THE ODYSSEY OF FYROMS OFFICIAL NAME: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICO-ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

(WORKING DOCUMENT)

Nicholas P.Petropoulos, Ph. D. Sociologist

Athens

August 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Unit I

II.

III.

IV. V.

VI.

Content Background: Conditions affecting the development of the problem.. A. Roots in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 1 Early Bulgarian claims to Macedonia. 2 Early Serbian claims to Macedonia 3 A separatist autonomist macedonian movement.. B. Ethnographic profiles of the three Macedonias following the 1913 partition and macedonian consciousness by the early 40s. C. The role of the Communist parties in Balkan affairs D. World War II and afterwards (1941-1949) 1 Occupation of Macedonia by Bulgaria 2 Anti-fascist resistance movements.. 3 Proclamation of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia a Cultural and historical construction and reconstruction b The role of language.. c The role of religion. d Coercive measures e Nation building, legitimation and irredentism... 4 Developments during the 1944-1949 period.. E. Developments during the 1950-1990 period. 1 The impact of the Cold War.. 2 Consolidation activities of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia in the 1960s.. 3 A note on the slavomacedonian diaspora in the 20th century 4 Other post 1949 & Pre-1990 activities conceptions of minority.. 5 Greek reactions to the construction of the Macedonian Nation during the 1944-1990 period.. 6 Proclamation of the new Republic of Macedonia Collective reactions of Greeks to the symbolic-territorial theats during Phase I, 1991-1993.. A. Mobilization of EU mechanisms B. Mass demonstrations in Athens, Salonica and large cities. C. Short-term boycotts against Dutch & Italian products D. Protest letters by high government officials E. 1992 summit meeting of Greek party leaders. F. Greek political party positions Collective reactions and strategies of FYROM - UN negotiations during the 1991-1993 period A. Reactions of FYROM.. B. United Nations negotiating teams Collective strategies and reactions of the two parties during Phase II, 1994+. A note on the collective reactions among the Hellenic and Slavomacedonian diaspora transnational dimensions of the struggle over culture and symbols (demographics, organizations, confrontations, new technologies, diaspora conservatism). Developments after the signing of the Interim Accord (mass demonstrations, embargo, the 1995 Interim Accord)

page 4 4 4 11 13 15 19 20 20 22 23 25 27 29 30 31 32 36 36 37 38 39 40 41 44 44 44 46 46 47 48 50 50 52 52

58 70

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The impact of the Interim Accord (economic, regional stability, international organizations, education materials, bureaucracy, name process) B. FYROM, NATO and EU integration processes 1 Integration of FYROM in NATO.. 2 Integration of FYROM in EU C. Public opinion polls {in Greece and FYROM} .. D. Greek and FYROM political party positions during the recent period, 2000 2007. E. The role of the UN multilateral negotiations.. VII. The NATO Summit neeting in Bucharest and its impacts.. A. Preparatory activities in view of the Summit meeting. 1 Greek activities (WCH Ad, political parties, government) 2 FYROM activities (Poster-flag, WCM, intellectuals, politicians, government...) B NATO proceedings (Greek veto, members reaction, communique) C Post SYNOD assessments and impacts of veto.. 1 Impacts on Greece . a Government, parties, public opinion. b Boycott of Easter lambs: the winners and losers. c Question of U.S. reprisals?.. 2 Impacts on FYROM and reactions of various factors.. a Government reactions (PM, President etc.) b FYROM press c Collective protest and other forms of reaction d Reactions of Macedonian Orthodox Church e Impact on Albanians f Impact on Greek businesses and investments in FYROM g Land and air travel: the battle of symbols becomes airborne 3 The reactions of significant international actors (U.S., NATO, European Union). 4 Name talk content and process- during the post-Summit period (course of UN talks, opinions of government, political analysts and the public in both countries, guarantees for composite name) VIII Election processes and outcomes in FYROM: an index of FYROMs future course. A Election procedures, provisional and final outcomes. B Post-election assessments and prospects for a solution of the namedispute.. IX A note on the constitution, the name, the macedonian ethnicity and language. X. Conclusions and proposals: Return to Ithaca without violence 1 Names with an ethnic reference 2 Names with Latin/Slavic characteristics 3 Names of an ornamental/tautological character. 4 Names with an historical basis. 5 Names with a geographical reference. 6 Multiple double and triple names. * Review cutting the Gordian Knot * A name proposal the case for Republic of New Macedonia BIBLIOGRAPHY............................. A. 70 85 86 91 94 97 103 120 120 121 124 132 134 134 134 140 141 142 143 146 147 147 149 150 152 153 156

163 163 170 176 179 180 180 182 182 184 186 188 195 196

4 THE ODYSSEY OF FYROMS OFFICIAL NAME: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICO-ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS1

I. Background: Conditions affecting the Development of the Problem

A. Roots of the problem in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries 1. Early Bulgaria claims to Macedonia. The controversy between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) over the name and the constitution of the new Republic of Macedonia is a modern version of the Macedonian Question that goes back to the late 19th Centuryduring the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the ascent of the Russian Empire. Two events according to Papavizas (2006, p. 11) constitute important background for the Macedonia question. The first of these involved the restitution, under Russian pressure, of the Exarchate in 1870, i.e. the establishment of the Bulgarian Autocephalous Church. Following the fall of Constantinople, all the Orthodox had come under the Partriarchiate in Constantinople. In 1766-67, the autonomous Archbishoprics of Pec (serving the Serbs) and Ohrid (serving the Bulgarians) had been abolished and come under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. As a result, the Greek language became dominant in religious services, education and commerce, leading to the

hellenization of language and consciousness of the Orthodox communities. The restitution of the autonomous Bulgarian Exarchate intensified the Bulgarian campaign to persuade the slavophone inhabitants of Macedonia that they really belonged to the Bulgarian nationality. The other nationalities, mainly the Serbs and the Greeks, were threatened by the success of the Bulgaria Exarchate. In 1872, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch excommunicated the

Exarch of the autonomous Bulgarian church; the schism reportedly opened the conflict between Bulgarians and Greeks for the control of Macedonia (Papavisas, 2006, p. 11, pp. 39-40 ; Zotiades, 1961, p. 13). The competition among the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks for the ethnic consciousness of the slavophones was exacerbated following the victory of the Russians over the Turks in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. This victory gave tsarist Russia the opportunity to extend its influence in the Balkans by establishing a big Bulgarian state. Thus, through the San Stefano Treaty (3/3/1978), an autonomous Bulgaria was created, in
1

A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 8th European Sociological Association Conference in Glasgow, in the context of the Research Stream, Memory, Culture and Conflict, 3-6 September 2007.

5 the form of a Russian Satellite, that included Bulgaria, Northern Thrace (Eastern Roumelia) and the greater part of Macedonia (Zotiades, 1961, p. 13). Moreover, the {San Stefano} Treaty provided for a two-year occupation by the Russian army and Russian participation in the organization of the government of the new autonomous state (Jelavich, 1983,p. 358). Because of the reaction of Greece and especially of the Western Powers who sensed that injustice had been done to the Greek population of Macedonia but whose primary intention was to stop Russian expansion into the Balkans, the San Stefano Treaty was revised by the 13.7.1878 Berlin Agreement (Jelavich, 1983, pp. 358-361). As a result of the Berlin Treaty, the large Bulgaria state which was less than 6 months old was divided into three sections: (a) Bulgaria proper that also included the Sofia region, which became a vassal principality of the Sultan (b) Eastern Roumelia (Northern Thrace) that became an autonomous region with a Christian Governor appointed by the Sultan but under the great power supervision, and (c) Macedonia-Thrace that was left under the sovereignity of the Sultan. The loss by Bulgaria of a territory that was never occupied, but had elevated the aspirations for a Greater Bulgaria, had a tremendous impact upon Bulgarias subsequent policies and alliances in the 20th Century.

The Treaty of San Stefano (Left) and the Treaty of Berlin (Right) (See B. Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth & Nineteenth Centuries, Vol.l, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 359).

With the Bulgarian aspirations elevated from the San Stefano Treaty, which no doubt evoked nativistic consiousness and recollection of the Great Bulgarian Empires of medieval

6 times (e.g. of Tsars Simeon, Samuel etc. that had challenged but never displaced the Byzantine Empire) and following their disillusionment from the Berlin Treaty which had created conditions of relative deprivation, the Bulgarians intensified their efforts to make their elevated aspirations a reality. One of their first goals was to annex Eastern Roumelia (Northern Thrace) that was inhabited mainly by Greeks; this, they accomplished by first declaring it autonomous under Turkish sovereignity and then (1885) occupying it and annexing it. Once this was accomplished, they turned their efforts toward Macedonia, but since direct annexation was not possible, due to the reaction of the Great Powers, they adopted the successful formula of Eastern Roumelia; the plan first called for an autonomous Macedonia and then annexaton. The Bulgarians rejected the method of insurrection and conspiracy proposed by the National Committee (External Macedonian Revolutonary Organization) and adopted the method of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization(IMRO) that entailed the gradual penetration and Bulgarizaton of the people of Macedonia, leading gradually to autonomy and annexation (Zotiades, 1961, pp. 14-15; Sfetas and Kentrotis).2 Nonetheless, during the first the decade of the 20th Century, Bulgaria continued its campaign against the Greeks and the Turks, often accompanied by armed

Sfetas & Kentrotis (1994, p. 24) say that VMRO {Vatreshna Makedonska Revolutionna Organizacija}, that was founded by a group of Bulgarian intellectuals in 1893 in Thessaloniki, despite the changes in its name which can be attributed to tactics, always maintained its Bulgarian identity. It sought the autonomy of Macedonia as a means of annexation to Bulgaria. One of its founding members {Chr.Tatarcev} is quoted as saying that If that in the final analysis is not posssible, then it could constitute a chain for the unification of the Balkan nations within a Federation (op. cit., pp. 24-25). According to Zotiades, the IMRO was founded with the purpose to effect the acquisition of Macedonia by Bulgaria. Its motto was Macedonia for the Macedonians and aimed at the liberation of Macedonia from the Turkish yoke. In actual practice, however, the Komitadjis (the armed members of I.M.R.O.) pursued a policy of extermination of the Greek and Serbian element in Macedonia. However, Sfetas (2003, p. 207), says the IMRO used the slogan autonomous Macedonia as a means toward annexation to Bulgaria. It played a decisive role in the 1903 Ilinden rebellion against the Ottomans (Sfetas, 2003, p. 259-260) In 1920-21, a faction of the IMRO, called the Federalists who saw the formation of a Federation of South Slavs as a solution to the Macedonia problem and not annexation to Bulgaria withdrew from the organization and in 1924 following a declaration of the Balkan Communist Federation for a unified and independent Macedonia, the Bulgaria government ousts the communist collaborators from IMRO. Those that survived, in cooperation with the Communist International, founded the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (United). The IMRO (United) was established by Comintern to challenge the monopoly of the autonomist movement in Macedonia by the pro-Bulgarian IMRO (Sfetas & Kentrotis, 1994, pp. 49-43; Kondis et al., 1993, p. 23). For some time, it seems there were two IMROs the one calling for a separate autonomous Macedonian nation (in an ethnotic sense) and the other (United) calling for one multiethnic Macedonia within a Balkan Federation, the first also believing in the existence of a macedonian ethnicity, the latter using Macedonia in a geographical sense and encompassing all the ethnicities (See Sfetas, 2003, pp. 272-273). Until 1934, IMRO (United) denied the existence of a Macedonian Nation, but in 1934 and alledgedly because of the rise of nazism, the Comintern made a decision affirming the existence of a {slavo}macedonian nationa position it maintained until its dissolution in 1936 and a decision that had a positive impact for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia which saw in macedonianism an opportunity to combat Bulgarian claims for Serbian Macedonia (Sfetas & Kentrotis, 1994, pp. 44-46). According to Sfetas & Kentrotis (p. 46), It is understandable why the historiographers of Skopje had until 1990 negative attitudes toward the two organizations {IMRO and IMRO (United) }.

7 terrorist attacks by the Komitadjides3 of IMRO; in 2 August 1903 -Day for Prophet Eliasthis culminated in the Ilinden rebellion against the Turks. There followed the proclamation of the Republic of Krousevo, calling all the peoples of Macedonia, Christians and Muslims, to unite in the struggle for an autonomous Macedonia. The insurrection, which lacked organizaton and broader popular support, was crushed by the Ottoman Turks and the new Republic fell again to the Turks 10 days after the declaration of independence. During the rebellion one of the IMRO leaders, Goce Delcev, lost his life. In the process, several Greek villages were decimated by the Turks who suspected the Greeks as the instigators. Though the Ilinden rebellion was an initiative of the Bulgarian IMRO whose ultimate purpose was the autonomy and eventual annexation of Macedonia to Bulgaria, the contemporary historiography of Skopje claims it as an historical event, comparable to the Greeks 1821 Revolution against the Ottomans, and the martyred Delcev as a national hero, for the founding of the Republic of Macedonia(Papavisas, 2006, pp. 47-52). Two other events, which were turning points and affected the Balkan relations and national consciousness that took place during the first decade of the 20th Century, were (1) the Macedonian Struggle of the Greeks and (2) the 1908 Revolution by the Young Turks (Neoturks) against the Sultan. The Macedonia Struggle (1904-1908) of the Greeks was largely a spontaneous response by Greek guerrila groups to the dehellenization and

bulgarization campaign of the Bulgarians. In it took part Greeks from the Macedonia region, Greeks from the liberated parts of Greece (Southern Greece and Peloponnese) but also Greeks from Crete that had not yet been liberated from the Turks. The struggle had as an outcome the repulsion of the Bulgarian irregulars (Komitadjides) from Central and Southern Macedonia where the populations were predominantly Greek and bringing back to the Patriarchate hundreds of villages and thousands of Slav-speaking Greek Macedonians (Papavisas,2006, p.67). Concerns of the Great Powers for the situation in Macedonia led to the formulation of an Anglo-Russian program of reforms for Macedonia, that, however, was never implemented. The Macedonian Struggle though not a declared war between two sovereign states but a guerrilla warfare between two ideas {Hellenism and Bulgarism}The Komitadjides started their actions while Macedonia was still under Ottoman rule. They were armed bands (cheta) consisting of ten men (chetniks) who were armed with Austrian rifles, a revolver and a small bomb. The Turks called the slavophone guerrillas komitadjis (committee men, slav-speaking terrorists) and the Greeks Komitadjides. The Komitadjides entered Greece from Bulgaria, at will, plundering Greek villages and slaugthering Greeks or slavophones with Greek consciousness who resisted conversion to the Exarchate. Their terrorist campaign was aiming at building two-thirds majorities of pro-Exarchist inhabitants in Macedonia to gualify for the new Ottoman rule whereby a majority status would grant them the prerogative to detach themselves from the Patriarchate, build their own schools, and acquire the right to Bulgarize the population. (See Papavisas, 2006, pp. 44-47 for a more extensive analyiss of their tactics and terrorist campaigns).
3

8 besides laying the foundations for the distribution of Macedonia in the Bucharest Treaty has become a core ingredient of the Greek national consiousness - equal in weight to the classical Macedonian heritage that continues to impact upon the current cultural and symbolic conflict over the name of the new Republic (For a more extensive coverage of the Macedonian Struggle see Papavisas, 2006, pp. 52-69; See also former Prime Minister Rallys assessment of the Macedonian Struggle below, pp.45-46). The second event, the Neoturk Revolution by the Turkish military officers, was an internal matter of Ottomans that broke out at a time the Ottoman Empire was shrinking and was intended to arrest its further diminution and consolidate the remaining territories. A

constitutional regime was established in Constantinople and the Neoturks promised equality before the law for all the inhabitants of the Ottoman state without discrimination based on language, religion and national identity. This appealing declaration led to the voluntary

disarmament of Greek andartes (guerrillas), Serbian tsetniks (guerrillas) and Bulgarian Komitadjides and to a reconciliation with the Ottomans. However, this reconciliation was short-lived and soon the Young Turk nationalists undertook a campaign of forced turkification of Christians (Papavisas 2006, pp. 69-70), leading the three Balkan states (Greece, Serbia and Bulgarian) to conclude (in 1912) a series of bilatateral treaties among themselves4 and to undertake common military action against the Ottomans (1912-13, the first Balkan Wars) which led to the defeat of the Ottomans. There followed the London Treaty (30 May 1913) where Turkey was forced to surrender all her European possessions.

The ousting of the Turks from Europe did not put an end to the territorial disputes among the three Balkan states. Meanwhile, and after the three Balkan states had signed the series of treaties, the Conference of the six Great Powers in London (20 December 1912) recognized the independence of Albania, thus depriving Serbia of north Albanian gains and an outlet to the Adriatic and forcing her to increase her demands from Bulgaria. Bulgaria, on the other hand, refused to modify the treaty it had signed with Serbia and demanded the whole of Macedonia, including the Turkish sanjakts {provinces} of Salonika, Uskub {Skopje} and Monastir. Greece rejected the Bulgarian claims to Greek occupied Macedonia. The

outcome of this was an attack by the Bulgarian armies against the Greeks and the Serbs on June 1913that signaled the start of the Second but brief (one month) War of the Balkans.
4

According to Zotiades (1961, p. 17), Whereas in the Greek-Bulgarian Treaty no reference was made for the division of Macedonia, the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty incorporated a Secret Annex providing for the partition of Macedonia in the event of victory over the Turks.

9 During the brief Bulgarian occupation of Macedonian lands east of Thessaloniki following the ousting of the Turks (i.e. Central Macedonia and Western Thrace), the Bulgarians (paramilitary bands of komitadjides with the support of the regular Bulgarian army) committed mass atrocities against the Greek inhabitants and the Grecomanis5 (International observers estimate some 40-50,000 inhabitants in the River Strymonas basin alone were killed) in an attempt to change the demographic composition of the liberated areas expecting a favorable distribution of lands in case of victory against the Turks (Papavisas, 2006, pp. 8083)6. The Bulgarians were defeated by the Serbian and Greek armies but were rescued by the intervention of Russia. There followed the 10 August 1913 Treaty of Bucharest which partitioned Macedonia mainly into three parts7.

According to the Treaty of Bucharest, the Macedonian lands were redistributed mainly to three countries, with Greece receiving the southern part of Macedonia, Serbia the northwestern part and Bulgaria a small section of northeastern Macedonia (Zotiades, 1961, p. 18); more than half of these lands were allocated to Greece (See map and graph). More relevant, 75% of historic Macedonia was within the Greek territory, while the region now occupied by Skopje was not a part of historic Macedonia (Papavizas, 2006, pp.81, 220221).8 As in any decolonization process, the partitions are not always made along strict ethnological lines, though this gets more complicated in the Balkans due to the history of fluidity with regard to national consciousness. Although in the case of Greece,

demographically-speaking, the plurality of the population were Greeks, there also remained in Greece slavophones of unspecified ethnicity (Serbian, Bulgarian or Greek).

Slavophones with pro-Greek sentiments were left in Bulgarian and Serbian Macedonia (Papavisas, 2006, p. 83). However, in Serbia Macedonia, the majority of the population were Bulgarian sympathisers (Zotiades, 1961, p. 18). The 1913 Bucharest Treaty did not solve the Macedonian Question. The population discrepancies and the claims for Macedonia lands
5 6

Slavophones with Hellenic consciousness (See also footnote 14) Zotiades writes (1961, pp. 17-18) that the Bulgarian brutalities during the Balkan Wars followed the pattern of the Komitadji terror in Macedonia. He quotes from Eliot G. Grinnell Mears book , Greece Today: The Aftermath of the Refugee Impact (Standor, 1929). Mears says (p. 231) all books, schools and monasteries in Macedonia were destroyed, and the first of the population actually murdered on the scene were the priests and school teachers, the idea being to stamp out the Greek language and substitute Bulgarian. 7 According to some sources, a small percentage (about 1%) of the territory of greater Macedonia was allocated to the new Albanian state (Papavisas, 2006, p. 80). 8 Although the Greek historian Voros (1991,p. 70) does not give a quantitative estimate regarding the percentage distribution of historical Macedonia to the three countries, he states: The southern region which came to the possession of Greece corresponded approximately with the outer bounds of the so-called historical Macedonia of the classical age, with only a small belt which remained in the Serbian and Bulgarian regions).

10 first by Bulgaria and later on by Serbia (Yugoslavia) whose access to the Aegean was blocked by the Bucharest Treaty would keep alive the Macedonia Question well into our days.

Source: G.B. Zotiades, The Macedonian Controversy, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1961, p. 17

1. Distribution of Macedonian land according to the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest (Voros, 1991, p. 70)

Greece Serbia Bulgaria 0 10,11 20 40

51,57 38,32

60

Bulgaria

Serbia

Greece

Despite the defeat of Bulgaria in the Second Balkan Wars, this did not discourage Bulgaria and the IMRO from pursuing their campaign for an autonomous Macedonia. It continued its incursions into Greek and Serbian Macedonia. Furthermore, during the First

11 World War, Bulgaria became an ally of the Central Powers hoping to annex Macedonia, despite diplomatic attempts and territorial promises by the Allies to discourage it. Bulgaria occupied and annexed Greek eastern Macedonia and started a new wave of terror and a ruthless campaign of bulgarization aiming once again to change the demographic composition. According to reports by the Inter-Allied Commission, which investigated the crimes and atrocities perpetrated by the Bulgarians in the period 1915-1918, 50,000 Greeks were killed and 42,000 deported to Macedonia, of which 12,000 never came back.9 The defeat of the Bulgarian/German front was followed by two treaty conferences, the Treaty of Neuilly(1919) and the Treaty of Sevres (25 July 1920). The Treaty of Neuilly reconfirmed the 1913 partition, ceded a small part of Bulgaria to Yugoslavia and contained provisions for the Greco-Bulgaria exchange of population. At the Conference of Sevres, Bulgaria requested from Western Powers the autonomy of Macedonia and its anexation to Bulgaria and from Russia the restoration of the Great Bulgaria of the San Stefano Treaty. Bulgaria at first had the consent of President Wilson and other western powers, but due to the internal problems confronting Russia after the fall of the Tsar and the Kerensky governments as well as the diplomatic skills of the then Greek Prime Minister (E. Venizelos) and the fact of defeat in the Balkan War, the demands of Bulgaria were not met. The Treaty of Sevres forced Bulgaria to yield Western Thrace and a large part of Eastern Thrace to Greece, thus blocking Bulgarias access to the Aegean and the Mediterranean (Zotiades, 1961, pp. 18-20; Papavisas, 2006, pp. 83-86; Mylonas, 2007, pp. 32-33).10

2. Early Serbian claims to Macedonia. The above text concentrates mainly on the territorial dispute and struggles between Bulgaria and Greece. However, Serbia was another of the principal suitors for the Macedonian land, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Following the recognition of the Bulgarian Exarchate by the Ottomans, which was
The Bulgarian crimes and atrocities according to the Inter-Allied Commission included kidnapings, rapes, deaths from starvation and diseases, executions, compulsory hard labor, snatching children from their parents and sending them to Bulgaria to be educated in Bulgarism. These actions led even to protests by many Bulgarians and the Bulgarian press to write: These actions {in Macedonia} stigmatize our Bulgarian civilization (Papavisas, 2006, p. 84). 10 On 29 September 1924, and following the ratification of the SevresTreaty by the Greek Parliament on 6 August 1924, a Protocol was signed between Greece and Bulgaria under the aegis of the League of Nations for the respective minorities in the two countries. While Bulgaria welcomed the formal recognition of a Bulgarian minority in Greece, Belgrade reacted to the characterization of the slavophones in Greece as Bulgarian as it undermined its efforts of serbianizing the Bulgarian population in Yugoslav Macedonia, demanded that they be characterized as Serbian and denounced the 1913 Alliance Pact with Greece. The reaction of Serbia, together with the expiration of the period (31 December 1924) for the voluntary emigration of slavophones with a Bulgarian national conscience from Greece, led to non-ratification of the Protocol by the Greek Parliament (Sfetas-Kentrotis, 1994, pp. 30-33). For Greece, the slavophones who chose to remain in Greece constituted a linguistic and not an ethnic minority (See below for statistics).
9

12 the culmination of an antagonism between Bulgarians and the Patriarchates of Constantinople (Greek), there also emerged a competition between the Serbs and the Bulgarians over Macedonian territories. Thus, in his report to to the Serbian Minister of Education (4.12.1888), the Serbian Ambassador in Istanbul (Stojan Novakovic) said:

The more I think of the ways that would undermine and break down the results of the Exarchate and the Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia, which have been accomplished principally since 1870, the more I think that this can be achieved by the fomentation of macedonianism (emphasis in original), i.e. by the separation of the macedonian idea and the slavo-macedonian ethnotic group from serbianism and bulgarism. I am certain that doing this, we need not fear any damage to the Serbian idea, because there are many, and there will never be a time when there will not exist those, who work exclusively on behalf of Serbia and to keep high the idea of serbianism. Since the Bulgarian idea, as is commonly known, has deep roots in Macedonia, I calculate that today it would be impossible to combat it fully, if we juxtaposed it only with the Serbian idea (italics added). That idea, I am afraid, would not be in a position, as a pure and plain juxtaposition, to repel the Bulgarian idea and thats why the Serbian idea has a need for some ally who would be inimical to bulgarism and would also contain elements that would appeal to the people and the popular feelings, and draw them away from Bulgarism. That ally, I see in macedonianism (emphasis in original) or in a relative -characterized by reasonable limits- fostering of the macedonian dialect and the macedonian particularities (Sfetas, 2003, p. 60). Novakovic himself did not believe in a slavomacedonian ethnicity but thought the idea was instrumental for the Serbian cause; in fact, if one analyzed it scientifically, he would conclude that the Macedonians constitute a transitional link between the Serbs and the Bulgarians and would compare them to Byelorusssians, who are between Russians and Poles. (Cf. Sfetas, 2003, p. 61-62). Consistent with this analysis, up to WWII, the official Serbian and later Yugoslav policy denied the existence of an macedonian nation or an autonomous macedonia. To

counteract the Bulgarian autonomist propaganda, the Serbians even eliminated the name Macedonia from their southern Vardar provinces and replaced it with South Serbia and later on with Vardarska Banovina, considering the Macedonian Slavs of the Vardarska Banovina to be of Serbian national origin and culture (Zotiades, 1961, p. 25). All the inhabitans were also forced to change their names (e.g. from Stankov to Stankovic). Finally, between 1913 and 1915, to expedite Serbianization of the slavophone population, Serbia also used demographic mechanisms; it relocated 50,000 soldiers and gendarmes, including 4,200 families from Serbia to Vardar Macedonia (Papavisas, 2006, p. 91-94).

13 The first Serbian scholar according to Zotiades (p. 25) to exploit the Bulgarian autonomist arguments was the human geographer, Jovan Cvijicwho in 1906 circulated a pamphlet which said that the Macedonian Slavs were neither Bulgarian nor Serbian Other sources (cf. Danforth, p. 72; ) present Cvijic as saying that the Macedonian Slavs were a transitional population (linguistically and culturally) between the Bulgarians and the Serbs. Later on (1909), Cvijic published an ethnographic map that visualized the Macedonian Slavs as a separate ethnotic group (Danforth, p. 72). autonomous idea of Serbia started to adopt the

the Bulgarians and Cvijic during the WWII and the resistance

movement, when there was a prospect that Macedonia would become part of the Yugoslav Federation. 3. A separatist autonomist movement. A significant movement that later constituted the ideological foundation for the Peoples Republic of Macedonia was the separatist movement of slavomacedonianan intellectuals during the first 15 years of the 20th Century. Protagonists in the movement were four intellectuals - S.J. Dedov from Ohrid, D. Misajkov of Monastir, K. Misirkov of Yiannitsa, and D. Cupovski of Monastir. Most of them had common studies and/or experiences of working and living in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Russia (St. Petersburg); they were knowledgeable of Novakovics ideas from their contacts in Belgrade; at the same time, they had some reservations about Bulgarias and Russias contribution to liberation from the Ottomans, especially after their hostile and apathetic position following the Ilinden insurrection, and had also been aware of the impending partition of Macedonia which they had seen as an historical and economic unity. They organized the slavomacedonian students in macedonian clubs within the Serbian student associations in Belgrade and also literary associations at St. Petersburg. They in turn published magazines, brochures, and/or submitted memorandums to the Russian

Government propagandizing for a separate and independent macedonian nation, differentiated from Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks but especially from the Greeks who had dominated the regions religious institutions since Byzantine times. The most well-known of these intellectuals (K. Misirkov), who was born in Yiannitsa and had also attended a Greek elementary school, wrote a brochure (1903) in a slavomacedonian dialect spoken in the Monastir region. According to Sfetas (2003, p. 72). Misirkov saw the formation of a slavomacedonian identity as a prerequisite in the process of differentiation of Macedonian slavs from Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks. As further prerequisites for this ethnogenesis, he saw the codification of a slavomacedonian language based on the central dialect and its introduction in the schools as well as the re-establishment

14 of the Archbishopric of Ohrid as an autocephalous Archdiocese for all of Macedonia with Serbian as the ecclesiastical language and an autonomous political status(Sfetas, 2003, pp. 72-73). Despite the fact that up to then Macedonia was constituted by various ethnic groups and had only a regional/geographic identification, Misirkov believed that a slavomacedonia nation can be established if the historical conditions demand it, as happened in the establishment of the Bulgarian and Serbocroatic nations from the South Slavs. He said: The name of Macedonia was used initially by the Slavomacedonians as a geographic term and as an indicator of their background/descent. That name is generally known to the Macedonian Slavs and all of them are called by that name. If this is so, and since the development of a national identity is a process involving political mechanisms, there exist all the pre-conditions Macedonia to constitute an autonomous ethnographic region. The autonomists also interceded in Serbia and Russia for recognizing the necessity of a separate Macedonian state, essentially demanding a millet organization within the Ottoman Empire but their efforts bore no fruit. Their movement came to nought, as the small group of intellectuals were not able to muster the support from the established then governments (Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia) and were not able to mobilize the agrarian masses A few years later (1907), Misirkov admitted that all of the content of the brochure had a political character but not a scientific basis. Later on (1908-1909), when, following a Russian initiative, a Bulgarian-Serbian rapproachment and a solution of the Macedonia Question were on the the horizon, Misirkov returned to Bulgarian positions and characterized the slavs of Macedonia ethnographically and linguistically Bulgarian.11 . The Bulgarian-oriented VMRO organization, which had attracted the majority of intellectuals at that time, also dissociated itself from the separatist movement of the intellectuals. Bulgarian historiography views the four as organs of Serbian propaganda In Bulgaria historiography, the four are considered as traitors to the Bulgarian cause and as organs of the Serbian propaganda of Novakovic,while the historiography of Skopje views them as protagonists in the macedonian nation and as national heroes.

According to Sfetas (2003, p. 82) in 1912, Cupovski, who had settled in Russia and who had a premonition of the impending partition of Macedonia, went to Skopje; he invited the prominent citizens of the city to submit a memorandum to Russia demanding the establishment of a macedonian state with a macedonian language and religion; he was met with the downright denial to change their Bulgarian identity. For a biographical note, Cupovski died in the Soviet Union in 1940 and his remains were transfered to Skopje in 1990 (op.cit. p. 78), when the new Republic of Macedonia was being born.

11

15 B. Ethnographic Profiles of the three Macedonias following the 1913 partition and Macedonian consciousness in the early 1940s. With the 1913 partition of Macedonia into three parts, the respective three countries (Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia) implemented various policies calculated to make the populations in their respective parts more ethnically and culturally homogeneous12. With respect to Greek Macedonia (Aegean Macedonia)13, following the Bucharest Treaty, the the Bulgarians 10% and the others 8%. These proportions changed following the

outmigration of about 125,000 Moslems and 15,000 Bulgarians as a result of the Balkan Wars and the First World War (Greeks =52%, Moslems = 31%, Bulgarians = 9% and others = 8%). Further changes in proportions occurred following the voluntary exchange of populations between Greece and Bulgaria (53,000 Bulgarians left Greek Macedonia while 82,000 slavophones opted to remain) (Neuilly Treaty of 1919) and also following the mass exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey (348,000 Turks left Greek Macedonia and 638,253 Greeks from Turkey were resettled in their place)(Lausanne 1923 Treaty).14 According to the League of Nations 1926 statistics, the total population of Greek Macedonia increased to 1,450,000 (Greeks=88,8%, slavophones=5,1%, Moslems = 0,1 and others=6,0%). In terms of absolute numbers, the slavophones were 77,000. Thus, the

demographic changes led to an essential hellenization of Greek Macedonia (See Zotiades, 1961, p. 38-40). According to Henry Morgenthau, Chairman of the Refugee Settlement

Cultural homogenization also included changing of the toponyms (renaming of cities and towns) and surnames (See Danforth, 1999, p. 77). 13 The geographical terms in parentheses were not used in the text of the 1913 Bucharest Treaty (See http://culture-routes.lu/...). Although we are not sure of the exact time when they were first used, the terms are used by FYROM officials, historians, NGOs, academicians etc., in order to sustain the idea of one Macedonia that must be united in the future. For the Greeks, the use of such terminology, Aegean Macedonia instead of Greek Macedonia and Pirin Macedonia instead of Bulgaria Macedonia, is tantamount to a continuation of FYROM irredentism against the two neighboring states(See also Michailidis, 2007, p. 34 for the irredentist connotations of these terms). 14 Since the Greek-Bulgarian population exchange was a voluntary choice, de facto this meant that most of those who remained in Greece had an hellenic consciousness, irrespective of dialect/language spoken. Despite that, the then Greek government (1924) signed a bilateral agreement with Bulgaria under the aegis of the League of Nations; the agreement recognized that the slavophones were of Bulgarian descent and spoke a bulgarian dialect, which would give them the right to claim minority status. Following the reactions within Greece and also from Serbia, the Greek Parliament did not proceed to a ratification of the agreement. Nonetheless, the initial recognition of a slavophone minority had long-term impacts (Voros, 1991, p. 71-72). Since then, Greece considers the slavophones who opted to remain in Greece as slavophone Greeks, with a Greek consciousness. Zotiades (1991, p. 46) adds that on account of their feelings they were called by the Bulgarians Grecomani {fanatic Greeks}. Besides language, they have nothing in common with the Balkan Slavs. That is why they are called by the Greek authors slavophones instead of slavomacedonians, national conscience and not language being the determining test of national allegiance

12

16 Commission in Greece, there was no more reason to keep alive the Macedonian Question(Zotiades, 1961, p. 40; Papavisas, 2006, p. 86)).15 Two Greek censuses (1928 and 1940) showed a decline of slavophones from 80,789 to 74,751. It is not certain if this reduction was due to a natural decrease, or out-migration processes, or non-declaration of slavomacedonian identity during the two censuses following the forced hellenization policies of the Metaxas Dictatorship (1936-1940) (prohibition of speaking in slavic dialect, exiles etc.)which policies infuriated the slavophones and prepared them for collaboration first with the Bulgarians during WWII and later with the Yugoslavs as a separate Macedonian ethnicity! (Voros, 1991, p. 72). During WWII, Bulgaria sided with the Axis Powers, occupied part of Greek Macedonia and tried to forcibly change the demographic structure by eviction of Greeks, mass executions and relocation of Bulgarians to Greek Macedonia (Bulgarization of Greek Macedonia to claim it in the event of victory), but with the defeat of the Axis powers Bulgaria was forced to withdraw its citizens from Greek territory (Zotiades, 1961, pp. 72-76). The population of slavophones in Greek Macedonia was further reduced following the Greek Civil War and the defeat of the communist guerrillas in 1949; some 50,000 some of which had pro-bulgarian sympathies but most had Greek consciousness - sought refuge in the northern communist countries (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania). An undetermined number of these eventually became emigrants to overseas countries (Canada, Australia); thus transplating the Macedonian Question overseas. In the Greek Census of 1951, the number of slavophones amounted to 41,017, increasing further the ethnic homogeneity of the Greek Macedonia (Zotiades, 1961, p. 46; Voros, 1991, p. 76) Contrary to the Greek situation, the ethnographic profile of Yugoslav Macedonia (South Serbia or Vardarska Banovina), between 1913 and 1944, despite the greater ethnological diversity, did not undergo many qualitative or large quantitative changes. Yugoslav Macedonia had not signed exchange of population agreements and experienced minor influxes, due to the wars, some of which were not even recorded in the censuses. Ethnographically, and on the eve of the Balkan Wars (1912), the part of Macedonia later annexed by Serbia, consisted predominantly of Slavs (about 55%), but also of large representations of Turks (18%), Albanians (14%) and smaller proportions of Greeks (7%), Vlachs (3%), Gypsies (1,4%), Jews and others (1,7%). Following the Neuilly Treaty (1919)
15

It is noteworthy that in the League of Nations ethnographic statistics of Greek Macedonia for 1926 (and all previous statistics) (Zotiades, 1961,pp. 38-40), there was no reference to Macedonians as a separate independent ethnicity, indicating that this was a subsequent fabrication .

