23). To experience a hammer as a hammer, for instance, is to apperceive a complicated system of intentional implications normative ly grounded in what a hammer is supposed to be, and I can apperceive such a system only if I myself am able to do something namely, try to use the hammer appropriately. I must be able to conform my behavior to a set of norms that distinguish that behavior from mere random movement and from other things I might be doing. To try to use a hammer appropriately that is, to exercise my Vermgens-Ich as a carpenter is not simply to wield it in the appropriate way; rather, it is to act in light of the norms of carpentry. I must understand myself in their terms. Such understanding, in turn, is not a matter of reflecting on myself; it must already inform pre -reflective practical engagement. How is this to be described phenomenologically? It is of great consequence t hat Husserl holds that such self understanding is itself a kind of apperception:
Wi r m s s en sch e id e n d a s Ich al s S ub j ekt al le r A ff ekt io ne n, Akt io n en, i n all e n ap p er zip ie r e nd e n Voll zg e n et c. u nd d as Ich , d a s se l b st zum ap p e rz ip i e rt en O bj ek t wi rd f r d a s d a be i wi rk lich tt ig e, wi rk li ch v or st el le nd e S u bj ekt ( wi rk lich e s I ch ). . .. [ S ]o ko n sti tu ie rt s ich i n ur sp r ng li ch e r Ap p er z e p t io n d a s I ch i n s ei n en v e rs ch i ed en e n Akti on e n, in s e in em Ap p e rz ep t i on v on O bj ekt e n, o b i ch a uf d a s Ich r e fl ekt i er e nd ach t e n od e r n ich t ( Hua 3 9 , p. 4 2 2 ).

But this is puzzling. If the normative force of apperceptions depend on the stratum of the Vermgens -Ich to which they belong i.e., on my ability to act in light of the norms that define my comportment precisely as an ability , something at which I can

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either succeed or fail how can the pre-reflective understanding of myself that this entails be a matter of apperceiving myself as something? Either I can understand myself as a carpenter in the very act of being one (thus amounting to a sort of personalistic selfconstitution that dispenses with the detour through apperceptions); or there must be another capacity of the Subject (another structure of the Vermgens-Ich ) operating according to norms that allow for the generation of an emp irical apperception of myself as a carpenter. In that case, the Person would be relative to the transcendental Subject. But then we would need an account of the capacity that enables the Subject to generate apperceptions of the relevant sort. Before looking at how Husserl proposes to discharge the latter requirement, we should recall that the thought that there must be a pre-personal level of constitution is not motivated by experience but by an argument , and though arguments are fair game in phenomenology they must be used with caution, since they may include phenomenologically inadmissable assumptions. Indeed, just such an assumption infuses Husserls thinking on this point. The argument seems to compel a distinction between the Person and the transcendental Subject only because Husserl does not reflect on the personalistic attitude in a purely phenomenological way. Rather, he brings to that reflection the background assumption that personalistic self- experience rests upon the supposedly more primordial experience of myself as an animal , as an entity in the natural world, in relation to which the Person is an apperceptive modification. The naturalism of this assumption shows up in Husserls claim that the subject of the personalistic attitude is a human being ( Mensch ), for he believes that he is phenomenologically entitled to the idea that the sense, human being, carries with it a reference to natural kinds not merely in some culturally relative sense in which the Umwelt contains various familia r types of creature, but in the strict sense of scientific naturalism . It is this tacit importation of a third -person point of view into the phenomenology of the human being that makes the assumption pernicious, for it makes it seem as though the subper sonal processes characteristic of consciousness conceived as a natural function could somehow be reconstructed in genetic phenomenology as constitutive abilities of transcendental subjectivity. In a text from 1929, for instance, Husserl holds that hum an being names a regional unity (Hua 39, p. 289). This would pose no problem for the claim that the Person is transcendental subjectivity if we could say that the Person apperceptively

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constitutes the human being, but here the Person is supposed to be an aspect of this constituted unity. This is shown in the way Husserl describes the death of the human being. Every [real thing] has its way of being destroyed [ zerstrt werden ], a way that is predelineated by its ontological region (Hua 39, p. 288). Dest ruction of the Person is spiritual death; destruction of an animal is death of the organism. The death of the human being, in turn, is organic and spiritual death in one (Hua 39, p. 287). Thus, while it is possible that the Person could suffer spi ritual death without the death of any organism, it is not possible for the organism that constitutes the human being to die without there ensuing the spiritual death of the Person. This shows that Husserl is committed both to the idea that the Person is i nseparable from the human being and to the idea that being human involves, as a founding stratum, an animate organism ( Animalitt ; Hua 39, p. 344 etc). To explain the apperceptive constitution of the Person, then, Husserl must turn to the sub -human, to the sub- personal in human existence (Hua 39, p. 391), since the subjectivity that accomplishes such constitution must be of the sort that persons share with other animate organisms. What is the nature of sub -personal subjectivity? According to Husserl, what links animal subjectivity with Personal (or spiritual) subjectivity is embodiment . In a text from 1926 he writes: To every living body [ Leib ], including that of the animal, belongs an ego-centering and a universal structural form that circumscribes everything psychical, thanks to which the one and identical ego of this living body lives in a multifarious ego - life, a life that has the character of ... ego - centered intentionality (consciousness of) (Hua 39, p. 274). Living subjectivity in this sens e is in a primitive [ erster ] sense personal ego (Hua 39, p. 274). For instance, Husserl holds that animal subjectivity constitutes species-relative Umwelten , including analogues of those structures that characterize the human Lebenswelt : tradition, natur e, sociality, and so on. He also holds that these operations of animal subjectivity from instinctual sourcesprovide the human being with the basis [ Untergrund ] for a life of will, for the development of will -subjects, i.e., Persons, and for the develop ment of personalistic communities of will (Hua 39, p. 390). Though Husserl reminds us that in regard to animal sociality there can be no talk of ... genuine willing and acting, he nevertheless holds that this living instinctivity and sociality serves continually as the underlying basis for personalistic

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achievements, insofar as those born into animality must first emerge into being Persons (Hua 39, p. 391). Thus, on the assumption that Person and animal subjectivity are linked through the embodiment of the living, Husserl can address the paradox of the pregiven world by first constructing animal subjectivity as an impoverished version of the acting subject and then holding it to be foundational for the Person. This solution may seem obvious. Who co uld deny that infants are not persons at the outset; that they must be socialized into the practices and institutions that will become, for them, second nature; that animals are social creatures, act purposively, and so on? The only question is whether a ny of this is relevant from the point of view of transcendental constitution . If one limits ones genetic considerations to the emergence of the Person from animal subjectivity one may be tempted to think that it is, but this is not the whole story about t he sub- personal subjectivity that Husserls response to the infinite regress requires. To hold that the Person cannot be the transcendental subject is to commit oneself not merely to the relatively benign thesis that human subjectivity has analogues in the animal world; rather, it is to commit oneself to the thesis that pure consciousness is sufficient to constitute a world. How so? The subjectivity that constitutes itsel f as a tiger subject as animate organism differs from the one that constitutes itself as a human animal only in its particulars. For the sake of simplicity we can say that, on the basis of different bodily abilities, the one constitutes what it is like to be a tiger while the other constitutes what it is like to be a human animal (Hua 39, pp. 429 -32). According to Husserl, however, animate organism is itself an apperceptive sense and thus a contingent form that the Subject can take. For this reason there must be a further level of sub-personal subjectivity a sub - animal level, so to speak whose normatively structured abilities ( Vermgens-Ich ) would be responsible for originating its self-apperception as animate organism. To apperceive itself as Leib , for instance, sub-personal subjectivity must exercise the ability to distinguish bet ween one set of Empfindungen as kinaestheses and another as object -sensations in such a way that a normative order of psychophysical conditionalities obtains between them. 3 But the subjectivity that can apperceive itself contingently as Leib must posse ss an essential structure not dependent on Leib . Such a subjectivity is, according to Husserl, the altogether pre-intentional temporality of consciousness, a standing 3

Hu s ser l, I d ea s I I : ... it b eco m e s Bod y [ L ei b ].. .

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streaming living present of Urimpressionen with their retentional and protentional modi fications, primal noticings, passive associations, and so on. At this level alone , according to Husserl, do we reach an ability that is genuinely self -constituting (thus putting an end to the regress), one that yields the necessary pre being: a doing ( Tun ) that is not a willing -planning doing, [not a] doing in the usual sense (Hua 39, p. 445). Having reached this point in a text from 1933, however, Husserl pulls up short: Primal affection in primal passivity, the fields of sensation with their prim al contrasts in primal temporalizing Is this really more than an abstraction and reconstruction? Such things, Husserl continues, I have never experienced. Yet he claims that in asking back [ nachfragend ] into the structure of meaning giving, the constit ution of ontic meaning, in following up [ hineinfragend ] intentional implications of what is currently experienced, and in reconstructing what is implicit, the wakeful, world-possessing phenomenolgizing ego must encounter the terrain of what he here ca lls inactive constitution, a standing core of the pre - egological which is ultimately presupposed in all egological achievements (Hua 39, pp. 432 -3). In other words: yes, this is an abstraction and reconstruction, but it is justified as necessary . How? Since we have no experience of such things, it must be on the basis of arguments such as the infinite regress characteristic of Personalistic constitution. But do such arguments really authorize these conclusions, which in part involve genuine descriptions, but in part do not? I do not believe so, but even if they motivate something like such conclusions i.e., even if they suggest that Personalistic constitution rests upon conditions that it does not constitute this does not mean that these are constitutive conditions. So - called primal passivity may contribute no more to the transcendental -normative constitution of meaning than does brain functioning as a third person natural process. Such facticity is a black box as far as phenomenology is concern ed, and if that is so, then in identifying the regress in personalistic constitution one also identifies the limits of the phenomenological doctrine of constitution itself. This may appear to limit phenomenology in a very crippling way, but it does not. In deed, by its means one achieves one of H usserls most cherished goals namely, a clear demarcation between transcendental philosophy and empirical science that allows for their mutual interaction but without the paradox of subjectivity.

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The key is to bracke t the naturalistic assumption that seduces Husserl into thinking that appeal to non (or pre -) intentional consciousness provides a way out of the infinite regress. While the intentional implications of what is experienced do point back to various processes of consciousness, they do not point back to constitutive processes in the Geltungs -theoretical sense. It is a naturalistic prejudice to hold that just because the Person is conscious, its constitutive achievements are transcendentally grounded in what it shares with animals. Or, to put it another way, it is a naturalistic prejudice to think that as constituting the Person is a stratum of the third - person natural kind, human being. Considered as a natural kind, the human being is indeed constituted, but t his does not mean that constitution itself rests upon the sub-personal processes of consciousness. In fact, the supposedly founding level is founded upon the Person my nature, my instinctual life, is constituted as pregiven in the way I take it up answer responsibly for it as a Person. In the following section I will conclude by developing this point a bit more fully. 4. Nature Without the Naturalistic Assumption The problem with Husserls genetic appeal to sub -personal constitutive processes becomes mo st pressing at the point where a constitutive difference between animate organism and the rest of reality requires a subjectivity in which the body ( Leib ) is not yet constituted. But if we abandon the naturalistic assumption that the Person is founded on t he human being conceived as a natural kind, then the body need not be seen as constituted at all. As transcendental subjectivity it is constituting through and through, and it belongs neither to nature as the object of natural science nor to nature as a di mension of the Persons Umwelt . A series of texts penned between 1921 and 1937 on the apodicticity of the world suggests what is at stake here. In them, Husserl considers whether the apodicticity of the Cartesian cogito includes the world, where world is understood in the phenomenological sense: a horizonal meaning -structure that includes all real being (and so nature) within it. Starting with the Person, Husserl runs through a series of thought experiments that lead him to conclude that the world h as practical apodicticity (Hua 39, p. ). For an ego conscious of a world, it is simply not possible to represent the world as non -existent, though it is possible to do so for every particular being in it (with the exception of its own being as human su bject) (Hua 39, p. 256). The latter caveat

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includes the body : I cannot represent my body as not existing without thereby losing the essentially human form of my conscious life as a Person (Hua 39, 248). 4 But, Husserl asks, if one moves from the person alistic to the transcendental point of view, is it apriori necessary that I am a human being, that my pure ego in its conscious life take such a form ...? (Hua 39, p. 249). Husserl is aware of the complexity of the question. For one thing, he sees that the notion of possibility at stake in generating these thought experiments may we ll be tied to a human ego that is, to the fact of an embodied, worldly subject (Hua 39, p. 226). Recallin g one such thought experiment the annihilation of the world from Ideas I, in which the realm of pure immanence is said to survive the dissolution of the constituted world into a swarm of sense dat a (Hua 39, p. 227) Husserl wonders whether his original conception of the immanent sphere, with immanent data that, through the passive achievement of association, ultimately become apprehendings, might be nothing more than a leftover from the old psychology and its sensualistic empiricism. But in the end he retains it, and with it the idea of an associative constitution of the body itself (Hua 39, p. 229). Apparently, it is not the Vermgens -Ich of the embodied Person, but the ego-centering of consciousness , that is essential for constitution. The natu re that belongs to the world and so also the body that belongs to that nature is a constituted achievement. However, if we bracket the naturalistic assumption that the Person is founded on the human being considered as a natural kind, then the concept of Leib becomes systematically ambiguous. On the one hand, Leib is that which incorporates, as it wer e, the Persons ability to try its skills and habitualities; its I can which opens up the practically normative space of possibility necessary for the constitution of meaning. Let us call this living body. On t he other hand, Leib is the animate organism, the body that belongs to constituted nature as Umwelt . Let us call this lived body. Recognizing this ambiguity has implications for our understanding of consciousness , for while it is still possible to conce ive consciousness as a stratum of the lived body for instance, one can distinguish between the lived body and the Krper by appeal to the presence or absence of psyche it is no longer possible to distinguish between constituting consciousness and the living body. Thus it is no
4

Th e m en sch li ch - se e li s ch e W e s en sg es talt o f m y p er so na l en B ew us s ts ei n sl e be n .

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longer possible to work back from the personalistic experience of practical constitution to a supposedly deeper level of primal passivity and association, from which the living body itself could be apperceptively constituted. Without the naturalistic assumption, the only transcendental question is how such sub -personal processes are constituted within the personalistic attitude as sub-personal, passive, and so on. Now if we ask how the sub -personal processes of consciousness show up in the personalistic attitude, the easiest place to begin is with their status as objects of natural scientific investigation. Whether in psychoanalysis, neuro -science, or some other branch of natural science, sub-personal processes are constituted as objec ts by means of evolving epistemic practices and third - person theories. Here nature is a region governed by causal law, a region that does not strictly speaking appear because its constitution presupposes a process of idealization that leaves the percep tual Umwelt behind. Thus bridging principles are required to link nature in this sense to the objects of ordinary experience. As phenomenologists we may critically reflect on the experiences from which scientific concepts are drawn, and we may work back and forth between empirical investigations and phenomenological reflection to refine such concepts and develop bridging principles. But without the naturalistic assumption we will not be able to hold that what such investigations uncover are constitutive conditions, conditions of possibility for intentionality as the consciousness of valid unities of meaning . But the nature that is the object of natural science can be approached phenomenologically only through the ordinary personalistic, intuitive or percep tual, experience of a pregiven Umwelt , which may include a distinct concept of nature as a region within it that contrasts with regions that are not nature e.g., culture or artifice. How to characterize this distinction rigorously is notoriously diff icult. In a text from 1928 Husserl tries to mark it by distinguishing between what is immediately and what is only mediately given: The universe of objects that are given as immediately experienceable by me (immediately demonstrable in original intuit ion) and must be so given is nature (Hua 39, p. 30). But it is not clear that an ontological region can be picked out in these terms. Like Aristotle, Husserl wants to circumscribe a region of things that are pregiven in the sense of not arising through praxis, and it is tempting to define nature as that which can be perceptually given without any apperceptions that refer to cultural production. But

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there seem to be no such things. Because perception itself is the Urpraxis whose Vorhabe aims to have the thing itself, one might be tempted to say that natural things are those that I can successfully have through sensible intuition alone . I can perceive a tattoo, for instance, but if I try to have the tattoo itself merely by looking at it from a variety of perspectives I will fail , since tattoos are constituted in part by the symbolic practices of particular cultures. In contrast, I might believe that I can successfully have a tree itself merely by carrying out an (infinitely long) chain of perceptu al acts. But unless we move to the level of a naturalistic third -person theory, what counts as a tree and so, whether this thing here actually can be had in perception alone can vary significantly from culture to culture. However these relations sort them selves out, one thing is clear: as part of the pregiven Umwelt nature is always normatively constituted within an horizon of valid meaning; it never presents itself as something pre - egological or as the product of some associative synthesis. It is consti tuted as pre-given in what I do: The woods I walk through were there long before I was born; I must find the perfect wave, and in order to surf it successfully I must conform myself to it ; the wood I am trying to lay down as a floor is warped. In a similar way, my own pregiven nature (if we are to use this term for the sub -personal primal passivity of embodied consciousness) is constituted as pregiven in my urge for ice cream, my striving for a better world, my fear of stepping on a crack, my commitment to curbing my enthusiasm for irony, and the like. Constituted as my pregiven nature, sub -personal processes, associations, drives, urges, bodily conditions, and the like are experienced as what I undergo; but what I undergo is always there meaningfully, in light of the stand I take toward it. What is the relation of the Person to nature in this sense? For Husserl, the connection is found in the body as Leib . According to Husserl, the Leib appears both as a privileged center of the Umwelt as organ of my subjectivity and as one animate organism among others (though a remarkably poorly constituted one). Here we again encounter the systematic ambiguity in this concept. In the first instance the Leib is the living body; in the second, the lived body. What is remarkably poorly constituted is not my living body but my lived body, which I can later describe as an animate organism. The living body does not appear as a thing in the world at all . Because he does not take note of the ambiguity, Hus serl thinks

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that the appearance of the Leib as organ of my will provides the basis for an apperceptive transfer thanks to which I recognize other animate organisms, thus constituting myself contingently as part of nature. But if we suspend the naturalist ic assumption and clearly disambiguate these notions, the living body cannot be the basis for grasping the lived body. To grasp myself as lived body, as one animate organism among others, requires a constituted space in which norms of the real, and its regions, are already there . Another way to put this is that the sense, animate organism, will always be concretely expressed in terms of the loose types that emerge from historically and culturally contingent personalistic practices. The Person constitute s the human being as a specific denizen of nature in this sense, and so I can treat my body as such a par t of nature both as Krper and as lived body. More particularly, the Person constitutes something like an us in contrast to other beings, but s uch grouping need not map onto conspecificity in the naturalistic sense: us might include our totem animals, pets, or whatever. But in whatever way body and consciousness show up in nature, they do not show up as constituting. The idea that the lived body is part of nature and that it is there fore constituted and relative is not wrong; but this does not entail that the Person is constituted by some sub-personal form of consciousness. Thus, as Husserl rightly insisted (though for the wrong reasons), th e paradox of a subjectivity that is part of the world but also constitutes the world need not threaten us, since the subjectivity that constitutes the world is not in the world at all; it is being -in-the-world.

The Question of Naturalizing Phenomenology

James Mensch (St. Francis Xavier University) One of the most remarkable developments of the past decade has been the attempt to marry phenomenology to cognitive science. Perhaps nothing else has so revitalized phenomenology, making it a topic of interest in the wider philosophical and scientific communities. 1 The reasoning behind this initiative is relatively straightforward. Cognitive science studies artificial and brain based intelligence. But before we can speak of artificial intelligence, we must ha ve some knowledge of natural intelligence, that is, understand our own cognitive functioning. Similarly, to understand how the brain functions, we need to grasp the cognitive processes that such functioning realizes. This, however, is precisely what phenomenology provides. It studies the cognitive acts through which we apprehend the world, observes the constitutive build-up of such acts, and attends to the temporal constitution at work in the genesis of every act, every intentional relation we have to the world. Its results, which have been accumulating since the beginning of the last century, thus, offer cognitive science a trove of information for its projects. As obvious as this conclusion appears, it is not immune to some fundamental objections. T he chief of these is that phenomenology does not concern itself with the real, psychological subject, but rather with the transcendental subject. By virtue of the reduction that reveals it, this subject, as Husserl writes, loses that which gives it the value of something real in the naively experienced, pre given world; it loses its sense of being a soul of an animal organism which exists in a pre -given, spatial -temporal nature." 2 As such, the
R epr ese n ta t iv e w or ks in t h is a rea i ncl ud e Va re la , F., Th o m ps o n, E., & R osc h, E., Th e em bod i ed m i nd : Cog n it iv e sc ie nc e a nd h um a n ex p er i enc e . Ca m bri dge , M A : The M IT Pre ss , 1 9 9 1 ; Va rela , F., N eur o ph en o me n o lo g y: A m et ho d ol o gi ca l rem ed y t o t he ha rd pr ob le m, Jo u rn al o f Co ns ci ou s ne s s S tud i es , 3 ( 4 ), 1 9 9 6 , 3 3 0 3 5 0 ; Va re la , F., Th e na t ura liz a ti o n of p he n o me n ol o gy a s t he t ra n sce nd en ce of na t ure . S ea rc hi n g f o r ge nera ti ve m u tua l co n stra i nt s, A lt er , 5 (4 ), 1 9 9 7 , 3 5 5 3 8 1 ; Ga lla g her, S ., M ut u a l e nl i gh te n me n t: Re cen t p h en o me n o lo g y i n c og n it iv e sc ie nce, J o u rn al of Co ns ci ou s ne s s St ud i e s , 4 , 1 9 9 7 , 1 9 5 2 1 4 ; Pe ti t ot, J., Va r lea , F. J., Pa c h ou d, B., & Ro y, J . M ., N at ur al iz ing p h eno m e no log y , S ta nf ord: S ta nf ord U n ive rs it y Pr es s, 1 9 9 9 ; Ga l la g h er, S ., P he no m en o l og y a n d ex per i me nta l des ig n, J o ur na l o f C o n sc io us n e ss St ud i e s , 1 0 (9 1 0 ), 2 0 0 3 , 8 5 9 9 ; Lutz , A ., & Th o mp s o n, E., N eur op he n o me n ol o g y: I nt egra ti n g s ub je ct ive e xper ie nc e a n d bra i n d yna m ic s i n t he n eur o sc ie nce of c on s ci o u s ne ss , Jo u r nal o f Co n sci ou s n es s Stud i es , 1 0 ( 9 1 0 ) , 2 0 0 3 , 3 1 5 2 ; a nd Ga l la g he r, S ., & Za ha vi, D., Th e p h en om en ol og ic al m i nd . Lo nd o n: R o u t led ge, 2 0 0 8 . 2 "Na c h wo rt, " I d e e n z u e i ne r r ei n en Ph n o m e nol og i e und p h n o m e nol og i sch e n
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transcendental subject no longer has its sense of being cau sally determined by this spatial -temporal nature. Given this, how can such a subject serve as a paradigm for understanding either artificial or organic, brain -based intelligence? As part of the world, the latter are causally determined structures, but t he transcendental subject, as Husserl asserts, has to be considered as absolute in itself and as existing for itself 'before' all worldly being (ibid., p. 146). If this is true, then the attempt to marry phenomenology with cognitive science is bound to come to grief on the opposition of different accounts of consciousness: the non -causal, transcendental paradigm put forward by phenomenology as opposed to the causal one assumed by cognitive science. Any attempt to employ phenomenology in cognitive scien ce must, then, reinterpret its results in terms of the causal account assumed by the latter. In its attempt to use transcendental consciousness as a paradigm for understanding artificial or brain -based intelligence, cognitive science must transform it int o a part of nature. This naturalization of consciousness is, in fact, a denaturing of it. It is a transformation that makes us lose sight of what is essential to consciousness. In what follows, I shall analyze this objection in terms of the conception of subjectivity the objection presupposes. By employing a different conception, I will then show how it can be met. My aim will be to explain how we can use the insights of phenomenology without denaturing the consciousness it studies. 3 1. Naturalizing Phenomenology and Transcendental Subjectivity Mathematics plays a crucial role in the attempt to naturalize phenomenology. The procedure begins with the phenomenological description of the performances of consciousness. An analysis of the invariant structures of these performances is followed by the development of a mathematical model for such constructions. Expressing this in mathematical algorithms, the cognitive scientist employs the latter in a naturalistic account of consciousness. 4 For a
Ph il os op h i e, Dr it te s B u ch, ed. M . Bi e mel (T he Ha g ue: M a r ti n us Ni j h off, 1 9 7 1 ) , p. 145. 3 Here, l et me a c k n o wl edg e M a rk W. Br o w n s P h. D. t he s is, Na t ura liz i ng P he no m en o l og y: A n Es sa y o n t he P he n o me n ol o g ica l Li m it s o f Na t ura liz i ng P he no m en o l og y, M u r doc h U ni ver si t y, M ur doc h A u s tra l ia , 2 0 0 8 , fro m w h ic h I ha v e dra w n s o me of t he f or m ula ti o n s o f t hi s o b jec ti o n. M y ex pre ss i o n of t he m is m y o w n a s i s m y a t t em pt t o mee t t h em . 4 Fo r a de ta i led d is c us si o n o f th i s pr oced ure, s ee Da vid M a r r, Vi s io n (S a n Fra nc is c o: W. H. Fr ee ma n, 1 9 8 2 , p p. 2 5 ff a n d Ter e nce H or ga n a nd Jo h n Tie n s o n, Co n ne ct i on is m and t h e Ph ilo sop h y of P sy ch ol og y (Ca mbr id ge M a ss .: M IT Pre ss ,

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simple example of this procedure, we can turn to the process of retention or short -term memory. According to Husserl, this memory is built up of a chain of retent ions of retentions of some original content. 5 Thus, first there is an impressional consciousness, then this is retained, then this retention is itself retained, and so on for upwards of a minute or so. We can mathematically model this process by using parentheses to express retention. The use of parentheses surrounding parentheses would then express the retention of a retention. Thus a simple model of the retentional process would be given by the series, i, (i), ((i)) ..., each later member being taken as a retention of the earlier. A computational algorithm can be written for this model. 6 A corresponding algorithm can also be written for the process by which we retain
1 9 9 6 ), pp. 2 4 - 4 5 . 5 In H u sse rl s w o rds , t he r ete n ti o n of t h e o ri gi na l c o n te nt c ha ng es i nt o rete n ti o n o f ret en t io n a nd d oe s s o c o n t i nu ou s ly . Th e res u lt is tha t a fixe d co n ti n uu m of r ete n ti o n a r is es i n su ch a wa y tha t ea c h la ter p oi n t is a ret e nt io n for ev ery ea r l ier p oi n t ( Z ur Ph no m e no log i e d e s in n e re n Z e it be w u s sts e in s (1 8 9 3 1 9 1 7 ), ed. R ud o lf B oe h m, [ T he Ha g ue: M a rt i n us N i j h off, 1 9 6 6 ] p. 2 9 ) . T he f u nct i o n is: ( Def u n Re te nt i o n ( X I mp res s i on) ( co nd ( ( = X 0 ) I mpre s si o n) ( T ( Re te nt i o n ( - X 1 ) ( li st I mp res s i on) ))). Def u n mea n s def i ne the f un ct i on . Re te n ti o n i s t he na m e of t he fu n ct io n . It s va r i a b le s a re X a nd I mp re ss i on . X sta nd s f or t h e nu m ber of rete n ti o n s t he im pre ss i o n i s t o u n der g o . Im pre s si o n s ta nd s f or t he im pre s si o n t o b e re ta i ned . Th e sec o nd li n e s ta tes a c o nd i ti o n f or t he co mp u ta t i on . If X is eq ua l t o 0 , i.e. , if t h e n u mbe r of re te nt i o n s re q ui red is z ero , t h e f u nc ti o n r etu rn s t he i m pre s si o n a n d th e co m pu ta ti o n cea ses . Ot he r wi se, i t p ro cee ds t o t he t h ird l i ne. T he T tel l s it t o perf or m t he co mp u ta t i on w h ic h f o l lo w s t o t he r ig h t o f i t. Fir s t, 1 i s su btra ct ed fro m X - - i.e., th e nu m ber of re qu ir e d ret e nt io n s is red uce d b y on e t hr o u gh t he i ns tr uc ti o n ( X 1 ). T he n, t he i m pre ss i o n t o be r eta in ed i s su rr ou nd ed b y pa re nt h ese s th ro u g h t he i n str uc ti o n ( l is t I mp res s i on) . Fi na l ly , t he o ri g in a l fu nc ti o n i s ca l led a ga in t hr o ug h th e i n st ru ct i on ( Re te nt i o n ( - X 1 ) ( li st I m pre ss i o n))). The va r ia b le s of t hi s f un ct i o n, h o we ver, h a ve be en tra n sfo r med th ro u gh t he fir st t w o ope ra t io n s ju st spe cif ied . F or exa m ple, if X wa s o ri gi na ll y g iv en th e va l ue 3 , t he f i rs t o per a ti o n red uce s i t t o 2 . If I mpre s si o n wa s gi ve n t he va lue i, t he se co n d o pera ti o n g iv es it t he va l ue (i). T h us , t he ca l l t o t he o ri gi na l fu nct i o n, Ret en t io n , is a ca ll f or i t t o ca r ry ou t i ts c o mp u ta t i o n o n a set of va l ue s a rr iv ed a t th ro ug h t he re su lt s of it s pre vi o us c o mp u ta t io n. Th i s ite ra t ive pr o ce s s co n t in ue s w i th 2 b ei n g r educ ed t o 1 a n d t he n to 0 a n d (i) bei n g tra n sf o r med t o ( ( i) ) a nd t h en t o ((( i))). Wh e n X i s 0 , t he n t h e s e c o nd l in e tel l s it t o s to p a n d ret ur n t he va lu e t ha t I mp res s i on n o w ha s - - tha t i s, ((( i))). Th us , ( Re te nt i o n 3 i ) yi e ld s ( ( (i))) . Th i s si g ni fie s t ha t i, t he i m pre ss i o n, ha s su n k ba ck t o a ret en ti o n of a r ete n ti o n of a r ete nt i o n of i .
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successive contents in the order we experience them. Feeding into it the successive contents, A B C D E, it would express their order through sets of increasing parentheses: (E (D ( C (B (A))))). 7 Now, to employ this model in a naturalistic account of consciousness would be to use these increasing parentheses as temporal tags for the successive contents. In terms of artificial intelligence, this would involve first accumulating the data provided by the machines transponders into defined temporal phrases before its processing. As for brain-based intelligence, one would use this model to investigate the sequences of neuronal firing. Generally, whatever the model, the focus would be on the implementation of a given task: in this case, the task of responding to the worlds temporal givenness. The most general objection to this procedure of naturalizing phenomenology is that it is actually a denaturing of it. To employ phenomenology in cognitive science is to miss its special focus. While the natural sciences, including cognitive science, aim at the understanding and manipulation of the external world, phenomenologys focus is on the subjective performances that generate the natural sc iences. It is not interested in contributing to their results, but rather in understanding how these results are achieved. Its focus, in other words, is critical rather than practical. It examines the evidence that a science has for its basic positions and shows how the basic sense structures that characterize the science relate to such evidence. Its critical function is that of limiting a sciences claims to the sense structures that its evidence supports. The ready reply to this objection is that on e may grant it without prejudicing the use of phenomenology. No matter what the focus of phenomenology, its results stand on their own. As genuine insights
Th e f un ct i o n s a r gu me n ts a re: p hra se e.g., A B C D E a g ive n i ni tia l ele me n t e.g ., A a n d X w hic h s i gn if ie s th e nu m ber of re t e nt i o ns. Th e fu nct i o n i s: ( def u n p hra s e - re te nt i o n ( ph ra s e i n it ia l - el e me nt X ) ( c o nd ( ( e q ua l n il ( cdr p h ra se )) ( Re te nt i o n ( - X 1 ) i n it ia l - el e me n t)) ( T ( p hra se - ret e nt io n (cdr p hra se) ( co n s (ca d r p hra se) (l is t i ni t ia l ele me n t) ) ( - X 1 ) ) ) ) ) . Here , (p hra se - r ete n ti o n ( A B C D E) (A ) 1 0 ) yie ld s (((((( E (D ( C ( B (A )))))))))). Of t he 1 0 re te n ti o n s, f ive a re u sed t o re ta i n th e ph ra s e a nd re su lt i n ( E ( D (C (B ( A ) ) ) ) ) . F iv e m or e o c c a s io n t he s i nk i ng d o w n of t he p hr a se a s a w h ol e f ive furt h er de gre e s of pa s tn es s. T he t h ird l i ne o f the a l g or it h m ca ll s up t he i n it ia l fu nct i o n p hra s e - re te n ti o n w h ic h m ea n s t ha t th e fu nc ti o n pr oc es se s t he re su lt s of it s pre vi o us o pera t io n. Wi t hi n t hi s r epr oce s si n g th ere i s a l s o a ca l l t o t he fu nct i o n R ete n ti o n, gi ve n i n n ote 1 , w hi c h a l s o r e pr oce ss es t he res ul ts of i t s prev i ou s op era t i o n.
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into our cognitive processes, their validity does not depend upon the particular aims of phenomeno logy, but only on the accuracy of its accounts. This holds, in particular, for its descriptions of the subjective performances that characterize consciousness as such. Such performances are carried out by the same subjectivity that the cognitive and neuro logical sciences study, namely, our embodied subjectivity. Thus, given that their subject matter is the same , the results of phenomenology can be used by cognitive science. This, of course, is precisely what the objection will not allow. Following Husse rls lead, it asserts that what phenomenology studies is not part of the world. It does not investigate the empirical subject, but rather the non -worldly, transcendental subject. As prior to the world, this subject cannot be described in worldly terms. To deny this is to de ny the point of Husserls epoch . This epoch is what first allows us to do phenomenology. We perform it when we suspend our belief in the natural world. Such a suspension is not a denial, but rather an attempt to examine with unprejudiced eyes the evidence we have for it. This means that we cannot avail ourselves of any thesis that presupposes the existence of this world and this includes all the theses of natural science. 8 Rather than employing these, phenomenologys focus is on the evidence we have for them. In pursuing such evidence, phenomenology discovers the transcendental subject, the subject that constitutes the sense of the world from such evidence. We thus have the aforementioned distinction between the transcendental a nd the empirical subject. The empirical subject presupposes the world, the transcendental subject does not. Descriptions of the former employ causal terms, those of the latter avoid them since their use presupposes the causal intertwining of consciousnes s and the world and, hence, the thesis of the natural world. Given this, we cannot explain the transcendental subject by referring to our embodied empirical subject. In fact, the explanatory relation is the reverse. Phenomenology reveals the empirical s ubject as a sense structure constituted by the transcendental subject from the evidence available to it. 2. The Functional View of Consciousness
A s R o ma n In ga r te n ob ser ve s, t he l o gi ca l po i nt of t he ep o ch is to a v o id t he f a lla cy of t he p et it io p ri nc ip i i , i. e., of a ss u mi n g a s pa rt of t he e vide n ce f or a th es i s s o m et h i ng t ha t pre su pp o ses t hi s t he s i s. T o d o s o i s t o " be g a pri nc ip le" a nd a ss u me w ha t o ne wa s tr yi n g t o pr ove ( O n th e Mot iv e s wh ich led H u s se r l to Tra n sc e nd e nt a l I d eal i s m , tra ns . A . Ha n n iba l ss o n [T he Ha gue : M a rti n us Ni j h off, 1 9 7 5 ], p. 1 2 ) .
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What exactly is the sense of subjectivity presupposed by this objection? Are we to think of the subject as a nonworldly agent, that is, as something ontologically prior to and, hence, independent of the world? Is its agency somehow responsible for the world? There are certainly passages in Husserl that would lead us in this direction. Husserl, in the Cartesian Meditations asserts that transcendental subjectivity constitutes both sense and being. 9 He writes that the project of phenomenology is to make every being itself, be it real or ideal, understandable as a constituted product ( Gebilde ) of transcendental subjectivity. 10 As for the world, it is described in the Crisis as a world whose being is being from subjective performances, and this with such evidence that another world is not thinkable at all. 11 Taken literally, such remarks would position transcendental subjectivity as a God -like agent, one that created the world from nothing. This, of course, is not Husserls position. Far from being independent of the world, it is dependent in its functioning on externally provided data. Such data he asser ts, are nothing produc ed by consciousness. They are that which has come into being alien to consciousness, that which has been received, as opposed to what has been produced through consciousnesss own spontaneity. This means that consciousness is noth ing without impression. 12 Externally provided impressions are the source of all its contents. As for the subject or ego of consciousness, it is, apart from such impressions, an empty form, one that is individualized through the contents provided by the impressions. 13 Given this, how are we to think of the subject? How can it be responsible for the sense and the being of the world and yet be simply a form for an inflowing content. To answer this, we have to first qualify the assertions of the Cartesian Mediations and take them as referring to sense and being for us . What is at issue is not being itself, but rather our action of positing being from the evidence it provides us. We do this by making sense out of a given material.
Ca rt es ia ni sch e Med it at io n en , ed. S . S tra s s er [Th e Ha g ue: M a r ti nu s N i jh off , 1 9 6 3 ], p. 1 1 8 . 10 Ib id. 11 D ie Kr i si s d er eu rop i sch e n W i ss e ns ch a fte n und d ie t ra n sz end e nta le Ph n om en olog i e , ed . W . Bie me l ( T he Ha g ue: M a rt in u s N i j ho ff, 1 9 6 2 ), p. 1 0 0 . 12 Z ur Ph nom e no log i e d e s i n ne r e n Ze it b ew u sst s ei n s (1 8 9 3 - 1 9 1 7 ) , ed. c it., p. 1 0 0 ) . 13 O ne ca n sa y t ha t t h e eg o of t he co g it o is co m pl ete l y de vo id of a ma ter ia l , spe cif ic e s se nce, co m p a ra bl e, i nde ed, wi t h a n ot he r eg o, bu t c o mpa ra bl e o n ly a s a n e mp ty f or m t ha t i s i nd iv id ua l iz ed t hr ou g h t h e s trea m: th i s, i n the se ns e of it s un i q ue ne ss ( M s. E III 2 , 1 9 2 1 , p. 1 8 ).
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This making (or constitut ing) sense is a many layered process. Essentially, it is a matter of identifying a sense as one -in-many and positing this unity as a common referent for an originally apprehended multiplicity, be this a multiplicity of impressions, perceptions, perceptual objects, or states of affairs composed of these. As for consciousness itself, it is not a thing but a function. It is not a particular entity either wit hin the world or prior to it, but rather this synthetic, interpretive function of identifying unities in multiplicities. It is as such a function that we can take it as an empty form informing or shaping the material it receives. The view of phenomenology that results from this insight is given by Husserl when he asks, is not consciousness function . ..? He con tinues, What is necessary?... We have to examine [intentional] experi ences as functions. We have to ask ourselves: What is accomplished in them? What kind of sense is present in them, what kind of sense is progress ively forming itself in the m?...How do functions synthetically, teleologically unite into the unity of a function, etc.? 14 As this passage makes clear, to take consciousness as a function is not to place it behind or beyond the world as if it were some creative agent. It is rath er to define it in terms of those performances that allow it to form and progressively unite senses into greater and greater wholes greater and greater unities in multiplicities. The intentional experience considered as such a function is that of taking o ur experiences as experiences of some common referent, a referent that stands as a unity for their multiplicity. 3. Applicability and Validity In asserting that consciousness is a function, we preclude an objection that can be brought against the attempt to capture it mathematically. This is that consciousness, taken as a concrete entity, is not itself mathematical. The experiences that compose it are not mathematical idealities, but rather the concrete qualitative contents the sights, sounds, tastes, s mells and textures of our daily lives. This point is undeniable. But equally certain is the fact
The e xte n ded qu o te is: . .. i st n ich t B e wu ts ei n F u nkt io n , ... ? Wa s i st a l so not we nd ig ? Es si nd i n t e nt io na l e Er l e bn is s e, E rl e b ni s se a l s F un kti on e n, al s r e lat iv g e sch l os s e ne Fu n kt io n e n b et rach t e n, s ie b etr ac h te nd nach l eb e n, n e u d ur ch l e b en , A kt e v oll zi eh en u nd s i e wi e d e rh ol e nd na c h v ol zi eh e n u nd si ch d a b ei b ef ra g en , wa s d a r in g e l ei st et wi rd , wa s f r S i nn e d a ri n li eg t und sich fo rtg e stal tet , wa s m an d a b e i tut und wa s d a rd ur ch f r S in n es l ei st ung g el e i stet wi rd im b e rg a ng z u d e n um fa s s end e n Z us am m enh ng e n in d e r E inh e it d e s Le b e ns , w i e Fu nkt io n en m it F u nkt ion e n si ch z u r Einh e it ei n er F u nkt io n s y nt h et i sch t e le og i sch e i nig e n, us w (M s. A V I 3 1 , p. 1 9 a ).
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that we can describe a function in mathematical terms without asserting that what performs this function is itself mathematical. To assert this would be to ontologize the description, making it the true being or reality of the thing described. This is the error that the Crisis denounces in its account of modern science. Post -Galilean science takes its equations as expressing the reality of the world. At bottom, its error is the simple one of substituting the description for the thing described. Just as the law of gravitation is not the gravitating bodies whose relations it describes, so a mathematical relation is not itself the things it relates. This p oint, however, does not hold with regard to functions. Such functions are not things but rather formal relations and processes. As such, their reality can be caught mathematically. To call consciousness a function is to assert that what is essential to it are not the concrete qualitative contents of the experiences composing it, but rather its performances with regard to such material. Because our consciousness is embodied, it does experience the world through its senses. Its contents are those of the t astes, touches, smells, sights and textures provided by our five senses. What is its relation to consciousness defined as a function? The answer can be found in a distinction Husserl makes between conditions of validity ( Geltung ) and those of applicabili ty ( Anwendugn ). 15 As Husserl observes in the Logical Investigations , the two involve very different laws. The formal laws of arithmetic, for example, give us the conditions under which additions are valid. Calculations which violate them are invalid. Quit e different laws are at work when we make these laws applicable to adding machines. A mechanical adding machine uses the laws of the gear and lever, a modern calculator uses those of electronics. Yet both instantiate the same mathematical laws. A simila r argument can be made with regard to our consciousness understood as a function. Such a consciousness represents a set of performances. For example, we apprehend objects by identifying perspectival patterns of appearing and assigning them referents. Do ing so, we interpret the perceptions of a given pattern as perceptions of a given object for
Hus ser l ma k es th i s d is ti n ct i o n w it h re ga rd to t he l o gi ca l la ws. F or su ch la ws to b e a pp li ca b le t o u s, w e ha v e t o be a b l e to k eep p r op os i ti o na l mea n in g s sta ble . Ch il dre n, b e f ore th e a ge of rea s o n, ca n n ot d o t hi s. If we fa il t o dis t in g ui s h t he va l id i ty f r o m th e a p p lica bi l it y of t h i s la w, w e w ou ld ha ve t o ca l l t he la w of n on c o ntra di ct i on i nv al id w he nev er, t hr ou g h a ge, il l ne ss o r in fir m it y, we c o uld n ot f ulf i ll th e c on di ti o n o f h o ldi n g mea ni n g s s ta b le. S ee Log is ch e U nt e r s uch ung en , E r st er Ba nd , ed. U rs ula Pa nz e r in Ed m u nd H u ss e rl, Ge sa m m e lt e Sch ri ft en ( Ha mb ur g: Fel ix M e in e r Ver la g 1 9 9 2 ), II, 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 .
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example, a box that we turn in our hands, viewing it first from one side and then from another. Given that this is actually how we see objects, this process must be one that is instantiated in our embodied being, that is, in our embodied, empirical subjectivity . The laws of applicability for such interpretive functions are thus biological ones those having to do with our brains. These, however, are not the laws o f consciousness as a function. They do not apply to the transcendental subjectivity that is defined by such functions. It is, nonetheless, quite helpful to understand the functioning of transcendental subjectivity in attempting to find out how our brains work. The formal laws of its functioning can serve as clues to the biological basis of our interpretive activity. Now, only if we equate the two sorts of laws, could we be accused of ignoring the special nature of transcendental consciousness. Given that such a consciousness is not a thing, but a func tion, this would be to commit the same kind of fallacy as equating the laws of arithmetic with those of, say, a mechanical adding machine. The relation of our embodied, empirical subjectivity to transcenden tal subjectivity is the same as that between this adding machine and the laws that specify the validity of its operations. Our empirical subjectivity embodies the transcendental by instantiating through its own organic processes the functions that charact erize the transcendental. 4. Transcendental Consciousness and Natural Science The distinction I have drawn between transcendental and empirical subjectivity allows us to meet another variant of the objection I have been considering. It is based on Gal ileos separation of the primary from the secondary qualities of matter. The primary are its quantifiable aspects such as its measurable distances, speeds, wavelengths, weights and so on. The secondary are its qualitative aspects, i.e., the tastes, sound s, colors and so on that our five senses reveal. Natural science, following Galileo, take s causality as pertaining to the quantifiable aspects of the material world. This means that before we can causally describe the world, we must first reduce its seco ndary qualities to its primary. Sound has to be understood as the frequency of the pressure waves reaching our ear, color to the wavelengths of light, and so forth. It is only in terms of such measurable qualities that we can mathematically formulate cau sal relations. The advantage we gain from this is not just greater precision. It is also the ability to make objectively verifiable (third person) claims based on objectively

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measureable data. The same cannot be said of the secondary qualities of matter . Each of us can experience them only through his own senses. Not directly quantifiable, they can claim only a subjective (first person) validity. Natural science gets beyond this by reducing the secondary to the primary. Concretely, this means explaining the sensuously appearing world in terms of its underlying physical processes. Given this, natural science stands unalterably opposed to phenomenology since phenomenology, by definition, studies appearances while science explains them away by reducing them to physical processes. The causality science employs presupposes this reduction, so do its mathematical descriptions. The implication here is that we conflate irreconcilable paradigms when we mathematize phenomenological descriptions and employ them in causal accounts of consciousness. The cognitive science that attempts this forgets that the causality employed by modern science is not a formalization of subjective experience, but rather a reduction of it to non -subjective processes. As in the earlier versions of this same objection, what is presupposed here is consciousness as a worldly reality rather than a function. The contents of our embodied consciousness are the tastes, touches, smells, sights and textures provided by our bodily senses. To reduce the secondary qualities presented by such contents to primary ones is to take them as the effects of the world on our embodied consciousness. The point is to relate them to the physical features of the world that produce these effects. The objection thus treats consciousness as a natural entity causally related to other natural entities, these being the objects affecting our bodily senses. Now, although such contents are understood in terms of such effects, they themselves are not explained away or reduced to them. The contents themselves do not suffer reduction, but only their claims to directly represent the features of the external world. 16 What is reduced are the references of these contents. As Descartes formulates it, the attempt here is to move from variations in the secondary contents, for example those of a change in color, to the corresponding variations in the material world. 17 Now, when we turn from our embodied, empirical consciousness to
Were t he c o nte n ts t h em se lve s t o u nder g o a redu ct i on , sc ie nc e w o uld l os e i ts ob ser v a t i o na l ( e mp iri c a l) ba s is. 17 In Des ca r tes w ord s, f r om t he fa c t tha t I perc ei ve d iffe re nt k i n ds of c ol or s, od or s, ta s te s, so u nd s, hea t, ha rd ne s s a nd so o n, I ver y rea d il y c o n cl ude tha t i n th e o b jec t s f r o m wh ic h t h ese va r i ou s se ns e perc ept i o ns pr oc eed t her e a re s o me cor re sp o ndi n g va ria t i o ns ( Med itat io n s o n F ir st Ph il o sop h y , VI, tra ns . L. La F le ur [Ne w Y or k: M a c m i lla n , 1 9 9 0 ] , p. 7 7 ).
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transcendental consciousness taken as a funct ion, what is at issue is not the physical reference of these individual contents, but rather those synthetic, constitutive performances that place these contents in intentional relations. As I said above, such performances, rather than the particular cont ents composing it, are the defining elements of transcendental consciousness. What cognitive science attempts to draw from phenomenology is an account of such performances. Its first concern is with the performances as such, independent of their field of application. It is, in fact, in terms of Husserls distinction between conditions of validity and those of applicability that we overcome the objection that the causality modern science employs presupposes the reduction of appearances to physical processe s. Strictly speaking, the notion of causality has nothing to do with this reduction. As Hume and Kant showed, it is simply a formal relation, one involving necessity in the sequence of appearances. To say that A causes B is simply to assert that the exp erience of A is necessarily followed by the experience of B. One may either give such necessity a psychological force as Hume did or affirm it as an a priori category as Kant chose to do. In either case, however, the concept per se is silent on the relat ion of primary to secondary qualities. It only concerns conditions for validly drawing causal relations. Its strictly formal character does not mean that we cannot use it to guide us in discovering the causal relations of physical processes. Such relations, insofar as they involve necessary sequences, can be taken as applications of this formal law. These applications, as concerning physical processes, do concern the primary qualities of matter. This, however, does not mean that the concept of causalit y inherently involves the reduction of subjective experience to physical processes. Rather, since it concerns the sequence of experiences, it is open to phenomenological explication. As such, it forms part of the resources that phenomenology can offer co gnitive science. To employ these resources does not involve any denaturing of the consciousness that phenomenology studies. Rather, it clarifies the transcendental nature of such consciousness, allowing us to focus on it as a function rather than a thing .

berschau and The Givenness of Life in Husserls Phenomenology

Andrea Staiti (Boston College) One of the seminal insights of modern thought is that to be a subject means to be capable of, and even called to, self determination. On this point, Husserl is notoriously consistent with the German transcendental tradition, particularly with Kant and Fichte. However, as a phenomenologist, he is not primarily concerned with a theory of self -determination (a point on which Kant, Fichte and other figures in th e transcendental tradition would significantly disagree) but rather with the experiential conditions for possibility of self -determination. Provided that being a subject does mean being called to self -determination, how is such a thing possible? Although t his question had been tackled already by the previous thinkers, it assumes for Husserl a quite distinctive meaning. Kant, in answering this question, introduces his postulates of practical reasoning, and Fichte appeals to the necessity of a free resolution of the will. Husserl, on the other hand, wishing that his answer be consistent with his phenomenological method, requires a reference to experience and conscious acts. The question must be restated in these terms: How is the experience of myself structure d so that self-determination is possible and even necessary? In this paper I will argue that Husserl, in attempting to answer this question, progressively focuses on a peculiar kind of act that he terms berschau , thereby borrowing a word from ordinary Ger man and giving a technical meaning to it. A possible English translation of berschau could be panoramic view or comprehensive view but, given the technicality of the term, I prefer to leave it untranslated for most of this paper. berschau is the kind of act in which we experience our personal life as a whole and, correlatively, the world as the constant horizon of this whole. In other words, berschau is a correlative apprehension of totality. Husserl sometimes employs the term berschau in contexts other than the problem of life and the world. For example, when he refers to the overarching act that embraces all examples of a certain region of being while we run through them in the performance of an eidetic variation, he occasionally speaks of berschau . Although also in this case he is describing a certain form of apprehension of totality, and so a full account of berschau should include a treatment of eidetic variation, in this paper I will exclusively focus on berschau as the originary mode of acce ss to that peculiar kind of totality that our life is. Moreover, whereas the talk of berschau with respect to the

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performance of eidetic variation, does not identify a particular kind of act and therefore doesnt have a technical meaning it is meant to denominate a peculiar and robust kind of intentionality when it refers to the issue of life. I will proceed as follows: First, I will try to elucidate the systematic venue of berschau in a phenomenological account of self-determination. Second, I will consi der some passages where Husserl speaks of berschau and attempt to reconstruct its phenomenological structure. Third, I will articulate a sharp distinction between berschau and modes of presentification ( Vergegenwrtigung ) and between berschau and reflection. At times, Husserl seems to endorse a reflective account of berschau but I find this characterization problematic. Finally, I will suggest a possible alternative account of berschau as a special actualization of self awareness. 1. The first import ant thing to notice in order to understand the import of Husserls discovery of berschau is the obvious fact that when we talk about self -determination ( Selbstbestimmung ) we are specifically talking about a special case of determination ( Bestimmung ). From a phenomenological point of view, the determination of something as something say of an apple as red is a quite sophisticated and multi -faceted kind of accomplishment that is better studied when we explicitly bring it to expression in a judgment. When we judge that this apple is red we ascribe a certain property to a certain substrate: the apple. 1 This substrate, however, must be previously given in experience as a suitable candidate for the ascription of more or less abiding properties such as rednes s. In this sense, determination refers back phenomenologically to givenness: the substrate must be given in the first place, i.e., it must be the thematic unity of an explicit intentional consciousness in order for me to determine it in any further way. 2 The givenness of a substrate in experience, however,
In Hu s ser l s t er ms : Ever y jud g me n t (if i t i s a s i mp le o ne) ha s i ts o wn ob je ct a bo ut- w h ic h a nd t hi s is t here b y a su bs tra te f or i ts de ter m i na t io n s [ Jed e s U rt ei l h at ( w en n e s ei n ei nf ach es i st) se i ne n G eg en sta nd - wo r b e r , und d i e se r is t d ar in Su b st rat f r s ei n e Be st im m ung e n ] . Hua X V, 5 2 0 . 2 I n t he se lf - gi ve n nes s t he s ub st ra te is g iv en pr i or t o it s det er mi na ti o n a nd t he dete rm i na t i o ns <a re g ive n > o nl y if [ ] t h e su bs tra te is g ive n i n a dva nce [ In d e r S el b st g eg eb e nh eit is t d as S u b st rat f r h er g e g e be n a ls d i e Be st im m u ng e n, und d ie Be sti m m u ng en n u r, we n n [ ] d a s Su b st rat v o rh e r g eg e b e n i st ]. H ua XV , 5 2 4 .
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refers back to what Husserl calls pre -givenness: If I can explicitly turn toward a certain substrate and thus have it given as ready for further determination, this is because that substrate was alread y there in my experience as a unity. This pre -given unity, for the Husserl of the Lectures on Passive Synthesis , is the result of a complicated dynamic of temporal and associative synthesis that takes place passively between the rudimentary elements of sensibility. Pre-givenness is thus the general title for that dimension of passive constitution that makes givenness (as explicit, thematic grasp) possible in the first place. Now, if we apply the threefold pattern of phenomenological explication pre -givenn ess/givenness/determination(s) to the issue of life and self -determination, the following situation can be noticed: Whereas some progress has been made in the investigation of both the pre - given dimension of life and here I have in mind various insightf ul studies dedicated to self -awareness and the self manifestation of the absolute stream of time -consciousness 3 and the structure of concrete self -determination developed by Husserl in his lectures on ethics and in his articles on renewal 4 little or nothin g has been accomplished to investigate the middle term of the series, i.e., the givenness of life in a genuinely phenomenological fashion. To put it differently: Granted that I am constantly self aware and that I do perform acts of self -determination, ho w do I move from a general sense of myself as enduring self -awareness to the experience of my life as a given, shapeable whole, so that acts of self-determination become open practical possibilities (and even imperatives) in the first place? It is in tryin g to answer this fascinating question that Husserl discovers berschau as a peculiar mode of totality -consciousness. 2. Husserls descriptions of berschau focus around two tightly interrelated issues he starts grappling with in the 1920s: The possibility of a universal epoch (explored chiefly in the second part of the lecture course on Erste Philosophie ) and the structure of ethical life (a topic he covers extensively in the articles written for the Japanese journal Kaizo ). The two issues are interrelated because in both cases Husserl is facing the same question: How can an accomplishment carried out in a single, temporally identifiable act
3 4

S ee a t lea st Za ha vi 1 9 9 9 ; Fa sc hi n g 2 0 0 9 ; D e Wa rre n 2 0 0 9 . S ee a t lea s t W el t o n 1 9 9 1 ; Or t h 1 9 9 3 ; S te i nb o ck 1 9 9 4 ; S ta it i 2 0 1 0 .

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extend beyond that particular act and become a permanent disposition? How could what is brought about in a single act become determinant for life in its entirety? And just what is that life in its entirety? As for ethical life, an apprehension of life in its entirety is manifestly what is somehow presupposed when we make life-embracing decisions such as choosing our professional career or getting married. No matter what happens with such a decision in the future eventually its motivational force can diminish and even fade out completely in the moment in which I seriously make the decision I want to marry this woman or I want to become a d octor, I am determining my life as a whole and committing it to that particular person or to health care. Acts of this kind constitute for Husserl the essence of ethical life, which is not about seeking fulfillment in just a momentary activity but about t rying to secure genuine satisfaction for life in general. 5 But how can a momentary activity extend to life in general and determine it? The same issue resurfaces in the Erste Philosophie lecture where Husserl tries to determine how the psychological epoch carried out on single acts of consciousness can be extended to a universal epoch , thereby transforming intentional psychology into 6 transcendental phenomenology. Also in this case, the question is: how can the suspension of being carried out in a single act be generalized into a suspension of worldly being overall? An indefinite iteration of single -act-related epoch s will not do, because
Fu lfi ll m en t d oe s n ot a ri se f r o m si n gl e [ ] sa t is fa ct i o ns. O n t he c o ntra ry , i t i s gr ou nd ed i n th e cer ta i nt y of t he h ig he st deg ree o f dura bl e sa ti sfa c ti o n i n o ne s w h ole l if e i n ge ner a l [ Z uf ri ed enh e it en tsp ri ng t ni ch t a u s ei nz el n en [ ] Bef r i ed ig ung e n, so nd e r n si e g r nd e t i n d e r G ew is sh eit g r tm g l ich e r s tand h a lt end e r Bef r i ed ig ung im G e sa m t le b e n b e rh a up t .] Hua X XV II, p. 3 1 . Fu rt he rm or e: [T he hu ma n be i ng] d oe s n o t p o si t f o r hi m se lf o n l y si n gu la r g oa ls a nd t he n i n ca se of fa i lu re tr ie s t o a t t a in ne w s i n gu la r g oa ls . Ra t h er h e p os it s f or hi m se lf lif e g oa l s a n d e nv i sa g e s a met h od o l og y for h i s pra ct ica l e x is te nce . T h is me t ho do l o gy re s ts up o n a pa n ora m ic v ie w o n l ife s o fa r i n it s s ucce s se s a n d fa il ure s, o n sa t isf a ct i o n a nd d is sa t i sfa c ti o n s o fa r. [ I n ot he r w ord s], i t res t s up o n se lf - r ef l ect i o n, c rit i q ue, u n iv ersa l re s o lu ti o n of t he wi l l. I n t hi s wa y [ t he hu ma n bei n g] p ro du c es a met h od of lif e a nd c or re la t ive l y a re l a ti o n t o t h e su rr ou nd w or ld d ef i ne d by a s tr iv i ng i n orde r t o gi ve t o t he su rr ou nd i ng w or l d a m ore f a v ora bl e f o r m. [ [ D e r M e n sch ] s tel lt s ich nich t n ur E i nz el zi el e und v e rs uch t b e i Mi s sl ing e n n e u e Ei nz e lz ie l e. E r st el lt sich L e b en sz i el e und e nt wi rft ei n e Met h od i k h and e l nd e n D as e in s, b er uh e nd auf e in e r be r sch au b er b is h e r ig e s Le b e n i n G el ing e n u nd Mi s s li ng e n, be r bi sh er i g e Z uf r i ed e nh eit und U nz uf ri ed e nh e it etc. < b er uh end > a uf S el b st be s in n ung , K ri tik , u niv e rs al em Wi ll e n se nt sc h lu s s. S o st el lt e r e in e L e be n sm et h od e h e r u nd k or r el ativ e in Ve rh a lt en zu r U m w elt i m St re b e n, i h r g n st ig e r e Fo rm zu g e b e n . ( Hua X X X I X, p . 1 5 6 ).] 6 O n t hi s is s ue se e Dr u mm o nd 1 9 7 5 a s we ll a s my e nt ry Ca rt e sia n is ch e r W eg / P sy ch o log is ch e r W eg / L e b e ns w elt lich e r W eg i n Ga nder 2 0 1 0 .
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this would leave unaffected the horizons of worldly validity implicitly surrounding any given act, thus failing to ach ieve genuine universality. Either a really universal, all -encompassing epoch has to be deemed impossible, or subjective life must be somehow given as a totality and not just as indefinite iteration of momentary experience in a specific form of intentional ity, thereby offering itself to the universal bracketing of phenomenological epoch . It is in this context that Husserl develops a more detailed description of berschau , whereas he refers to it only cursorily when he deals with the problems of ethics. Aft er giving a presentation of the horizon-like structure of consciousness and highlighting that the horizonal validity of the world represents a difficulty for the method of epoch carried out on single intentional acts, Husserl remarks that: On the other h and, however, there is a radical means to disconnect at once all validities that are entailed in the streaming life as constituting. This means is given to us precisely through our above considerations about the constant horizon -consciousness which accompanies every present phase of life and can be penetrated at any time from our thematically grasping regard. 7 The horizonal structure of consciousness thus turns out to be a resource rather than a menace to transcendental -phenomenological radicalism: Husserl points out that we actually can dominate the whole, doubly -infinite manifold of horizonal validities because they are a priori entailed in our constituting life and we do have a panoramic, all-embracing view on our life ( berschau ). In order to provide a phenomenological description of berschau , Husserl starts by developing it out of other act -classes having subjectivity rather than objects as their theme: First, we have simple reflections, directed towards already accomplished acts. I perceive a house an d subsequently I shift my attention and thematize this perception -ofa-house. Acts of simple reflection, Husserl argues, are not exclusively theoretical: there are also reflective evaluations and volitions, 8 for example, when I look back and ask myself w hether the dismissive answer I gave to my student in class was really the right thing to do. But the thematic grasp of subjectivity is not limited to that. We can manifestly thematize entire stretches of life, 9 past and future included, and, for example, we can decide to devote the upcoming summer to rest or we can bitterly acknowledge that we wasted our last month trying to pursue a project that
... H ua VII I, p. 1 5 3 f . ... H ua VII I, p. 1 5 4 . 9 [ g anz e L e be n s st r ec k en ] , ib id .
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proved unfeasible. It is important to notice, already in this case, that casting a panoramic view on our past month does not amount to reawakening all or some of the acts that we performed and not even to compiling a sort of chart of last months highlights. 10 We can do that too, but this is not the point when we speak about our past month as a whole . The point is rather that we possess and dominate it as a whole and are able to determine and assess it as such. The wholeness of single stretches of life, however, does not embrace the full breadth of my subjectivity: a single stretch of life is always located either in the past, or in the future, sometimes reaching up to or including the present moment. In any case, the wholeness of a stretch of life is but a finite wholeness. This kind of experience, however, can be further extended: Finally, I can also cast a panoramic, universal view on my entire life and make decisions regarding my whole life, similar to what I can do that for finite stretches of life. Thus, I can carry out a universal critique of my life up to the present moment and at the same time be determinate to shape my entire future life: be it from the point of view of a universal value that I accept as valid without questioning it (such as power, success, and the like) or be it in the above sense of ethical self -reflection, self -critique and self -regulation. If we follow this second sense and, so to speak, we look for its ideal -form, we get to a peculiar reflective form of self -regulation connected to a universal panoramic view on life ( universale berschau des Lebens ) . 11 The simultaneous grasp of past an d future is the peculiar trait of berschau that distinguishes it from any other form of thematization of subjectivity. In the next section I will expand on this and distinguish berschau sharply from any form of presentification (recollection or expectation) and from reflection intended as a retrospective look on conscious acts. 3. The function of berschau , as presented thus far, is making our life graspable as a whole and thereby making it available for self determination. In so doing, berschau makes something (my life) present which strictly speaking is not present. At least, it is not present in the manner of perceptual objects or of the particular thought I am entertaining in this given moment. However, berschau must be first of all distinguished f rom any form of presentification.
The sa me go es , w it h th e a p t m od if ica ti o n s, f or t h e pa n ora mi c vie w o n t he upc o m i ng s u mm er. 11 Hua VI II, 1 5 4 . M y I ta l ic s.
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There are two interconnected reasons to this: a temporal and an egological one. If we consider temporality it is quite obvious that, first of all, berschau cannot be a form of imaginative presentification. Imagination is non-positional consciousness: it lacks completely any referenc e to a real temporal context ( Zeitzusammenhang ) for the perceptual, practical or evaluative situations it represents. For this reason, if berschau were a form of imagination, it wouldnt be a ble to offer a grasp of my real life as unfolding in real and not merely fantasized time. It would offer just imagined life. On the contrary, the other two basic forms of presentification viz. recollection and expectation could at first glance seem to be good candidates for the explanation of the kind of consciousness berschau is. Couldnt berschau be a mixed kind of consciousness combining together series of recollections and expectations into a whole? Husserl is very careful here excluding this option a nd emphasizing how both recollections and expectations are reproductive modes of consciousness while berschau is not. 12 When we want to thematize our life as a whole, filling -in with illustrative intuitive content some past or future stretches of time (by means of a presentifying reproduction) is not only irrelevant, but also disturbing, for it distracts our attention from the wholeness we want to grasp and redirects it to some particular. Moreover and this is what is really crucial about the distinctive te mporal character of berschau berschau is a simultaneous grasp of the past and the future from the vantage point of the present . 13 A recollection, in order to be a recollection, needs to reproduce illustratively its content as unfolded in the past. Likewis e an expectation, in order to be an
If no w w e ref l ect upo n wha t k i nd o f a cco mp l is h me n t th e un ive rsa l pa n ora m ic v ie w is, pr ov ide d t ha t we a re ce rta i n ly a l rea d y fa m il i a r w i th i t i n ot he r c o n tex ts , is i t cl ea r t ha t he re we a c tua ll y do n ot ha ve a rea l a ct of s eei n g. [Th e pa n ora m ic vi ew ] i s n ot a rea l r epr od uc ti o n of t he pa s t lif e in a c o nt i nu it y of e xp li ci t in t ui ti ve r e co ll ect i o ns , a s if I ha d t o r el ive my pa st o nce a ga i n a nd ste p b y st ep. A n d ev e n les s ca n t he pa n o ra mi c v ie w be a n ex pl ic it il l us tra ti o n of t he pr o ba b il it ie s a nd p o ss ib il i tie s o f m y fut ur e lif e. [ be r leg e n wi r n u n zu nch st , wa s d i e u n s j ed en fa ll s so n sth e r v e rt r aut e un iv er s al e b e rs ch au b er u n se r Le b e n f r ei n e L ei st un g is t , so is t e s kl ar, d a e s sich h i e r be i nich t e r ns tl ich um ei n e Sch a u h a nd e lt , nich t um ei ne wi rk li ch e R ep r od u ktio n d e s v erg ang e n en L e be n s i n e in e r Ko nt in uit t ex p liz it e r an s ch a ul ich er Wi ed e r er in n e ru ng e n, a l s o b ich m ei ne Ve rg a ng enh e it Z ug um Z ug g l eich sa m no ch e in m al d u rch l e be n m te , und e rst r ech t nich t k an n e s si ch h a n d el n um e in e ex p li zit e Au sm a l ung d e r V e rm u t lich ke it en u nd Mg li ch k eit e n m ei n es z uk n ft ig e n L eb e n s . ( H ua V II I, p. 1 5 5 ).] 13 A d is cu ss i o n of t he n ot i o n of l iv in g pre se nt wo u ld be a pp ro pr ia te here b ut th i s w o uld r e qu ire t o o l o ng a d ig res s i on fr o m t he ma i n l i ne o f i n qu ir y o f t hi s pa per .
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expectation, needs to reproduce illustratively its content as unfolding in the future. This belongs to the essence of, respectively, recollection and expectation and clarifies why a mixture of recollection of expectation is utterly inconceivable, or better, unexperienceable. The intentional content of berschau , instead, which is life itself, is grasped as being located simultaneously both in the past and the future. This is why, as Husserl points out: The representing and grasping -as-being through berschau manifestly has the character of an anticipating and vague grasp from afar and this is necessarily so. 14 Either one -sided temporal determinacy (recollection or expectation) or temporal indifference (pure imagination): these are the only two options in order for an act of presentification to admit of illustrative content. By withholding both options, berschau withholds at the same time any kind of illustrative content. My life as a whole can be fully grasped as such but not articulated within an illustrative act. Every intuitive illustration what Husserl calls Veranschaulichung must be temporally qualified as either past or future or as time -indifferent. But life as a totality is neither, because it embraces the enti rety of the temporal determinations of both objects and acts. 15 As concerns the aforementioned egological issue, one essential feature of presentifications (both pure imagination and recollection/expectation) is what Husserl calls doubling or splitting of the ego. The act of presentification entails an ego other than the present one. Both egos, however, are grasped as the same through the work of a synthesis of identification. However, when I cast a panoramic view on my life and thereby grasp it as a w hole there is manifestly no ego implied other than my present one grasping this flux of life as his own and as a shapeable totality. From this point of view, one could argue that berschau is closer to simple perception, at least in egological terms, than to presentification. This last remark is helpful to articulate another important distinction, before I proceed with a brief conclusion: we have to distinguish sharply between berschau and reflection as a second [ D as b e rs ch a ue nd e V or st el le n u nd A ls - s e ie nd - e rfa s s en h at o ff e n ba r d en Ch a rakt e r ei n es a nt i zip i er e nd e n u nd v ag e n E r fa s se n s v on Fe r n en , und h at ih n not we nd ig . ( Hua VII I, p. 1 5 5 ) ] 15 M o re o n t h i s po i nt ca n be f ou n d i n t he s o - c a lle d C - ma nu scr ip t s w her e H us ser l spea k s o f l if e in t h e f o ll o w in g ter m s: M y l ife is a n u nbr o ke n u n it y of or ig i na r il y f l o wi n g te mp ora l iz a t i on in w hi c h a l l t he ma n if ol d t e mp ora l iz a t i on s a re en ta ile d [ M e in Le b e n i st e in e ung e b roch e ne Ei nh e it d er ur st r m e nd en Z eit ig u ng , i n d er al l e m an nig fal t ig e n Ze itig u ng en g e b org e n si nd . ( M a t . VI II, p. 3 ). ]
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grade act. Reflection, as is quite obvious, is an act that regards another act. Moreover (and consequently), reflection is an act in which subjectivity rather than objectivity is thematic. Now, although it is self -explanatory that berschau has subjectivity as a theme (and to that extent Husserl is right to classify it among the forms of reflective consciousness), it seems that it cannot be a second-grade act. A second-grade act reflection has a retrospective character. Therefore, some sort of act must be straightforwardly accomplished first , in order for subjectivity to return reflectively on it. But what kind of first -grade act could be accomplished that has berschau merely as its second -grade act? To be sure, berschau ranges over a manifold of past and future acts that are the first hand material of life. But this panoramic ranging over is manifestly not a second -grade review of the already accomplished or future acts because its intentional object is not these acts but my life as a whole. Let me briefly expound the solution suggested in Erste Philosophie in order to then criticize it. Husserl points out, as I stated as the outset, that berschau is always a correlative kind of consciousness. By casting a panoramic view on our life we cant help but realize that this life has always already be en and will be a life -in-theworld that is to say, a life in which a tacit position of the world has been unceasingly carried out: Casting a panoramic view on my life means thus at the same time and correlatively casting a panoramic view on the world [ ]. 16 This realization is crucial for Husserls problem of articulating a universal epoch : since life embraces constantly the entire horizon of the world, it is possible to bracket the worlds validity at once because we dispose of this life as a whole in the present. In this context Husserl suggests that the berschau on life is a second-grade reflection carried out on the previously accomplished consciousness -of-theworld[ Weltbewusstsein ]. He even suggests a strong affinity between what he terms single r eflection and universal reflection 17 and suggests that in the same way in which the straightforward perception of a single object comes first and reflection can only follow simple perception, so the simple panoramic gaze directed towards my surrounding wo rld is what comes first and is then followed by a reflection upon my life which posited the world. 18 In
M ei n Le b e n be r sch a ue n, h e i t a l so in e in s d am it u nd i n k o rr e lat iv e r We nd u ng : d ie W e lt be r sch a u e n [ ] . ( Hua V III , 1 5 7 .) 17 Z wi sch e n Ei n ze l re fl ex ion u nd u niv e rs al e r R ef l ex i on (i bid .) 18 U nd e b e ns o ist d er sc h lich t b e r sch a u end e Bl ick a uf m e i ne U m we lt d as e r st e, u nd ih m f olg t d an n d i e Re fl e x io n a uf m e in L e b en , d a s d a s we lt s etz end e wa r . (ib id.)
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other words: We are at first tacitly aware of the world in its entirety and then realize by means of a panoramic, backward, reflection that our intent ional life (as the positing factor) constantly embraces its entire scope. In this way, we become aware of our life as a whole. This solution, however, is somewhat puzzling to me. I am inclined to think that it is, on the contrary, by means of the grasp of our life as a whole that we may become conscious of the world as a whole. Following Husserls solution on this point seems to imply that what gives unity to my life, what literally holds it together as a whole, is the ceaseless positing of the world tha t it carries out. I am more inclined to think that the very fact that the world can appear to us as a totality is conditioned by the fact that we can grasp our life as a totality: take, for example, the notion of surrounding world ( Umwelt ) evoked by Huss erl in the previous quote. The unity of my surrounding world as the terminus ad quem of all my actions and the terminus a quo of all my conscious objects seems to derive its unity from the reference to my life rather than the other way around. It is becaus e I can grasp my life as a whole that the world becomes manifest as a totality that is correlated to this life. Otherwise, why couldnt we have just an endless and pervasive series of singular positions of being that were merely juxtaposed against each oth er, rather than a world? Given the heterogeneous character of the objects of our experience and the fact that they are all more or less independent of one another, it is all the more enigmatic that we can experience them as pertaining to an encompassing whole the world. It seems to be more convincing to ground this unity in the life that posits and experiences the world, rather than arguing that this life only gains its unity within a reflective act upon our consciousness of the world. 19 4. Brief conclusion If berschau is not understood as a reflective modification of world-consciousness, how can we then account for its phenomenological origin? My proposal on this point will be tentative: I think that we can understand berschau as a peculiar form of actualization of self -awareness. Let me briefly explain what
I nte re st i ng l y, H us se rl se e ms to r ev is e h is p o si t io n in s o me of h i s la ter ma nu sc ri pt s on t he pr ob le m of th e l ife - w or l d (H ua X XX I X) a nd e mp ha siz e ho w we ca n ha ve a g e nu i ne expe rie n ce of t he w or ld on l y a s t he c or re la t e of t he t o ta l expe rie n c e of ou r l if e. I ca n o nl y me nt i o n t h is he re, f or t he sa ke o f bre vi ty, b ut I wi ll def i ni te ly expa nd o n t hi s po i nt i n a m or e de ve lo ped ve rsi o n of t h i s pa per .
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I mean. I already mentioned in the first point of this paper that every explicit grasp and further determination of an object presupposes its pre-givennes. The same goes for life. If we can carry out an berschau on our life as a whole, this is because our life is preconstituted as such. How is this pre-constitution structured? One of the merits of Husserls approach is that it offers a strong account of this point: the pre-constitution of life as a w hole is to be understood in terms of the self -manifestation of the absolute flow of time consciousness. This self -manifestation constitutes what we commonly refer to as self - awareness. Self -awareness is a pervasive phenomenon that can be found at all lev els of our subjective life. The origin of self -awareness can be traced in the peculiar structure or retentional consciousness, whereby consciousness does not only retain just -past phases of the object but at the same time retains itself as correlated to th ese phases. Retention is a form of double -consciousness. The pervasive sense of mineness inherent in our experience is constituted precisely as a result of this double -consciousness that constantly preserves itself as itself thanks to retention. A number o f insightful studies on this point showed convincingly that retentional consciousness qua prethematic self-awareness must be considered the condition of possibility of both act -intentionality and act -related reflection. Thanks to the constant work of rete ntion, we are able to thematize objects and return on our acts in reflection. But is this all? I would like to suggest that berschau might be considered as a further way of capitalizing on self -awareness distinct from act -related reflection. Tacit self -awareness is activated and capitalized on every time we perform an act of reflection pertaining to a single intentional object or state of affairs. What comes to manifestation is an object or a complex of objects correlated to a temporally qualified cross-section of our intentional life. But since self -awareness is pervasive, it is also perfectly plausible that it can be enacted in a way that is not related to a single cross -section of intentional life but, exploiting this pervasiveness, brings the whole of this intentional life to manifestation. In this case, the tacit self manifestation of the stream of time -consciousness that accompanies every intentional act (self -awareness) is transformed into an explicit grasp of my intentional life in its entirety, as constituted within this stream and phenomenologically prior to every other object or act. The appearance of life as whole is, as I said at the outset, the condition of possibility of all further accomplishments that constitute ethical life and are known a s acts of self -determination. A

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more extensive study of the passage from mere self -awareness to berschau would be required in order to determine where exactly the motivational sources for self -determination lie. Husserl suggests in different places that a full understanding of this point is crucial to understand the difference between human and animal life. Moreover, it would be fascinating to spell out the metaphysical anthropological consequences of this view and show how the notion of berschau can offer a radical alternative to the Augustinian Heideggerian position that understands human life primarily in terms of scatteredness (Augustine) and Ruinanz (Heidegger). For both Augustine and Heidegger, the unity of life has to be actively restored in the fir st place by turning the mind towards God (Augustine) or by the anticipation of death (Heidegger). For Husserl, this unity is an originary feature of life itself that can be appropriated at any time by means of berschau . Bibliography De Warren, N. (2009). Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Drummond, J. (1975). Husserl on the Ways to the Performance of the Reduction. Man and World 8, p. 47 -69. Fasching, W. (2009). The Mine ness of Experience. Continental Philosophy Review 42, p. 131 -148. Gander, H.-H. (2010). Husserl-Lexikon. Darmstadt: WBG. Orth, E.-W. (1993). Interkulturalitt und Inter -Intentionalitt. Zu Husserls Ethos der E rneuerung in seinen japanischen KaizoArtikeln. Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung 47, p. 333 351. Staiti, A. (2010). Different Worlds and Tendency to Concordance: Some Remarks for a New Look at Husserls Phenomenology of Culture. Forthcoming in The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomeno logical Philosophy X. Steinbock, A. (1994). The Project of Ethical Renewal and Critique: Edmund Husserl's Early Phenomenology of Culture. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 32/4, p. 449 -464. Welton, D. (1991). Husserl and the Japanese. Review of Metaphy sics 44, p. 575-606. Zahavi, D. (1999). Self -Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

The Husserlian Project of Formal Logic and Individuation

Carlos Lobo (Caen) In a letter from the 10 t h April of 1918, Husserl tells Hermann Weyl how he is delighted to see that their respective researches co nverge in a similar direction : the great and vast perspective [i] of a mathesis universalis philosophically founded, [ii] in relation to a new formal metaphysics (the a priori and universal theory of individuation), at which he has been working for years . 1 Hence the rare profile of the book he is projecting to write : a philosophical book for mathematician as well as a mat hematical book for philosoph er, trying to clear the way from a formal (systematic) logic to a formal logic of individuation. This is no marginal or secondary project, since the phenomenological exploration of the manifold dimensions of inner time itself should take place in that p erspective, as a part of the leading and fundamental task of solving the huge problem of individuation, of constitution of individual (hence fact ual) being in general.
Beca u se I a m a t th e m o me nt ta ke n up a nd i ne vi ta b ly a b so rbe d b y th e ela b ora t i o n of a g rea t b o o k, I ha ve n ot a lrea d y a nd pr ope rl y st ud ied y ou rs [ Sp a ce T im e M att e r ]. B ut I ha ve rea d a nd un der st o od en o ug h of i t t o sa y t ha t i t is a p i on eer i ng w or k w hi c h ma r ks a tur n i ng p o in t i n th e f ou n da t io n o f ma t he m a tic s. I t wi ll mea n, a t lea st f or m e , a grea t e nc o ura ge me nt, fo r s ur e. Bu t on e ca n wo n der w het h er ( ) ma t he ma tic ia n s wi l l b e d i sp o se d t o fo l lo w y o u. I see a ll t ha t y o u wri te i n a grea t a nd va st per spe ct ive , t ha t of a m at h e s is u niv e rs al i s p h il o so p hi ca l l y fo u nde d, a nd t h i s, i n tur n, i n rela ti o n t o a ne w f o r ma l me ta p hy s ic s ( th e a p r io r i a nd u ni ver sa l th eo ry of in di vid ua ti o n), a t w h ic h I ha ve be en w or ki n g fo r yea rs a nd w il l b e wo rk i n g o n. S o a bi g t ha n k y ou . I a m fi r ml y e xpe ct i ng a n d n o t s i mp ly wi s h in g t ha t y ou r pr oj ect s wi l l rea c h ma t ur it y a nd be f ru itf ul.

These declarations, despite their many ambiguities, are nonetheless sufficient to justi fy the two following statements : (1) there is a project by Husserl of a new formal logic; (2)this project is intimately connected with the problem of individuation. The remaining ambiguities stem essentially from the multiplicity of new or renewed form al disciplines mentioned here : mathesis universalis , new formal metaphysics, a priori and universal theory of individuation, etc. Are we dealing with [i] a manifold of
Wh i le c o ns u lt i ng H u s s er l - Ch ro nik ( ed. K. S c hu h ma n n) a s we l l a s t he e nd of th e let ter , we lea r n tha t th is b o ok ha d i nd iv id ua t io n a s ce ntra l t he me.
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distinct formal disciplines or [ii] with a manifold of different names for one and the same for mal discipline, or, else, [iii] with a manifold of different aspects or states of a same discipline ? And are all the items of those manifolds formal or equally formal and, if the one or the other, in what sense? Another ambiguity concerns the part phenomenology is supposed to play in that project. If its main goal is to provide formal disciplines with sound philosophical foundations, does this im ply minor or major transformations in formal logic? And if so, what do the se transformations consist in ? Although, luckily we won't have to address today all those questions, I would like to state, and this is my third assertion: (3) that the renewal of formal logic requires a kind of foundation which modifies deeply t he traditional division of labo r between logician, mathematician and philosopher . 2 This means that, after the transcendental turn, Husserl's logical investigations instead of being a mere critique of formal logical perfo rmances, evolved into a program of a new formal logic , a renewal in which transcendantal logic plays an active role. Or to put it in other words, the logical investigations have evolved from critical readings of logical works (1883) into a project of systematic and radical critique of logical reason (1929), a critique, which unlike Kant's, is a strongly revisionist one. Among the many lines of interpretation which can be drawn from the ambiguities just mentioned, I would like to articulate these three statements (1)-(3) in the following way : [i] there is indeed an Husserlian project of reform of formal logic in its broadest and all encompassing sense ; [ii] this reform requires transcendental phenomenology as its kingpin; [iii] this reform consists e ssentially in correcting a fail ing or in filling a lack which hinders the whole set of formal disciplines to be fully constituted and to contribute, as they should, to a continuous critical and adequate reflection on sciences in th eir progress, sensitive to the methodological essence of scientifically constructed truths, as well as to the essential openness of the se constructions. This failing lies in a naive formal metaphysics of individuation and, correlatively, in a naive theory of individual reference (of naming). According to this general hypothesis, we are entitled to talk of the existence of two formal ontologies , two logical grammars, two logics of consequence, two logics of truth, etc. Or rather of two states
In ord er t o ta ke t he f ul l mea s ur e of t he c ha n ge i nv o lv ed i n it, c o mpa re F or m al and T r an sc e nd ent al Log ic , n o te (a ) t o 3 5 , p. [8 9 ] (N ie me yer) , a nd P ro leg om en a , 71.
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of these formal disciplines. Since the beginning Husserl did res ent the need for a clarification of the inner logic of mathematics and sciences, but it is only later that he became aware of this lack. And the main aftershock of the Logical Investigations will have consi sted in a deep modification of the architectonic of the so -called pure logic , a modification motivated by the awareness of the insufficiencies affecting its implicit and naive theory of individuation. 3 In order to give support to this hypothesis, I shall focus on two rather small texts, but large enough in scope to provide a full overview of the problem I am dealing with at present. The first one, from 1926, figures as Beilage VII in Husserliana 's edition of Formal and Transcendental Logic , and deals exp licitly with the project of reform of formal logic. Its title is : To be used for a critique of formal logic and its reform into a fully universal ontology . The core of this reform consists in the justification of the transition from the formal ontology o f individuality as individual whatever to a formal ontology of individuality as individual within the frame of its type . The second one, fr om 1936, belongs to the appendic es to the book Husserl projected as his discours de la mthode , and which we know as the Crisis . This text offers so to speak a model as well as a touchstone for the change in formal ontology advocated ten years before. In fact, Husserl tackles the essent ial issues of quantum mechanics: status of physical individual, meaning of probab ility function y , logical and etiological signification of the uncertainty principle, etc., and in that epistemological context, he traces more clearly than ever the lines for a renewal of formal disciplines, and particularly for a new theory of individuat ion. 4 I will just mention briefly this second point, and those who will be interested in examining Husserl's reform from the point of view of physics can refer to the full text given in the proceedings. 1. Individuality Whatever and Typical I ndividuality: Two Versions of Formal O ntology
Cf. Id ea s, I, 1 3 - 1 4 . For wa nt of ta ki n g in to a c c ou n t t he d eep met h od o lo g ica l cha ra ct er of Hu s ser l' s cr it i qu e of l o gica l rea so n, e ve n th e be s t - i nf or me d c o m m en ta t or s we re n ot a ble t o se e t ha t , a m on g th e p os i ti o n s s tr ug g li n g i n t he ph il o s op h ica l ba tt lef ie ld a r o un d qua n tu m ph y si cs a nd its a pp ro pr ia te o nt o l og y, tra ns ce nde n ta l ph en o me n ol o g y di d n o t s tep o n t he s ide of o nt o lo g ica l co n ser va t is m ( c f . M . B it bo l, M ca ni q u e q ua nt i q ue , U n e i nt rod uct io n p h ilo sop h i qu e , Fla m ma r i o n, 1 9 9 6 , pp. 2 8 7 s q.) .
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The first text aims at motivating the project of reconstructing the whole set of formal disciplines and it indicates the main trends for a renewal of formal ontology. Among the reproaches Husserl addresses to logic: its thoughtlessness as regard s the fundamental oper ation of logical idealization, which represents its central condition of possibility, and, correlatively, the given upon which t his idealization is carried on, and consequently the obscurity involving it. A. An Enlargement of the Naive Formal Ontology is Necessary Because of this thoughtlessness the effective formal ontology of logic remained naive up to now. From an axiomatic point of view, naivite means that apparently trivial presuppositions about fundamental logical concepts exert a double negative effect of limitation and of inhibition upon its theoretical performances , hence upon the critical reflect ion which should not only foll ow but should also stimulate the se performances. As a first consequence , formal logic did not manage until now to coincide with its very essence, and, correlatively, this is a second consequence, the field of formal ontology has been arbitrarily and excessively restricted. The most manifest symptom of the misunderstanding of logic about its essence lies in the lack of clarity of its realizations and, hence, in obscurities and confusions Husserl has been tracking down since his first articles on Ernst Schrder 5 and Alexander Voigt 6 concerning, for instance, the differences b etween calculus and logic, 7 algorithm and language , 8 sets and varieties 9 or between different concepts of content and form, or of individual names , 10 etc. Hence, it would be a mistake to think that the layers of formal disciplines belonging to apophantic lato sensu would describe fully constituted disciplines. Formal logic as it actually is does not coincide with any of the formal discip lines it is supposed to
Rece n si o n on S c hr d er' s L e ss on s o n log ica l alg e b ra , p. 2 6 4 , G tti ng e r G e leh rt e An ze ig en , 1 8 9 1 no 7 , p p. 2 4 3 - 2 7 8 6 El em en t a ry Log i c o f A. Vo ig t a nd m y p ap e rs o n th e log i c o f log ica l c alc ul u s , Vi e rte r jah rs s ch r ift f r wi s se n sch a ftl ich e Ph il os op h i e, 1 7 , 1 8 9 3 , pp . 1 1 1 - 1 2 0 . 7 op . c it. p.2 4 6 . 8 ib id . p. 2 5 8 . 9 ib id . p. 2 6 4 . 10 ib id . p. 2 5 1 . I n t he co nc ep t of pr o per na me, ma y be un der t he i nfl ue nc e of Jev on s, t w o c o nce pt s wh ic h s h o ul d be s e pa ra te d a re mix ed u p: t he g en era l co nc ep t of i nd iv id ua l na m e a nd t he pa rt ic ula r c o nc ep t of pr o pe r na me i n i ts us ua l s en se, i. e. t h e na me of i nd iv id ua l w it h ou t c o - de s ig na ti o n .
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embrace: pure logical grammar, logic of consequence, logic of truth. Taken in its strict and ideal sense, formal logic is an analytic of propositions and meanings [which] leaves necessarily a side the ontological dimension, but consequently also the concept of truth and of t rue being are disregarded (p. 415 ). This restriction of course does not represent a failing by itself, and Husserl does not pretend either that it should be avoided ; for, as the conditions of true being of an object in general, which are the main themes of the analytic of formal ontology, are rooted in the analytic of meaning and consequence, the latter must necessarily precede the former. Of course, the sphere of meaning and proposition considered as objects are thems elves a kind of formal region, belonging as such to mathesis universalis . But the reverse holds as well, since the universe of sense, in a certain way, encom passes the universe of objects, in so far as precis ely every object has an objective meaning and since, obviously, the a priori of meaning is of major importance for the knowledge of the objective a priori (ibid). If the analytical sphere can indeed be set out in three disciplines, the necessity to take into account the ontological orientation complicates this distribution, for in each formal sub -sphere the logician should draw out the purely formal elemen ts capable of founding this objective orientation, without exceeding the limits of analyticity. Hence, for instance, the exact extent and limits of logic of sense, i.e. of purely logical grammar have been misunderstood. Although on this track, logicians fi nally managed to d iscern within the forms of judg ment distinct moments of form such as substantivity and adjectivity (as predicate and subject), this exploration finally was stopped, on account of a restrictive and superficial conception of the terms, or i n other words, on the account of an insensitiveness to the non syntactical formal dimension proper to the terms themselves : that of core-forms . The origin of this is to be found in an unjustified presupposition regarding the nature and content of the funda mental ontological concept, that of the something whatever .
The pr es up p os it i o n of a na ly ti ca l l o gi c c o nc ern i ng t he te rm s a nd f i na l ly t he ir u lt i ma t e cor e s i s tha t t he y a r e he ld a s id en t ica l a nd dif f e re nt w it h ou t qu es ti o ni n g a b o ut a n y tr u e es se nt ia l id en t it y or dif f e re nce, he n cef or t h wi t ho u t que s ti o ni n g t he q uid o ne is su pp o sed t o e sta bl is h i n i t s i de nt it y or di ffere nce n o w t h is i s a lrea d y a q ue st i o n o f tr ut h. Th e i n te nt i o ns a re n ot j u st ifi ed, dem o n str a te d, e l uci d a ted. A l t h ou g h th ey a re st a n di n g th ere dis cl o sed i n a m o re or l es s grea t cla ri t y, t he q uid it se lf, th e po s si ble a nd th e t ru e a re n ot qu es ti o ne d ; on e d oe s n ot pa y a tte n ti o n to t he m. ( p. 4 3 1 )

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The resulting formal ontology, irrespective of its methodological intention, introduces a restriction in the understanding of its fundamental concept of something or object whateve r . 11 From the start, the something whatever is understood following the things at hand in the environment. Having under the eye, the example of the world and eventually of ideally exist ing worlds, the former ontology (formal logic as well as mathematics) has adopted as formal categories those corresponding to the sphere of naive mundane experience. Among these categories we find the fundamental one, that of individual, which has never been criticized and has been adopted, unchanged, in first order logic as in set theory. B. The Enlargement of Ontological Concepts through A doption of Modalities At this stage, phenomenology intervenes on the ground of formal logic with two critical operations. The first critical operation consists in a reductive procedure through which phenomenology exhumes the founding formal ontological concept carrying on the full weight of the restrictions just mentioned that of individual whateve r, of mathematical individual in order to subject it to the second critical operation , that of enlargement . But these two operations seem problematic. Don't the final su bstrata belong to an empirical, inductive or synthetic logic ? Isn't it natural and legitimate to proc eed as ordinary formal ontology does, by restricting its theme to the substratum whatever, to the variable matter of terms as a support for any kind of iterations and modifications? And Husserl himself seems hesitating. So, Husserl goes on,
I ca n' t sa y a n yt h i ng i n t he f ra me of f or ma l a na l yt ic a b ou t in di vi dua li ty , ex cep t a bo ut w ha t be l o ng s i n i t t o t he fo r ma l, a b ou t th e u lt i ma t e s ub s tra tu m of mea n in g a nd a bo ut t ha t w h ic h i s im p lie d i n i t a s a na l yt ica l c on se q ue nc e, wh ic h i s so m et h i n g to ta l l y em pt y. T he ul t ima t e s ub st ra t u m a l wa y s e nta i ls s o me th i ng te mp ora l. M a y be. Bu t a n a l yt ica ll y, we mu st i gn o re i t, beca u se th i s is no f or ma l , a na l y ti ca l ly re du ct iv e de ter m i na t io n of a so m et h in g - ul ti ma te - su bs tra t u m. N eve rt he le ss, t h is i s i m pl ied i n th e p os s ib il it y of a n y o b jec t i n ge ner a l, of a n y ul ti ma te su bs tra tu m - ob j ect . 12
11 12

Cf . 2 3 a ) , 2 4 a nd 3 5 a ) a nd t he n ot e (a ) t o t hi s la s t o ne, i n F. T. L. Ich kan n a ls o v o n I nd iv id ual itt in d e r fo rm a le n A na ly ti c n ich t s a us sag e n, e s se i

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If classical formal ontology keeps silent (as in set theory or in formal semantics) about such determinations (as temporal determinations), that does not mean that it has renounced every theory of individual, for it has since the beginning adopted one. With Leibniz's principle of identity of the indiscernible, modern formal ontology did try to correct and overcome the insufficiencies of the competing theory of individuation, that of individuation through location in absolute time and space. But this principle has become a lock that the reductive procedure aims at opening in order to set a new formal ontology capable of assuming the role of a formal first metaphysics . In order to justify this reform, it is necessary to consider the other operation that underpins the first (that of reduction to the ultimate substrata) or at least is coordinated with it : that of enlargement by tracing logical activity back to the moving manifold of intentions and intuition s bearing it. Arrived at that point, one meets the requirement of transcendental phenomenology. Its task is that of a critique of logical reason, which aims at exhuming a kind of possibility which must be qualified as transcendental in so far as it enables the critique both to clarify and modify the grounds for the axioms o f formal disciplines. It must be able, as Husserl insists, to inscribe the formal sphere in a larger formal ontological a priori , of which naive formal ontology represent s a superficial and abstract stratum. 13 For that, the judgment must be situated in the general frame of the correlation of the judging subject and the being upo n which the judgment is orient ed. More generally, what is required is another theory of method, more profound t han that offered by the analytic, a method sensible in particular to the modes of the

d en n, wa s z u d em F o rm a l en l etzt e s M e i n u ng s s u b str at g eh rt u n d wa s i n d er ana ly ti sch e n Ko n se q u en z d av o n l i eg t, w as e in v ll ig Le e r es i st. D as l etzt e Su b st rat <h at > im m e r Z e it l ich k e it im Si n n e nth a lte n. D as m ag se in : A be r a n aly ti sch i st d a s nich t e in zu s eh en , d e n n d a s l i eg t n ich t in d e r fo rm al e n, a na ly ti s ch r ed uktiv e n Be sti m m u ng e i ne s l et z t en Su b st rat - Etw as . A b e r e s li eg t i n d e r Mg lich ke it e in e s Geg e n st a nd e s b e rh a up t u nd ei n es l etzt e n S ub st rat - Geg e n sta nd e s. o p. c it . p. 4 2 7 . (ib id.) [ Da s he s i n t he En gl i sh tra n sla t io n a re m i ne ] . 13 T hi s a m o u nt s to c o n s ider i ng t he f or ma l sp her e a s a re gi o n, t h e re gi o n of ca te g ori es m ea ni n gs a nd e s se nce s. Cf. Id ea s I, 1 7 , a lrea dy co n s id ered th e ta s k of a n a na l yt ic i n a q ua si Ka n tia n s en se t o tra c e t h e ge nera l di st i nc ti o n s bet we en a nd wi t hi n t he re g io n s, a n d fr o m tha t p oi n t of vie w, f o rma l o n t ol o g y a ppea r ed it se lf in t he sa me se rie s a s t h e re gi o na l (t he s tr ic t ly ma t er ia l, s y nt he ti c o nt o l og ie s) , it s re g io na l c o nce pt o bj ec t de ter m i ni n g t he f or ma l (a na l yt ic ) ca te g or ie s . ( p. 7 0 of W. R. Bo yce G ib so n t ra ns la ti o n, C ol l ier M a cm i ll ia n P ub l is he rs ) .