17 and the cession of a small part of Bulgarian Macedonia to Serbia, 68,457 Bulgarians were added to the population of Serbian Macedonia, although these were not recorded in the 1921 Serbian census; Also, some 50,000 Greeks from the Monastir region crossed the borders and settled in Greek Macedonia; in 1940, Yugoslav Macedonia consisted of 66% Slavs, 31,2% Albanians and Turks and 2,8% Vlachs and Greeks (See Zotiades, 1961, pp. 46-51). There was no separate reference for Bulgarians, which meant they were incorporated within the category of Slavs. The subsequent Yugoslav censuses (1948-1959), following the establishment of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia in 1944), had no category for Slavs (they became macedonians by statute), but there were also separate categories for Albanians, Turks, Serbs, Vlachs, Bulgarians, Gypsies, Greeks and others. A number of Turks (100,000) reportedly emigrated to Turkey between 1950 and 1960, while an undetermined number of slavophones fled to Yugoslavia Macedonia (Aegean Refugees) following the defeat of the Greek guerrillas in 1949 (Zotiades, 1961, 46-51). Ethnic consciousness of Yugoslav Macedonians. As already mentioned, and according to the official Serbian policy, following the 1913 partition, the residents of Yugoslav Macedonia were considered as South Serbs and the language they spoke was a Serbian dialect (See Danforth, 1999, p. 73). Other sources of information (Zotiades, 1961, p. 48; Andriotis, 1960, p. 53) suggest that the residents identified themselves as Bulgarian (or Bugari), rather than Serbian and that only the residents in the Skopje region were more likely to identify themselves as Serbian. However, there is also information that there was a great fluidity with respect to ethnic identification, even from the time of the Ottoman Empire. In his report, the Russian Consul of Monastir (V.Kal) concluded that the agrarian population had no ethnic consciousness and a farmer was indifferent if he was called Bulgarian or Serbian; in fact, there were families where one son identified himself as Bulgarian and the other as Serbian. Also, others called themselves Bulgarian because of fear of Bulgarian terrorism (Komitadzides) and others Serbian because of monetary compensation.

Nonetheless, in the urban places (e.g. Monastir, Ohrid), the Bulgarian consciousness was more established (Sfetas, 2003, pp. 63-64).16 Danforth himself (1999, p. 73) concluded it is difficult to conclude if there actually was a macedonian ethnicity during the 1940s,
Along the same lines, a British study group describing the social climate after the occupation of Yugoslavia by the Axis Powers said the following: The Moravia valley and much of Macedonia (i.e. pre-war Vardarska Banovina) in particular were inhabited by Slavonic populations of an intermediate ethnic character, which could become specifically Bulgarian or non-Bulgarian according to whether they were incorporated in a Bulgarian or non-Bulgarian state (Kontis et al., 1993, p.12). Kontis et al (p. 12) add pro-Bulgarian feeling in the area had roots stretching back to the late Ottoman rule and was subsequently sustained by the terrorist activity of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO or VMRO).
16

18 when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia recognized the existence of such a nation(emphasis added). Aside from demographic statistics and identification processes, language often determines the ethnicity of a population; according to linguists, the peoples in the areas were speaking various slavonic dialects, going back to the 9th century but those dialects had undergone successive changes due to the impacts of Russian and Bulgarian languages. At the last quarter of the 19th Century, with the recognition of the Bulgarian Exarchate by the Ottomans in the slavic-speaking regions of Macedonia, the Bulgarian Exarchate did not tolerate other forms of written language except for the Bulgarian (Andriotis, 1960, pp. 4447). According to Andriotis (op. cit., p. 32), the Slavs of Northern Macedonia called their dialect bulgaric when from the mid -19th Century they started to record local folk songs; also, they were called Bulgarian by the Greeks of Macedonia and their dialect as Bulgarian. Bulgaria Macedonia (or Macedonia of Pirin) was the smallest area of Macedonia ceded to Bulgaria who had lost the Second Balkan War with Serbia and Greece. Following the Bucharest Treaty (1913) and the exchange of populations between Greece and Bulgaria in 1919 (Neuilly Treaty), Bulgarian sources put the population in Bulgaria Macedonia at 213,540 of which 77,3% was Bulgarian, 16,3% Turks, 2,0% Vlachs, 1,9% Gypsies, 1,5% Greeks and others,1,0%. During the exchange, some 30,000 Greeks left Bulgaria for Greece, and some 53,000 Bulgarians left Greece and settled in Bulgaria (small number settled in Bulgarian Macedonia). The population of Bulgarian Macedonia in 1940 was estimated at about 230,000, of which 83% was Slavs and 17% Moslems and other minorities. WW II did not bring many changes in the demographic structure of Bulgarian Macedonia. However, a treaty with Romania (ceding of a region to Bulgaria) in 1940 increased the population of Turks in Pirin Macedonia. In 1950, about 45,000 Turks were estimated to live in

Bulgarian Macedonia, constituting the largest minority. In contradistinction to the policy of Titos Yugoslavia, Pirin Macedonia was not recognized as a separate Macedonian Nation, but remained an integral part of Bulgaria (See Zotiades, 1961, pp. 51-53); this was also consistent with Bulgarian policy not to recognize the existence of a macedonian ethnicity and language. It seems that macedonianism was the ideology targeting

exclusively the inhabitants of Vardarska Banovina.

19 C. The Role of the Communist Parties in Balkan affairs following the Revolution The 1917 Russian Revolution seems to have had its impact on the Macedonian Question. Reference has already been made to the memoranda of the Slavomacedonian intellectuals sent to the Russian government in the first decade of the 20th Century asking for Russias intercession for the macedonian nation. Also, the transnational composition of the Comintern (Bulgarian Communist Dimitrov the General Secretary) expedited the intervention of the Soviets in Balkan affairs. Following WWI, the partition and population exchanges in the Balkan region, the new Soviet Communist leaders decided that the Balkan peninsula and especially the Bulgaria/Macedonia region, was most mature for the spreading of the workers revolution. In 1922-24, the Comintern adopted the Bulgarian communists position on Macedonia.17 Specifically, the Communist International (5th Comintern

Congress, 1924) took decisions denouncing the partition following the Balkan Wars, and came out for an independent, unified Macedonia of the Balkan Proletariat within a Balkan Federation (also the line of VMRO-United)as a way to counteract the bourgeois regimes in the Balkans (For VMRO see footnote 2). The Bulgarian Communist Party, baecause of its strongest organization at that time, was assigned a leadership role in the implementatin of the new Comintern decision. Both the Yugoslav and the Greek Communist reluctantly complied with the Comintern decision, after strong pressures from the Soviet Communists, but were rather slow in propagating the new platform.18 For the Bulgarian Communist Party, the new Comintern decision gave them new hopes of implementing their visions for Greater
17

According to Papavisas (2006, pp. 95-96), the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) in the early 1920s scored a great victory during the 6th Congress of the Balkan Communist Federation when it secured a majority vote for an autonomous and independent Macedonia and Thrace. The BCP proposal that Papavisas characterizes as a conglomeration of illusions and a mosaic of historical inaccuracies included the following: Macedonia (Greek, Serb and Bulgarian) and Thrace (Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian) are inhabited by people who are neither Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians or Albanians but Macedonians, with Macedonian consciousness (Macedonian race); and the Thracians with Thracian consciousness (Thracian race); consequently, those people have inalienable rights for autonomy and independence. 18 The Greek reluctance was also accompanied by the withdrawal of cadre from the KKE, including John Kordatos, historian and publisher of Rizospastis, who believed that the conditions in Greek Macedonia (i.e. homogeneity of population) did not justify the Comintern decision (Voros, 1991, p.72). Nonetheless, after September 1934, there were publications of the VMRO (United) texts and reports in the KKE organ (Rizospastis), which were supportive of the macedonian nation. In one of these , there is a reference to the persecution of Slavomacedonians in Florina because of their linguistic preferences . Besides the Rizospastis outlet, the Greek Komounistiki Epitheorisi (Communist Review) published in February 1935 a translated version of V. Ivanovskis article manifesto for an independent Macedonian nation with its own history, economy, language and identity (Sfetas, 2003, pp. 116-125). Although Sfetas calls the claims to antiquity a geneological myth(e.g. mix of Slavs and Illyrians , the slavomacedonian state of Samuel etc), he denies the existence of a separate macedonian economy and views many of the cultural/linguistic traits as common to all the Balkan peoples; he also recognizes that the Ivanovski text continues to constitute the basic framework within which move the Skopje historiographers.

20 Bulgaria. For the Soviet Communists, it meant developing a satellite in the Balkans that would allow them to attain an age-old goal, a warm-sea port in the Aegean, a goal that the czars had failed to accomplish (Papavisas, 2006, pp. 95). The pro-Bulgarian policy of the Comintern lasted until 1935. At that time, the Comintern itself (7th Congress), recognizing the need for avoiding friction among the Balkan states and for the development of popular fronts and tactical alliances with bourgeois parties against the emergent Fascism, abandoned its policy for a unified Macedonia within a Balkan Confederation and supported the doctrine of the self-determination of the Macedonian ethnicity. The ultranationalist IMRO opted to promote the new Comintern policy and to cooperate with the Bulgarian Communist Party, jeopardizing its standing in the eyes of the Bulgarian non-communist government (Papavisas, 2006, p. 97). The Yugoslav Communist Party in turn opted for a Yugoslav Federation that would also provide a solution for the Macedonian Question. The Greek Communist Party (March 1935) realizing the divisive impact of the Macedonian Question on the mobilization of the working classes in the Balkan countries in the struggle against fascism and because of the changes in the ethnographic structure in Greek Macedonia, dissociated itself, at that time, from the policy of a separate and independent Macedonia and adopted the policy of full equality for all the minorities in the Balkans. (See Voros, 1991, p. 72; Kondis et al., 1993,pp. 12-13; Sfetas, 2003, pp. 125-127; Papavisas, 2006, pp. 94-103; Mylonas, 2007, pp. 34-35, 43-45).

C. Word War II and Afterwards (1941-1949) The high points during this period were the alliance of Bulgaria with the Axis powers and the Bulgarian occupation of Yugoslav Macedonia and large parts of Greek Macedonia (E. Macedonia and Thrace); the resistance movements of the Yugoslav Partisans and the Greek Communists against the nazis and the fascists; the formation of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia within the Yugoslav Federation; the Bled agreements between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; the Greek Civil War (Second Guerrilla Resistance); and the Break between Tito and Stalin. All these events impacted on the course of the Macedonian Question. 1. Occupation of Macedonia lands by Bulgaria. With the experience of defeat in the 1912-13 Balkan Wars, the promises made by Hitler for reclamation of lost lands (Papavisas, 2006, p. 107-108) following the revocation of the San Stefano Treaty, the nostalgia for the Great Bulgaria and the securing of access to the Aegean, Bulgaria allied

21 itself with Axis powers19 and occuppied Yugoslav Macedonia and large parts of Greek Macedonia (as well as Eastern and Western Thrace). The Yugoslav Macedonians, that the Bulgarian government considered mainly (80%) of Bulgarian origins, at first welcomed the Bulgarian occupiers as liberators. Later, however, as a result of maladministration, discontent developed, on account of social grievances and not on national grounds, against Bulgaria administrations and not against Bulgaria (Kondis et al., 1993, p. 13). The predominantly Bulgarian composition of Yugoslav Macedonia notwithstanding, an official Yugoslav source at the time said that 120,000 Serbs were forcibly evicted by decrees (Zotiades, 1961, p. 73). In Greek Macedonia, the Bulgarians started to more radically change the demographic structure; they implemented once again a policy of forced bulgarization, with the expulsion (estimates of over 100,000) and the extermination of Greeks (some 40,000 official estimates) and the resettlement of Bulgarians in Greek

Macedonia (122,000 said to be imported), so that in the event of victory, the de facto situation would justify annexation (See Zotiades, 1961, pp. 73-75, Sfetas, 2003, p. 145 ).20

Although on the 25th of March 1941 a secret protocol was signed between the Tsvetkovic government of Yugoslavia and the Third Reich (which had promised that within the New Organization of Europe Yugoslavia would receive an outlet to the Aegean and sovereignity over the port of Thessaloniki), the Tsvetkovic government was overthrown on March 29th 1941, with the result that Yugoslavia never joined the Axis Powers (Zotiades, 1961, p.70; Papavisas, 2006, pp. 107-108). 20 The goal of the Bulgarian occupiers in Greek Macedonia was de-hellenization : Whereas the Germans and italians did nothing to disturb the local Greek administrations, the Bulgarians in their zone did everything to destroy it: they closed the Greek administrative offices, replaced the Greek teachers and the clergy, closed the Greek banks or expropriated them,and forced the people to admit in writing that they were Bulgarians, not Greeks. Exiles,dismissals, arrests, murders and rapes of women were everyday atrocities aimed at forcing the Greek population to migrate to the German zone of occupation (Papavisas, 2006, p. 112 and 113-114 for other estimates of civilian victimization).

19

22

2. Anti-fascist resistance movements (First Guerrilla War).

Resistance

organizations against the Axis Powers, organized by the local communist parties, cropped up both in Greece (National Liberation Front--Greek Peoples Liberation Army) and Yugoslavia Macedonia (Slavomacedonian National Liberation Front/SNOF) in the early 1940s. The Yugoslav partisans pushed for the establishment of a Common Balkan Command for all resistance groups but the Greek communists (General Secretary George Siantos) disagreed when they suspected their ulterior aims to control the resistance movement and to effect the unification of Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia (Sfetas, 2003, pp. 166-167; Papavisas, 2006, pp. 126-127). Subsequently, the Yugoslav partisans promoted the development of parallel Slavomacedonian armed resistance groups in order to mobilize the slavophones in Greek Macedonia and to make them more receptive to the macedonian ideology, but this was also rejected by the Greek communists. Eventually, armed Slavomacedonian units were incorporated within the ELAS Greek resistance movement, in accordance with the 1935 Greek Communist Partys decision to support within Greece the full equality of minorities and the propaganda by the Yugoslav partisans for macedonian nation was allowed in order

23 to recruit slavophones who had been misled by the fascist Bulgarian propaganda (Ohrana)21. The Slavomacedonian guerrilla units were also able to absorb into their ranks defecting members of the Ohrana security battalions when they sensed the impending defeat of the Nazis. Within the ELAS were also absorbed several thousand komitadjides whose aims were other than the eviction of the Nazi occupation forces. According to Koliopoulos (Cf.

Papavisas, 2006, p. 139), SNOF became a Trozan Horse of the Yugoslav partisans within the Greek resistance movement in Macedonia. The Greek Communists realized it (1) when in a meeting of SNOF leaders (28 January 1944), the leaders expressed the view that after the war Greece must become a federated peoples democracy like Yugoslavia with two republics, the Peoples Republic of Greece and the Peoples Republic of Aegean Macedonia22 and (2) when the integrated Slavomacedonian resistance battalions refused to obey the commands of ELAS to attack German convoys. When the Greek communists realized that the integrated slavomacedonian units were taking orders from the Yugoslavmacedonian command, ELAS collided with them and following an armed confrontation forced them to withdraw to Yugoslav territories in the summer of 1944 (Voros, 1991, p. 73; OEDB, 1992 pp. 30-32; Papavisas, 2006, pp. 139-144). 3. The proclamation of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia within a Yugoslav Federation. Wanting to encourage and reward the participation of Slavomacedonians in the resistance against the nazis but also to neutralize autonomist claims of Yugoslav Macedonians23 and any future claims of Bulgaria to Macedonia, Tito deviated from the

1924 Cominterm policy of an independent Macedonia within a Balkan Federation and opted for solving the Macedonian Question by incorporating Macedonia, along with five other
The Ohrana were security battalions consisting of slavophones and were organized by the Italians but were were also a product of VMRO propaganda. For reasons of interest or because of coercion, these battalions became organs of the Bulgarian occupation forces and collaborared with the local German garrison headquarters to counteract the Greek National Liberation Army (ELAS) in the Western Macedonia front. The Ohrana battalions were also cooperating with the Germans for Macedonian autonomy and annexation with Bulgaria. In view of the Nazi and Bulgarian defeat, many of the Ohrana members changed camps and joined the Slavomacedonian National Liberation Front (SNOF). Nonetheless, the literature talks about a German Ohrana and an ultranationalist Bulgarian Ohrana and also about possible secret links between Ohrana and SNOF (Sfetas & Kentrotis, 1994, p. 33-35; Sfetas, 2003, p. 166-168; Papavisas, 2006, p. 138, 259) 22 Although after the formation of SNOF, the Greek Communist Party had assured the Greeks that the Greek Liberation Front (EAM) and its allies were working to safeguard Greeces territorial integrity, Yiannis Ioannides, the strongman behind the Partys General Secretary (George Siantos), defying the official Party policy by signing an agreement (12 July 1943) with the representative of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Dusan Daskalov), which based on the Comintern instructions foresaw as a joint aim of the two parties the establishment in the Balkans of a Union of Soviet Republics, which would include Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia (Papavisas, 2006, pp. 136-137). This diarchy within the Greek Communist party, which apparently tried to maintain good relations with all the Communist parties in the Balkans, may have communicated the wrong messages to the Slavomacedonian resistance. 23 The fact that the ethnic and linguistic composition of the population in Yugoslavia Macedonia was predominantly Bulgarian possibly introduced factors of insecurity in the minds of the Yugoslav leaders .
21

24 Republics, within a new Yugoslav Federation.24 He left open the possibility of the future

extension of the federation to a South Slav union embracing Bulgaria. During a meeting of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (29 Nov. 1943) in Jajce, a resolution was adopted regarding the future reorganization of Yugoslavia into a Federation with six Republics including Macedonia. Having secured the endorsement of Moscow for the reorganization, and less than a year after that (August 2, 1944), the Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) proclaimed the establishment of a Peoples Republic of Macedonia within Federal Yugoslavia (Zotiades, 1961, pp. 78-83).25 Simultaneously, it recognized macedonian as the formal language of the state and established Ilinden as a national holiday. The disillusionment of the Vardarska population with the Bulgarian occupation and administration and the success of Titos partisans in the resistance no doubt expedited Belgrades new policy regarding Yugoslav Macedonia. Henceforth, what was previously known as South Serbia or Vardarska Banovina would be called the Peoples Republic of Macedonia. The 1940 Yugoslav census recognized only two large ethnic groups in Vardar Province, Slavs at 66% and Muslims at 31%; in 1945, three years after the formation of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia, the Slavs disappeared from the census which showed 66% Macedonians(Papavisas, 2006, pp. 152153). This new state-nation and the resultant ethnicity were not the result of a long-term historical dialectical process, following an industrial revolution and the development of a bourgeois class, but a high-level political decision of the Comintern, in accordance with the Soviet Byelorussian model (See footnote 42) and in cooperation with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Sfetas, 2003, pp. 91-95, 131-132, 210; Papavisas, 2006, pp.152-153)26. To

In August 1941, the Comintern sent the following directive to the Bulgarian and Yugoslav communists: Macedonia must be attached to Yugoslavia for practical reasons and for the sake of expediency. The two parties must take up the stand of the self-determination of the Macedonian people. Comintern shifted the burden and responsibility of how to conduct the struggle for Macedonia from Bulgaria to Yugoslavia(Papavisas, 2006, pp.124-125). 25 According to Zotiades (1961, pp. 79,83), Moscows endorsement of the Jajce Resolution , allowing for the incorporation of Macedonia into the Federal Yugoslav Republic, was sustained until the breakup between the Comintern and Tito in 1948. 26 Papavisas refers to the establishment of the macedonian ethnicity as a state-controlled ethnogenesis. Besides the census statistics, he also cites several other historical facts/events/arguments to document his point. First, during the seventy-year period (1870, when the Bulgarian Exarchate was established, up to 1943 when the Peoples Republic of Macedonia was established) the only ethnicities that amounted to much were the Turks, the Greeks and the Bulgarians, there was no ethnicity that called itself Macedonian and most of the Slavs called themselves Bulgarian. Second, if the slavophones without Hellenic consciousness in the Peoples Republic of Macedonia were really Macedonians , as the world calls them today, why did they not assert their Macedonian identity before the communist dictator officially transformed them to Macedonians in 1943-1944? Third, the Macedonian ethnicity was not existent before the onset of communism and is an invention since new ethnicities are borne over hundreds and thousands of years, not in a few years . He concludes that it was worth to the Slavs to create a new ethnicity with territorial claims on the entire

24

25 give substance and meaning to a formerly geographical entity that became a nation, to protect it from other claimants, to compensate for the dialectical vacuum and to legitimize it, the new Yugoslav and Slavomacedonian leadership undertook several short- and long-term measures, more on the level of propaganda27, social construction, and institutional building and less on the level of coercion. a. Cultural and historical construction and reconstruction. The cultural historical reconstruction (Greek historian Kofos calls it mutation) involved interventions on the level of ethnicity, language and religion. With regard to ethnicity, up to 1944 the word

Macedonia had generally a geographical meaning, its peoples having undergone both cultural and genetic mixture in the succession of the various empires since antiquity (Alexandrine, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman etc.) (See Andriotis, 1960, pp. 33, 77-78,/1992; Andriotis, Cf. Babiniotis, 1992, pp. 220-221 for the opinion of Belgian, Swiss and Czechoslovak

historians). The new leaders gave it ethnographic and enthnological content, retroactively interpreting history, starting from antiquity (Voros, 1991,p.73). An Institute of National History was established to contribute, coordinate and legitimate the historical reconstruction process. Since the Slavs came to the area of historical Macedonia in the 7th Century A.D. (a millenium after the Macedonians), Slavomacedonian historiographers refrained from

claiming direct descent from Macedonian antiquity; instead they claimed indirect descent from the survivors of the vanquished Macedonians with whom they mixed in the 7th Century. In the literature this is referred to as the social amalgamation theory of ethnogenesis (Papavisas, 2006, pp. 159-161).28 Simultaneously, using the tactic which says

Macedonia, including the city and port of Thessaloniki(Papavisas, 2006, pp. 153-158, 178). Nonetheless, Gale (2006, p. 4) maintains that with the establishment of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia within the Yugoslav Federation, the main goals of autonomy and socialism of the old IMRO organization were fullfilled, with the exception of the unification of the Pirin (Bulgarian) and the Aegean Macedonian lands(See www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Macedonia-History.html). Of interest is an exceprt from a circular (868.014/26/12/1944) sent by the then U.S. Secretary of State Stettinius, during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, to certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers: The Department has noted with considerable apprehension increasing propaganda, rumors and semi-official statements in favor of an autonomous Macedonia, emanating principally from Bulgaria, but also from Yugoslav Partisan and other sources, with the implication that Greek territory would be included in the projected state. This Government considers talk of a Macedonian nation, Macedonian Fatherland, or Macedonian national consciousness to be unjustified demagoguery representing no ethnic or political reality, and sees in its present revival a possible cloak for aggressive intentions against Greece (Martis, 2006, pp. 37, 116). 28 Kofos (1991, p. 21) added: In this somewhat oversimplified ethnogenetic process, the Macedonian Slavs, by their intermarriage with the relics of the Ancient Macedonians, offered twentieth Century Yugoslav Macedonians the missing link in the lineage from Kings Philip and Alexander and the Macedonian-born philosopher Aristotle (italics in the original). On the other hand, there has been ample documentation by the overwhelming majority of Greek and foreign scholars with regard to the Greekness of ancient Macedonia and the refutation of the hellenization theory(cf. Babiniotis, 1992; Hatzidakis/Cactus Philological Group, 2008, pp. 82-92, 160-170; Papavisas, 2006,
27

26 that attack is the best defense, they contested the Greekness of ancient Macedonians, saying that the ancient Macedonian dialect was not a Greek dialect and that the ancient Macedonian kings were not pure Greeks, but hellenized Macedonians while the Macedonian masses remained Macedonian (Kofos, 1991, pp. 21-22; Babiniotis, 1992, pp. 161-180; Danforth, 2003, pp. 177-180; Papavisas, 2006, pp. 154-155).29 Focusing on the middle ages, they reconstructed Bulgarian and Hellenic historical events and persons, saying that the Bulgarian Czar Samuel was Macedonian (macedonization of Czar Samuel) and that the Greek missionaries, Cyrillos and Methodios from Thessaloniki, who invented the Cyrillic alphabet, translated the holy books into a slavic dialect and brought christianity to Slavs in the 9th Century, were Macedonian (Papavisas, 2006, p. 28, 131)30. For more recent periods, the protagonists in the Bulgarian renaissance of the 19th Century (e.g. G. Pulefski, G. Pirlitsev, K. and D. Miladinov and K. Misirkov) were also claimed as Macedonians. Finally, events of the early 20th century (1903 Ilinden rebellion against the Ottomans)31 and of the mid-20th Century (e.g. the resistance against the fascists by Greeks and Yugoslav partisans that led to the founding of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia and known as the 2nd Ilinden),
pp. 161-179), using a plethora of documentation methods and criteria (e.g. archaelogical findings; the inscriptions on archaelogical findings; coin inscriptions in Macedonia and the lands conquered by Alexander the Great; Greekness of Macedonian toponyms and Peoples personal names; structural and semantic similarities of Ancient Greek with ancient Macedonian dialects; cultural similarities between Greeks and ancient Macedonians in religious practices and the arts/theater; references by ancient Greek, Jewish and Roman writers; participation of Macedonians in the ancient Olympic Games in which only Greeks could participate; the Greek meaning of Macedonia as tall people; Alexanders instructions to conquered Persian soldiers; letters exchanged between Alexander and the Persian kings; the perception by ancient Asian and African peoples of Macedonians as Greeks, etc.). See Danforth, however (2003, 179-182) for the use of archeaology to legitimize nationalist positions and the social construction of the ancient Macedonian identity by the Greeks. The calling of Philip of Macedonia Barbarian (=foreigner) by classical Athenian politicians and thinkers (e.g. Demosthenes ) has been misinterpreted by some scholars who ignore the antagonistic political context in the Greek city states of those days (Kalleris, 1992, pp. 155-157; Hatzidakis/Cactos Philogogical Group, 2008, p. 19). According to Hatzidakis (Cactos Philological Group, 2008, pp. 26-32, 139-142) the names Hellene and barbarian did not always have one and only -the ethnological- meaning that is usually attributed to them. Hellene and Hellas were used as synonyms for civilized people, civilized country. Thus, the barbarian epithets were also hurled at other Greeks and other Greek city states by the Athenians who felt proud and superior with regard to their democratic institutions (Sakelariou, 1992, pp. 121-123). 29 According to classicist, Richard Stoneman, the debate about the Greekness of Macedonians may never be solved, principally because we have little information about the language of the Macedonians. However, what made him significant as an historical figure is that he was an agent of hellenic culture that he spread up to Indus River (Tachydromos, 26/07/08). Using common sense, however, one could raise the following question: Are there cases of conquerors in human history who would spread other than their own civilization? And if yes, what would be their motivations and incentives? 30 Pope John Paul B {of Poland and a Slav}, Pope Benedicts predecessor, said that Macedonia is the fatherland of Philip, Alexander, the brothers Methodios and Cyrillos and Macedonia is Greek (Martis, 2006, pp. 17). During his administration, Pope John Paul B approved the return of the Methodius & Cyrilloss remains to Thessaloniki, testifying to the Greek background of the brothers (Mertzos, 1987, p. 428). 31 According to Papavisas (2006, pp. 51-52), the Serbs had initially condemned the Ilinden uprising and the actions of the Bulgaro-Macedonian committees; however, later on when J. B. Tito was cultivating the idea of an independent and united Macedonia under Yugoslavia, he recognized the Ilinden rebellion as a slavomacedonian rather than a Bulgarian achievement a view that brought him into opposition with D. Dimitrov, the Bulgarian communist leader.

27 which were at least common struggles of Bulgarians, Greeks and Yugoslavs, were also interpreted as exclusively macedonian historical events/accomplishments (See Kofos, 1991, pp.21-22; Sfetas, 2003, pp.276-277; Martis, 2006, pp. 35-37, 103-108). b. The role of language. The new republic had to develop and adopt a new language, that would support the new ethnicity. The School of Philosophy of the University of Skopje and specialists were enlisted to develop this new language A dialect spoken by a large segment of the population mainly from the central region of Yugoslav Macedonia, allegedly going back to a slavic idiom spoken in the 9th and 10th Century and used by the missionnaries Sts. Cyrillos and Methodios who translated of the Bible from Greek to Slavic language and christianized the Slavs, was selected for further codification, elaboration and development into a literary language. This new language was baptized as macedonian and was legislated by the Republic of Macedonia into existence in 1945. New grammar school books were circulated by local authors as well as by departments of slavic studies abroad (e.g. Harvard University). A special journal was published by the School of Philosophy of the University of Skopje in 1950 with the object of linguistic research and discussion of relevant practical problems. In addition, within a few years, original literary works were written and classics of world literature were translated into the new language to elevate its status and legitimate it on an international basis. In 1953, there followed the

establishment of the Institute of the Macedonian Language (named after Misirkov who was the first to recognize the need for the codification of a slavomacedonian language based on a central dialect (Andriotis, 1960, pp. 48-49; Sfetas, 2003, p. 276-278).32 Nonetheless,

Andriotis wrote that there were not sufficient differences between the macedonianlanguage and the Serbian or Bulgarian, to deserve the status of an autonomous language. closely related to ancient slavic languages, but which, successive influences of the ecclesiastical language, It is more

however, was subject to the the bulgarization following the

establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate (Andriotis in Babiniotis, 1992, pp. 227-239) and, of course, the serbianization following the 1913 annexation to Yugoslavia and especially after 1944-following the proclamation of the Republic of Macedonia within the Yugoslav Federation.33 There is evidence (Andriotis, 1960, pp. 31-32; Cf. Babiniotis, 1992, pp. 218The process for the international recognition of the new language continued well into the 1960s, as the University of Skopje entered into contracts with foreign Universities (e.g. Halle, Bradford, Moscow, Prague, Vienna, Warsaw, Tashkent, Istanbul, Washington, Arizona.) for the establishment of lectureships on the Macedonian language, and the government established the Academy of Sciences and Arts that would also conduct research on the macedonian ethnicity, language and ethnography (Sfetas, 2003, p. 279). 33 The Serbanization (or de-bulgarization) process after 1944 also included changing the suffixes of surnames, from -ef and -of to -efski and ofski(Babiniotis, 1992, XX-XX1; Danforth, 1999, p.171;)a practice which
32

28 219) that before 1944, the people in Yugoslav Macedonia identified themselves as bugari (bulgarian) and that in the past the Slavs of Northern {Yugoslav} Macedonia and the Greeks of Macedonia called the dialect of the inhabitants in the Skopje region bulgaric. In fact, Greek linguist Babiniotis notes that the macedonian language of Skopje is a slavic language which, before 1944, was more Bulgarian and after 1944, more Serbian, reflecting the impact of serbianization upon the new language and has almost nothing to do with the dialect spoken in Ancient Macedonia before the 5th Century B.C.34 or with the Greek language spoken today in Greek Macedonia (Babiniotis, 1992, p. 262).35 He prefers to designate this new constructed language as neoslavic rather than macedonian which is misnomer. What then were the social historical political factors that led to the calling of the new language Macedonian? The answer is given by the Italian linguist Vittore Pisani

who said actually, the term macedonian language is essentially a product of political origins (Il Macedonico Paideia 12, 1957, p. 250). More concretely, Andriotis

(1960/1992, pp. 47-48) states that as soon as the territory was annexed by Serbia in 1912 and especially after 1944 when the region became one of the 6 states within the Yugoslav Federation {as Peoples Republic of Macedonia), the primary concern of the Federation and the local government of Skopje was the severance of the regions people from their

linguistic and cultural dependence on Bulgaria, in order to neutralize any future irredentist claims.36 Greek linguist Babiniotis places the linguistic experiment and baptism in a wider geopolitical context: Having to do with such an ancient and genuine dialect of ancient

Greek, the Macedonian, that was spoken and continues to be spoken in its evolved form even today by a genuine and select segment of Greekdom, it is natural for the Greeks of

Macedonia to feel bitterness and indignation, when as a macedonian language is baptized (from 1944), promoted and propagandized the newfangled slavic (bulgaroserbian) idiom of
Danforth called nationalization of names and which was also common, after the 1913 partition, in all sections of Macedonia. 34 There were two camps (of linguists) with regard to the Greekness of the ancient Macedonia dialect: The first camp said that it was one of the many Greek dialects and the second which believed in the hellenization of the macedonian language (i.e. the original macedonian was not Greek). However, both Greek and foreign linguists analyzing the available evidence of salvaged materials concluded that phonologically, morphologically (grammatically) and lexicologically, the ancient Macedonian dialect was Greek (Babiniotis, 1992, pp. 165-178). 35 This does not mean that is no relationship of the neoslavic language of Skopje at all with Greek, especially on the level of vocabulary. After the descent of the Slavs and the assimilation of the Northern Macedonia Greek speakers by the Slavs, the Greeks went through a stage of bilingualism and retained in their new slavic language a part of the rich lexicological heritage (Andriotis, 1960, p. 36). 36 The role of the University of Skopje, according to the ideologues of the Macedonian Communist Party was the enrichment of our language, our national history and our cultural heritage in order to silence any counterarguments of Moscow and Sofia critics (Sfetas, 2003,p. 277).

29 the state of Skopje. And when on the basis of this so-called macedonian language there is an unprecedented attempt to sever Macedonia from a 4000 year-old Greek tradition, in order to set the stage for the claiming of the unredeemed minorities of Aegean Macedonia {Greek} and Pirin Macedonia {Bulgaria} who in common with the liberated Macedonia the state of Skopje- seek for purely political reasons to constitute the unified and independent supposedly Macedonia!... (Babiniotis, 1992, pp. 179-180). Aside from the geopolitical interests, the positive historical associations with the term Macedonia contributed further to the legitimation and consolidation of the new Peoples Republic of Macedonia. c. The role of religion. Although matters of religion theoretically do not have priority in a communist social organization, the new leadership in Belgrade and Skopje managed not to overlook the relevance of religion for supporting the autonomy and bestowing legitimacy to the new republic. Historically, as mentioned above, the Ottomans had organized the subjugated groups by religion (millets); thus all Eastern Orthodox (Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, Bulgarians) were under the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (Jelavich, 1983, pp. 19, 49-57,91-97). According to Jelavich, the Greek Orthodox Church was the dominant factor in the Ecumenical Patriarchate as Mehmed the Conqueror considered himself a successor of the Byzantines, was extremely interested in Greek thought and theological doctrine and had respect for the civilization he had subdued. The Serbs and the Bulgarians also had autocephalous chuches which were under the general jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Jelavich noted the existence of a Patriarchate of Pec in the early 18th Century that catered to lands with Serbian majorities; the Patriarchate had come into existence in the 14th Century during Dusans reign. The Bulgarians were under the jurisdiction of the Archibishopric of Ohrid. However, both the Patriachate of Pec and the Archibishopric of Ohrid were abolished by the Sultan in 1766 and 1767, respectively, with the Serbians coming under the jurisdiction of a Metropolitanate and the Bulgarians transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. With the abolition of the Archibishopric, Greek became the language of the church services even in Slavic areas 37 Later, the Bulgarians reacted to these developments because they identified the Ecumenical Patriarchate with Greek cultural dominance. In 1866, the sultan established the Bulgarian Exarchate, designating at the same time its territorial jurisdiction and thus the Bulgarians gained an advantage over the Serbs who were still under the Ecumenical

Jelavich (1983, p. 97) wrote that Greek was also the language of education and commerce, thus completing the cultural dominance by Greek civilization.

37

30 Patriarchate38. K. Misirkov, who was one of the Slavomacedonian intellectual separatists, saw the affiliation of the Slavomacedonians with the Bulgarian Exarchate as an act of dissociation from the influence of the Greeks (Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople) (Sfetas, 2003, pp. 74- 75). Aside from the territorial struggle that the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate precipitated among Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians (in the event of independence from the Ottomans) the new Exarchate started a bulgarization process within its jurisdiction that continued well into the early 20th Century. According to Ivanovski, one of the founding historian-ideologues of the new Republic of Macedonia, the policies of the Bulgarian Exarchate replicated the policies of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (Sfetas, 2003, pp. 206-207). With the partition of the Macedonian lands in 1913, Yugoslav Macedonia came under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Patriarchate. Following the proclamation of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia within the Yugoslav Federation in 1944, the new Communist government, over the objections of the Serbian Patriarchate, established by decree the Autocephalous Macedonian Church,

tracing its historical roots to the Archidiocese of Ohrid, which was also re-established by government decree (Sfetas, 2003, pp. 189-190). According to Kofos (1991, p. 19), the government was certainly not aiming to better serve the spiritual needs of the believers in a newly established communist state. However, a separate church, despite its marginal role in domestic developments, proved a successful carrier of the mutation process abroad, among the Macedonia diaspora. There is also no doubt that the historical grounding of the Autochephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church contributed further to the legitimation and consolidation of the new Repuplic in the eyes of the largely agrarian population-for whom religion may have still been a priority.39 d. Coercive measures. In March 1945, the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) issued a decree to prosecute crimes against macedonian honor, i.e. to bring to justice collaborators (e.g. Albanians, Bulgarians etc.) with the occupation forces. The decree was meant for the collaborators but there are indications that it also targeted those opposed to the coercive serbianization process in Yugoslav Macedonia. (Sfetas, 2003, pp. 198-204). Soon, there appeared the Democratic
Article X of the Firman said that if 2/3 of a district wished to join the Exarchate, the district would become under its jurisdiction (Jelavich, 1983,p. 344). 39 According to a recent article by M. Antoniadou (To Vima, 13/04/08), the schismatic Autocephalous Macedonia Church was established during the Clergy-Laity conference (8/10/1945) and had the support of Tito who saw it as necessary step in the efforts made by the descendants of Alexander the Great for international recognition(emphasis added).
38

31 Front of Macedonia {some say VMRO was behind this organization}, which submitted a memorandum to the Soviet Union, U.S. and Great Britain where they denounced the terrorist establishment in Serbian Macedonia, the imposition of Slavomacedonism by force and the decimation of Bulgarianism. They in turn asked for the establishment of a united,

independent Macedonia under the United Nations. The organization was broken up by Tito and its members were imprisoned. There followed also trials against 13 members of VMRO who were accused of inciting separatism and establishing an American protectorate. The trials are said to have neutralized the external Bulgarian dangers and the Slavomacedonian nationalist separatism. To what was happening in the Peoples Republic of Macedonia also reacted the Bulgarian parties (Democratic Party, Agrarian Party etc.) as well as the Patriotic Macedonian Organization from the U.S.40 The latter condemned the trials against the VMRO as an attempt to eradicate Bulgarism and also expressed their radical disagreement for the solution that was given to the language question; they said the language was not macedonian but novamacedonijan an amalgam of bulgaromacedonian dialects with serbianisms and not representative of the three sections of Macedonia. In a convention held in Detroit Michigan (1945), they also came out for an independent Macedonia under the United Nations (Sfetas, 2003, pp. 211-215). (Bulgaria reactions parties, etc.). The protests of Bulgarian organizations, however, came to nought as Belgrade (Tito) and the Partisan Resistance movement were negotiating from a position of strength following the victory of the Allies against the Axis Powers and their Bulgarian allies. e. Nation building, legitimation processes and irredentism. A crucial question is why the new state builders did not adopt an historical name indigenous to the region surrounding Skopje, such as Republic of Dardania(ROD)?41 The historical and political conditions for the establishment of a macedonian nation had apparently reached maturity on the eve of the termination of WWII, the defeat of the Axis Power and the victory of the Yugoslav partisans. It is worth quoting a Greek historians analysis: To Yugoslav policymakers of the early 1940s, it mattered little whether the name {Macedonia} bore an ancient Greek legacy, or had been re-introduced since Enlightenment as a regional name that was gradually shared by all the nationalities inhabiting the region. The advantages offered by the
Was founded by the Bulgaromacedonians in 1922 in Fort Wayne, Indiana, with the name of Macedonian Political Organization (Danforth, 1999, p. 95). 41 According to Martis (2006, p. 45), Skopje was the capital of Dardania in antiquity and in the Roman period, the capital of Kossifopedio during the Turkish occupation and the capital of Vardarska Banovina during the period 1912-1944.
40

32 name Macedonia to the ethnogenetic process were too many and too effective to be ignored. It was already familiar to the masses as a regional label, and therefore convenient for rapid adoption. It was clearly distinguishable from the Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian names, and was thus expected to lure Slav speakers away from whatever connections they maintained with these three nations. Most important, it offered the opportunity, through the interplay of its regional and national meanings, to create confusion, to muddle issues, facts, personalities, institutions and everything connected with Macedonia from antiquity to modern times (Kofos,1991, p. 23). One could also add that such names as Republic of Dardania, Republic of South Serbia and Republic of Vardarska, that were regionally/geographically restricted, were not associated with the glories of antiquity, they could not constitute a unifying force and they could not allow for the development of possible irredentist expansion on the part of those who were behind the establishment of the new Republic into the greater region, including access to the Aegean.

Map of Ancient Greece and the Balkans. (See Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth & Nineteenth Centuries, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, p. 5)

4. Developments during the 1944-1949 period: Belgrades territorial ambitions, the Greek Civil War and Titos split with Moscow. After the end of WWII, the victory of

33 the partisans against the fascists and the alliance of Bulgaria with the defeated Axis Powers, Belgrade {Tito} had become an important and powerful actor in the Balkans, in the eyes of the Soviet Communist Party, at least at that time. By 1946, Belgrade had not only managed to incorporate Yugoslav Macedonia into the Yugoslav Federation, it had aslo managed to win the approval of Moscow for the administrative and cultural autonomy of Bulgarian Macedonia42. By the summer of 1946, the Bulgarian Workers Party itself had gone so far as to accept Macedonian Unification within the framework of a Federal Yugoslavia, but in exchange for claims on Greek Thrace at the upcoming Paris Peace Conference. The

subsequent Bled Agreements between Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist leaders (27 July 2 August 1947) recognized the cultural autonomy of Bulgaria Macedonia but gave only lipservice to the idea of a federation43. It was also at this time that Yugoslav Macedonia sent language teachers to Bulgarian Macedonia to teach the macedonian language. There followed mass protests in Bulgaria Macedonia condemning Titos imperialism and Dimitrovs capitulation, while at the same time expressing their objection to the macedonization of Bulgarians in Bulgaria (Pirin) and of Bulgarians in Yugoslav

(Vardar) Macedonia (Papavisas, 2006, pp. 198-199) However, the Bled Agreements, the cultural autonomy and the unification of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria Macedonia within a Yugoslav Federation that was allegedly part of the secret agreements of Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist leaders at Bled never materialized. Bulgaria saw no prospects for annexation of Greek Thrace territory during the Paris Peace Conference (1947), Greece had come under the US sphere of influence (Truman Doctrine) and Titos expulsion from the Comintern (June 1948) led to Moscows abandonment of the idea of a South Slav federation

It is interesting to note some excerpts from a communication of Stalin to the Bulgarian Delegation, published in a Sofia Daily (7/6/1946): Cultural autonomy must be granted to Pirin Macedonia within the framework of Bulgaria. Autonomy will be the first step towards unification of Macedonia, but in view of the present situation there should be no hurry on this matter That a Macedonian consciousness has not yet developed among the population is of no account. No such consciousness existed in Byelorussia either when, after the October Revolution, we proclaimed it a Soviet Republic We are in accord that the overwhelming majority of the population {in Yugoslav Macedonia} are Bulgarian. However, for political reasons,we are as yet absolutely unable to return these regions to the Bulgarians On the question of Greek-Bulgarian borders we have stated in Paris: We and the Americans were not parties to the drawing of these borders {in 1919} and do not recognize them as just. You should seek a territorial outlet on the Aegean, and if this is not accepted, you should seek an economic outlet (emphasis in the original) (Kondis et al., 1993, Document 28, pp. 48-49; Papavisas, 2006, p. 133). 43 There is no conclusive information in the literature with regard to the direct participation of the leaders of the Greek Communist Party in the Bled meeting between the two Communist Leaders (J. Tito and G. Dimitrov) where the fate of Greek Macedonia after the Greek Civil War was discussed. After the Bled meeting, Greek politicians in Athens and elsewhere were convinced that the detachment of Greek Macedonia from Greece was inevitable in case of a victory of the Democratic Army of Greece (Papavisas, 2006, pp. 198).

42

34 .44 The Stalin-Tito break gave Bulgaria more bargaining power vis--vis Moscow and Belgrade. The Bled Agreement was the first casualty of the high-level rift. Bulgaria

abandoned any ideas of unification and cultural autonomy of Bulgarian Macedonians, taking even practical measures against the Skopje government (e.g. expelling language teachers and political commissars sent by Yugoslav Macedonia, etc), undoing cultural agreements, denouncing the Skopje leaders practices of forging a new identity on an anti-Bulgarian basis and flirting once again with the idea of a unified independent Macedonia within a Balkan Federation. (Zotiades, 1961, pp. 83-87, 92-93; Kondis et al., 1993, pp. 16-17; Kofos, 1991, p. 26-27; Papavisas, 2006, p. 201) 45 Belgrades territorial ambitions also extended to the South, to the so-called Aegean Macedonia. Taking advantage of the division within Greece (the impending Civil War), Titos regime organized (in April 1945) guerrilla Slavomacedonian units (Narodno

Osloboditele Front/Peoples Liberation Front(NOF)) for autonomist activities in Greek Macedonia; these units that also included many Slavomacedonian cadre who during the resistance were participating in the SNOF organization and were expelled by ELAS to Yugoslavia, were now incorporated within the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG), presumably to support the second Guerrilla War against the Greek government forces. The subtraction of the S{Slovenomakedonski} from the SNOF according to some analysts (Papavisas, 2006, pp. 194) belied Belgrades ultimate goal to unify the three Macedonians under Yugoslavia46. In addition, Belgrade took the role of a sole defender of a

Macedonian minority, which was reportedly persecuted and victimized by the Greek authorities, thus laying the ground for territorial claims (Kondis et al., 1993, p. 16). Intentions for unification of Greek Macedonia within the metropolis47 (i.e. the Peoples Republic of
Belgrades policies on the unification of the two Macedonias within a Yugoslav Federation , as well as Titos attempts to control the communist movements in the Balkans without consultation with Moscow, are said (Zotiades, 1961,pp. 86-87; Kondis et al, 1993, p. 17) to have caused Titos expulsion. 45 However, the Bled Agreements were not a totally lost cause for the Yugoslav Macedonians, at least on a symbolic level of analysis. To honor his commitments to Tito during the Bled talks, Bulgarian President G. Dimitrov consented (in 1948) to the transfer of Goce Delcevs remains from Sofia to Skopje (Kofos,1991,p. 26). Delcev, a Bulgarian, died in the Ilinden insurrection against the Turks in 1903. As mentioned above, Ilinden has become a national holiday for the Peoples Republic of Macedonia. The Greek historian Kofos (op.cit., p.26) adds: With Delcevs remains departed the Bulgarian identity of a national liberation struggle fought in Macedonia for almost half a century (1870-1913) (emphasis added). 46 According to Michailidis (2007, pp. 26-28), NOF was organized upon the initiative of the Communist Party of Macedonia for the purpose to effect the union of Greek Macedonia with the Yugoslav Federation. 47 The word metropolis was used by Marshal Tito himself in a speech that he made on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of Peoples Republic of Macedonia: After referring to the Bled Agreement between Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communists and their committment to finally resolve the Macedonian Question in a Marxist-Leninist way, that is, that the Macedonian people, not only in Vardar Macedonia but also in Pirin and Aegean Macedonia, be given the right to decide their own fate(emphasis in original) he said: At that time, the Bulgarian leaders had to agree with the above, although not fully; since they were against the
44

35 Macedonia within the Yugoslav Federation) were also expressed by the Yugoslav delegate to the Paris Peace Conference and Macedonia. the first Premier of the Peoples Republic of

Although the Greek National Liberation Front and the Greek Communists

were aware of Titos secret agenda (i.e. annexation of Greek Macedonia) and NOFs secessionist propaganda, they could not be vocal about it because of their dependence on Yugoslav support as well on the recruitment of slavophones in the Demoratic Army of Greece against the Greek government forces. The Greek communists during these times of crisis opted to tolerate the irredentist activities and propaganda of Slavomacedonian guerrilla units at Greeces expense (Zotiades, 1961, pp. 87-88; Papavisas, 2006, p.196)48 The split between Moscow (Comintern) and Belgrade in 1948, and the nationalist aspirations of the Yugoslav Communists with regard to Greek Macedonia, compelled the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party (N. Zachariades) in January 1949 (5th Plenum) to endorse the old Comintern slogan for a united and independent Macedonia within a communist Balkan Federation, enabling the Greek Communist Party to retain the support of the Slav-Macedonian Communists in the continuing Civil War, while guarding against Titos influence (Kondis et al., 1993, p.17-18). Other sources (cf. Papavisas, 2006, pp. 203-204) state that the united and independent Macedonia which was to include the Greek, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian sections of Macedonia, would become a part of a Balkan Communist Federation, not under Yugoslav, but under Bulgarian hegemony. This new Greek Communist Party leadership turnaround not only startled many Greek communists and NOF leaders who were looking to Yugoslavia for a solution to the Macedonian Question and their restitution but also led the Greek government to say that now the real aims of the rebellion are manifested and the Truman Commission to cite it as an excellent example of the subservience of the Greek Communist Party to the dictates of International Communism (Zotiades, 1961, pp. 97-98; Papavisas, 2006, pp. 203-204). The Greek Communist leadership decision, however, had also evoked condemnation among the party ranks49 and provoked Belgrade who saw the Bulgarian and Greek actions as

immediate union of Pirin Macedonia with Vardar Macedonia, the metropolis (emphasis added), they postponed the matter until after the Federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had been effected (Kondis et al., 1993, p.55). 48 The territorial ambitions of Yugoslav Communist resistance organizations (e.g. Peoples Liberation Front etc.) over Aegean Macedonia during the Greek Civil War are also well documented in a recent publication by the Society for Macedonian Studies and the Karipis Foundation for Macedonian and Thracian Studies (Society for Macedonian Studies., 2007, pp. 25-33) 49 Writing after the termination of the Greek Civil War , two protagonists of the Civil War, refer to the role that Madedonia played in what otherwise was known as an ideological conflict. Marcos Vafiadis, the commander of the Democratic Army of Greece wrote in his memoirs (vol..5, 1992): the Civil War was not a revolution of

36 undermining their designs for a unified Macedonia within the Yugoslav Federation. In turn, Tito closed the Greek-Yugoslav borders in July 1949, and contributed to the defeat of the Democratic Army of Greece. The closing of the borders and the subsequent defeat of the Democratic Army led to a mass exodus of Greek Communists and Slavo-Macedonian members of the Peoples Liberation Front whose aspirations for an independent Macedonia were frustrated, to the socialist countries.50 Later on, many of the slavomacedonian refugees (the Aegean Refugees) emigrated to Australia and Canada. At the same time, the dissociation of Greek communists from Belgrade communists following the rift between Stalin and Tito provided more opportunities for the more conservative Greek/Western governments and the communist Belgrade governments to improve their relations in the 1950s (Zotiades, 1961, pp. 96-100; Kondis et al., 1993, pp. 16-18; Voros, 1991, p.76).

E. Developments during the 1950-1990 period 1. The impact of the Cold War period. The termination of WWII both in the European and the Asian fronts signaled the onset of the Cold War between the two victorious
suppressed democratic civilians or a spontaneous manifestation of self-defense agasint suppression by the British and the Greeks. The main reason for the decision to fight the war agaisnt Greece was the Macedonian Question. Along the same lines, Ioannis Ioannides, the number two man in the Greek Communist Party Politburo during the Civil War, wrote in 1979: Tito attempted to use the Greek Communist Party guerrillas for his own irredentist aims against Greek Macedonia (Papavisas, 2006, pp. 207-208). Undoubtedly, these statements and admissions can also be regarded as mea culpas since the protagonists, with their various actions and reactions before and during the Civil War, encouraged the irredentist pursuits of the Soviet, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist parties for whom the ideological struggle against the domestic capitalist classes in the Balkan countries was apparently not the sole motivation. 50 An Association of Aegean Macedonian Refugees was set up in early 1950, with the encouragement and economic support of the local party leadership. This association published a magazine (The Aegean Voice) during 1950-1954 that served as an outlet for articles on the events of the Occupation and the Civil War, the resistance of the slavomacedonian units in Greek Macedonia, their relations with the Greek communists, the condition of the slavomacedonian minority in Greece as well as on folklore in Greek Macedonia between the two wars. Among the goals of the Association was the development of a domestic intelligentsia among the youth; this could be accomplished through the writing of memoirs, the recording of the victims and with professionalism the writing of books and brochures. The Association published books and articles on Aegean Macedonia and Aegean Macedonia in our National History by former slavomacedonian guerrillas. In addition, the history of Aegean Macedonia became an object of study of the Institute of Natonal History (IEE) established in 1948 by the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. In a meeting of the IEE (1956), Todor Simovski a refugee from Kilkis who was the first Aegean Macedonian to be hired by the IEE, said that one of the basic missions of the IEE should be the collection of historical materials not only of the remote past but also of the recent struggles of the Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia It seems that Simovskis recommendation was taken into consideration, since by late 1980s about of the scientific collaborators of IEE had originated in Greece. According to Michailidis (Society for Macedonian Studies., 2007, pp. 33-41), the veteran Aegean Macedonians discovered that historiography was the road to vindication.

37 allies the Capitalist West (US) and the Communist East (Russia). Indisputably, the Cold War also had its impact on the Macedonian Question, especially after the divorce between Stalin and Tito in 1948. To encourage the break, to preclude any reconciliation with the communist camp and keep Yugoslavia within at least the neutralist camp, the U.S. put pressures on Greece for a rapproachment with Yugoslavia. Aside from some differences between the two countries attendant to the post-civil war years (e.g.return of refugee children etc.) which apparently were never resolved to the satisfaction of Greece, the normalization process proceeded and was completed by 1960 (ephemeral alliance pacts between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece; agreements on the management of common water sources etc.). Yugoslav irredentist activities and territorial ambitions for annexation of Greek Macedonia were suppressed or took the back stage. Although questions regarding the

existence of a Macedonian minority in Greek and Bulgaria Macedonia were occasionally raised by Yugoslav diplomats and more systematically by the government officials and ideologues of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia, President Titos policy toward Greece was generally independent of the treatment of the Yugoslav minority within Greek Macedonia (Sfetas, 2003, pp. 278-279).51 A Soviet peace offensive in the Balkans in the late 1950s and early 1960s (with Bulgaria playing a significant role), that was accompanied by Bulgarian overtures to Greece and Yugoslavia, the announcement of a moratorium on the Macedonia Question and the perception of Macedonia as a unifying link between all the Balkan peoples rather than an apple of discord, also contributed to a normalization of relations between the three Balkan countries (Zotiades, 1961, p. 121).52 2. Consolidation activities of Peoples Republic of Macedonia in the 1960s. The consolidation of the new Republics ethnic identity, both at home and abroad, took several forms during the decade of the 1960s (1967). Among other things, it included (1) the promotion of agreements between the University of Skopje and foreign universities (See footnote 32) for the establishment of lectureships on the macedonian language (2) the establishment of the Academy of Sciences and Arts and the extension of its research

See also Michailidis (Society for Macedonian Studies., pp. 41-44) for a documentation of declarations by officials of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Peoples Republic of Macedonia during the 1950s and 1960s regarding the existence of a slavomacedonian minority in Greece despite the general rapprochement with Titos Yugoslavia. In fact, Michailidis describes the situation as guerrilla warfare on the level of declarations. 52 Besides the rapproachment with Yugoslavia, Greece made steps from the early 1950s to also normalize its relations with Bulgaria, despite the traumatic legacy of the WWII occupation. During the early 1950s, there were several attempts, emanating from both sides, to sign bilateral agreements on reparations of Bulgaria to Greece, on repatriation of Greek citizens and military personnel, on demilitarization and on non-aggresssion pacts, although none of these seems to have materialized in the 1950s (Zotiades, 1961, pp.113-120).

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38 program to issues involving the Macedonian Nation, language and ethnography and (3) the proclamation of a Macedonian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, over the objections of the Serbian Patriarchate (Sfetas, 2003, p. 279). Kofos (1991, pp. 28-30) also mentions a number of more specific activities undertaken by the second generation Yugoslav Macedonian historiographers, including (1) a growing number of historical treatises, publications, the incorporation of a Macedonian Clause in

movies and television series, (2)

Yugoslav bilateral agreements (3) the holding of annual international conferences to acquaint foreign scholars wih the Macedonian history, language and culture, (4) the granting of scholarships to those willing to acquaint themselves with the past and present of the new nation, (5) the undertaking of a major translation programto make available in major foreign languages the basic works of Yugoslav Macedonian authors and (6) the organization of Greek language broadcastschallenging the traditional Greek perceptions of Macedonian history and culture, especially of recent history and culture.53 While according to Kofos (op. cit., p. 29), the scholars remained sceptical about the conclusions of revisionist Macedonian historiography, there is no doubt that new social institutions and various activities contributed further to the domestic/international credibility and to the consolidation of the new identity in the second generation at home as well as among the slavo-macedonian diaspora. 3. A note on the slavomacedonia diaspora in 20th Century. Slavo-macedonian emigration started in the early part of the 20th Century and continued well into the mid-20th century. There were generations of emigrants, from the days of the macedonian struggle against the Ottoman Turks in the early part of the 20th Century, the days of the Metaxas dictatorship in Greece (1936-1940), the days of the Occupation during WWII and also from the days of the Greek Civil War(1946-49). In many of the above cases, the emigrants left their area with traumatic experiences; competing and conflicting loyalties within the same families; fluid, transitory and unresolved identities; and rising but unrealized expectations from their active participation in several struggles. The establishment of the Peoples

Thus, various leaders of the Macedonian Struggle, known to Greeks as Bulgarians, are acclaimed by Radio Skopje as Macedonians and are projected as local heroes. Similarly, Slav-Macedonians, who had participated during the Occupation and the Civil War in communist-led organizations, are singled out as macedonian fighters who died for the liberation of Macedonia Radio and television programs from Skopje aim subliminally to convey a sense of pride for deeds real or imagined of Aegean Macedonians and to connect them to the overall Macedonian heritage (Kofos, 1991, pp. 29-31). While in these broadcasts, Kofos (p. 30) noted a replication of patterns of the early phases of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, he also noted certain marked differences: The primary aim in the 1940s and 1950s was to eradicate the Bulgarian connection, while the aim of the Greek language broadcasts in the 1980s was challenging the traditional Greek perceptions of Macedonian history and culture(emphasis added).

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39 Republic of Macedonia in 1944, along with the accompanying emergent institutions such as the autocephalous church, gave many of them a concrete geographical anchorage, while the multicultural societies of Australia, Canada and the U.S. gave them the freedom to express, develop and consolidate their identities, athough in the process they collided with the Greek Macedonian emigrants in the diaspora countries. Kofos (1991, p. 32) noted: At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to detect a strong Bulgarian national identity among the prewar Slav-speaking immigrants to the United States and a Macedonian identity, of the Yugoslav type, among mainly post-war immigrants from Yugoslav Macedonia, and Slavspeaking immigrants from Greek Macedonia who had left their villages owing to the Greek Civil War. According to Kondis et al (1993, p. 19): Since the late 1960s the Slav emigrant communities in Australia and Canada have developed into the standard bearers of a particularly virulent version of nationalisn, often in excess of official ideology in the mother country.54 It is indicative that the present symbol of the Macedonian flag the pattern of a sixteen-rayed sun or star accidentaly identified with the ancient Macedonian dynasty which was adopted by Skopje in August 1992 as a national symbol in its flag, had been in use by Macedonian circles in Australia as early as 1983. 4. Other post-1949 and pre-1990 developmentsconceptualizations of minority. Other signficant developments in the post-1949 period that are worth mentioning have to do with the emergent conceptualizations of minority in the three Balkan nations. As indicated above, the new rapproachement that was characterized less by territorial claims and more by a struggle for symbols/identities- forced the new Yugoslav government not to allow issues with regard to the so-called macedonian minority in Greek Macedonia to determine its foreign policy toward Greece. This notwithstanding, such questions were occasionally raised by Yugoslav officials but especially Skopje government officials who felt that the minorities in Greece and Bulgaria should comprise part of any future settlement (Zotiades, 1961, p. 103, 106; Kondis et al, 1993, pp. 18-19). For official Greece, this was not an issue after the homogenization accomplished in the past as a result of voluntary exchanges of populations but also as a result of departures of slavomacedonians for Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and the Eastern European countries following the defeat of the
Besides the fact that the migrant communities are not generally bound by the diplomatic restrictions and international commitments of the home country, the multicultural context (and probably the need of the capitalist system to divide the working class) facilitated these ultranationalist expressions. In addition, the extent to which the home countries depend upon the emigrant communities, they could be subject to their influence (as was the case in the adoption later of the flag by FYROM or the renaming of the national airport after Alexander the Great)leading to further polarization between the home countries of the respective emigrant communities.
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40 communist guerrillas. The slavophones who remained in Greece had de facto a Greek consciousness. This official assessment was further complemented by the 1957 decision of the Greek Communist Party. During the 7th plenary of the Greek Communist held in

Bucharest in 1957, the Communist Party officially abandoned the 1949 line for a unified and independent Macedonia and reverted to the 1935 formula of equal status for Macedonians living in Greece(Zotiades, 1961, p. 118-119) About 30 years later, (Sept. 1988), the President of the Greek Communist Party (Charilaos Florakis) closed the issue once and for all by declaring : In Greece, a Macedonian minority does not exist. (Voros, 1991, p. 80). For official Bulgaria, on the other hand, President Zivkov (1963), according to Sfetas (2003, p.278) put the problem on more realistic basis; he denied the existence of an historically developed Macedonian nation, said that the macedonian consciousness exists only in Yugoslav Macedonia and that there does not exist a macedonian minority in Bulgaria.55 He characterized as unacceptable the distortion of Bulgarian history and the founding of a nation on an anti-Bulgarian basis. Yet, despite these new developments/objections, it seems that such claims, especially on the part of Skopje ideologues, regarding the existence of macedonian minorities (in Greece, Bulgaria and even Albania) and their human rights, were intensified in the 1980s and became points of contention in international organizations56. It remains to be determined if the death of Tito who was a balancing element in Yugoslavias internal national politics during the post-war period - in 1980 affected the course of these developments (Kofos, 1991,p. 28). 5. Greek reactions to the construction of the macedonian nation during the 1944-1990 period. A natural question that could be posed by skeptics of the current Greek reactions is why there were no significant protests by Greece against the systematic and

The acceptance of a macedonian consciousness for the residents in Yugoslav Macedonia on the part of Bulgarian officials, over the forty-year period, seems to have had its impact on the identification of the Yugoslav Macedonians. According to Kofos (1991, p. 27): Yugoslav Macedonians are no longer identified as Bulgarians, but rather as of Bulgarian extraction. Yet even that tacit recognition is rejected by nationalist Yugoslav Macedonians, who view the claim to the Bulgarian origins of the Macedonians as the negation of the foundation of the Macedonian nation. 56 This notwithstanding, some social anthropoliogists, such as L. Danforth (1999, pp.117-151) and Jane K. Cowan (2000) continue to use the term macedonian minority within the context of Greek Macedonia. Although from the historical (See above), the legal (international agreements) and sociological perspective the existence of such a minority within Greece is questioned, one could concede that such a minority exists on the level of consciousness. But if we for a moment play the devils advocate and accept Danforths and Cowans argument, I ask from a logical point of view can one talk of a macedonian minority within Macedonia, of an American minority within America, of a German minority within Germany? An affirmative answer to this question leads to non-sequitors. However, we could talk of a slavomacedonian minority within Greek Macedonia. Whether or not such a minority actually exists is a sociological question that can be answered empirically using both objective and subjective criteria as those used in elections (votes) but also in censuses (identification) (See Footnote 80 for election statistics).

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41 organized efforts of the Yugoslav Federation and the Skopjean governments, during the 45year period following the proclamation of the new republic in 1944, to carve a macedonian nation out of the Greek cultural heritage?57 Without doubt, in the contest of the East-West ideological Cold War, the need of the Western Alliance to encourage Titos neutralist stand also necessitated that Greece as an ally of the Western Camp maintain a rapprochement with Belgrade and subordinate its own national interests (Society for Macedonian Studies, 2007, p. 41; G. Rallis/To Vima, 2012/92).58 Kofos states (1991, p. 28): Greek indifference towards developments in the Socialist Republic {of Macedonia} was due to the reluctance of successive Greek governments to let anything weaken their close relationship with Belgrade. Another significant factor according to Kofos (p. 28) is the comtemptuous attitudeof most Greek intellectuals and scholars59 summed up in the statement: everybody knows that Alexander the Great was Greek. As we shall see later (see bilateral

recognitions), this overconfidence and complacency had serious consequences in the struggle/propaganda over national symbols. Finally, and perhaps most crucial, is that

Socialist Republic of Macedonia was not interpreted as threatening to collective Greek identity as long as Macedonia was part of the Yugoslav Federation and made no claims for international recognition.

6. Proclamation of the new Republic of Macedonia as a nation-state in 1990sthe quintessence of the problem. With the termination of the Cold War, the collapse of the eastern block, the breakdown of the Yugoslav Federation in 1989-90, and with the backing of Western powers (especially Germany and Italy) who were competing for the acquisition of spheres of influence in the Balkans, two of the constituent Yugoslav Republics, Slovenia and Croatia, rushed to declaration of independence. Within a short time, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia that was also a constituent Republic of the Yugoslav Federation since 1944, followed up with its own declaration of independence (17/9/1991) but after a referendum which, incidentally, the Albanian minority that comprised 25% of the
The new Macedonian nation was also carved out of the Bulgarian nation (language,culture and history) as we demonstrated in the historical review, but the relations between FYROM and Bulgaria are not the principal object of this writing. 58 That Yugoslav neutrality was a central priority for the Western Alliance in a world polarized by the Cold War was also pointed out by Former Prime Minister of Greece and an astute analyst of Balkan Affairs, George Rallis (To Vima, 20/12/1992). 59 Among the significant exceptions during the 40 year period are linguists Nicholas Andriotis, The Federal State of Skopje and its Language (In Greek), Thessaloniki, 1960 and J. Kalleris, Les anciens Macedoniens. Etude linguistique et historique, Vol. I, Institut Francais dAthenes, Athens, 1954. See also G. Babiniotis, TheLlanguage of Macedonia: The Ancient MacedonianLlanguage and the So-called Macedonian Language of Skopje, Athens: Olkos, 1992 (In Greek) for more exceptions.
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42 population, boycotted. The Socialist Republic of Macedonia that had been an integral part of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sought independence and

international recognition (bilateral, European Union, United Nations, Intrnational Organizations) as Republic of Macedonia, but also with a new constitution that contained a number of irredentist provisions against its neighbors. Thus, the stage was set for a new rendition of the Macedonian Question, a confrontation more on the level of collective symbols and culture and less on the level of territorial claims, although within the Balkan context the symbols are also loaded with connotations of territorial claims. The emerging confrontation was principally on two levels.