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something involved in the diverse subjective modes . 14 The analytic in its actual state provides us only with a fragment of the method of the practice of the knower an d k nowing which is much richer, and neglects in particular the modal and axiological dimensions of the activity of knowledge as well as their passive counterparts. Now, analytic should be the formal study of scientific production as such, i.e. of a rati onal praxis of knowledge. The enlargement entails the import of doxic modalities inside the analytic of judgment and, correlatively, the import of ontic modalities, and of probabilities as one of them, inside ontology. The task of exploring this modal manifo ld falls on phenomenology and not on formal logic. But the latter needs an enlargement in order to overcome the obscurity of its fundamental concepts, especially that of possibility , which is restricted to pure analytical possibility, i.e. to justifiable o r justified, demonstrable or demonstrated being. The elucidation of this concept, so vital for a logic of truth, depends on the acceptance of the full scope of modalities as constitutive of logical matter . 15 The first act of a radical formal ontology consi sts in taking into account true being of every kind (following every species of subjective activity in every attitude, practi cal and theoretical). Despite its privilege, true being in the sense of ultimate self evidence has no meaning apart from the dynami c of modifications leading to it. Husserl insists on this point in many instances. The transition from a logic of consistance (which is something less than consequence, restricted to the pure analytical possible) to a true logic of truth entails a deep mod ification of formal ontology, such that its corresponding ontology bec omes an authentic ontology, a formal science of possible individual being. The possible here at stake is not anymore the pure possible of analytics, for, instead of the something whatever supporting the poorer conditions of true being in general, we get now the something possible in its possible modalities (pp. 427 -428).
A m o n g t he m ode s re f erred t o, a s we lea r n i n a c lo se r rea di n g o f 2 3 a ) of Fo rm a l and T ra n sc end e nt a l Log ic, a re a b ov e a ll t ho se p ro cee di n g fro m m oda l m od ifi ca t i on s, u nder s to od a s op era t i o ns ex erte d n o t on l y o n t he ju dg m en t b ut o n th e sy n ta c ti ca l m a ter ia l, he nce a s c o n st it ut i ng t h e lo g ica l ma t ter of t he ju dg m en t. 15 We re c og n iz e he re t he p he n o me n ol o gi ca l ta sk of q ue st i on i n g i n it s fu ll sc ope , t he r ei g n of a p ri or i nece s si ti es w it h ou t w hic h a tr ue be i n g c ou ld n ot exi st f or th e k n o wi n g s ub jec t, t h e m od es of k n o wle dg e a n d th e m od es in se pa ra b le f r o m th e m of e mp ty, bl i nd, ob sc ure i n te nt i o n; [ ] wi t h ou t w h ic h tru e b ei n g w ou ld be a n e m pt y co n c ept dep ri ved of a n y p ro per l y co mp re he n si ble s i gn if i ca ti o n, of a n y sc ie nt if i c a l ly u sa b le si g nif ica t i o n.
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C. Formal Eidetic a Morphology The most delicate point, apparently for Husserl too, lies in the ambiguity of the concept of morphology involved in this new formal ontology. The enlargement indicated before seems in fact to jumble the well-known delimitation between analytic and synthetic. Husserl denies it. It is still a question of formal ontology, except that the logical matter is from now on understood in its full extension, and not only in the way of a mathematical variable. This means that the recasting of formal ontology goes with a promotion of a new concept of form. 16 Next to, or rather below the usua l concept of form, the new concept of the formal is significant in as much as it applies at present to something possible in its possible modalities. 17 This holds also for the upper forms, for the genera embracing all lower forms. Beside or below the s tandard categorial predicative productions, there is another form which mea ns rather a supreme generality, stemming from the set of supreme generalities, in which every substratum, and so every possibl e objectivity must be
O ne wi l l re me m ber t ha t i n t he Id e as , H us s erl d i st i ng ui s hed t he i nd iv id ua l a s ul ti ma te s y nta ct ica l ly f or ml es s s ub st ra t um ( 1 2 ) (a s tod e- t i or p ure sy n ta c tica l ly f or ml es s i nd iv id ua l u n it ) ( 1 4 ) fr o m th e i ndi vi dua l a s ul ti ma te for m le ss es se n ce, a s f or m le s s su bs ta nt iv e ( s ach h a ltig e ) e sse n ce , a n d i n s is ts o n t he f a ct t ha t th ere i s be t wee n th e m a n es s en tia l pr ed ica t iv e c o n nec t io n, s in ce ever y t hi s - t h ere ha s it s e s se nt ia l s ub sta n ti ve qua li t y p os se s si n g th e c ha ra c ter of a f or m le ss s ub sta nt iv e e ss en ce ( i bid .) , or i n ot h er w ord s, si n ce it is su bs u med i n a sp ec if i c se n se u nde r t he u lt i ma t e su bs ta nt ive es se nce , or in fim a sp eci e s . T hi s di st i nc ti o n is p u sh ed f ur t her b y ta ki n g i nt o a cc ou n t t he di st i nc ti o n bet we en de pe nde nt a nd i nde p e nde n t ob jec ts, o r wh ic h i s t he s a me, be t wee n a bs tra c t a nd c o nc ret e ( 1 5 ) . We a rr ive d a t a n a b so l ute t h i s - t her e t he i m me dia te su bs ta nt ive es se nc e of w hi ch i s a co n cre tu m, a nd re pre se n ts a n i nd iv id ual i n t he na rr o we r se ns e. A s s o o n a s we in sc ri be [i] ei det i c ge ne ra l iz a t i o n i n the rea l m of pur e l og ic , a n d c on s id er it a s a k i nd of l o gi c a l m od if ica ti o n ( A b wa nd l ung ) a nd [ii] c on ver se ly , f or ma l iz a t i on a s a wa y o f a bs tra c ti n g fr o m e ver y es se nce, a n d reg i on of e ss e nce s, t h e pur e em pt y f or m c o m mo n to a ll ( 1 0 ), t h e i n di vid ua l ta ke n i n i ts la st s en se doe s n o t fa ll a n y m ore ou t sid e th e f ie ld of pu re l o g ic, a nd cor re sp o ndi n g ly, of f o rma l o nt o l og y, b ut a p pea r s o n p ur el y l og i ca l gr o u nds a s t he l o gi ca l a bs o lu t e t o w hi ch a l l l o g ica l m od ifi ca t i on s r efer u s ba ck ( 1 5 ). 17 op. c it . p. 4 2 7 - 4 2 8 : B ed eut sa m i st d e r n e u e Beg ri ff d e s Fo rm al e n u nd , w e nn m an wil l, n och d e s A na ly t is ch e n, d e r a ls o ni ch t m eh r d a s A naly ti sch e d e r l ee r e n Ko n se q u e nz bet r if ft . D a s F or m al e b et ri fft jet zt m g li ch es Et wa s i n s ei ne n m g li ch en Mod al it t e n. Wi r st eh e n j et z t v o n v o r nh e r ei n in d e r Sp h r e d e s Ev id e nt en , si ch d ur ch S e l bst g e b ung e r f l le nd e n S u b str at satz e s und p rd ik ativ e n S atz s u nd in d e r Sp h r e v o n D ox a b e rh a up t a ls s ich e rf l l end e r b ew h r e nd er D o x a und ih re n Ko r r elat e n .
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situated. While taking into a ccount those forms, we do not at all step into material ontology, since, remarks Husserl, it is still only question of the quid of possible objectivities, and not of accessible genera or supreme genera. These generalities are prescribed by the formal ge nerality something in general and the ultimate substrate something in general . The possibility and justification of such a splitting of the concept of form (and consequently of all formal concepts) results from the operations described previously : (1) reduction of the formal to its ultimate formal matter, i.e. to the fundamental category of individual and (2) incorporation of modalities into this logical matter. The new formal ontology exceeds the opposition between modern and ancient logic. Ancient logi c recognized the individual as fundamental category, and, especially in its Aristotelian form, dealt extensively with modalities, but it never admitted them as substantive ( sachhaltige ), i.e. as blended into the individual, and giving it its finishing t ouch. Modern logic inherited the se limitations, and the question remains opened as to whether it has overcome them since the time of Husserl. According to Gian Carlo Rota, it was still in an impasse in 1975, and the only radical reform of logic since Aristotl e is due to Husserl himself . 18 And he encouraged us to develop the program set before us or rather to dig it out from the material Husserl left us. From that material, we learn which the tasks of this new logi c in its connection to ontology:
It is a b s ol u t el y ne ce s sa r y t o ge t a fu ll pr e se nta ti o n of t he i nt er im p lica t io n a nd of t he sy st e ma t ic ord er of p he n o me n ol o gi ca l a nd o nt o lo g ica l ma t ter s. [ i] O nt o l og ica l lo g ic a s m ath e s is u n iv e r sa li s sa y s no t hi n g a b ou t th e ca te g or ia l - be i ng of i nd iv id ua l it y, b u t ra t her of t he o b jec t in ge ne ra l a s s ub st ra te for pre di ca t io n s ; i t i s th e f or ma l s cie n ce of ob je ct s in g en era l , of tru e be i n g i n ge ne ra l or, if y ou l i ke, of d et e rm i na t i ng tr ut h i n ge nera l. [ i i] O nt ol o g y of in di vi dua l bei n g, f o r m a l o nt o lo g y i n th e m or e s pec if ic se n s e of t he ter m, f or ma l a n d f ir s t m eta p h y si cs, mu st deve l op t h e a p r io ri of in di vi dua li ty . O f c ou r se, a ll th at wh ich is m at h em at ica l h o ld s al so fo r t h e ind iv id ua l, a nd m a t h em at ic al c at eg o ri e s h old th em s elv e s f or th e scop e ( U mf a ng) o f t h e c at eg o ri e s o f ind i v id u ali ty . B ut t he se ca te g ori es , ca t eg or ie s of t h e o b jec t a nd of m od ifi ca t i on s of t h e ob je ct, a re m od if ied i n a pec u lia r wa y w h il e a ppl y i ng i n pa rt ic ula r to i nd iv id ua l it y. He nce f or t h e c o nce pt s of e ss e nce, ge n u s, spe ci es, w h o le, pa rt , etc . De ve lo pi n g t h es e c o nce pt s a n d Hu s ser l a nd t he Ref o r me of L og ic, i n D i sc re te Th oug h t s , M a r k Ka c, G ia n - Ca r l o R ota , Ja c ob T. S c hwa rt z , Bir k h use r, B o st o n, Ba se l, B erl i n, p. 1 7 3 .
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deve l op in g t he w h ol e o nt o l og y i nt o t he f or m of i nd iv idua t io n a s su ch ( he nce i nd iv idua ti o n of ge nera l it ie s i n to i nd iv id ua l t h i ng s, in t o s i n gu la r it ie s) f o ll o wi n g a p r io ri a nd for ma l l ega li t ies of es se nce : su ch is t h e t as k . Be l o ng t o i t, t h e t h eor y of t i me, s t il l i n a f or ma l u n ive rsa li t y, i. e. eve n if w e di s ti n gu is h b et we en ti m e a n d it s ma tte r ( t he f il l i n g rea l c on te n t of ti me) , t h e ma t ter i s in tr od uce d i n a pur e for ma l wa y (a s a ca teg o ry of fo rm a l me ta p h ys ic s) , wh i le we kee p va ria bl e a ll c o nc ret e rea l pa rt ic ula riz a ti o n. A ris t ot el ia n ca te g ori e s (a f ter a s ma l l pur if ica t i o n) bec o me th e mse lv es c a te g ori es of t he i nd iv id ua l it y ( op . c it . p. 4 2 4 - 4 2 5 ) [ E mp ha si s m i ne ] .

If we take this program seriously, our first task should be now to endeavor to understand what would be the profile of a formal logic in which every formal concept would be purified and developed in the form of individuality. 2. Elements in Classical Physics and in Quantum P hysics Since this new formal ontology reveals its intentio n to espouse the methodological essence of scientific activity, and to supply epistemological reflect ion with adequate tools to decipher the provisional behavior of judging activity in science and, correlatively, the modular identity of scientific objects, including ultimate individuals, it would be of interest to try to instantiate the new fundamental categories with physical objects, by filling out these forms. This kind of instantiation is prescribed by the very status of the formal as such . 19 For example, the transition from the concept of space to that of Euclidean multiplicity is obtained through formalization , 20 and the former illustrates the latter, as any material essence illustrates the form abstracted from it. But that means at the same time that th e forms can and must be inscribed in the same series as material essences. In an other sense, Riemann's manifold is a mathematical theory among many other, and can be built up as a formal system of axioms. This is no arbitrary complication. Instead, with t hat example as well as with that of quantum physics we obtain a touchstone for the consistency and a yardstick for the scope of Husserl's reform of logic. For, exactly as he pointed out the limits and insufficiencies of
Hu sse rl a lrea d y s ta ted i n t he Id ea s I t h a t, fo r exa mp le, ev ery def i ni te in fere nc e, i t ma y be o ne t ha t i s s erv i ng th e i nt ere st s of p h ys ic s, is t he in s ta n ci n g of a def in i te pur e - l o gi ca l f o rm of i nfe re nce , e v ery def i ni te pr op os i ti o n o f p hy s ic s t he in s ta n ci n g of a pro p os it i o na l f or m, a nd so f or t h ( Id ea s I , 1 3 ) . 20 C f. Id ea s I , 1 3 , a nd F TL , 5 3 .
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formal apophantic and ontology, Huss erl indicates, here too, the limits and presuppositions of classical physics. And in fact, the mathematics proper to classical physics suffers from the same limitations as classical formal ontology. A. The Limits of Classical P hysics What is the epistemo logical profile of classical physics ? Nature is defined as a close universum of bodies in themselves, defined in their ultimate individuality by their absolute location in absolute space and time, i.e. by their position in relation to an arbitrary coordinate system. All subjective variations are dependent on this structure. Bodies are posited in themselves on account of this variability (relativity) of the positions of possible observation and measure . For every arbitrary coordinate system and so, for ever y spatio-temporal location and extension, is postulated the fact that it is possible to determine completely the numerical calculus of sizes. 21 Such completeness is purely axiomatic, and implies, from an ontological point of view, that every physical prop erty attribuable to a physical individual element is deducible down to its ultimate determination. Physical individuality is submitted to the requirements of this completeness in the calculability of movements. The determinist postulate reduces itself to that of the consistency of the calculus of the relations between physical individuals, according to which these are mediately or immediately determinable in themselves. Hence the main features of physical individual : atomic (real indivisible elements), geometric (spatio - temporally located), numerable (numerical individuation) and measurable 22 (equivalently as continuous or discrete). Classical physics is atomistic in a logical sense. From an algebraic point of view, that means that it has a classical group
K ri s is , A p pe nd ix IV. Here i n ter ve ne s t he u nrea l is ti c s upp o si t io n tha t ea c h s ub se t of p ha se - s pa c e sh o u ld b e i de nt if ied w it h a n e xpe ri me n ta l pr op os i ti o n a nd co n ve rse ly . T h is i s un rea li st ic : f or ex a mp le, h ow a bs urd i t wo ul d be t o ca ll a n ex per i me nta l pr op os i ti o n, t he a s ser ti o n t ha t t he a n g ula r m o me nt u m ( in ra d ia n s pe r s ec o nd) of t he ea rt h a r ou nd t h e s u n wa s a t a pa r ti cu la r i ns ta nt a ra ti o na l nu m ber. Fo r th i s rea s o n, it se em s b es t t o a s su m e t ha t [s uc h a d yna m ic s ys te m] i s t he Le b e sg ue- m e as u ra b le su bse t s of a p ha se - spa ce w hic h c o rre s p o nd s t o exper i me nta l pr op os i ti o ns ( G. B i rk h of f a nd J. v o n Neu ma n n, T he lo g ic of q ua nt u m mec ha n ic s ( 1 9 3 6 ) , Th e N e um a nn Com p e nd i um , ed. F. B ro dy a n d T. V a m os , W o rld S cie n tif ic, 1 9 9 5 , pp . 1 0 7 ) . Neve rt he le ss, t h e lo gi c of exp er im e nta l prop o s it io n s in c la s si c a l p hy s ic s ha s t he s tr uct ur e of a B o ol ea n a l ge bra ( p. 1 0 8 ).
21 22

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structure, in which physical proporties are defined as classes of equivalence of experimental propositions . 23 The individual of classical physics has the same form as the individual whatever of classical formal ontology, posited in its identity accord ing the principle of identity of the indiscernible. B. New Physics Require a New Formal O ntology The recent experiences at the core of quantum mechanics represent for Husserl a radical challenge for formal ontology, i.e. for mathematics, and not, as usu ally seen, for causality. Concerning causality, quantum mechanics reveals one of the restrictions of classical formal ontology. No individual is temporally and spatially determinable in a one -to-one relation. Spatio -temporal individuation is necessarily i ncomplete (indefinite). Physical individuals are never completely deducible, but deducible only in a certain range of play ( Spielraum ). This notion, Husserl adopted from von Kries in the Prolegomena , is decisive in this text, and as announced in Formal and transcendental Logic , it expresses a deep displacement of the distinction between nomological (deductive) sciences and ontological (descriptive) sciences. This absence of one-to-one spatio-temporal determination does not imply any kind of indeterminism . The nomological and etiological character of physics is necessarily preserved. But it is modified in order to take into account a new formal ontological dimension, by incorporation of which alone individual cease s to be indifferent individual, to become free and concrete individual within the frame of a certain type. Physical individual is never fully determinined, but only determinable in a certain range as regard its causal behavior. With the formalism of quantum physics, physical etiology becomes m ore flexible and more akin to the ordinary sense of explanation in descriptive sciences, where the behavior of an individual is explained on account of and within the frame of a given type (of behavior, of circumstance, etc.)
The be ha v i or of u lt i ma t e s i n g u la ri ti es i s su b jec ted to pa rt ic u la r ca u sa l it ie s i n s uc h a wa y t ha t t he y ob e y a certa i n gr o up in g f o ll o wi n g a ce rta i ne m a th e ma t ica ll y c ha ra cte ris a b le t yp e. (p p. 3 3 7 A lt ho u g h Ne uma n n a nd Bir k h off st ri ve to det er mi n e th e fun da me nta l diffe re nce be t wee n c la ss ica l l o gic a nd qua n t um l og ic a s th eo ri es c o nce rn i ng th e str uc tu re of set s of exper i me nta l pr op o si ti o n s, t he y ca n ' t esca p e na tura l in tr us i o ns i n to t he o n t ol o g ica l g ro u nd. T he p os t ula te (S 3 ) of l o g ica l e qu iva le nce bet we en e xpe ri me n ta l pro p os it i o ns ca n b e i nt erp ret ed a s p o s it in g a ph ys ica l q ua l it y.
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The computing and measure apply to the behavior of the group and according to types ne ver to the individ ual singularities of the group. All predicable of such individual singularities is affected by the same indetermination. The theory keeps its deductive character and its requirement of nomological completeness, but it is no more through and through deductive, as this was the case for classical theories. For those who are lead by the sole requirement of axiomatic, completeness postulates a priori absolutely determinable individual singularities (interchangeable physical points). On the other hand, nomological completeness does not require a one-to-one and absolute deduc ibility of individual, but only of types. As regard the behavior (change, movement) of ultimate singularities, it is computable only with a certain proba bility, according to a certain type to which they belong, a type which pre -traces a certain range of play and nothing more. The interpretation of this indetermination in terms of interruption of (or rupture with) causality proceeds from an erroneous and naive understanding of probabilities. If logic must allow ontological modalities to step in the realm of formal ontology, interpreting probabilities objectively as setting the existence of chance is a symmetrical misinterpretation to that of idealistic determinism (Laplace's or Maxwell's). Husserl says unequivocally that if we take into account the very meaning of the con cept of causality, it is absurd to posit causally indetermined events. The postulate of causality is an a priori of nature. From a formal point of view, nature is equivalent to the positing of a general mutual dependance of every event to every other. This law is a transcendental mathematical principle , or, which amounts to the same, a formal ontological principle stating purely that every empirical proposition about nature is an approximation of nature mathematically grasped. New physics preserves causality in this sense, o nly causality means now that the se elements are legally bound by complex -types, or else, that a priori connections and disconnections of a complex according to an unconditionally universal type happen inside nature, so that what happens to the singular element, to the most singular one, is never arbitrary ( beliebig ), is never calculable in its individuality, but only according to its complex, i n the context of its complexes. Thus we dismiss also the ad hoc hypothesis by which classical physics allowed itself to fill the ontological void that no real observation could fulfill, and to consider the margin of

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approximation, of average mea sure, only as indicating non already realized observations . 24 This hypothesis sustain ed the idealization and guaranteed, in set theoretical term s, the inclusion principle or, analogically, in logical terms, the principle of strict implication . In formal ontological terms, that meant that any indeterminacy was only the mark of an ignorance of the knower and observer, but no intrinsic indetermination. Probabilities could only be taken as a subjective expression. But what does that mean if now probabilities are objectively taken, and if it excludes any suspension of the a priori law of causality, i.e. any position in nature of any objective probability, of any objective contingency ? Husserl answers :
Pr oba bi li t y a s we ll a s cer ta in t y, o ne - t o- o ne co rre sp o nde n c e, ca lc ula bi l it y etc . a re su b jec ti ve exp re ss i o ns referri n g ba c k t o u s, pre su m i ng, ca lc u la t i n g s ub je ct s. I n th e h yp ot h et ica l na tu re i n it se lf t he re is n o r oo m f or a n y pr oba bi li t y or su pp o si ti o n, bu t o nl y f or t h e la w of gr o up s wh ic h b ec o me s fo r t he p h ys ic i st, th e ra ng e of pla y f or t he pr oba b i li ti es a nd p o ss ib il it ie s of th e e ve nt.

It would be misleading to consider the modalities in which things (events) are given, as mere ob jects. The object (event) in -its-modesof-givenness (including modalities such as certa inty, probability, possibility, etc.) must not be projected upon the background of classical space -time. But to noetic (doxic) modalities correspond nomeatic modalities. Wh at about ontological modalities ? From the perspective of Husserl reform of logic, re al pure existence is itself an ontological mode, i.e. the limit of a modal function. Every being whatever is to be considered according to the ma nifold of its modal dimensions. If the ultimate element is posited in its identity as an x , the ultimate individual predicates defining its individual form entail that this x is identical to itself only modulo a certain frame
Cf. Neu ma n n a nd B i rk h of f . N o w bef ore a pha s e - s pa ce ca n b e c o me i mb ue d wi t h r ea l it y, i ts e le m en ts a n d su bs et s m us t b e c or rela ted i n s o me wa y w it h ex per i me nta l pr op o si ti o ns ( w h ic h a re su bs ets of di ffere n t o bs erv a ti o n - spa c es). M ore o ver, th i s m us t be s o do n e t ha t s et - t he ore t ica l in cl u si o n ( w hi ch is t he a na l o g ue of l o gi ca l i mp l ica t i o n) i s p re serv ed. T here i s a n o bv i ou s wa y t o d o th i s i n dy na m ica l sy st em s of t he c la ss ica l ty pe. O ne ca n mea sur e po si t io n a n d it s f irs t ti me - der iva ti ve ve l oc it y a nd he n ce mo m en t um e xp li c it ly , a nd so esta bl i s h a o ne - o ne c o rres p o nde nce wh ic h p rese rve s i nc lu si o n be t wee n s ub se ts of p ha s e - s pa ce a nd s u bse t s of a su ita bl e ob s erva t i o n - s pa ce . In t h e ca ses of t he ki ne ti c th eo ry o f ga se s a nd of ele ct ro ma g ne tic wa ve s n o su ch s i m ple pr oc edu re is p o s si bl e, b ut i t wa s ima g in ed f or a l o n g t im e t ha t de m o n s of s ma l l e no u g h siz e c ou ld b y t ra ci n g t he m ot i on o f ea c h pa rt ic le, or b y a d y n a m o met er a nd in fi n ite s ima l p o i nt - ch a rge s a nd ma g ne t s, m ea s ure qua n ti t ies co rr esp o nd i ng t o ever y c o or di na t e of t h e p ha s e - s pa ce i nv o lve d (o p. c i t. p. 1 0 5 ).
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fixing the limites of its variability (of its indetermination). This frame is the type or eidos. The incorporation into formal ontology of a new layer of form means in physics that ultimate elements and events must be conceive d in a typical individual way, i.e. that every event, every change in elements () are determined in their being by the individual typique of groups to which they be long and in which, stemming from groups of individual types, they must immediately be subjected. A certain dose of empirical intuitions of bodily world is, so to speak, introduced into the theoretical frame of physics. As the individuals in perception, i ndividuals in new physics are identifiable only according to their types : they are identical through the modification of their matter, in as much as they preserve their individual type. But all this still belongs to the enlarged sphere of mathesis univer salis. Quantum laws marks the beginning of a knowledge of the typically individual kind which re mains nonetheless mathematical. Mathematics have only penetrated farther into the noetico -noematic structures, and more particularly in the for mal structures of observation correcting and modifying the excessive idealizations of classical physics (from Galileo to Laplace). The mathematics substitutes to the atoms of classical physics (i.e. translates it) into typical individual units which, in the in -itself of nature, precede the being of their ultimate elements and co-determine the being and the being - so of the latter. The very methodological essence of idealization is taken into account by the new mathematics. Empirical approximation is objectified. Every step of approximat ion in a series has its dignity : everything, ultimate elements as well as totalities, must be taken into account in an typical - individual way and idealization as well as mathematization are nothing but a method, which henceforth does not overcome, as meant to do the old classical attitude, the relativities of intuition, but maintains itself in relativity and is justified precisely as long as it remains in relativi ties through always new levels. Last but not least, quantification (measu rement) presupposes for itself a new nomological form for nature and a new formal ontology. Quantification means that the method as conquered a new ontological legality, that of the being in a concretion, built up starting from the ultimate concretions (the individual typical wholes ). If Husserl's reform did not lead into any axiomatic presentation, it is nevertheless remarkable that it has given way to an

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interpretation of the logic of the new physics which in many instances meets von Neumann and Birk hoff's heuristic considerations on the logic of quantum mechanics : sketch of a modified (non boolean) algebra of propositions substituting to the distributive identity 25 of the logic of classical physics, a modular identity , 26 or in syntactical terms, substi tuting to the logical system of strict implication , a logic of probabilities . 27 In other aspects, the concept of typical individuality puts into play a concept of groups which is akin to the W eylian concept of aggregate of individuals , as it has been worked out in contemporary logical essays, such as the quasi-set theory of Krause and Da Costa (who take explicitly) their inspiration from Weyl . 28 Whatever the successes and failings of this attempts may be, they satisfy obviously to the requirements Weyl puts forward for every logic pretending to give a serious account of the methodological truth of any scientific theory : to be at the same time inherent to its symbolism and to remain opened in its topmost layer to the light of meaning, of simple and honest trut h, as revea led in evidence and experience, for pure symb olism is never closed in itself; ultimately the mi nd's seeing eye must come in it. 29

op. ci t . p. 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 . D i str ib u ti ve ide n ti t y sa t i sfi es L6 . a ( b c ) = ( a b ) ( a c ) et a ( b c ) = ( a b ) ( a c ) . 26 o p. ci t. p.1 1 1 - 1 1 2 . M o dula r ide n ti ty sa t isf ie s st ric t ly L5 . If a c, t he n a ( b c ) = ( a b ) c. 27 o p. c it . p.1 2 4 - 1 2 6 . P ro ba b il it y l og ic s ca n n ot be red uce d to s tr ic t l o gi cs , b ut co n st it ut es a n e ss en t i a ll y wid er s y ste m tha n t he la t ter, a nd sta te me n ts of t he for m P ( a , b) = q ( 0 < q <1 ) a re perfe ct l y ne w a nd s ui g en e ri s a sp e cts of p h y si ca l rea l it y. 28 Da C o sta a nd Kra u s e, O n Q ua s i - S e t Th e o ry, N ot r e D am e Jo u r n al of F or m al Log ic , V o lu me 3 3 , N u mb er 3 , S u m mer 1 9 9 2 , p. 4 0 3 : In ord er to p r ov ide a m ot iva ti o n, we n o te o nl y t ha t i n s o me d o ma in s of k n ow le dg e, s uc h a s qua n tu m mec ha n ic s, ch e mi st ry , b io l og y, or ge ne ti c s (c f. We yl [1 2 ], A pp. B), it i s nec es sa r y t o co n s ider co ll ect i o ns of en ti t ies tha t a re ca pa ble of be i n g in c erta i n stat e s, b ut su ch t ha t it i s i m po s si bl e t o sa y wh at e le me nt s b e lo n g t o ea c h pa rt ic ula r sta te. O n ly t he q ua nt it y of e le m en ts i n ea c h sta te ma y be k n ow n. We yl ca ll ed s uc h c o lle cti o n s e ff ect iv e ag g r eg a te s of in di vi dua ls ([1 2 ] , p. 2 3 9 ). T he idea i s t ha t i t i s n o t p os s ib le t o d is t in g ui s h a m o ng th e el em e nt s t ha t bel o n g t o th e sa me sta te of a n ef f ect iv e a g gre ga te. It i s im p ort a n t t o n o te t ha t s uc h a gg re ga te s ca n n ot be co n sid ered s et s in t he us ua l se n se ( Z FU , sa y), si nc e i n a set t h e ele me n ts a re a lwa y s di st i ng u i sh a b le. H. We yl, Ph il os op h y of Math em at i cs a nd N at ur al S ci e nc e , Pr i nce t o n U n ive rs it y Pr es s, N Y, 1 9 6 3 , A ppe nd ix B. 29 H. We y l, T he Gh o st o f m oda li t ie s, G e sam m e l te A bh a nd l ung e n , v ol. I II, S pr in ge r, 1 9 6 8 , p. 7 0 6 .
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Husserls Notion of Leib and the Primary/Secondary Properties Distinction

Emiliano Trizio ( Husserl Archive Paris/ Poincar Archive Nancy)

I t h in k t ha t ta s te s, od o ur s, c o lo ur s, a nd s o o n a re no m o re t ha n me re na me s so fa r a s th e ob je ct s in w h ic h we l o ca te t he m a re co nc er ned, a n d t ha t t h ey r es ide o n ly i n co n sc io u sn es s. If li vi n g cr ea t ure s wer e rem o ved [ r im o s so la n i m a l e], a ll t he se q ua l it i es w ou ld be w iped o u t a nd a n n ih i la te d. P hi l os op h y is w ri tt en in t h is gra nd b o ok t he un iv er se,[ ] I t is w ri t te n i n t he la ng ua ge of ma t h ema t ic s, a nd it s c ha ra c ter s a re t ria n gl es , circ le s, a nd o t her ge o me tr ic f ig ure s 1

1. The Specificity of the Constitutive Analyses D eveloped in Ideas II I begin by repeating once more these ever -quoted Galilean claims for they will serve us as a guide to reconstruct how Husserls philosophy provides a phenomenological foundation to the primary/secondary properties distinction. Husserl has dealt with the problem of the relation between the world as it is given in perception and the world as it is described by modern mathematical physics mainly in three occasions: in Ideas I (most of all 40, 52), in Ideas II (especially chapter 3), and, famously, in the Crisis ( 18). A fundamental thesis, however, underlies all of Husserls writings about the subject, a thesis that is of crucial importance for the very idea of phenomenology as transcendenta l idealism and that can be spelled out in the following way: the constitution of the world by and within transcendental subjectivity cannot be considered achieved at the level of the objective correlates of ordinary perception and of the judgments directly f ounded on it. The bottom level of natural objectivity, that is, ideally, nature as it is itself , can be constituted only by resorting to the objectifying power of a different kind of intentional activities, namely the purely intellectual acts of idealization charac terizing modern mathematized physics. In this sense, far from being a criticism of the Galilean revolution, Husserls phenomenology of material nature should be read as an attempt to interpret it in the correct way and to unveil its underlying rationality.
1

G. Ga l ile i, I l Sag g iat o r e , 7 , Ed. Na z ., v ol. VI , pp. 3 4 7 - 3 4 8 .

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The intellectual/idealizing acts replace the transcendent units constituted in perception, i.e. the things and processes of ordinary experience, with the entities postulated by theoretical physics, which are situated in a fully geometrical space and time , and whose properties are physico -mathematical only and hence, in principle, inaccessible to intuition. A perceptual constitution has thus to give way to a purely intelle ctual/theoretical constitution. Husserls view, already in Ideas I , amounts to t wo theses that can be seen, respectively, as the phenomenological Ersatz of Galileos first and second quotation: 1) Pars destruens or subectivization of sensuous qualities : transcendence is gained at the level of ordinary things of perception, but the perce ivable and hence secondary properties of the latter are not to be reckoned as the objectively true ones. 2) Pars construens or objectivation of nature : the thing as determined by physics is obtained by replacing all perceivable subjective properties with id eally true physico -mathematical ones (the primary properties), and yet it is the very same thing, which is perceived. In other words, as Husserl says, the perceivable thing offers only the empty X, which will become the substrate of objective physical prop erties. 2

A s a ma t ter o f f a ct, i n I d e as I H u sse rl d oe s no t dev el op a de ta i le d a cco u nt of th i s i nt el lec tua l c o ns t it ut i on of p h y sica l is ti c ob je ct iv it y. Hi s a na ly s is of t he pr ob le m i s t o be f ou n d i n t he s o ca l led Co ns id er ati on Fu nd am e nta l to Ph e nom e nol og y a nd i s in te nd ed a s ju st a nec es sa r y s te p i n t he a tt e mp t to s h o w th e p os si bi l it y of tr a n sce nde n ta l r edu ct i o n a nd to e l uci da te the se ns e of tra ns ce nde n ta l c o ns ci ou s ne ss a s t h e a b s ol ute i n w h ic h a l l ob j ect iv it ie s a r e co n s t it ut ed. I n a nu ts he ll, Hu s ser l s res u lt s in t hi s re spe ct ca n b e su m ma r iz ed a s f ol l o ws : wha t ha s co m e t o be a c o m m o n i n ter pre ta t i o n o f t he r ela ti o n bet we en pe rce pt i on a nd ma ter ia l na t ure , pre ve nt s t he r ec o g ni t io n of t he a bs o lu te cha ra c ter of c o ns ci o us ne s s. A cc ord i n g t o t h is a cc o u nt, w h a t i s di rec tl y perc ei ved is red uced to a n i m ma ne nt c o n te nt of s ub jec t iv it y (a ki n t o L o ck e s idea s) ca u sa l l y d ete r mi n ed by t he ex ter na l w or ld, wh ic h re ma in s hi dde n fr o m us in pri n ci ple . P hy s ic s w o uld t hu s be a n a t t em pt t o de sc r i be i n a n ind ire ct a nd sy m b ol ic wa y t he hi d den ca u se of p erce pt i o n, t o ga i n a n i nd ir ect k no w led ge of w ha t l ie s ou t sid e th e im ma n en t co n te nt of hu ma n m i nd a n d ca us a ll y a ff ect s i t. But i n t hi s wa y, Hu s ser l a r g ues , c o ns ci o u sn es s bec o me s t he f i na l l i nk o f a ca u sa l pr oce s s, a nd, g ive n t ha t ca u sa l it y co nce r ns t he re la ti o n a m o ng m u nda ne rea l it ie s o nl y, c o ns ci o us ne s s is re if ied, be c o me s a pa r t of t he t o ta l it y of rea l bei n g, a nd i ts a bs o lu te cha ra ct er is t her eb y mi s sed.
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I have recalled these results of Ideas I because I believe that they underlie all of Husserls subsequent analyses of the problem, including the one carried out in the Crisis . 3 Nevertheless only in Ideas II does Husserl sketch the entire stepwis e constitution of material nature from simple perception to physical objectivity. In this paper, I will briefly outline Husserls phenomenological foundation of Galileos two famous claims, and I will insist on the specific role that the Leib plays in it. 2. Phantoms and T hings In Ideas II Husserl introduces a first fundamental distinction between material nature , (the lowest and first sense 4 of nature) and animal nature (nature in a second, broadened sense 5). 6 Due to the founded character of the so ul on corporality, the first step in the constitution of nature is the constitution of merely material things, which at least up to a point can be carried out with no reference to animal nature. The essence of thing is characterized thanks to an eidetic analysis of the acts in which a thing is given to us and of the noemata correlated to these acts . 7 Moreover, this first stage of constitution is carried out with respect to a solipsistic subject , that is before taking into account the interplay of differen t constituting subjects and thereby the formation of an intersubjective world. First of all, things are, according to their essence, spatially and temporally extended. Perceivable properties such as the visual
I n co n tra st wi th t h e i nt erp reta ti o n s pr op o s e d b y Ro ma n I n ga rde n ( i n H u s se r l s Bet rach t u ng en z u r Ko n st it ut io n d e s Ph y si kal i sch en D ing e s . A rch iv es d e P hi l os op h ie, 1 9 6 4 , X X VII ( II I - I V): p p. 3 5 6 - 4 0 7 ) a nd, m or e re ce nt ly , by Ber n ha r d Ra n g (i n H u s s er l s Ph nom e no log ie d e r m at e ri e ll en N at u r , Fra n kfu rt a m M a i n : Vi tt or i o Kl o ste r ma n n, 1 9 9 0 ) , a cc ord i ng t o w hi ch t her e i s a sha r p di sc o nt i nu i ty in t he wa y th es e H u ss erl ia n te xt s trea t t he p ro ble m. 4 Id ea s I I , p. 3 0 . A ll q u ota ti o n s fr o m Id e as II a re ta k e n fr om t he E n gl i sh e di ti o n Kl u wer 1 9 8 9 . 5 Ib id. 6 T hi s pa r ti ti o n i s ba se d o n a n e mp ir ica l a cc ou n t of th e fro n ti er b et wee n l iv i ng a nd n o n- li vi n g ma tt e r a s so m eb od y a ccu s to m ed t o c o n te mp ora ry di sc us s i on a bo ut th e f ro n ti er be tw ee n p hy s ic s a nd b io l o gy w ou ld ex pec t, but o n t he op p os it i o n b et we en s i mp le ma te ria l t hi n gs a nd u n it y of a ma t er ia l s ub st ra t e a nd a s ou l, w h ic h i s i n t ur n gr o un ded o n a n es se n tia l diff ere nce bet we en t h eir m ode s of g iv en ne s s. T hi s t he me i s f ur t her d eve lo ped i n Id e as III 7 (1 9 8 0 t he Ha g ue M a r t in u s N i jh of f p ub l is he rs), w her e Hu s ser l i n tr od uce s wi t hi n l i vi n g na t ure t he f ur th er d i st i nct i o n be t wee n L ei b a nd P sy ch e in te nd e d a s d iffer en t o nt o lo g ica l reg i o ns. A deta i led d i scu s si o n of th e p os si bl e co n t ra st b et we en Id ea s II a n d I d ea s I I I o n th i s p o in t li es o ut s id e t he sc op e of t h i s pa p er. 7 Id ea s I I , p. 3 8 .
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and tactile ones necessarily fill a certain ex tension and also a certain time stretch. The thing is as a unity in a manifold of actual and possible perceptions that are constantly synthesized in the internal temporal flux of living experiences, at least as long as no failure in the concordance of expe riences surfaces. However, even the essential attribute of the extensio is far from being sufficient to characterize the essence of the thing as an extended material reality , insofar as it does not allow us to tell apart a real thing from what Husserl calls a phantom, that is a purely spatial configuration of sensuous properties (perhaps pertaining even to different senses and coherently synthesized). The question is, therefore: what is the eidetic trait that must be added to a phantom in order to obtain a thing as material-real ? 8 And, correlatively, what is the difference between the apprehension of phantom and the apprehension of a thing? To be sure, according to its essence, a material thing can move and change, although it could remain as a matter of fac t motionless and unchanged. However, this is equally true for a phantom: also a phantom can undergo a change of color or shape or modify its position relatively to the perceiver. Husserls answer requires the introduction of the notion of sensuous schema , which he defines as this groun dwork, this corporeal (spatial ) shape along with the filling which extends over it . 9 At each moment, the givenness of a thing requires that a spatial extension, that is a sensuous schema be given. In other words the sensuo us schema is the most fundamental and necessary level of the givenness of a thing. If we perceive a thing at rest and unchanged (which is the situation normally referred to by Husserls examples of thing perception), what comes to originary givenness is bu t the schema. Materiality, in this case, is certainly co -apprehended, but not fulfilled by the act of perception. Adopting the standpoint of genetic phenomenology, Husserl clarifies this point by adding that had the subject never experienced the materialit y of things, then, the intuitive givenness of a sensuous schema could not motivate the positing of a thing at all . 10 Now, this apprehension can find its intuitive motivation only if the thing is considered in relation to the surrounding circumstances. It is not by focusing on an ideally isolated thing that we can tell it apart from a phantom, for what we need to consider is the evolution of the different sensuous schemata in their functional dependence from a given class of circumstances. A material property of a thing comes to givenness only as an
Ib id. p. 4 0 . Ib id. 10 Ibi d. p. 4 4 .
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invariant element in a series of modifications caused by circumstances that are themselves originarily given. A certain chromatic aspect, for instance, belongs at each instant to a sensuous schema. But when the asp ect of an object changes as a consequence of a variation of the conditions of illumination, we still attribute to the object one single objective color that simply appears different according to different optical circumstances. In the same way, a spring has the real property of elasticity, which manifests itself only under a series of modifications of its shape in a certain regulated order determined by causal circumstances. The eidetic trait that differentiates a thing from a phantom is, therefore, its b eing causally interconnected with the surrounding environment, which amounts in turn to a regulated modification of the sensuous schemata pertaining to it. Husserl can thus conclude, reality (or what here is the same, substantiality ) and causality belong together inseparably . Real properties are eo ipso causal ones. 11 3. The Thing and the Leib : from the Thing Given in Perception to the Empty X So far the constitution of material nature has been accomplished not only with respect to a solipsistic subje ct, but also in a sort of self-forgetfulness of the actual role of subjectivity. A change of attitude is now required for the constitutional analysis to be further pursued. In particular, we can no longer ignore the role played by the Leib in perceptive li fe. To be precise, there are two fundamentally different levels at which the Leib is involved. 12 The first level had been already analyzed by Husserl in the course Ding und Raum (1907) and is based on the constant correlation between
Ibid . p. 4 8 . Let u s s t res s t w o ma j or t ra i ts of t h i s c o ns ti tu ti o na l a na l y si s. 1 ) The en t ire p ro ce ss s o f a r des cri bed w her e by a t h i ng , i n t he f u ll ne s s of it s rea l /ca u sa l pr o per tie s , co me s t o gi ve n ne ss ta ke s p la ce e nt ir el y a t th e le vel of perc ept i o n: b ot h t he c irc u ms ta nce s a n d t he ca u sa l it ie s i nv o lve d a ppea r a t t he lev el of pe rce pt i on ( Ib id. p p. 4 6 - 4 7 ). 2 ) I t i s nec es sa r y t o d i st in g ui sh be tw ee n a ) th e se n su ou s sch em a ( w he th er c ha n gi n g o r u n cha n gi n g) p ert ai ni ng t o on e se n s e ; b) th e f ul l s en s uo u s s ch e m a of a t h ing , w h ic h Hu ss erl a l s o ca ll s (ra t her da n ger o u sl y) s en s e- th i ng ( I bid . p. 8 2 ) ; c) the re al/ c au sa l th ing ( w hi c h a ct ua l ly is st il l a ppre he n ded i n pe rce pt io n) wi t h it s rea l/ c a usa l pr op ert ie s. A t e a ch ne w lev el we e n co u nt er a gi ve n ne ss a s a u ni ty ap p ea ri ng i n a ma nif o ld of e le me n ts bel o n gi n g t o t he l ow er lev el. 12 F or a de ta i le d a na l y si s of H us se rl s no t io n o f t he Le ib i n Id e as II se e E. Be h nk e Edm u nd H us se rl s C o ntr ib u ti o n t o Ph e no me n ol o g y of t he B o dy i n Idea s I I i n Is su e s i n H u s se r l s I d e as I I , ed b y T. Ne n o n a nd L. E mb ree, D o rdrec h t 1 9 9 6 , pp.1 3 5 - 1 6 0 . T he a r ti cl e, h o we ver, d oes n o t f oc us o n t he r o le p la ye d by t he L ei b in t he es ta b li s h me nt o f t he p ri ma r y / sec o nda ry pr ope rt ie s d is ti nc t i o n.
11

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perceptive adumbrations on the one hand and systems of kinesthetic data motivating them on the other . 13 Through a complex and multi layered process both the hyletic data and the kinesthetic data are localized in the Leib , 14 which is co-constituted along with the perceived things a s a transcendent unit necessarily accompanying all perceptions. In virtue of this localization, the Body 15 becomes a system of organs of sensation that I can freely move, thus motivating different perceptual processes. At this first level, there appears already a fundamental relativity of my perceptive environment to my own Body, notably at the spatial level, insofar as each actually perceived or potentially perceivable object necessarily has a position relatively to my Body, which thus acquires the role of bearer of the zero -point of orientation. Every object occupies a there with respect to absolute here of my Body. The constitution of the momentary states of sense -things is termed by Husserl the most original psychophysical 16 conditionality, for it implies a dependence of the givenness of the thing from ordinary states of the sense organs (opening th e eyes, moving the hands, etc.) Further, this conditionality becomes the psychophysical conditionality between, on the one side, my Body and its causal interweavings in extra -Bodily nature, and, on the other side, the subjective courses of sensation, courses of changing aspects, etc. 17 Husserl adopts the term conditionality precisely to mark the essential difference between a causal relation among realities, and a relation involving real/objective elements on the one hand, irreal/subjective element of the other . 18 The Body is thus at
I n th e rea l - i m ma ne nt co n te nt of a p erce pt ua l Er le b n is t he re re si de n ot on l y t he h yle ti c da ta of se n sa t i o n t ha t a r e a p pre he nd ed b y t he n oe se s i n s u ch a wa y t ha t th ey a du m bra te t he d i rect l y p erce iva b le pr o pert ie s of w ha t ma ni f est s i tse lf, i n th e fi rs t pla c e, a s a tr a n sce nde n t se ns u ou s s che ma , b ut a l s o a ki n d of da ta t ha t a re no t a ppr eh e nded a s e xp os i n g a ny t hi n g tr a n sce nde n t a nd t ha t s i mp l y go ver n reg ula ted f l o w s of s ub se q ue nt a du mb ra t i o ns. 14 Id e as I I , 3 6 - 3 8 . T he l oca liz a t io n a nd t ouc h se n sa t i o ns, f or i n sta nce , is m or e pri m or dia l a nd dir ec t tha n t he l oca liz a ti o n o f vi s ua l of a c ou s ti c s e ns a t io n s. A n d th o se l oca liz a ti o n s a re i n t ur n d iffe re nt fr o m t he o ne of ki ne s t het ic da ta . 15 Bod y wi t h a ca p it ol B tra ns la t es L ei b. 16 Id ea s I I , p. 7 0 . 17 Ib id. p. 7 1 . 18 Ibid . p. 6 9 . T he d if f ere nce bet we e n na t u ra l ca usa l it y a nd p s yc h op h ys ica l co nd it i o na l it y i s m ore clea rl y exp o sed b y Hu s ser l in a n ote p u bl is he d a s t he sec o nd su pp le me n t t o th e E ng l is h tra ns la t i o n of Id ea s II . T he n o te bea r s t he ti tl e Ps yc h op h y si ca l ca us a li ty a nd ca u sa l nex u s of th i n gs. Hu s ser l exp l a i n s, t he ph y si ca l t h i ng i s w ha t it i s, i. e., ha s r ea l pr oper t ies , o n ly i n re la t i on t o t he ca u sa l ne xu s of p h ys i ca l na t ure ( Id e as II , p. 3 5 5 ). If we c on s ide r i ns tea d t ha t a n y ob je ct w ha ts oe ver ca n ha ve a n eff ect on t he exp eri e nci n g s ub j ect b y b ei n g
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once a real/causal thing embedded in the causal nexus of nature and the bearer of a special relation with psychic life. Each sensation process has a purely physical/causal side interwoven with a psychophysical conditionality connecting together a natural causal chain with a subjective event. As we shall see, taking into account the role of the embodied subject in perception is the starting point of the next step of the constitution of material nature, because now the perceived thing bears a number of actual relations with the perceivers Body. In the third chapter of Ideas II Husserl puts forward of number of example s showing that the appearing material thing (which Husserl, reviving an Aristotelian term, call Aestheta ) depend on the functioning of the Body, intended as a psychophysical complex endowed also with real/causal properties. Husserl mentions, for instance, the fact tha t a blister on a finger alters its tactual sensibility, that wearing blue spectacles changes the chromatic aspects of the environme nt, and that the intake of a drug , like santonin, modifies color perception . 19
us ed a s a st i mu l us - Ob je ct (Ib id.) , we re a liz e t ha t, in t h is wa y, n o f urt h er in n er rea l/ ca u sa l pr op ert y of t he o b jec t i s pr od uced . A n e xa mp le ma y i ll us tra te th i s fa c t. A ma gn et re vea l s o ne o f i t s r ea l p ro per tie s b y a t tra ct in g a nd b y be in g a ttra cte d b y m eta ll ic bo die s, t ha t i s, b y ob j ect s tha t be lo n g e n ti r el y t o na tu re. But t he f a ct t ha t a ma g net ca n c o nd it io n th e e mer ge nc e of ta ct i le se nsa ti o n s by bei n g i n c o nta c t wi th t he B od y d o es n ot co n tri bu te a t a l l th e c o ns ti t ut io n o f th e i nn er rea l /ca u sa l pro per tie s of t he ma g net, e ve n if t he ta ct ile se nsa t io n s co n tri bu te t o t he co n s ti tu ti o n of t he s en s u o us s ch e me of t he ma g ne t. Of c ou rse , if a ma g ne t h it m y B od y, t he wa y i n w hi c h t he co n ta c t ta ke s p la ce a nd th e su bs e que n t rea ct i on o f th e ma g ne t wi ll i nde ed c on tr ib ut e t o t he c o ns ti t ut io n of th e ri g id it y of t he ma g net a s o ne of i t s rea l /ca usa l p r oper t ies ; b u t t hi s is , o n ce m ore, a ca usa li t y ta ki n g p la ce en t ire ly w it hi n t he na t ura l w or ld . C on ver se ly , ps yc h ica l ca u se s ca n n ot i nte rve n e i n t he c a usa l na t ura l pr oc es s es. Hu s ser l s co nc lu s i on i s tha t th e t hi n g a nd w h ole of na tur e a re sea led o ff (I bid. ) 19 It i s i m po rta n t n o t t o mi s s t he me t ho d ol o gi ca l sta tu s of t h e a p pea l t o t he se we ll- k n o wn f a c ts a b o ut per cep t io n. On e m ig h t su sp ect t ha t Hu ss erl i s he re rela ps i ng in t o t he na t ura l a tt it ude , by a cce pt in g t he va l id it y of tra ns ce nde n t, a nd spe cif ica ll y, e m pi rica l s ta t es of a ffa irs , tha t t he tra ns ce nde n ta l re du ct i on sh o u ld ha v e bra c ke te d f r o m t he o ut se t. It t hi s w ere t he ca se, th e th eo ry of co n st it ut i o n of ma te r ia l na tur e wo u ld b e gr o u nd ed o n e mp ir ic a l ma t ter s of fa ct s, a nd t hi s w o ul d be s i mp ly a b sur d, g i ve n t ha t th e a i m of t ra n sce nd e nta l ph en o me n o lo g y i s t o gi ve n a n a c c ou nt of t he e ide ti c st ru ct ure o f the wa y i n w hi ch o n ob j ect iv i ty o f w ha t eve r k i nd mu s t be a b le to a pp ea r t o tr a n sce nd e n ta l su b jec ti vi ty , f or t hi s o bj ec ti vi ty t o be t h ere a t a ll. I n s h or t, co n st it ut i o na l a na l y se s a l wa y s re qu ire b ot h tra n sce nd e n ta l a n d e ide ti c r ed u cti o n s. N o w, a lt h ou g h H u ss erl do e s se e m h ere t o in du l g e i n c on s idera ti o n s o f a so me w ha t em pir ica l c ha ra ct er, h i s a na ly se s a r e i nd e ed i n te nded a s c om p a ti ble w it h a su bs e que n t r ig or o us a ppl ica ti o n of t h e ph e no m en o l og ica l me th o d. I n pa rt ic ula r: 1 ) t he si tu a ti o ns des cr ibe d i n t h e exa mp le s j us t me nt i o ned nee d t o be c o n sid ered a s n oe ma t ic c orre la tes o f ce r ta i n a c t s of p erce pt i o n, i ma g i na t i o n

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These events produce deviations from normal per ception that amount to a new level of psychophysical conditionality. The appearance of the Aestheta is conditioned by changes in the state of the Body in a way that differs from the normal conditional dependence of appearances from the Bodily movements, fo r in this case the very qualities that appear in the Aestheta are modified. Changes in the Body condition changes in the Aestheta . However, as long as we are aware that these apparent changes are connected to real/causal modifications of the Body (as in th e case of the intake of santonin), we do not apprehend them as actual modifications of the surrounding world, but only as perceptual anomalies. What is noteworthy is that the perceptual anomalies, insofar as they are recognized as such, do not contribute a t all to the constitution of the things. 20 The resulting changes are considered as semblances of the true things, which are constituted in the orthoaesthetic condition. We thus come to understand that the constitution of nature is made possible by the exi stence of a normal or orthoaesthetic psychophysical conditionality in virtue of which, first of all, the sensuous schemata are constituted harmoniously. It is only because there is a normal state of perception that a coherent world can appear and that de viant occurrences such as the previously mentioned ones can arise. Husserls analysis of the interplay of normal and abnormal psychophysical conditions varies depending on whether a solipsistic subject or a subject as a member of a community is taken into consideration. But the essential point remains the same, i.e. it is possible to gain knowledge of the fact that the way the external world appears to us is relative to the psychophysical structure of the Body. Even the normality shared by an entire community of subjects in mutual understanding appears as a result of the contingent features of their Corporality. The result is that there is a second, more fundamental sense, in which the things as they are given in perception are relative to the Body, for they are
a nd me m or y, a n d of t he ca te g or ia l a ct iv i tie s b u il t t he re up o n. Th eref ore, t he y ca n be gra s ped by n oe ma t ic refl ec ti o n c a rrie d o u t i n t h e tr a n sce nde n ta l a tt it ude. 2 ) T he ex i ste nce o f a d epe nd en ce of t he Ae sth eta fr o m t he Bo dy m u s t be se e n a n e id et ic nec es s it y, e ve n if th is o r t ha t pa rt ic ula r i ns ta nce of depe nd en ce i s a n e m pir ica l ma tt er of fa ct . He nce, w herea s t he fa ct t ha t a sa nt o ni n m od if ie s ou r p erc ept i o n is n o t a n e ide ti c nec es s it y, t he in ter dep en de nce be t w een t he p hy si ca l s ta t e of t he B o dy a nd t he co n te nt of perc ept i o n is i nde ed, f or H u sse rl, a n e ide t ic ne ces s it y. T ha t me a n s t ha t i t is im p os s ib le t o c o nc ei ve o f a s ub jec t c o n s ti tu ti n g t he w or ld w h o d oe s n o t co n st it ut e a l on g w it h i t a B ody a s a n or g a n of pe rce pt i on pa rt a ki n g i n t he ca u sa l ne xu se s of t he r ea l w or ld. 20 Id ea s I I , p. 7 8 .

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correlates of the perceptual experiences of a subject or community of subjects endowed with a contingent psychophysical conditionality. The truth of the judgments grounded in perception is thus, according to its essence, subjective -relative. Here we have reached the endpoint of the perceptual constitution of material nature. The constitutive resources of perception are unable to pursue the process of objectivation precisely because there is no concordant unit posited by perception in a multiplicity of different Aestheta relative to perceiving subjects that have different psychophysical structures. This is true also at the level of discordant perceptions arising from anomalies affecting one single subject. To resort to Lockes old example, if for one han d the water is cold while for the other it is warm, these two sensations are not apprehended as aspects of one synthetic unit manifesting in them. Although it might be suspected that the result thus obtained could lead us into a sort of skepticism about th e possibility of objectively d etermining the external world, it is precisely at the level of the system of relativities just outlined that is possible to find the rational motivations for a different mode of constitution: the purely intellectual one. The phenomenological strategy, here, is the same as always, namely trying to work out what is presupposed when a system of relativities is posited/constituted as an actually obtaining one. As I have already stressed, the crucial point is the difference between normal perceptual life and perceptual anomalies. A subject who had no orthoaesthetic perceptual life at all, a subject for whom the properties of the surrounding things as well as those of its own Body, even the real/causal ones, changed in a chaotic way throughout its perceptual life, would have no rational grounds to assert even the relativity of the world of perception to the psychophysical structure of its own Body. This is why perceptual normality plays an essential role. In normal experience the coh erent succession of perceptual Erlebnisse posit as real existing synthetic units both the thing perceived and the perceivers Body . 21 Only once this two -fold positing or co -positing is effected does it become possible to observe the existence of anomalies, which are acknowledged as such on the grounds of what is given in normal conditions, and which, for this reason, cannot modify the positing accomplished in the latter. The effect of anomalies is, rather, to highlight that the very same thing that appears to me in normal perceptual life can appear differently to me if a change occurs in my psychophysical structure, or equivalently that other subjects could
21

The la tte r b ei n g, of c o ur se, a p os it of a c o mp let el y d iffe re nt k in d.

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apprehend this very same thing throughout their perceptual life in a way which would correspond to an a nomalous mode of experience for me, and vice versa . 22 In short, the relativity of the thing to the Body, the fact that it can exhibit itself differently to different contingent perceptual normalities rationally motivates the intellectual positioning of the thing as an identical something that is differently declined depending on the perceivers factual constitution. We observe here an ascent to a new level of rationality and constitution. First the rationality of perception that, as originary presenting act, posits in the context of harmonious normal perception the Aesthetic thing as existing, then, an intellectual constitutional activity works out from what is given in perception the idea of an identical something that the thing is beyond any perceptual relativity. The second step, which marks the switch from perceptual to intellectual constitution, amounts to the replacement of the thing with an empty X, referred to already in the 40 of Ideas I . Of course, for the moment, we know nothing of this identical something that we are rationally compelled to posit. However, Husserl can here resort to a general principle of formal logic, according to which any identical something must be determined by a stock of properties that belong to it:
If t he t h in g i s ( a nd co nc or da n ce i n t h e p os i ti n g of th e b ei n g wi t hi n t he nex u s of ex per ie nce i s a n or ig i na l gro u nd o r rea s o n fo r th e a s ser ti o n, I t i s ) , th en it mu st be d eter m i na b le i n a wa y w hi ch de ter m i ne s w ha t is no n - rela t ive fr o m a m o ng t he re la t iv i tie s a nd, o n t he o th er ha n d, de ter m in es i t ou t o f t ha t w h ic h c o n ta i n s a ll gr ou nd s of ri g ht , ou t of t he da ta of e x per ie nce, t hu s o ut of se ns u ou s re la t iv it ie s. Of c our se, e xper ie nc e d oes n ot exc l ude t he po s si bi li t y t ha t i s be a n nu ll ed b y fut ur e ex per ie nce or eve n t ha t th e r ea l no t be a t a l l, t h ou g h it ha d bee n gi ve n i n a c o nc orda n t wa y. Bu t no w th ere a re ri g htf u l gr o u nds f or p o si t in g b ei n g a n d co n se q ue nt ly f or t he p os s ib il it y a n d nec es si t y of po s it i ng t he g oa l of l og ic o- ma t h ema t ica l de ter m i na t i on . 23

Here the necessity of logical-mathematical determination is introduced rather abruptly, and it will be necessary to say more about it. 24 For the moment however, a decisive step towards the
Of c our se it m i gh t ha ppe n t ha t t he ver y ex i ste n ce of a t hi n g I ha v e expe ri en ce of i s a ck n o wl ed ged t o be a n il lu s io n on t he g ro u nd s of ex cha n ge w it h ot her su b jec ts wh o wo u ld per s ua de me t ha t I s uffer of sev er e pe rce pt ua l dy sfu nc t io n s. B u t ev e n in t ha t ca se, co m m un ica ti o n w o uld be ma de p os s ib le o nl y by a cer ta in c ore of s ha red o b jec ti ve po si ti n g. 23 Id ea s I I , p. 8 1 . 24 Th i s ha s b ee n n ot ed a l s o b y Pa ul Ri c oeu r (se e An aly s es a nd p r ob l m e s d a ns
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transcendental foundation of the scientific knowledge of nature has been made. By including in the constitutional analysis of material nature also the reference to living nature, specifically to the Leib , we have acknowledged that the acts of perception in which nature is constituted are affected by a relativity involving the perceived things on the one hand, and the Leib on the other, and that in order to overcome this relativity we have to divest the thing of its sensible qualities and replace it with an empty X whose properties will have to be determined. At this level, Galileos first statement is thus reformulated in the language of phenomenology and transcendentally founded: sensible properties cannot belong to the things as they are in themselves; they simply appear to be in the thing to the embodied (animal) subject, without which ( rimosso l animale ) they would disappear too. 4. Filling the E mpty X The last step in the constitution of material nature consists in the positive characterization of the so -called empty X in order to constitute the fully objective physicalistic thing , that is, ideally, the thing as it is in itself, as it must be determined in principle by any rational subject. It is thus necessary to decide along which lines this constitution, that is no longer perceptual in character, can take place. Clearly, if this constituti on is to be possible at all, the relativity of the Aestheta to the perceiving subject cannot imply that the perceived thing is a mere illusion, nor that experience does not provide us with the elements necessary in order to progress in its intellectual determination. That the perceived thing is not a mere illusion has already been established, for the reality of the empty X exhibits itself in perception. But how can we predicatively fill the empty X on the basis of what is ultimately given to us? The way modern science answers this question is, of course, that the empty X must be determined solely through primary properties , that is, through causal properties that are essentially geometrical in character. This is precisely the sense of Galileos second quo tation. Again, transcendental phenomenology must be able to provide rigorous foundations to this fundamental presupposition of modern science, which was stated by Galileo, Descartes and Locke in ways that would not be satisfactory at all for Husserl, and t hat, on contrary, have motivated in his eyes nothing less that the crisis of
Id es II d e H u ss e rl i n A l c ol e d e la p h e nom en ol og y , Pa ri s: V ri n 1 9 8 5 , p. 1 0 6 .) H ow eve r, i n t hi s pa p er, I a tte m pt t o s h o w tha t Hu s ser l s tex t c o nta i ns ma ny ele me n ts e na b li n g t he rea der t o f il l t h i s ga p .

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European culture. Chapter three of Ideas II indeed contains an analysis of the constitution of primary qualities, which anticipates most of the essential traits of the analysis of the Galilean mathematization of nature developed in the long 9 of the Crisis . Husserl s indications can be best spelled out by considering the constitution of the physicalistic thing at the intersubjective level, although in Ideas II he insists that als o the solitary subject could, in principle, achieve it. The starting point is to acknowledge that there is a distinction to be made, already at the level of the eidetic traits of the perceived thing, between the spatio -temporal element and the specifical ly sensible one. 25 A thing, as it is perceived, is always something spatio-temporal from the first, having form and duration and also having a position in space and time . 26 These determinations are not be identified with their idealized geometrical counter parts precisely because, insofar as they are perceivable, they cannot be thought without sensible fillings like colors and tactile qualities (this being of course due to a well -known material a priori of perception). From this point of view, as I have alre ady anticipated, all perceivable traits must be replaced when constituting the physicalistic thing. Nevertheless, according to Husserl, the spatio -temporal character of perceived objects, and specifically the spatial one, must be granted a privileged status. Indeed, this was already implicit in the previous discussion about the positing of the empty X. Let us see why. To each subject there corresponds a space orientated with respect to its own Body; but a community of subjects constitute an objective space in which each here and there are interchangeable, in such a way that an object does not only have a position with respect to an individual subjects Body, but also an objective position in a single, shared space which is no longer oriented. This space is a single unified system of locations in which both the Bodies and the things have their definite place . Interestingly enough, although this common objective space is not yet the idealized space of geometry, according to Husserl, it is already somethi ng that is grasped only by the intellect, and not through mere perception:
In t hi s wa y i s so lv ed t he pr ob le m of t h e f or m of in tu i ti o n a nd of spa tia l i n tu it i o n. I t i s n o t a ma t ter of t h e se n ses , a l t ho u gh i n a n ot he r re sp ec t i t is . T he pri ma ry i nt u it iv e s p a ce i s se ns u ou s ly gi ve n t h o ug h th i s i s n ot ye t s pa ce it se lf. O b je ctiv e sp ac e is not s en s uo us , a lt h ou g h it i s st il l i nt u ite d o n a h i gh er le vel , a nd i t A s Hu ss er l sa y s a l rea dy i n I d ea s I , 4 0 . Id ea s I I , p. 8 8 .

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co me s t o gi ve n ne ss by mea n s of a n ide n tif ic a ti o n wi th i n a c ha ng e of ori e nta ti o n, b u t ex cl us ive l y o n e t he s u b jec t i t sel f ca rr ie s o u t f reel y. O rie n ted spa ce ( a nd a l o ng w it h i t, eo isp o Ob je ct ive s pa ce) a nd a ll a pp ea ri n g sp a tia l f or m s a l rea d y a dm it s of idea liz a ti o n; th ey a re to be gra sp ed i n ge o me tri ca l p u rit y a nd det er mi n ed exa ct l y . 27

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The objective but not yet idealized space is the link between what is given to us in perception and the idealized language of physics. The fact that objective space is not sensuous implies that it cannot be treated on an equal footing either with the sensuous oriented space or with the qualitative eidetic traits of the Aestheta . It is not perceived with the eyes as colors are, for it comes to givenness only via the constitution of a system of location invariant with respect to changes of orientation, i.e. with respect to real or imagined movements of the Body whereby the subject is able to take up different points of view on the same things, thus making the here and the there interchangeable. This is indeed Husserls way to clarify the notion of space as a necessary form of all possible objects of experience. The subjective -relative character of sensuous properties depended precisely on their dependence on the contingent Bodily constitution of the subject. We may, for instance, imagine a subject who sees colors in a completely different way, or who is even completely blind to colors. But insofar as a subject can be said to share our world, to be in our world, its senses must be able to locate its own Body as well as our Bodies, and make a sense o f the here and the there. Hence, they must be able to constitute space as the single objective system of locations of all things, and, along with it, time and motion . 28 Therefore, in contrast with the sensuous qualities of perceivable things, the existence of the objective space in wh ich these things are situated is not relative to the contingent structure of the Body: objective space is, so to speak, every- Bodys space . In this way, we come to realize that the empty X, the identical something , was posited from the start in this object ive space, along with the imagined differently embodied subjects to whom the empty X appears endowed with different secondary qualities. Moreover, we understand why geometrical space, which is the idealization of objective/intersubjective space sho uld be t he language of nature, and why all physicalistic properties have t o be, in a sense, geometrical. Indeed mechanical properties, which exhibit
27 28

Ibi d. I ta l ic s a d ded. Ibi d. p. 9 1 .

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themselves in the regulated series of changes of positions and deformations of things inherit the objectivity o f this spatial form and admit of what Husserl will call in the Crisis a direct mathematization. Real -causal properties, such as colors or heat, which are not immediately understandable in terms of space, time and movement, have to be indirectly mathematize d by causally explaining them via the effects of light rays or heat radiations, which are thought as real physical phenomena occurring in objective space. In some sense, between the real/causal property of the elasticity of a spring and the real/causal pro perty of objective colors, which were a t first introduced at the same level of objectivity, there is a difference that grants the former a privileged objective status with respect to latter. The privilege of mechanical properties is grounded on their being rooted in a space witch is a necessary form for all possible natural things and processes that can be objects of experience by any possible subjects . 29 5. Conclusion Although, in contrast with the Crisis , Ideas II contains no detailed analysis of two necessary ingredients of the development of physical science, that is measurement and idealization, it develops a rich account of the role of the Body in the constitution of physicalistic objectivity, which can be read as a phenomenological foundation of Gali leos distinction between primary and secondary properties. We have seen that the first stage of the constitution of material nature abstracts from the role of the Body, that is, from animal nature. Subsequently, material and animal nature must be considered together as thing and Body . It is within nature intended in this broad sense that the relativity of perceivable properties arises. The Body on the one hand makes possible the constitution of the objective space of nature in which both thi ngs and Bodies are situated and, on the other, is responsible for the fundamental subjective-relative character of perception. With the establishment of the distinction between primary and secondary properties, the constitution of material nature enters its final stage. Consequently, there appears yet another level of identity in manifolds of
W hi c h do es n ot a mo un t t o sa y in g t ha t a ll ph ys ica li s tic pr ope rt ies m us t b e mec ha n ica l i n t he tec h ni ca l se ns e of th e w ord . Li gh t w a ves a re a n elec tr o ma gn et ic p he n o me n o n a nd, s in ce M a x we ll, d o n ot be lo n g in mec ha n ic s a t a ll. Ho w eve r th ey c o ns i st i n a g eo m etr iz a ti o n of li g ht e ss en t ia l ly a ki n t o mec ha n ica l p ro ce ss es, i n tha t o nl y q ua nt i ta ti ve pr ope rt ie s occ urr in g i n spa ce a nd ti m e a re reta i ned.
29

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appearances. The physicalistic thing is not relative to the perceivers Body and is an identical element exhibiting itself in the different Aestheta appearing to subjects endowed wit h different 30 psychophysical structures . According to Husserl, nature is thus fully objectified, for mathematical idealities are the same for all possible subjects 31 and are free from any relativity to the Body . 32

S ee Id ea s I I I p. 5 4 : P h ys ic s e lim i nat es t he r ela t i o n t o t he no rm a l org a n izat io n . It sa y s: n or ma li ty i s s o me th i ng a cc ide n ta l c o mp le tel y r ela ti ve, a n d a cc ord i ng l y tha t O b jec ti vi ty w hi c h i s co n st i tu ted ou t o f suc h a g ree me n t is n ot a ny le ss a rela ti ve a nd a cc ide nta l on e. 31 In t h i s se n se, t he ob j ect iv it y of na t ure ul t i ma t el y re s ts o n t h e o bj ect iv it y of ma t h ema t ica l id ea l it ie s, w hi ch H u sse rl ha d e sta bl is h ed si nc e t he P r ol eg om e na . 32 A n d ye t o b jec ti ve na t ure i s s t il l a b e ing r ela tiv e to p u re c on sc io u sn e s s ; h o we ver , th i s is a re la t iv i ty of a c o mp let el y diff ere nt k i nd, w h ic h fa r fr o m e xc lud i n g ob je ct iv it y is es se n tia l ly t ied t o i t.
30

The Lebenswelt : Subjectivity and Objectivit y in Husserl and Patoka

Lubica Unk (Murdoch University)

Abstract: In his translation of Edmund Husserls Cartesian Meditations , Dorion Cairns points out that Husserls use of the words Gegenstand and Objekt have different meanings, whereas David Carr questions this opposition. However, in this paper, I propose to discuss precisely this distinction and its relevance to our thinking about the world. Nevertheless, to limit my discussion, I will leave aside a discussion of the meanings of Gegenstand and Objekt and concentrate only on the meaning of the word objective in connection to the meanings of the terms subject/subjectivity/subjective. My concern is with the meaning of objectivity that is largely understood as scientific objectivity based on fac ts, and subjectivity when reduced to crude versions of solipsism. Husserls concern with science turned into technology, forgetting its own ground, is relevant even more today than it was in his time. Science became not one domain among many others but i s now supposedly the only arbiter of objectivity. Even worse, psychology is now so powerful that to question its methodology amounts to heresy. The point is to remember that theories, rules and methodologies are constituted by us humans, that science is a human endeavor. The scientific world of objective facts is not the objective world through which we understand the Lebenswelt , but sciences have their starting point in the Lebenswelt and, as Patoka would say, the human lived experience cannot be converte d into an object that we can observe and describe as rocks or the lava on the moon .
De m o ns tra ti n g ex per i enc e c o ns t it ute s a n expe rie n tia l mea n in g, n ot t he e nt i t y [ v c ] i ts elf [ th e ta bl e, f or i ns ta nce ]. T h e st ru ct ure of ou r i n ne r l if e t ha t is t he d em o n st rat io n . Fo r ev er y t yp e of obj e ct i vi t y [ p ed m t n o st ] th ere m us t e xi st r ule s of d e mo n st ra t i on , a m od e a c co rd in g t o w hi ch t h is o bje cti vit y [ p ed m tn os t ] e n ter s in t o o ur e xpe ri en ce. F or i n sta nc e, o bje cts [ p ed m ty ] of o ne ty p e a re t he nece s sa r y pre s upp o s it io n of a c ces s t o o bje cts [ p ed m ty ] of a n ot he r t yp e; we ca n n ot ha ve a c ce ss t o n u mb er s wi t ho ut ha v in g expe rie n ce of t hi n gs [ v c ] fir s t. T ha t i s no r a nd o m s e qu en ce b ut a nec es sa r y o ne, f ol l o wi n g fr o m t he na tu re of th e ma tte r [ z p od staty v c i ] . 1 Pa t o ka , 1 9 9 6 , 9 0 , ita l ic s i n ori g i na l , st re ss a dded. Fr o m n o w o n r eferre d t o a s BC L W . Vy kaz ov n z ku en ost i j e zk u e no st n sm y sl, nik ol i v c s am a. St r ukt u ry
1

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Translating Edmund Husserls Cartesian Meditations , Dorion Cairns notes that Husserl frequently uses the words Gegenstand and Objekt to express importantly different senses. In order to keep this difference in his translation, Cairns draws a distinction between them by sp elling the word object with a small letter when it represents Gegenstand and with a capital when it represents Objekt . All this applies, mutatis mutandis , in the case of any word derived from Gegenstand or Objekt . 2 By contrast, translating Husserls The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy , David Carr questions this opposition and writes that [t]here is no difference in meaning between Objekt and Gegenstand as Husserl uses these term s and hence no reason for following Dorion Cairnsin trying to distinguish them in translation. 3 In a certain sense, Carr is right, if we take into account Husserls epistemological project. Husserl pays attention to the constitution of an object any object in our perception in order to secure knowledge of it. However, in this paper, I propose to discuss precisely this distinction. Nevertheless, to limit my discussion, I will leave aside a discussion of the meanings of Gegenstand and Objekt and concentrate only on the meaning of the word objective in connection to the meanings of the terms s ubject/subjectivity/subjective. To make clear the framework of this paper, I would like to start with Husserls claim that the crisis of European spirit is a naive ratio nalism that is based on the naivite of naturalism taken as objectivism 4 that he defines as the psychophysical world - view that takes the psychic and physical as two domains that can influence each other through causality. 5 Husserls project from the beginning is to question this dualistic view of the world, in which nature and spirit are to count a s realities in a similar sense, onebuilt on the

na eh o v nit nh o iv ot a t o j e v y ka zov n . Pro kad d r uh p ed m t no sti m u s ex i stov at p rav id l o t oh ot o v y ka zov n , zp so b, j ak ta to p ed m tn o st v y s tup u j e v na zku e no st i. N ap . p e d m t y j ed n oh o d r uh u j so u n utn m p ed p o klad em p r o to , aby ch om m li p st up k p ed m t m ji n h o d r u h u; n el ze m t p st up k s lm , an i d v e m m zk u e no st o v c ech . To n e n n h od i l s ouv i sl ost , n b r nut n, p ly no uc z p od st aty v c i ( Pa t o ka , 1 9 9 5 b, 6 5 , ita l ic s i n or ig i na l ) NB. T h e Cz e ch e q ui va l en t of t he E ng l is h wo rd ob je ct a re: o bj ekt , v c , p ed m t ; th e Cz e ch wo rd s for o b jec ti ve a re o bj ekt iv n , p ed m tov , v cn . 2 Ca ir n s , 1 9 7 3 , 3 , t ra ns l a to r s n ote 2 . 3 Ca rr, 1 9 7 0 , 2 2 , tra ns la to r s n ote 1 . 4 Hu ss er l, 1 9 7 0 [ 1 9 3 5 ] , 2 9 2 . 5 Ib id. 2 9 4 .

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other causally. 6 What I would like to do is to ask even more nai ve questions about the meaning of subjec tive and objective that might, perhaps, illuminate further what is at stake today. This opposition is complicated not only because of the various meanings of objective, but also because of the different meanings of subjective. Ernst Cassirer, discussing wh at empirical knowledge amounts to, suggests:
We ca ll o b jec ti ve t h os e ele m en t s of ex pe rie nc e, w hi c h per si s t th ro u g h a l l c ha n ge i n t he he re a nd n o w, a nd o n w h ic h r es t s t he un c ha n gea bl e c ha ra c t er of ex per ie nce; w h ile w e a s cri be to t he sp her e of su b jec ti vi t y a ll t ha t be l on g s t o t hi s c ha n ge i ts elf, a nd tha t on l y ex pre s ses a dete rm i na t i o n of t he p a rti cu la r, u ni q ue her e a nd n o w. T he res u lt [i s tha t] t h e di s t in ct i o n be t wee n t h e su b jec ti ve a nd t he ob j ect ive , h a s mer el y r e lativ e s ig n ifi ca nce.

In this sense, obje ctive elements of experience are defined by the unity in multiplicity, to use Husserls terminology. We see one unceasing entity through different aspects by experiencing it as something singular that persists through those different aspects. Those elements that are not consistent through time are subjective and we simply discard them. However, as Cassirer also notes, a content of experience is always relative to the elements of experience. When a thing appears to be permanent, a further appearance of so mething else can change our experience and the original can no longer hold as a true and perfect expression of objectivity, but as a me re partial expression of being. The point is that there is not a fixed line of division, separating two eterna lly sund ered fields of reality. As we advance, we deal with a moving limit, which constantly shifts in the progress of knowledge. Hence, to use the division between subjective and objective, between an inner and an outer world is misleading because it obscur es this fundamental relation. Subjective and objective are not autonomous for they depend upon each other. We forget that instead of a living, reciprocal relation realized along with advancing knowledge, we create a fixed and absolutely closed division of things. 7 As Cassirer sums up, our concern with this transition into the subjective is not with a change in the substance of things, but merely with a change in the critical evaluation of cognitions because a judgment, that previously seemed to hold
Ib id. 2 9 7 . Ca s sir er, 1 9 2 3 , 2 7 3 - 4 , ita li cs i n or ig i na l .

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unconditionally, is now limited to a certain sphere of condition. 8 In other words, our experience of things has nothing to do with the substance of things, with their being or not being, but is relative to our knowledge. For Cassirer, the problem is ne ither objectivity nor subjectivity but the way we have carved the world of experience up into physical and psychic, into objective and subjective, by taking those meanings as standing for something unproblematic, given and frozen in time. For Cassire r, true and per fect expression of objectivity, the thing that we can be certain of as being in the world and that it is the object we are seeing depends on the critical evaluation of cognitions. In other words, ontology depends on epistemology. Cassire rs reading of the distinction is helpful to start thinking about what we mean when we use these terms. In a different context, Cassirer notes that objectification is always a constructiv e process. The physical world the world of constant things and qualities is no mere bundle of sense data but is constructed in thought, and is based on acts of theoretical objectification, objectification by conc epts and scientific constructs. 9 Cassirer already uses the word objectivity in two different senses. One meaning is objectivity in a sense of the world of objects the Lebenswelt , the world we experience and the other is objectivity of thinking, in other words, our judgment about the objects. It is our thoughts that produce knowledge; acts of theoretical obje ctification produce scientific constructs. Those two senses of objectivity are not reducible to each other. As Erwin Schrdinger notes, I do n ot think thatmany physicists certainly not experimentalists are ready to endorse the statement that light wave s do not really exist, they are only waves of knowledge. 10 Waves of knowledge are objective in the sense of the objectivity of human thought that builds scientific knowledge. We can never be sure if they are really in the world. They are relative to a certain sphere of condition, in other words, our knowledge. Waves of knowledge are not facts that one can find in the world. They are not mind independent phenomena but they are our description of what we take to be their status as far as our knowledge is c oncerned. In science, epistemology is primary. Patoka remind s us that the word objectivity is multivalent. He also traces the historical conflation of two epistemological senses
Ib id. 2 7 4 . Ca s sir er, 1 9 9 2 [ 1 9 4 4 ] , 1 6 0 . 10 Fre e qu o ta t i o n f r o m J ea n s: S c h r di n ger, 2 0 0 0 [1 9 5 6 ], 1 0 6 5 .
8 9

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of objectivity, or, perhaps, the bifurcation of the second meaning of objective. With a positivist turn in sciences, the self -constituting thought is superseded by the facts as the ground of objectivity. As Husserl writes, the problem with underst anding objectivism as facts, overlooks that it cannot be based on facts beca use facts arealready meant as t ruths rather than mere opinion. 11 Patoka suggests that self -constitution through objectivity and objectivity as a fact are two different things which, in the nineteenth century, entered into a nonsensical and paradoxical idiosyncratic union. 12 However, the question is in what sense Pato ka uses the word objectivity here. I suggest that it is objectivity in the first sense, that is, the world of objects, the Lebenswelt , from which two other senses are derived. Although ontology precedes epistemology, it is epistemology that Patoka di scusses. In other words, there are three different senses of objectivity and not two. Self -constitution is a constitution of an object in thought, i.e., how do I know the object through objectivity as an ontological category (objects in the world); objectivity as a fact is a reduction, or, rather, forgetting of our human participation in the constitution of an object whereby one takes the object as a fact beyond which one does not have to go, objectivity becomes a matter of factuality. 13 The problem starts with the Cartesian split of the world into two substances, res cogitans and res extensa . In order to confront the skepticism of his time, Ren Descartes search for clarity and perspicuity of knowledge leads him to posit the ground of this certitude in the indubitability of our thinking, res cogitans . As Husserl an d Patoka point out, in the I, Descartes discloses the personal. Yet despite his stumbling upon th e personal dimension of the I, he obscures this discovery by shifting his attention to res extensa , which could be accounted for by mathematics. As Pato ka notes, the Cartesian cogito is quaternio terminorum . It is the personal I think as well as the permanent [ trval ] substance with all the attributes belonging to it, res cogitans , the impersonal ground of certainty. 14 On the one hand, only a thought that is clear and distinct ( clare et distincte ) can certify the being of a thing ( res extensa ). On the other, Descartes new ontological conception derived from Galileo and Newton is no longer nature as we experience it in our
Hu s ser l, 1 9 7 0 [ 1 9 3 5 ] , p. 2 9 6 . Pa t o ka , 1 9 9 6 , 7 2 , t ra n sla ti o n m od ifi ed . Se b ev y tv e n sk rz e o bj ek tiv itu a ob je ktiv it a j ako fakt um jso u d v ro zd ln v ci, kt e r v ak v e l i v 1 9 . stol et v p rot is m y s l no u a p ar ad o x n p e r so nl n u n ii ( P a to ka , 1 9 9 5 b, 5 5 ) . 13 Th is i s a ls o Hu s ser l s co nc er n t hr o u gh o ut h i s wo rk . 14 Pa t o ka , 1 9 8 0 , 2 .3 .1 4 .
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everyday living, but nature constructed in thought, where clare et distincte ideas are certified by mathematics. Calculation is based on principles that are impossible to verify by human experience, leading to an indirect mathematiz ation of nature. The contemplation of nature is replaced by a construction of mathematiz ed structures that become knowable objects; 15 epistemology grounds ontology. On this model, res extensa becomes a knowable object based on the clear and distinct ideas of res cogitans ; yet a thinking thing cannot be co nverted into a geometrical manifold. This is the outcome of the unacknowledged equivocation between the two senses of cogito . Our thinking might be certain for each of us but it is impossible to compare with the thought of others; ones thinking cannot be taken as identical to the thinking of someone else. The ego becomes the ground of knowledge, but this gro und cannot be our personal I. The personal I vanishes from the Cartesian project supplanted by the thinking thing, separated from the world in which we live. Correlatively, the world of our living is reduced to the impersonal substrate defined as res extensa . Matter alone can be expressed through extensio , cogitatio , and so forth. 16 Only matter can be thought identically by everyone because only an object res extensa can be converted hypothetically into its numerical indices. The question of correlation between two separate substances is resolved by the principle of psychophysical parallelism. Only on this model, can mental events [be] added a s a correlate, an epiphenomenon because thinking becomes impersonal thinking thing res cogitans separated from matter res extensa . Matter is privileged as the only knowable substance accounted for by the thinking thing. Certainty of knowledge is based o n the privileged forms supplied by mathematics because it can be reckoned with. 17 Knowledge is assured, skepticism is confronted and overcome, but the personal is lost. Personal knowing becomes subjectiv e, while impersonal knowledge certified by mathematical thinking becomes objective knowledge. Yet, objective in this sense is bifurcated further. This problem is precipitated by the Kantian endeavor to ground the objectivity of human knowi ng in the autonomy of our mind. 18 Although Kant acknowledges the pro blem of autonomy and finitude, his awareness of our finitude, according to Patoka, is lost in subsequent thinking. Hegel is not satisfied with the
15 16 17 18

Pa t o ka , 2 0 0 2 , 4 7 1 . Pa t o ka , 1 9 9 5 b, 2 6 . S e e a l so Pa t o ka , 1 9 9 6 , 3 0 . Pa t o ka , 1 9 9 6 , 3 0 . Ib id., 7 1 .

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incompleteness of the Kantian project, a project that is aware of human limitations; in contrast with Kant H egel posits a new model whereby autonomy and human freedom as an activity become unlimited, absolute, [and] backed by infinity. The Hegelian absolute spirit is the ultimate source of everything. 19 After the collapse of this model, Patoka speaks of the positivistic reaction to Hegelian metaphysics. He points out that it was not an entirely new way of thinking because it was partially already present in pre Kant ian empiricism and rationalism. For positivists, objectivity becomes simply factual. It is facts that count in scie nce, whatever is observed, is and we do not inquire any further. Facts become undisputable constituents of nature that can only be observed and described. 20 As I already discussed, Patoka notes polyvalent senses of objectivity that are not compatible. To extend his observation, we can say that if we take objectivity as expressing the world of objects (the Lebenswelt ), then objectivity as the self constituting thought is the second sense of the objective, and objectivity as facts that we observe in the world from the disinterested point of view becomes objectivity in the third sense that forgets its grounding in the second sense of objectivity, the sense that Schrdinger is talking about: it is only our waves of knowledge that we think we observe when we read the instruments. 21 Hence, in the first sense, the objective world (the world of objects, the Lebenswelt ) is dressed up in the garb of ideas, 22 as Husserl observes, using scientific objectivity in the second sense in order to construct it, so we can observe and describe it, using the
Ib id . Ib id., 7 2 . 21 He nce, we ha v e t hree se nse s of o b jec ti vi t y. In t he f ir st se n se, i t i s t he w orl d of ob j ect s t ha t ex is t ou ts ide of u s, t hi n ki n g b ei ng s, t he o bj ec ti ve w or ld i n w hic h we l iv e; i n t he se c on d sen se, it i s t he ma t he ma t ica l ly s elf - cer tif ie d th o ug h t t ha t co n str uc t s t he o b jec t ive w orl d of sc ie nce tha t we ca n n ot e x per ie nce. A s S chr di n ger a ls o ob s e rved, t h i s ty p e i s n o t o nl y p ra ct ica ll y ina c ces si b le, b ut n ot eve n t hi n ka b le, or, ra t her , we ca n, o f co ur se, t hi n k it, bu t h o wev er we th i nk i t, it i s wr o n g; n ot per ha ps qu it e a s mea n in g le ss a s a tr ia n gu la r cir cl e, bu t muc h m or e s o th a n a w i ng ed li o n ( S c hr d i ng er, 2 0 0 0 [1 9 5 6 ] , 1 0 5 6 , i ta l ic s in ori g ina l ) . Li ke w is e, A le xa n dre K o yr n o te s: T h e Ga l i lea n c o nce pt of m o ti o n (a s w el l a s tha t o f spa ce) se e ms t o us s o na t ura l t ha t we e ve n be l iev e we ha v e deri ved it f r o m ex pe rie nc e a n d ob ser va t i o n, th o u gh , o bv i ou s ly, n ob od y ha s ever e nc o u nte red a n i ner tia m ot i o n for th e si m ple r ea s o n t ha t su c h a m ot i o n i s ut ter ly a nd a bs o lu te ly i mp o ss ib le ( Ko yr , 1 9 6 8 , 3 ). F ina l ly, we h a ve ob je ct iv e in t he t hir d s en se, i t i s t he w or ld of fa ct s t h a t w e ca n ob ser ve a nd des cri be i n a su pp o sed ly u nb ia sed ma n ner. 22 Hu ss er l, 1 9 7 0 b , 9 h, 5 1 - 2 . S ee a ls o H us se rl, 1 9 7 3 , 1 0 , 4 4 - 5 .
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term objectivity in the third sense. Ontology is reduced to epistemology that ends up becoming techn , the art of a pre cise calculation of nature. The problem is not, as Husserl suggests, with science as techn , the problem is that we have forgotten our human complicity in the structure of knowledge, cloaking the primordially given world, subjective and unprecise, in an ideational garb which transposes it into a precise universe of truths for all and so makes it calculable. 23 As Husserl notes, the objective world existing independently of us (the first sense) is not the substrate of truths in themselves 24 (objective in t he second and third sense). Through scientific objectivity in the second sense, it is hypothesized as a domain of facts in the third sense, as nature in itself. 25 It can be posited otherwise. Those three senses of objectivity are not interchangeable. For Patoka, to know is to pass a judgment on our experience according to certain criteria. Yet, criteria can be thought of in different ways. They could be scientific criteria that delimit what is the knowable world according to the latest scientific theori es, or, they could also be thought (with Husserl) as the typification that we experience in the Lebenswelt , the world of our living. To experience something is, for Husserl, the apperceiving of the object as object according to the primary universal typ ification precisely the typification of the object as experiential object, perceptual object, and the typification of the unities as a configuration of objects. 26 Hence to reduce knowledge to scientific knowledge only is to overlook that this knowledge pro ceeds from the Lebenswelt ; our typical, everyday engagement with the world. Patoka reminds us also that it is important to distinguish between two senses of subjectivity. 27 On the one hand, we are talking about subjectivity of experiencing as opposed to so mething we experience; in this sense, we are talking about the structure of subjective experience. It is the Cartesian structure, Ego Cogito Cogitatum : personal moment subjective process ( prbh )

Pa t o ka , 1 9 8 9 [ 1 9 7 3 ] , 3 2 9 . Hu s ser l, 1 9 6 9 , 1 0 4 , 2 7 7 . 25 O bj ect if ica t io n i s a ma t ter of m eth od , f ou nde d up o n pr es cie n ti fic da ta o f expe rie n ce. M a th e ma t ic a l m et h od c o ns tr uc ts, ou t of i n tu it iv e re pre se nta ti o n, idea l ob je ct s a nd t ea c he s h o w to dea l w it h t he m o pera ti ve ly a n d s ys te ma tica l ly. It d oe s n ot pr od uce t hi n g s ou t of ot her t h i n gs i n t he ma n ne r of ha nd w or k; i t pr odu ce s id ea s. Idea s a ri se t hr o ug h a pec u l i a r s ort of me n ta l a cc o mp l is h me n t: idea liz a ti o n ( H us ser l , 1 9 7 0 a , 3 4 8 , ita li cs i n or ig i na l ) . 26 Hu s ser l, 1 9 8 1 [ 1 9 3 1 ] , 2 4 6 . 27 Pa t o ka , 1 9 9 5 a , 1 8 5 .
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object/thing ( pedmt ). 28 On the other hand, my exper ience is subjective if I experience a thing from my perspective that is available to me only. Yet my perspective is not a cogitatum, it belongs on the side of experience, on the side of sensation. It is situational experience that is available to me, or to a particular society. In this sense, scientific objectification aims to eliminate this type of subjectivity. It wants to capture beings as they are, without our point of view, without human perspectival understanding. 29 The issue here is the equivocation o f the terms; it is the confusion between different senses of the commonly employed terms subjective and objective . For example, objective can mean the world of objects or things existing independently of the way in which we experience them; or, objective can be taken as the method of natural science, devoid of any subjective remnants, where two senses of objective are conflated (objectivity as self -constitution and objectivity as factuality). The use of subjective is similar. No human experience is atomistic, comprised of subjective impressions of sensations that we then collate together. For Husserl, no human experience is subjective in this sense. 30 Patoka notes that something like the atomistic data is a mere construction 31 that does not take our experience into account. If experience were really only mine or yours, whose head can phenomenology use to come to life and present its theses? 32 We can speak of subjective in the sense of talking about: the subject of our discussion. In this sense, it is the structure of human experience as opposed to the structure of objects and things that we encounter in the world. In this sense, subjective structures of experience are objective, so to speak. These are the structures of experience of everybody; the subj ective structure of human experience is not reducible to one particular point of view. On the
Pa t o ka , 1 9 9 5 b, 2 0 . 1 ) s u bj e kt iv no st p ro v n p roti p r o v a n m u ; 2 ) s u bj e ktiv no st t oh o, c o s e p ro v , p okud j e t o p st up n j en om p r ov aj c m u (k u p . p e r sp ektiv a, kt er ou m m na v ci; p e rsp ekt iv a n en s am a p ro it k em , je t o p e r sp e kti v a v c , p at na str an u p ro v a nh o, a n e na st ra n u p ro it k u) . T ed y d an os t p i roz en h o sv t a j e s u bj ekt i v n v e d r uh m sm y sl u. C o j e p v od n d no, j e d n o v s itu ac i, p st up n b u m n ne b o u ri tm u sp o le e n st v . l oh o u o b je kt iv a c e, v d y , kt e r c h ce z ac h y t it j so uc no , ja k s am o o s o b je st, b e z oh led u na n s , kt e p ro v m e a p o zn v m e, je v y lo it v ech no s u bj ekt iv n (v e d ruh m s m y s lu ) a p ej t k t akov ch a rakt e ri st ic e j so uc na , kd e se to s u bj e ktiv n nev y s ky t u j e n e bo j e n v m in im ln m m tk u ( Pa t o ka , 1 9 9 5 a , 1 8 5 ) . 30 Pa t o ka , 1 9 9 3 , 1 7 . 31 Ib id., 1 9 . 32 Ibi d .
28 29

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other hand, the use of the term subjective as we use it in our everyday life, and in opposition to the standpoint of a disinterested observer, means that our pers onal experience is relative to our particular situation. This meaning of subjective is in opposition to the use of objective in scientific usage; in other words, our experience is subjective in a sense that it is shaped by our subjective personal history, unique to each of us. But this uniqueness does not mean that it is atomistic in the sense that nobody else can see the same things, understand our experience. We live in the common world, Lebenswelt . Our subjective experience is explicable in terms of the subjective in the first sense: the structures of subjective experience. Finally, there is a prevalent, even if incomprehensible in terms of our lived experience, third understanding of subjective. That is, our experience is subjective to each of us in a se nse of the brain in a vat, to use Hilary Putnams expression. 33 What I see, you cannot see, what I experience, you cannot experience. My experience is reduced to my mental states only. I am an atom among other atoms in the world. Yet, if we reduce subject ive to this third sense only, if our thinking is subjective in this sense only, if it is a physics of thinking, 34 individual to each of us, how can we think formally; that is, how can we think something that is, in a way, independent of our own subjective , atomistic, way of thinking? Psychology might serve as an example. Psychology investigates the structures of human mental processes. Yet, as a science, it cannot be about the changeable nature of a singular human mental life. It must be first and foremost based on the system of formal rules that psychologists use to understand those structures. Using these formal rules, psychologists order and systematiz e human finite, individual, subject ive experience into a standardiz ed objective manifold that is impossi ble to find in any human being. By using the natural science as its starting point, psychology tries to straddle between the Scylla of subjective in the sense of being singular and Charybdis in the sense of being scientifically objective in both senses: the self-constituting and factual. This struggle is simply an outcome of the unacknowledged starting point: human mental lives are impossible to reduce to the unchangeable impersonal substrate that would become a measurable res extensa by turning human cha ngeable experience into the substrate of truths in themselves (objective in the second and third sense). My concern is with the meaning of objectivity that is largely
33 34

Pu tna m , 1 9 8 2 . Lip ps, 1 8 8 0 , 5 3 0 f f . ; c i ted i n H u ss erl , 2 0 0 1 , 1 9 , 4 2 .

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understood as scientific objectivity based on facts, and subjectivity when reduced to crude versions of solipsism. Husserls concern with science turned into technology, forgetting its own ground, is relevant even more today than it was in his time. Science became not one domain among many others but is now supposedly the only arbiter of objectivity. Even worse, psychology is now so powerful that to question its methodology amounts to heresy. The point is to remember that theories, rules and methodologies are constituted by us humans, that science is a human endeavour. 35 The scientific wor ld of objective facts is not the objective world through which we understand the Lebenswelt , but it is, as Husserl already argued, the other way around. Sciences have their starting point in the Lebenswelt and, as Patoka would say, the human lived experience cannot be converted into an object that we can observe and describe as rocks or the lava on the moon. Bibliography Cairns, Dorion. Translators Notes. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. Carr, David. Translators Notes. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Edmund Husserl. Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1970. Cassirer, Ernst. An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992 [1944]. Cassirer, Ernst. Substance and Function and Einsteins Theory of Relativity. Trans. William Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins Swabey. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1923. Husserl, Edmund. Appendix I: The Vienna Lecture: Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity. Trans. David Carr. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1970 [1935], 269-99. Husserl, Edmund. Appendix V: Objectivity and the World of Experience. Trans. David Carr. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1970a, 343-51. Husserl, Edmund. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Trans. David Carr. Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy. Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1970b. Husserl, Edmund. Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic.
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S ee Hu s ser l, 1 9 7 0 [ 1 9 3 5 ] , 2 7 2 - 3 .

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Trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe. Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy. Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1973. Husserl, Edmund. Formal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. Husserl, Edmund. Logical Investigations. Trans. J. N. Findlay. Ed. Dermot Moran. International Library of Philosophy. Vol. 1 of the German Editions: Prolegomena to Pure Logic; Investigation I, Volume II of the German Editions: Expression and Meaning; Investigation II, Volume II of the German Editions: The Ideal Unity of the Species and Modern Theories of Abstraction. Vol. 1. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. Husserl, Edmund. The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World External to the Organism. Trans. Frederick A. Elliston and Lenore Langsdorf. Shorter Works. Eds. Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston. Brighton; Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press; The Harvester Press, 1981 [1931], 238-50. Koyr, Alexandre. Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. Metaphysics and Measurement: Essays in Scientific Revolution. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968, 1-15. Lipps, Theodor. Die Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie. Philos. Monatshefte. Vol. xvi. 1880. Patoka, Jan. 2.3. Fenomenologie Vlastnho Tla. Pirozen Svt a Pohyb Lidsk Existence. Tmatick Sbornk. Vol. II. Prague: Samizdat, 1980, 1-20. Patoka, Jan. Body, Community, Language, World. Ed. James Dodd. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1996. Patoka, Jan. The Dangers of Technicization in Science according to E. Husserl and the Essence of Technology as Danger according to M. Heidegger. Trans. Erazim Kohk. Jan Patoka. Philosophy and Selected Writings. Ed. Erazim Kohk. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989 [1973], 327-39. Patoka, Jan. Evropa Pramenem Djin... Pe o Dui: Soubor Stat a Pednek o Postaven lovka ve Svt a v Djinch. Eds. Ivan Chvatk and Pavel Kouba. Sebran Spisy Jana Patoky. Svazek 3. Vol. III. Praha: Oikoymenh, 2002, 463-75. Patoka, Jan. Problm Pirozenho Svta. Tlo, Spoleenstv, Jazyk, Svt. Ed. Ji Polvka. Praha: ISE, Oikoymenh, Edice Oikmen, ve spoluprci s Archivem Jana Patoky, 1995a, 129-202. Patoka, Jan. Tlo, Spoleenstv, Jazyk, Svt. Ed. Ji Polvka. Praha: ISE, Oikoymenh, Edice Oikmen, ve spoluprci s Archivem Jana Patoky, 1995b. Patoka, Jan. vod do Fenomenologick Filosofie. Eds. Ji Polvka and Ivan Chvatk. Praha: ISE, Oikoymenh, Edice Oikmen, ve spoluprci s Archivem Jana Patoky, 1993.

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Putnam, Hilary. Brains in a Vat. Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 1-21. Schrdinger, Erwin. Causality and Wave Mechanics. The World of Mathematics. Ed. J. Newman. Vol. 2. New York: Dover Publications, 2000 [1956], 105668.

Husserls Notion of the Primal Ego in Light of the Hermeneutical Critique

Saulius Geniusas (James Madison University)

A bs tra c t : Th is f o ll o w i ng a na ly s is a i ms t o s h o w h o w the he r me ne ut ica l cr it i qu e of Hu s ser l s p he n o me n ol o gy p ro vi de s a n i m p etu s t o d is cl o se t he ph il o s op h ica l si g nif ica n ce of t he h i s t or ici t y o f t ra n sc end e nt al s u bj ect iv ity . T he pa per i s d iv ide d in t o s eve n sec t io n s. S e cti o n 1 si tua te s Ga da mer s cr it i qu e of H u ss erl s n ot i o n of th e pr i ma l e g o i n t h e co n tex t of th e he r me ne ut ica l cr it i qu es of H u sse rl s ph en o me n o lo g y. I n S e cti o n 2 , I t ur n t o t he fu nct i o na l rea di n g of t he p ri ma l eg o a nd a r gue t ha t th i s r ea di n g pa rt l y a n sw ers Ga da mer s o b jec ti o n. A cc ord i ng to t he f un ct i o na l i nte rpre ta t i on , t he re a re ma n y pr i ma l e g o s t o be f ou nd i n Hu s ser l s p he n o me n ol o gy, ea c h of w hic h i s de ter m i ned d iffe re n tl y wi t hi n a co nc ret e c o nt ext of a n a ly s is. T he s ub se q ue nt t hree s ect i o ns i ll u stra te th i s p o i nt by pr o vi di n g a n a cc o un t o f t he pr i ma l e g o in t he C ri si s (S e ct i on 3 ), in t he CMa n us cr ip t s ( S ec ti o n 4 ) a n d in t he B e rn au M an us cr ip t s (S ec ti o n 5 ). I n th e si xt h sec ti o n, I pr ov ide a r e sp o ns e t o t he he r me n eut ica l cr it i q ue b y e m pha s iz i n g t he hi s to ri ca l di me n s io n i ns cr ibe d i n t he pr o ble ma t ic o f t he pr i ma l e g o. I a r g ue tha t th e p ri ma l eg o of t he C r is i s pre su pp o se s t he pr i ma l e g o of t he C- Ma n us cr ip t s a nd t ha t i n t he B er na u M an u sc rip t s H u ss erl pr ov ide s a n eve n m o r e r udi m en ta r y a cco u nt of t h e pr ima l eg o t ha n i n t he C- M an us cr ip t s . I n t he se v en th a nd la s t sec ti o n I su g ge st t ha t th e her me n eu ti ca l cr it i que i n vi te s o ne t o su ppl e me nt t he fu nct i o na l rea d i ng of t he pr i ma l e go wi t h a n i n ter pre ta t i on t h a t hi g hl i g ht s su b jec ti vi ty s tra n sce n den ta l h is t ori ci t y. He re I a rg ue t ha t t ha t p ri ma l e g o i s n ot t o be t h ou g ht of a s a n e nt it y, bu t ra th er a s a n o ti o n tha t in di ca te s a pa rt ic ula r le ve l of t ra ns ce nde n ta l s ub je ct iv i ty s c on s ti tu ti ve a c c o mp l is h me n ts. But if s o, th e n ne it her t he h er me ne ut ica l cri t i que n or t h e fu nct i o na l in ter pre ta t i o n ex ha u s t s t he s i gn if ica nce of Hu s ser l s n o ti o n o f t h e pri ma l eg o. A cc ord i ng l y, th e pri m a l e g o is a n ot i o n, w h i ch i s f ir st a nd f or e mo s t de s ig ne d to in di ca te t he h is t or ici t y of t ra ns ce nde nta l su bj ect iv it y.