The first level was on the the name of the new Republic, since it came into conflict with the name of the geographical region in Northern Greece that was also called Macedonia. As was said in the history overview, Greek Macedonia was the largest part of Greater Macedonia ceded to Greece after the 1913 partition and also encompassed almost all of the historical Macedonia. The potentially exclusive use of the name macedonia by the new Republic on an international level, in the international organizations and on its passports in bilateral relations, threatened the national identity not only of the some three million people who lived in the region of Greek Macedonia but also of the Greek population as a whole for whom the term Macedonia was an integral part of their socialization and their national consciousness for 2500 years, whether or not they were aware of the events that led to the partition in the early 20th Century. For a group of Greek nationalists, the use of the term Macedonia per se was equated with irredentist claims, regardless of any explicit references to territorial claims (Papavisas, 2006, p.229). The second level of confrontation was actually focused on the new constitution of the new Republic which indeed contained provisions with irredentist content. Article 3 said that the territory of the Republic of Macedonia is indivisible and inviolable and Article 49 that the Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighboring countries implying the eixtence of minorities in these countries. This was exacerbated by circulation of maps showing the countrys borders reaching Mount Olympus in Greece and also by the continuing circulation of school

textbooks showing historical Macedonia, and the three macedonias (Vardar, Aegean and Pirin) that resulted from the 1913 partition. In addition, coins and bank notes were circulated depicting the White Tower of Salonica and figures of Alexander the Great (Papavizas, 2006, p. 230). In 1992, the FYROM

43 government incorporated the Sun of Vergina (with 16 rays), a national symbol for Greeks especially after the archeological discoveries in Greek Macedonia, in its new national flag, besides already using statues of Alexander the Great, and despite the opposition of the Albanian minority who wanted a more multi-ethnic symbol (Danforth, 2003, pp. 175-178).60 So, the Greeks, who considered Alexander the Great an integral part of their collective history, their symbols, their culture and their national identity felt threatened and reacted especially the 3.000.000 Greek Macedonians. Some talk of overlapping legacies (To Vima, 14/11/04); however, for the Greeks whose history and culture antedated the arrival of Slavs by 1000 years (Slavs arrived around 600AD), there was no overlapping legacy, especially in regard to Ancient Macedonia and the symbols surrounding Alexander the Great.

Left: The initial flag of the newly created Republic of Macedonia. Shows the Sun of Macedonia {Vergina} with a bright red background, as it appears in the August 1992 issue of Makedonija ( Source: Loring Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict. Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (Greek Edition), Alexandria Publishers, Athens, 1999, p. 176). Right: Stamp with the Sun of Vergina issued by the FYROM State Post Offices in 1992 (Society for Macedonian Studies, Macedonianism: FYROMS Expansionist Designs against Greece afte the Interim Accord (1995)).

According to Mihou (2005, pp. 53-54), the Albanians who claim descent from the Ancient Illyrians, also claim that Alexander the Greats mother Olympiada was of Illyrian descent; their national currency, the lek, symbolizes Leka, a contraction of the name of Alexander the Great, though as the author points out the name Alexander is rare in Albania. Although this geneological allegation may constitute part of the Greater Albania vision, taught to successive generations of Albanians, it has not led the modern Albanians to claim the Macedonian culture and civilization, perhaps because of the patriarchal nature of most dynasties .

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II. Collective reactions of Greeks to the Symbolic and Territorial Threats (Phase I, 1991-1993)
The reactions of the Greek and Skopje Governments may be divided into two phases, Phase I (1991-93) and Phase II (1994+), the crucial dividing point being the imposition of the embargo in 1994, which represented a qualitative change in bilateral relations and also led to the Interim Accord that presumably determines the bilateral relations of the two states until even today. Once the Greeks realized the intentions of the Skopje government to seek international recognition with its constitutional name, and the irredentist implications of the new constitution etc. they undertook several initiatives, short of overt aggression, to prevent this from actualization. A. Mobilization of European Union mechanisms. During the meeting of the EU Council of Foreign Ministers (16 December 1991), Germany put pressures on the Council to recognize the right to independence of various Republics of the Yugoslav Federation.

Though Greece as a member state of the EU could have put a veto and have stalled the breakdown of the Federation, it opted for a more mild reaction61. Nonetheless, Greece managed to put forward three preconditions for the recognition of the independence of the Republics, which were adopted by the Council: (1) That the new Republic would make no territorial claims against its neighbors (2) that it would not engage in hostile propaganda against neighboring states and (3) that it would refrain from using a name that implied territorial claims. These preconditions were targeted principally against The Socialist

Republic of Macedonia which had already declared its independence (17/9/91) and sought international recognition with the name Republic of Macedonia. B. Mass demonstrations in Athens, Salonica and other large towns of Greece (February 1992 and 1994). These mass demonstrations had the endorsement of all parties except the Communist Party of Greece and the Left Alliance party, though individual members of the left parties took part in some of these demonstrations.. The Greek Orthodox Church also played a significant role in the mobilizations. The slogan Macedonia was, is and will remain Greek was salient in all the demonstrations.
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Some Western commentators

Theoretically, the breakdown of SFRY can be seen as a domino impact following the breakdown of USSR which led to the emergence of long-standing dormant nationalisms and to the establishment of new nationstates. However, in the case of the Yugoslav Federation, the breakdown of the Federation and the resurgence of dormant nationalisms (even if socially constructed as in the case of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia) were abbetted by the Euroatlantic powers, wanting to secure spheres of influence in the Balkans. The non-use of the veto against the breakdown of SFRY by the conservative Greek government in the European Council of Foreign Ministers meeting (16 December 1991 in Brussels) constitutes a foreign policy debacle according to the then opposition leader Andreas Papandreou (Ta Nea, 14/04/92)..

45 (cf. Cowan, 2000, p.5), both within the EU and the US, thought that these collective reactions were not commensurate to the threat, that they contradicted the image of Greece as a democratic and stable state, that they constituted regional recidivism, that they reflected the Balkan syndrome and were more characteristic of Balkans than Europeans.
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Social and political analysts warned that the mass demonstrations would have boomerang effects on audiences and countries not aware of Balkan history and politics, including the displacement of geopolitical priorities, the cultivation of an underdog image for the newborn small Republic of Macedonia and the accusation of Greece for irredentism against FYROM (N. Mouzelis To Vima 10/4/94 and A. Liakos, To Vima, 14/11/2004).

Protest demonstration in Thessaloniki (14 February 1992) against the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by the European Community (Source: Loring Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict. Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (Greek Edition), Alexandria Publishers, Athens, 1999, p. 38). Nonetheless, Former Prime Minister George Rallis, a student of Balkan History and conversant with world literature, starting from Shakespeares Whats in a name; a rose by any other name will smell the same, says that the name itself is not the essence. Citing the Latin, Nomen est Omen {the name is an omen} he says that what is essential are the
This notwithstanding, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, when asked at the annual meeting of the Management Center Europe held in Paris in 1992 about Skopjes authority to use the word Macedonia in the name of the new republic, said: I believe that Greece is right to object and I agree with Athens. The reason is that I know history which is not the case with most of the others, including most of the government and the administration in Washington The strength of the Greek case is that of history which I must say that Athens has not used so far with success (Papavisas, 2006, p. 209).
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46 collective representations asociated with the name Macedonia. According to him, it is not so much the associations with antiquity (ancient Macedonia and Alexander the Great}, but the traumatic associations that Greeks have from recent Balkan Historystarting from the Treaty of St. Stefano, continuing with the Balkan Wars, the two World Wars and the occupation of Greek Macedonia by Bulgaria, and culminating in the current provocative actions of Skopje, following its declaration of independence in 1991. Within this perspective, the reactions of Greeks are neither hysterical nor paranoid (To Vima, 20/12/1992).63 C. Short term boycotts against Dutch and Italian products (February 1992). The boycotts occurred because the Dutch and Italian Foreign Ministers, whose countries were members of EU, took favorable positions with regard to the recognition of the new country. The boycotts were seen by the Foreign Minister of Portugal which had the presidency of the European Union as going counter to community solidarity. There were charges that the boycott was incited by the mass communication media of the opposition. D. Protest letters by Greek government officials from Macedonia to officials abroad occupying critical posts. The President of the Republic Constantinos Caramanlis sent a letter (3/1/1992) to the leaders of the European Community. Reminding them of his Macedonian origins, he went on to say that the new republic has no historic or ethnological right to use the name Macedonia, because (1) the Slavs who constitute the majority of todays population of that republic appeared in the History of the region the 6th Century A.D., 1000 years after Alexander the Great had made Macedonia an important part of the ancient Greek world and (2) the population of that republic is comprized of Slavs, Albanians, Gypsies and other ethnic groups who, while deserving our respect, have nonetheless no relation whatsoever with the Macedonians. Continuing his letter, he said that It is known that that republic, which constituted part of Yugoslavia was named Macedonia by Tito in 1944, when he and Moscow were seeking an outlet to the Aegean via the dismemberment of Greece. And it is inconceivable today, after the ending of the Cold War, to accord an historical legitimacy to those who had in the past or will have in the future such plans. The President concludes his letter by saying For all these reasons, I am certain that your government will not proceed to recognition of that republic unless it complies fully with all
Using Bourdieus theory of symbolic capital and the idea of the magic power of name-giving (Bordieu 1991, p. 236), Danforth (1999, p. 165) says that name-giving constitutes an elementary form of political power exactly because it contains the power to give existence to that which it names. Also, the possession of a name rhe right of someone to identify with a certain name is tantamount to the possession of that which it names. Thus, the collision between the Greeks and the Macedonians over the term Macedonia constitutes a controversy as to which of the two groups will have the exclusive rights over all that are connected with the term Macedonia its culture, history, and in the final analysis,and its territory.
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47 the conditions unanimously agreed upon during the European Community Council of Foreign Ministers meeting (16th December 1991) (Ta Nea, 20/04/92).

The President of the Greek Republic, Constantinos Caramanlis. Skylakakis (1995, p. 231).

E. A summit meeting of Greek party leaders under the President of the Republic to secure a consensus (13 April 1992). At the meeting, the overwhelming majority of the Party leaders (with the exception of the Greek Communist Party) agreed that Greece should not recognize the new country if it used the term Macedonia or any of its derivatives; the Communist party stressed the role of Great Powers in the Balkans and gave second priority to the name talk (onomatologia), accepting at the same time derivatives/geographical determinants to macedonia. The overwhelming majority position of the Party leaders proved to be an obstacle to progress toward more flexible compromize positions. Upon the recommendation of the then Greek Foreign Minister, and under the shadow of the countrywide mass protests, a moderate proposal made by the Portuguese Presidency (the Pinheiro package) that had secured inviolability of borders and a pledge to refrain from making

territorial demands but was accompanied by a proposed composite name (New Macedonia), was rejected by the Greek government and the major opposition party both concerned over the political costs (E. Kofos, 2005, pp 134-135). There are indications that FYROM at that time was ready to accept a composite name (such as the above or one with a geographical reference). In fact, M. Papakonstantinou, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs under K. Mitsotakis) mentioned in his book (To Vima 1/1/95) Gligorovs

preference for Nova Makedonija as a compromize solution. Thus, Greece lost a vital opportunity for a resolution.

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Upper left: Joao Pinheiro, Foreign Minister of Portugal during the Portuguese Presidency. Upper right: The summit meeting of the party leaders under the President of the Greek Republic, Constantine Caramanlis, 13/04/92. Lower left. Constantine Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece, 1989-1993. Lower right. Antonis Samaras, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1989-1992 and leader of the new Political Spring party (Photos from Skylakakis, 1995, pp. 93, 135, 239, 249).

F.

Greek political party policies. Generally, during the first two years of the

controversy, the two major political parties (the conservative New Democracy and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement) in practice followed a maximalist position on the name, i.e. not recognize the new Republic with the term Macedonia or any of its derivatives.64 Small parties differed widely among themselves, with the Left Alliance

According to former Prime Minister George Rallis, the December 16, 1991 Council of Foreign Ministers Decision did not preclude the adoption of a composite name: The European Community and its Member States expect of every Yugoslav Republic to commit itself before its recognition to adopt constitutional changes and guarantees to assure them that (1) it will not make any territorial claims against their neighbors who are members of the European Union (2) it will not engage in hostile propaganda against neighboring European Union member-states and (3) that it will not use a name that will imply territorial claims. Apparently, the December 16, 1991 decision did not preclude such names as North or New or Gorna Macedonia. The former Prime Minister blames the then Minister of Foreign Affairs (A.Samaras) for the wrong interpretation and the two major political parties (New Democracyand PASOK) for the mishandling of the difference between the two countries (Ta Nea, 14/10/95). Elected with the New Democracy ballot, Mr. Rallis resigned from Parliament, 29/03/93, because too much emphasis was given on the name (3rd condition) and too little attention to the other two conditions (the irredentist content of the constitution and the hostile propaganda) by the Government and the official opposition during the party leaders Summit meeting (Ta Nea, 30/03/93).

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49 party (New Left) taking more moderate positions (e.g. composite names, with derivatives, especially geographic determinants such as Macedonia Republic of Vardar proposed by Leonidas Kyrkos), the Communist Party of Greece being the most progressive, which was differentiated in the Party Summit as it gave more priority to the role of Great Powers in the Balkans than to the naming processes (onomotalogia), opting at the same time for a geographical determination of Macedonia. The new small party, the Political Spring, was an offshoot of the New Democracy party and took the most consistent maximalist (ultranationalist) positions65. It is worth noting that on the level of individual politicians, there were maximalists, moderates and progressives within the two major political parties. These intraparty differences uniform policies, often constituted obstacles to the formulation of

led to accusations of diglossia (double-talk) against high-level

government officials and simultaneously hardened the positions of FYROM officials.

Left: George Rallis, PM of Greece (1980-1981). Center: Leonidas Kyrkos, President of the Greek Communist Party (Interior) (1968-1986), Leader of Greek Left (1989-1992) and General Secretary of Coalition of Left and Progress (1989-1992). Right: Aleca Papariga, General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party(1991- ) (Ta Nea, 14/10/95; 26/02/94 and 30/01/92).

The leader of Political Spring Party, Antonis Samaras, was the Foreign Minister of the Constantine. Mitsotakis government (1989-1992). He was removed from his post immediately following the Summit meeting of the party leaders on 13/04/92. The more maximalist positions of the Foreign Minister over the Skopjean issue as compared to the more moderate and realistic position of Prime Minister Mitsotakis led to a confrontation and later to the resignation of the Foreign Minister (21/10/92) who soon organized a new party. Samaras accused the PM that he was adopting a double-name solution (one name for the interior and another for international use both of which would contain the term Macedonia, that he interpretedd as deviating from the party leaders decision (Ta Nea, 22/10/92). The confrontation between the PM and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs led to accusations of double-talk (diglossia) against the Mitsotakis government which subsequently fell (Fall 1993) due to a marginal majority in the Parliament.

65

50

III. Collective reactions and strategies of FYROM and UN Negotiations, during the 1991-1993 Period
A. FYROM Reactions. The new Republic at first sought recognition from the European Union. To get recognition it had to satisfy the criteria of the Badinter Commission (e.g. rights of minorities, good relations with neighbors), as well as the three Greek conditions mentioned above. Accordingly, FYROM completed a relevant questionnaire, and provided answers based mainly on the provisions and amendments of its new Constitution regarding protection of minorities and relations with its neighbors. Specifically, it indicated that it amended its constitution (6/1/1992), denying that it had territorial claims on neighboring countries, renouncing hostile propaganda and involvement in the affairs of other countries. It also declared that henceforth the use of the name, Macedonia, will not convey any territorial demands against other countries, although it did not proceed to a modification of the constitutional name. In other words, it rejected Greeces third condition.66 Although the Badinter Commission did not take into serious consideration the memoranda submitted by the minorities in FYROM (Albanians, Serbs and the Montenegrans who lived in FYROM and were critical of integration process) or those submitted by Greece (Ta Nea, 17/01/92), the Commission concluded that the new Republic met the EU criteria for recognition, opening the way for bilateral recognition by EU member-countries.. Although FYROM made no amendment to its constitutional name following the Badinter Commission, there are various reports that President Gligorov had accepted As already

composite names or a double-name solution during the 1991-92 period.

mentioned, Gligorov had accepted the compromize composite name Nova Macedonia proposed by Pinheiro during April 1992. Also, according to Gligorovs Memoirs

(Tziambiris, 2003, pp.267-268) President Gligorov declared in the FYROM Parliament (9 December 1992) that he was ready to accept the name Republic of Macedonia (Skopje) proposed by the British Diplomat Robin ONeal mandated by the EU for all international uses, while he would retain the constitutional name for use inside the country. However, the Greek side bound then by the maximalist position of the party leaders summit meeting

Critisism was leveled against the Greek government by A. Papandreou ( the leader of the official opposition) and by George Rallis (former PM under New Democracy) because the Government failed to secure highlevel representation in the Badinter Commission with the result being the Commission to proceed with the recommendation for recognition of FYROM by the EU without having met the Greek conditions (Ta Nea, 14/04/92; Ta Nea, 14/10/95).

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51 (13/04/92) and sensitive to political costs and the recent mass demonstrations had rejected these names because they contained the term Macedonia or its derivatives. In turn, the new Republic sought recognition through the United Nations, international organizations and directly with other States through bilateral contacts, with a national flag depicting the original sun of Vergina (with 16 sun rays). Again, because of the objections of Greece, Skopje was admitted to the UN with a provisional name, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (Resolution 817/93) and without the right to raise the controversial flag outside the UN headquarters (Kofos, 2003, p. 160). This was unprecedented in view of the right of nations to self-determination. However, the

interlocking memberships between UN and EU (e.g. France and UK as permanent members of UN Security Council) could not have produced a different outcome. President K. Gligorov became the target of intensive criticism by opposition parties, especially the

ultranationalist VMRO-DPMNE, who viewed the admission to the UN with a provisional name as an unacceptable compromize (Tziambiris, 2003, p. 268). This notwithstanding, the UN decision did not prevent the new Republic from

pursuing more intensively and systematically recognitions by other international organizations or by countries on a bilateral basis. During the first phase, it managed to secure recognitions with its constitutional name from a number of countries not members of the EU and permanent members of UN Security Council (e.g. Russia and China) as well as by a number of Balkan countries and the new independent Republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, it had almost no success in obtaining recognition from international organizations with its constitutional name, in view of the UN Resolution 817 which recognized it with the provisional name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (See Kofos, 2005 , p. 154). During a meeting with the British mediator, OBrien, the President of FYROM, Gligorov had rejected whatever name contained the term Slav (e.g. Slavomakedonija or Slavic Macedonia), as that would convey irredentist territorial claims against them by the Serbians (Ta Nea, 12/5/1993), but would theoretically be receptive to other names (e.g. New or Upper Macedonia).67 Other sources (Ta Nea, 1/6/93) say that the name slavomacedonia had also been recommended to Gligorov by Milosevitch, along with the
The proposed name Upper Macedonia (Ano Makedonia) provoked an article by Elly Pappa (Ta Nea, 17/5/93). Elly Pappa expressed her serious objections to such an alternative because according to her documentation, there was a Western Macedonian region in antiquity (that now corresponds with the prefectures of Grevena, Kozani, Kastoria and Florina) that was known as Ano Macedonia. If such a name is adopted, she maintained, there would be a lot of confusion in international communications.
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52 recommendation not to allow the deployment for foreign troops on FYROM territory. The rejection of the slavomacedonia alternative by Gligorov was also convenient for internal comsumption in view of the heterogeneous ethnic composition of FYROM (with 25% Albanians).

B. Negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations. Greece as well as FYROM,
during the 1991-1993 period, agreed to seek mediation of the name conflict under the auspices of the United Nations, with Cyrus Vance of the U.S. and Lord Owen of UK as mediators. The two mediators produced a draft bilateral agreement (15.5.93) between

Greece and Nova Makedonija(Slavic version) that included provisions for securing borders, discouraging irredentist propaganda, abstaining from the use of symbols which constitute part of the other partys culture, and cooperating on economic, environmental and diplomatic affairs. Specifically, it required Nova Makedonija to cease using the sunburst of Vergina symbol. However, the draft agreement was rejected by both parties, due to the maximalist orientations of both parties (fears of political costs) but also because of technical problems and contradictions among the various provisions, e.g. using the name Nova Makedonijafor FYROM in the draft bilateral agreement that had not yet been formally adopted by FYROM (See extensive Critique by J. Kapsis, To Vima, 23/5/93). Nonetheless, the draft agreement was resurrected two years later and became the text basis for the Interim Accord.

IV. Collective Strategies and Reactions of the two Parties during the Second Phase (1994 +)
As there was no imminent progress in the name issue, with FYROM continuing to use its constitutional name, with European Community countries threatening to open

diplomatic offices in FYROM, fearing destabilization and possible escalation of violent conflict in the region, the new Socialist Government of Greece (that had resulted from the October 1993 elections), under Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, froze negotiations at the UN and on 16 February 1994 imposed an economic embargo on FYROM that exempted only food and medicine. The embargo was supported by the two major parties (New Democracy, PASOK socialists) as well as the Political Spring party which had maximalist positions. In fact, the Political Spring leader was of the opinion that the embargo had come too late. The economic embargo was not supported by the Left Alliance and the Greek Communist parties but had extensive popular support. Aside

53 from the mass demonstrations that took place in Thessaloniki during the embargo period, a Gallup in Athens showed that 83% of the electorate were for the embargo (See Figure 2).

Mass demonstration in Thessaloniki (St. Sophias Square) organized after the initiative of the Greek Orthodox Church of Thessaloniki to protest the U.S. Recognition of the FYROM (Source: Ta Nea, 16/02/1994).

Mass demonstration (reportedly attended by 1,2 million Greeks from all continents) organized by the Municipality of Thessaloniki on 31/03/1994 (Source: Ta Nea, 1/04/1994)

54

2. Percentage of Attica Residents w ho agreed w ith the econom ic em pargo against Skopje (ALCO & MARTEL, N= 800, 18 years+, 2122/2/1994)

YES NO DNK/NA 3,3 0 20 40 60 14

82,7

80

100

Andreas Papandreou, PM of Greece, 1981-89, 1993-96

The embargo provoked the reactions of the European Commission who took Greece to the European Court for violating community solidarity and market principles. There were also reactions from the UN and the United States, who maintained that the embargo is not conducive to the promotion of dialogue between the two countries. Furthermore, there were internal Greek concerns lest other countries fill the economic vacuum (Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey etc.) and Greece jeopardize its geopolitical position in the region. There were also fears among some Greek social scientists that negative impacts of the embargo would cultivate an underdog image of FYROM with boomerang effects on Greece, as well as fears that the UN mandate of the mediators would end, leaving he Security Council itself to decide upon the name. These considerations weighed heavily upon the Papandreou

government and led eventually to a reconsideration of the embargo and a reactivation of the dialogue process at the United Nations.

55

President Kiro Gligorov, Mediator Cyrus Vance and UN Secretary General Butros Butros-Ghali (Ta Nea, 8/11/94)

Although there were differences between FYROM and Greece in the tactics for rapprochement (Papandreou government looked for signs of concessions on symbols,

borders and constitution before lifting the embargo, while Gligorov insisted that there can be no dialogue unless the embargo is lifted first), the two negotiators (Vance & Nimitz) managed to overcome these obstacles and come up with a proposal of an Interim Accord, which the representatives of the two countries signed on 13.9.95. The Interim Accord was based largely on the 1993 Vance-Owens plan, but left the question of the name open for future negotiations68; in fact, the two parties are referred to in the document as the First Part (Greece) and the Second Part (FYROM). It has provisions for cooperation in all sectors, but especially the economic. At the same time, there are provisions for securing the constitutional changes regarding territorial claims and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. There are also provisions for prohibiting hostile propaganda by state agencies and discouraging same acts by private groups, as well as for protecting the symbols, though these are more on the level of exhortation than obligation. What is mandatory is the abandonment of the Vergina symbol on the national flag by FYROM. The Interim Accord binds Greece to expedite the membership of FYROM in international Organizations,

Specifically, Article 5 states The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council Resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993). No where in the Interim Accord is there a time-table for the settlement of the name question.

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56 but reserves the right to object if the second party seeks admission with a name other than FYROM (Resolution 817/93).69

Carolos Papoulias (Left) and Stevo Crvenkovski (Right), the Foreign Ministers of Greece and FYROM, who signed the Interim Accord (Ta Nea, 14/09/95).

An indication of the priority of economic over symbolic capital in the Interim Accord is the following provision: The parties shall take practical measures so that the difference about the name of the Second Part will not obstruct or interfere with normal trade and commerce between the two parties. (Article 5, par. 2). This is in contrast to the VanceOwen draft agreement that had given priority to the cultural and symbolic aspects of the conflict over the name . There was a concerted effort to minimize as much as possible the divisive elements, to start from scratch and to open widely all channels of communication for the development of normal relations in all sectors (Kofos, 2003, pp. 167-170). The Interim Accord was to remain in force until superseded by a definitive agreement, provided that after seven years either Party may withdrawwith a written notice, that shall take effect 12 months after delivery to the other Party. The Interim Accord took effect with the signing by the two parties (13/9/1995). Ratification by parliament was not necessary since it was an interim agreement; however, it was ratified by the FYROM Parliament (102 for, 1 against and two abstentions), but not by the Greek Parliament. The government-owned newspaper establishment of Nova Makedonija initially saw the signing of the Interrim Accord as signifying the end of the Bucharest Treaty (1913)(Vlasidis, 2003, p. 305). Parliamentarians of the FYROM majority party commented that the name of Macedonia was an exchange for the concessions they
69

Greece had vetoed FYROMs application for membership in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Ta Nea, 19/11/1994).

57 had made on the Alexander the Great symbols (i.e. replacing the 16-ray by the 8-ray sunburst on their flag). The lack of ratification by the Greek Parliament makes it problematic from the framework of national law but did not affect its validity in international law (Zaikos, 2003, pp. 33-34).

Discussion in the Greek Parliament about the 1995 Interim Accord. Left: Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou: The Interim Accord is a good first step; it does not solve the problem. Right: Opposition Leader Miltiades Evert: The Interim Accord was not ratified by the Parliament (Ta Nea, 7/11/95).

During a discussion of the Interim Accord in the Greek Parliament, there was a general consensus, with some minor exceptions. The conservative New Democracy

Opposition Party, though not essentially against the Interim Accord, expressed reservations for the lack of parliamentary ratification (Kofos, 2003, pp. 172-173). The New

Democracy party also had reservations regarding strategy, maintaining that the Government should have gone for the big package, that would also have included a definitive solution of the name. The Political Spring party which had adopted a maximalist approach charged Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou of mitsotakization (i.e. compromize and diglossia), asked for a referendum and called again for a new summit meeting of the party leaders under the President of the Republic before the signing of the Interim Accord.70 The Communist Party pointed out the dangers that this poses for the Balkans, noting also that U.S., Germany and NATO can manufacture provocations regardless of the name.

Among the other proposals of Political Spring were (1) the division of FYROM into cantons based on ethnicity, following the Swiss model and (2) its re-integration into New Yugoslavia (Ta Nea, 7/11/1995).

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58

Greek and FYROM delegations working out the details of the Interim Accord (Ta Nea, 11/10/95).

With the signing of the Interim Accord, the embargo against FYROM was terminated and the European Court withdrew its charges against Greece. The two countries set up delegations to work out the practical details for the circulation of peoples and products between the two countries. Solutions had to be found for FYROM citizens entering Greece holding passports stamped with Republic of Macedonia, for products made in

Macedonia, for automobiles with the sun of Vergina on the licence plates and for the office of the FYROM delegation in Athens (e.g. FYROM outside the building and Republic of Macedonia inside etc.). Solutions were found for most of the bureaucratic problems and the two countries were on the road to normalizing their bilateral relationsthough the name controversy took the back stage or entered a period of moratorium as priority was given to confidence-building measures.

V. A Note on collective behavior among the Hellenic and Slavomacedonian DiasporaTransnational dimensions of the struggle over culture and symbols
Mass emigration from South and Eastern Europe (including the Balkan countries of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia) took place in the first two decades of the 20th Century and had as a destination mainly the U.S. Most of the emigrants from the Balkans to the U.S. in the early 20th Century were Greeks (368,000 between 1890 and 1920) but there were also emigrants from Bulgaria (about 50.000 between 1903 and 1906). Up to the early 1960s, in the U.S., most of the slavophones from Macedonia who had been in the U.S. had a Bulgarian or Bulgaromacedonian identity (Danforth, 1999, p. 94-96). There followed

59 new waves of migration to the U.S., as well as to new destinations of Australia and Canada, from the Balkan countries after the Second World War and the Greek Civil War, as part of the European reconstruction/rehabilitation process (e.g Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, Displaced Persons Act etc.). This emigration, which was direct (from the Balkan countries) or indirect two step migration (especialy via other European countries as in the case of Civil War Refugees), took place after the establishment of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia in 1944 within the Yugoslav Federation. More slavophone Macedonians from Yugoslavia and Greek Macedonia emigrated to Canada and Australia, challenging the Bulgarian or Bulgaro-macedonian social organization and asserting a Macedonian identity (Danforth, 1999, p. 96). Finally, the next mass migrations from the Balkans and especially from Yugoslavia and Greece (and the Macedonian Regions) took place in the 1960s toward the overseas destinations, but especially toward Western Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany. Although the determination of the numbers of various ethnic groups is a complex issue for Census takers, due to the complexity of criteria (e.g. country of origin, ethnotic descent or mother language), there is no question of the numeric superiority of the Greek as opposed to the slavomacedonian diaspora in the three overseas countries (US, Australia and Canada). According to Danforth (1999,p. 95), the use of country of origin as the criterion makes invisible the Macedonians who come from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece.71 Also, for other reasons (fear, economics etc.) many who may privately identify with the macedonian ethnotic group may report to the census takers any of the three birth places or the host country identity if second/third generation. Yet, taking into account the limitations, and using mainly self-determination/identification criteria that were allowed by the various censuses or estimates based on ethnotic criteria, on the eve of the declaration of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as Republic of Macedonia, in the U.S. there were about one million Greek-Americans (Census 1990) and about 25,000 to 30,000 Macedonians(1980); in Australia (1988), there were 323,000 citizens of Greek ethnic background (1988) among whom an estimated 55,000 Greek Macedonians and about 75,000 of Macedonian ethnicity of which two-thirds were from Yuguslavia and 1/3 from Greek Macedonia; in Canada (Census 1991), 191,000 citizens identified themselves as Greek
71

and 21,000 as

Some have called this genocide via re-determination by the Census (Danforth, 1999, p. 95, footnote 9). Although this indeed complicates estimates of ethnotic groups, it is a very common problem and it is not restricted to Macedonians. In the early part of the 20th Century, those who came to the U.S. from Russia were not necessarily Russian Orthodox. Most were Jews. Also many immigrants from Turkey were not ethnic Turks but Asian Minor Greek (Pontian) refugees.

60 Macedonians, though in accordance with another estimate the Macedonians in Canada fluctuated between 100,000 and 120,000 (Danforth, 1999, pp. 93-97).72 Clearly, there has been a demographic dominance of the Greek diaspora in the overseas countries, as compared to the Slavomacedonian diasporathough this should not necessarily be equated with the influence these diaspora have had on the domestic politics of the host countries. As with most immigrant groups, soon after their arrival in the host countries, both the Greeks and the Slavomacedonians formed organizations basically in order to maintain cultural ties with the homelands and also to facilitate adjustment in the new country. Usually, they organized cultural, religious, age- and sex-based and athletic organizations but also locality associations based on their region, city/town or village of origin. There is no need to mention the 100s of oganizations in the diasporic ethnic communities; the most significant for our purpose are the locality-based organizations which can represent regions in the homeland (e.g. Macedonia, Thrace, Crete etc.), cities (e.g. Thessaloniki, Volos, Florina, Athens etc.)73 or town/villages and can be organized as federations on a state, national or world basis. Both the Greek Macedonians and the Slavomacedonians organized locality

organizations on various levels of the host country and even on a transnational basis (e.g. Panmacedonian Union of Ontario, Panmacedonian Union of Melbourne and Victoria, Panmacedonian Union of Australia {or U.S. or Canada}, World Confederation of

Panmacedonian Unions and Federations etc. for the Greek Macedonians; the Macedonian Federation of Canada, the Federation of the Macedonian Unions of Victoria, and the United Macedonians for the Slavomacedonians). Aside from the established, cultural and locality-based organizations which were activated by both sides following the declaration of independence, there were also activated established political lobby groups (e.g. UHAC in case of Greeks); in addition, special organizations were established both among the Greek

Danforth accepts the use of the term Republic of Macedonia (without quotes) since it is the countrys constitutional name that it chose for itself, because it has been called Peoples Republic of Macedonia for 50 years, and because the EU Arbitration Commission {1992 Badinter Commission} saw no irredentism in the use of the term Macedonia. He also sees no problem in the use of the term Macedonia by the Skopjeans and by the Greeks, since in the first case it refers to an ethnic group and in the latter to a regional group (Danforth, 1999, pp. 11, 195). Morever, throughout his book, he uses the word Macedonian without quotation marks, not only when referring to ethnicity but also to language and minority. Another words, he accepts the existence of macedonian ethnicity, language and minority. When all these notions have been challenged by a plethora of historians, archaelogists, linguists, and social scientists (Greek and foreign) and also by governments and international organizations (Greek and other) and when there has been enough evidence to document the irredentist motivations behind the 1944 ethnogenesis, I wonder if the Danforths approach is not a way to use the science of anthropology to legitimize the new phase of macedonian ethnogenesis (i.e. transition from a republic within a federation to an independent nation in 1990). Incidentally, the Badinter Commission report was based on completion of a questionnaire by FYROM officials, which denied irredentist claims (Ta Nea, 17/01/92; See also p. 50, footnote 66, of this text). 73 Obviously, the diversities of identities, the factionalism over religious and political preferences, the diversified experiences with respect to the Metaxas Dictatorship, as well as their differential experiences during the Resistance and the Greek Civil War have complicated the organization of single locality-based organization by Floriniotes.