1. The Primal Ego in the Context of the Hermeneutical Critiques of Phenomenology As Paul Ricoeur has remarked, the histo ry of phenomenology is the history of Husserlian heresies. 1 This claim, besides highlighting the generally ambivalent relation of post -Husserlian phenomenology to its origins in Husserls program, also characterizes the hermeneutical approach to phenomenol ogy. Whe n Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeu r call for the hermeneutical turn in phenomenology, they assert the need to continue the phenomenological legacy, yet with a notable qualification: to remain
Si bi e n q u e la p h nom n ol og i e au se n s la rg e e st la s om m e d e l o euv r e h u s se r li e nn e et d e s h r si e s i ss u e s d e H u s s er l R ic oe ur, A l col e d e la p h no m n olog ie ( Pa r is: Vri n, 1 9 8 7 , p. 9 ) .
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true to the spirit of phenomenology, one needs to libera te oneself from the letter of Husserls writings. What is this spirit of phenomenology that hermeneutics aims to preserve? This question has received a number of different answers: this spirit is sometimes identified with categorial intuition (Heidegger), sometimes with the life -world (Gadamer), yet other times with phenomenologys general effort to restore to phenomena their quota of strangeness (Ricoeur). As far as the letter of Husserls phenomenology is concerned, here the hermeneutical approach is much more univocal. Ever since Heideggers reading of Husserl, 2 the hermeneutical critique of phenomenology has been directed at one and the same target: Husserls notion of subjectivity. 3 In the context of the hermeneutical critiques of Husserls phen omenology, Husserls notion of the primal ego occupies a prominent place. This is understandable: we find the notion of the primal ego in those pages in the Crisis , which complete the path to the reduction through the life -world problematic. As seen from t he hermeneutical perspective, Husserls discovery of the life -world signals the recognition of the intersubjective, historical, and linguistic nature of subjectivity. Yet Husserls subsequent discovery of the primal ego seems to reduce sociality, linguisti cality, historicity, and worldhood to phenomena of secondary importance. What is more, the discovery of the primal ego seems to assert the primacy of a non -linguistic, pre- social, in short, a worldless subjectivity. Thus in Truth and Method , Gadamer interprets the notion of the primal ego in terms of Husserls unyielding resistance to the hermeneutical turn in phenomenology. This notion bespeaks Husserls commitment to an illegitimate conception of subjectivity that precedes its being -among-others and i ts being -inthe-world and to this conception Husserl continued to cling to the end of his days. 4
S ee e sp ec ia l ly 1 3 of He ide g ger s H i sto ry of th e Co nc ep t of Tim e. Pr ol eg om e na (Bl o om i n gt o n, In dia na U P, 1 9 8 5 ) . 3 T he rea s o n se e ms t o be st ra i g htf or wa r d: be tw ee n th e tra ns ce nde nta l pr i ma c y of su b jec ti vi t y a nd t h e f a c tic i ty of Da s ei n o ne m u st c ho o se; o n e c a n n ot ha ve it bo t h wa y s. 4 The c o nce pt of t he pr ima l e go see m s t o be so f ore i g n to her m en e ut ic s t ha t i n fa ct, Ga da me r n ever c o me s cl o se to sp el li n g ou t h i s cr it i qu e. N ee dle ss t o sa y, ju s t beca us e t he rea so ns a r e m is s in g, on e c a n n ot s et t h is cr it i q ue sa fel y a s ide. O n t he c o n tra r y: Ga da mer do es n ot pr ov ide a n y rea so n s be ca u se f or hi m, a s f or her m en eu ti cs a s a w h ol e, i t i s o nl y ob vi o us tha t Hu s ser l s no ti o n of t he pr i ma l eg o is a d is t ort ed c o nce pt i on of s u bj ect i vi ty. Ev ery t hi n g see m s on l y sel f evid e nt: t hi s n o ti o n c a n o nl y be u nder s to o d i n a c c orda nc e wi t h tha t m ode l of
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Yet is the notion of the primal ego as illegitimate as Gadamer takes it to be? There are good reasons to be doubtful. 2. The Hermeneutical Critique and the Fu nctional Interpretation The hermeneutical critique appears dubious as soon as one takes into account that the Crisis is not the only text in which the notion of the primal ego is to be found. Husserl also utilizes this notion in the Bernau Manuscripts as well as in the C-Manuscripts . What is more, the notion of the primal ego changes its precise meaning in these texts. With this in mind, Dieter Lohmar has recently argued against the Kantian readings of the primal ego, which would identify the primal ego w ith Husserls discovery of the unity of apperception. 5 As Lohmar has it, the primal ego is not a hypostasized or fixed ego and it cannot be regarded as something like the Kantian I think. The precise meaning of each primal ego can only be determined in the concrete context of research in respect to different levels of constitution (Lohmar, 17). For the functional reading, the primal ego is always an ego in relation to a particular level of constitution. This means that the concept of the primal ego does not foreclose, but rather opens the possibility to take a next step in the regressive inquiry that will deepen and enrich the phenomenological analysis. To put this in paradoxical terms, it is always possible to uncover a more rudimentary primal ego b ehind a particular figure of the primal ego that emerges within a particular framework. But if so, then it makes little sense to interpret the primal ego as the ultimate objective presence that underlies Husserls phenomenology. It seems that the hermeneutical critique does not to hold. Nonetheless, one could argue that the functionalizing of the primal ego only seems to invalidate the hermeneutical critique, while in fact it only corroborates it. Two responses could be made on hermeneutics behalf. (1) One could ask: what does it really mean that the concept of the primal ego changes its meaning in different contexts? And one could answer: this fact indicates nothing less
bei n g w hi ch H eid eg ge r ha s ter me d Vo rh and e nh e it . 5 S ee Die ter L o h ma r, Ei ne G es ch ic h te de s Ic h b ei H u ss e rl . M it Bem er ku n ge n z u m U r - Ic h i n H us s erl s sp te n Z ei t ma n u sk ri pte n, i n D a s S el b st u nd s ei n And e r es . F e st sch ri ft f r Kl au s Er ich K aeh l er . Ed. b y M a rk u s Pfei f er a nd S ma il Ra p ic ( M ns ch e n: V erla g Ka r l A l ber Fr eib ur g) p. 1 6 2 - 1 8 1 . A n En g li s h tra ns la t i o n i s a ls o a va i la b le, a lt h o ug h ha s n o t be en p ub li s hed: A Hi st o ry of t he Eg o in H u sse rl ia n p he no m en o l og y. T he A r ch - eg o in Hu s ser l s La te M a n us cri pt s O n Ti me a nd t he C r i si s . Her ea fter a l l q u ota ti o n s refer t o th e a ut h or s En g li s h t ra ns la t i on .

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than Husserls failure to discover the primal ego. One could further argue that this f ailure is by no means accidental: for how could Husserl succeed in discovering the primal ego, when it fact, no such ego is to be found? (2) One could also ask: does the mere fact that in Husserl we find a plurality of primal egos necessitate one to interpret this concept in a functional way? After all, these primal egos are still egos, which means that they must stand in some relation to each other. But once the relation between different primal egos is brought to light, does one not have to privilege one particular figure of the primal egos over others? And if so, then is one not left with the realization that, for lack of a better term, the ultimate primal ego, as far as it is ultimate, must be conceived in terms of Vorhandenheit ? The functional reading does not have the resources needed to answer these objections. 6 In what follows, I would like to show that the hermeneutical critique, once reformulated in the above mentioned way, calls for an interpretation of the primal ego that highlights the historic ity of transcendental subjectivity. With this in mind, let me briefly turn to three contexts in which Husserl has employed the notion of the primal ego: the Crisis , the C-Manuscripts , and the Bernau Manuscripts . 3. Husserls Notion of the Primal Ego in t he Crisis As Husserl remarks on several occasions in the Crisis , the path to the reduction through the life -world problematic leads to paradoxical enigmas. The notion of the primal ego emerges out of one such paradox, viz., the paradox of subjectivity ( Crisis , 53). This paradox is twofold. On the first level, it is a paradox of intersubjectivity; on a deeper level, it is a paradox of subjectivity, taken it its unique solitude. Regarding the first level: On the one hand, Husserl maintains that the world is the constitutive accomplishment of intersubjectivity. Yet on the other hand, intersubjectivity seems to be nothing other than a particular part of the world. But if so, then a part of the world seems to swallow up the whole world, and itself too. What an absurdity! ( Crisis , 180) Regarding the deeper level: On the one hand, transcendental intersubjectivity itself is a constitutive accomplishment of
T he fu nc ti o na l rea d i n g lea ves o ne wi th a p l ura l i ty of t he pr i ma l e g os wi t ho u t cla r if yi n g h o w th ey r ela t e t o ea ch o t her. A s L o hma r p ut s i t, t h e pr ima l e g o doe s n o t ref er t o o ne s in g le en t it y . t he n ot i o n of t he pri ma l e g o d oe s n ot den o te o ne si n g le ki nd of eg o ( Lo h ma r , 1 6 ).
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subjectivity; yet on the other hand, what is subjectivity if not a member of the intersubjective communit y? Again, what an absurdity! Just as the paradox of subjectivity emerges in a twofold form, so the resolution Husserl offers is also twofold. At the first level, Husserls resolution lies in the realization that each and every I is both a mundane and a t ranscendental subjectivity. So as to resolve the paradox at the second level, Husserl further deepens the distinction between transcendental and mundane intersubjectivity with the insight that transcendental intersubjectivity is itself a constitutive accomplishment of that subjectivity which, in the unique sort of philosophical solitude, constitutes in itself another as Other. 7 Thus the second resolution of the paradox brings to light a threefold manifestation of subjectivity. First, the ego can be conceived as a mundane ego as a member of humanity. Secondly, the ego can also be conceived as a transcendental ego as a member of the transcendental intersubjectivity. Thirdly, the ego can also be conceived as a primal ego as the constitutive origin of transcendental intersubjectivity. The emergence of the primal ego in the Crisis overcomes a particular transcendental naivite, viz., that naivite which overlooks the constituted nature of transcendental intersubjectivity. Husserls concrete analysis of the primal ego in the Crisis is lamentably brief. 8 Yet arguably, Husserls detailed account is missing because the problematic that falls under the heading of the primal ego has already been treated quite extensively elsewhere, most notably, in the Fifth Cartesian M editation. 9
Pu t o th er wi se, a s f a r a s I ide n tif y my se lf a s a tra ns ce nde n ta l s ub jec t iv it y, I a lrea d y co n cei ve m y se lf a s a n e g o a m o ng ot h er e g os. F or t h is rea s o n, I st il l la c k th e i ns ig h t i nt o t he c o ns t it ut ive or ig i ns of i nt er su bj ect iv i ty. He nc e the need to su pp le me n t t he i n it ia l di st i nc ti o n be tw ee n t he m u nda ne a n d th e t ra n sce nd e nta l eg o w i th a f ur th er d is ti nc ti o n b et wee n t he t ra n sce nd e nta l eg o a nd the pr i ma ry su b jec ti vi ty . 8 A s H u sse rl ha s i t, t he pri ma l e g o i s t o be ca lle d I o nl y by e qu iv oca ti o n, e ve n th o ug h it i s a n ec e ss a ry e qu iv oca t io n. T h i s mea ns tha t o n t he o ne ha n d, t he pri ma l e g o i s n ot a n I i n sof a r a s a n I i s a n e g o a mo n g ot he r eg os , be t he y mu n da n e or tra n sc en den ta l . Ye t o n t he o t her ha n d, t he pr i ma l eg o is a n I in s ofa r a s i t i s t he p he no m en o l og ica l r esi du u m tha t r e ma i ns a ft er th e perf or ma nce of t he pr i m ord ia l re duc t io n. T h us o n t he on e ha nd, t h e pr i ma l e g o is u ni q ue i n t ha t it is i ndec l ina bl e ( C ri si s , 1 8 5 ); ye t o n t he o t her ha nd, eve r y hu ma n be i n g w h o ca rr ied o u t th e ep oc h c o uld c erta i nl y rec o g niz e hi s u lt i ma te I ( Cr i si s , 1 8 6 ) . 9 A s H us ser l p ut s it in th e C r is i s , t he e m er g enc e of t he p ri ma l I sh o w s h o w th e a l wa ys s i ng ula r I, i n th e ori g i na l co n st it ut i ng l ife pr ocee di n g w i th i n i t,
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Husserls description of how the primal I solves the paradox of subjectivity in broad strokes reiterates the line of argument that we find in greater detail in the last Cartesian Meditation. One ca n therefore say that the epoch within epoc h that we find in the Crisis is a transition from a general transcendental epoch to the primordial reduction . 4. Husserls Notion of the Primal Ego in the C-Manuscripts Is one then to say that the primal I, conceived as the residue of the primordial r eduction, is the ultimate I that we find in Husserls phenomenology? The manner in which the notion of the primal ego emerges in the C-Manuscripts invites one to answer this question in the negative. As we saw, the primal ego in the Crisis is conceived as the phenomenological residuum left unaffected by the performance of the primordial reduction. This reduction, as Husserl remarks in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, is the reduction to the living present (CM, 133), conceived as the sphere of ownness that t ranscendentally underlies the intersubjective levels of world -constitution. In the CManuscripts , one of Husserls central goals is to clarify time constitution on the basis of the primordial reduction, i.e., on the level of the living present. These manus cripts lead to the realization that the primordial reduction, as the reduction to the living present, is still not free from transcendental naivite. Precisely because the reduction to the living present does not problematize the given relation between the ego on the one hand, and the primordial world on the other hand, this reduction cannot be conceived as the ultimate one, and it calls for another epoch within epoch. When in a manuscript from 1931, published as Text Nr. 20 in Hua XXXIV, Husserl once a gain introduces the notion of the primal ego. Not only is this notion significantly different from the one that we find in the Crisis . In a sense, the primal ego of the C-Manuscripts emerges after the primal ego of the Crisis is put in parentheses. At first glance, it seems that in the living present a phenomenologist can find everything that phenomenology has to
co n st it ut es a f irs t s p her e of ob je ct s, t h e pri m or dia l s ph ere ; h o w it t he n, sta r t in g f r o m t hi s, in a m o ti va t ed fa s hi o n, p erf or m s a co n st it ut iv e a cco m pl i sh m en t t h ro u g h w h ic h a n i nt e nt i o na l m od if ica t i o n o f i tse lf a nd it s pri m or dia li ty a c h ie ve s o n tic va l id it y u nd er t he t it le of a li en - perc ep ti o n, perc ept i o n of o t her s, of a n o th er I w h o is fo r hi m se lf a n I a s I a m ( Cr i si s , 1 8 5 ).

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bring to light. 10 Yet is the living present, assumed as the primal event ( Urgeschehen ) of transcendental subjectivity, to be conceived as a tempora l process? Initially it seems that this question is to be answered affirmatively. Yet Husserls analysis leads to the realization that the specific temporality of the living present is an accomplishment of subjectivity. And thus, one is invite d to perform a new epoch within the epoch : the naively won transcendental I must be again subjected to a transcendental reduction (Hua XXXIV, 300). 11 This new reduction is meant to bracket those undisclosed apperceptions, which the reduction to the living present has naively presupposed without clarifying them. If that transcendental subjectivity, which already stands in relation to the world, is a constitutive formation, then it must be possible to place it within brackets. Where does this new reduction lead us? It leads us to the transcendental primal ego and its transcendental primal life (Hua XXXIV, 300). This transcendental primal ego is conceived as the ultimate source from within which every concrete transcendental ego obtains its transcendental temporality, ordered acc ording to the strict temporal order of the modalities of the present, past, and future. Thus the reduction to the new primal ego that follows the reduction to the living present highlights the distinction between two fundamentally different notions of the ego. At the level of the living present, the ego is inseparable from its acts, possibilities, and acquired habitualities; it is an ego that has already constituted the primordial world. Once the living present is itself subjected t o an epoch , the ego, as the primal ego, is conceived as the primal ground of temporalization, i.e., as the ego of the all -temporalizing life. As Husserl puts it in the C-Manuscripts , in a certain sense one can say: while all time originates out of temporalization , all temporalization originates out of the primal temporalization (Hua XXXIV, 300). 12 The first primal ego that of the Crisis leads back from all time to temporalization, conceived as the genetic source that underlies the intersubjective constitution of the world. The second primal ego that of the C-Manuscripts leads back to primal
In d e r l e b end ig en G eg en wa rt d ah i n str m end u nd i n ih r em u rp h nom e nal e n Wa nd el m it d e n d ar in a uf t r et e n d en Wi ed e r er in n e ru ng e n, Id e nti fi zi e ru ng e n, U nt er sch e id u ng en lie g t a l le s ( H ua X X XI V, 2 9 8 ). 11 D a s n aiv g e wo n ne n e t ra n sz e nd e nta l e Ich m us s s e lb st wi ed er e i ne r tra n sz end e nt a l en R ed uk t io n u nt e rw or f en w e rd e n ( Hua X X X IV, 3 0 0 ). 12 In g ew i ss e r We i se ka n n m a n s ag e n : A lle Ze i t en ts pr in g t a u s Z ei ti g u n g, u nd al l e Z eit ig u ng e nt sp r i ng t a u s ei n er U rz eit ig u ng ( H ua X X XIV , 3 0 0 ).
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temporalization that genetically precedes what Husserl calls the primordial domain, discovered through the primordial reduction. Thus paradoxically, the C-Manuscripts provide an account of the primal ego that is more basic than the primal ego of the Crisis . 5. Husserls Notion of the Primal Ego in the Bernau Manuscripts Is the notion of the primal ego that we find in the C-Manuscripts the most rudimentary notion of the ego that we find in Husserls phenomenology? This question needs to be answered in the negative. From a historical point of view, Text Nr. 15 of the Bernau Manuscripts marks the emergence of the notion of the primal ego in Husserls phenomenology as a whole. This text was written in 1918, thus more than one decade before the composition of the CManuscripts and almost two decades earlier than the Crisis . From a genetic point of view, Bernau Manuscripts thematize the primal ego at more primordial levels of con stitution than the C-Manuscripts and the Crisis . Thus just as in the Crisis , so in the C-Manuscripts too, Husserls choice of the term the primal I is not to be understood as the discovery of the most original figure of the ego in phenomenology. In Texts Nr. 14 and 15 of the Bernau Manuscripts , Husserl hypothesizes the possibility of a reduction that would lead to pre egoic dimensions of experience. At first glance, the reduction to original sensuality seems to accomplish this goal. The ego is from the start identified as the correlate of instincts, affections, and acts. The reduction to original sensuality abstracts from all these dimensions of experience, and thus it is only to be expected that it will discover a pre -egoic level of experience. Husserl is thereby led to draw a distinction between three different levels of experience: (1) the pre -egoic level of pure passivity, (2) the (already egoic) level of affections and reactions, and finally, (3) the level of attentiveness ( Aufmerksamkeit ), the level of the intellectus agens (Hua XXXIII, 276). Here the reduction to the pre -egoic original sensuality is conceived as the reduction to immanent temporality. Yet Husserls analysis leads to the realization that original sensuality is not pre egoic at all. At f irst glance, after the performance of this reduction, it appears that we have now everything subjective. Yet a closer look reveals that in a certain sense we do, and yet we dont. What we have is what is temporal; yet not everything subjective is temporal

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(Hua XXXIII, 277). 13 What is not temporal is precisely I myself, conceived as the identical center, the identical pole, correlated with the whole stream of experiences. Much like in the Crisis Husserl was led to claim that the primal ego is called I onl y by equivocation, so here also he claims that this rudimentary I should not be called I, that, in fact, it should not be called at all and should remain nameless. 14 This means that the reduction to the original sensuality is still not free from a certa in transcendental naivet, and for this reason, it must be coupled with the reduction to the original time -constituting consciousness. The second reduction is called for by the realization that inwardness , which is supposed to be the phenomenological residuum, is in fact an ambiguous notion. On the one hand, inwardness can stand for the immanent contents of experience; on the other hand, this notion can also mean the constituting consciousness within which these contents are given (Hua XXXIII, 281). This ambiguity generates two significantly different notions of the ego. On the one hand, as far as inwardness stands for the immanent contents of consciousness, the ego is what is constituted in the stream of consciousness along with the constitution of particular objects of consciousness. The ego is an actual and potential object of consciousness. In this regard, the ego is temporal. On the other hand, as far as the ego is conceived as the ego of the time-constituting consciousness, the ego reveals itself as al ltemporal. 15 This all-temporal ego, conceived as the correlate of time constituting consciousness, Husserl calls the primal ego. 16
Sch ei n ba r h a b e n wi r d am it a ll e s S u bj ekt iv e u nd i n g ew is s e r We i s e h a b e n wi r e s u nd d och wi ed e r ni ch t ; d e n n w a s w ir h a b e n, i st e b e n S e ie nd e s, Z eit li ch e s, u nd nich t a ll e s S u bj e kt iv e is t Z ei t li ch es (H ua X X X III, 2 7 7 ). 14 D as I ch so ll t e eig e nt l ich n ich t d a s Ich h e i e n , und b erh a up t n ich t h ei e n, d a e s d an n sch on g eg en st nd l ich g e wo rd en i st. E s i st N am e nl os e b e r al l em Fa s sb a re n, d a s be r al lem n ich t St eh en d e, ni ch t S ch w e b end e, nich t S e ie nd e, so nd er n F u ng i e re nd e, al s f as s e nd , a l s w e rd e nd u sw . ( H ua X X XI II, 2 7 7 - 8 ). 15 It is di f f i cu lt t o i g n or e t he st ruc t ura l s i mi la rit ie s b et we en t hi s pr i ma l e go a n d th e p ure e go o f wh ic h Hu s ser l ha d s po ke n i n Id e en I ( Hua II I, 5 7 ). Y et t her e i s a n i mp or ta nt di f f ere n ce: w hi le i n Id e e n I , th e p ur e e g o is c o nc eiv ed a s t he nec es sa r y c or re la te of i nte n ti o na l a ct s, i n t he B e r na u Ma nu s cr ip t s , t he p ri ma l eg o i s c o nce iv ed a s t h e co rre la te of pre - i nte nt i o na l se n sua l pr i ma l - i mpr es si o n s ( s en s u ell e U r im p r es s io n en ) . 16 Hu s ser l hi m se lf pr o vide s a ra t h er vi vid exa mp le to i ll u stra te t hi s po i nt . Co n si der rea liz i ng tha t y our f e et a re c o ld. H o w do es t h is e xper ie n ce u nfo ld o n th e th ree le ve ls o f e xper ie nc e Hu s ser l ha d di s ti n gu i sh ed i n T ext Nr . 1 4 ( t o w hi ch I ha ve ref e rre d ea r li er)? F or t h is e xper ie nc e t o e mer ge a t t h e hi g he st lev el ( t ha t of th e i nt el le ct u s ag e n s ), I w o uld ha v e t o t ur n to t hi s e x per ie nce a s a
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How exactly does the primal ego of the Bernau Manuscripts differ from the primal ego in the other two texts? Let me once again return to the passage from the C-Manuscripts to which I have already referred above: while all time originates out of temporalization , all temporalization originates out of the primal temporalization (Hua XXXIV, 300). This passage allows one to draw a threefold distinction between the three figures of the primal ego I have discussed above. (1) In the Crisis , Husserl identifies the primal ego with the level of temporalization; this ego is primal in relation to all time that level, within which trans cendental intersubjectivity is constituted. (2) In the C-Manuscripts , Husserl identifies the primal ego with the level of primal temporalization; in this regard, the ego is more rudimentary than the domain discovered by the primordial reduction. (3) The Bernau Manuscripts mark the discovery of the primal ego as the correlate of primal temporalization. As such, this notion of the primal ego is more basic than the other two figures of the primal ego that we find in Husserls later works. 6. A Response to the Hermeneutical Critique of the Primal Ego Let me now turn back to the hermeneutical critique of Husserls notion of the primal ego. As far as the exact formulation of this criticism in Truth and Method is concerned, clearly, this critique is an instance o f misplaced criticism. The very fact that there are more basic primal egos than the one Husserl addresses in the Crisis means that Husserls discovery of the primal ego in the Crisis cannot be conceived as the most rudimentary determination of transcendental subjectivity. Moreover, if there are further -reaching accounts of the ego than the one we find in the Crisis , then clearly, this account cannot be conceived in terms of what Heidegger calls Vorhandenheit . Nonetheless, the fact that Husserls analys is of the primal ego is much richer than Gadamer takes it to be does not by itself mean that the hermeneutical critique does not hold. This fact only calls
th e me of m y c on sc i ou sn es s. A t t he l o wer le vel, tha t of a ffec ti o n s , I w ou ld be a ffect ed a nd i rri ta t ed b y th e c o ld ne ss of m y fe et w h il e bei n g t he ma t ica l ly pre occ up ie d w i t h ot he r th e me s (fo r i n sta nce , w hi le rea di n g a ca p ti va t in g n ove l, I co u ld p res s m y f ee t cl o ser t o t he hea te r). Y et ju s t a s a ff ect io n prec ede s a tte n ti o n, s o th e se n su o us te nde nc ie s pre cede a ffe ct io n. Th u s a t t he l o we s t lev el, t ha t of ori g i na l se ns ua li ty , I w ou ld s ti ll i n a pec ul ia r se ns e exper ie nc e th e gr o wi n g p o wer o f a f f e cti o n w h ic h ha s n o t ye t t ur ned i nt o a ffec ti o n .

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hermeneutics to abandon the exact formulation, not the critique itself. Thus I have suggested earlie r that there are two ways in which hermeneutics can respond to the functional interpretation. (1) One could interpret Husserls uncertainty regarding which figure of the ego is to be identified as the primal ego as phenomenologys inevitable failure to f ind the primal ego itself. (2) Moreover, Husserls identification of numerous figures of the ego as the primal ego does not foreclose the question regarding which of the primal egos is the most fundamental one; and once a certain figure is identified as th e fundamental one, the hermeneutical critique could be redirected to it. Regarding the first point: Could one not interpret the plurality of the primal egos as phenomenologys failure to discover the primal ego itself? According to such a view, Husserls a nalysis of the primal ego inevitably leads to the subsequent discovery of a more rudimentary primal ego, precisely because no primal ego is to be found. Yet clearly, such a view is indefensible: the history of the primal ego in Husserls phenomenology is not to be conceived in terms of a progressive deepening of this notion; on the contrary, the primal ego of Husserls last and unfinished Crisis is not as farreaching as the primal ego in his earlier C-Manuscripts ; moreover, the primal ego of the C-Manuscripts is not as rudimentary as that of the even earlier Bernau Manuscripts . This means that when Husserl addresses the primal ego in the 1930s, he does not intend this notion to be understood in the manner in which hermeneutics understands it. It therefore makes little sense to accuse phenomenology for its apparent failure to discover the ultimate primal ego when such a discovery was never phenomenologys intention. Regarding the second point: If the primal ego of the Bernau Manuscripts is more fundamental than the primal ego that we find in the C-Manuscripts and the Crisis , then could one not redirect the critique formulated in Truth and Method to the Bernau Manuscripts ? Should the primal ego of these manuscripts, identified as the most fundamental figure of the primal ego, not be conceived in terms of Vorhandenheit ? In this regard, it is hard to overestimate the significance of Husserls remarks in the Crisis that precede his analysis of the primal ego. As Husserl has it, by carrying out the epoch the phenomenologist by no means straightaway commands a horizon of obviously possible new projects ( Crisis , 180). Phenomenology begins by excluding any underlying ground and thus must create a new ground for itself through its own powers ( Crisis , 181). And yet, sooner or later, the phenomenologist is bound to find out that

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the created ground is still shot through with naiveties of various sorts; sooner or later, the phenomenologist is bound to give up the acquired ground and create new ones. The overcoming of the naivet of the natural attitude leads to transcendental naiveties. Husserl goes as far as to suggest that the fate of phenomenology is to become involved again and again in paradoxes, which arise out of uninvestigated and unnoticed horizons ( ibid .) If such is indeed the fate of phenomenology, then it becomes understandable why the primal ego of the Crisis does not exclude the possibility that phenomenology could have already discovered more basic figures of the primal ego those we find in the CManuscripts and in the Bernau Manuscripts . Moreover, if a phenomenologist does not straightaway command the horizon of all possible projects, then one can never know in advance where exactly new transcendental naiveties are to be found. The notion of the primal ego is not meant to foreclose the possibility of a renewed inquiry into the transcendental origins of subjectivitys life; on the contrary, it is meant to overcome a p articular transcendental naivete and thereby open the possibility of new regressive inquiries. Put bluntly, one can never know if a particular figure of the primal ego is the ultimate one. The fate of phenomenology, conceived as the discovery and overcoming of ever -new transcendental naiveties, calls for renewed inquiries into the transce ndental origins of world constitution. It is thus only to be expected that there are other, even more rudimentary figures of the primal ego to be found alongside the one Husserl had thematized in the Bernau Manuscripts . 7. The Functional Interpretation Transcendental Subjectivity an d the Historicity of

Just as the functional interpretation of the primal ego provokes hermeneutics to reformulate its critique, so this reformulated critique calls for a modification of the functional reading. To be more precise, the hermeneutical critique calls one to supplement the functional reading with an interpretation that highlights subjectivitys transcendental historicity. As we saw, in the wake of the functional reading of the primal ego, one can reformulate the herme neutical critique by raising the question regarding how the different primal egos relate to each other. The functional reading lacks the resources needed to answer this question in a promising way. To be sure, the functional reading is within its rights wh en it insists that Husserls analyses of the primal ego in the Bernau Manuscripts , C-Manuscripts , and the Crisis

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do not refer one single primal ego . Yet the mere fact that the notion primal ego changes its meaning in these diverse contexts does not warrant the conclusion that these three figures of the primal ego do not refer to one single kind of ego. The three figures of the primal ego differ from each other in that they thematize transcendental subjectivity at three different levels of its constituti ve accomplishments . To ignore this would mean to ignore much of the philosophical significance that falls under the problematic of the primal ego in Husserls phenomenology. It would mean to ignore Husserls unique contribution to the philosophical themati zations of subjectivity. To put this differently: Husserls analyses of the primal ego do not refer to one single entity called primal ego, yet not because there are three such entities. Rather, the primal ego is not an entity at all . A particular figure of the primal ego refers to a particular level of constitution, which initially remains hidden from phenomenology due to a particular transcendental naivete . Moreover, the fact that Husserl speaks of different primal egos means that there are many levels of constitution, which remain af fected by transcendental naivete. Even more: by reminding us that there very well might be other primal egos to be found even more rudimentary ones than the ones he himself has uncovered Husserl invites one to pursue further a regressive inquiry into transcendental subjectivity. In this way, the multi -level problematic of the primal ego brings to light the historicity of transcendental subjectivity. We face here a unique transcendental historicity a historicity composed of numerous constitutive levels, where each particular level is built on a previous accomplishment. It is highly intriguing that for Husserl, such a transcendental historicity does not have a clearly defined starting point, just as it does not have a clearly d efined endpoint. This means that, the hermeneutical critique notwithstanding, Husserlian subjectivity is not a hook from which the world dangles. It rather is this endless historicity itself.

Reduction to Evidence and Its Liberating Function: Husserl s Discov ery of Reduction Reconsidered
Shigeru Taguchi (Yamagata University )
W ha t is fu nda m en ta l is t o a ppre h en d th e se ns e of a b so l ut e g iv en n es s, t he a bs o lu te c la r it y of be i n g g iv en Hu s ser l, Hua II, 9 /6 6

Introduction The aim of this paper is to show ho w Husserl s conception of phenomenological reduction makes it possible to liberate our philosophical thinking from its natural understanding of immanence and transcendence, and how fundamentally the theory of evidence contributes to this change of pers pective. In the ordinary sense of the word, reduction has such implications as lessening, cutting , or limiting . Although these connotations play a certain role in Husserl s theory of reduction, they have led to the common misunderstanding that Hus serl s reduction means a sort of retreat or withdrawal into a subjective, individual, and psychological consciousness, and based on cutting off the outer world as well as other people s consciousness. However, it can be said that phenomenologists are now capable of remov ing such misinterpretations quite successfully. John Drummond makes persuasively clear that the phenomenological attitude cannot be identified with a first -person, introspective perspective (Drummond 2007). Andrea Staiti also showed in his essay on the Einstellungslehre that the phenomenological attitude is fundamentally different from the first person perspective within the natural, human self -apprehension (Staiti 2009, 231-32). John Brough convincingly argues by clarifying Husserls argumentations in The Idea of Phenomenology that consciousness is not a bag or container that cannot go beyond itself (Brough 2008). 1 In the following I will make an attempt similar to that of Brough s, yet from a different perspective. In the lectur es published under the title The Idea of Phenomenology, it is well documented how Husserl became explicitly aware of the liberating function of the phenomenological reduction. 2 In my interpretation, it is a
A s f or t he cr it ic is m of t he ca ps ul e c o nce pt i on ( Kap s el - Vo r ste ll u ng ) o f co n sc io u sn es s, se e a l s o Ta g uc hi 2 0 0 6 , 1 2 . 2 I tra ce d t h i s p ro ce s s in t he s ec o nd c ha pte r of m y bo o k m ore c l os el y (Ta g uc hi 2006, 23-49).
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radicalization of his critique of evidence ( Evidenzkritik ) that leads Husserl to the full development of his theory of reduction. This interpretation makes it possible to understand why the phenomenological reduction is not a sort of retreat or withdrawal, but a method of liberating one s thinking. In what follows, I will demonstrate my proposed interpretation on the basis of the description developed in The Idea of Phenomenology (1907) and the relevant texts written during the same period (1902 -1913). These famous Five Lectures document Husserl s struggle for a clear understanding of his own phenomenology; for this reason, they lack an easily comprehensible, systematic structure. It thus becomes necessary to reconstitute Husserls train of thought through the se lectures. In my view, the short text in which Husserl himself attempted such a self -interpretation and reconstruction 3 is still not sufficient. I will thus make clear that his examination of evidence can shed light on the perplexing presentation of these lectures. 1. What is Given? Immanence and Transcendence The Five Lectures Husserl gave in the spring of 1907 are motivated by the riddle of knowledge or the question: How is objective knowledge possible? In the natural attitude , we take it for granted that objects of our knowledge ar e given to us. Philosophical questioning, however, severely shakes this natural confidence. How can knowledge go beyond itself and reach its objects reliably? What appears to natural thinking as the matter -offact givenness of known objects within knowl edge becomes a riddle (Hua II, 20/17). In the face of such a riddle , Husserl radicalizes an interrogation regarding what is (really) given? This can be interpreted as a straightforward expression of his evidence-theoretical motivation to secure a tru ly reliable starting point for philosophical thinking. At the first stage, a clue is provided by the conceptual pair immanence and transcendence . What is to be transcendent can be typically exemplified by physical things in the outer world . Closer examination reveals , however, that such things transcendent things cannot be free from skepticism. This is showed by the Cartesian doubt which is based on a type of the argument from illusion : every perception cannot fundamentally exclude the possibility that it may prove to be an illusion. Therefore, it cannot
3

Th e t ra i n of t ho u g ht in t he le ct ure s ( Hua I I, 3 - 1 4 /6 1 - 7 0 ).

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be considered to be absolutely reliable. Such a methodological doubt shows that the transcendent object cannot be a starting point of a critical philosophical thinking. In opposition to the transcendent, what is immanent , understood as cogitatio , can bear the test of critical skepticism. For in making the judgment that everything is doubtful it cannot be doubted that I am making this judgment (Hua II, 30/23). Even if the object of my mental a ct proved to be an illusion, it is undeniable that I am perceiving, judging, imagining, etc. At least, I cannot think that I am not performing these acts while performing them . This classical argument, however, is used by Husserl for an intrinsically different purpose than that of Descartes. At the beginning , Husserl himself was not aware of the significance of his reinterpretation of the Cartesian consideration, which I will now explicate in the next section. 2. Radicalized Thinking of Evidence In the Second Lecture, Husserl makes a short, relatively modest comment on the Cartesian procedure that he just introduced. Descartes made use of this consideration for other purposes; but with the appropriate modifications , we can use it here as well (Hua II, 30/24). Husserl does not intend to secure the thinking ego as such a substance on the basis of which he can build a logically deduced system of theory. 4 Rather, he concentrates on the reason why the cogitatio can be regarded as absolutely given . Husserl first calls attention to the intuitive givenness of experience, especially that of perception. He finds an absolute ground in it: [ ] the perception, as long as it lasts, is and remains an absolute entity, a this-here, that is what it is in itself, som ething that I can refer to as a final criterion in determining what being and being-given might mean, and here must mean, at least for the manner of being and givenness exemplified by the this-here. And this holds for all specific forms of thought, no ma tter how they are given (Hua II, 31/24-25). 5 The manner of givenness which is signified by this-here, that is
Cf. Hua M a t I II, 8 9 , 9 0 - 9 1 . U ng le ich Ca rt e si us s uch e n wi r ni ch t n ac h d en a bs ol ut si ch e r e n F u nd am en t e n, auf d e n en wi r na c h ab so lu t s ich e re n P ri nz ip i e n d a s Ge sa m tg e b ud e m en sch l ich en Wi s s en s a uf ba u e n kn nt e n [ ] (H ua M a t III , 9 0 ). Th e sa me ty pe of cr it ic is m ca n be fo u nd i n ma ny of Hu ss er l s wr it i ng s. S ee esp ec ia l ly 1 0 of t he C art e si an M ed itat io ns (H ua I, 6 3 - 6 4 ). 5 Wit h f i na l cr i ter io n Hu ss erl i mp li es e vi d enc e, w h ic h i s f ir st me n ti o ned in th e re ca p it ula ti o n i n t he m idd le of t he sec o n d le ct ure s ( Hua II , 3 3 / 2 6 ).
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what it is in itself, is characterized by immanence : [ ] because of such immanence , this form of knowledge is free of that enigmatic character which is the source of all skeptical predicaments (Hua II, 33/26). However, in the meantime, immanence has already acquired a different meaning from that originally suggested at the first stage of the lectures. Husserl now becomes aware of this ambiguity and draws a clear distinction between the immanence as real [ reelle ] containment in the experience of knowing and an entirely different kind of immanence, namely, absolute and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense (Hua II, 35/27 ). It is obvious that such a characterization of givenness can be expressed by the term evidence in Husserl s terminology. In fact, he paraphrases self-givenness as follows: This givenness, which excludes any meaningful doubt, consists of an immediate a ct of seeing and apprehending the meant objectivity itself as it is. It constitutes the precise concept of evidence, understood as immediate evidence (Hua II, 35/27 -28). We can reconstitute this train of thought in the following way: Why can we conside r real [ reelle ] immanence as being given ? Because it is clear and distinct , i.e., evident. Thus, it is the evidence that gives the reason why immanence can be conceived as being absolutely given . In this way, Husserl radically transposes h is foothold of thinking. The natural, naive distinction between immanence and transcendence cannot be a reliable basis of phenomenological thinking. It cannot be a starting point to think that only that which is really [ reell ] contained in the psychologica l consciousness is indubitable, that which transcends it is dubitable. Rather, the only criterion of phenomenological givenness is whether something is evident or not. It is not the distinction between immanence and transcendence that makes it possible t o distinguish evidence from non-evidence. Conversely, it is evidence that enables us to define what is immanent and what is transcendent in phenomenological sense. 6 This fundamental insight into the methodological peculiarity of phenomenological thinking is fully expressed in the Third Lecture,
Th is i s th e in s ig h t w h ic h, d e fact o , Hu s ser l h a s a l rea d y ga i n ed in t he A pp en di x of L og i cal I nv es t ig at i on s ( Ex ter na l a n d I nt er na l Per cep ti o n: P hy si ca l a nd Ps yc h ica l P he n o me na ) . The Id ea of Ph e no m e nol og y ena bl es Hu s ser l t o brea k th ro u g h t o a n ew le v el of u nde rs ta ndi n g of hi s ow n ph en o me n ol o g y o n th e ba s is of t ha t i n si g ht . Cf . H ua X I X /2 , 7 5 1 - 7 7 5 / 8 5 2 - 8 6 9 . Th e fu nda me nta l si g nif ica n ce of th i s A ppe nd ix fo r a ph e n o me n ol o gi ca l tu r n of Hu s ser l s th i nk i n g i s e la b o ra te d by Ni c ola s d e Wa rre n (2 0 0 3 ).
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where Husserl retrospectively refers to the Cartesian doubt and the two senses of immanence :
De sca r te s a sk ed, a s y ou wi ll reca l l, a f ter h e ha d e sta bl i sh ed t he evid e nce of t he cog it at io [ ]: Wh at i s i t th at as s ur e s m e of th i s b as ic g iv e n ne s s? T h e a ns we r: cl ea r a nd di st i nc t perc ep ti o n [ c la ra et d ist i nct a p er cep t io ] . We ca n la tc h o n to t hi s p o in t. I need n o t me n ti o n t he f a ct t ha t we ha ve a lrea dy gra spe d t he ma t ter i n a pur er a nd dee per wa y tha n De sca r te s di d, a nd t ha t we ha ve th u s gra spe d a nd u n der st o od ev ide n ce, c lea r a n d dis ti n ct pe rce pt i on , in a pu rer se ns e. Wi t h De sca r te s w e ca n n o w ta ke th e a dd it i ona l ste p ( m ut at i s m ut a nd i s ): w ha teve r is g iv e n t hr ou g h c lea r a nd dis t in ct pe rce pt i on , a s it i s i n a ny s i n g ula r cog itat io, we a r e en ti tl ed t o a cce pt . ( H u a II, 4 9 /3 7 )

In short, we can accept whatever is given with evidence . This newly discovered principle of phenomenology, which apparently becomes echoed in the principle of all principles of Ideas I , 7 continues to determine the character of Husserl s phenomenology until the latest period of its development. 8 In what follows , I will show how the strict observance of the principle of evidence, against naive expectations, opens our eyes to the whole range of phenomenological givenness. 3. Essences are also Given The next question is: W hat does the new principle bring about in phenomenology? The Cartesian doubt led Husserl to the evidence of cogitatio . However, a philosophical science cannot begin with such fleeting cogitationes (or an eternal Heraclitean stream of phenomena ) from which we can grasp nothing other than individual facts of experiencing , nothing other than this here! As Husserl asks: What statements can I make about it? (Hua II, 47/36). Therefore, it is necessary to find other types of self givenness. In any case, it is illuminating to note that the possibility of a critique of knowledge depends on the indication of forms of
[ ] t he pri n ci ple s o f a ll pr in ci pl es: t ha t e ver y o ri g ina ry pre se n t ive i nt ui ti o n is a le g it i miz i ng so ur c e of c og n it i on , t ha t ev ery t hi n g or i gi na r i ly ( s o t o s pea k , i n it s per so na l a ct ua l it y) o f f ere d t o u s i n i n tu it i on i s t o b e a cce p ted s i mp l y a s w ha t it i s pre se n ted a s be i ng , b ut a ls o o n ly w it h in t he li m it s i n w hic h it i s pre se nte d t he re. ( H u a III /1 , 5 1 /4 4 ) 8 Cf. Hu s ser l s r e ma r k i n t he C art e si an M ed it ati on s: Na tura l l y e ver yt h i ng depe nd s o n s tr ict l y prese rv in g t he a b so l ute u np re jud ic ed ne ss of t he desc ri pt i o n a nd t her e by sa ti sf yi n g t he pr i nc ip le of p ure e vid e n ce, w h ic h we la id d ow n i n a d va nce ( H ua I, 7 4 /3 6 ) .
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absolute givenness other than the reduced cogitationes (Hua II, 50/38). Husserl then indicates that not only particulars, but also universals, universal objects, and universal states of affairs can be brought to absolute givenness (Hua II, 51/39). This indication is elaborated in the next, Fo urth Lecture. As Husserl writes: [C]an universality, can general essences [ ] actually achieve the same kind of self -givenness that a cogitatio does? (Hua II, 55/41) . This is a crucial question, for universality apparently transcends acts of knowing; it cannot be found in the real ( reell ) stream of consciousness as its real ( reell ) component. The self-givenness of such a transcendent object is something incomprehensible insofar as we conceive that only the real ( reell ) immanence of consciousness assures self -givenness. However, we now have the new principle of phenomenology that is discovered in the Third Lecture: Whatever is given through clear and distinct perception, i.e., evidence, we are entitled to accept . According to this principle, we can reasonably accept universality if it is self -given. 9 Not only can the real ( reell ) experience of cogitatio satisfy the critical criterion of evidence; but also the givenness of universality can be clear and distinct, or evident, insofar as a universal object is given in the intuitive consciousness. If a universal object is only meant as universal, it is incomprehensible or meaningless to say that it is not what it is. L et us take an example; Husserl speaks of intuiting the essence of red . Insofar as essence is concerned, it is nonsense to say: Red can be something different from what we understand by red ; because red in specie is exactly what we mean by red. If we, for example, paraphrase the sentence as: It is possible that the red we know is not the true red , then what is meant is not the essence of red, but a red specified in a certain way. The essence of red is a simple moment of consciousness without which all consciousness and verbal expressions of red are meaningless; in other words, a type of primitive givenness which enables us co ncerning various objects to say: I see a red or It is red. 10 Insofar as such primitive givenness is meant, it is impossible
To di sc u ss t he th e ory of es se n ce o n t he ba s is of t he re leva n t a rg u m en ta t i on s i n th e Log ica l I nv e st ig at i o ns is b ey o nd t h e sc op e of t hi s br ief pa per . I wi ll me nt i o n o nl y w ha t is nec es sa r y f or m y pur p os e, ba s ed o n t he de scr ip ti o n in t h e fo urt h lec tu re of Th e I d ea of P h e n om en ol og y . 10 Es se nc e is no t a m eta p h ys ica l en t it y, bu t a s or t of ex tre me l y si m ple a nd ob vi o us g ive n ne ss , w ho se o bv io u sn es s ma kes it diff ic ul t to gra sp i n refle ct i o n. Hu s ser l i nd ica tes s uc h o bv i o us ne s s in Ph ilo sop h i e a l s st re ng e Wi s s en s ch aft : D e r B an n d e s ur w ch sig e n N at u ra li sm us b e st eh t a uch d ar in, d a e r es un s al l en s o sch w e r m ac h t , W e se n, Id e e n z u s eh en od er v i el m eh r, d a wi r si e ja d och soz u sag e n be st nd ig s eh en, s ie i n ih r er Ei g en a rt g e lt en zu la s s en , st att si e
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to think that red as red is not what it is given to us. Thus it is senseless to question and to doubt what the essence of red is, or what the sense of red is, provided that, while one is seeing red and grasping it in terms of its specific kind, one means by the word red exactly what is grasped and seen (Hua II, 57/42 -43). It must be noted that the intuitive consciousness of the essence of red does not imply that we can have an image of the very essence itself. To have the essence of red as intuitive givenness, we need not to be imagining or picturing the essence of red next to a red thing. Rather, intuition here correspo nds to adequateness. If what is meant is fulfilled as it is exactly meant and does not contain any empty intention which can be further fulfilled, we can then appropriately refer to the intuition as adequateness. 11 And it is exactly such a kind of evidence that requires us to accept universality in its phenomenological givenness. Universal objectivities and states of affairs come to self-givenness for us, and they are in the same sense [as cogitatio ] unquestionably given, in the strongest sense adeq uately self-given (Hua II, 60/45). After having proved that universality can be evidently self -given, it follows that it can be counted as phenomenological immanence. Thus this givenness is a purely immanent givenness, not immanent in the false sense, na mely, existing in the sphere of individual consciousness (Hua II, 57/42). Universal objects which are initially considered as transcendent are now integrated into the sphere of phenomenological immanence so that such objects can be phenomenologically analyzed on the basis of evidence. Through this consideration, we can confirm again that the appeal to evidence functions as a principle: Not the real ( reell ) immanence, but evidence assures us phenomenological givenness. This point is now more clearly no ticed by Husserl himself : One must get especially clear on the fact that the absolute phenomenon, the reduced cogitatio, does not count as an absolute givenness because it is a particular, but rather because it displays itself in pure seeing after the phenomenological reduction as something that is absolutely self-given. But in pure seeing we can discover that universality is no
wid e rs in n ig z u nat ur al is i er e n. W e se n ss ch a uu n g bi rg t n ich t m eh r Sc h wi e rig k e ite n od e r m y s t i sch e G eh e i m ni s s e a ls W ah rn eh m u ng ( Hua X X V, 3 2 ); cf . H ua X XV, 3 6 ; X X /1 , 2 8 2 . 11 Cf. H ua X XV , 3 2 f . I n cide n ta l l y, it i s n ot ne ces sa r y f or t he va li di t y of es se nc e to be a de q ua te l y i n tu i ted. H us ser l a cce pt s t he es se nc e - i n tu it i o n i n a b r oa der se ns e t ha n t he a de q ua te o ne ( cf. H ua I II /1 , 1 5 ). S ee a l s o t he d is ti nc ti o n be t wee n em pir ica l u n ive rsa l a nd p ure es se nc e o r eid os by S o k ol o w s ki (1 9 7 4 , 5 8 6 2 ).

SHIGERU TAGUCHI less such an absolute givenness (Hua II, 56/42). 4. Extension of the Given through Intentionality

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Based on the principle of e vidence, Husserl further extends the sphere of phenomenological givenness. As already announced at the beginning of the Fourth Lecture, phenomenological immanence also includes that which is intentionally given . [ ] here we will not only be concerned with what is really [ reell ] immanent, but also with what is immanent in the intentional sense (Hua II, 55/41). This insight is fully developed in the Fifth Lecture. Finally, at this stage, the phenomenological immanence covers the whole sphere of the given in whatever sense. At the first stage, phenomenological reduction was applied to the objective transcendence. As Husserl notes in the Second Lecture, all transcendence that comes into play here must be excluded, must be supplied with the index of indif ference, of epistemological nullity (Hua II, 39/30). 12 However, Husserl now asks in the Fifth Lecture whether transcendent objects are also phenomenologically given in a peculiar sense: In the perception of an external thing, say the house standing befo re us, it is precisely the thing tha t is perceived. This house is a transcendence, and forfeits its existence after the phenomenological reduction. What is then actually given is the appearing of the house, this cogitatio , emerging in the stream of consciousness and eventually flowing away. In this house phenomenon we find a red -phenomenon, an extension -phenomenon, etc. And these are given with evidence. But is it not also evident that a house appears in the house -phenomenon, thus giving us a reason to call it a house-perception? (Hua II, 72/53). If we separated the house from the house -phenomenon, we could not call it house-phenomenon anymore, since, in this case, it would be an intrinsically different phenomenon. The phenomenon contains that moment on account of which it is called housephenomenon ; and furthermore, what is appearing in this phenomenon is not the house in general, but a particular house. So , this phenomenon has particular moments and characteristics without which it cannot be the pheno menon of the very house that is standing in front of me, a brick building, with a slate roof, etc. Such characteristics are descriptive moments in the phenomenon, which means that they are intuitively given.
A t th i s sta ge , ph en o me n ol o gi ca l r edu cti o n i s ca lle d ep i ste m o l og ica l redu ct i on ( Hua II , 3 9 /3 0 , 4 3 /3 3 ) . T he t er m ph en o me n o lo g ica l r e duc ti o n f ir st a ppea r s i n t he t h ird le ctu re ( Hua II , 4 4 /3 4 ).
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The same applies to objects of imagination and s ymbolic thinking. In imagining, St. George is an appearing, transcendent object, but manifests itself within the appearances as a givenness (Hua II, 72/53). As for the symbolic thinking of counter-sensical objects (for example: round rectangle ) are also given as it is thought in this thinking. We think exactly that object which is round and rectangular at the same time. Here an intentional object is nevertheless obviously there (ibid.) In this way, every intentional object can be counted as phenomenological givenness, insofar as it cannot arbitrarily be separated from the phenomenon that gives the object as the very object which is given in the phenomenon. In regard to this phenomenon, not only the intentional act as cogitatio but also the intentional object can have phenomenological givenness, because they are the decisive moments of that phenomenon in which they are inseparably related. Th at is to say, various modes of intentionality can also be regarded as self -given. What is indicated in the Third Lecture can now be understood in more detail: The relating-itself-to-something -transcendent, to refer to it in one way or another, is an inner characteristic of the phenomenon (Hua II, 46/35). On the basis of this inner characteristic of phenomenon , it is possible to exhibit the different modes of genuine givenness, and, in this regard, the constitution of the different modes of objectivity and their relation to each other (Hua II, 74/54). In such an investigation of genuine givenness , an object and its appearing cannot be separated; they must be examined in correlation; and the essential correlation between appearing and that which appears (Hua II, 14/69) is not an external relation like that between a sack and a thing in it, but another expre ssion of constitution , i.e., the phenomenon in which the object constitutes itself (Hua II, 7475/55). This everywhere ongoing occurrence is also lived as an experience, and can thus be phenomenologically analyzed. Thus, all types of givenness whether it manifests itself in connection with something merely represented or truly existing, real or ideal, possible or impossible (Hua II, 74/54) fall into the sphere of phenomenological givenness. At the beginning, the phenomenological reduction had to exclude all that is posited as transcendent (Hua II, 5/63). At the final stage of lectures, all that was excluded comes back to the sphere of phenomenological givenness; what is more, it is enriched with an intrinsically deeper understanding. This outcome of the phenomenological reduction is fully expressed in the lecture Einfhrung in die Phnomenologie der Erkenntnis (1909):

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Vermge der Intentionalitt der cogitatio oder des Bewusstseins [] umspannt die Phnomenologie, die wir auch als Wissenschaft vom reinen Bewusstsein bezeichnen knnten, in gewisser Weise all das, was sie so sorgfltig ausgeschaltet hat; sie umspannt alle Erkenntnisse, alle Wissenschaften und in gegenstndlicher Hinsicht alle Gegenstndlichkeiten, auch die gesamte Natur. Die Wirklichkeit der Natur, die Wirklichkeit von Himmel und Erde, von Menschen und Tieren, von eigenem Ich und fremdem Ich schaltet sie freilich aus, aber sozusagen ihre Seele, ihrem Sinn behlt sie zurck . (Hua Mat VII, 64) In this passage , we can glimpse the mature expressions of the phenomenological reduction of later years, in which a kind of regaining by abandoning is stressed: I must lose the world by epoch , in order to regain it by a universal self -examination (Hua I, 183/157). 13 5. Conclusion According to Husserl s considerations in the Five Lectures, nothing is left as givenness that cannot be treated in the sphere of phenomenological immanence . In this sense, phenomenological immanence does not stand opposed to a particular region of givenness or su bject-matters, but to a certain kind of attitude or way of seeing ; that is to say, the transcendence vis--vis the phenomenological immanence would consist in naively positing such objects as we naturally believe to have without sufficient reason, i.e., without evidence. Therefore, the reduction to the phenomenological immanence though this term immanence seems not appropriate anymore does not mean a withdrawal into the real consciousness conceived as a bag or capsule. Instead, the reductio n expresses a movement in which the thinking that is imprisoned by its groundless beliefs breaks its limit and becomes open to every conceivable type of givenness as it manifests itself, namely, to the things themselves. 14 Thus, the phenomenological red uction proves to have a liberating function which is based on the theory of evidence. The radicalization of the appeal to evidence makes it possible for
Cf. Hua VI II, 1 6 6 : [ ] a ll e s p re i sg e b e n h ei t, al le s g e wi n ne n. In t h is se ns e, i t i s s tri k in g t ha t Ja m es D o dd cha ra ct er iz es t he r educ t io n a s ph en o me na liz a ti o n ( D odd 2 0 0 4 , 1 8 8 ff.)
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phenomenological thinking to free itself from the naively presupposed division between the real [ reelle ], psychological immanence and that which transcends it, so that all conceivable kinds of givenness can be phenomenologically analyzed. The Idea of Phenomenology clearly shows that there is nothing esoteric about the operation of the phenomenological reduc tion; rather, it is grounded on the evidence-theoretical change of perspective which, once it has gained greater clarity in the Five Lectures, continues to determine Husserl s thought. I will finish by quoting a passage from the Fourth of the Five Lectures, which can serve as evidence for my conclusion:
A cc ord i ng l y, t he p h en o me n ol o gi ca l r edu ct i o n d oe s n o t s ig n if y t he li m ita ti o n of t he i nv est i ga t i on t o t he sp her e of rea l [ r e el le n ] im ma n en ce, t o t he sp h ere of w ha t is rea l ly [ r ee ll ] c o n ta i ne d i n t he a bs o lu te t h is of th e cog ita tio , a nd it d oes n ot a t a ll s i gn if y t h e li m ita ti o n to t he sp he re of t he c og it ati o , b ut ra t her t he l i mi ta ti o n to th e sp h ere of p u r e s el f - g iv e nn e s s , t o t he s ph ere of w ha t i s n ot mer el y ta l ked a b ou t a nd r efer red to ; b ut a l s o n ot to t he sp he re of w ha t i s p erce iv ed, bu t ra t her t o w ha t i s gi ve n in exa ct ly t he sa me se ns e i n wh ic h i t i s m ea n t a nd se lf - gi ve n i n t he str ic te st se n se in s uc h a wa y tha t n ot h i ng t ha t is mea n t fa il s t o be g iv e n. I n a w ord, i t i s a l im i ta t io n t o th e sp her e of pu re e v id e nce (H ua II , 6 0 - 6 1 /4 5 ) .

Bibliography Brough, John (2008): Consciousness is not a Bag: Immanence, Transcendence, and Constitution in The Idea of Phenomenology . In Husserl-Studies 24, 177-191. De Warren, Nicolas (2003): The Rediscovery of Immanence: Remarks on the Appendix to the Logical Investigations . In Husserls Logical Investigations , Daniel O. Dahlstrom (ed.), Dordrecht : Kluwer, 2003, 147-166. Dodd, James (2004): Crisis and Reflection. An Essay on Husserls Crisis of the European Sciences , Dordrecht: Kluwer (Phaenomenologica 174). Drummond, John J. (2007): Phenomenology: Neither auto - nor hetero- be. In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6, 57-74. Husserl, Edmund (1950): Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrge , Husserliana I. Hrsg. v. S. Strasser. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. English translation: Cartesian Meditations. Trans. D. Cairns. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999 (= Hua I) [Page references [German]/[English]] Husserl, Edmund (1973): Die Idee der Phanomenologie. Husserliana

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II. Hrsg. v. W. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. English translation: The idea of phenomenology . Edmund Husserl: Collected Works, Vol. VIII. Trans. L. Hardy. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990. (= Hua II) Husserl, Edmund (1976): Ideen zu einer reinen Phnomen ologie und phnomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einfhrung in die reine Phnomenologie. 1. Halbband. Neu hrsg. v. K. Schuhmann. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. English translation: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. Trans. F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983. (= Hua III/1) Husserl, Edmund (1956): Erste Philosophie 1923/24. Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phnomenologischen Reduktion. Hrsg. v. R. Boehm. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (= Hua VIII) Husserl, Edmund (1984): Logische Untersuchungen . Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phnomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. II. Teil. Hrsg. v. U. Panzer, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. English translation: Logical Investigations. Trans. J. N. Findlay. 2 vols. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970. (= Hua XIX/2) Husserl, Edmund (2002): Logische Untersuchungen. Ergnzungsband. Erster Teil. Entwrfe zur Umarbeitung der VI. Untersuchung und zur Vorrede fr die Neuauflage der Logischen Untersuchungen Sommer 1913 . Hrsg. U. Melle. Dordrecht: Kluwer. (= Hua XX/1) Husserl, Edmund (1987): Aufstze und Vortrge (1911-1921). Hrsg. v. Th. Nenon; H. R. Sepp. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (= Hua XXV) Husserl, Edmund (2001): Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie . Vorlesung 1902/03. Hrsg. v. E. Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Kluwer. (= Hua Mat III) Husserl, Edmund (2005): Einfhrung in die Phnomenologie der Erkenntnis. Vorlesung 1909. Hrsg. v. E. Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Springer. (= Hua Mat VII) Sokolowski, Robert (1974): Husserlian Meditations , Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Staiti, Andrea (2009): Systematische berlegungen zu Husserls Einstellungslehre. In Husserl Studies 25, 219 233. Taguchi, Shigeru (2006): Das Problem des Ur - Ich bei Edmund Husserl. Die Frage nach der selbstverstndlichen Nhe des Selbst. Dordrecht : Springer (Phaenomenologica 178).

Phantasie and Husserls Phenomenological Inquiry

Smaranda Aldea (Emory University)
A bs tra c t: The pa per cla i m s t ha t t he i ma gi na ti o n ma ke s p o ss ib l e H us se rl i a n ph en o me n o lo g ica l i n q uir y. I n o rder t o un c ove r th i s r ela ti o n be t wee n t he ima g i na t i on a nd p he n o me n ol o gy in it s c om ple xi ty I f oc us f ir st o n H us ser l s a na l y si s of Ph a n ta sie ( ima g i na t i on) a s i nte n t io na l a c t i n lec tu re c o ur ses h e ga ve th ro u g ho ut h is ca re er in or der to br in g f or th it s str uc tu re s a n d a spe ct s, m os t im p or ta n t of w h ic h b ei ng f reed o m, p o s si bi li ty , ne u tra l i ty, a nd t hi n k in g t he ot he r wi se. Ne xt, I f oc us o n h o w t hes e a spe cts a l o n g wi t h Hu s ser l s re fere n ces to t he i ma gi na ti o n i n h is pr o gra m ma t ic w or k s re vea l t he i mp or t of t he ima g i na t i on i n c o n tex t of p he no m en o l og ica l in q u ir y. [ ] if a ny o ne l o ves a pa ra do x, h e ca n rea l ly sa y, a nd sa y w it h str ic t t ru t h if he w il l a ll o w f or th e a mb ig ui ty , t ha t t he el em e nt w hi ch m ak e s up t h e li fe of p h e no m e no log y as of all eid et ica l sci e nc e s i s fi ct i on , t ha t f i ct i on i s th e s our ce w he n ce th e k no w led ge o f et er na l tr ut h s dra ws it s su st ena n ce. ( Id ea s I , 1 8 4 )

The goal of this paper is to show that there is an intimate relation between the imagination ( Phantasie ) 1 and Husserlian phenomenological inquiry more precisely, the paper seeks to unravel the extent to which Phantasie opens up the very possibility of this method or way of inquiry. In order to reach this goal I will focus on Husserls phenomenological analysis of Phantasie as intentional act in his lecture courses spanning from the 1900s to the 1920s. This discussion aims at uncovering the structure of the imagination as act in order to bring forth its unique aspects. Exploring these aspects will prove crucial in seeing why and how the imagination is essential to Husserls phenomenological project. I will also focus on Husserls sporadic references to the imagination in relation to the phenomenological method in his mature
Hu ss erl e m pl o y s t he ter m Ph a nta s ie to r efe r to i ma g i na t i on a s a c t. T hi s i s a n in ter es ti n g w or d c h oi ce t ha t di ffer s fr o m th e ty pi ca l te r m u sed i n a ph il o s op h ica l c o nt ex t Ei n bi ld ung or E i n bi l d ung sk r aft . T he m o ti v a ti o n be hi nd th i s c h o ice i s h is i n t eres t i n m ov i ng a wa y fr o m tra di ti o na l e p is te m ol o gi ca l pr oj ect s ( l i ke t he Ka nt ia n a n d Ne o - Ka nt i a n o ne s). A n ot h er, p erha ps m ore im p lic i t a n d s ub tl e r ea s o n f o r t h is c h o ice is th e i n si g ht i nt o th e fa ct t ha t co n sc io u sn es s a nd it s a cts a re n ot e pi s te mi c fu nc ti o n s o r fa c ul ti es, bu t ra t he r dy na mi c i nt er tw i ni n g di me ns i o ns or m od es of c o n sci o u sn es s. La st bu t n o t lea s t, it is a l so tr ig ge red by Hu s ser l s m ov in g a wa y fr o m i ma ge a nd se n s e da ta th eo ry a nd i ts re pre se nta t io n a l i mp lica t io n s h e c ri tic iz e s t he e mp iri ci s ts fo r c la im i n g tha t t he re a re i ma g es ( a s c o nte n ts pr ope r) i n co n sc i ou s ne ss. T he ter m E inbi ld ung i s et y m o lo g ic a ll y a n d ph i lo s op h ic a ll y cl o ser to t h e re pre se nta ti o na l a ppr oa c h.
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programmatic works. 2 They are relevant to the pr esent project along with the insights into the structure and aspects of the imagination as act; together, they should enable an answer to our question: What is the relation between the imagination ( Phantasie ) and Husserlian phenomenological inquiry? 1. Phantasie and Imagining Consciousness Husserls main discussions of the imagination ( Phantasie ) occur in lecture courses he gave between the mid -1900s and mid -1920s. 3 What makes these lecture courses unique (and also, at times, hard to follow) is the dynam ic of Husserls thought on the subject. He relentlessly seeks to reveal the constitution of imagination as act apart from any psychological or philosophical biases. Thus he experiments with different ways of accessing its structures without imposing anythi ng foreign on it. I will be looking at two such methods that represent examples of both confusing and successful approaches. Husserl first attempts to explore Phantasie in terms of physical imaging consciousness 4 this method, though effective in illumin ating the ways in which the two are differently structured acts, leads Husserl at times to unwarranted moves such as importing some of the aspects of physical imaging into what he considers imagination proper or immanent Phantasie . The main challenge here is to avoid thinking the structure of Phantasie in terms of mental images somehow in consciousness. Sartre refers to this error in his Imaginary as the illusion of immanence. Husserls phenomenological instincts keep him from falling into this trap , but he occasionally relapses and uses what I would refer to as Bild terminology in analyzing immanent Phantasie . Even though he does not think there are mental images in consciousness, nevertheless, the language and concepts that he employs make the matter confusing.
I w il l ma i n ly l oo k a t I d ea s I , Ca rt e ns ia n Med itati on s , a nd t he Cr i si s of E ur op e an Sci e nc e s a nd T ra n sc e nd en t al Ph en om e no log y . 3 Cf., H ua X X III ( Ph a nt a si e, B ild b ew u ss ts e in , Eri n ne r ung 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 2 5 , M a rti n us Ni j h off , T he Ha g ue, 1 9 8 0 ) ; Hu ss er l a ls o d is cu ss es t h e i ma g i na t i o n i n si m i la r ter m s i n hi s O n t h e P h en om en ol og y of th e C on sc io us n e ss o f I nte r na l Tim e (1 8 9 3 1 9 1 7 ) ( Hua X ) a nd i n hi s L og ic al I nv e st ig at io ns ( Hua XI X ) t he se a re m os t l ik el y th e t ex ts S a rt re wa s f a m il ia r w it h du ri n g th e p eri o d w he n hi s in ter es t i n a ph en o me n o lo g y of th e i ma g i na t i o n wa s m o st pr o mi ne n t ( mi d t o la t e 1 9 3 0 s). 4 I di st i ng u is h bet w een p h ys ica l ima g i n g c o ns ci o us ne s s a n d i ma gi n i ng co n sc io u sn es s t he la tte r ref ers t o w ha t H u ss erl ca l l s i m ma ne nt Ph an ta si e or Ph a nta si e pr op er, w h i ch do es n o t occ ur i n t he co n tex t of perc ei vi n g p ic tur es.
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He eventually successfully distances himself from this way of describing Phantasie and settles for another, better approach he focuses on the differences and similarities between Phantasie as presentification 5 ( Vergegenwrtigung ) and per ception as presentation ( Gegenwrtigung ). This juxtaposition is far more fruitful in so far as the two acts are radically distinct and one is less in danger of superimposing some of their sub -structures. Distinguishing them in detail is what proves most he lpful in offering insights with respect to the structure of Phantasie . Because I consider this method more successful I will primarily rely on it in my discussion of imagination. Perception is the basic intentional act that not only gives access to the world as real and actual, but also gathers content that, once modified, functions at the level of other intentional acts. Perception offers an intuition of objects as present , or as Husserl refers to this in propria persona . For this reason, perception is a form of presentation ( Gegenwrtigung ). Phantasie is also an intentional act, but it functions in a radically different way than perception it does not give access to the world as real and actual, i.e., as present. Phantasie makes present that which is non-present . We shall see in the course of this essay what this non - presence refers to. For now, it is important to note that Phantasie has a fundamentally different kind of object and moreover it gives this object in a radically different way than perception as presentation does. Unlike perception, Phantasie is a form of presentification ( Vergegenwrtigung ). Memory and expectation are also presentifying acts, but there is one significant difference between them and Phantasie . The latters object is given as non-present; however, this non -presence is not directly rooted in reality, it is (as Husserl stresses) an irreal non presence . The objects of memory and expectation are also given as non-present, but they are directly linked to reality memory is memory of objects once given as real, and expectation is of objects that are anticipated to be given as real. Phantasie appears to be our sole link to irreality we have a consciousness of irreality only through imagining 6 consciousness. Establishing the uniqueness of imagining consciousne ss is central to this project we will come back to it in our elucidation of what Husserl means by the irreality of the imagined object. It is
I fin d pr es en t if i ca t i o n t o b e a bet ter t ra ns la ti o n of Ve rg eg en w rt ig u ng t ha n rep re se nta ti o n th e la tte r be in g e mp l o yed a s a tra n sla t io n of b ot h R ep r se nt at io n a nd Vo r st el lu ng , w h ic h a re te r m s H u ss erl re gu la r ly us es. 6 I use Ph a nt as i e , i ma g i na t i o n, i ma g i ni n g, a n d p ha nta s y in ter c ha n g ea bl y i n t hi s pa per . I di st i ng u is h t h ese ter m s fr o m i ma g i n g.
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worth stressing that despite the differences between Phantasie and perception, they are n ot completely divorced. Modification implies a relation between them. 7 This is crucial in seeing how reality and irreality are connected, and most importantly, where phenomenological inquiry is to be located in terms of the reality irreality relation, (keeping in mind the presentation -presentification juxtaposition I would like to turn to Husserls description of physical imaging 8 and to the insights he gained with respect to how it is to be distinguished from Phantasie .) * [Physical imaging and immanent im agining are both forms of consciousness that give access to a non -present object. They also share the irreality of this non -present object. This being said, they have fundamentally different structures. The objectifying process of physical imaging involves three main dimensions: 1) the actual physical thing (picture or photograph), 2) the depicting image (the image: scene of the countryside), and 3) what is meant or intended as such, or the depicted object proper (scene of the countryside). Husserl refers t o the second as imageobject and the third as image-sujet . The image-object points beyond itself to the intended object proper ( image-sujet ); the former therefore does not stand for itself but solely offers passage for consciousness toward its meant object . But here lies an interesting ambiguity that will eventually help Husserl differentiate physical imaging and Phantasie . Despite the fact that consciousness of non -presence characterizes physical imaging the scene is not there, given in person perception is still at work in it. The physical thing (painting in its physical dimensions) and the depicting scene are given through external perception and sense intuition. Contemplating a painting in a museum also involves a consciousness of the wall on which the painting is displayed, of the room in which the painting finds itself, etc. The intending of the image - sujet occurs therefore within the spatio-temporal field or world of perception. This intending or consciousness of the non -presence and irreality of the depicted scene is not it self given through perception an alien space and
I wi ll s o on tu r n t o m od if i ca t i on i n t he ca se of Ph a nta s ie ; ne ver t he les s th e fa ct tha t m od if i ca t i on i m p lie s a re la t i on be tw e en per cep ti o n a nd Ph a nt as ie i s w or th em pha s iz i n g. 8 Cf., Hua XX II I, L ect ur e N o.1 (1 9 0 4 /0 5 ), c ha p ter s 2 - 4 * D ue t o t im e co n st ra in t s I w il l lea v e o ut a nd br ief l y su m ma r iz e the sec ti o n bet we en s q ua re b ra c ket s ( pp. 1 5 9 - 1 6 2 ). H o we ver, I dec ided t o in cl ude t hi s sec ti o n of t he tex t f or t h o se in t he a u di enc e w h o wi l l ha ve a cces s to a pri n ted /e lec tr o ni c v er si o n of it.
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temporality are therefore opened at the heart of the real world of perception. Experiencing the painted scene is located so to speak at once within and without the space of reality. O nes consciousness of the irreality of the scene on the background of the consciousness of reality is what makes the aesthetic experience possible. There is a tension located at the very edges of the paintings frame the limit where two worlds (one real, t he other irreal) almost come in touch with each other. The person contemplating the painting will not actively attend to the image-object; the latter will be used as mere unnoticeable stepping stone. But the possibility of directing ones attention toward the image-object is always there. 9 What is so striking about the status of the image -object is that it is given through perception but it is a structural element of imaging consciousness. Because of this Husserl discusses it as being given in quasi -perception. Noticing this ambiguity shows why there is still a physical dimension at work in physical imaging (hence the name), and more importantly, it will show why this physical dimension is lacking in the case of Phantasie . The phenomenologist can focus o n the image-object because it can be apprehended on its own. Husserl identifies two levels of apprehension ( Auffassung ) in the case of physical imaging: first, the apprehension of the image -object as that which points beyond itself, and second, the apprehe nsion of the image - sujet through the image object. Because of this double apprehension a rich 10 phenomenological description of the image -object is possible. Husserl attempts to describe Phantasie following the model of physical imaging. But unlike physica l imaging, Phantasie does not involve interacting with a physical image it is immanent, i.e., not occurring in relation to the reality given through perception. Thinking about it in terms of physical imaging could therefore be potentially misleading and Hu sserl is well aware of this. He engages in this comparison nonetheless hoping that he would stay clear of any structural superimposition. What such a comparative attempt
9 Th e a r t s c ho o l st ude nt w o ul d pr o ba b ly w a nt t o f oc us o n t he i ma ge - ob je ct. Hu s ser l a l s o f oc u ses o n th e i ma ge - o bj ec t i n hi s p he no m en o l og ica l a na l y si s. 10 Th i s str uc tu re of a p p reh en s i on i s a l so t yp i ca l of s y mb o liz i ng a n d s i gn if yi n g co n sc io u sn es s. T he f ir st a pp re he ns i o n i s t h a t of t h e s y mb o l or t he w ord , t h e sec o nd, t ha t of w ha t is m ea nt b y t he s y mb o l or th e w or d. B ut t he re i s a diffe re nce bet w ee n t he se tw o la t ter ca s e s of pr ese n ti fica t io n a nd ph y si ca l ima g i ng si n ce i ts i ma ge - ob je ct d oe s n ot f u nc ti o n a s an alog on t he wa y s ym b ol s a nd w ord s d o. Th ere i s n o res e mb la nce ( ne c es sa ri l y) be t wee n t he ana log o n a nd tha t w h ic h i t p o in t s t o , w herea s t he re i s nec es sa ri l y a res e mb la n ce bet wee n t h e ima ge - o b jec t a nd th e s uj et of p hy si ca l i ma gi n g.

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implies is seeking the equivalent of the image -object of physical imaging in the structural context of Phantasie . But Husserl eventually realizes that he cannot push this equivalence. The key to understanding why this is not the case has to do with the nature of Phantasie apprehension unlike the case of physical imaging, there is only one a pprehension in Phantasie . What this suggests is either that there is no mental image in Phantasie , or that if there is such an image, it is not separately apprehensible in phenomenological analysis it could only be described as being given at once with the imagined object in its appearance. At first, Husserl does not explicitly choose one option over the other one sees him painstakingly struggling to elucidate the structure of Phantasie apart from physical imaging while sporadically employing the language of mental images. Eventually he lets go of this and changes his descriptive approach; what helps him do this is another comparative project: the comparative analysis of perception and Phantasie (i.e., of presentation and presentification). Before focusing o n this analysis we should stress some of Husserls findings with respect to the structure of Phantasie as distinct from physical imaging. The appearance ( Erscheinung ) of the imagined object and the imagined object itself are the same in the case of Phantasie . 11 The two cannot be set apart because there is only one apprehension in the entire intending process. Phantasma , or the modified content of Phantasie , is not to be paralleled with the image -object of physical imaging because of the latters ambiguity (i .e., being perceived yet pointing toward the non -present). Phantasma as content of immanent imagining is not given through sense intuition. 12 Rather than having a threefold objectifying structure the way physical imaging does, Phantasie has, like perception, a twofold structure. Just as sensation ( Empfindung ) is the content of perception giving the object as present, so Phantasma is the content of immanent imagining pointing to a non-present object. Nevertheless the content of either perception or imaginatio n is not separable from the appearance and intuition of the intended object. One question comes to the fore: if there is no mental image in Phantasie , does that imply a loss of a sense of spatiality that is still functioning at the level of physical imaging through the physical thing and the image -object? It is evident from Husserls description of the appearance of imagined objects, which itself relies on spatial metaphors, that a sense of spatiality (and of temporality for that matter) is not lost it is
Cf., Hua XX II I, L ect ur e N o.9 (1 9 0 9 ) . T here i s t her ef o re n o se pa ra te ( p os si bl e) i n tu it i on of a m e nta l i m a ge beca u se th ere i s on l y on e a p pr ehe n si o n i n t he e nt ire Ph ant as i e c o mp le x.
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simply modified in so far as it is not given through sense intuition. 13 The appearance of imagined objects is itself given from a certain perspe ctive, at a certain distance, in a certain spatial context, and has its own temporality.] The analysis Husse rl engages in by juxtaposing perception as presentation and Phantasie as presentification 14 provides many insights. We have already seen that the formers object is given as present or in person , while the object of the imagination is given as non-present , absent , or elsewhere . This sharp difference stresses the fact that one should not confuse the two by placing them on a continuum varying in degree only ( pace Hume). The difference between them is not one of degree, but of kind, and this difference comes about through what Husserl refers to as modification. An example why one must think of presentation and presentification as being different modes of intentionality is the fact that under a difference of degree scenario an act of judgment (presentation) and imagining an act of judgment (presentification) could not be distinguished. The imagined judgment is a modification of the actual judgment, i.e., it is given as irreal or as mere possibility rather than actuality. 15 Presentation gives access to the real and the actual. It primarily involves the present temporal dimension and it offers a sense of spatial coherence and order made available through the simple apprehension of the act of perception. Judging or any other doxic act functions in strict cooperation with perception their focus too is primarily on the real and the actual . 16 Any act as consciousness of the real is a form of realizin g or positional consciousness i.e., their object is given and posited as real and actual. But as we have seen, acts do not solely function in the context of realizing -positional consciousness; they can also occur within the context of imagination and imagining or neutral consciousness. The nature of acts changes
Hus se rl a l s o di sc us s es t he s pa t ia l i ty, t e m po ra l it y, fu lf il l me nt, a nd u n it y of ima g i na t i on i n hi s 1 9 0 5 O n t h e Ph en om en ol og y of th e Co n sc io us n e s s of I nt e rn al Tim e ( Hua X ) a n d i n h i s 1 9 0 7 Th ing a nd Sp ac e lec tu res (H ua X VI). 14 Hua XX II I, C ha pte rs 5 - 9 of le c t ure N o.1 (1 9 0 4 /0 5 ). 15 Here we a ls o see tha t H u ss erl s a na ly s is c ha ll e nge s th e tra d it io na l epi st e mo l o gica l v ie w of t h i nk i n g a b ou t p erc ept i on , i ma gi na ti o n, u nde rs ta ndi n g in ter m s of f a cu lt ie s or f u nc t io n s of fa c ul ti es. Th ro u g h p he n o me n ol o gi ca l a na l y si s it b e c om es evid e nt t ha t t he se i nt en t io na l a c t s a re f un da me nta ll y in ter t wi ne d a n d ca n no t be nea tl y ca te go riz e d o n t he ir o w n a n d s t ric tl y i n t hei r fu nc ti o n i ng. T he a bo ve - me n ti o ned e xa mp le su g ge st s t he po s si bi li t y of t h ou g ht i n th e i ma g in in g m od e or a t t it ude. 16 Jud gm e nt ca n a ls o i nt en d id ea l ob j ect iv i t ies , s uc h a s ma t he ma tica l ob je ct s. We m us t t h eref ore di s ti n gu is h be t wee n r ea l, irr ea l, a n d i dea l o b jec ts.
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in imagining consciousness their object is no longer given as real, actual, and present, rather it is now a non -present, irreal object. The existence or non-existence of the object is not posited. This observation that Husserl makes is crucial in seeing how thought and imagination cooperate and to what extent it can be said that the imagination makes possible an other kind of thought. Presentification grasps its object as irreal , non-actual , absent , other , and even as nothing in so far as its lack of presence can imply non being. We should distinguish between irreal objects and non-real objects the former are given non -positionally in so far as there is no belief in their existence or non -existence. The latter are given in a context of positionality their givenness involves the belief in their lack of existence or being. 17 An irreal object is not accessible w ithin the realm of perception the imagination alone can give access to it. We saw earlier what the difference between imagination, memory, and expectation was. It seems therefore that the imagination is the only way of accessing the irreal. Phantasie lets the irreal appear, and along with it, an entire field of vision or horizon that is completely separate from the real a nd actual world of perception. ( This is not the case with physical imaging, because it involv es perception and it opens the world of imaging at the very core of the real world; there is a different dynamic at work between these two fields of vision. They could potentially come into conflict since they find themselves in such close proximity. There is no equivalent ambiguity in the case of Phantasie .) The world of the i magined object stands aloof it is a different horizon. This space is independent of the real in so far as it opens up apart from it; but it nevertheless remains related to it throug h modification. The content ( Phantasma ) and apprehension of Phantasie are modifications of the content and apprehension of perception. The imagination does not therefore abide by the same rules that govern the world of presentation, and in this sense it is free and independent. But modification does not
A (te nta ti ve) m or e nua nce d a ppr oa c h to t h is a mb i gu it y w ou ld be t o dis t in g ui s h be tw ee n t he i ma g in ed o b je c t w h ich i s in te nd ed a n d t he i ma gi n ed ob je t a s it i s i nt end ed . The ob j ect a s it is int e n d ed ma y be gi ve n n on- p os itio na lly a s ir r ea l (a p os s ib le o b je ct t ha t m a y o r ma y n ot ex i st, e. g., my id e a of a n idea l um bre l la ) , p o sit io nal ly as r eal ( th e Eiff el T o wer w h i le I a m a wa y fro m it), or p os itio na lly a s n on - r ea l ( a ce n ta ur ). H o wev er, i m ma ne nt ima g i ni n g is fu nda me nta ll y n o n - po si ti o na l, a s H us ser l re pea te dl y s tre ss es th e o bj ect wh ich is i nte nd ed d oe s n ot im p ly a se n se of p o si ti o na li ty it i s a n i rrea l o b jec t. Hu s ser l h i mse lf s ee ms to s ug ge s t th i s a ppr o a ch i n hi s Th i ng and S p ace : L ect ur e s of 1 9 0 7 , t ra n s. by R ic ha rd R o jce w icz , K lu w er A ca de m ic Pu bl i sh e rs, D ordr ec ht, 1 9 9 7 , S ect i o n I, 9 ( cf ., H ua X VI ( D i ng u nd Ra um V or l e su ng en 1 9 0 7 , M a rt in u s Ni j h off , De n Ha a g, 1 9 7 3 , pp.2 3 - 2 5 )).
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preclude the possibility of some rules being carried over from the realm of presentation into that of pres entification the imagined judgment can be valid, and the thinking involved in unfolding it can be clear despite the fact that belief in the actuality and reality of the judgment has been suspended. Thinking in the horizon of imagination has its order and unity. Imagination does not have to be a completely lawless fluid play lacking focus and coherence. Imagining an irreal object can also be consistent and stable. This characteristic of the imagination as independent from the real yet bound by it secures its relevance to the real. In other words, it can be at once free from the real and related to it. This ambiguity (i.e., its opening of a relation between the real and the irreal) reveals how the imagination can point to new possibilities that are not completely divorced from reality. I now turn to the main aspects of imagination given its structure and cons titution. These aspects will reveal the ways in which the imagination is crucial to the Husserlian phenomenological method. Imagination, as intentional act, involves a particular kind of consciousness. The main dimensions of the imagination are therefore manifested in the ways in which the imagining ego is conscious of its intended object. Since the imagined object was characterized as non-present , irreal , non-actual , or nothingness , consciousness as a wh ole relates differently to it it is, in the context of Phantasie , consciousness of non -presence . The object is given as non-present, but the fact that it is given the very apprehension and intuition of it is present and real ( reell ). This is another way in which imagination is between reality and irreality. As conscious intentional act imagining is not nothing it simply points toward that which is not present or in other words, it points toward something possible rather than actual . Thus, imagining consciousness is linked to possibility since imagination is that through which conceiving the otherwise as a distancing from the real and the actual becomes feasible. As we have seen, consciousness of non -presence is consciousness of irreality. In this sense, it is a consciousness that frees itself from the real and thus surpasses its boundaries. Imagination entails freedom from the present and the actual, from that which is given as familiar or granted as that which is the case . Freedom and the possibility of conceiving the otherwise are the primary dimensions of the imagination in its relation to phenomenological inquiry. Imagining consciousness as consciousness of the otherwise has pointed us in the direction of understanding the imagination in terms of freedom and possibility.

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In order to fully explore the ways in which freedom and possibility constitute the very axis of phenomenology I first turn to Husserls discussion of phantasy modification and its relation to neutrality . Once it becomes clear what Husserl means by neutrality modification in the context of his phenomenological method we will be ready to approach the overarching relation t his paper seeks to illuminate the relation between imagination and Husserlian phenomenological inquiry. 2. Phantasy Modification and its Phenomenological I mport Phantasy modification involves a radical transformation. This transformation occurs at several different levels but it is the shift from presentation to presentification, from an object being given as present to it being given as if it were present . 18 First and foremost, modification is a transformation in term s of content and apprehension sensation (the content of perception) and perceptive apprehension give access to reality and actuality. In Phantasie , the sensation and apprehension of perception are reproductively modified and gain this as if ( gleichsam ) character Phantasma (the content of Phantasie ) and imaginative apprehension give access to the object as if it were present. 19 Husserl uses reproductively here to point to the fact that phantasy modificati on reworks the content and apprehension of perception such that its content and its apprehension are not brought forth ex nihilo . The result is that while everything in the context of perception occurs in actuality ( wirklich ), the context of Phantasie is m arked by this as if character ( gleichsam ). Phantasy modification is not the sole type of modification Husserl also explores retentional and memory modification 20 but it is the only one that leads to a shift from
We ha ve a lr ea dy s ee n t hi s a s if ( i.e. , g l e ich sam ) c ha ra c ter of i ma g in ed o bj ect s w he n w e di sc us sed th e a mb i gu o us na t ure o f im ma ne n t i ma g i na t i o n t he a ct of ima g i ni n g i s a ct ua l a nd t he ref ore pre se nt , it i s a ct ua ll y ex per i enc ed a n d it fo ll o ws t he ei det ic la ws of c o ns ci o us n es s a s a w h ole ; b ut t he i ma gi ne d ob jec t is n o n- a ct ua l a nd n o n - p rese n t i t is g iv en a s if it were pr es en t. O ne ha s a co n sc io u sn es s of it s a b se nce a n d no n - be in g. 19 Cf., Hua X X III , Le ct ur e N o.8 (1 9 0 9 ) . 20 M em or y a nd re te n ti o na l m od if ica ti o ns a l s o in v ol ve c o n sc io u sn es s of a n o n pre se nt ob je ct, bu t t h eir t ra nsf or ma ti o n i s a tem p ora l n o t a n o nt ol o g ica l o ne. The y s ti l l oc cur a t t he le ve l of a ct ua l i ty, t he s o le d iff ere nce b ei n g tha t w ha t i s br ou g ht t o t h e f or e i n re me m ber in g ha s th e cha r a cte r of o n ce g ive n a s r ea l (a nd in r ete n ti o n a s ju s t g ive n a s rea l ) a nd n ow pre se nt if ied a s if i t were pre se nt. T here i s t her ef or e a c o here n t se n se of t e mp ora l or der i n me m or y a nd rete n ti o na l mo dif ica ti o n t he te mp ora l se q u enc e i s m ore o r l es s p rese r ve d a nd m os t i mp or ta nt l y, i t i s li n ked to t h e pre se nt it s ter m i nu s p oi n t . The re i s n o
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reality to irreality because it implies no t only non-presence (object as if it were present) but also irreality (object as if it were real). 21 Furthermore, phantasy modification involves a transformation of all doxic acts occurring at the level of presentation (i.e., actuality and reality). 22 One can imagine that one recollects, believes, hopes, expects, judges, and so forth but in the context of imagining consciousness all of these acts occur under the aegis of possibility rather then that of actuality and certainty. 23 The object of these doxic a cts is given as if it were judged, hoped for, etc. Its irreality and nothingness ( Nichtigkeit ) are acknowledged, and although judging in the imagining mode is not actual judging, it nevertheless, as modified cognitive act, maintains its structure and coh erence. 24 What changes is that the doxic modality of the act in the imagining attitude and the ontic modality of its object are neutralized. The imagined object as irreal is thus relocated from the context of actuality to that of possibility. The phantasy modification of doxic acts implies a shift from actuality to possibility ; 25 it therefore places the acts in a context of freedom 26 from the real and the actual. Imaginative expectation, for example, can engage in an infinite modulation of free possibilities and it can do so for two main reasons: phantasy modification places
dire ct c o n nec ti o n b et wee n t h e te mp ora l s e q ue nce of Ph a nta s ie a nd t he a c t ua l ly expe rie n ced pre se nt . F or th i s rea s o n, th e t em po ra l it y of t he i m a gi ne d ob je ct a nd of i t s w orl d i s c o m ple te ly i nd epe nde n t of t he te mp o ra l f l o w of co n sc io u sn es s of a ct ua l it y i nc l udi n g t ha t of th e e g o c o n sc io u s of it s ima g i ni n g. O n ce m o re , the a s if i t we re re a l c ha ra cte r co m es t o the f ore a nd ma r k s bo t h t he t im e a nd s pa ce of t he i ma gi ne d h or iz on . Th e i ma gi ne d ob je ct be ha ve s a s if it w ere i n ti me a n d spa c e (cf ., H ua X XI II, Le ct ure No .1 3 (1 9 1 0 ) ; cf., a l s o Hu s ser l s 1 9 0 5 lect ure O n th e Ph en om en olog y o f I nt er na l Tim e Co n sci ou s n es s, tra n s. by Ba r ne tt Br ou g h, K lu we r A ca d e mi c P ub li s her s, D ordr ec ht , 1 9 9 1 , S ect i o n II, 1 7 - 1 9 , a nd H ua X, Z u r Ph nom e nol o g ie d e s In n er e n Z eit b ew u s st se in s 1 8 9 3 - 1 9 1 7 , M a rt i nu s Ni j h off , De n Ha a g, 1 9 6 6 , pp .4 0 - 4 7 ). 21 A ls o, th ere is m oda li ty m od ifi ca t i o n w it h i n t he c on tex t of p o si t io na li t y t he sh if t fro m t he na ve b eli ef i n t he ce r ta i n ex i ste n ce of t he ob je ct, w hi c h per ta i n s to pe rce pt io n a n d i s la be led b y Hu s ser l a s p rotod ox a , t o th e m od ifi ed d ox ic m oda li ti es of p o si t io n a l a ct s suc h a s d ou bt i n g, que s ti o ni n g, or n ega t i n g. T hi s m od ifi ca t i on ( A bwa nd l ung or Wa nd l u ng ) i s di sc us sed in m ore de ta il in H u ss erl s la te r lec tur e c o ur se s s uc h a s th o se fo cu sed o n a c ti ve a nd pa s si ve sy n t hes i s (c f., Hua XI a nd H ua X X XI) a nd t h o se c o ll ec ted b y La nd gr ebe i n Er fah r ung u nd U rt e il (s om e of it s sec ti o n s o ver la pp i ng w i th pa ssa ge s fr o m Hua X I). 22 Cf., Hua XX II I, L ect ur e N o.1 3 (1 9 1 0 ) . 23 Cf., Edm u nd H u sse r l, C art e si an M ed it ati o ns , tra ns . D or i on Ca i rn s, K l uw er A ca de mi c, Th e N et he r la n ds, 1 9 9 9 , p p.7 0 , 8 4 . 24 Cf., Hua X X III , Le ct ur e N o.1 0 (1 9 0 9 ) , p p.2 8 2 - 2 8 3 . 25 Cf., Id ea s I , p p.2 6 8 - 2 7 0 . 26 Cf., Hua XX II I, L ect ur es N os.1 0 (1 9 0 9 ) a nd 1 9 (1 9 2 2 /2 3 ).

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the act on a more general level (i.e., it uproots it from any real and particular context) and it gives it a sense of indeterminacy once certainty and the search for it are left behind in favor of possibility. The same holds for the other doxic acts occurring in the imaginative attitude. So far we have seen how phantasy modification occurs at the levels of non-presence , irreality , possibility , and freedom . Another dimension neutrality reveals why Husserl refers to phantasy modification as neutral. Phantasy modification involves a bracketing of belief 27 in the actuality and existence of the intended object. Once the ego suspends belief in the existence or non existence of the imagined objec t it finds itself in a doxically neutral position with respect to it. In fact Husserl considers the imaginative ego to be a non-positional ego since it, unlike the realizing -positional ego, is free from having to hold any beliefs with respect to the ontic modality of its objects. Neutrality consists therefore in the egos experiencing of the imagined object as if it were real or existent but no decision needs to be made with respect to its ontological status. 28 The imagining ego remains non -positional, neutral, and therefore it can maintain its object as hypothetical and uncertain. The realizing ego of presentation on the other hand engages in doxic acts while constant ly seeking to reach certainty be it epistemic or ontological. In the imagining mode the eg o ceases to focus on certainty and can freely engage the uncertain without seeking to surpass it. 29 Phantasy modification as neutrality modification brings to the fore several aspects of the imagining ego: it is non -positional and free to engage in a poten tially infinite variation of possibilities. It does so at a general level since it is not bound by any particular context. 30 The generality of free variation is therefore a form of disinterested 31 moving away from the individual and the singular.
Cf., Id ea s I , p.2 7 3 . Cf., Id ea s I , p p.2 8 2 - 2 9 3 . 29 Cf., Hua XX II I, L ect ur e N o.2 0 (1 9 2 1 /2 4 ). 30 Cf., Ed mu n d H u ss e rl, Th e Cr i si s o f E u r op ea n Sc i en ce s and T ra n sc end e nta l Ph e nom e nol og y , tra n s. Da vid Ca rr, N or th w est er n U P, Eva n st o n, 1 9 7 0 , p p.3 7 6 3 7 7 , a nd Ca rt e s ia n M ed it at i on s , pp .8 4 - 8 5 . 31 I w ou ld li ke he re to q ui ck ly e mp ha siz e t he d is in te r e sted n e ss of t h e i ma g i ni n g eg o si n ce it t o o i s nec es sa r y f or a n y o pe n - e nde d hy p ot he ti ca l e nd ea v ors si nc e th e n o n- po s it i ona l e g o doe s no t s ee k t o re s o lve u ncer ta in t y, i t d oe s n o t ha ve a set g oa l ( t he wa y t he rea l iz i n g e g o e nga g in g i n d o xic a ct s d oe s); th eref or e i t s freed o m l ie s n ot o nl y in it s po s si bi li t y t o e n ga g e i n a va ria ti o n of po s si bi li ti es , bu t a l s o i n th e f a c t t ha t it ca n fre el y c h o os e t o d i sta nc e i ts elf fro m see k in g certa i nt y i t is n o t b o un d b y th e r ul es of re a liz i ng d oxi c a c ts .
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Without neutrality modification there would be no abstraction in the context of objective eidetic sciences, no hypothetical thought in the context of the positive sciences, and no reductions (phenomenological and eidetic) or epoch in the context of phenomenology as subjective eidetic science. 32 What this suggests is that any theoretical thought, be it scientific or philosophical is reliant, to some extent, upon neutrality modification. Neutrality modification is different from abs traction, hypothetical thought, and the reductions; each of these modes of thought is rooted in a different facet of neutrality modification. In the case of the phenomenological reduction, the bracketing of belief in the objects ontological status is cent ral; in the case of the eidetic reduction, indeterminacy as the distancing from the individual and the singular plays the central role. Both non -positionality and indeterminacy are facets or aspects of neutrality modification. We see therefore that neutral ity modification is a broader concept than any of the reductions. This reminds us why we stated the importance of the uniqueness of imagination it alone, as presentifying act and non -positional consciousness, can trigger the shift from the real to irreal a nd irreality lies at very core of universalizing thought. Although the irreal and the ideal are distinct Husserl describes the irreal as the path to the ideal because of its non-positionality with respect to the ontological status of the object, i.e., its existence, and because of indeterminacy. The irreal is non-positional with respect to the existence of the object and makes no reference to the essence of the object (be it subjective or objective). The ideal , on the other hand, is non-positional with res pect to the existence of the object and
The r ed uc t io n s mu st b e di st i ng ui s hed f ro m ab st rac tio n , th e la tte r bei n g a t ype of f or ma liz a ti o n a nd g ene ra l iz a t i o n t yp ica l o f ob je ct iv e ei det ic sc ie nce s su ch a s ma t h ema t ic s. A b s tra c t io n ne ce ssa ri ly i mp l ie s a m ove me n t a wa y fr o m a ny t hi n g su b jec ti ve i t a i ms a t o bj ec ti ve idea l s, w hi le t he r ed uct i o ns u lt i ma t el y a i m a t th e es se n tia l s tr uct ure s of c o n sc i ou s ne ss a n d th e p he n o me no l o gic a l eg o, w hi c h a re su b jec ti ve i dea li ti es. D uri n g t he for ma t iv e per i od of H us ser l s ph en o me n o lo g y f ro m 1 9 0 0 /0 1 u nt il 1 9 1 3 Hu ss erl s hif ts fr o m cla im i n g t ha t a bs tra c ti o n i s t he m et h od i n p he n o me no l o g y (1 9 0 0 - a pp ro x.1 9 0 5 ), to re c og n iz i n g th e si g n if i ca n ce of t he p he n o me n ol o gi ca l reduc ti o n b ut e q ua t i n g it wi t h a bs tra c ti o n ( a ppr ox .1 9 0 5 - 1 9 0 9 ), t o f ina l ly see i ng t ha t a b stra c ti o n a nd th e ph en o me n o lo g ica l a n d eide t ic red uc ti o n s a re ra di ca l l y diff ere n t g ive n t h eir a im i n g a t t w o d is ti n ct ty pe s of idea ls ob je cti ve a nd s ub je ct ive . W ha t is w o rt h me n ti o ni n g h er e i s t he f a c t t ha t t he i ma gi na ti o n, g iv en it s n eut ra l it y a n d in det er mi na cy, pla y s a cruc ia l r ole i n both a bs tra c ti o n a nd t h e re duc ti o n s. I t i s a ls o i n tere s ti n g t ha t Hu ss erl s f ir st me n ti o ni n g of t he p he n o me n ol o gi ca l redu ct i on i n t he su m m er of 1 9 0 5 ( cf., S ee f eld e r Ma n us k rip t e i n H ua X) f o ll o w s hi s fir st a nd ma i n lec tu res o n Ph ant as i e gi ve n i n th e wi n ter of 1 9 0 4 /1 9 0 5 .
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positional with respect to its essence . The positionality of acts intending ideals is therefore different than the positionality of perception and of acts occurring in the perceptive mode of consciousness, which refe rs to the existence and not the essence of the object (i.e., the objects of perception are intended and intuited as real and actual). These newly revealed dimensions of imagining consciousness point to a radically different attitude. In the imagining presentifying attitude, the ego has a freedom and possibilities that are not available to it in the realizing, presenting attitude. It can freely run through series of variations of possibilities, it thinks without belief in the ontological status of its object , it leaves behind the individual as real and actual. New insights can therefore be gained in this attitude and I would suggest that it is this very attitude that opens up the possibility of phenomenological inquiry as Husserl conceives it. Without the pos sibility of distancing oneself from the real and engaging in a thinking of that which is radically other , the phenomenologist would not be able to access and engage the phenomenological attitude. This is why in Ideas I Husserl stresses at times the importa nt role of Phantasie . Let us now turn to a more in-depth discussion of freedom and possibility as aspects of Phantasie and their impact on phenomenological inquiry. 3. Imagination and Husserls Phenomenological Method We have already seen the extent to which imagining consciousness as consciousness of non -being, nothingness, and the otherwise is essential to thinking freedom and possibility. Neutrality modification has shown us the extent to which the two are bound to the imagining attitude. We have yet to understand what role freedom and possibility play in the context of phenomenology. Let us begin with possibility. The first dimension of possibility that impacts the phenomenological method is the bracketing of belief with respect to the ontological st atus (actuality or inactuality, existence or non existence) of the object. This is the level of the phenomenological reduction , which gives access to a new kind of object , i.e., to phenomena . 33 The second dimension of possibility is that of the shift, thr ough modification, from sense intuition (of singular objects qua physical
33 Cf., Ed mu n d Hu ss e rl, I d e as I , tra ns . B o yce G ib s o n, Co l lie r - M a cm i lla n, Lo nd o n, 1 9 7 2 , p.1 4 0 ; c f ., a l s o C ri si s , p.1 5 2 .

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things) to categorial intuition (of essences and structures). Phenomenological analysis is eidetic thought that aims at grasping the essential structures of consciousness; but graspi ng these ideal subjective structures involves a movement away from the contingent and the singular, given through sense intuition. The goal of phenomenology is to move beyond sense intuition and find a way of accessing the essential or the structural. 34 Since everything contingent could be otherwise , the way to break free from it is to attempt to conceive this otherwise: Now when we stated that every fact could be essentially other than it is, we were already expressing thereby that it belongs to the mean ing of everything contingent that it should have essential being and therewith an Eidos to be apprehended in all its purity; and this Eidos comes under essential truths of v arying degrees of universality. 35 Through this modification in attitude the object loses its singularity and relativity and is now thought at a more general level. The eidetic core, i.e., the ideal structures of intentional acts and their objects, is therefore accessible through neutrality modification. This is the level of the eidetic reduction , which focuses on the structures of phenomena as a new kind of object . Through the free variation of imagining consciousness the gradual shift from sense intuition to categorial intuition is made possible. This shift is not an abrupt rupture between the real and the ideal possibility can be real, irreal, and ideal. Irreal possibility is conceived by Husserl as spanning between actuality along with its real possibility on the one hand and universality and ideal possibility on the other. 36 The movement here is from real possibility toward ideal possibility through the irreal possibility of Phantasie . It is a movement away from positionality focused on existence toward pos itionality focused on essence but this shift can only be facilitated by the non positionality regarding existence that marks the imagination. Irreal possibility is nothing other than the very freedom of the imagination to move away from the real it is its neutrality and
Cf., Ca rt e sia n M ed i t at i on s , pp.7 0 - 7 1 . Id ea s I , p.4 7 . 36 Cf., I d e a s I , p.5 0 . I n hi s Log ic al I nv e stig atio ns H u ss erl d is cu s ses po s si bi li t y a s bei n g f u n da m e nta ll y i dea l t h is di sc us s io n is i n t he c o n tex t of d escr i bi n g a n d a cce ss i ng ob je ct ive id ea l s su c h a s l o gi ca l p ri nc ip le s or ma t he ma t ica l ob j ect s. Rea l p o ss ib il i ty is g ove r ned b y t h is ide a l p os s ib il it y. Gra d u a ll y, b et wee n 1 9 0 0 /0 1 a nd 1 9 1 3 H u s ser l c o me s t o ex pl ic it l y l oca te idea l p os s ib il i ty a ls o in t he co n tex t of t he su bj ec t ive i dea l st ruc t ure s o f co ns ci o us ne s s. He re a s wel l rea l po s si bi li t y s ta nd s f o r th e i n sta n tia ti o n of id ea l p o ss ib i li ty . Ir rea l po s si bi li t y po s si bi li t y i n t he c o nt ext of t he i ma gi na ti o n s ee ms t o off er t he b rid ge or pa t h fro m gra sp i ng rea l p o s si bi li t y t o see i n g i t s i d ea l c or e.
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non-positionality. It is also important to note the fact that evid ence as the accessing of the ideal is not immediate that it involves the gradual work of modification through variation; the ideal is therefore graspable by toiling through the irreal. Reaching categorial intuition of the structures of intentional acts and their objects is grounded in the neutrality modification of imagination. What the latter offers is the possibility of an other way of thinking it brings about new insights through new ways of seeing. Phantasie opens the path toward essential vision and essential apprehension. 37 As Husserl emphasizes in his Ideas I , essential intuition is a form of phantasy intuition. 38 The possibility of categorial intuition is the result of the work of free imaginative variation as neutrality modification. 39 Because neutrality modification does not involve a reification of contingent facts or given s into mental images of facts, the move away from contingency only leads to higher levels of universality. 40 This is why imagination, as that which gives the irreal , offers the path toward the study and thinking of ideal possibility a method used in geometry also. 41 The geometers thinking of ideal possibilities is free: [] in fancy he has perfect freedom in the arbitrary recasting of the figures he has imagined, in running over continuous series of possible shapes, in the production therefore of infinite new creations [] 42 Freedom of research lies in the infinite variation of free possibilities. 43 Since ideal possibility brought forth through phantasy modification is free po ssibility, we should clarify the nature of this freedom and the role it has to play in Husserls phenomenological method. The first thing to note about the freedom of Phantasie is that it is fundamentally a freedom from the actuality and reality of the no w . As irreal, it is a freedom from finite contingent contexts and as such it is inextricably linked to possibility as ideal. Yet it is important to keep in mind that this freedom is a bound freedom i.e., it is not the free play of an imaginative ego lackin g self-consciousness. Such an ego would be lost in the imagined world not taking it as if it were real but actually believing in its reality. Such can be liminal cases of psychological disorders or perhaps children who create their own
Cf ., Id ea s I , pp.5 3 , 7 4 - 7 5 . Id ea s I , p.5 4 . 39 Cf., Id ea s I , p.4 8 . 40 Cf., Id ea s I , p.8 2 . 41 Cf., Id ea s I , p.5 5 . 42 Id ea s I , p.1 8 3 . 43 Cf., Id ea s I , p.1 8 3 .
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imaginary worlds . Not even aesthetic experience is possible without consciousness of irreality, and the latter is a consciousness that only a self-reflective imagining ego can have. The freedom of Phantasie is first bound by the fact that it is rooted in the modification of the content and apprehension of perception. As such, its content ( Phantasma ) and its apprehension retain a certain level of regularity and coherence from the previous level of presentation. Presentation and presentification are therefore related and not separated by neutrality modification. Secondly, the modified doxic intentional acts and their contents are not completely arbitrary in their functioning in the imaginative attitude. As we have seen in the case of imagining a judgment, the latter could very well maintain its structure and unity despite the fact that it is experienced by the imagining ego. The very functioning of the imagining ego is bound, to a certain extent, by the laws and rules that govern the realizing ego. There is therefore a connec tion between the real and the ideal , between the actual and the possible, that phantasy modification as irreal itself guarantees; thus any hypothetical (scientific), abstract (objective eidetic), and phenomeno -logical (subjective eidetic) thought of essenc es remains relevant to the real, the contingent, and the actual. Phenomenology as a way of thinking happens in the imagining attitude. We begin to see that phenomenological inquiry is grounded in and moved by the imagination: Hence, if anyone loves a paradox, he can really say, and say with strict truth if he will allow for the ambiguity, that the element which makes up the life of phenomenology as of all eidetical sciences is fiction , that fiction is the source whence the knowledge of eternal truths draws its sustenance. 44 We have seen the extent to which the imagination makes possible the phenomenological method as Husserl conceives it. The phenomenological method is thus intricately (and intimately) connected to the movement of Phantasie . This movement from the real to the irreal and from the irreal toward the ideal reveals a horizon of inquiry stretched open through the very relation established between actuality and possibility. Phenomenology as philosophy is free to engage in a thinking of possibi lities, of that which is otherwise, without having to resolve their status it is free to let otherness remain otherness while engaging in a relation with it. This I would claim is the utmost freedom of phenomenology as
44

Id ea s I , p.1 8 4 ( H us ser l s ita l ic s a nd q uo te s).