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61 and the Slavomacedonia diaspora in the late 1980s and early 1990s for the promotion of their respective positions on the Macedonian Question74. Both the Greek and the

Slavomacedonian Diaspora organizations had their link agencies/services in the home countries, the Greek diaspora with the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad and the Center for Macedonian Emigrants in Thessaloniki; the Slavomacedonians with the Queen Bee for Macedonian Emigrants. Both published their respective and structurally/functionally

analogous magazines, the Greek services Makedoniki Zoi (Macedonian Life) and the Slavomacedonians, Makedonija, which provided the emigrants with cultural as well as political information and also promoted their activities abroad pertaining to the

Macedonian Question. Danforth (1999, pp 105-106, 110-113) noted the greater difficulties confronted by the Slavomacedonian emigrants with regard to organization due to factors other than their smaller numbers. Such factors included the (1) greater heterogeneity of origins of the macedonians (e.g. from the three departments of Macedonia in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece) compared to the Greek immigrants who had origins in one nation state and mother country,75 (2) the assimilation pressures exerted by the three nation states on the residents after the 1913 partition which led to differential subjective identifications as Yugoslavs, Greeks or Bulgarians (3) the linguistic/dialectical and cultural differences between the Macedonians of Vardar and the Aegean Macedonians, (4) the settlement of various groups of Macedonians in different suburbs of the citiesmaking for different churches, organizations etc. and (5) the neutralist attitude of Yugoslavia (during the 1950-1980 Cold War period) which did not want to provoke her Balkan neighbors by encouraging the development of the Macedonian identity beyond the borders of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. These factors complicated the organization and the formation of a supranational Macedonian identity. Nonetheless, the multicultural environment of the overseas countries especially after the abandonment of the assimilationist policies and the adoption of cultural pluralism

For example, the Australian Institute for Macedonian Studies and the Toronto Committee for the Truth about Macedonia for the Greeks and the Union of Refugee Children of Aegean Macedonia, The Macedonian Australian Committee for Human Rights, the Macedonian Canadian Committee for Human Rights, International Macedonia Lobby and the World Macedonian Congress, the Macedonian Information Agency etc. for Slavomacedonians. 75 Generally, this may be true; however, one cannot ignore the different origins of the Greeks (e.g. from the metropolis, from Asia Minor, from Russia etc) as well as the religious differences in Australia and the regional localisms); nonetheless, for the overwhelming majority of Greek immigrants, the Greek Orthodox Church, the classical antiquity and the 1821 Revolution act as unifying forces. Also, there seems to be unanimity on the Macedonian Question regardless of intrareligious and regional differences.

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62 in the 1970s- gave an opportunity to all Slavomacedonians to develop their suppressed ethnic identity claims; the new multicultural environment legitimated their development and increased the viability of these identities,compared to their homelands, whether or not these identities were imaginary communities without any reference to a nation-state with actual geographical borders (Cowan, 2000, p. 17; Danforth, 1999, 213-215). These

diasporic tendencies were no doubt reinforced subsequently by two other world/global processes: (1) the global and regional processes (e.g. migration, supra-national economic systems such as EU, human rights movement) that challenged the nation-state and

strengthened the role of international organizations in the protection of civil rights and (2) the collapse of the communist block in 1989 along with the attendant proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Macedonia that provided the Slavomacedonian emigrants with the missing link of a geographically-based nation-state. The presence of the above processes, along with events in the respective

homelands, increased the competition and the confrontations among the Greek and Slavomacedonian diaspora in all sectors of social existence: 1. Competing claims over the use of the name Macedonian in Australia After Greek

pressures (in 1993), the Australian government announced that henceforth the Macedonians of Australia would be called Slavomacedonians. The Macedonian policies

community reacted, accusing the Government for betrayal of its multicultural (Danforth, 1999, p. 163) 2. The circulation

of maps by Slavomacedonian diaspora organizations depicting

Macedonia before partition. These ethnographic maps showed the three departments of Macedonia (Vardar Macedonian, Pirin Macedonia and Aegean Macedonia) and also varied in form and content (e.g. placement of borders, use of slavic toponyms, etc.), depending upon the ideological proclivity of the diaspora organization. The most extreme rendition showed the international borders of United Macedonia extending to Central Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the three departments internally demarcated by barbed wires and described as being under the occupation by Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. The more moderate versions recognized the international borders but still showed the three departments with FYROM terminology and the cities with their slavic toponyms (e.g. Solon for Thessaloniki, Voden for Edessa etc.) The latter map, adopted by almost all the organizations of the macedonian diaspora, was usually decorated by other popular macedonian symbols and included busts of Delcev, the Vergina Star and the Salonica White Tower, besides being imprinted in posters, keychains, t-shirts, and wall clocks. For

63 the Greek diaspora, as well as the Greeks in the Metropolis, all these maps, whatever their form, signified irredentism and evoked protest reactions. More specifically, the maps depicting United Macedonia with slavic names were also used in Macedonian language courses in Melbourne public schools. The Greek community of Melbourne protested, but the Slavomacedonian community replied there were no irredentist motivations; they just wanted to show the children the parents places of origin in the Aegean Macedonia (Danforth, 1999, pp. 185-195).

Representative map of Macedonia used by almost all the organizations of the macedonian diaspora (Source: Loring Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict. Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World {In Greek}, Alexandria Publishers, Athens, 1999, p. 190).

Map of the unified Macedonia showing the three parts under occupation. The map was circulated at the close of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s by Macedonia ultanationalists in Melbourne. ((Source: Loring Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict. Ehtnic Nationalism in a Transnational World {In Greek}, Alexandria Publishers, Athens, 1999, p. 190).

64 3. Confrontations between the two diaspora over the use of historical national symbols (e.g. name and statutes of Alexander the Great, the Star/Sun of Vergina etc) by one or the other of the immigrant communities. These confrontations (often involving verbal

harrassment and occasionally physical violence) have occurred (1) in ethnic parades where the figure of Alexander the Great was an inevitable accompaniment for both communities in all host countries (2) during soccer games between three teams in Australia (e.g. Alexandros of the Greek Macedonians or the Grecomanis; the Makedonija of the Slavomacedonians and the Hellas of the Greeks76 and (3) in a Toronto public square, where Greeks (Panmacedonian Association of Ontario and the Greek Community of

Metropolitan Toronto) who had donated a bust of Alexander the Great to the municipality of Toronto (with the inscription: King of the Greeks) prevented with their bodies wrapped in Greek flags a delegation of United Macedonians from depositing a wreath on the 2346th anniversary of Alexander the Greats birthday despite reservations from other segments of the macedonian community regarding the United Macedonians action (Danforth, p. 181-185, 200-203).77

During the games, the Alexandros fans called the fans of Makedonija Yugoslavs; the fans of the Greek team Hellas called the Alexandros fans Bulgarians; and the fans of Makedonija called the fans of Alexandros Grecomanis (or traitors)(Danforth, 1999, p. 200). 77 The Macedonian community of Toronto reacted because they felt that the inscription should have been Alexander: King of the Macedonians. However, there were many other ways that the two communities both in the diaspora and the Metropolis in the early 1990s used the AtG symbolism. The Greek Macedonians from all over the world set up in 1992 the Alexander the Great Foundation, with the ultimate purpose to establish an International AtG Cultural Center. In Preston, Melbourne (though in smaller scale) an ultranationalist group of macedonians set up in a central avenue of Preston, Melbourne, the Library for Alexander and Delcev attempting to show continuity from antiquity to the beginning of the 20th Century (1903 Ilinden). Also, both communities competed promoting missions to Afganistan and Pakistan claiming that they discovered the descendants of AtG, speaking either Greek or Macedonian, depending upon the community (Danforth, 1999, pp. 182-183).

76

65

Left: Bust of Alexander the Great. A gift to the Mayor of Toronto by the Pammacedonian Union of Ontario and the Greek Metropolitan Community of Toronto. Right: Two men dressed as Alexander the Great, or ancient Macedonian warriors, in Macedonian demonstration demanding the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, Melbourne, 1 February 1992. (Source: Loring Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict. Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (Greek Edition), Alexandria Publishers, Athens, 1999, pp. 56, 184)

4. Competition over the sistering of host country cities with cities in the respective homelands. While the Greeks managed to achieve sistering of Thessaloniki with the world Metropolises such as Melbourne and Toronto Canada (Mid-1980s), the Slavomacedonians managed to achieve sistering of Skopje and Vitola with satellite cities of Toronto (East York) and Sidney (Rockdale), respectively (Danforth, 1999, pp. 99-100, 110). The process of sistering allowed for cultural exchanges and the promotion of respective political positions on the Macedonian Question. The Pan-Macedonian Association of Melbourne (sister city of Thessaloniki) and Victoria organized the Dimitria (Agios Demetrios-Patron Saint of Thessaloniki) with lectures on the Vergina archealogical findings, traditional performances and memorials for the heroes of the Macedonian Struggle in the beginning of the 20th Century (op. cit., p. 103) 5. Competition in the sector of church organization. Danforth (1999, 227-228) cites the case of Melbourne where three different groups of emigrants from the Florina area of Greek Macedonia organized three different churches, depending upon their relationship to communism and the church hierarchy. The first, the Church of Sts. Cyrillos and Methodios, was organized in 1950 by non-communist macedonians in the context of the Bulgarian Exarchate and catered to Bulgarian Macedonians. The second, involved a group of immigrants who identified themselves as Macedonians but were sympathetic to communism; they organized in 1959 the Macedonian Orthodox Church of St. George, in

66 the context of the Autocephalous Church of Macedonia in Yugoslavia. The St. George Church became a very powerful institution for Macedonian Australians during the 1990s. The third, the Hellenic Orthodox Church of Sts. Cyrillos and Methodius, was estabblished in 1967 and catered to Floriniotes who identified themselves as Greeks. According to Danforth the historical trichotomization of Greater Macedonia in 1913, among Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, was also reproduced in the diaspora church organization. 6. Confrontations at scientific/professional conventions regarding the

ethnicity/language/archeology of ancient Macedonians.

The Australian Institute of

Macedonian Studies was organized in 1986 by a group of Greek Macedonian academics to counteract the organized propaganda of the Slavs, to check the rampant erosion of terminologies such as macedonian languageand macedonian culture in the educational intitutions of Australia and to promote the Greek positions regarding the Macedonian Question. They adopted the Star of Vergina as their emblem, organized conventions and also made interventions regarding government policies. The Institute protested the use of public funds to teach the macedonian language in Australian public schools. Specifically, the Institute maintained that public funds should not be used to teach the slavic idiom of Skopje and call it macedonian language In 1988, the Institute organized a convention on Macedonian Studies at La Trobe University in Melbourne; the program cover featured the archaelogical findings of King Philips grave (golden larnaca) as well as the Star of Vergina excavated within the territory of Greek Macedonia. The Slavomacedonian community of Melbourne, on the other hand, organized counter-protests78 to the convention, saying that it offended the dignity of the Macedonian people, its purpose was to deny the existence of a Macedonian ethnicity and to eradicate the macedonian language and the macedonian culture from the schools and universities of Australia and called upon all the Macedonians to participate and defend their rights in the multicultural society of Australia(Danforth, pp. 175, 223-226).79

Danforth notes that the protesters were wearing T-shirts with Delcevs portrait and were also holding red flags with the golden Star of Vergina (p. 226). 79 Reference is also made to two conventions organized by the Pan Macedonian Association of the US and Canada in New York (1989) and by the Australian Institute of Macedonian Studies at the Melbourne University (1991) where the archaeological findings became the object of discussion (Danforth, 1999, pp. 180182). Danforth discusses the uses of archeology, as an academic discipline and as a means for legitimizing ultranationalist ideologies. During the second of the above conventions, an American historian of antiquty (Borza from the Pennsylvania State University) made a reference to the ways Greek governments try to control the presentation of Alexander the Great in the world forum using exhibits such as the one In Search of Alexander the Great... Some Greek archeologists considered Borsas analysis as politicization of a scientific meeting and withdrew during his presentation

78

67 7. Conflict over the question of macedonian minorities and their human rights in Bulgaria and Greece. In 1984, the Central Organizational Committee for Macedonian Human Rights in northern Greece issued a declaration calling for the recognition of the human rights of the macedonian minority in Greece. This declaration was written in three languages (Greek, macedonian and English) and was sent to all members of the Greek Parliament, to all embassies in Athens, to all European governments, to the UN and to many international organizations.80 According to Danforth (1999, p. 135), the Committees

initiatives were also supported by the diaspora communities of the Aegean Macedonians. First, the Slavomacedonian diaspora formed Human Rights Committees in Canada and Australia to promote the human rights of the macedonian minority abroad. Second, they took part in various international meetings on refugees and human rights. They participated in the First International Meeting of Aegean Macedonian Refugee Children held in Skopje in 199840 years after they fled from their homelands following the defeat of Communist guerrillas in the Greek Civil War. Attempts by Slavomacedonian conventioners to enter Greece after the Skopje meeting and visit their birthplaces in Northern Greece were aborted allegedly because they had chosen to call themselves Macedonians and not Greeks.81 They also participated in delegations to the Organization for European Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and specifically in the 1990 Conference on Human Rights in

Copenhagen to promote minority rights of Macedonians in Northern Greece and Bulgaria, together with Slavomacedonians from the Socialist Republic of Macedonian. In the OSCE meeting, the macedonian delegation encountered the opposition of the Greek delegation that included the Pan-Macedonian Association of Canada and also the opposition from the Bulgarian delegation. The Pan Macedonian Association of Ontario supporting the Greek delegation said that the Human Rights issue was a pretext that the slavomacedonian
Danforth (pp. 117-118) writes that The existence of a macedonian movement actually refutes the allegations of the Greek government that there are no Macedonians in Greece, except for slavophone Greeks with a Greek national consciousness. However, it is crucial to assess the quantitative aspects of this movement. This movement took the form of a political party, the Rainbow party, that participated in local, national and European Parliament elections. In the 1994 EU Parliament elections, the Rainbow party received a nationwide vote of 7,268 votes. In the Florina prefectural elections of 1994, the Rainbow party received 1,400 votes. Finally, the Rainbow received 3,485 votes in the national elections of September 1996, and those jointly with the OAKKE, the Organization for the Reconstruction of the Communist Party of Greece. Kofos (2005, p. 200) concludes that the partys poor performance in local and national elections disappointed its organizers and supporters. Its meagre results also demolished the myth of a sizeable and oppressed minority and tarnished its image among sympathisers and activists both in Greece and abroad (emphasis added). 81 However, according the other sources (Vlasidis, 2003, p. 319), the Greek government allowed the members of the Association attending the convention to visit Greek territories for one day, a gesture that was also acknowledged as a positive step in editorials by two national FYROM newspapers, the independent Dnevnik and the then government-owned Nova Makedonija (Vlasidis, 2003, pp. 319-320).
80

68 emigres were using for territorial claims against Greek Macedonia, while the delegation of the Union of the Macedonian Societies of Bulgaria said that the macedonian nation was an artificial creation of Serbia, that the Slavs of the Republic of Macedonia were actually Bulgarians who had been persecuted by the Yugoslavs and concluded with a call for the protection of the rights of Bulgarian minorities in Yugoslavia and Greece (Danforth, 1999, p. 109, 113-115, 117-118, 128-129, 135, 145-149).82 8. Confrontations following the declaration of independence. Finally, there were

confrontations (demonstrations/counter-demonstrations) among the diaspora communities over the independence and recognition of the Republic of Macedonia with its

constitutional name. According to Kofos ( 2005, pp. 193-196), As early as the 1960s, long before the Greeks in Greece were aware of the problem, the ethnic Greek Macedonianswere constantly at loggerheads with Slav Macedonian immigrants over aspects of their historical and cultural identity. This was the main reason for their vigorous mobilization as soon as it was announced that the Republic of Macedonia had declared independence The declaration of independence and the pursuit of international recognition by the Republic of Macedonia in 1991-92 actually mobilized both the Greek and the Slavomacedonian diaspora communities. First, the Slavomacedonian Diaspora even took part in the 8/9/1991 referendum, though their votes were counted separarately; nonetheless, according to Danforth, this process reinforced the transnational identity of Macedonians who identified with the Republic of Macedonia. Second, the organizations of both groups were mobilized; the Greeks besides the long established regional and other types organizations (e.g. Pan Macedonian Associations abroad) also took advantage of the extant lobby groups and the World Council of Hellenes Abroad developed earlier to promote other ethnic issues (e.g. Cyprus, Turkey, Travel advisories etc.). In the early 1990s, the Slavomacedonian themselves organized an International Macedonian Lobby, a World Macedonian Congress modeled after the World Jewish Congress and the Macedonian Information Services in order to effect interventions on National Governments and World Bodies to promote recognition. Lastly, there were organized mass demonstrations with the competing symbols (Alexander the Great, Star of Vergina, etc.) by both sides in diaspora cities and decision-making centers (e.g. New York, Toronto, Melbourne, Brussels etc.). The demonstrations projecting the Ancient Macedonian symbols received extensive coverage in
82

According to Danforth (1999, p. 128, 149), the Macedonian activists for human rights in Northern Greece reject the autonomist/irredentist claims of the ultranationalist Macedonians from FYROM or from the macedonian diasporas in Canada and Australia and look forward to a United Europe without borders.

69 the respective magazines of the two communties (Danforth, 1999, pp. 56, 108-109, 226). Danforth (1999, p.50-51) also refers to a boycott of Greek products organized by the United Macedonians of Victoria against the Greek government for not recognizing the new Republic of Macedonia.83 In terms of outcomes for the two groupswhich no doubt were not equal in organizational resourcesthe Greeks in Australia at least managed to delay

the Federal Governments recognition of the newly independent republic for a long time; and when it was eventually recognized, it was under the name of FYROM On the other hand, the efforts of ethnic Greeks to persuade the Australian government to substitute the name of Macedonian Slavs for the citizens of FYROM and the name of Macedonian Slavonic for the language did not meet with long-term success due to the opposition of the Slavomacedonian Australians. (Kofos, 194-195). Drafting of new techologies. The new technologies of the internet also

became an integral part of the transnational conflict between the Greeks and the Slavomacedonians, either after initiatives of the metropolis or the dispora communities themselves. Danforth (1999, p. 110) cites attempts of some Macedonians (does not specify if they were emigrants) in 1993 to establish an internet discussion group (e.g. social.culture.makedonija) but were thwarted because the Greeks outvoted them 20 to 1. However, by 1994, both groups had unmoderated interactive groups (alt.news.macedonia and soc.culture.greek) accessible to internet users and also moderated discussion groups (Macedon and Hellas) accessible only to subscribers. While the unmoderated interactive groups are no longer active, both groups have created new websites which the author consulted for documentation purposes84. It should be pointed out that these are illustrative; there are hundreds of other relevant websites, state-sponsored, organizational and individual, for both sides. More systematic research is needed to identify, classify and assesss the relative impact of the cyberspace/electronic manifestations of the transnational conflict over the historic and cultural symbols. Diaspora conservatism. Social scientists and historians have generally observed more conservative attitudes among the diaspora communities, in relation to the respective
Accompanied by publication of a pamphlet describing the Macedonians as a separate ethnicity (vs. Greeks, Yugoslavs and Bulgarians) descended from Ancient Macedonians (Danforth, 1999, pp. 50-51). 84 Specifically, one could access www.panmacedonian.info/ of the Pan-Macedonian Association of U.S.A., www.macedoniansincanada.com of the Pan-Macedonian Association of Canada and www.greece.org/themis/macedonia/ of the Hellenic Electronic Center for Greek websites; and www.umdiaspora.org of United Macedonian Diaspora, www.unitedmacedonians.org of the United Macedonians of Canada and www.makedonija.info/ of Macedonia for Macedonians for websites of Slavomacedonians. A more systematic and exhaustive census of sites under state, organizational and individual aegis has been done by Vlasidis (Society for Macedonian Studies, 2007, pp. 77-92).
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70 governments in the metropolis. For the Greek diaspora, Inevitably, the exclusion of the name from the {Interim} Accord and the Greek Governments subsequent efforts to arrive at a compromize formula led the ethnic Greek Macedonians to openly criticize the governments policy and to accuse it of compliance. This oppositionidentified the

{Greek Macedonia Diaspora} with the maximalist line within Greece For their part, the Greek Macedonians did not conceal their disappointment at having been abandoned by the motherland on what they regarded as an existential issue (See Kofos, 193-194). For the Slavomacedonian diaspora, Danforth (1999, p. 54) points out the

continuing identification of the Macedonian diaspora with the Macedonia antiquity Alexander the Great and the Vergina Symbols when these have been formally abandoned by FYROM officials (e.g. Gligorovs admission of no connection of the Slavs who arrived in the 6th Century with the ancient Macedonians).85 Possibly, the dynamics of a multicultural

environment (anomia etc.), the nostalgia for the home country and information gaps put greater pressures on immigrants (Slavomacedonians or Greeks) to overidentify with imagined communitiesand cultures that have meanwhile undergone extensive sociocultural changes. In this context, the diasporas often adopt more maximalist and extremist positions on the national issues of the home country and, under certain conditions, could affect the course of the latters international relations.

VI. Developments after the signing of the Interim Accord (19952007)

A. Impact of Interim the Accord It is logical, 12 years after the signing and implementation of the Interim Accord, to evaluate its impact, with respect to the outcomes (e.g. economic, political, cultural, educational, the name etc.) from the perspective of the two signatories but also from the

In June 1992, Gligorov admitted: We have no relationship whatsoever with Alexander the Great. We are a slavic people who arrived here {Macedonia} in the 6th Century we are not descendants of the ancient Macedonians.. For centuries we have this name {Macedonians}. It comes from the name of this geographic region and we live in one section of this region (Cf. Danforth, 1999, pp. 54, 166). Furthermore, Gligorov, the first President of FYROM, declared in Rome on October 31,1991: It is inconceivable to think that todays Slavomacedonians are descendants of Alexander the Great, and later on in Skopje, while addressing a group of Greek correspondents he said: We do not insist that we are descendants of Alexander the Great or the ancient Macedonians (Cf. Papavisas, 2006, p. 232-233). According to Danforth (op.cit., p. 54), such a moderate view that accepts the view that the majority population of FYROM are descendants of Slavs and not of ancient Macedonians are usually adopted by the more educated Macedonians who usually question the Greekness of ancient Macedonians.

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71 perspective of regional and international relations. This assesment can only be exploratory and not exhaustive, in view of the diversity of goals of the Interim Accord.. Economic impacts. After the signing of the Interim Accord (13/9/95), Greece increased considerably its economic activities and investments in FYROM. Almost

immediately after the signing of the Interim Accord, FYROM was incorporated into the European Interborder Program PHARE, that Greece had blocked since 1993; the program provided development assistance to FYROM while at the same time negotiations were begun for the signing of a Cooperation Agreement between EU and FYROM (Kontonis, 2003, pp. 91-92). During 2000, under the Simitis Government, Greece also started the Hellenic Plan for Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (ESOAB), that involves seven countries including FYROM (Albania, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and FYROM). Although there was a lag in implmentation, the five-year development program had as a target the promotion of productive investments, the develoment of transport and energy infrastructures, the modernization of public administration, the development of democratic insitutions, social cohesion and education (Kontonis, 2003, p. 81-83). During the first seven years after the signing of the Interim Accord, the volume of trade between the two countries increased from less than 20,000 (1995) to about 600,000 (2001), with the trade balance in favor of Greece, while the average annual rate of growth of Greek investments was 224% (Nicas, 2003, pp.116-119, 133-135). In the beginning of 2008, the Greek investments constituted 57% of total foreign investments (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic _of_Macedonia). More specifically, about 300 Greek entreprises have made investments in FYROM, the value of the investments reaching about 1 billion and the number of local jobs created amounting to 20.000 (Ta Nea, 23-24.2.2008). Thus, in an economic sense, the Interrim Agreement was a success from the point of view of FYROM and naturally the Greek investors. Regional stability and international relations. The Interim Accord as well as the subsequent economic investments have contributed to the economic development and

stabilization of FYROM as a new Republic; Greece supported the territorial integrity of FYROM, both during the Kosovo crisis and the 2001 ethnotic crisis, either with economic and humanitarian assistance or by condemning extremist actions which threatened its

viability (Kontonis, 2003, p74). However, there were also other factors including the support of neighboring Balkan countries (Albania, Bulgaria) during the 2001 crises, the investments by other nations, the pressures of the European Union and the 2001 Ohrid Agreement (giving more cultural, linguistic and administrative autonomy to the Albanian

72 minority) and which have undoubtedly contributed to the countrys sociopolitical

development and stabilization. Some may also consider the presence of NATO and foreign troops as a factor of stabilization but this may be questionable if in the long-run it contributed to FYROMs intransigence toward Greece and increased the probability of FYROM becoming a protectoratea charge leveled against NATO by Antonio Milososki then Government Spokesman under the previous VMRO-DPMNE administration86.

Upper Left: UCK men in action. Upper Right: Slavomacedonian Armed Vehicles. Down Left: Demonstration of Slavomacedonians against NATO and UCK. Down Right: Demonstration of Albanians in TETOVO against exclusion (Source: Marina Vihou, Makedoniko: the Powder Keg of he Balkans (In Greek), Kurier Publishers, Athens, 2005, pp. 160161; photos are the contribution of Cedomir Nenkovits of Dnevnik).
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The events leading to the 6 month confrontation between the UCK guerrillas and the FYROM security forces, the victims on both sides and the conclusion of the Ohrid Agreement are described in detail by Marina Vihou {Makedoniko: the Powder Keg of the Balkans (In Greek), Kurier Publishers, Athens, 2005}. Throughout the text, the perception of the Slavomacedonian officials and citizens that the western factor especially the U.S. and NATO- was allied with the Albanians was pervasive (See pp. 34-35, 64-65, 86-87, 90-91, 138-139, 155, 219-220, 232, 255, 260, 291-292, 299). This perception was determined not only by the inability of the NATO forces in Kosovo to prevent exportation of the crisis to FYROM and by the open invitation by Albanian leaders for NATO mediation of the crisis and actual deployment in FYROM but also by the characterization of the UCK men in Skopje as extremists rather than terrorists. The perception of favoritism toward the Albanians was accompanied by a bitterness especially in view of the U.S. war against terrorism after 9/11 and was also evident in the demonstrations organized by the Slavomacedonians during the 2001 crisis (op cit., p.299) In the demonstrations took part mainly Slavomacedonians who had been pushed out of (or abandoned) the Albanian-dominated areas (op. cit., 108-110, 230-234)(a minority within a minority?). Besides their antiamericanism/antiwesternism they were also indignant with the Skopje government for not taking more effective measures against the UCK terroristswhich incidentally was not an easy task for the government since Albanian parties (DPA and Democratic Party for Prosperity) were also part of the coalition government, held government posts, were for mobilization of security forces and not for military action while simultaneously demanding of the UCK extremists to cease fire (op. cit., pp. 51-52, 77, 91-92, 111

73

Signing of the Ohrid Agreement (13 August 2001) by the four party leaders and the President of the Republic in the presence of mediators (EU & US) and Representatives of NATO and the European Union (Source: Marina Vihou, Makedoniko: the Powder Keg of he Balkans (In Greek), Kurier Publishers, Athens, 2005, pp. 160-161, 288-291; photo is the contribution of Cedomir Nenkovits of Dnevnik).

Direct outcomes of the Interim Accord regarding cultural and symbolic issues and admission of FYROM in international organizations. In accordance with the provisions of the Interim Accord, FYROM relinquished the Vergina symbol imprinted in its national flag. The new flag adopted is a variation of the sunburst, with eight sunrays instead of sixteen. During the relevant discussion in the FYROM Parliament, the Albanian deputies proposed flags for other ethnic groups in Albania (Ta Nea, 6/10/95) to reflect the multicultural composition, but these were rejected by the parliamentary majority. Nonetheless, FYROMs compromize on an issue that was not central for the Government (e.g. Gligorovs admission of no connection with ancient Macedonia) may have been a tactical maneuver calculated to influence international opinion by showing flexibility and to justify their uncompromizing attitudes on the countrys denomination. The renaming of the National Airport by FYROM, from Petrovec Airport to Alexander the Great (Aleksandar Veliki), despite provisions in the Interim Agreement discouraging such

policies and hostile acts against the other countrys cultural symbols, may constitute a continuation of tactical maneuvers, though it must be acknowledged that these provisions were of a consultative, exhortatory and not of a mandatory nature as were those pertaining to the Star of Vergina.

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Left. FYROMs first national flag after the declaration of the independence of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991. Right: The new and current flag of FYROM following the implementation of the Interim Accord in 1995 ((http://flagspot.net/images/m/mk.gif)

Membership of FYROM in international organizations. In accordance with the Interim Accord, Greece expedited the admission of FYROM into International

Organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, though with its provisional name, in accordance with the Interim Accord. FYROM representatives/or their sympathetic NGOs, from Europe and abroad, attempted to promote the human rights issues of the macedonian minority and the macedonian language in Greece and Bulgaria in these international organizations, despite the amendments in their new constitution denying intervention in domestic affairs of their neighbors and despite the absence of any reference by the Council of Europe report to the existence of a macedonian minority in Greece (Kontonis, 2003, pp. 100-102). In addition, they

continued their efforts to get recognition with their constitutional name in these organizations, despite the provisions of the Interim Accord. However, there were initially negative reactions on part of FYROM when these international organizations focused on rights of minorities and the need for FYROM to protect its own multicultural heritage; in the long run the role of international obserevers is anticipated to improve democratic institutions and international relations. Educational materials: Maps, regional terms and grade-school texts. The Interim Accord provided a mandate for cooperation between the two countries in the field of education and science (Article 16). Despite the removal of the direct irredentist references in the FYROM Constitution, few substantial changes have taken place. According to

Michailidis (Society for Macedonian Studies, 2007, pp. 35-40), there is a continuing use of the term Aegean Macedonia (rather than Greek Macedonia), state funds are allocated to organizations organizing conventions and publications which carry the name aegean macedonianwhich also included the republication and circulation of the Aegean Voice

75 {stopped publication in 1954} and the newspaper I Dont Forget.87 In addition, the

FYROM Parliament included in its calendar (2003-2004?) the celebration of the anniversary for the founding of the Aegean Brigade (November 1944) whose program was the

secession of Greek Macedonia and its union with the Yugoslav Federation. The unitary and unredeemed Macedoniais also projected in the formal webpage of the state church. Finally, Michailidis claims that even state institutions like the Institute of National History and the Academy of Sciences continue to operate within the same framework; with a series of publications domumenting the integral bonds linking the macedonian lands. In the latter connection, it would be instructive to make a brief reference to the 1997/2006 editions of maps and the 2005 edition of elementary school history textbooks. With regard to the maps, the author points out that the idea of the diachronic continuity of Greater Macedonia, as a distinct geographical unity became evident after 1998; until then, its historicity was extrapolated only to the 19th Century (Michailidis, 2007, pp. 46-50). Thus, in the 1992 formal historical map, prehistoric macedonia was coterminous with the territory of todays FYROM, while in the republications of the same Atlas in 1998 and 2006 the map includes the whole of geographical Macedonia. The same holds for the other periods, antiquity and the medieval period. In the antiquity, whereas in the 1992 editions there is no clearcut distinction between the borders of Greece and Macedonia, in the 1997 edition these two territories are depicted as separate. Along the

same lines, in the medieval period, whereas the 1992 edition does not mark off the ethnotic and geographic limits of Macedonia, the 1997 edition depicts Macedonia as a distinct unity with geographic and ethnotic borders. Michailidis (op. cit., pp. 47-50) concludes: This undoubtedly represents a radicalization of the irredentist ideology of FYROM after 1998, inspite of the Interim Accord (emphasis added). It constitutes an emergent attempt to construct the national myth of the neighboring nation, via an aggressive appropriation of the historical past of the region, which culminates even with claiming of the
Incidentally, Vlasidis (2003, pp. 313-314, 331-332) makes a reference to the appearance of a series of negative publishings during the period Summer 1996-December 1999 regarding the treatment of minorities in Northern Greece. He said that this activity was not emanating directly from the government or the press but from various Aegean organizations that had very close relations with the goverming party (SDSM) and many of which were subsidized from the state budget. Vlasidis lists the more active Aegean organizations and their presidents (the names of two of the four presidents are Alexander). It seems that these Aegean organizations were a strong lobby both within the country and also abroad, in cooperation with emigrant organizations. However, with the improvement of relations between Greece and FYROM due to Greek investments, the acquittal of Rainbow party cadres, and the greater flexibility of Athens with regard to visits by children of the aegean refugees to their birthplaces by late 1998, there appeared in the FYROM press for the first time articles critical of Aegean organizations, that they are on a state-diet (kratikodiaitoi) and that they sustain political division for their benefit(op. cit., pp. 331-332). Nonetheless, more systematic studies are needed to assess the demographic and political impact of aegean macedonians in FYROM society.
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76 ancient Greek heritage and its prehistoric legacies. The phrase prior tempore fortio jure interprets in an optimal manner the specific attempt at construction of a macedonian identity, divergent from the Greek, which continues incessantly its historical course from the prehistoric period and culminates in todays descendants the residents of FYROM. With respect to the elementary history textbooks, Mavrogenis conducted a content analysis of the new history textbooks (2005 editions) for the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th grades.88 According to Mavrogenis (Society for Macedonian Studies, 2007, pp. 57-76), the new books contain less text and more graphics. In addition, there is more coverage of world and Balkan history and less on national history. In the units on Balkan history, about 50% of the text covers history of the Albanian nation and state. Aside from the quantitative changes, the author also recognized as a positive development the serious efforts by the authors to restrict the excesses in phraseology chararteristic of previous texts which targeted the affect of

students. Nonethless, she concludes that the new texts continue to cultivate in the student population the vision of a Greater Macedonia via (1) the geographic determination of what constitutes mother country (Macedonia as discreet from pre-history) (2) the demonstration of a historical continuity of the mother country (from antiquity through the medieval and byzantine period country89 to the time of the 1913 Bucharest Treaty) (3) the

documentation of the homegeneity of the national identity of the population of the mother (4) the partitioning/dismemberment of the mother country by the 1913 Bucharest Treaty that interrupted the continuity from antiquity to the 20th Century and (5) the

According to Mavrogenis, the textbooks are written on the basis of a national curriculum program developed by the Pedagogical Institute of FYROM. Based on national legislation, at least two books are available for each grade. Mavrogenis analyzed the four new books, one for each of the four grades. Two new history books for the 5th and 6th grades published by another publishing house were not available during the writing. However, since the texts are based on a common curriculum, the author concludes that their inclusion would not lead to divergent conclusions. 89 For the sake of homogeneity, and in order to maintain the idea of continuity of national character since antiquity, the textbook authors present the ancient Macedonians as different in language and customs from the Greeks. The authors even overlook the hellenization theory of the higher strata of ancient Macedonians that they used in previous texts to account for the plethora of Greek inscriptions in archaelogical findings, they view the hellenistic civilization as the product of Macedonian and hellenic influence, they portray the contact between the descending Slavs in the 8th Century and the indigenous Macedonians who were Christian and had a higher civilization as leading to cooperation and the mutual acceptance by the Slavs of the name Macedonia for their new country and by the indigenenous Macedonians of the slavic language. Thus, according to Mavrogenis (Society for Macedonian Studies., 2007, pp. 62-64), the use of the term Macedonians {As used by slavomacedonian historiography) antedates the christianization of the Slavs in the region During for example Samuels reign the texts say that the largest part of the macedonian empire was inhabited by macedonians and to a lesser extent by Greeks, Armenians, Vlachs, Serbs and others Apart from that, according to {name in Cyrillic}, Saints Cyrillos and Methodius were descendants of Slavs from Thessaloniki (See historical section for the reconstruction of history by the founders of the Peoples Republic of Macedonia in the 1940s in the service of the then geopolitical interests)

88

77 suppression of the macedonian minority who remained in Greece following the partition.90 A new dimension in the 2005 textbooks according to Mavrogenis (op. cit., 57-58) is the incitation of Albanian irredentism by references to persecution of the Albanian population in Greece following the Bucharest Treaty, the interwar period and during the occupation. Undoubtedly, this new dimension represents an attempt at pacification of the Albanian minority in FYROM following the 1999-2001 insurrection rather than an attempt to implement the 2002 Ohrid Agreement leading to the genuine integration of the Albanian minority. Bureaucratic and administrative problems. During the early years of the Interim Accord implementation (1995-1996), problems were reported mainly with regard to the movement of peoples, vehicles and products. Usually, these were submitted as protests by FYROM authorities. Specifically, these involved among other things the special stickers on the automobiles from FYROM, the rejection in some cases of certificates of product origin with the designation of Macedonia, the denial of permission for landing by the Corfu Airport Authorities to an airplane with the designation Palair Makedonija (Macedonian Airlines?), the non-participation of FYROM in the an Interbalkan Conference in Sofia because of Athenss veto for the name under which FYROM would participate, the denial of Greek border authorites to allow visits of FYROM citizens born in Greek territory because their birthplace (toponym) was designated in their passports in the slavomacedonian language.91 However, after the first months of 1996, most of these problems were eliminated and the mobility of peoples and products across the borders were becoming normalized (Kofos, 2003, p. 184, Tziambiris, 2003, pp. 271-272; Vlasidis, 2003, 307-308). Between October 1995 and November 1996, a year after the implementation of the Interim Accord, 500,000 applications by FYROM citizens for entry into Greece were approved (Syrris, 2003, pp. 370-371); for the following years (1997-2000), statistics of FYROM tourists to Greece actually show a cyclical pattern (1997: 378,095; 1998: 86,910; 1999: 128,051 and 2000:

For a somewhat comparable analysis of the educational system (continuity since antiquity, differentiation from other groups, the invokation of a past macedonian state structure, the cultivation of a sense of historical injustice and victimization by neighboring peoples), the reader is referred to Vlasidis (2003, pp. 336-358). 91 Although the authorities of the two countries had signed an agreement that FYROM citizens whose passports referred to their birthplace using a slavic name would not be allowed to enter, some FYROM citizens protested. One of these was Alexander Popovski, the President of the Association of Aegean Macedonians (otherwise Dostoinstvo or Dignity) who said that we would never agree to be recorded in our passports that we were born in Greece. This would be tantamount to a humiliating deprivation of identity for those Macedonians who were born in the Aegean department of Macedonia (Vlasidis, 2003, p. 317).