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philosophical questioning and attitud e. This freedom is bound to manifest itself in terms of possibilities governed by the very movement of imagination. Through this bound freedom phenomenological thought transcends the actual and the everyday but it nevertheless remains related to it. The sp ace of Phantasie as irreal is stretched open between the real and the ideal ; we could say that this is the very horizon within which phenomenological inquiry itself unfolds in so many irreal paths as different ways of transcending the real toward the ideal while never fully leaving the real behind.
W ha t m us t be s h ow n in pa r ti cu la r a n d a b o ve a ll i s t ha t th ro u g h th e ep oc h a ne w wa y of ex per ie nc i ng, of th in k i ng, of t h eo riz i ng , is op en ed t o t he p hi l o so p her; he re, s i tua ted a bo ve hi s o w n na t ura l w or ld, he l os e s n o th i n g a t a ll o f t he s pir it ua l a c qu is i ti o n s o f hi s w or ld - l if e or t ho se o f th e w h o le hi st or ica l c o mm u na l li fe; he si m pl y f orb id s hi m se lf a s a ph i lo s op he r, i n th e u n i que ne s s o f h i s dire ct i on of i nt ere st to c o nt i nu e t he w h o le na t ura l p erf or ma nce of i s w orl d- l if e, t ha t he fo rb id s hi m se lf t o a s k q ue st io n s w h ic h res t up o n t he g ro u nd of th e w or ld a t ha n d, q ues t io n s of b ei n g, q ue st io n s of va lue , p r a cti ca l qu es ti o n s, q ue s ti o ns a b o ut be i ng a nd n o n- be i ng , a b o ut b ei n g va l ua b le, be i ng u sef ul, be i n g b ea u tif u l , bei n g go o d, e tc. A l l na tura l i nte res t s a re o ut of pla y. 45

45

C ri si s , p.1 5 2 .

Back to Space
Lilian Alweiss (Trinity College, Dublin)

A bs tra c t: The re i s a ge n era l c o ns e ns us i n t he l it era t ure t ha t H u ss erl s p h en o me n ol o g y pri or it iz e p la c e o ver spa ce . W hi le t he tr a dit i o n of m oder n p h i l os o p hy a nd sc ie nce h old s t ha t pla ce me re ly ta ke s up s pa ce i ns ofa r a s a n y r epre se nta t io n of s pa t ia l r ela ti o n s or po si t io n s ca n o n ly be dete rm i ned with in o ne a bs ol ut e a nd in fi n ite s pa ce , th e c la i m i s tha t p he n om e no l o gy re vea l s t he o pp o s ite : b y ta ki n g ou r l ive d b od y ( na m e ly t he p la ce w her e w e a l wa y s fi n d o ur se lv es i n) a s our sta r t in g p o in t p he n o me n ol o g y, s h o ws t ha t o ur u nde rs ta nd in g of sp a ce is p ost e ri or to , if n ot e ve n der iv ed fr o m o ur u nde rs ta ndi n g of pla ce . A ga i n st t hi s rea di n g t hi s pa p er s h o ws 1 ) t ha t a n a ppea l to e mb od i me nt d oe s n ot qu es ti o n th e pr io ri ty of s pa ce a nd 2 ) t ha t Hu s ser l s a im is n ot to q ue st i on ou r sc ie n tif ic co nc ep ti o n of spa c e b ut t o s h o w t ha t t h ere is a c on cep t ua l co n ti n ui ty be t wee n in t ui ti ve a nd ge o met r ica l c o nc ep ti o ns of sp a ce w hi ch h a s b ee n se vered b y t he m oder n o ut l o ok .

There is a general tre nd in phenomenology to prioritiz e place over space. While the tradition of modern philosophy and science holds that place merely takes up space insofar as any representation of spatial relatio ns or positions can only be determined within one absolute and infinite space, the claim now is that phenomenology reveals the opposite: place is primary and absolute. It is not, as Newton or Kant hold, that we cannot think of bodies without space, but tha t we cannot think of existing things without place. 1 In many ways Edward Caseys work: Getting Back into Place represents such a trend. He believes that in the past three centuries in the West the period of modernity place has come to be not only neglected but actively suppressed. Owing to the triumph of the natural and social sciences in this same period, any serious talk of place has been regarded as regressive or trivial . 2 Drawing on
Ca sey , f o r exa mp l e, ci te s t he pr e - S oc ra ti c p hi l os o ph er A r ch yta s wh o ma i n ta i n ed ( a s re po rt ed by S i m pl ic iu s): t h a t pla c e is th e fir st of a l l t hi n gs, si nc e a l l e xi s ti n g t h i n gs a re e i th er i n p la ce or n ot w i th o ut p la ce (Ca se y (1 9 9 6 ) : 4 7 n.2 ) . Ca se y ma i nt a in s: T h e po w er o f the A rc hy tia n A xi o m ca n no t be un dere s ti ma ted, t o be gi n w it h in t he a nc ie n t Gree k w or ld. Pla t o i s cr yp ti ca l l y q uo t in g i t i n Tim a eu s wh en he wr ite s t ha t a n yt h in g t ha t i s m u st b e i n s o me pla c e a nd occ up y s o m e ro o m, a n d w ha t i s no t s o me w her e i n ea r th or hea ve n is no t hi n g ( T im a eu s 5 2 B i n C or nf ord 1 9 9 5 ). S i m ila rl y A ri s to t le in sc ri be s th e a xi o m a t th e o pe ni n g of hi s t rea t me n t of p la ce i n h i s Ph y s ic s , B o ok IV w he n, referr i ng t o He s io d, h e sa y s t ha t he t hi n k s a s m o st pe op le d o th a t e ver yt h in g is s o me w here a nd in p la ce ( Ph y s ic s , 2 0 8 b 3 2 - 3 3 ). 2 Ca se y ( 1 9 9 3 ) : x iv . H us ser l a lrea dy ob ser v ed i n L og ic al Inv e stig a tio ns t ha t i n
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Edmund Husserl, Casey call s this our natural attitude: One belief endemic to the natural attitude, he says , concerns how place s relate to w hat is commonly called space. Once it is assumed (after Newton and Kant) that space is absolute and infinite as well as empty and a priori in status, places become the mere ap portionings of space, its compartmentaliz ations. Indeed, that places are the determinations of an already existing monolith of Space has become an article of scientific faith (Casey, 1996: 14). Casey attempts to reverse this trend by deepening our underst anding of how a sense of place plays a central role in our lives. For the purpose of this paper I am less concerned with Caseys achievements and more with the manner in which he attempts to retrieve a sense of place by appeal ing to what he calls Husserls argument against authority (Casey (1996): 16). I shall examine whether Casey is justified in the claim that Husserls phenomenology shows that the very idea of space is posterior to plac e, perhaps even derived from it (Casey (1996): 16). In Caseys lights we find our way back to place by returning to the place where we always already find ourselves, namely, our lived body. Husserls account of kinaesthesia and embodiment is thereby central to his point of departure. Husserl argues convincingly that we live with a sense of place. While objects necessarily constitute themselves as standing opposed to me, as over there I can only experience myself as being here in a particular place. However much I move around the world, I always ex perience myself as b eing here. I cannot be anywhere else but here . Husserl thereby seems to suggest that we cannot think of existing things without place. Everything that is or can be can only be experienced as being opposed to me, i.e ., as over there. Indeed, Husserl emphasises that objects necessarily have bodily-based dimensionality. They present themselves as perspectival, they appear from a particular angle and as oriented around my embodied persp ective: As Husserl says: all
ord er t o perc ei ve a n o bj ect f ro m a pa rt ic u la r a ng le we ne ed t o r ec o gn iz e t ha t it is o ne o f ma ny p os s ib le a n gle s of o ne a nd t he sa me u ni ta r y ob je c t. I ca n o nl y refer to a pa r ti cu la r s ha de of red if, a t t he sa me t i me, I a m a wa r e t ha t it i s a pa rt ic ula r i ns ta nt ia t i o n of t he idea of r ed, in t he sa me wa y a s I ca n o nl y rec og n iz e t he sp i ne of a b o ok if I see i t a s a per spe ct ive o f a u ni ta ry ob j ect (t he bo o k a s suc h) . T he u n i ta ry ob jec t is tra n sce n den t to a l l m y a c ts . I t is c on s ti tu ted a s s o o n a s I rec o g ni z e m y p oi n t - of - v ie w a s a p oi n t - o f - v ie w, na mel y, if I rec og n iz e t ha t it is o ne a mo n g ma n y, in de ed, a n i nf i ni te nu m be r of p os s ib le po i nt s of vie w. T h i s i s p os si b le o n ly w he n I dete ct a n ide n ti t y a cro s s va r io u s a ct s. A s i n gle a ct is in s uf f i ci en t. A s Hu s ser l p ut s it, it i s o n ly t hr ou g h a sy n t hes i s of re c ol lec t io n, na me ly , by c o m pa ri n g diff ere n t per sp ect ive s t ha t a un i ta ry o b jec t ma nif es ts it se lf . Cf. A l we is s ( 2 0 0 9 ).

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spatial being necessarily appears in s uch a way that it appears either nearer or farther, above or below, right or leftThe lived body then has the unique distinction of bearing in itself the zero point ( Nullpunkt ) of all these orientations (cf. Hua IV 158/1989: 166). The lived body is always here, and it is precisely because it is always here that spatial objects can constitute themselves as over there. Casey is not mistaken in his claim that through Husserl we can regain a profound understanding of place. Husserl is not concerned with an empirical sense of place. The point is not that I am necessarily somewhere but that I can only experience myself as occupying a particular place because I already have an absolute sense of place. This absolute sense of place or hereness allows me to recognise that I can take up or inhabit different places. Knowing that perspectives change requires an awa reness of something permanent or unchanging I can only experience myself as moving around the world and taking up different places, when I am able to contrast the individual positions which I hold at each instance with an absolute one. My concrete and particular sense of place or hereness is relative to an absolute or unitary sense of place that does not change even when I move around the world. My sense of being here is both particular and universal. It is particular insofar as I am aware that my sense of hereness is constantly changing; it is universal insofar as I have a sense of hereness which does not change. While places may indeed be particular, place itself, the concept of place is absolute. This would underline Caseys point. Phenomenology provides an argument against authority, which seems confirmed in Husserls later writings, when he refers to this absolute sense of place as the earth that does not move. After all, it led him to ask the heretic question: if we experience the world as stable should we not say, contrary to Galileo, the world does not move? 3 Casey, who regards his position as both pre -modern and post -modern (Casey (1996): 19) clearly seems to veer toward such conclusions when he says that place is primary and absolute. What has priority is our lived sense of place over against the abstract mathematical conception of space. This may well be Caseys position, but does it reflect Huss erls? Does Husserls phenomenology question the primacy of space? Or does it not at least prove, as others suggest, that phenomenology is limited in scope because it can only account for our common sense, or pre-scientific understanding of the world and c annot say
3

Cf. Hu s ser l, ( 1 9 8 1 ) : 2 3 0 .

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an ything about such questions as whether some bodies (such as the Earth) are absolutely at rest or in motion, or whether space is absolute, or whether it exists at all ? 4 The aim of this paper is to question such readings. Contrary to Casey, I s hould like to show that an appeal to embodiment does not suggest that place is prior to, and more fundamental than space, rather the contrary is true: an appeal to embodiment can explain why space is necessarily absolute. 5 Further, I should like to argue t hat Husserls aim is to show that phenomenology is not limited in scope. To the contrary, it can explain how we move from a pre -scientific to a scientific understanding of the world; the scientific conception of space thereby remains a central theme for ph enomenology. 1. The Fate of Place Casey, when referring to Husserl, presents him as an anti -modern thinker who questions the Newtonian -Kantian assumption that space is absolute and infinite as well as empty and a priori in status (Casey (1996: 14). Yet , as I shall seek to show, Husserl is not the heretic Casey likens him to be. Rather Husserl fits squarely within the Kantian modern tradition. Furthe rmore, I believe Casey fails to realize that if embodiment is central to our analysis of space, then the relational view of space advocated by Casey can simply no longer be upheld. We can glean this insight from Kants 1768 paper Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Direc tions in Space, 6 in which he shows that the (Leibnizian)
R obe rt o Ca sa t i, f or exa mp le, be l iev es tha t q ue st i o ns a bo u t w he th er s o me bo die s ( s uc h a s t he Ea rt h) a r e a b s o lu te ly a t res t or i n m o ti o n, w he th er spa ce i s a bs o lu te, o r w he t he r it ex is t s a t a l l, ma y b e be yo nd t he l i mi t s of ph en o me n o lo g y ( Ca s a ti ( 1 9 9 9 ): F or ma l S t ruc tu res i n t he P he n o me n ol o g y of M o ti o n in N at u ral i si n g Ph e nom e no log y 3 7 2 ). 5 In deed I be l iev e we sh o u ld be ca ref ul w h en u si n g t he te rm p la ce. O nce we trea t p la c e a s s o met hi n g ge ne ra l, p er ha p s eve n u n ive rsa l ( Ca s ey (1 9 9 6 ): 1 9 ) , it i s d if f i cu lt t o see h o w i t ca n b e d is ti n g ui s hed fr o m a n a b so l ute co nc ep ti o n of spa c e. Th e da n ger c o n si st s, a s Ca se y hi m se lf a ck n o wl ed ge s, in ma ki n g pla c e or it s c o mp o ne nt s, i nt o a ne w p la ne of pe rfec t i o n, a ne w ta bu la ra sa , in w h ic h a l l tha t ma t ter s i n h u ma n ex per ie nc e c o mes t o be w ri tt en . S pa t i oce n tri s m w o ul d th en gi ve wa y t o a n e q ua l ly sp uri o u s to p oc en tri s m (Ca se y (1 9 9 6 ): 4 1 ). The a i m ca n n ot be s i mp ly t o re ver se th e ord er of pr i or it y, ra t her t he a i m w ou ld ha ve to be t o e mp ha siz e i ts pa rti cu la r it y. T heref o re we s h ou ld trea t Ca se y w it h ca u ti o n w he n h e sa ys: tha t p l a ce s h ou ld be c o nc ei v ed a s a ki n d of pr e - o bj ect iv e a nd un iv er sa l b ei n g i n w hi c h a ll bei n g ca n b e fou n d or w he n he refers to th e Heb re w w ord m a kom ( p la ce ) w hi ch i s a na me f o r Go d (Ca se y (1 9 9 3 ): 1 7 ). 6 In D Wa lf ord & R M eerb o te e ds : T he Ca m br id ge E di ti o n of t he W or ks of Im ma n ue l Ka n t. T he ore ti ca l P hi l os o p hy, 1 7 5 5 - 1 7 7 0 Ca m br id g e: Ca mbr id ge
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relational view of space cannot account for the notion of orientation and direction, so central to Caseys account of embodiment. What is striking about Kants paper is that in many ways it pre empts Husserls position by giving credence to the significance of embodiment for our understanding of space. It shows that spatial relations cannot be understood only in terms of their relative position to each other, but necessarily specify a direction by reference to my lived body. Take the following passage from Kants text as an example:
[ ] t he m o st pr eci se ma p of th e hea ve ns , if i t d id n o t, i n a dd i ti o n to sp ec if y i ng t he p o si t io n s of t he sta rs r ela ti ve t o ea c h o th er, a ls o spe cif y t he d irec t io n by refer en ce t o t he pos i ti o n of t he c ha r t rela ti ve t o m y ha nd s, w o uld n ot e n a b le me, n o ma tt er h o w prec i sel y I ha d it i n mi n d, t o i nfer fr o m a k n ow n dir ec ti o n, f or exa mp le, t he n or t h, o n w h ic h si de of t he h o riz o n I ou g ht t o ex p ect th e s un to r is e. T he sa me t h i ng h old s of ge o gra p h ica l a nd , i ndee d, ou r m o st or di na r y k n o wle dg e of t he p o s it i on of p la c es. S uc h k no w led ge w ou ld be of no u se t o us u nl es s we c o ul d a l s o or ie nta te th e t h i ng s th us or dere d, a l o n g wi t h t h e e nt ire s ys te m of th eir re ci pr oca l p o s it i o ns, b y refer ri n g t he m t o th e sid es of ou r bo dy ( A K 2 : 3 7 9 ) . 7

Like Husserl, Kant arg ues that directions in space such as farness, nearness, right and left can only be understood with respect to my (lived) body. We cannot merely treat bodies as extended things located at a given position in space because there is something unique about the living body: it has a sense of place in accordance to which objects constitute themselves. Casey is familiar with this text and believes that in many ways it reflects Husserls position, a position he is trying to promote. He praises Kant for giving sign ificance to the no tion of place and showing that the body is essentially, and not contingently, inv olved in matters of emplacement (11). He believes that while this text
U n ive rs it y Pre ss 1 9 9 2 : 3 7 7 - 4 1 6 . [ Vo n d em e r ste n Gr u nd e d e s U nte r sch i ed e s d e r Geg e nd en im Ra um e ] . 7 W e nn i ch a uch n och s o g u t d i e O rd n u ng d e r Ab te il u ng e n d e s H o ri zo nt s w e i ss, so kan n i ch d och d i e G eg e n d en d an ach n u r be st im m e n, i n d e m ich m ir b e wu s st bi n, n ach we lch e r H a nd d i es e O r d nu ng fo rt la uf e, u nd d ie al l erg e na u est e H im m el sk ar te, w e nn au s se r d er Lag e d e r St e rn e unt e r ei na nd er ni ch t noch d i e St e ll u ng d e s Ab r is s e s g eg e n m ei n e H nd e d i e G eg e n d d et erm i ni e rt w rd e , s o g e na u w ie ich si e a uc h in Ged an ke n h tte, w rd e m ich d och nich t in d en Sta nd s etz en , au s e in e r b e ka nnt e n Geg end , z . E. N ord e n, z u wi s se n, au f w el ch e r S eit e d e s H o ri zo nts ich d e n S o nn n en au fg a ng z u su ch e n h t t e. Eb e n so ist e s m it d e r g e og r a p h is ch e n, ja m it u n s er e r g em ei ns te n K en nt ni s d e r Lag e d e r rt e r b ew and t, d ie u ns z u ni ch ts h i lft , w e nn w i r d i e s o g eo r nd et e D i ng e und d as g an z e Sy st em d e r w ech s el s eit ig e n Lag e n ni ch t d u rch d i e Bez i eh u ng a uf d i e S e it e n u ns e r e s K rp e rs nach d en G eg end e n st e ll e n kn n en ( Ka nt We isc h ede l Ba nd 2 : 9 9 6 ) .

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affirms precisely his own and Husserls position, alas , Kant soon rejected it in fav or of his absolutist conception of space. Kant, says Casey, quickly forgot what he had discovered and it is what Husserl rediscov ered a century and a half later (Casey (1996): 22). Here Casey clearl y misreads Kant (just as he mis interprets Husserl, as I shall go on to show). He fails to realiz e that the above citation shows the exact opposite. According to Kant, it does not prove that place is fundamental but, in his lights, it provides a clear proof that absolute space, independently of the existence o f all matter and as itself the ultimate foundation of the possibility of the compound character of matter, has a reality of its own (AK 2: 378). 8 In a word, it is meant to prove that space cannot be relative but is necessarily absolute. The reference to m aps shows that to account for spatial facts we need not only to specify the relative distances between material bodies but, moreover, their orientation. And contrary to Casey, Kant believes that the phenomena of direction and orientation cannot be understo od relationally. Kant quite explicitly states that direction does not refer:
to p la ce s i n t he s pa ce f or t ha t w o uld b e the sa m e t hi n g a s rega r di n g t h e p o si ti o n of t he pa rt s t o t he t h in g i n qu e s ti o n i n a n exte rna l re la ti o n bu t ra th er t o un iv er sa l s pa ce a s a u ni ty ( A K 2 : 378).9 The gr o u nd of t he c o mp le te de ter m ina t io n o f a co rp orea l f or m doe s n ot d epe nd s im pl y o n t he re la t i o n a nd po si t io n of it s pa rt s t o ea ch ot h er; i t a l s o dep end s on th e refe re nce of t ha t ph y si ca l f or m to u n ive rsa l a bs o lu te spa c e, a s it i s co nc e iv e d by g e om e te r s (A K 2 : 3 8 1 em p ha s i s a dde d) . 10

Casey thereby fails to see Kants argument, namely, that the problem of orientation questions a relationist view of space. 11
Es se i ei n ev id e nt er Be we i s z u f ind e n , da s s d er a b s ol ute Ra u m u na bh n gi g vo n dem Da se i n a l ler M a ter ie u n d s el bs t a l s der Gr un d der M g l ic hk ei t i h rer Z u sa m me n se tz u n g e in e ei ge ne R ea l it t ha b e ( Ka nt W ei sc hed el Ba nd 2 : 9 9 4 ) . 9 [ Bei al l em a u sg ed eh n t e n i st d i e Lag e s ei n er Te il e g eg e n ei na nd e r au s ih m s e lb st h in r eich e nd zu e rk e n ne n ] , d i e G eg e nd a b e r, wo h in d i e se O rd n u ng d er Tei l e g e rich t et ist , be zi eh et si ch a uf d e n Ra um au s s er d em s el b en u nd zwa r n ich t au f d e ss e n rt e r, we il d i e s es ni ch t s a nd e r es s ei n w rd e, a ls d i e Lag e e be nd e rs e lb e n T ei l e in ei n em u s se r e n V erh lt n is , s ond e rn a u f d e n a llg em ei n en R aum al s se in e Einh e it ( Ka n t We isc h ede l Ba nd 2 : 9 9 3 - 4 ) . 10 W ir wol l en a ls o d art u n, d ass d er v o ll st nd ig e B e stim m u ng sg r u nd ei n e r krp e rl ich e n Ge sta lt ni ch t l ed ig li ch au f d e m V e rh lt n is u nd L ag e s e in e r T ei l e g eg en e in and e r b er uh e, so nd e rn n och b erd em a uf e in e Be zi eh ung g eg e n d e n a llg em ei ne n a bs ol ut en Ra um , s o w ie ih n si ch d i e M es s k n stl e r d en k en ( Ka nt We i sc hede l B d 2 : 9 9 7 - 8 ). 11 Ka n t ha s pa rt ic u la rl y Lei bn iz s a naly s is sit u s in m i nd w h ic h s ta te s tha t we ca n a na l yz e spa t ia l e q ua li tie s i n ter m s of c o n gr ue nce. Le ib n iz u nde rs ta n ds t h is i n
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Somebody adhering to a rel ationist view of space thinks: If two figures drawn on a plane surface are equal and similar, then they will coincide with each other. However, Kant holds that the whole point about corporeal bodies such as my left and my right hand is that they cannot be un derstood in terms of congruence:
The y ca n be ex a ct ly e q ua l a nd s im i la r, a n d y et st i ll be so d iffe re nt in t he m se lve s t ha t t h e li m it s of th e on e ca n n ot a l s o be t he li m it s of t he ot he r t h e m os t co m m on a nd c lea r es t exa m pl e i s fur n is he d b y t h e l i mb s of t he h um a n bo dy t h e ri g ht ha nd i s s i mi la r a nd eq ua l t o t he l ef t ha n d. A nd if on e l oo ke d a t o ne of t he m o n i t s o w n, exa m i ni n g t he p ro po rt i on s a nd th e p o si ti o n s o f i ts pa r ts t o ea ch o t her, a nd sc ru ti ni s i ng t he ma g n it ude of t h e w h o le, th en a co mp le te de sc ri pt i on of t he o ne mu st a pp ly in a ll re s pec ts to th e ot he r a s wel l ( A K2 : 3 8 1 ) 12

A left and a right hand are formally identical with respect to their internal relations. They can have the same shape, extension and texture. However, there remains an inner difference ( innerer Unterschied ) that cannot be measured in te rms of relation and positions of their parts to each other. 13 Despite their similarity, they cannot be superimposed on one another and made identical to one another (i.e., they are not congruent). They would only be congruent if we could turn them inside ou t like a glove which, at least in three dimensional space, is not possible. 14 As a result, hands constitute a primordial form of spatiality which exceeds a purely relational arrangement . Incongruent counterparts such as a left and a right hand point to fact s about directionality and orientation that go beyond facts regarding relative distances. What holds for incongruent counterparts such as a hand, sna il or screws equally holds for spherical triangle s from two opposite hemispheres (AK2: 403). Hence geomet ry employs principles that go beyond a relational conception of space.
ter m s of e q ua l it y or m a g ni tud e a nd si m ila ri t y of f or m ( Cf. L ei bn iz 1 9 6 9 , 2 5 1 ). 12 Si e k nn e n v ll ig g l eic h , j ed och a n sich s e l bst so v e r sch i ed e n se i n, d a s s d ie G r en ze n d e r ei n en nich t z ug l e ic h d i e Gr e nz e n d e r and e rn se i n k n n e n .D a s g em ei n ste und kl r es te B ei sp ie l h a b en wir a n d e n G li ed e rm a s s en d es m e ns ch l ich en K rp e r s d i e r ech t e H a nd i st d e r li nk en h n li ch u nd g l ei ch , u nd w en n m an bl o ss a u f ei n e d e r s el b en all e in s i eh t , au f d ie P ro p ort io n und Lag e d e r T ei l e unt e r ei na nd er u nd auf d i e G r s se d e s Ga nz e n, so m us s ei ne v ol lst nd ig e B es ch r e i b ung d e r e i ne n i n a ll e n St ck en au ch v on d e r a nd er e n g elt e n ( Ka nt We i sc hede l B d 2 : 9 9 8 ). 13 the sur f a ce w hi ch e n cl os es th e o ne ca n n o t po s si bl y e nc l ose t he o th er (A K 2 : 3 8 2 ). [ n m l ich d e r, d as s d ie O be r fl ch e, d i e d en e i ne n b e sch li e ss t, d e n a nd e rn un m g l ich e in s ch li e s se n k nn e ( Ka nt W ei sc hed el 2 : 9 9 9 ] . 14 Cf. o n t h e na tu re of i nc o n gru en t c o un ter pa rts i n fo ur d i me n si o na l s pa ce, see va n Cl eve ( 1 9 9 1 ) : 2 0 3 - 3 4 .

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By appealing to our embodiment, Kant arrives at a conclusion that is diametrically opposed to that of Casey. The lived body does not give significance to our understanding of place, rat her it provides a cogent proof that space must be absolute. 15 The term absolute here only intimates that spatial relations cannot be understood in relational terms alone (i.e., it is far from proving a Newtonian concept of space). At first sight this conclu sion may seem a bit fraught. Indeed, Kant appears to defend the opposite view when he says that the ultimate ground, on the basis of which we form our concept of directions in space, derives from the relation of these intersecting planes to our bodies (A K 2: 378/9). 16 Yet Kant goes on to say that while phenomenologically we do make sense of directionality and orientation with respect to our lived body, we can nonetheless find real differences in the constitution of our bodies which are grounded solely i n relation to absolute and original space (AK 2: 283) [ absoluten und ursprnglichen Raum (Kant, Weischedel 2: 1000]. 17 I.e., a left hand is not only left because it is on the left side of my body (in the same way as my heart is on the left side), rather there is something about the left hand that makes it intrinsically left in orientation independently of relations to other bodies.
Ka n t w o ul d cl ea rl y q ue st io n Ja me s D o dd s vi ew t ha t: ob je ct iv e spa c e t he co ord i na t e sy st e m of ge o me tr y, sh o ul d n ot be c on fu sed w it h per spe ct iv e . G e o me try , wh en i t rid s s pa ce of t he se n se of t he di sta n ce b et wee n su b jec t a nd o b jec t, a l s o rid s spa c e of t he se ns e of th is or ie nt ed c ha ra cter ( D odd: (1 9 9 7 ): 4 7 ) . 16 d a wi r al le s, w as a u ss e r u ns i st, d u rch d i e S in ne n n u r in so f er n e ke n n en , a l s e s i n Bez i eh u ng a u f u n s se l b st st eh et , s o i st ke i n W und e r, d a s s wi r v o n d em V e rh lt ni s d ie s e r D u rch n it t s fl ch e n z u u n se r em K rp e r d e n e r st en G ru nd h er n eh m en , d e n B eg ri ff d e s R aum e s z u er ze ug e n ( Ka nt We is ch ede l 2 : 9 9 5 ). In a re c e nt a rt ic le Wo ele rt, f or exa mp le, def e n ds su ch a ( mi sta ke n) v ie w w he n he a r gu es: Ka nt c la i m s prec i sel y tha t t h e t hre e - di me n si o n s wh ic h a re es se n tia l f or th e c o ns tr uc ti o n of ge o met ri ca l s pa ce a l o ne do n ot a l l ow u s t he p os s ib il it y of d is ti n gu i s hi n g bet we en r eg i o ns a s s uc h ( t ha t i s, o rie n te d a nd d ire cte d spa ce s) (W oe ler t (2 0 0 7 ): 1 4 3 ) a nd t he hu ma n b od y a s a w h o le ha s t o be re ga rde d a s a n en ti t y w hi ch d oe s n ot mer g e i n to a h o m oge n o us ext e ns i on of ge o me t rica l spa ces (W oel ert ( 2 0 0 7 ) : 1 4 4 ) . 17 The f u l l qu o te rea d s: O ur c o n si dera ti o ns , t h eref ore , ma ke i t c lea r t ha t diffe re nce s, a n d t ru e dif f e re nce s a t t ha t, ca n be f o u nd i n t he co ns t it ut i on of bo die s; t he se di f f ere n ces re la t e e xc lu si ve ly to a b so lut e a n d or ig i na l spa c e, f or i t is i n v irt ue of a bs o lu t e a nd or i gi n a l spa ce t ha t t he r ela ti o n of p h y si ca l t h in g s t o ea ch o t her i s p o ss ib le ( A K 2 : 3 8 3 ) E s i st h i er a us kl ar , d a s s n ich t d i e B e stim m u ng en d e s Ra um e s Folg e n v on d en Lag en d e r T ei le d e r Mat e ri e g eg e n ei na nd er, so nd er n d i es e Fol g e n v o n j e ne n si nd , und d as s a l so i n d e r B e sch a ff e nh eit d e r K rp e r U nt er sch i ed e ang et rof f en w erd e n k n ne n und zw ar wah r e U nt er sch i ed e , d i e sich l e d ig li ch a uf d e n ab so lu te n und u rsp r n g lich e n R au m b e zi eh en, we il nu r d ur ch ih n d as V e rh lt ni s krp e rl ich e r D ing e m g l ich i st ( Ka n t Wei sc he d el 2 1 0 0 0 ).
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To prove his point he proposes a thought experiment. Imagine a solitary hand in the universe. A solitary hand, so Kant claims, is not completely indeterminate (Cf. AK II, 383) [ gaenzlich unbestimmt ], i.e., it would not fit either side of the human body but it would still remain either a right or a left hand. It is precisely this thought experiment that leads Kant to conclude tha t the essential property of leftness or rightness that pertains to a hand is not due to, or relative to my bodily standpoint. That a hand is left does not depend on how it is related to other material objects, notably asymmetrical bodies like our human bod ies but these differences relate exclusively to absolute and original space (AKII, 283). The point is thus not, as Casey maintains, that the lived body is the pivot around which the three dimensions of spatial extension arrange themselves and from which they ultimately proceed, 18 rather we can only make sense of the phenomenon of orientation and directionality if we assume an absolute and original space. 19 Kants essay points to something important. First, embodiment is central to our conception of space. This is a thesis that Casey would endorse. Second, an appeal to embodiment does not question the priority of space, rather it leads us to realise that space must be absolute and original precisely because facts about directionality and orientation go beyo nd facts about relative distances. An insight that either Casey does not see or chooses to overlook. Casey not only fails to see that the discovery of the lived body, or more precisely, of incongruent counterparts, leads Kant to argue that space must be absolute but, furthermore, that this discovery is pivotal to his later critical position. He did not quickly forget what he discovered, rather the discovery led him to refine his notion of space by arriving at the conclusion that space must be a form of intuition and transcendentally ideal. In his Inaugural Dissertation (1770) he argues that space must be an intuition and not a concept since the phenomenon of incongruent counterparts can not be explained conceptually, but can only be apprehended by a ce rtain pure intuition (Kant (1992b); AK II: 403). In The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science , in turn, he says that the left right distinction provides a good proof for the claim that space is not a property of a thing in itself, but is a subjectiv e form of our sensible intuition of things (Cf. Kant (1985): 23; AK IV: 483 -84). To
Ca s ey ( 1 9 9 9 ) : 2 0 8 . Thi s c la i m i s tr ue eve n if w e a l lo w f or t he po s si bi li t y t ha t spa ce ma y be f o ur di me ns i o na l . Cf . J a m es Va n Cl eve (1 9 9 1 ): Ri g ht a nd Lef t a n d the F our t h Di m en s io n ( 2 0 3 - 2 3 4 ) a nd I ntr od uc ti o n t o th e A r gu m en t s of 1 7 7 0 a nd 1 7 8 3 (1 5 - 2 6 ).
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this extent an appeal to our lived body is crucial to Kants claim that space is a form of intuition and that it is ideal and does not pertain to an autonomous reality. 2. Back to Space However, although Caseys depiction of Kant is inaccurate, the aim of this paper is not so much to vindicate Kant, but to show how Husserl in many ways advances his position. This is not to say that Husserl would endorse Kants conception of space. As we know, Husserl rejects Kants two -world (phenomenon/noumenon) distinction and therefore necessarily the view that sensuous material needs to be formed by our intuition. What is given, according to Husserl, is necessarily already spatial in f orm and no form needs to be superimposed by us (Husserl (1956) [ Erste Philosophie I]: 358). C ontrary to Kant, he holds that space is the necessary form of physical entities [ Dinglichkeit ] not the form of experience, not even sensuous experiences (Husserl (1973) [ Ding und Raum ]: 42-3). Indeed it is questionable whether Husserl would argue that an appeal to embodiment vindicates the claim that space is absolute or an infinite given magnitude. In fact I believe that Husserl, like Casey, would probably argu e that an appeal to embodiment in many ways relativiz es space. At least when he does discuss geometrical space, he only considers geometrical objects in terms of their congruence. 20 Nonetheless Husserl does not to e Caseys line. He believes that even though we necessarily need to begin with our lived understanding of space which is necessarily indexically or ostensively structured in accordance to our practices, this should not lead us to regard space as derived from place, nor should it lead us to question whether the scientific conception of space lies within the scope of phenomenological investigation. To the contrary, from very early on, he tries to make sense of David Hilberts approach to geometry which states that axioms of geometry are not sentences s tating fundamental facts about spatial intuition but logical forms devoid of intuitive content. 21 He thus faces the question head on: if axioms of geometry cannot be intuited, but only thou ght (Hua XXI 271), how can phenomenology make sense of an axiomati c conception of geometry when our starting point is necessarily our lived and intuitive conception of
A t lea st in h is ea rl y wr it in g s, t he n ot es t a ke n f or h i s R a um bu c h Hua X XV I, w he n he d is cu ss es t he pr oc es s of id ea l iz a t i o n he on l y co n si der s co n gru en ce a n d defi ne s it a s U na bh n g ig k eit d e r Ge b ild e v o m O rt ( H ua X XI: 2 9 1 ) . 21 Ja gn o w ( 2 0 0 6 ) : 6 7 .
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space? Husserl raises this point not in order to question our scientific conception of space but to explain how it is possible to move from an intuitive, extra-scientific under standing of space which we all laymen, children and scientists alike share, to a scientific conception of space. Or, to put it otherwise, how we are to understand the relation between our subjective lived experience of space which is necessarily relative and imprecise and the objective conception of space which disregards our subjective point of view . 22 The task is thus to show how we can account for the relation between our scientific and our extra -scientific conception of space. Husserl draws on geometry to illustrate what is at issue: Like all modern science, geometry is grounded in the practical and perceptual processes that take place in the life world. We begin with an intuitive conception of space which is relative and imprecise (Husserl calls it morphological). When we are concerned with measurement 23 for example, the exact [measurement] is determined by the particular end in view, for which there can also be irrelevant differences which do not count (C 311). The aim is to construct a round table, to provide a link between two points or to make sure that the frame is bigger than the picture to be framed. In these instances we are not looking for a perfect circle, line or square. Only when we are no longer simply guided by pract ical interests but wish to perfec t our skills, for example, the capacity to make the straight s traighter and the flat flatter (C 25) do we come to aim at ideal limits. 24 What is of interest then is no longer the particular line or shape of a particular ob ject but the apodictically general content [which remains] invariant throughout all conceivable variations of the spatio- temporal field of shapes (C 377). Our attention focuses on the perfect circle or line which can never be realised or constructed howe ver much we succeed in perfecting our skills. What emerges is an infinitely perfectible measuring process, one that generates an ideal limit or a limes toward which we move, which itself however can never be made present. 25 This shift in interest can be o bserved, for example, in land surveying ( Feldmesskunst ). Land surveying has turned into a
O n th e re la t i o n b et we en t he su b jec ti ve a nd t he o bj ect iv e see A l we i ss (2 0 0 9 ). M ea s ur i ng be l on g s t o e ver y c u lt ure, va r y i n g on l y a c co rd in g t o sta ge s fr o m pri m it iv e t o h ig he r p e rf ect i o ns (C: 3 7 6 ) . 24 O ut o f t he pra xi s o f perf ec ti n g, or free l y pre s si n g to wa r d t h e h or iz on of co nc ei va b le pe rf ec ti n g a ga in a nd a ga i n, l im it s ha pe s e mer ge t o wa rd w hi c h t he pa rt ic ula r ser ie s of p e rf ect i n gs te nd , a s t o w a rd i n va ria n t a nd n ev er a t ta i na bl e po le s ( C : 2 6 ) . 25 O n th e pr o ce ss of id e a liz a ti o n see Ja g n o w ( 2 0 0 6 ) a nd He ld (2 0 0 3 ).
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mathematical technique. The surveyor constantly strives to improve her techniques and seeks to establish the rules which allow her to interpret whether the measuremen t approximates to the idealised constructions in geometry. Husserl describes the manner in which our intuitive and scientific conceptions of space are interlaced. He shows how we come to move from intuitive to geometrical space and how the geometrical con ception of space, in turn, has transformed our practices. However, it is important to note that although Husserl shows how both conceptions of space are interlaced, a task that he regards of utmost importance for any meaningful understanding of geometry and our practices, he does not claim that this proves that geometrical knowledge is derived from intuitive space. To the contrary, as we have said above, he insists that geometrical space is a logical construct not derived from experience. Take the following passage from his early notes on space ( Raumbuch) as an example:
In tu it i o n a nd th e e mp iri ca l c o nc ep ti o n of s pa ce c o nta i n po i nt s of depa r tu re a n d lea di n g m o ti ve s fo r t he ge o me tri c fo r ma t i on of co nc ep ts. Ye t, t he a b s tra c t ob j ect s be l o ng i n g t o th e co n cep ts a nd th e a t tr ib ut es of t he s e c on cep t s a re n o t t o be ob ta i ne d si m pl y th ro u g h a b st ra ct i o n ( i n th e pre se n t co m m o n se n se of a tte n ti ve l y em pha s iz i n g s i n gu la r f ea tu re s) fr o m i n tu it io n s. Th e c on cep t s a r e not em bed d ed i n i nt uit i on l i ke t he see n s ha p e in t he se e n p la ne. The tr ia ng le a s a n i nt ui ted a b s tra c t c o nce pt is n ot a ge o met rica l f ig ure . T he t ria n gl e s erve s t he ge o me ter a s p ure sy m bo l wh o se cha ra ct eri s tic ty pe p os se s se s di sp o si ti o na l co n ne ct i on i n t he ge o met er s mi nd w it h the co rre la t i ng pur e co nc ep t a nd it s i dea l , mer el y t h ou g ht , o bj e ct . 26

Husserl clearly shows that geometrical objects are not embedded in intuition , they refer to logical forms that can only be thought. Take the construction of a line as an example: However small the distance between two points, a distance remains which can be filled by another point and so ad infinitum (cf Hua XXII 287 -9). The actual
D i e A n sch a u ung und d i e em p i r is ch - r um l ich e Au ff as s ung en th lt d i e Au sg a ng sp u nk e und l ei t e nd e M otiv e f r d i e g eom et ri sch e B eg ri ff s bi ld ung , a be r d ie d en B eg ri ff e n zug eh r i g en a b st ra kte n G eg en st nd e u nd d e r en Attr i b ut e si nd n ich t ei nf ach d u r ch A b st rak t io n ( i n d em b lich e n Si nn a u fm e r ks am er P oin ti e ru ng v o n Ein z elz g en ) a u s d en An sch au u ng en z u g e wi nn e n, si e li eg e n i n d ie s e n nich t ei ng e bet t et wi e d i e g e seh e n e G es talt d e r g e seh e n en F lch e . D a s D r ei eck d e r ang e sch a ut en A bst ra kt i on i st k ei n e g e om etr i sc h e F ig u r, e s d ie nt d em Geom et e r al s bl os s e s Sy m b ol, d e s se n ch ar act er i sti sch e r Ty p us in s ei n em G e ist d isp os iti on e ll e Ve rk n p f u ng b e si t zt m it d em zug eh r ig en r ei ne n B eg ri ff u nd s e in em id e al en b lo s s g ed ach t en G eg en st and ( Hua X XI: 2 3 7 ) . Tra ns la ti o n ta ke n fr o m Ja g no w (2 0 0 6 ): 8 1 n.1 9 .
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process can never be completed: we can always add further points. Although the process is infinite, one can nonetheless stipulate an ideal limit as the product of such infinite division and add them to a line. This then allows us to hold fast to the idea that points have no extension and that a line is continuous. However, to do so we need to depart from the actual object that can be perceived since the focus is on an entirely new object, one that can only be thought but never perceived. The process of idealiz ation explains the move from an extra scientific to a scientific conception of space. This should not be read as an argument against aut hority. It does not lead Husserl to conclude that local knowledge not only precedes but even makes geometrical knowledge possible. Nowhere does he claim that space is posterior to, or derived from place (Casey (1996): 16). Casey believes that because Husse rl shows how knowledge arises out of experience, phenomenology reverses the order and shows that knowledge is derived from experience (Casey (19 96): 16). Yet he fails to realize that in many ways Husserl adheres to, rather than d eparts from Kants dictum t hat though all our knowledge begins with experience it does not follow that it all arises out of experience (CPR B1). Even though all knowledge begins with experience, we can divorce ourselves from experience and conduct an a priori and transcendental inquiry. 27 We can arrive at geometrical truths that cannot be demonstrated by actual measurements and are not relative to our subjective point of view. 28 To this extent Husserl falls squarely within the Kantian modern tradition. Indeed, there are passages in w hich Kant, like Husserl, suggests in passing that mathematical concepts have meaning only if they are constructed in concreto first . To arrive at mathematical propositions such as 7+5=12, for example, he observes that we have to go outside these concepts, and call in the aid of intuition which corresponds to one of them , our five fingers for instance (B15). 29
A s H u ss erl sa y s i n EU : Vo n j ed e r ko nk re te n Wi rk lich k eit u nd j ed em a n ih r wi rk lich e rf ah r e n en u n d e rfah r ba r e n Ei nz e lz u g e steh t d e r W eg i n d a s Re ich id e al e r od e r r ei n e r Mg li ch k ei t u nd d am it i n d as R ei ch d es ap r io ri sch e n D e nk en s of f en (Hu s ser l ( 1 9 8 5 ) : S ec 9 0 , 4 2 8 ) . Cf. Ber ne t (2 0 0 3 ). 28 Ge o met ry d oe s n ot e xi st a s s o me th i n g per s o na l w it hi n t he pe rs o n a l s ph ere of co n sc io u sn es s; i t is t h e ex is te nc e of w ha t is ob je ct ive l y th ere f or ever y o ne (f or a ctua l a nd p o s si ble g eo me ter s, or th o se w h o u nd er sta nd ge o me tr y). I nd eed, it ha s, fro m i t s pri m a l es ta b li s h me nt, a n ex is te nce w hi ch is pe cu l ia rl y su per te mp ora l a nd w h ic h of t h is we a re cer ta i n i s a c ce ss ib le t o a ll m en , fi rs t of a ll t o t h e a c tua l a nd po s si bl e ma t he ma t ici a n s of a ll pe op le s, a ll a g e s; a nd th i s i s tr ue of a ll i ts p a rti cu la r f or m s ( C: 3 5 6 ). 29 m an m us s b e r d i e s e Beg ri ff e h i na usg eh e n, i nd e m m a n d i e An sch a u ung z u H u lf e
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Elsewhere Kant says: The concept of magnitude seeks its support and sensible meaning in number, and this in turn in the fingers, in the beads of the abacus, or in strokes and points whic h can be placed before the eyes (B 299). 30 Yet Kants aim is to show that the concept itself is always a priori in origin, and so likewise are the synthetic principles or form ulas derived from such concepts (ibid.) The a priori is thereby treated as a given. Unlike Husserl, Kant does not seek to show what motivates us to move from the empirical to the transcendental. It is precisely this move that Husserl attempts to provide. 3. Making Space for Place Husserl deepe ns the Kantian project by questioning its historical origins. He does not wish to affirm an argument against authority, as Casey assumes. Rather he is concerned about what he calls our scientific naturalistic outlook which Kant represents. The problem is that our mathematical characterisation of things is a result of a process of idealisation, yet we have come to believe that mathematical science represents or mirrors the life world. As Husserl puts it:
[ it ] d r e s se s it up a s o b jec ti ve ly a c t ua l a n d tru e na t ur e. I t i s th ro u g h t he ga r b of idea s t ha t we ta k e f or t r u e be i ng wha t is a ctua l ly m et h od w h ic h is de si g ned f or t he pu rp ose of pr og res s ive l y im pr ov i n g, i n in fi ni t um , t hr ou g h sc ie n tif ic p red ic ti o n s, t h ose ro ug h pr ed ict i o ns w hi c h a re t he o n ly o n es o ri gi na ll y p o ss ib le wi t hi n t he sp her e of w ha t is a c tu a ll y ex per ie nce d a n d expe rie n cea b le i n t he l if e w or ld ( C: 5 1 - 2 ).

We believe that the natural sciences capture the true nature of things and fail to realise that reality is not reducible to mathematical equat ions. Modern science makes us believe that we can understand material things only in terms of their extension and geometrical shape. All other aspects such as texture, color, heat, taste or sound have been reduced to what Locke has fittingly called second ary qualities . This means that all non -scientific ways of describing the world of things is regarded as a merely subjective
nim m t, d ie ei n em v on b eid e n k o rr e sp o nd i e rt, et wa s ei n e f n f Fi ng er od e r ( wi e S eg n e r in s e in e r A rit h m et ik) f n f Pu nkt e, u nd s o na ch u nd n ach d i e E i nh e i te n d e r in d e r An sch au u ng g eg e b e ne n F n f z u d em B e rg i ff e d e r Si e b en h i nz utut . 30 D e r Beg r if f d er G r s s e s uch t i n e be n d e r W i ss en sch aft s e in e H a ltu ng und S i nn i n d e r Z ah l, d i es e ab e r a n d en F ing e r n, d e n Ko ra ll en d e s R ech en b r ett s, od e r d en St rich e n und Pu nk t e n, d i e v o r A ug e n g e st el lt w e rd en .