90

78 234,464), that the author attributed to the enforcement of Sengen in 1998 and the Greek requirement of a visa for FYROM citizens entering Greece (Nikas, 2003, pp. 131-133)92

Progress on the name issue. The period 1995-2002, that covered the first seven years of Interim Accord implementation, was also accompanied by a number of

earthshaking geopolitical and other regional events (e.g. the bombing of Serbia by NATO in 1999, the interethnic crisis of 2001 in FYROM, the withdrawal of historical figures, C. Caramanlis, A. Papandreou and Kiro Gligorov from politics, the commencement of negotiations for the signing of the Stabilization and Accession Pact between FYROM and EU in 2000, changes in composition of Ministries of foreign Affairs etc.) that affected the course and the content of the name-dispute. During the period 1996-2000, when Greek foreign policy was in the hands of PM Constantinos Simitis and Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodore Pagalos, the Simitis government cooperated wtih the multilateral UN infrastructure in New York (Cyrus Vance) but also inaugurated a more aggressive policy of direct talks coupled with packages of economic proposals and a hard language of realism (Kofos, 2003, p. 190). There took place several visits by Pagalos to FYROM, for talks with the

government officials (President Gligorov, PM Georgievski and Foreign Ministers). In the first three years after the Simitis govevrnment took over (1996-1999), there was noted an opening of the Greek government toward more composite solutions (e.g. Republic of Macedonia Skopje, Nova Macedonia), but there was no policy consistency as the government often reverted to the maximalist 1992 positions (not macedonia or its derivatives) and vaccilated between two proposed names, Republic of Macedonia Skopje and Nova Macedonia (Zacharakis, Eleftheros Typos, 18/05/08). For a time (Summer 1998), the name Republic of Macedonia Skopje was about to be proposed to the international team for all intenational uses, as the choice name of the two sides. During his visits to FYROM, Pagalos tried to convince Gligorov that holding on to the constitutional name argument violated the Interim Accord that called for a mutually acceptable solution. Pagalos also reminded him that negotiations do not mean that one

The Interim Accord had also provisions for cooperation between the two nations in other sectors (e.g. the environment, disasters etc.). In the area of the environment, Kofos and Vlasidis (2003, pp. 408-413) in a calendar of significant bilateral actions, list the signing of accords, memoranda, and other documents regarding energy, the environmental protection and sustainable development of the Prespes region, the environment and sustainable development in general, and interborder water management. It will be recalled that the river Vardar after which FYROM was named before 1944, traverses both countries and empties in the Aegean Sea (Axios in Greece). A more systematic analysis is needed to assess actual practices and outcomes of these bilateral programs.

92

79 side remains in its initial position while the other side is compelled to make full concessions (Kofos, 2003, p. 190). Gligorov himself appeared to accept a double-name formula, with FYROM using the constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia) for international purposes and Greece selecting whatever name it wanted for the bilateral relations between the two countries. Gligorov added that he would never monopolize the term Macedonia since Northern Greece is also called Macedonia (Tziambiris, 2003, p. 275). Along the same lines (June 1998), FYROMs Foreign Minister B. Hatzinski said that while he understood that for Greece there are other Macedonia departments in other countries and the desire of Greece to call them by another name, he said that their constitutional name could not change, that the proposed Republic of Macedonia Skopje also is not feasible since it would require a change in our constitution something not possible, so the the issue would have to remain pending and there is nothing smarter than to learn to live with that (Tziambiris, 2003, p. 276). Nonetheless, the solution Republic of Macedonia Skopje seems to have been promoted by the new government of FYROM (VMRO-DPMNE) under PM Georgievski in December 1998, though a series of events including the bombing of Serbia in March 1999, with the attendant mass influx of refugees from Kosovo, the resignation of Th. Pagalos following the Ocalan affair, the inability of Greece to use effectively its new carrot-stick policies, the priorities of the Interim Accord 2003, pp. 194-196).93 During the period 1999-2001, the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, as well as the March 1999 events in Kosovo, played a role in the course of the name-dispute. Thus, the European Parliament (February 2000) said (1) that an integral part the Stability/Association pact negotiations should include the change of the anachronistic name since it does not accord with a forward looking regional approach and (2) called upon both Greece and FYROM to exploit the improved political and economic relations {attendant to the Interim Accord} to find a mutually acceptable solution on the name (Tziambiris, 2003, pp. 277-278)94. Indeed, there were several meetings between the Fall of 2000 and the
During 1991, a period when nationalist frenzy was at its height, Georgievskis party (VMRO-DPMNE) proclaimed the vision of a Greater Macedonia, and expressed the hope that the next party convention have as a venue the city of Solun {Thessaloniki in Greek Macedonia}. When confronted 7 years later by the historian E. Kofos (2003, p. 194) he justified his partys platform by admitting: We all have gone through our childhood diseases. Invoking at the same time Clintons famous saying, Its the economy stupid, Georgevski promised that during his new administration his policy will focus by 90% on the economy (Kofos, 2003, p. 194). 94 Fearing that the European course of FYROM would require a compromize on the constitutional name, the presiding Board of the FYROM Writers Center issued an announcement that not only defended the
93

and the domestic priorities of FYROM

(economy) relegated the new proposal to the category of collateral losses (See Kofos,

80 beginning of 2001, between the New Minister of Foreign Affairs George Papandreou and the new PM L. Georgievski. According to historian E. Kofos (2003, pp. 198-200) both men concluded that the circumstances (e.g. Interim Accord contributing to economic development, promises of the Stabilization and Association Pact, the social and economic costs of Kosovo refugees after the 1999 bombing of Serbia, fears of domino impacts on local population, less nationalistic public opinion, American factor, the initiatives of the two men etc.) favored a compromize. Among several possible compound names supposedly discused were Nova Macedonija and Gorna Makedonija. According to later reports of Alexis Papahelas, both PM Georgievski and the Opposition Leader Branco Crvenkovski, had reassured PM Constantinos Simitis in February 2001 that they would support Gorna Makedonija as a name for international uses and were ready to sign an agreement with Greece. This was to be accompanied by guarantees for ecomomic assistance and security on the part of Greece. Nonetheless, other sources (Tziambiris, 2003, p. 282) report the

reactions to these compromize proposals of the opposition were absolutely negative. While the position of the main opposition regarding the Gorna Macedonia proposal remains to be clarified, what cannot be questioned is that immediately after the hostilities broke out between the Albanian guerrillas and the FYROM Security Forces (March 2001), FYROM officials themselves were called upon, to put aside the negotiation for the name-dispute, to give priority to the matters of survival of the new Republic, and to let international NGOs take over following the termination of the hostilities (Kofos, 2003, pp. 196-200; Tziambiris 2003, pp. 277-282).95 The torch for Gorna Macedonia was taken over by the International Crisis Group (ICG)96, an international NGO which reportedly played a decisive role in the 2001 Ohrid Agreement between the Slavomacedonians and the Albanians in FYROM. In its report {released on 10/12/2001, Human Rights Day}, Macedonias Name: Why the Dispute Matters
constitutional name but also requested of the Government to take the necessary steps in order to revise the UN decision about the provisional name which they considered a violation of the UN charter. This decision was also endorsed by the Senate of the St. Cyrillos & Methodius University (Tziambiris, 2003, pp. 277-278). 95 The Holy Synod of Greece, sensing an impending compromize by the Greek government on the name, issued a press release (5/03/01) , reiterating its 1992 maximalist positions against the use of the term Macedonia by FYROM. They saw the use of the term as a usurpation of Greek history and culture, opening the door to irredentist claims and an insult to Greek dignity and historical truth. In addition, it noted that the Church cannot overlook the protests of the Organizations of Macedonian Emigrants {Greek}, nor the concerns and anxieties of its parishioners living in Northern Greece. It concluded that if we sign such an agreement, then in few years they might even forbid the Northern Greeks to call themselves Macedonians (Kofos, 2003, p. 236). 96 According to historian Kofos (2003, pp. 205-209; 2005, pp. 170-171) the ICG is an international NGO whose board consists of prominent figures in the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media, which at times of heightened trouble stations its teams in the crisis areas and which unofficially appears to assist the diplomatic initiatives of Western (mainly the US) and international organizatons.

81 and How to Resolve it, the ICG underlines the continuing importance of the name for FYROM, not only for its national identity but also for its survival and creates the impression that its exisence is threatened by the intransigence of Greece regarding the name, the {relative} denial of Bulgaria to recognize the macedonian language and the unwillingness of Serbia to recognize the Macedonian church (Tziambiris, 2003, p. 285). In addition, the report acknowledges that because of pressures by international mediators (e.g. EU, US etc.) the Slavomacedonians were forced to make concessions to the ethnic

Albanians unprecedented for a Balkan nation and concludes that there are no more margins for concessions to Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia on the part of FYROM with regard to the name-dispute. The ICG proposes a double-name solution, recommending that Greece use the term Gorna Makedonia (Upper Macedonia) in its bilateral relations with FYROM and in international organizations, while the name Republika Makedonija with its

slavomacedonian pronounciation and written in Latin would be used erga omnes in all other cases (i.e. by all other countries in all situations); the term Republika Makedonija would be found under the letter R, in the alphabetical directory of the U.N. The ICG proposal was also accompanied by a number of concessions to be made to Greece by FYROM, including such things as Greeces right to call inhabitants of FYROM Upper Macedonians, the harmonization of FYROM school textbooks (especially history and geography) to international standards and commitment by FYROM not to object to the commercial usage by Greece of terms such as Macedonia or Macedonian.97 While the ICG proposal acknowledges the importance of guarantees for Greek history, culture and identity, Greek historians and political analysts saw the more favorable to the FYROM proposal as a trade off paid by the Greeks and calculated simultaneously to assuage of the guilt of the ICG members for the concessions the Slavomacedonians were forced to make to the Albanians in the Ohrid Agreement (Kofos, 2003, pp. 196-209; Tziambiris, 2003, pp. 283-293). Nonetheless, the severest criticism leveled against the ICG proposal came from the intellectual community of FYROM and specifically the Academy of Sciences and Arts. In a relevant Memorandum, the Academy besides rejecting proposals for review of FYROM textbooks, rejects the proposal for the Latin version of the name (Republika Makedonija) because it would be the only member-nation in the UN whose name would not be translated into English, because Latin is not used in FYROM and would create problems in nations
The writer puts quotation marks around the word concessions because it is presumptuous, to put it mildly, on the part of the ICG to cast FYROM in a role to make concessions when its exclusive claims to Macedonian history, language and culture have been challenged by both Bulgarian, Greek and many other independent historians .
97

82 using the Cyrillic alphabet and because it would create confusion since the various membernations of the UN pronounce differently the letter j. The Academy also viewed the concession allowing Greece to call the residents of FYROM as Upper Macedonians as unprecedented in modern history, as depriving the national character of a people who has lived for centuries in Macedonia and as denying their macedonian identity (Tziambiris, 2003, pp. 288-290). According to Tziambiris (op. cit., p. 290), the Memorandum of the Academy {which he labels as a Memorandum of intransigence) provided a scientific cover for maximalist platforms, for an exclusive use of the term macedonia by FYROM and for rejecting any sort of compromize proposal regarding the nameand this despite the fact that the President Boris Traikovski, the Georgievski Government, most of the former Foreign Ministers and all the significant slavomacedonian parties (op. cit.. pp. 287, 290) had seen positive aspects in the proposal. An attempt to salvage the ICG proposal by FYROMs Foreign Minister (Slobodan Tsasoule) in February 2002 by substituting Republic of Macedonia Skopje for Gorna Macedonia (op. cit., pp. 290-293) came to nought as the country was preparing for national elections (15/09/02). Although the author does not have access to the Greek governments reaction to the ICGs proposal {at that time the erga omnes position had not yet crystallized}, one could infer its reactions from the publication of a non paper text in the Foreign Ministrys webpage (electronic politics) on 28 January 2002.. The text states that Greece supports a compromize, composite solution, that will contribute to regional stabilization. It adds that the Greek Parliament would never accept the name Republic of Macedonia. It requests of its partners and third countries to take into account Greeces attempts for regional stabilization (refers to a series of relevant activities by Athens), to intercede in Skopje for a quick resolution of the problem and meanwhile to avoid using the term Macedonia. While this might be the first time that the Simitis government took a clear stand (even if electronic politics) for a composite solution, according to Kofos (2003, p. 189) the text conveys the impression to the FYROM authorities that time works for them. The lack of substantial progress on the name issue 12 years after the signing of the Interim Accord seems to vindicate the Greek cassandras of 1995, who had called for a big package that would have also included a solution for the name (Kofos, 2005, p.156 ). The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, acknowledged that the the very good economic cooperation that had been achieved by the end of the Interim Accord period was not sufficient by itself to solve the name-dispute (Kofos, 2003, p. 209). It seems that the focus on economicconfidence measures (the substructure) rather than on cultural-

83 symbolic measures which include the name (the superstructure) may not have been the correct strategy after all. But then what time-frame should one use to determine success or failure of an international strategy? Also, consideration had to be given to the alternative gains, in terms of stabilization and geopolitical gains for Greece and the region. Another factor in the postponement of the solution had nothing to do with the priorities in the Interim Accord but with the priorities of the geopolitical events (e.g. the bombardment of Serbia and the 2001 ethnotic crisis in FYROM) which relegated the name to the backstage, but which crises may nonetheless have been surpassed thanks to the priorities of the Interim Accord. Finally, one of the decisive long-standing factors, perhaps, for the non-solution may have been the mutual fear of political costs, in both of the countries, if they had adopted a composite name solution; in fact, before the signing of the Interim Accord, there were suspicions of collusion between the leaders of the Greek and Skopje governments for postponements of bilateral negotiations after national elections in both countries (To Vima, 30/5/1993). The mutual strategy of non-solution for the avoidance of political costs may have continued even after the signing of the Interim Accord, which translates into a nonwillingness of political leaders in both countries to transcend populism.

Table 1. Recognition Status of FYROM as of 7/11/2007

Continent As Republic As of FYROM Macedonia Europe Oceania Asia America Africa Republic of No Diplomatic Total Macedonia Relations/No & FYROM RecognitionYet/ Unclarified

Total

13 4 26 22 32 97

22 2 8 5 6 43

11 --2 2 1 16

2 7 4 7 15 35

48 13 40 36 54 191

However, aside from political costs, there may have been other differential incentives for the leadership in the two countries to postpone a solution: for Greece, to allow for a change of maximalist attitudes in the Greek society and for FYROM to obtain more bilateral recognitions and to present Greece and the international community with a fait accompli, a de facto situation. In fact, by 1996 some 72 countries had recognized FYROM. Soon after that, President Gligorov submitted an application to the UN for changing the provisional name and adopting the constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia) asserting that two thirds of the 72 countries which had recognized FYROM had done so with its constitutional

84 name. However, FYROMs application was rejected, as the number of countries that had

recognized FYROM with its constitutional name did not comprise two-thirds of the United Nations members. Gligorov later stated that he would come back when two thirds of the UN members will have recognized FYROM with its constitutional name (Kofos, 2005, pp. 153). According to Wikipedia (The Free Encyclopedia), as of September 2007, 118 countries had recognized FYROM with its constitutional name.98 Nonethless, Wikipedia does not give a complete list of the countries which have recognized FYROM with its constitutional name, so we cannot assess the accuracy of these statistics. A classification of 191 UN member countries by recognition-status based on UN statistics and compiled by Greek diplomatic services shows that as of November 2007, 97 countries had recognized FYROM with its constitutional name, 43 had recognized it as FYROM, 16 countries had a dual relationship with FYROM (e.g. As FYROM in the United Nations but a as Republic of Macedonia in its bilateral relations) and 35 nations who had not yet recognized or established diplomatic relations with FYRFOM (See Table 1). Among those that recognized FYROM with its constitutional name were populous and significant members of the UN Security Council (e.g. US, China, Russia etc), all the countries that had been part of the Yugoslav Federation, and a large number of other countries from various continents, many of which are small island-nations. On the other hand, large and significant countries (e.g. France, Germany, Italy, India, Japan, Indonesia, Egypt, etc), some of them also members of the UN Security Council, but also a few island nations had recognized FYROM with its provisional name. Undoubtedly, the above statistics may have undergone between November 2007 and May 2008, since FYROM claims 121 states have recognized it with its constitutional name. Nonetheless, what constitutes recognition has to be better operationally defined by social scientists knowledgeable of international law, i.e. the method and the conditions of recognition. For example, Bulgaria has recognized FYROM with its constitutional name by a decision of the Parliament; however, Bulgaria has not recognized the macedonian ethnicity or a macedonian language for reasons explained in the historical part of this document. Aside from that, some of the countries which have already recognized FYROM with its constitutional name (e.g. Russia) have publicly announced that they will adopt the name that the two countries will mutually agree in the context of the UN negotiations.99

See http://en.wikipedia.org In a way, when this materializes, symbolically it will represent a closure for Russia, if one takes into account its historical contribution to the genesis of this conflict (See historical section). Incidentally, on 23 July 2008, after a meeting between the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ambassador of Panama in Athens, the
99

98

85 An interesting question for political sociologists has to do with the accounting of the differences among nation states with regard to their stand on the battle of cultural symbols between Greece and FYROM. Perhaps some of the countries, which have recognized

FYROM with its constitutional name, have done so because of general principles that give the nations the right to self-determination. Others may have done so or not depending upon their level of awareness or appreciation of classical Greek antiquity (e.g. classics chairs in the universities) and of the semiotics of names in the Balkan history a lack of awareness for which the diplomatic services and the intellectual community of Greece should be faulted.100 For others, the migrant communities in the host countries and the level of its

effectiveness may have played a decisive role in the countrys diplomatic choice. For still others, the role of professional lobbies, recruited by either Greece or FYROM, may have played a more significant role than even levels of classical awareness or the demographics of the diasporas. Finally, and these may be the most decisive factor of them all, social scientists should explore the role of economic, political, military and commercial interests as well as the relationship of smaller nations to the nework of significant nations as determinants of the nations choice in the battle of cultural symbols.

B. FYROM, NATO, EU Integration Processes According to the Interim Accord signed by the two countries (13/9/1995), Article 11, Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part {Greece} agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part {FYROM} in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 817 (1993). Theoretically, Greece should not object to membership of FYROM either in NATO (a multilateral regional organization) or the

Panama Ambassador announced that it changes its position on the name and henceforth it will adopt the temporary name (FYROM) in all its bilateral and multilateral relations. 100 This is a working hypothesis. Of interest may be an excerpt about Alexanders Invasion of India from a Standard Six History of Ancient India school textbook: The Greek king Alexander vanquished the Iranian empire and then invaded India. He crossed the Indus and reached Takshashila. Some of the local Indian kings opposed him fiercely. The text goes on to describe the impact of Alexanders invasion on Indian trade, culture and coinage. The author would like to thank Prof. Popat N. Patil, Ohio State University, for taking the time during his trip to India to do the research and to furnish me with the English version of the textbook.

86 European Union (a multilateral regional institution) if FYROM applies for membership with its provisional name (Former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia); consequently, exercising a veto by the First Part would violate the Interim Agreement. Nonetheless,

Greece has maintained that a bilateral agreement must be respected by all parties to the agreement; the questions have been raised (Ta Nea, 21/09/07) if Greece is bound by this Accord since FYROM has violated a number of other provisions of the Interim Accord (e.g. Article 7, paragraph 3) by renaming its national airport Alexander the Great as well as the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 817 when the President of the UN General Assembly (of FYROM) introduced the President of FYROM as President of the Republic of Macedonia (Kathimerini, 30/9/2007). The fact that FYROM has not respected the Interim Agreement may justify Greeces decision to block FYROMs admission in international institutions and organizations, such as NATO and the EU, which admit new members on the basis of consensus. 1. Integration of FYROM into NATO. The discussion for the admission of the three Balkan countries (FYROM, Croatia and Albania) into NATO was scheduled for the

Organizations Summit meeting in Bucharest on April 2, 2008, although there was at times talk for postponement of the decision, not so much because of the name-controversy but because of the possible destabilizing impact of the impending Kosovo declaration of independence and because of questions regarding the fullfilment of substantive criteria such as meeting democractic political standards and the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement regarding the treatment of the Albanian minority, combatting corruption, demarcation of borders with Kosovo, relations with neigboring countries (Gaber-Damjanovska & Jovenska, 2007, pp. 13-14; Ta Neal 6/11/07; To Vima, 4/11/07, Ethnos, 11/11/07; Eleftherotypia, 13/11/07).101 However, as soon as there were signs that the Kosovo declaration of

independence would proceed without any major destabilizing repercussions for FYROM and NATO (and this was reinforced by the outcome of Presidential Serbian elections), the talk about postponement was halted and the reports on FYROMs readiness for admission (e.g. regarding military organization, constitutional progress, relations with its minorities and economic relations with Greece) became more favorable regardless of the actual situation pertaining to the admission criteria ( Ta Nea, 21/12/07; Ta Nea, 21/1/08).
There were fears among the Western Powers (US, UK, etc.) that the imminent declaration of independence by Kosovo Parliament may destabilize FYROM with its large Albanian minority population, encouraging secessionist movements in order to form the Greater Albania. Nonetheless, among the criteria initially mentioned by the US permanent representative to NATO was the necessity to establish good relations with neighbors, that also includes a settlement of the name-dispute with Greece ( Eleftherotypia, 13/11/07).
101

87 According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of FYROM, A. Milososki, 90% of the FYROM citizens were for integration in NATO and the Prime Minister of FYROM (N. Gruevski) said it would be to the best interests of all in the region (including Greece) as it would guarantee stability (Ta Nea, 16/10/07; Eleftherotypia 10/10/07). FYROM

officials also warned of the possible destabilizing impact of the impending Kosovo declaration of independence as a complicating factor--meaning of course the impact on an autonomist Albanian movement within FYROM. In other words, the FYROM leaders held Greece accountable for the possible internal destabilization, not themselves who remained intransigent on the name issue nor the Western Powers who were competing for new spheres of influence and unilaterally carving out of the Balkans new nations without following UN procedures. According to political analyst, John Kartalis, with the integration of the three Balkan countries into NATO, Washington aimed to establish in the Balkans an American sphere of influence to counterbalance the Moscow-Belgrade Axis. The same aim is also served by the declaration of the independence of Kosovo, with the arbitrary detachment of a section from Serbia territory, violating all the rules of international law (To Vima, 9/2/2008).

Flag-raising celebrating the declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo following its unilateral secesssion from Serbia ( Eleftheros Typos, 17/02/08)

It is no secret that the U.S. and most of the major NATO countries, were among the protagonists in the latest version of the Balkan ethnogenesis. A symbiotic relationship among the U.S., NATO, Kosovo and FYROM antedated the declaration of independence by Kosovo and the FYROM application for admission to NATO. First, during the 1999 Yugoslav crisis, FYROM was used as a staging ground for the movement of NATO troops into

88 Kosovo. Second, following the Albanian insurrection (NLA) for minority rights and the signing of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement by the leaders of the four political parties paticipating in the ecumenical government, NATO undertook the task (Operation Essential Harvest) of disarmament of the NLA ( Roudemotof, 2002, pp. 217-218; Mihou, 2005, 288-291).102 Third, the US opposition toward the 2004 referendum, that if voted would have rescinded a law granting more political rights to the Albanian minority in accordance with the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, contributed possibly to a defusion of potential ethnic conflict103. Fourth, the continuing presence of UN KFOR and NATO elements in the region is responsible for a relative stability in FYROM (Papavizas, p. 239). Fifth, FYROM troops have participated in British contingents within the NATO-led forces in Afganistan and have also supported American intervention in Iraq (International Herald Tribune-Europe, 3/12/07). Sixth, FYROM has signed a series of treaties with the US that exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (International Herald Tribune-Europe 3/12/07). Thus, besides the need to secure a new sphere of influence (and also future allies within EU if these countries become members of EU), there is also the need to reward these emergent countries by facilitating their integration into NATO for their contribution to USinitiated humanitarian and anti-terrorist interventions.104 Not surprisingly, the US and other major Western European NATO members (Germany, France, UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy) were among the first to recognize Kosovo after its unilateral declaration of independence on 17/2/08. In addition, the US/NATO adopted a two-front campaign, mainly by exchange of visits between the State Department and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries and by visits of the NATO officials to the two countries. The goal of the official exchange of visits was to discourage the use of veto by Greece and to encourage FYROM and Greece to compromize on the name, not only to stabilize the new Republic of Kosovo but also to
In Operation Essential Harvest also participated a Greek military force of 400 men in order to collect and destroy the weapons surrendered by the two embattled groups in FYROM (Zaikos, 2003, p. 53) 103 The law involved reorganization of electoral districts in such a way that would increase Albanian representation allowing them to elect their own mayors and/or requiring the government to establish the use of Albanian as a second official language. The referendum was defeated because of the poor turnout (required 50% of electorate and only 25% voted) because the government (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia with B. Crvenkovski as Prime Minister and the Albanian party (DUI) taking part in the government coalition were against it. On the other hand, the VMRO-DPMNE opposition campaigned for the recall of the law. Journalistic reports say that the local US Ambassador Lawrence Butler took an open position against the referendum. According to the leaders of the government coalition, the citizens of FYROM by defeating the referendum opted for the European Union (Ta Nea, 8/11/04). 104 Although for U.S. geopolitical interests take precedence, it has also been said (Kathimerini, 2/3/08) that President Bush wants the integration of the three Balkan countries into NATO before he leaves office, so that he can count it among his administrations accomplishmentsand brace up his posthumous reputation.
102

89 prevent destabilization of FYROM due to the large minority of Albanians who might claim autonomy, especially after the recognition of Kosovo and the visions of a Greater Albania. More specifically, the discouragement of Greece has taken various forms including

psychological pressures, such as interpreting the use of the veto as an act violating the principle of solidarity among the allies, or holding her accountable for contributing to destabilization, though the Greek government has denied subjection to such pressures. The encouragement of FYROM to compromize included not only the need to demonstrate good neighbor relations with Greece as an essential prerequisite for admission to the defense organization but also the underlying threat of destabilization and dissolution in case of an impasse on the name-dispute and the utilization of veto by Greece.105

Upper Left. Foreign Ministers of Greece (Dora Bacoyiannis) and the U.S. (Condoleezza Rice) during the formers visit to Washington (To Vima, 9/03/08). Upper Right. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Victoria Newland and Prime Minister Gruevski during the formers visit to FYROM (To Vima, 16/03/08). Below: NATO General Secretary Giap de Hop Schefer during his visits with Prime Minister K. Caramanlis in Athens (left) and Prime Minister N. Gruevski in Skopje (right) (Ta Nea, 3/03/08; To Vima, 27/01/08).

One is often amazed by the alacrity of Eastern European countries, formerly under Soviet Union control, to become members of the Western Alliance (NATO), which theoretically, should have also been dissolved following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the termination of the Cold War, with all the regional defense organizations coming under a UN command, after of course a restructuring of the UN organization. Social science is called upon to use its research tools to assess the causes and consequences of this international behavior and find out why humanity lost the opportunity for organizational learning. Is it a backlash overreaction by new nations to the oppression and insecurity under communist control? Do they associate the alliance with securing of democracy? Do they expect acceleration of economic development and enjoyment of the consumption goods of Western democracies? In any case, the expansion and recruitment of NATO, besides serving the interests of the leading members, may dialectically lead to a resurgence of the Cold War bereft of the classical ideological content, with all that it implies for escalating into a hot war, the draining of natural resources and the destruction of environment.

105

90 Yet despite the application of pressures against the Greek use of the veto, the chances are that Greece will actually use veto against the FYROM membership to force FYROM into a compromize on the name in order to forestall internal destabilization of the governing party and defections to the ultranationalist party by its deputies and its constituency from Greek Macedonia but also to prevent north-south regional polarization in view of the fact that Greek Macedonia demographically constitutes 1/3 of the Greeces population, more than the population of FYROM, and a major source of New Democracy voters. The fact that the governing party governs with a marginal minority makes it more vulnerable and sensitive to the intraparty opposition and increases the probability of veto usage. Another factor reinforcing the use of veto by Greece are the results of public opinion surveys. Greek public opinion polls conducted during the last five months (October 2007 February 2008) indicated that between and 4/5 of the Greek citizens would agree with the use of the VETO by Greece to block FYROMs membership in NATO if FYROM does not accept a compromize (See Table 2). Greece may be forced to use the veto (its last good card), seeing that the overwhelming majority of the electorate supports the use of veto if no mutually acceptable solution is found, that multilateral negotiations have had no result up to now, that the countries de facto recognizing FYROM with its constitutional name have increased and that FYROM is becoming all the more entrenched in its intransigent position. Table2. Greek Public Opinion regarding the Exercise of Veto for Membership in NATO in case FYROM Refuses to Compromize on the Name** Opinion categories MRB 31/10/2007 Telephone Survey (N=1007) 83,4% 10,9% 5,6% 100,0% MRB 22/11/ 3/12/2007 Field Survey (N = 2100) KAPA Research 1922/2/2008 Telephone survey (N= 6379) 74,3% 82,0% 15,9% 9,7% 100,0% 10,0% 8,0% 100,0% MARC 2223/2/2008 Telephone survey (N=903) 83,7% 11,2% 5,1% 100,0%

Yes, use veto No, compromize DK/NA Total

**There was some variation in the above surveys in the formulation of the question. In the MRB surveys, the respondents were asked to express their opinion as to what Greece should do regarding the integration of FYROM if FYROM refuses to compromize on the name. In the KAPA research survey, the respondents were asked to express their opinion if Greeces proposal {which is a composite name} was not accepted, while in the MARC survey the respondents were asked to express their opinion about Greece vetoing FYROMs membership in international organizations in case a mutually acceptable solution was not found.

91 The ramifications of the use of veto by Greece. FYROM officials, both from the government and the Presidents office, respond to the threat of the use of veto by saying that its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia) constitutes an integral part of their

national identity and if Greece used VETO, they would choose to remain outside of NATO ( Ta Nea, 22/10/07). A survey done in FYROM showed that the overwhelming majority of the citizens (83%) would not agree to a change of the countrys constitutional name if that was the price to pay for membership in NATO, while 16% would agree to a change of the constitutional name of the country in order to join NATO (Macedonia Daily, 10/3/2008; Ta Nea, 11/3/2008).106 In turn, there are those who say that the use of veto would become a boomerang for Greece. This senario says that that FYROM would interpret the move as a violation of 1995 Interim Accord, would accuse Greece of not respecting multilateral agreements, denounce the Accord and seek recognition with its constitutional name through the UN Security Council and the General Assembly-in view of the fact that a significant number of countries have already recognized FYROM with its constitutional name. The chances for this scenario to materialize are increased, in case of destabilization of the FYROM, following a declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians that would also impact on the large Albanian minority within FYROM, provoking underdog sympathies for FYROM (Ethnos, 11/11/07; Ta Nea, 26-27/10/07).107 Naturally, this scenario presumes that FYROM will

have credibility in the UN organizations and that the UN member countries will approve of its new application. Such credibility, however, is not guaranteed if no destabilization occurs following declaration of Kosovo independence, in view of the fact that FYROM has on its record several violations of the Interim Agreement and, most important of all, in view of FYROMs intransigence following Greeces rapproachement and unequivocal willingness compromize on the name. 2. Integration into the European Union. In 16 December 2005, FYROM was

accorded the status of a candidate country for integration in the European Community. The determination of the date for the commencement of integration negotiations depended mainly
The survey was done by the Center for Research and Policy Making of FYROM (www.macedoniadaily.org); an electronic search done to locate more details of the survey (e.g. formulation of question, sample etc.) brought no results. 107 There are also scenarios (deliberate leaks to the press) that would have FYROM reverting to the original flag symbol, renaming streets using Alexander the Great name etc. in case Greece vetos FYROMs admission to NATO (Ta Nea, 13/2/2008). And this despite the fact that FYROM government officials in the past (e.g. Gligorov) have denied descent to the ancient macedonians. The use of the Alexander the Great symbolisms as a bargaining tactic may have an impact on those nations and governments who do not know Balkan history. For those who know history, these threats have no value in negotiations.
106

92 upon the extent to which FYROM met the Copenhagen criteria for admission. In June 2007, the European Parliament voted the annual report on the progress that FYROM had made during 2006. The Report noted the relative progress in minority rights, political processes, common defense, the Ohrid Framework Agreement, EU-FYROM visa requirements, biometric passports, etc. Simultaneously, it also noted a retardation in the pace of the process and room for improvement with regard to the practical implementation of new legislation, especially with regard to equitable representation of minorities in public administration, the transfer of political communication in the Assembly, the organization and functionning of the police and the judiciary policy, the protection of the environment, the construction of crossborder infrastructures, the demarcation of Kosovo/FYROM borders, the unemployment rate and the trafficking of people and organized crime (EU Parliament, Final Report, 8/6/2007; Gaber-Damjanovska & Jovevska, June 2007). With regard to the name-dispute, the EU Report noted progress with respect to the redesigning of the national flag and the constitutional changes to prevent irredentism and propaganda against the neighboring countries. Nonetheless, the Report was critical of FYROM for renaming the national airport to Alexander the Great, notes the lack of progress on the resolution of the name issue since the signing of the Interim Accord (1995) and called upon both countries to settle this isssue as soon as possible, under the auspices of the United Nations. The Report also noted that important countries, like the U.S., Russia and China, as well as some states of the European Union (UK), have recognized FYROM with its constitutional name and it is of the opinion that the name-dispute per se does not and should not constitute a precondition integration into the European Union. At the same time, the 2007 Report stated that the provisional name (FYROM) caused confusion in public, both within and without the country, making such countries as the US, Russia and China to use FYROMs constitutional name. According to the authors of the Report, such historical situations (where the country name and the province name of another country are the same) were rare but they do exist (e.g.the independent country of Luxemburg is contiguous with a Belgian province with the same name, while the independent state of Moldavia uses the same name that is used by the northeast department of Romania, and Azerbaitzan has the same name as two provinces in Iran). In these cases, the Report stated that the use of the same name has not caused any problems, and it concluded that the name difference is not the problem but the fear for territorial claims. By citing these comparative cases, the EU Parliament ostensibly tried to persuade the Greek for commencement of negotiations and the

93 government to accept FYROM with its constitutional name. However, besides the

territorial claims which indeed are paramount and very salient in Balkan history, one wonders if the historical significance of the provinces in these exemplary countries was central for the countrys history and national consciousness.108 The European Parliament Report was approved by the almost all of the New Democracy delegates (except for A.Samaras who persisted in his maximalist positions) but rejected by the Socialist, the Communist and the LAOS delegates. A.Samaras who in 1992 had formed a factional Political Spring returned to the New Democracy Party. The Left Alliance Party delegate abstained from voting. Needless to say that the Socialists Communist and LAOS (ultranationalist) deputies voted against the Report for different reasons.109 The next stage in the integration process was the determination of a date for the start of negotiation. FYROM expected the date to be set during the first 6 months of 2008, when Slovenia had the Presidency; Slovenia was also a former Republic in Yugoslav Federation and also among the first to recognize FYROM with is constitutional name. Indeed, pressures have reportedly been applied by Slovenia on EU officials to set the coveted date for

negotiations assuming of course that there was progress on the criteria. As in the case of NATO, FYROM considered the name-dispute a bilateral issue and believed that its settlement should not be a precondition/criterion for the beginning of integration negotiations. Nonetheless, an article in a Skopjean newspaper (Dnevnik) reported that in a recent (October 2007) meeting between the the Vice President of FYROM and the EU official response for enlargement, half of the time was spent on the name-dispute, suggesting
In support of the FYROM arguments, Danforth (1999,p. 169) also mentions that France did not ask of Great Britain to change its name because it has a province called Bretagne. Nonetheless, United Kingdom and not Great Britain is the official name used in international relations. Though name-disputes are not a frequent phenomena, as the European Parliament Report noted, there have been other historical cases including the objection of Communist China to the use of the name of China by the Nationalist government of Taiwan and the Allies objection against Austrias use of the name German Republic of Austria after the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the goal of the Allies was to prevent the development of a strong German nation (To Vima, 14/2/1993; Danforth, 1999, pp. 169-170). 109 The 2008 European Parliament Progress Report which noted progress in most of the integration criteria but also specified the sectors that needed further improvements was approved (55 for, five against and one abstention) by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in late February (Eleftherotypia, 28/2/08) and will come for a vote in the full sesion of the Parliament on 10 April 2008. Among the five Euro deputies who voted against the report were the three Greek-members of the committee who belong to New Democracy (governing party), PASOK (Opposition) and the LAOS parties. The negative Greek vote was due mainly to an amendment of an otherwise well-balanced report that called upon both of the countries {Greece and FYROM} to increase their efforts to settle the name-dispute, which in no way should constitute an obtacle for the integration of FYROM in international organizations, in accordance with the Interim Accord of 1995. The Greek parliamentarians felt that the amendment went against the new policy of the Greek government (no solution, no invitation to join) and also violated the principle of equal distances between the European Parliament and the two countries at a crucial time in the multilateral negotiations.
108

94 that the name-dispute was a multilateral affair and would indeed constitute an important criterion for the process of integration. Undoubtedly, pressures were also applied on these

same EU officials by the Greek government which had the comparative advantage of membership (principle of solidarity) and the right to veto not only the final admission of new countries but also the setting of a date for the start of negotiation talks (meetings of Foreign Minister with EU foreign policy coordinator and EU official for enlargement in October 2007). In fact, in his report for FYROM, the European Union official (O. Rehn) postponed the setting of a date for the summer of 2008, together with Albania and Bosnia, despite Slovenian pressures (Eleftherotypia 16 & 23/10/2007; Ta Nea, 21/11/2007). Perhaps, the date for EU negotiation talks may also depend upon the outcome of the preceding NATO summit meeting.

C. Public Opinion Polls, etc. Greek public opinion polls. Although it is hard to draw definite conclusions regarding trends due to the absence of systematic surveys and the lack of methodological uniformity over time (See Table 3 footnote), the results of the Greek national gallups point to a greater willingness to accept a composite name by the general Greek Public up to October 2007 and then a decline in December 2007. Possibly, the intermediate upward trend is due to the improvement of the bilateral economic relations following the Interim Accord and the termination of the boycott. Possibly, its also due to the moratorium on mass demonstrations that characterized the period 1992-1994. The re-emergence of the issue

during the last two-three years (with the renaming of the Skopje Airport.), the need for settlement of the name issue in view of FYROMs application for NATO and EU, the recognition of FYROM with its constitutional name by the U.S. (in 2004), the intransigence of FYROM regarding the name following UN initiatives, as well as the entrance into the Greek Parliament of the ultra-nationalist party (LAOS) and the irredentist statements by metropolitans from Greek Macedonia, all these may have been responsible for the increasing chasm and the more nationalist attitudes in late December 2007. On the other hand, the increase in more positive attitudes toward a composite solution in the last few months may have also been due to the governments steady position, the unanimity of most opposition parties on a composite name and the discouragement of mass demonstrations by the almost all the parties in the Parliament regardless of ideology as well as by the new Archbishop of Greece who generally discourages involvement in politics.

95

Table 3. Survey Agency and date of research

Nationwide Greek Public Opinion Surveys (1992-2008) Reject solution that includes term Macedonia or derivatives** Accept Other Percent composite Responses or mutually acceptable name** 91,3:% 7,0% 1,7% 100% 72,7% 62,2% 60,1% 23,4% 29,7% 36,1% 3,9% 8,2% 3,6% 100% 100% 100%

Sample Size

1.MRB Hellas, 1992 2. MRB Hellas, June 1996 3. ALCO, 2224/10/2007 4. MRB HellasAlpha 31/10/2007 5. MRB Hellas, 22/11-3/12/2007 6. ALCO, 2022/2/2008

2000 2000 1,200 1008

2100

75,1%

17,1%

7,7%

100%

1000

70,4%

26,1%

3,5%

100%

7. MARC, 2223/2/2008, Telephone survey

903

68,7%

30,1%

1,2%

100%

**Often times, the results may depend upon the formulation of the question. In the first MRB survey (1992),
the respondents were asked whether they would accept (Yes, No, Maybe) variations of the term macedonia such as Slavomacedonia, Vardar Macedonia or New Macedonia. In the second MRB survey (1996), the respondents were asked whether they would accept or reject a composite name that contained the term macedonia. We presume that a rejection of a composite name is equivalent to a rejection of a name that includes the term macedonian or its derivatives. In the first ALCO survey, the alternatives are more clearly stated i.e. reject a name that includes macedonia or its derivatives and accept a compromize with a composite name that would include the term Macedonia. In the next two MRB surveys, contrary to the previous surveys, the respondents were given 4 response alternatives (definitely accept composite name with term macedonia, maybe accept.., maybe reject.., definitely reject composite name with term macedonia); the 4 categories were collapsed into two to make them more comparable with the other surveys. It is to be noted that survey No. 4 was conducted by phone,while survey No. 5 was done in the field. In the second ALCO survey (No. 6), the respondents were asked if they would accept a name that would include the term Macedonia or its derivatives. Finally, the MARC survey asked the respondents whether Greece should accept a compromize or reject a composite name that included the term MACEDONIA (e.g. Upper or New Macedonia).

An one would expect, the Greek gallup results were also dependent upon several other factors (political, regional and social). With regard to region, in a study of urban

96 centers (OPINION/2001), the Athenians had a more favorable opinion (51% accept a mutually satisfactory name) than the residents of Thessaloniki (capital of Greek Macedonia) and other urban centers (44% accept mutually satisfactory solution) (Kofos, 2005, p. 204). A more recent gallup by MARC (Ethnos, 25/2/2008) showed the residents of Macedonia/Thrace to be more inclined to use the veto (89%) if no mutually acceptable solution is found than those from the other regions of Greece (82%); moreover, the former were more likely to reject (80%) a composite solution than those from the other regions of Greece (65%). Politically, a survey of 800 Athenians (Martel, EPE, 13/14.3.1996) showed an equal proportion (46,5%) of New Democracy (conservatives) and Panhellenic

Socialist Movement voters, a higher proportion of Greek Communist (60,7%) and Left Alliance party (75,8%) voters and a lowest proportion of conservativePolitical Springvoters (31,3%) supporting a composite name solutions.110 In 1996, 47,8% of the Athenians, as a whole, supported the compromize composite name solution. Finally, the 2001 OPINION survey (data not shown) showed variation by education: Fifty-four

percent of university graduates, as compared to 44% of secondary school graduates and 41% of primary school gradues, were in favor of a mutually acceptable (composite) solution (Kofos, 2005, p. 204). FYROM public opinion surveys. There has been little direct survey information on the opinions of FYROM citizens regarding the name. A study of political culture research of FYROM (Ta Nea, 25/2/1994), using a stratified sample 990 adult citizens, was done by KEME on the eve of the imposition of the Greek embargo (December 1993). The study focused on the most important problems facing the country generally and more specifically on the most important problems in relations with Greece. With regard to the problems facing the country generally, the partially published data show that 64,4% of the selfdesignated Macedonians and 51,2% of the Albanians thought that the most important problem of the country was the securing of peace while the second (but by a big difference) most important problem was the name of the country (by 18,1% of the self-designated
110

In the national survey (N=2100) conducted by MRB Hellas (22/11-3/12.2007), 17% of the Greek citizens were for a composite name, 75% against a composite name and 8% did not reply or did not know. In this survey, the voters of three political parties were above the average on the composite name (ND = 19,1%, Communist Party =21% and the Left Alliance Party = 32,2%), while the voters of two parties were below the average (Panhellenic Socialist Movement =12,6% and the Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos = 9,1%). The most progressive on the composite name were the voters of the Left Alliance Party (32,2%), while the most conservative were the voters of LAOS (9,1%). The most recent MARC survey (Ethnos, 25/2/2008) showed about 29% of New Democracy, 28% of PASOK and 37% of Other Party voters accepting a compromize solution. The more favorable vote of the other party voters are due to Left Alliance and Communist voters who have been for a composite solution since the early 1990s and not due to LAOS voters who hold the most conservative positions.

97 Macedonians and 4,7% of the Albanians) (Ta. Nea, 25/2/1994). Thus for the Albanian minority, the name issue does not have priority. With regard to problems in relations to Greece which was only answered by the self-designated Macedonians, 60,6% mentioned

the name issue, 24,3% the minority in Northern Greece, 5,20% the economic exclusion and another 5,2% the flag problem. Thus, for about 40% of the self-designated

Macedonians, the name issue is not the most important problem in their relation with Greece. A survey done by the Center for Research and Policy Making of FYROM in view of the Bucharest NATO meeting showed that the overwhelming majority of citizens (83%) were against the change of the countrys constitutional name if that was the price for membership in NATO and another 81% were also against the use by other countries and international organizations of a name other than their constitutional name. As indicated above (See footnote 106), the author has no specific information as to the identity of the survey (composition and size of the sample) nor about the formulation of the question. It is conjectured that those who might accept to change the constitutional name are mainly members of the Albanian community and/or the more educated Slavomacedonians.

D. Greek and FYROM Political Party positions in the recent period (2000-2007) 1. The Greek case: During the 12 year period (1995-2007), since the Interim Accord, bilateral economic relations were salient and the name issue was relegated to the backstage, despite provisions in the Interim Accord (Article 5) for continuation of negotiations under the auspices of UN with a view to reaching an agreement regarding the name. Although the PASOK government under Andreas Papandreou (1993-1995), had formally rejected the use of Macedonia or its derivatives, the PASOK Simitis government (1996) had adopted more moderate positions. Thus, the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website in 2002 said that it favored a compromize, composite name, that would help to stabilize FYROM adding, however, that it would never accept the name Republic of Macedonia.
111

In fact,

the then FYROM leadership { PM Georgievski of VMRO and B. Crvenkovski of the SDSM opposition} had assured the Simitis government of accepting Gorna Makedonija (Upper Macedonia) as an international name, when the Albanian hostilities were about to break out and forced a change of priorities (Kofos, 2005, p. 166).
However, in a recent disclosure (Ta Nea, 30/10/2007), former Minister of Foreign Affairs Th. Pagalos of PASOK during the administration of Andreas Papandreou amd Constantinos Simitis, revealed that the composite name was discussed in New York bilateral talks, that the Greek government had accepted it a long time ago and that numerous versions were proposed to FYROM but were always rejected.
111

98 While the official line of the conservative New Democracy party that came to power in the 2004 national elections was against the adoption of a name that included Macedonia or its derivatives, many of its high level party cadre had publicly favored a composite solution. In fact, following the 2007 September election, where the New

Democracy won with a marginal majority, the new government officially adopted a composite solution to the name problem. This preference was communicated to FYROM, the United Nations and other governments; for the Greek government, the problem was multilateral and had to be resolved under the aegis of the United Nations. The conservative Greek government threatened to veto FYROMs integration into NATO and the European Union, unless it agreed to a compromize mutually acceptable name (See Table 2). A composite solution was also favored by the major opposition party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement ( PASOK), as well as by the Greek Communist Party and the Left Alliance party both of which had since the early 1990s officially favored a composite name, with a geographical reference (e.g. Vardar Republic of Macedonia or North Macedonia). The small party Political Spring, which had been a protagonist in

maximalist positions during the 1992-1995 period, was dissolved in late 1990s and its leader (A. Samaras) had re-joined the ranks of the New Democracy party (first in the European Parliament and later in the National Parliament); although Mr. Samaras voted against the European Parliament FYROM Progress Report (2007) he did not publicly differentiate himself as a member of the Greek Parliament from the official New Democracy

government line for a composite name. The only small party which retained a maximalist position (reject the term Macedonia or its derivatives) was LAOS (Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos) which entered the Greek Parliament in 2007 (with 10 seats). LAOS is an ultranationalist party, with strong connections with the conservative Orthodox Metropolitans, especially from Northern Greece.112 LAOS also stated that the conditions were ripe for new party leader summit meeting in order to formulate a uniform policy (Eleftherotypia, 16/10/2007).113

Metropolitan Anthimos in a speech to Group 21 spoke against any sort of compromize with Skopje and also said that that we need to take back that part of Macedonia which is missing (Monastir/Bitola). He further said that if the Skopjeans continue with their irredentist claims Greece should make claims on the Greek and the Greco-Vlach population in FYROM which constitutess 20% of its population (Ta Nea, 6/11/2007). 113 Another small party, Dimokratiki Anagenisi (Democratic Rennascence), under the leadership of S. Papathemelis, did not manage to enter Parliament during the 2007 elections since it received less than 3% of the popular vote. Papathemelis was a former Minister of PASOK from Thessaloniki in the A. Papandreou governments. During 2004-2007 he participated in a coalition with the conservative New Democracy government. Ideologically close to the Orthodox Church, he has consistency held maximalist views on the Macedonia issue and also has been a significant factor in the campaign among the Greek diaspora.

112

99

Alecos {Alexander} Alavanos, President of the Greek Left Alliance party during his visits (7/11/07) with President Branco Crvenkovski and Prime Minister Nicola Gruevski of FYROM to promote direct talks between the two countries on the name-dispute. Mr. Alavanos was criticized by the leader of the ultranationalist LAOS party for his talks in Skopje without prior clearance with the Greek government (Ta Nea, 8/11/07; To Vima, 11/11/07).

The

electorate generally follow party lines according to their vote in previous The conservative Greek

election - but are more conservative than their party leaders.

governments position to overtly and publicly choose a composite solution that would also include Macedonia or a derivative, goes against the popular opinion, since between 2/3 and of the voters are against a name which uses the term Macedonia or its derivatives and between to 4/5 approve of the use of veto to block FYROMs membership in NATO if FYROM refuses to compromize. The more progressive position of the Government, in relationship to the constituency (See Table 3), can be accompanied by political costs, during the coming elections and by the transfer of voters to more ultranationalist parties The failure to use the veto may cause a fall of the government, especially if there is a reaction from the Greek Macedonian deputies, since the conservative governing party has only a marginal majority and all is needed is a loss of two seats for the fall of the government. 2. The FYROM case. . During the 2006 parliamentary elections, more than 34

political parties took part (the 34 listed had received at least 1% of the popular vote) (Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, Macedonia Parliamentary Elections, 2006). However, there were two major political parties: (1) the right of center Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) which traces its ideological roots to the late 19th Century IMRO and which has observer status in the European Peoples Party and (2) the Social Democractic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) which is a successor of the League of Communists of Macedonia that governed the Republic of Macedonia when it was part of the Yugoslav Federation (1945-1990). Despite its communist history, the ideology of SDSM is moving in a neoliberal direction.

100 There were also two Albanian-based parties the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). DUI is the third largest political party in FYROM and it is the legalized successor of the National Liberation Army which participated in the 2001 rebellion against the Macedonian Security Forces and subsequently played a significant role in the Ohrid Agreement. DUI is led by Ali Ahmeti political representative of UCK during the 2001 crisis, who after obtaining political amnesty in 2002, organized the party which first took part in the 2002 elections (Mihou, 2005, pp. 189, 264, 287, 312) and subsequently participated in a coalition government (2002-2006) with the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia. The party is committed to integration within a multi-ethnic Macedonia. The DPA, which antedated the establishment of DUI and also played a crucial role in shaping the events leading to the the signing of the Ohrid Agreement,114 is the fourth largest party in FYROM and has as a platform the recognition of Albanians as a constituent nation within FYROM with rights to language and education, proportional representation in existing institutions and the demand for a separate university in Tetovo
115

During the 2001 crisis, Arben Xhaferi was the leader of DPA, while Menduh Thaci was then the VicePresident of the party (Mihou, 2005, pp. 21,28, 58). They organized demonstrations condemning UCK extremism in FYROM and protested against the attachment of the label of terrorists to FYROM Albanians by Slavomacedonians positions which were understanable since DPA was participating in the coalition government of L. Georgievski (VMRO-DPMNE). Nonetheless, they often exploited the threat of UCK extremism for the benefit of integration in FYROM. Thus, Arben Xhaferi in an interview to NY Times on 27 March 2001 warned: If the political dialogue has not been inititated within one month, the activists in the struggle will have every right to take up arms again (op. cit., pp. 62-63, 173) The party also had a lot to do in transforming the image of the UCK who were at first labeled terrorists by the U.S., then extremists and finally human rights activists (op. cit., pp. 62-63, 302) . These mechanisms, whether calculated or not, remind one of the similar dynamics in the U.S. Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s-1970s (e.g. Black Panthers and Black Muslims vs. mainstream civil rights organizations). 115 See FYR Macedonia Update, European Forum (www.europeanforum.net/country/macedonia). Though both the major Albanian parties seem to support political integation, DUI reportedly will accomplish this through federation, while DPA has never talked about Federation or cantonization, believing that it is not to the interests of the Albanians, whose demographics will in the long-run allow them to absorb the entire FYROM state structure(Mihou, 2005, p. 69-76, 314-315). (According to official statistics, the population of Albanians and Macedonians between 1953 and 1994 grew 171% and 51%, respectively, with the Albanians constituting in 1994 22% of the population. The 2003 census estimates the Albanian proportion to have climbed to 25%, though they themselves say that they are undercounted and their atual proportion fluctuates between 30-40%.) Slavomacedonian politicians equate the implementation of Ahmetis platform with de facto federation, they believe that possible federation will not lead to Switzerland but to Bosnia; in other words, they view federation as a first stage to partitionhaving as a precedent the situation of Kosovoespecially with the presence of NATO forces (op. cit., pp. 69, 218-220, 255-256).

114

101

Left: Ali Ahmeti, leader of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). Right: Menduh Thaci, leader of the Democratic Party for Albanians (DPA) Source: http://balkaninsight.com/en/main/info/10 050/

Finally, there were two other small but historically significant parties, the VMROPeoples Party and the New Social Democratic Party, which in the 2006 elections won 6 and 7 seats respectively. These are mainly offshoots of the two major political parties, the VMRO-Peoples Party is a more nationalist version of VMRO-DPMNE, while the New Social Democratic Party is an offshoot of SDSM which strayed from its Social

Democratic ideology (FYR Macedonia Update, European Forum, p. 9). During the 16 years since FYROM became independent, the two major parties (VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM) alternated in power and governed the country with coalition governments,116 with either of the two major Albanian parties (DUI or DPA) participating in the coalition. The 2006 parliamentary elections were won by a coalition led by VMRO-

DPMNE (For a Better Macedonia) which nonetheless did not obtain a majority of the vote and formed a governing coalition with the smaller of the two Albanian parties (DPA) to the dissatisfaction of DUI which as the largest of the Albanian parties expected proportional participation in the government based on the Ohrid Accord (FYR Macedonia Update, p. 23).117 The coalition with the smaller Albanian party caused the DUI to organize protests and
116

The SDSM governed the country the periods 1992-1998 and 2002-2006, while the VMRO-DPMNE governed it during the period 1998-2002 and 2006+. Generally, and until the 2008 parliamentary elections, SDSM governed in coalition with the DUI and VMRO in coalition with DPA. 117 FYROM has a one-house (Assembly) parliamentary system with a strong Prime Minister and a symbolic President ( Tzonos, 1994, pp. 42-43), despite the fact that the President is elected by popular vote. Nonetheless, the fact that the current President (Branco Crvenkovski) and Prime Minister (Nikola Gruevski) come from different parties (SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE, respectively) makes the cohabitation problematic. In a study by the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research, the authors point out: In the moment when Macedonia is expected to work unanimously on all fronts, as it is a decisive year for NATO membership and the advancement of the EU integration process, unanimous position is seriously lacking. This refers not only to

102 also to temporarily boycott the parliamentary procedures (Wikipedia-the Free Encyclopedia, December 2007)a situation which undoubtedly affected the countrys European Union integration 118. There is no systematic information with regard to the parties differentiation on the name issue. In the past, there is evidence of mutual recriminations by the two major slavomacedian parties (VMRO and SDSM) for making compromizes on the constitutional name while governing (Vlasidis, 2003, pp. 333-334). mentioned, On the other hand, as already

high-ranking government officials of both major FYROM parties have

reportedly shown willingness to compromize on the name. Thus, according to former Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Papakonstantinou former President Gligorov (of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) had decided (1992-93) to accept a composite name (Nova Makedonija)the Pinheiro Package (To Vima 1/1/95), but the Greek government was following at that time the maximalist policy of party leader summit meeting. Later on, a prominent Greek reporter, Alexis Papahelas, revealed in February 2001 that both

Georgievski (VMRO) and the leader of the opposition, Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM), had assured Greek Premier Simitis that they would accept Gorna Makedonija (Upper Macedonia) as the international name and were ready to sign the agreement, but as the hostilities were about to break out with armed Albanians the name issue was relegated to second priority (Kofos, 2005, p. 166). As of February 2008, systematic information on the position of Albanian parties regarding the name-dispute was also not available. The Albanian parties were more

concerned with integration processes and the implemention of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement than the name-dispute. Historically, however, they favored a name that would recognize their claims to archaic roots (Republic of Illyria), but certainly not one based on the ethnicity of the majority population (e.g. Republic of Slavomacedonia) which the FYROM government also did not want, recognizing the mutli-ethnic composition and also wanting to neutralize irredentist claims of Serbia or Bulgaria. The Albanian party position on the namedispute will also probably depend upon its participation in the government coalition (e.g.

the ambassadors list which was not agreed, but also to open issues like Kosovo, the name issue and EU integration, were neglected (Gaber-Damjanovska & Jovevska, 2007, p. 20). 118 The boycott reportedly was terminated late in 2007 when the Gruevski government agreed to promote further reforms based on the Ohrid Agreement and demanded by DUI; this provoked accusations on the part of the DPA leader M. Thaci against the Gruevski government of courting DUI and led Thaci in March 2008 to present the government with an ultimatum: either you implement the six demands by the time of the NATO Summit or we withdraw confidence from the Gruevski government (www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/info/10059/ and www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/info/10062/) (See below).

103 DUI had boycotted the Assembly and DPA had participated in the coalition), the progress of the FYROM government regarding the Ohrid Agreeement and possibly on Greeces policy regarding the recognition of Kosovo in the event of a declaration of independence.119

E. The Role of UN multilateral negotiations-Recent Developments (1999-2008)

Although the Interim Accord of 1995 (Article 5) gave the two countries a mandate for the continuation of negotiations under the auspices of the UN with a view toward settlement of the name-dispute, there was little systematic work on a multilateral level during the period 1995-1999. Also, Article 5 contained no provision for a time-table of the negotiations. In 1999, Matthew Nimitz replaced Cyrus Vance as the UN Secretary Generals Personal Envoy in the negotiations. Following Greeces abandoning of its maximalist policy and its

readiness to accept a compound name (circa 1999), Nimitz proposed Upper Macedonia (Gorna Macedonia) for all uses, but Skopje replied that it could accept the compound name only in bilateral relations with Greece but insisted on its constitutional name in multilateral and other bilateral relations. The double-name model was not acceptable to Greece and the impasse continued. Nimitz came back five years (2005) later with two new rounds of alternative proposals. The first round included the proposed compound name, Republika Makedonija Skopje. Greece rejected the new proposal but accepted it as a basis for discussion while FYROM came back again with the double-name formula: Greece to use Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in its relations with FYROM and FYROM to use its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia) in international relations. The second round included the proposed Latin Alphabet name, Republika Makedonija, also proposed by the International Crisis Group (See above) for international institutions and organizations and Republika Makedonija Skopje for use by Greece in its relations with FYROM. FYROM found this proposal a good basis for discussion while Greece rejected once again the double-name formula (Council of Europe Information Report, 2008, p. 4)120

119

In a recent interview (To Ethnos, 11/11/2007), Ali Ahmeti, the leader of the largest Albanian Democratic Union for Integration Party (DUI) which is not part of the governing coalition and which played a significant role in the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, said that the Greeks and the Albanians constitute two of the ancient peoples in the region and should support one another. He also said that while he proposed the new Republic be named Republic of Ohrid, he recognized that this would not be acceptable to the government and conceded to name it Macedonia based on the Ohrid Agreement. 120 Political Affairs Committee, Use of the provisional reference the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the Council of Europe, Doc. 11524, 8 February 2008.

104 After two years of stagnation, the multilateral negotiations under the UN were reactivated in the fall of 2007, because of the timetable requirements for the admission of FYROM in NATO (2-4 April 2008) and later on in the European Union. The negotiations and the need for a settlement of the name-dispute were given priority because one of the parties (Greece), a member of these two organizations/institutions has the right to veto the admission of new members. Announcing that he would use the framework of the 1995 Interim Accord as a basis for the new negotiations, Nimitz formulated a working framework for the negotiations, stipulating criteria that had come up during previous negotiations (e.g. avoiding irredentist provocations etc.) and called for a mutual compromize, within a

reasonable time-table. The working framework provided for a series of meetings in New York and the two countries, first at the ambassadorial level and later on the level of Foreign Ministers. The resumption of the multilateral talks in the fall of 2007 was almost threatened by an interview the special UN Envoy gave in the Skopje Newspaper (Dnevnik) before his trip to FYROM. Specifically, the UN mediator M. Nimitz wondered why there was such an antagonism and competition between the two countries over the legacy of Alexander the Great. According to him, Alexander the Great was a great conqueror who massacred thousands of people, levelled many cities, did not promote democratic or civic life and did not leave behind him a positive viable empire. He said that that was his pesonal view that may have no actual value. He urged the two countries to leave behind the historical issues and work in common to establish new relations, strong democracies and develop

economically within the Euroatlantic framework (Eleftherotypia, 9/10/2007). As one would expect, the mediators comments provoked various reactions among Greek government officials, disapora organizations and the ultranationalist party which entered the Greek Parliament in the recent September 2007 elections. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, replying in a moderate tone, said that the historical contributions of

Alexander the Great have been recognized for thousands of years, that history has been written and cannot be rewritten and also added that on regional matters we talk in future and not past terms. The ultranationalist party of LAOS, on the other hand, counterattacked by saying that if Mr. Nimitz is looking for butchers in history, he should tell us what other nation has wiped off the earth a whole race of people, as happened in the case of the redskins (Ta Nea, 9/10/07). The U.S. Coordinator of the Council for Greeks Abroad (SAE), in more restrained tone, said such commentary was not becoming of a UN mediator

105 and could undermine hopes for rapproachment between the two countries121. Following the pressures from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nimitz retracted and reconstructed his remarks about Alexander the Great, saying: I sincerely regret the impact those comments have had and particularly the inadvertent introduction of historical comments into the agreed diplomatic process. I take this opportunity to retract the comments made and would ephasize instead the lasting influence and profound importance of Alexander the Great on world history (Eleftherotypia, 23/10/07). Following the mediators about face and the historical restitution, the negotiations for finding a solution to the cultural and symbols struggle proceeded.122 The working framework submitted by the negotiator to the two parties was not published and there were several reactions and interpretations on both sides of the debate as to its content. On the FYROM side, the Prime Minister of FYROM said the text which says that the Republic of Macedonia should accept an international name other than its constitutional name is a point that is not discussable/negotiable for us ( To Vima, 4/11/07). On the Greek side, there were allegations that the text says that the term macedonia cannot be monopolized by either party and that the acceptance by FYROM of its constitutional name for use within its jurisdiction would require that Greece also adopt a compound name for the region of Macedonia in Greece (e.g. Greek Macedonia). customary policy of maintaining secrecy in the negotiation The

process reinforced the

speculative and rumor processes on both sides.

One perhaps can understand the UN Envoys efforts to defuse the confrontation by minimizing the importance of certain symbols; however, more crucial questions can be raised with regard to the neutrality of UN negotiators who come from countries which have already recognized FYROM with its constitutional name and with explicit geopolitical interests in the Balkans. 122 My working hypothesis is that only Greeks as the principal stakeholders in this battle of culture, symbols and historical legacies - reacted to the UN mediators initial assessment of AtGs achievements; nonetheless, I would be curious to learn if there were reactions on the part of FYROM or the slavomacedonians abroad to Nimitzs assessment of AtG. We should recall, that since 1991-92, the first President of the FYROM, Gligorov, had denied descent of the FYROM inhabitants from Ancient Macedonians.

121

106

The second UN Negotiation Team. Ambassador Adamantios Vassilakis (Greece) Matthew Nimitz (UN Mediator) and Ambassador Nicola Dimitrov (FYROM) (Source: Ta Nea, 18/03/2008).