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arrangement of our ideas. It describes the way we happen to carve up the world but does not tell us anything about the world of things. Against this Husse rl wishes to show that our judg ments are not merely relative and subjective but that there is a conceptual continuity between intuitive and geometrical conceptions of space which has been severed by the modern outlook. Husserl regard s this as a task of utmost importance as he believes that the natural sciences have been one -sided and biased in their outlook. Their only concern is with the establishment of absolute and necessary truths, which they believe to be irrelative, i.e. true fo r everyone. This leads them to ignore the intuitive space of the life world , namely, the way in which objects first constitute themselves relative to our first person perspective. In a word, they treat the world as if it exists independently of any human accomplishment. Husserl believes such a position to be both untenable and dangerous. 31 By ignoring the life world, the danger is that mathematical sciences turn into purely formal inquiries that have no relevance beyond the pure theory of deductive scienc e. 32 To overcome this impas se, Husserl says we need to do justice to the very subjecti vity which accomplishes science (C 295). Our subjective point of view should not fade into insignificance with the discovery of objectivity, rather it ought to be foster ed to make sense of experience. As long as we ignore original intentions that have led to the formation of the various mathematical sciences, we regard scientific research as an autonomous and infinite activity for which we take no responsibility. We passi vely allow the natural sciences to control and shape our life world. This is why Husserl believes nothing is more urgent than to turn the life world itself into a theme. We need a science of the life world . We must study what life interests have led us t o adopt the theoretical attitude in the first place and why we have turned our attention to certain tasks and not to others. In the same way as we are able to arrive at scientific truths through the process of ideali zation, Husserl believes that we need t o find out the norms that inform our intentional life. According to Husserl, there are two ways to respond to the modern crisis, either by turning against reason and the rationalist spirit that has given rise to the natural sciences, which he believes will lead to
Cf. A l wei s s ( 2 0 0 7 ) . The que s ti o n h o w we a re mea nt t o u nde rs t a nd t he c o nt i nu it y be t wee n b ot h i s bey o nd t he sc ope of t hi s pa per . H o we ver, Re ne Ja g n o w pr o vid es a n ex ce lle n t dis cu s si o n of t hi s i n J a g no w ( 2 0 0 6 ). In deed , it i s hi s a rt ic le t ha t h a s dra w n m y a tte n ti o n to H u sse rl s 1 8 9 0 n ot es o n spa ce i n Hua XX I.
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barbarism, or by rekindling the spirit and infinite goals of reason that have given rise to our theoretical attitude. This would allow for a new humanism because we would be fostering the practical ideals that originally guided mankind in the life world. 33 By gaining an understanding of how to arrive at a geometrical conception of space from our first person point of view, we can establish the extent to which modern science has lived up to its primordial intentions that have given rise to the scient ific attitude in the first place. Nowhere does Husserl question our capacity to reason or the process of idealisation. What concerns him is what makes us humans distinct (C 388) and Casey ignores precisely what makes us distinct, namely, our capacity to transcend our sense of place, the possibility to see myself and the world around me from a third person perspective. 34 When Casey urges us to return to a sense of place, he only takes one aspect of Husserls phenomenology seriously, the fact that we have a sense of place. However, he fails to acknowledge that Husserl is not only worried about natural science ignoring its genesis but he is equally concerned that we simply regard ourselves as formed and determined by the life world and fail to ask about ( Rckfragen) its origins. In order for a transcendental inquiry to take place, we need to be able to free ourselves from our contingent world -view which has been passed down to us and ask how we ourselves have arrived at the position in which we find ourselves today. Only with a phenomenological science of a life world can the modern naturalistic outlook be questioned. Casey, like many contemporary phenomenologists, disregards precisely those aspects which make us truly human. Embodiment, Husserl repeatedly ar gues, is something we share with other animals. Men and animals are spatially localiz ed, and even what is psychic about them, at least in virtue of its essential foundedness in what is bodily , partakes of the spatial order ( Ideas II : 36). A dog experiences the world as orientated around his lived body. A dog has a sense of above, below, inside and outside. However, what he is unable to do, but we can do, is abstract from his situatedness. 35
Vi en na Lec tu res i n C: 2 9 9 . Hu s ser l b el iev es t ha t I o n l y re c og n iz e m ys e lf a s a u ni ta r y s elf (e g o po le), if I ca n p re se nt m yse lf in va ri ou s m ode s, i .e. a s s it ti n g i n t he ro o m a nd a s k in g m ys elf w ha t I sh a l l be l ik e i n te n y ea r s ti me, na me ly w he n I a m b ot h t he ima g i ni n g a n d t he i m a gi ne d eg o. I t i s t he n tha t I ex per ie nce m y sel f a s a se lf tha t r ema i n s i de nt ica l a cro s s a l l t he se a c ts o f i ma g i ni n g a nd pre se n tif ica ti o n. 35 A n a ni ma l la ck s t he po s si bi li t y of i ma g i na ti o n, w hic h a ll o w s u s hu ma n s t o tra ns ce nd t he p la ce i n wh ic h we fi nd ou rse l ves: Ma n ka n n h i e r fr a g en , h a be n d i e Tie r e a n sch a u lich e P h ant a s iev o rst e ll u ng e n i m s el b e n Si nn e wi e wi r ? (1 8 3 ); B eim
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What marks us out as human beings is that meaning is not reducible to the habitus and the institutional practices in which we find ourselves involved. We can regard ourselves as responsible for our activity by seizing upon possibilities which pertain to the life world. Rather than advocating an anti -modern position, Huss erl remains Kants true heir by emphasiz ing that we are responsible active subjects and not , as Casey would have it, ineluctably place bound (Casey (1996): 19). Abbreviations: C: Husserl (1970) CPR: Kant (1933) EU: Husserl (1985) Ak: Kant (1902-) Ideas II: Husserl (1989) Bibliography: Alweiss L (2009) Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserls Account of Intentionality in Inquiry Vol. 52 No.1 (53-78) ---------------- (2007) Leaving Metaphysics to Itself in International Journal of Philosophic al Studies . Vol 15, No 3: 349 365 Bernet R (2003) Desiring to Know through Intuition in Husserl Studies 19: (154-66). Casati (1999) Formal Structures in the Phenomenology of Motion in Naturalising Phenomenology eds by Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud, Jean-Michel Roy. Chapter 12. Casey E (1993) Getting Back into Place: A Phenomenological Study (Studies in Continental Thought). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ---------------- (1999) The Fate of Place; A Philosophical History . Berkeley: University of California Press ---------------- (1996): How to get from Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time in Senses of Place eds. Steven Feld and Keith H. Basso, Santa F, New Mexico: School of American Research Press: 13-52.

M en sch e n v o ll zi eh t sich e be n ei n e st nd ig e U m wa nd l ung d e r p a s siv e n Int ent io na lit t in e i ne A kt iv it t a u s V erm ge n der W ied er h ol u n g (1 9 3 3 1 8 4 ) C it e d b y M a rba c h (1 9 7 4 ): 3 3 4 .

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Dodd, J (1997): Idealism and Corporeity; An Essay on the Problem of the Body in Husserls Phenomenology . Kluwer Academic Publishers. Jagnow, R (2006): "Edmund Husserl on the Applicability of Formal Geometry," in Intuition and the Axiomatic Method , eds. Emily Carson and Renate Huber. Dordrecht: Springer: 67 -85 Held, K (2003): Krise der Gegenwart und Anfang der Philosophie. Zum Verhltnis von Husserl und Heidegger in Festschrift fr Walter Biemel , ed. by Madalina Diaconu, (special edition of Studia Phnome nologica Humanitas Publishing House: 131 145. Held, K: Ideen zur Phnomenologie der Zeit 2. Eigentliche Zeit bei Husserl und Heidegger Husserl (1956): Erste Philosophie (1923/4). Erste Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte Husserliana VII ed by R. Boehm. ---------------- (1960): Cartesian Meditations - An Introduction to Phenomenology , Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. ---------------- (1970): The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press ---------------- (1973) Ding und Raum (Vorlesungen 1907), ed. Ulrich Claesges, Husserliana XVI. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. ---------------- (1981) 'Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spa tiality of Nature' trans. by Fred Kersten: in Husserl; Shorter Works , eds. McCormick, P. et al., Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press : 222-233.Husserl (1983): ---------------- (1983) Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie. Texte aus dem Nachla. Zweiter Teil: Philospohischer Versuch ber den Raum (1886-1901). Husserliana XXI ed I Strohmeyer. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1983. ---------------- (1985) Erfahrung und Urteil; Untersuchung zur Genealogie der Logic ed by Ludwig Landgrebe. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. ---------------- (1989) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy; Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution , Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andr Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers . Kant I (1902 -) Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Knigliche Preuische (later Deutsche) Akadmie der Wissenchaften. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter [Akademieausgabe].

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---------------- (1933) Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smit h. London: Macmillan Press. ---------------- (1992a) Concerning the ultimate ground of the differentiation of directions in space (365 -72) in D. Walford and R Meerbote, eds,: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [AK II: 375 -383] . ---------------- (1992b) On the form and principles of the sensible and the intelligible world [Inaugural Dissertation] (377 -416) in D. Walford and R Meerbote, eds,: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant Theoretical Philosophy, 1755 -1770 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [AK II: 385 -419] ---------------- (1985): Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science trans by James Ellington in Philosophy of Material Nature Hacket Publishing Company. Book II. ---------------- (1996): Immanuel Kants Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics ed. Beryl Logan London: Routledge. ---------------Akademieausgabe Leibniz (1969) Studies in a geometry of situation in L E Lowemaker ed: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters . Second ed. Reidel Dordrecht: 249 -53 Marbach E (1974): Das Problem des Ich in der Phnomenologie Husserls Den Haag. Martinus Nijhoff. Van Cleve, J and Frederick R E eds (1991): The Philosophy of R ight and Left . Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Woelert, P (2007) Kant's hands, spatial orientation, and the Copernican turn in Continental Philosophy Review , Vol 40, No 2: 139-150

Husserls Phenomenological Idealism and the Problem of Realism

Maxime Doyan (McGill University) 1. Transcendental Phenomenology is an Idealism Despite the countless disputes Husserls commitment to idealism has provoked, it is an undisputable fact that Husserl himself ascribes to the doctrine of idealism a central r ole in the general framework of phenomenological philosophy. In the Afterword to Ideas I (written in 1930), Husserl contends that transcendental phenomenological idealism is not a particular philosophical t hesis, one theory among others, but rather tran scendental phenomenology as concrete science (V, 152). As it is well known, it is in the Cartesian Meditations (in 1931) that Husserl publicly acknowledged for the first time the idealistic orientation of transcendental phenomenology. And it was not a tim id statement. The doctrine of phenomenological idealism expressed in that text brings together in systematic fashion the strongest tenets of transcendental phenomenology, such that it leads Husserl to present it in the final analysis as the only possible sense- interpretation of what is actually or possibly for us (CM 87; I, 119). Phenomenology is said to entail eo ipso transcendental idealism (CM 86; I, 118). 1 This late public acknowledgment was nevertheless nothing but a self-conscious interpretat ion of what has rightly been recognized as such (and heavily criticized by his Munich and Gttingen followers) in the second part Ideas I , where Husserl demonstrates how every object must necessarily be understood in correlation to constituting subjectivity. Thanks to the 36 t h volume of Husserls collected works, we now know that Husserls position concerning phenomenological idealism goes even further back. Essentially, it had already been established and labelled as such in Husserls research manuscripts from 1908 on. The validity of some of the proofs for transcendental idealism that Husserl provided in these texts will be our main concern today. 2. Idealism and R ealism
He a dd s : T he pr o of of t h is id ea l is m is t he refo re p he n o me n o lo g y i t se lf. On l y so m eo n e w h o m is u nd ers ta nds e it he r th e d e epe st se n se of i nte n ti o na l met h od, or tha t of t ra n sc e nde nta l re du ct i on , o r pe r ha p s b o t h, ca n a t te m pt t o se pa ra t e ph en o me n o lo g y f r o m t ra n sce nd e nta l i dea l i s m ( CM 8 6 ; I, 1 1 9 ) .
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Stated broadly, the question I aim to address today concerns the relationship betwe en idealism and realism. For it is far from being obvious at least intuitively that an idealistic framework can do justice to the richness and concreteness of lived experience. Indeed, we may wonder how a theory that seems to restrict its field of research to subjective mental states can be entitle d to possess objective purport that is to say, as directed, and so answerable, to the one and only world we share with others. Husserls position on this issue is very clear: Husserl always insists that phenomenological idealism and empirical realism ought not to be seen as mutually exclusive, quite to the contrary. In the Cartesian Meditations , Husserl goes even as far as to consider idealism to be the only consistent theoretical framework capable of supporting a nd even proving the transcendence of the empirical world through a systematic analysis of constituting intentionality (cf. I, 34). Husserl has perhaps never expressed his view on the matter more acutely than in the well -known letter of 1934 to the abbot m ile Baudin, in which he affirms that No ordinary realist has ever been so realistic and so concrete as I, the phenomenological idealist ( Briefwechsel , Dok. III/7, 16). It is in this same spirit and for the very same reason that Husserl maintained in his 1923/24 Freiburg Lecture on First Philosophy that phenomenology is the first, strict scientific form of idealism (VIII, 181; cf. V, 152). Indeed, according to Husserl, phenomenology has the edge over the other traditional forms of idealism (at least in part) because it does not renounce the realism of the natural attitude. Phenomenological idealism contains natural realism entirely within itself (IX, 254). Of course, what Husserl means by that is that the sense of natural realism is itself consti tuted in intentional ways and can, as such, only be understood in relation to the transcendental ego as the ultimate source of all justification and validation. Against this background, it is clear that Husserl does not in the least doubt that the transcen dent world exists (cf. V,152). The transcendental research includes the world itself, with all its true being (VIII, 432) . What Husserl rejects is a certain objectivistic interpretation of the world, which considers its existence as mind independent. 3. An Idealism of Sense It is by practicing the epoch and phenomenological reduction that we come to realize that reality depends on subjectivity and that

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idealism must be true. The bracketing of the natural attitude allows one to turn inward towards the subjective acts in which the world is experienced in the natural attitude. The world now appears as a world for us , i.e. only insofar as it is experienced. Before we recognize the natural attitude as an attitude, the ego seems a priori cut-off from the ext ernal world. But after the suspension of the epistemic claims informing the natural attitude, a universal sphere of givenness opens itself, on the basis of which transcendental philosophy can execute itself as a universal idealism (V, 152). The phenomeno logical reduction is the route that leads into transcendental idealism (VIII, 181). The goal of the epoch and reduction is of course not to replace the worldly objects with mental representations, or else to reduce being to being -given and the worl d to a mere phenomenon. After the reduction, we continue to be concerned with the real, empirical objects we find out in the world, but the difference is that we no longer consider them naively, but rather as they are given in experience, that is, as corre lates of experience. The reduction is what allows to switch from one kind of description to another. The difference between the real, intended object and the object as it is given in the transcendental attitude is, as Sokolowski and Drummond rightly and re peatedly emphasized, a structural difference internal to the noematic structure of consciousness. It is not an ontological distinction between different entities (say between the intentional object and the real, empirical object which is intended), but ra ther a difference in the way one and the same object is considered. One of the great advantages of this inte rpretation is that it allows to make sense of Husserls acknowledgment of the possibility of a transcendent reality, while at the same time underst anding his strong commitment to idealism. The key here is to realize that Husserls phenomenological idealism is an idealism of sense, not an ontological or a metaphysical idealism. The fundamental thesis of Husserls phenomenological idealism is namely th at it is the significance, not the existence of the world that is mind -dependent. There are structures of our experience that are responsible for the objects to appear to us in such and such a significant way and according to Husserl, a consistent account of reality will find these structures as its necessary correlate. And if we are entitled to call this idealism an idealism of sense, it is because it is rooted in the noematic structure outlined above, where the difference between the noema and its object is a difference of sense, not an ontological one. The idea that phenomenological idealism is an idealism of sense

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finds support at different places throughout Husserls corpus, but it is most clearly expressed in 55 of Ideas I , where Husserl explains tha t [r]eality and world are names here precisely for certain valid unities of sense , unities of sense related to certain concatenations of absolute, of pure consciousness which, by virtue of their essence , bestow sense and demonstrate sense -validity precisely thus and not otherwise ( Ideas I , 129; III/1, 120) . According to Husserl, if we are to avoid any dogmatic assertion concerning the ontological status of reality, it has to be understood as a system of validity and meaning standing in relation to subje ctivity. Reality needs the experiential and this seems inevitable the conceptual perspectives of a transcendental subject to manifest and articulate itself as reality. 2 4. The Primacy of Subjectivity over R eality We thus arrive at the crux of the matter , since this view implies the recognition of the transcendental primacy of subjectivity over reality (something, it bears noting, Husserl makes no secret of). 3 Indeed, in Husserls phenomenology all sense issues from transcendental subjectivity. The whole being and sense of the world is construed as an accomplishment or achievement ( Erkenntnisleistung ) of the ego (cf. VII, 248). Not only all knowledge, but, more broadly, all experience of being is grounded in constituting, meaning -bestowing subjectivity f rom where it manifests itself. In this precise sense, being is relative to the experiencing subject. As Husserl wrote in a manuscript dating from 1908, it belongs to beings essence to be experienced: To the essence of all being belongs a relation to cons ciousness (XXXVI, 32). 4 In this correlational structure, the experiencing subject is the absolute pole as that to which all being is relative and dependent upon. If consciousness did not exist, not only would knowledge not be possible, but al so nature itself would lose all its basis, its root, its arch , and thereby would be a nothingness (B IV 6, 92b) . In other words, over and above transcendental subjectivity, there is, he says, nothing (C 17 V 2, 88), or maybe I should add, nothing we could make sense of. These two passages come from still unpublished manuscripts, but the readily available works provide
Eve n G od i s f o r me wha t h e i s, i n c on se q ue nce of m y ow n p r od uc ti vi ty of co n sc io u sn es s ( FT L 9 9 , p. 2 5 1 ; X VI I 2 5 8 ) . 3 Cf. H ua VI II 2 1 5 a nd Hua X X X VI 1 9 . 4 O n th e sa m e pa s sa g e, we ca n a ls o rea d: I t bel o n gs t o t he e s se nce of be i ng t o be- a b le - to - be- g ive n ( X X XV I, 3 2 ).
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all kinds of other proof - texts which the very large majority of you must be familiar with. The basic idea here is that the transcendental ego is for Husserl the ultimate source of justification an d validation of the ontological status of reality, because being needs to be experienced in order to reveal itself and thus have meaning. Inasmuch as the transcendental ego stands in such an experiencing relation to the world, it bestows ontological valid ity on the being of the world (V, 149). This is the sense in which Husserl considered his phenomenology to be a novel form of idealism. 5. The Concerns of the R ealists What I would like to do now is consider a set of objections that have been formulated against the idealist thesis from the realist point of view. What the realists find most unacceptable in Husserls phenomenological idealism is the reduction of being to sense and, with it, the more or less explicit primacy Husserl grants to the possible over the effective. The realists argue on their part for the contrary position and affirm the ontological priority of the effective over the possible (or of reality over constituting consciousness). There is, they maintain, an unbridgeable gap between reali ty and the synthetic power of consciousness and it is the former that determines the latter, not the other way around. This argument has been formulated in very diverse ways both inside and outside the phenomenological tradition. For explanatory purposes, Ill sketch out in rough strokes two forms this objection can take before considering Husserls response to such charges. A. Jean-Franois Lavigne In his rich and penetrating book Husserl et la naissance de la phnomnologie , which bears on the genesis of Husserls phenomenological idealism, J. -F. Lavigne draws our attention on the lecture course of the winter semester of 1902/03 on 5 Erkenntnistheorie , for he sees Husserls idealistic framework already in place. 6 In Lavignes view, the major advance of t his lecture course consists in the restriction of the phenomenological analysis to the inner content of the lived experience. This reduct ion amounts to a kind of epoch in which the relation to the outside world and the empirical ego is bracketed. As Lav igne repeatedly points out
E. H us ser l, A llg em ei n e Erk en nt ni sth eo r ie. Vo rl e su ng 1 9 0 2 / 0 3 . Hr s g. v o n El isa be th S ch u h ma n n. 2 0 0 1 , x vi i i + 2 6 0 p p. 6 S ee, a bo ve a ll , t he c ha p. 4 of H u ss e rl et la n ai s sa nc e d e l a p h no m no l og i e .
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throughout his book, this restriction is problematic, for it leaves one only with the actual immanent lived experience as evidently given in phenomenological reflection. 7 Although phenomenology is still called descriptive psychol ogy in 1902/03, Lavigne terms it on this basis immanentist phenomenology. Lavigne argues further and this is what interests me here that this immanentist reduction poses in an essential way the ontological fundament of the full -blown transcendental p hilosophy of 1906 onward. Indeed, the immanentist reduction would be but a consequence of an implicit pre -reduction that forms, according to him, the core of Husserls idealistic stance up until Ideen I and beyond: the reduction of being to sense. 8 For lack of time, I will not dig into the details of Lavignes very long and complex exposition here. For our present concerns, it suffices to note that Lavigne describes Husserls phenomenological idealism as an idealism of sense as well, but he does so for wholly different reasons than I do. For Lavigne, Husserls idealism is an idealism of sense because the immanentist motives informing Husserls phenomenology reduces being to sense . Against this background, it becomes clear why Lavigne believes Husserlian phenomenology to be incapable of solving the enigma of transcendence. And this is all due to one crucial mistake, his fundamental implicit postulate according to which being is only of sense. 9 Earlier in this paper, I have tried to explain why this critique, however relevant it may be with regard to the 1902/03 lecture course, misses the point about Ideas I . I have argued that the structural difference informing the noema allows Husserls idealism to be an idealism of sense that is at the same time o ntologically committed. Well come back to this issue later on in the paper. B. Thomas Nagel Another argument against idealism comes from Thomas Nagel, who argues that being is in excess . For Nagel, realism must be true,
T he f o u nda t i o n of t he H us se rl ia n e pi st e m ol o g ica l t he s is i s t ha t be i ng i ts e lf doe s n o t tra n sce nd the l iv ed ex per ie n ce i n a n y es se n tia l respe ct; a nd co n se q ue nt ly , t ha t i t let s i ts elf be di s so lv e d co mp le te ly in th e e le me nt of t he in te n ti o na l a c ti vi ty . J .- F. La v i gn e, H u s se r l et la na i ss a nc e d e la p h n om n ol og i e , p. 3 3 9 . 8 J .- F. La v i g ne, H u s s er l et l a na is sa nc e d e l a p h n om n ol og i e , p. 3 3 3 . The re le va nt pa s sa g e her e is 5 5 of I d e as I t ha t w e q uo te d a b ov e a nd w he re H us ser l a f fir m s in a n ut s hel l t ha t [ r] e a li ty a nd w or ld a r e na me s [. ..] f or ce rta in va lid u n iti e s o f s en s e. 9 J .- F. La vi g ne, H u s s e rl et la na is sa nc e d e la p h nom nol og i e , p. 7 5 .
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because being is always in exces s in relation to the kind of beings that we are:
[ W ha t] t he re is a nd w ha t w e, i n vir t ue of o ur na tu re, ca n t hi n k a bo ut , a re d if f ere n t t h in g s, a nd t he la tte r m a y b e s ma l ler t ha n th e f or me r. [ ] T he re a re so me t h i ng s t ha t we ca n n ot no w c o nce iv e bu t ma y ye t c o me t o und er sta nd; a nd t he re a re pr oba bl y s t il l ot he rs t ha t we la ck t he ca pa ci ty t o c o nce i ve n ot mer el y beca u s e we a re a t t oo ea r l y a s ta ge of h is t ori ca l de ve lo p me nt , b ut b eca u se of th e ki nd of be i ng s t ha t w e a re. 10

Nagel is not claiming that some of the things we positively find inconceivable might be true (unicorns or square circles, for instances). He is concerned with aspects of reality that are negatively inconceivable to us in the sense that we have and can have no conception of them . 11 Nagel insist s that there may be aspects of reality which we cannot form any conception of. And this isnt due to contingent features of the environment or of our historical development, but it has to do with essential features of who we are. We, as human beings, have a distinctive nature which makes us capable of grasping certain features of reality. But at the same time, it might also be the case that we are simply incapable of thinking certain other aspects of reality. In short, Nagels charge is that the world is v ery likely not completely in reach of our concepts. Whereas the idealists try to cut reality down, so that it fits our concepts, the realists affirm positively the transcendence of reality, a transcendence that manifests itself in the discrepancy between o ur conception of how things are and how things actually are. 6. Husserls Response to these C harges Husserls response to these charges consists in stressing that it can only make sense to speak of realitys transcendence from our perspective . Of course, reality cannot be reduced to my experience of it. Not only is my perspective always essentially limited, but what I take to be the case can always turn out to be wrong. However, affirming this difference does not amount to conceive reality as independent of or inaccessible to my perspective in any absolute sense. On the contrary, Husserl believes that it only makes sense to speak of transcendence insofar as reality is transcendent for us. If the classical sk eptical charge voiced by Nagel, according to which things might well be different than we think they are, is only
10 11

Th o ma s Na g el, Th e V i ew f rom N owh e r e , Oxf o rd: Oxf ord U ni ver si t y Pre ss , 9 1 - 2 . Ib id., p. 9 2 .

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meaningful from our point of view and does not, as such, straightforwardly prove realism, it can, however, support Husserls thesis for phenomenological idealism, which claims that every su ch hypothesis can only be meaningful from the point of view of an actual I . I take this claim to be the crux of Husserls proof for phenomenological idealism as he worked it out between 1908 and 1920. For lack of time, I wont go into the details of th is proof here. Instead, I shall sketch out very generally the principle of the argument and the consequences it entails for the problem Im dealing with here. In the end, it might well turn out that, contrary to what has been suggested earlier, Husserls i dealism can indeed make sense of reality. There are, indeed, at least two set of reasons that speak for this conclusion: the first has to do with Husserls account of subjectivity, and the second with Husserls description of the normative character of ex perience. Ill conclude by discussing them in turn. A. The Experiencing S ubject The basic principle of Husserls idealism is such that every factual existing thing demands the coexisten ce of an experiencing subject: every thing lies a priori in the envi ronment of an actual I (XXXVI, 114). By that Husserl means that even if it is not currently being experienced, every real object is at least in principle experiencable by an I and lies as such in its horizon. 12 This is one of the possible responses to Nage ls charge. And the same holds for real possibilities , that is, for possible empirical objects of actual experience. Really possible empirical entities require correlation with an actual existing subject (XXXVI, 113ff.). As such, they are clearly different than the merely ideal possibilities of logic or mathematics. For an ideal entity to exist, it simply has to be logically (or ideally) possible (cf. XXXVI, 140). To such entities there
A t la s t y ea rs c o nf er e nce i n Le uve n o n t he o cca s i o n of th e 1 5 0 t h a n ni ver sa r y of Edm u nd H us se rl ' s b ir t h , U lr ic h M e ll e s e xp l a na t i o ns were t o t he p oi n t w he n h e cla im ed t ha t rea l o bj e cts si nd a n s ich i n d em S in n, d a ss ih n en d a s E r fah r en s ei n au e rw e se nt lich i st , d a s s si e s ind od e r m ind e ste n s s ei n k nn e n, au ch w e nn [ ] ni em a nd si e e r fh rt ( Hua X X XV I, S . 1 9 1 ). D a si e a b e r p r in zip ie ll Geg en st nd e m g li ch er Er fah r ung e n si nd , h ab e n si e i m m e r e i ne n B ez ug a u f e in e m g li ch e Su b j ektiv it t ( Hua I II, S . 1 0 0 f f .). Jed e G eg e n s tnd lich ke it [ . . . ] ist , wa s si e i st, o b e rka n nt w ird od e r ni ch t , ab e r i st d och a ls G e g en st nd li ch k eit m g l ic h e r E rk en nt ni s [ .. ] p ri nz ip i e ll e r ke n n ba r, a uch w e nn si e f akti sch ni e e rk an nt w ord e n ist und e rk en n ba r s ei n wi rd ( Hua II, S . 2 5 ; vg l. H u a X X XI I, S . 6 3 ). Qu o t es a r e fr o m a st il l u n pu bl is h ed ver s io n of P r of. M e lle s V ort rag e n ti tl ed H u sse r ls Be wei s f r d en tra n sz e nde n ta l en Idea l i s mu s .
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is correlated onl y a possible subject. However, a merely logically possible subject is no s ubstrate for real possibilities such as those pointed at by the realists (XXXVI, 139). The world of real being, if it is to be meaningful at all, must be correlated to an actual subject. His basic thought on this is generalized in the following passage: Thus it is said that a world could exist even if an I apprehending it did not exist. But this is nonsense. For the truth that a world can ex ist is nothing without principal justifiability. This justifiability presupposes, however, an actual I that is relate d to this world in a thetic way (XXXVI, 119) . 13 From this vantage point, it seems that the idealistic primacy of subjectivity in the intentional relation between self and world, far from going hand in hand with the alleged prio rity of the possible over the effective, entails, on the contrary, a primacy of the effective, insofar as every factual existing thing as well as every real possibility presuppose the existence an actual, embodied I (cf. XXXVI, 132). B. The Presumptive Character of Experience Important for our concern is to realize that Husserls account of subjectivity doesnt prevent his idealism from being an idealism of sense. Husserl is well aware that the only consequent idealism is an idealism of sense , since every-thing is always given immediately with meaning. But the reasons why Husserl conceives his idealism as an idealism of sense have nothing to do with a restriction of the field of phenomenological research to the immanent content of experience. Husserl st resses only that what is experienced is always in one way or another given with a specific validity ( Geltung ). Everything I experience is experienced as something meaningful, even if I cannot reduce what I experience to its meaning for me . This difference is absolutely crucial, for it is supposed to show that Husserls idealistic position is compatible with the realistic point of view. This compatibility is best seen when one bears in mind that experience is always only presumptive: my experience can alway s disclose unforeseen aspects. 14 Our encounter with the world is full
The o ri gi na l rea ds a s f o ll o w: A l so, sag t m a n, ei n e We lt k n nt e ex i sti e r en, oh ne d as s ei n si e er fa s s end e s I ch ex ist i e rte , s o i st d a s no ns e n s. D en n d ie W ah rh eit E s ka n n ei n e We lt ex i st i e r en ist ni ch ts oh n e p ri nz ip i e ll e B eg r nd b ark e it. D i e s e Beg r nd ba rk e it a b er s e t zt e in a ktu e ll e s Ich v ora u s, d a s th eti sch a uf d i e s e W e lt b ezog e n i st ( X X X VI, 1 1 9 ) . 14 I ha ve lea rn ed a grea t dea l f ro m S . Luf t o n t hi s. S ee Fr o m Bei n g t o G iv en ne s s
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of surprises: objects showing themselves differently than we anticipated, people behaving differently than we expected, things turning out different than we imagined. The sense of my expe rience can even turn out to be total non -sense: I may be certain that the building I see every day when I stroll around the university Campus is an old Gothic Church, until one day I discover that due to budget cuts the Church has been sold and that what I see is just a cardboard copy of the old facade. According to Husserls idealism, such a discovery can only happen through some new experience that automatically and immediately bestows new permutations of meaning. With every new experience, some new meani ng arises. The intentional structure of consciousness is always unfolding and expanding such that we never escape the realm of meaning. At first glance, this story seems to support the realistic point of view, inasmuch as the intentional structure of sens e anticipation can always be invalidated by experience. This is certainly true, but there is nothing in there that is incompatible with Husserls phenomenological idealism. Since the meaning -bestowing structure of experience will always continue even if it can be momentarily disturbed by some unforeseen events, any meaningful account of being will always be achieved through a certain apprehension of the sense of being. Therein lies the fundamental insight of Husserls phenomenological idealism. Fundamentall y, idealism refers not so much to the intentional structure of sense anticipation as to the fact that the intelligibility of the real (be it actual or possible) can only be grasped by recourse to the intentional structure of conscious experience and the se nse it bestows upon reality. It is upon this basis alone that any meaning of being can be clarified, even if it cannot be reduced to it. 7. Conclusion In short, if our access to being is always given, even if only in a limited way, through the sense o f being, idealism must be construed as an idealism of sense, not a metaphysical or ontological idealism. But this is only to return to being more forcefully and affirm the truth of ontology. The phenomenological account of experience as meaning bestowing describes a process that leads back to transcendent reality as that which consciousness is directed at and answerable to . I must admit that I am not sure I understand why this normative
a nd Ba c k: S om e Re ma rk s o n t he M ea ni n g o f Tra n sce nd e nta l Idea li s m i n Ka nt a nd H us se rl i n I nt e r n at io na l J ou r na l o f Ph i lo sop h ica l St ud i e s , 1 4 6 6 - 4 5 4 2 , V o lu me 1 5 , Is s ue 3 , 2 0 0 7 , p p. 3 6 7 3 9 4 .

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structure doesnt suffice to allay the worries of the realists. This is , to be sure, what Id like to discuss with you now.

Jan Patokas Care for the Soul in the Nihilistic World

Ivan Chvatk (Center for Theoretical Studies, Prague) History proper is, for Patoka, the history of human understanding of the world and of the human situation in the world, insofar as it rep resents life above the level of simple self consuming sustenance. As early as the 1930s, Patoka characterizes this movement toward a higher level of life than that of mere animals as an upswing . Prior to this historical upswing, mankind was nearly complet ely absorbed by providing for sustenance. Even the most primitive people exceed however, in some way, this biological level. The initial transcending can be summed up under the headings of rite and myth. Patoka connects this mode of transcendence with the pre-historical period. History proper begins only when man explicitly realizes that rising above the mere biological level may be what it means to be human. History up to the present day comprises, according to Patoka, two major periods. The dividing line is the birth of Christianity. Each of the two great periods is defined by an epoch -making upheaval, or conversion, a change in humans understanding of themselves and the world. To rescue us from todays nihilistic decline, Patoka suggests nothing less than a new gigantic conversion, an unheard -of metanoein 1 that would thus be the third in the line of conversions. The first conversion can be defined as the passage from pre historical life in myth to the life of a free human being confronted with the whole of what -is, and called on to prove himself with no support in the traditional, mythical understanding of the world inherited from the past. This passage is a gradual process. In sacred rites, humans fall prey to an orgiastic exaltation that swallows them up entirely in a demonic way, but at the same time raises them rudimentarily above the level of providing for sheer survival. 2 Patoka shows the ambiguity of this orgiastic sacrality. It is an upswing inasmuch as it raises above the level of mer e sustenance, but also a decline, inasmuch as it falls prey to demonic ecstasy. 3 Because of this ambiguity, one cannot view the opposition of the sacred and the profane as equivalent to Heideggers opposition between authentic existence and the inauthentic
Ja n Pa t o ka , H er et ica l E ss ay s i n th e Ph il os o p h y of H i sto ry , e d. J. D odd, tra n s . E. K o h k ( C h ica g o a nd La S a l le: O pe n C o ur t) , p. 7 5 . 2 Ibi d., p p. 9 8 - 9 9 . 3 Ibi d., p p. 1 0 0 - 1 0 2 .
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decadence of the ordinary day in which we can lose ourselves among the things that preoccupy us. 4 Heidegger does not seem to have taken into account this orgiastic -sexual side of human life. Yet precisely this aspect is essential to the structure of the human mode of Being. According to Patoka, history begins when and where the ambiguity of this sphere is first thematized. All of this means that the orgiastic dimension cannot be overpowered, but must be related to responsibility by grafting onto responsible life . 5 Man progressively succeeds in disciplining it through interiorization. In epic and dramatic poetry, in the Olympic games, etc., the orgy is symbolically displayed to the spectator who can thus experience it in his innermost self, in his soul. I t is a sacred theria through which orgiastic rupture with the everyday is cleansed of demonic destructiveness. Man then begins asking explicit questions which thematize the problematicity of the human condition. Sacred orgiasm functions as the disciplined moving force of this development. Interiorization progressively gives birth to a new, disciplined man who becomes aware of his individuality, of his freedom. This process is the emergence of the individual soul. Theria is now extended to encompass the entire universe. Philosophy and politics come into existence, history begins as the realization that life hitherto had been a l ife in decadence and that there are possibilities of living differently 6 than in toil and orgy. This new possibility is the free life in the city-state the Greek polis. On leaving myth behind, man is profoundly shaken, put into a position hitherto reserved for the gods, while at the same time realizing that he is not equal to this task. Pre -Socratic philosophers seek to gain anew a solid foothold , no longer on mythical ground, but on the present basis of their own insight. This foundation can be nothing elusive or inconspicuously changing, but must, on the contrary, be perfectly stable, eternal, divine. Philosophical attempts to secure such a foun dation repeatedly fail. The sophists discover the power of discourse, capable of relativizing anything firm, upholding tyrannical views which lead the polis to its ruin. Socrates too mercilessly analyzes, in a manner similar to that of sophists, everything that had till then been taken for granted, viewed as certain, unchanging and clear. He does not do so, however, in order to relativize it, but rather to show, through dialogue with his fellow citizens, where they are contradicting
Ib id., p. 9 9 . Ib id. 6 Ibi d., p . 1 0 2 .
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themselves in their view s on the good conduct of life. Socrates shames those he confutes, but gives no advice. Faithful to his non knowing, he endeavors to lead their soul to tell for itself good from evil. Socrates thus develops a technique of dialogue as serious philosophical reflection known as dialectic a rigorous technique of assessing the value of human opinions and ideas. These dialogues with his fellow citizens are what he calls care for the soul. For Plato and his time, Socrates seems not to be enough. He asks the right question, but does not give a positive answer. The question of where to find a firm ground on which to base human reasoning is answered by Plato who reinforces Socrates dialectic as a means of rising above the deceitful world of appearances and politic s to the divine world of unchanging, constant, eternal Forms. The care for the soul now acquires a new meaning. The task of the soul becomes to acquire knowledge of the constant, rational and divine structure of the universe, represented by the consistent system of the Forms, in order to become itself consistent and non -contradictory. Only thus will the soul be able to attain a vision of the Good that is above the Forms. The journey in search of the Good undertaken by Platos care for the soul leads ultimat ely to the immortality of the soul, different from the immortality of the mysteries. For the first time in history it is individual immortality, individual because inner, inseparably bound up with its own achievement. 7 The result of the first conversion is thus an individual, free and responsible soul, which chooses its destiny and remains in its heart the bearer of a disciplined sacred orgiasm as an inherent part of itself. Yet, despite its inner life, this soul retains a trait of exteriority: the Platon ic philosopher relates to the divine impersonal Good as he would to an external object. The falsity of the Platonic relation to the Good is revealed by Christianity. The Platonic lover of wisdom assumes erroneously i.e., believes merely that he is in dir ect rational contact with his metaphysical mainstay. St. Paul labels Greek philosophy foolishness. 8 Christianity is more realistic. It maintains that the divine Good is transcendent and cannot be mastered through human knowledge. Instead of the philosoph ers chimerical belief, Christianity offers a faith that is not grounded in reason alone. Christianity transforms the impersonal absolute Good into a personal God who is infinitely Beneficent. 9 To give faith to this good message is to undergo a
Ibi d., p . 1 0 5 . 1 C ori n t hia n s 1 : 2 0 : ha t h n o t Go d ma de fo ol i sh t he w i sd o m of t h is w or ld? 9 Cf. Ja n Pa t o ka , o p. c i t., p p. 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 .
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second conversion. Before the infinite Beneficence of God, all men are always already guilty because they can never, in their finitude, perceive all the circumstances and consequences of their acts. God omniscient sees man in the inmost depth of his being. Man, c onscious of being at all times seen from within, learns to see himself in a Gods eye view and becomes far more interiorized than in Platonism. The intimate relation of the always sinning to the infinitely Beneficent gives birth to a new figure of the hu man individuality. The human soul has now a hidden, secret interiority. Following Gods view, it sees how it is in itself, per se . In relation to the personal God, the human being becomes a person . The transformation of God into a person and the transformation of man into a person is one and the same transformation. The problem of overcoming the everyday and the orgiastic i.e., the task of history proper, taken over by Christianity from Greek Antiquity remains however unsolved. 10 The new-born person with his deepened individuality is gradually contaminated by individualism, bent solely on playing an important role in society. 11 Reprobate Platonic rationalism remains active, leading to the triumphal march of modern natural science, since nature, in Christianity , has no place in the eschatology of salvation. Nature is given to man to care for and rule over. There is no longer anything divine in nature. It can, therefore, become an object of rational, i.e., mathematical, reconstruction. Henceforth, the sole meanin g of nature is to serve human needs. Denied any further significance, the reality of nature is thus ultimately meaningless. Ironically, the success of natural science leads to the endeavor to build a similarly successful rational theology. The contradicto riness of this attempt to acquire more geometrico an exact knowledge of God himself is unveiled by Immanuel Kant. Shortly afterwards, Friedrich Nietzsche denounces Christianity as nihilistic. Traditional Christian sacrality no longer fulfills its task of d isciplining the orgiastic, 12 no longer channels and gives meaning to the aspiration to rise above the everyday. Modern technicized society, submitting nature to the more and more profligate maintenance of life, falls prey to boredom, while orgiastic energy finds an outlet in wars, genocides and political witch -hunts. 13 There is nothing left of the original upward impulse of the second conversion.
Ibi d., p . 1 1 0 . Cf. i bi d., p. 1 1 5 . 12 Ibi d., p . 1 1 3 . 13 Ib id., pp. 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 .
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In his private lectures and seminars, as well as in his essays from the 1970s, Patoka raises the question of wha t can be done here. First of all he undertakes an in - depth reflection on Heideggers notion of Gestell. Patoka largely agrees with Heideggers analysis of Gestell as the presently reigning mode of Being, but not with his suggestion as concerns the means o f seeing this era to its end. He does not want to merely prepare readiness 14 and wait for salvation from the realm of art. He interprets the domination of Gestell as a conflict within Being: after the collapse of metaphysics, positive science has succeede d in so far -reachingly uncovering what -is that this discovery has completely covered up, concealed what makes it possible, i.e., mans understanding of Being. The human mode of Being is thus mutilated in its very essence. Gestell allows for no understanding of a difference of ranks in Being. There is no longer anything divine in the world; everything, including man, has the same ontological status as a source of power that can be accumulated and used for further accumulation of power. Yet there are signs that the rule of Gestell is not absolute. One of these signs, according to Patoka, is the fact that we still speak of sacrifice. The understanding of a difference of ranks in Being remains present in this concept, though inappropriate in the era of Gestell . In mythical sacrifice, man addressed the divine as a higher rank of Being. Those who lay down their life for their family or the community of which they are members also experience a difference of rank. Such traditional examples of sacrifice, where one existent is offered up and exchanged for another, are however merely preliminary. Authentic sacrifice is where one offers up ones own life purely as a means of opposing Gestell in its tendency to level everything down to the sustaining of life for life, in order to make it clear that man is fully human only when he rises ab ove this level. Authentic sacrifice opposes the self -evidence of Gestell and insists on its problematicity. Not a sacrifice for any existent, it is, in this sense, sacrificing for nothing. It boils down to simply persevering in the specifically human mode of Being: to live in upswing, to accomplish understanding of Being while opposing violation by Gestell , means more than merely to preserve ones existence. Authentic sacrifice works as an example. Showing what it means to be fully human, it is in this sens e a sacrifice for appearing
14 M a rt i n Hei de gge r , Nur no c h e in Go tt ka n n un s ret te n , i n D e r Sp i eg el , n o. 2 3 , 1 9 7 6 , p. 2 0 9 . S ee En gl i sh t ra ns l. b y W. R ic ha rd s o n: O n ly a G od Ca n S a ve U s, i n T. S hee ha n ( ed .) , H e id eg g e r: Th e Ma n and th e Th i nk e r (C h ica g o: Pr ece de nt Pre ss , 1 9 8 1 ) , pp. 4 5 - 6 7 .

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as such and, hence, for everything and everybody. Patokas idea of authentic sacrifice may appear to be Christian in inspiration, but Patoka parallels the Christic sacrifice to the death of Socrates. 15 Both sacrificed their liv es in order to make apparent that humanity is fully human only in overcoming bondage to life, in proving capable of living above the level of mere sustenance. At the end of the sixth heretical essay, after the nightmarish description of the twentieth cen tury as war, Patoka states explicitly that the means by which this state [i.e., war in the form of Forces planning for peace] can be overcome is the solidarity of the shaken . 16 In the context of the foregoing analysis of front -line experiences, concentratio n camps, and persecution of dissidents, it might seem that Patokas shaken are but the lucky few who have survived these various trials and tribulations. I suspect that would be a serious mistake. The shock due to these boundary experiences is merely an extremely acute symptom of another shock which has hit the majority of mankind and been going on for many decades already (having in fact begun more than two hundred years ago) the shock due to the death of God and the collapse of metaphysics. These two losses are equivalent to the loss of absolute meaning the dreaded Nietzschean nihil is here. Absolute values, absolute meaning, hope of absolute truth, be it in infinity, hope of absolute justice in the Christian paradise all of this has vanished with the smoke from the conflagrations lit by the wars of the twentieth century. With this epochal shock, our situation resembles that of Ancient Greece at the time of the first conversion, and everything indicates that Patoka indeed means to draw this parallel. A similar shock also foreshadowed the birth of Christianity. Christianity is again at issue today, although in an opposite sense. Whereas in the second conversion faith was acquired, here faith is being lost. The starting -point is thus an epochal shock whi ch Patoka views as leading ultimately to disengagement from the reign of Gestell . This disengagement, to which he ascribes the significance of an epochal turn in the understanding of Being, has been heralded by
15 Cf. J a n Pa to ka , P ir oz e n sv t v me dita ci sv h o a ut ora p o t ia ti ce ti let ec h, i n P i roz e n sv t jak o fi lo sof ic k p r ob l m , ed. I. C hva t k a nd P. K o uba (Pra ha : e sk o sl o ve ns k s pi s ova te l, 1 9 9 2 ) , pp. 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 . S ee a ls o Fr en c h tra ns la t i o n: M di ta t i o n sur L e m o nd e n atu r el com m e p r o bl m e p h i l osop h i q ue , i n Le m o nd e nat u re l et le m ouv em e nt d e l ex i st e n ce h um ai ne , ed . a nd tra ns . E. A bra m s (D ordr ec ht : Kl u wer A ca de mi c P u bl is he rs , 1 9 8 8 ), pp. 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 . 16 Ja n Pa t o ka , H e ret ica l Es say s , p. 1 3 4 .

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authentic sacrifices. It is a turn accomplished , a conversion undergone by persons of spirit, i.e., precisely those who are capable of such a sacrifice, those who are capable of understanding what life and death are all about, and so what history is about. 17 What, then, is at stake in history, toda y and in the future? What should the upward move aim at? In a situation where all is void of meaning, it will have to be a reaching for meaning. 18 Of course, the relative meaning of providing for survival (life for life), dictated by the Force of the Gestell , has not been lost. But, as Wilhelm Weischedel argues, without an absolute, total meaning, all relative meaning is, in last resort, meaningless. 19 Patoka takes Weischedels analysis seriously and says: Yes, man cannot produce the meaning of the whole. 20 But neither can man truly act without this meaning of the whole. There is an aporia here, a strange deadlock. 21 Let us try however to conceive an aporia of this sort as fundamentally characteristic of the human way of Being. We have seen that this aporia emerges as highly topical precisely in the above -mentioned epochal conversions. It was twice side -tracked by postulating an absolute, transcendent instance. This should not be attempted a third time. Patoka suggests here that historical man is this aporia. We must understand that this aporia does not mean absurdity, an absolute negation of meaning, but merely problematicity. History is history when man knows about this problematicity and responds to i t. To live above the level of mere life for life means just this. And that is why Patoka says: Those who understand what history is all about should be capable of the discipline and self -denial demanded by the stance of unanchoredness in which alone a me aningfulness both absolute and accessible to humans, because problematic, can be realized. 22 We must expose ourselves to problematicity, ask questions and attempt to answer them: build hypotheses of meaning and act as if this hypothetical meaning were real . This brings us back to Socrates and his care for the soul. To quest for meaning while at the same time knowing it to be questionable, realizing that any super -temporal, absolute meaning once and for all is utter nonsense that is precisely what Socrates w as doing,
Ib id. Ib id., p. 7 5 . 19 Ib id., pp. 7 5 - 7 6 . 20 Ja n Pa t o ka , M a j d ji n y n ja k s my s l? (l ect ure tra n sc ri pt, 1 9 7 5 ), i n S e b ra n sp i sy , sv . 3 , P e o d u i I I I ( P ra ha : O I K O Y M E N H , 2 0 0 2 ), p. 3 4 8 . 21 Ibi d., p p. 3 4 3 - 3 4 5 . 22 Ja n Pa t o ka , H er et ica l Es say s , p. 7 6 .
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dialoguing with his fellow citizens and dispelling their illusions as to the value of their naive and dogmatic beliefs. We understand now why Patoka needed to construct a Socrates distinct from Plato, despite the fact that the substance of our k nowledge of Socrates all comes from Platos dialogues. He needed a Socrates who had not yet succumbed to the urge to find or invent an absolute foundation. What does it mean that the persons of spirit who are today at the peak of technoscience are drive n to take responsibility for meaninglessness ? 23 How are we to understand taking responsibility for meaninglessness if not as admitting guilt in the loss of meaning and pledging ourselves to ascertain what should be done to change this situation, so as n ot to repeat the same mistakes. That is precisely what Socrates brings his partners in debate to understand. It is a matter of mobilizing all the powers of the mind in order to search, in a serious and disciplined debate of the soul with itself, or better, with others, for what good can be done in a given situation. This quest for the good in a given situation is precisely Socrates care for the soul. It presupposes no metaphysical contact with the absolute Good. It is a reaching meant to rise above the level of mere sustenance. In this sense, the meaning discovered by the Socratic dialectic is absolute. It is not a relativistic all is allowed. And it does not matter that this meaning may, in a new situation, turn out to be false and lead to decline. One h as simply to try and try again. To be sure, this hermeneutical structure of responsible human decision-making is something we already know from Christianity. There it had the form of sin, forgiveness and repentance. It is familiar to Heidegger too, in Being and Time , under the heading of Wiederholung , repetition. And let us not forget the self - denial 24 mentioned by Patoka in relation to the third conversion. To understand this, we must recall what we have already seen concerning the primordial demonic, orgiastic drive, disciplined and preserved throughout the two previous conversions. This is still to be maintained in the third conversion, in the disciplined form of self - denial, as a motor or hormone pushing mankind to reach upwards. So long as humans are open in such a way, respecting others and working with them in solidarity in the hermeneutic circle of sense bestowing in which things appear (Patoka would say with Heidegger: so long as humans let all that is be as and how it is, not
23 24

Ib id. Ib id.

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distorting it, not denying it its own Being and its own nature), 25 all is not allowed to them, free as they may be. Their essential post metaphysical freedom, acquired through the shock of the loss of God, is precisely what brings them to decide for solidarity with those who have undergone a similar shock and, thus, to maintain life above the level of mere sustenance and, again and again, to find meaning for it. They maintain life in an upward surge which makes it possible for it to have authentic history. One example o f such a solidarity of the shaken, and consequently of historical action, will surely be, in the future also, the maintenance of an open space for social freedom where people like Socrates and Patoka will not be made to die for political reasons. In the hermeneutical quest and constitution of meaning, absolute meaning is not necessary for acts to be meaningful. It is fully made up for by the blundering, fumbling, groping solidarity of the shaken.

25

Ib id., p. 9 8 .