The first

meeting of

the latest round

of multilateral negotiations on the

ambassadorial level was held in the seat of UN, in New York. It was largely a procedural and a review meeting, without any tangible outcomes, as each side reaffirmed its original positions. The next meeting of the negotiations was held in Ohrid of FYROM (21 January 2008), again without essential progress. At the Ohrid meeting, both revealed their divergent outlooks, with Greece seeing it as a multilateral problem and FYROM as a bilateral one between Greece and FYROM. Greece also put on the negotiating table the idea of a

composite name, that allowed use of term macedonia with a geographical reference without specifying the adjective (North, Upper or Vardar), leaving perhaps this up to FYROM. FYROM on its part replied that there was nothing new with the compound (composite) name, saying that the term FYROM itself and the March 2005 proposal of Nimitz (Republika Makedonija Skopje) were also compound proposals. Furthermore, it enumerated the concessions that FYROM had already made (e.g. change of national flag, constitutional amendments against irredentist claims and use of FYROM name in international organizations etc.) and also proposed the constitution of a joint educationhistoric committee to review the differences in the history textbooks of the two countries. During the Athens meeting (19 February 2008), the UN Envoy submitted a more detailed proposal based on the Interim Accord (1995) that contained five alternative names (e.g. Constitutional Republic of Macedonia, Democratic/Peoples Republic of Macedonia, Independent Republic of Macedonia, New Republic of Macedonia123 and Republic of Upper

123

Presumably this version of the name would differentiate FYROM from archaic Macedonia which has been identified with Greek history and national consciousness (Ta Nea, 22/2/2008) However, the adjective

107 Macedonia); the two parties were instructed to select among these a name that would be formally used in multilateral agreements, passports and international organizations, though it left open for discussion the use of a name in other formal international situations and in formal bilateral relations. The parties were further told to accept certain givens, e.g. the geographic distribution of Greek Macedonia into three regions (East, Central and Western), the constitutional name of FYROM as Republic of Macedonia, that both countries are part of historical Macedonia124, that the formal name will not consist of the single word Macedonia and that neither party will have the commercial or political exclusiveness on the terms Macedonia and Macedonian. The proposal further says that the Interim Accord will continue to be in effect, except where amended by the present proposal. The document contains a proposal for the constitution of a Joint Committee, to examine cultural and educational matters. There are also clauses against irredentism by the two parties, for Greece to expedite integration of FYROM in intenational organizations (including EU and NATO) and for FYROM to re-examine the renaming of its national airport. The formal name on which the two parties agree will be referred to the Security Council which will in turn adopt the decision. Finally, the proposal requests of FYROM to act through the constitutional process in order to implement the Security Council decision (Eleftherotypia, 22/2/2008). Although the proposal does not contain an explicit reference to a double-name formula, the acknowdgement of the constitutional name and the fact that a bilateral name is open for discussion suggest that this might be an inevitable outcome following consideration by the two parties. The Nimitz proposal was submitted to the two parties for consideration, with instructions to respond within 15 days, in view of the NATO preparatory meeting in early March. A day after the Athens meeting, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Ms. Bacoyiannis, briefed the President of the Republic and the Greek party leaders. Although a written version of the proposal was not shared with the party leaders, the proposal leaked to the Greek press and provoked a local controversy regarding its impact on the ongoing negotiations.

New seems to be a misplaced modifier and the version Republic of New Macedonia might be a more accurate signifier of this otherwise useful differentiation . 124 While there is some historical truth in this allocation and obviously purports to preclude the monopolization of the term by either country, one must recognize that it represents a quantitative leveling in favor of FYROM, since after the 1913 partition the part that was ceded to Greece contained 75% of the historical Macedonia and the capital of Skopje was not even part of historical Macedonia (Papavisas, 2006, pp. 220-221; Voros, 1991, p. 70)(See also historical background).

108

UN Mediator Matthew Nimitz meets with Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bacoyiannis in New York (Kathimerini, 30/9/07) and with Greek Prime Minister Constantinos Caramanlis in Athens (Ethnos, 25/02/08)

The Greek political parties reaffirmed the positions along the lines we have already described above. The governing New Democracy party said the proposal constitutes a basis for negotiation and that it sticks to its position for a mutually acceptable (composite) name before consenting to an invitation of FYROM to the NATO enlargement meeting. PASOK took a stand against the double-name formula and said that it supports a single composite name for all uses, including inside FYROM (erga omnes). The Communist Party also rejected the double-name formula adding that this could create pressures for FYROM to use their constitutional name abroad and reiterated its position for a geographic determinant that would check irredentism. It challenged the government to use veto for membership in NATO but also added that the use of veto postpones the solution. The Left Alliance party criticized the successive governments for the lost opportunites during the last 15 years, repeated its 1992 position for a composite, geographically-based name and called for a new summit meeting of party leaders under the President of the Republic. Both of the left parties said that they were indifferent to NATO considerations, viewing it principally as an agent of Western imperialist interests in the Balkans and not the appropriate forum for a resolution of the name-dispute (Kathimerini, 21/2/2008). Generally all the above Parliamentary Parties, from the Left to the Center Right, were in agreement on a composite name, preferably with a geographical determination, though for different purposes. In addition, this time all the above parties, having drawn their lessons from the impact of the ultranationalist demonstrations during the 1992-94 period, discouraged the organization of mass demonstrations on the Greekness of Macedonia as well as the participation of their deputies in mass demonstrations organized by other organizations.

109 LAOS, the ultranationalist party, was the only parliamentary party which took an altogether different stand on the Nimitz proposal. It remained consistent in its maximalist stand, rejecting a compromize solution and calling for a reconvening of the Party Leaders under the President of the Republic as well as for a referendum on any decision taken by the government. LAOS invoked the public opinion polls (See Table 3) that showed an

overwhelming majority of the Greek people being against a compound name and also proceeded to the organization of mass demonstrations. The Greek Government formally replied to Nimitz, within the first two days, saying that it accepts the proposal as a basis for negotiation/discussion, without however publicizing the details; the immediate reply of Greek diplomatic services may have acted as a deterrent to populist demonstrations. Journalistic sources indicated that of all the choices proposed by Nimitz, the Greek government selected Republic of Upper Macedonia ---which is the only genuinely composite name but also asked for various clarifications, especially with regard to the usage of the name in international relations and the uses of the terms Macedonia and Macedonian in commercial and civil contexts.125 Other sources said that the Government also proposed Republic of New Macedonia (a version of New Republic of Macedonia), while others were more pessimistic and insinuated that the Government had abandoned its initial position that the name would be one for all uses (erga omnes). Two mass demonstrations, the one organized by LAOS and the other by the World Committee of the Macedonia Struggle (WCMS), took place in Thessaloniki on 5 March 2008, two weeks following the Athens meeting of the negotiators and after the
125

A very live and in-depth discussion, with the participation of journalists, diplomats, politicians and historians, took place in the Greek mass media, with regard to the five alternative names proposed by M. Nimitz for international usage. The consensus was that only one of these names, Republic of Upper Macedonia met the criteria of the Greek governments proposal. The other four alternatives, Constitutional Republic of Macedonia, Peoples Republic of Macedonia, New Republic of Macedonia and Independent Republic of Macedonia, were not really compound names because they described the form of government and not the status of Macedonia. In other words, for the Greeks the modifier was misplaced, redundant and superfluous. The modifier should qualify the term Macedonia and include such names as Upper Macedonia, Nova Makedonija, Vardar Republic of Macedona etc.

110 multilateral meeting in New York, with the UN Envoy (29 February-1 March 2008). The demonstration organized by LAOS was held outdoors, near the citys beach, at the statue of Alexander the Great. George Karatzaferis, the leader of the party, was the speaker at the demonstration. He supported his partys maximalist policies and attacked the government for adopting a composite solution. The podium in front of the speaker was dressed with the sunburst of Vergina; left and right of him stood two ancient Macedonia soldiers holding spears and shields with the sunburst of Vergina. Behind the speaker, hung a banner with the incription they will never take the land of the Macedonians-a song from the Greeks historical Macedonian Struggle(1904-1908).

Left: Indoor demonstration for the Greekness of Macedonia organized by the World Committee for the Macedonian Struggle (Source: Ta Nea, 6/03/08). Right: Outdoor demonstration for the Greekness of Macedonia organized by LAOS (To Vima, 9/03/08).

The demonstration organized by the WCMS, in cooperation with the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki, was held indoors at the Alexandrian Mansion. Principal speakers there were the Metropolitan Anthimos, the leader of the Democratic Renascence party, S. Papathemelis, and Prof. K. Zouraris. They, too, supported maximalist policies, with isolated irredentist slogans and banners; the most militant speech was made by Prof. Zouraris who accused the oligarchical four-party pseudostate of Athens of doing geography instead of politics a criticism of the four parties in parliament which had agreed on a compound name with a geographical reference (e.g. Upper Macedonia).

111 The participation in the two demonstrations was estimated to be 7,000-15,000 and 5,000 respectivelyvery low compared to the organizers expectations and to the hundreds of thousands (over 500,000) participating in the February 1992 demonstrations (Kathimerini, 29/2/2008; Ta Nea, 1-2/3/2008;Ta Nea, 5 & 6/3/2008; To Vima, 9/3/2008). The neutralist stance of the new Archibishop and the overwhelming majority of the Holy Synod metropolitans, the pressures of the four political parties against the mass demonstrations, the imposition of party discipline by the convervative party during the process of negotiations and the fact that the Prime Minister himself was a Greek Macedonian126, apparently had their moderating and pacifying impact upon mass participation.

In the case of FYROM, the President (Branco Crvenkovski) called a meeting of all party leaders to consider the latest Nimitz proposals. Although at first the Prime Minister (Nicola Gruevski) said that this would have to be decision of the citizens of FYROM (i.e. a referendum), after the meeting the referendum was called off until they had a more

conclusive name. Journalistic sources indicated that among the five proposed alternative names, FYROM selected the two without a geographical determinant (e.g.

Democratic/Peoples Republic of Macedonia and Sovereign/Independent Republic of Macedonia)apparently because these two did not violate their constitution and their national identity. Morever, the Government of FYROM reportedly viewed the new proposal as worse than the 2005 proposal of Nimitz, saying that it was more favorable to the Greek side and opted to continue the party caucuses until February 24, before conveying its formal reply to the UN Special Envoy (Ta Nea, 22/2/2008) Following the completion of the

party cacauses, the FYROM government decided to accept the Nimitz proposal as a basis for negotiation and also decided to convey its decision to Nimitz during the early March meeting in New York. There are indications (Ta Nea, 29/2/2008), however, that the FYROM government was totally negative to the Nimitz proposal from the beginning, but selected two of the more innocuous Nimitz alternatives as a tactical maneuver, to avoid conveying an image of intransigence, to disclaim responsibilty for a fiasco of the multilateral negotiations, and to avoid jeopardizing its chances for an invitation to join NATO. Unlike Greece, where demonstrations were discouraged by the major parliamentary parties, this was not the case in FYROM as several demonstrations took place in support of
126

In a speech in the Greek Parliament (during the Prime Ministers Hour), following a dedication of the song (They will never take the land of the Macedonians) by the leader of ultranationalist party LAOS to the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister replied that patriotism is a property of all the Greeks and should not be confused with populism or be identified with extremism (Adesmeftos Typos 23/2/2/2008),

112 the constitutional name. The demonstrations, some said they were spontaneous while others said they were organized by the governing party (VMRO) in collaboration with the

Macedonian Orthodox Church, took place almost concurrently with the multilateral negotiations going on in Athens (February 19) and in New York (29 February-1 March 2008) (Proto Thema, 24/2/2008; Ta Nea, 28 & 29/2/2008; Kathimerini, 29/2/2008) and were probably held in order to influence the outcome of the negotiations.

Left: Meeting of FYROM party leaders under the President Branco Crvenkovski to discuss and respond to the Nimitz proposal (Ethnos, 25/2/08). Right: A protest demonstration against Greeces name policy in Skopje; the demonstrators are holding the amended flag of FYROM (Kathimerini, 29/02/08)

On the day of the Athens meeting (19/2/2008), a demonstration of young extremist/nationalists (around 1500) took place in Skopje, accompanied by attacks against the property of the Greek Diplomatic Mission and two Greek TV stations. A larger

demonstration of about 5000 nationalists/extremists followed, on the 23 and 27 February, 2008. Aside from the 8-ray national flags, the demonstrators also displayed the 16-ray sunburst of Vergina, which had been officially abandoned by FYROM as a national symbol. In addition, the demonstrators hurled expletives against Greeks and Greek government officials. They also committed acts of vandalism against the Diplomatic Mission and the property of its personnel. About 8 FYROM police who were defending the Mission were injured in the process. Prime Minister Gruevskis reaction to the demonstration was

equivocal: It is understandable during these hard times for the people to protest peacefully and to express their opposition. I can sympathise with that part but I disapprove of the violence. If one compared the Greek and the Skopje demonstrations, he would note both commonalites and substantial differences. One of their commonalities was the ultranationalism and the maximalist positions on the Macedonian Question. common characteristic was the Macedonian Orthodox Church and Another

few nationalist

113 Metropolitans of the Greek Orthodox Church who co-organized the demonstrations in the two countries. With regard to the contrasts, the Skopje demonstrations were more extensive than those organized in Greece, if one considers the populations of these two countries. Second, and most significant, the demonstrations were qualitatively different with respect to the target and the levels of overt violence, with the FYROM demonstrations directing their attacks outward, against the Greek Diplomatic Services and the Greek demonstrations being held in neutral territory and directed inward, against the government and the parties willing to compromize by adopting a composite name. It remains to be seen, whether the differential decibel and vociferousness levels will impact on final outcome; in any case, the demonstrations in FYROM, whether or not they were incited by the government, must have reinforced FYROMs entrenchement in maximalist positions in view of the upcoming New York meeting with Nimitz on 29 February 2008as the mass demonstrations had done in Greece in the early 1990s, with the result of the perpetuation of the pending problem.127 Although no proceedings were published, the multilateral meeting in New York under the aegis of the UN (29 February 1 March), where the negotiator Mr. Nimitz met successively with both ambassadors, culminated once again in a deadlock. The mediator said that there was a substantial chasm between Athens and Skopje with regard to the name but also on most of the other points of the Nimitz proposal. It seems that the Athens proposal of Upper Macedonia or New Macedonia for all uses (erga omnes), including within the jurisdiction of FYROM, was diametrically opposed to the Skopje proposal of a doublename, i.e. its constitutional name for all international uses (internal relations, international organizations, bilateral relations with all countries except Greece) and a different name for bilateral relations with Greece (e.g. Upper Macedonia or New Macedonia) (To Vima, 2/3/08; Kathimerini, 2/3/08) . Asked if he was about to submit a new revised proposal, the mediator was negative; it is conjectured that the mediator was henceforth investing his hopes for a solution in Washingtons pressures on both sidesto secure a mutually acceptable solution and prevent the use of veto by Greece in the upcoming (2-4 April 2008) Bucharest NATO summit meeting. The mobilization of Washington on all fronts, following the fiasco of the New York multilateral negotiations,
127

became urgent in view of the scheduled preparatory NATO

The demonstrations, whether orchestrated or spontaneous, may have been calculated to show to the international community the possible political costs for the FYROM (Gruevski) government in case it compromized on the constitutional name. Some sources (Ta Nea, 1-2/3/2008) state that Prime Minister Gruevski supported the demonstrations because he wanted to call for elections on an nationalist platform and form a coalition with the largest Albanian party (DUI) which had been boycotting the National Assembly (See above).

114 meeting in Bruxelles (6 March 2008) where the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member nations would discuss the readiness of the three candidate countries and the sending of a corresponding invitation to the three candidate countries. The mobilization included, first a around of visits by NATO General Secretary G. Schefer to the US (met with President Bush) and to Greece (met with the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs). In Athens, Mr. Schefer reassured the Greeks that priority would be given to the member-states and that the three candidate members will not necessarily be admitted as a package, but each will be judged separately according to the criteria for membership. Second, it included a sudden unexpected trip (3/5/08) by the UN negotiator, M. Nimitz, to Skopje and then by road to Thessaloniki; in FYROM, Mr. Nimitz met with the four strongmenthe President Crvenkovski, Prime Minister Gruevski, Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Milososki and Ambassador N. Dimitrov128. During the FYROM meeting, the FYROM government simply documented further its position and reaffirmed its willingness to continue the negotiations. In Thessaloniki, Nimitz met with Ambassador A. Vassilakis to brief him on his contacts with the FYROM officials. Following his meeting with Vassilakis, Nimitz announced that he comes from Skopje without any new ideas or new proposals, which translated meant that FYROM did not budge at all from its initial positions. The preparatory NATO meeting (6/03/08) was held in Bruxelles, with enlargement being the principal issue on the agenda and specifically, the consideration and approval of progress reports for extending an invitation to join to the three Balkan countries. As the Council operates on consensus there was no voting but a discussion. Most of the NATO members who were for the admission of the three countries gave as an argument the need to admit the three Balkan countries as a package. US secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: I have the feeling that Macedonia129 meets the criteria for membership and her application for membership should be accepted. She also wished that Greece and

Macedonia will manage to agree in one formula so that they can move ahead (Proto Thema, 9/3/08). Greece received overt support for its position from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France who pointed to the constructive stance of Greece and urged FYROM to

128

In view of this meeting, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of FYROM reportedly said that the threats of the Greek Prime Minister to use veto do not contribute to the progress on the name-dispute. He also declared that It would be good to know if Mr. Caramanlis gives more priority to the stability of his parliamentary majority than to regional stability, especially since Greece is one of the older NATO members (Ta Nea, 5/3/2008 129 The Secretary of State used the term Macedonia, because the U.S. had recognized FYROM with its constitutional name since 2004. Nonetheless, the equal distance toward the two countries overlooks the tremendous progress that Greece made toward a composite name since 1992 and the historial ties between the United States and Greece.

115 make a compromize. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Bacoyiannis, consented to the sending of an invitation to Croatia and Albania, but not to FYROM; she presented the Greek arguments and positions and invoked the NATO enlargement criteria: The Euroatlantic integration includes the promotion of regional cooperation, good neighbor relations and the finding of mutually acceptable and timely solutions to pending problems. Ms. Bacoyiannis said she was not happy with her decision not to consent to FYROMs invitation. In fact, the Greek Foreign Minister avoided the use of the word veto,

preferring instead to use the words consent. She also said that Greece had gone 2/3 of the road since 1992 (when the Party leaders had maximalist positions) and she exhorted FYROM officials to take a risk and cover the other 1/3 of the road to a solution (Ta Nea, 7/3/08; Proto Thema, 9/3/08). Although FYROM was not actually participating in the NATO preparatory meeting, it made its presence known through paid full-page advertisements in major European and American newspapers(Financial Times, New York Times, Le Monde, International Herald Tribune, Die Welt etc.) the same day of the preparatory NATO meeting (Ta Nea, 8-9/3/08). The advertisement consisted of two full pages, one showing a force of

about 30 men that FYROM has sent to Afghanistan and accompanied by the title, REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA DESERVES NATO MEMBERSHIP and the opposite page featuring an excerpt (Article 11) from the 1995 Interim Accord which states that Greece should not object to the membership of FYROM in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions unless it uses a name other than FYROM and was accompanied by the title MACEDONIA AND GREECE NEIGHBORS AND

PARTNERS. On the top of both pages, side by side, appeared FYROMs modified national flag, NATOs flag and a map of SE Europe showing FYROM within its legal borders a symbolism no doubt calculated to counter Greeces charges of irredentism. However,

another underlying message of the advertisement is that NATO and US can continue to rely upon FYROM for their future military undertakings.

116

Full-Page Ad published by the government of FYROM in European and American newspapers one day after the NATO preparatory meeting in Brussels (Ta Nea, 8-9/03/08).

The use of veto

by Greece in the preliminary NATO meeting, aside from

pacifying the ultranationalists within the governing party of Greece, provoked, as one would expect, reactions among the FYROM leadership. The Prime Minister of FYROM

(N.Gruevski) said that the Greek veto has as a target Washington, London and Paris, not FYROM, and that Greece by blocking Skopje from becoming a member of NATO had become the U.S.s biggest enemy in the Balkans. The FYROM Minister of Foreign Affairs (A. Milososki) reportedly said that FYROM cannot give its consent to such names as New Republic of Macedonia proposed by Mr. Nimitz because they ignore thousands of years of history of their nation. Such inflexible reactions on the part of the FYROM

government officials suggest that the Skopje leadership decided to invest its efforts to change the attitudes of allies and European partners against Greece rather than in the ongoing UN negotiations (Ta Nea, 7/3/08; Eleftherotypia, 9/3/08).

117

U.S. Deputy Foreign Minister, Daniel Fried, long-term associate of Condoleezza Rice dispatched to Skopje for talks with the FYROM leadership (Kathimerini, 30/03/08).

Failure to obtain a consensus on the invitation of FYROM to join NATO led to a further escalation of meetings of U.S./NATO officials and the UN negotiation team in the two capitals in view of the Bucharest meeting. First, there were the efforts on the part of the U.S State Department. Thus, the Deputy Minister of the State Department, Daniel Fried, was dispatched to Skopje for consultation. This was also accompanied by an exhortatory announcement of the American Embassy in Skopje urging all the party leaders of

Macedonia to concentrate on integration into NATO, not to lose the golden opportunity to receive an invitation to join, which the Republic of Macedonia deserves after so many succesfull efforts and reforms, and called upon them to transcend the only obstacle that remains, which is the dispute with Greece over the name (Ta Nea, 11/03/08, 13/03/08) Second, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Newland, orchestrated a meeting

between Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis and FYROM Prime Minister Gruevski on the fringes of the annual Congress of the European Peoples Parties (13.3.08), of which both the New Democracy and the VMRO-DPMNE are members (Ta Nea, 14/3/08). Although this meeting was unofficial, it was the first meeting on the level of Prime

Ministers. Furthermore, ambassador Newland in collaboration with her colleague ambassadors from UK, Turkey, Slovenia and Turkey (among the strongest friends of FYROM in NATO) called upon Skopje to adopt a creative stance and a mutually acceptable solution to the name-dispute. Finally, a new multilateral meeting under the aegis of the UN (M.Nimitz) took place in Vienna (17/3/08). While we do not have details of the proceedings, journalistic sources (Ta Nea, 18/3/08) suggested that the discussions

118 started out with four names (Republic of Upper Macedonia, New Republic of Macedonia or Republic of New Macedonia and Republika Makedonija-Skopje) but concentrated on two names: New Republic of Macedonia and Republic of New Macedonia. The crucial issue was the use-context once an agreement on the name was reached, i.e. whether it would be adopted for all uses (erga omnes) as Greece wanted or whether the use would be different for international organizations, bilateral relations with Greece and bilateral relations with other countries (double-name formula). Both questions remained open, though the UN mediator noted some progress in the Vienna meeting. The next meeting of the UN team was scheduled for 25/3/08 in New York probably the last one before the crucial Bucharest meeting.130 Two other events that occurred parallel with the UN negotiations and may impact on the course of the negotiations include: (1) the withdrawal of the Democratic Albanian Party from the Government coalition and (2) the UN negotiators attempts to manage FYROMs identity problem. With regard to the first of these, the DPA the second largest Albanian party reportedly withdrew because the government had not honored the 2001 Ohrid Agreement with respect to the integration of the Albanians. It made six demands of the Government, that should be met before the NATO Bucharest meeting, including among others the recognition of the Albanian language as a formal state langauge, the recognition of the independence of Kosovo, an increase in the number of Albanians in public administration and the use of the Albanian flag in FYROM as is done by Albanians all over the world131.
Following the Vienna meeting, a new meeting took place (21/3/08) between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries after an initiative by the US Ambassador to NATO, Ms. Victoria Newland. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S., Mr. Daniel Fried, also took part in the meeting. It seems that de facto the meetings between the two countries have been upgraded. The meeting was presented as an effort to supplement and support rather than replace - the efforts of the UN Envoy Mr. Nimitz. I presume that if a solution is found in this meeting under the US/NATO umbrella, the decision will in turn be legitimated by referral to the UN negotiating team. 131 Among the longterm and consistent demands of the Albanian population, that are not included in this shortterm list, but were quite salient in the negotiations between the Albanian parties and the government during the 2001 crisis, is the one concerning the change of the constitution so that the Albanians can constitute an integral part of the multi-ethnic state of Macedonia, despite Robert Badinters assesssment that the FYROM constitution is one of the best in Europe. The Albanian parties have proposed changes to the Preamble (concept of a nation), as well as to Articles 19 (religious equality), 56 (historical and aesthetic health) and 131 (the majority of the Albanian deputies required for amendment of the constitution). A reading of the Preamble and Articles 19 and 56 of the amended (in 1992) constitution gives the impression that there are the Macedonian People and the rest. For example, after a reference to the historical events and to the 8th September 1991 referendum, the Preamble continues as well as the historical event that Macedonia is established as a nation-state of the Macedonian people, which provides for the full equality of citizens and for the continuous coexistence of the Macedonian people with the Albanians, the Turks, the Vlachs, the Roma and other ethnic groups who live in the Republic of Macedonia. A compromized re-formulation was proposed by the Xavier Solana (e.g. the citizens of Macedonia, the macedonian people and the citizens who live within the borders of the country and are segments of the Albanian people, the Turkish people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, the Bosniak people, the Roma people..) which supposedly was acceptable to all the parties, to the Albanians as well as the other ethnic groups who at first reacted to the unilateral initiatives of the Albanians (for the historical review of the issue see Mihou (2005, pp. 135-136, 152-153, 192-193, 194-195,
130

119 According to the leader of the DPA (Mr.M. Thaci), the withdrawal took place following the consultation (11/3/08) and the encouragement by the ambassadors of NATO, the EU and the U.S. (Eleftherotypia, 12/3/08; Ta Nea, 14/3/08); no doubt it was also motivated by the traditional competition with the rival DUI party for the Albanian constituency and the recent overtures of cooperation by the Gruevski government with the rival Albanian party. The withdrawal of the DPA theoretically should lead to a loss of government majority, to the fall of the government and to a call for new elections. Undoubtedly, the withdrawal of DPA added a factor of instability and fluidity at a crucial time of the multilateral negotiations. It remains to be seen whether the withdrawal was the spontaneous initiative of Thaci, exploiting the situation to promote minority demands or an orchestrated, realpolitic, machiavelian intervention of the above powers to create instability, to knock sense into both sides and to expedite a mutual compromize on the name-dispute, accellerating at the same time the integration of FYROM in NATO.132 With regard to the second, the negotiator has tried at several times to confront the roots for the FYROMs intransigence. Often times, in the recent past, FYROM officials have often equated their constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia) with their national identity. After the first New York multilateral meeting the Special Envoy

Matthew Nimitz said that national identity should not be exhausted in a countrys constitutional name. After the Vienna meeting, he also said that national identity can also lie in the idea of nation and the language of a peoples. Thus, the implication was that if FYROM compromized and adopted a composite name such as Upper Macedonia or New

203-204, 217-218, 220-221, 236-237, 246-247, 276-277, 281-282, 296-297) A comparison with a recent text of the FYROM Constitution which also includes the 1992 amendments against irredentist claims on/propaganda against the neighbors (http://b-info.com/places/Macedonia/republic/ Constitution.txt) shows no amendments of the controversial articles. The slavomacedonian governments reacted to the changes, equating them with the establishment of a federation and the loss of ethnic identity. In fact, a proposal by the President of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of FYROM (Georgi Efremov) that would solve the problem of nationhood by the exchange of territories between FYROM and Albania with corresponding population exchanges was rejected by the major Slavomacedonian and all the Albanian partiesthough some officials (President of Parliament St. Antov) saw it as an interesting proposal for a civilized solution. Prime Minister Liouptso Georgievski rejected it, but showed understanding given the three month impasse of military operations. Aside from the dismissal of the President of the Academy, the proposal seems to have generated new ideas for redrawing the Balkan maps with the goal of more ethnically homogenous states , inciting Albanian irredentists abroad and leading to reactions on the part of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as to a dissociation from the irredentist claims and affirmation of respect for the territorial integrity of Greece and FYROM by Ali Ahmetithe political representative of UCK in FYROM (Mihou, 2005, pp. 198-202). 132 About a week after the withdrawal, DPA decided to rejoin the coalition government of Gruevski, after the two party leaders agreed to set up within 10 days working groups that would take into consideration all the demands of the Albanian Democratic Party, except for the one that involved the recognition of Kosovo (To Vima, 25/3/08).

120 Macedonia, this would not macedonian language. Here it is necessary to recall that Bulgaria has recognized FYROM with its constitutional name, but they have not recognized it as a macedonian nation nor have they recognized the macedonian language as an independent language due to common legacies in the region. Furthermore, due to the mixture and amalgamation of races during the preclude their claim to macedonia nationhood and to a

successive empires most historians recognize Macedonia only as a geographic entity, and deny the existence of a macedonian nation in any part of Greater Macedonia. Finally, most linguists deny any structural relationship of the modern macedonian language, which was a political decision, with the ancient Macedonian dialects or the modern Greek spoken in Greek Macedonia (See historical section). Nonetheless, Greece in the interests of

minimizing the polarization and securing viability of the new Republic and also regional stability has kept the matters of language and nationhood out of the negotiation process, at least for now.

VII. The NATO Summit Meeting in Bucharest and its Impacts

This section is an overview of the actions and reactions of the principal protagonists just before, during and after the crucial Bucharest meeting, starting with the actions of the U.S. government, whose geopolitical interests (and the interests of an outgoing President) were most at stake in this meeting. A. Preparatory activities in view of the Summit. The U.S. intervened on both sides. First, on the Skopje government. Daniel Fried, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, reminded the FYROM government of his past intercession on their behalf and demanded that they do their part: It was I and Grossman (former US Deputy Secretary of State) who recognized you as Republic of Macedonia. Now you too must do what has to be done (Kathimerini, 30/03/08). On a higher government level, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reportedly placed a call to Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bacoyiannis during an ongoing meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Slovenia reminding her that a Greek veto against FYROMs admission to NATO would not be acceptable. At the same time, in her comments in Washington Times (28/3/08) Condoleezza Rice said: Its too bad if something which is related to antiquity becomes an obstacle to what would constitute significant steps for Macedonia and NATO (Kathimerini 30/3/08; Ethnos 30/3/08). While the Greek sensitivities were

121 offended by this second attack on the contributions of ancient Greek civilization (the first being that of Matthew Nimitz on Alexander the Greats contributions), analysts attributed the faux pas to the dominant ahistorical and pragmatic values of Americans.133 In any case, most sources indicate that the US platform at the NATO summit would be based purely on legalistic grounds: i.e. support integration of FYROM on the basis of the 1995 Interim Accord which provides for admission to international organizations as FYROM, not with the name (Republic of Macedonia) with which the US had recognized FYROM in 2004. Worthy of mention was also the intercession of the Slovenian Presidency, which historically was a sister Republic of FYROM when Yugoslavia was a Federation and which also owes a lot to the Great Western Powers for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the new Balkan states. During a meeting of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, the Foreign Minister of Slovenia said that a solution must be found on the name and added that FYROM has shown flexibility and the ball is now in Greeces hands. This intervention was calculated to influence outcomes in favor of

FYROM during the impending Bucharest summit meeting of NATO. However, Greek parliamentarians asked the Slovenian delegate to give examples of FYROM flexibility regarding the name without receiving a response and added that if anyone has shown any flexibility during the last 15 years it is Greece. At the same time, they requested of the Slovenian representatives to avoid judgements which undermine community solidarity in the midst of the crucial Athens-Skopje negotiations (Eleftherotypia, 2/4/2008).

1. Greek reactions/activities in anticipation of the NATO summit meeting took various forms but can be characterized by a general consensus and moderation. They included among other things: (1) The publication of a full-page ad by the World Council of Hellenes. The ad was published in three languages (English, German and French) in large circulation

newspapers (e.g. Washington Post, NY Times, Times of London, Le Monde etc.) on April 2, the first day of the NATO proceedings. It challenged FYROMs attempts to monopolize the name of macedonia and also showed the Prime Minister of FYROM (N.

133

Condoleezza Rices commentary, according to Greeks, overlooked the contributions of ancient Greek civilization to Western, including American, civilization. As a sociologist, I might also add that the Secretarys remarks overlook the role of collective historical consciousness on contemporary identities. To bring matters closer home, such commentary overlooks the struggles of the black peoples in the U.S. to rediscover their roots and to restore pride in the black community, with all that that implies for personal and social development.

122 Gruevski) laying a wreath on Delcevs monument to which is also attached a map of Greater Macedonia that also includes Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia134.

Full-page Ad of the World Council of Hellenes published in European and American Newspapers and supporting the Greek Governments position for a compound name (www.sae,gr/files/img/full/1228.jpg).

(2) Interventions by the parties of the opposition. The principal opposition socialist party (PASOK) criticized U.S. policy toward a long-standing ally who has met his

obligations (e.g. the Suda military base in Crete, mission in Afganistan) and spelled out the red lines that the government should not cross at the summit (e.g. composite name with geographical determinant, erga omnes, against admission as FYROM) during a last-minute meeting between the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition. The Left Alliance
134

The advertisement supports the governments proposal for a compound name (e.g. North Macedonia), although earlier declarations of the Greek diaspora were more maximalist in their demands against FYROM (See pp. 69-70 of this text)

123 party recommended that Greece should use the veto to block NATO enlargement in

general especially toward former Soviet Union candidate countries while the Greek Communist Party warned the Government not to compartmentalize the name issue from other issues on NATOs agenda (geopolitical interests, new bases in the Balkans, troops for Afganistan etc.) (Ta Nea, 1/04/08 & 2/04/08; Eleftherotypia, 2/04/08)135 (3) Interventions by the Greek government. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs published articles in the international press that described the irredentist foundations of the new republic, the traumatic links of the Macedonian issue with the destructive Greek Civil War, the presence of irredentism in FYROMs everyday practice (e.g.textbooks, speeches, articles, maps and national documents) despite the declarations of FYROM officials to the contrary, the recognition that part of historic Macedonia lies within FYROM, the progress/compromize Greece has made toward the acceptance of a compound name since the start of the negotiations and the need for FYROM to reciprocate by the adoption of a modifier for the term Macedonia in order to distinguish it from Greek Macedonia (e.g. the precedent of Mexico and New Mexico(U.S.)(International Herald Tribune, 31/03/08).136 Other Greek government activities included a relevant letter sent by the Prime Prima Minister to all NATO leaders, communications by telephone with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of EU and briefings of all the EU Ambassadors in Athens by Ambassador Vassilakis before the Summit meeting apprising them of the Greek position and Greeces non-willingness to accept last-minute solutions, except perhaps for the term New Macedonia(Ta Nea, 2/04/08; Kathimerini, 6/04/08); The final Governmental Committee meeting, following consultation with the political parties, drew out the red lines that would guide the Greek government delegation during the Bucharest Summit meeting: First, to accept a composite name with a clearcut
The parties of the Left were generally against the settlement of the name issue within the context of the NATO structure. The Left Alliance also criticized the main opposition party for connecting the solution of the name with the U.S. base in Crete, wanting apparently to avoid legitimation of the military base. Nonetheless, the Papandreou intervention also conveyed the message that the military bases for which the Greek population indeed had reservations could not be taken for granted by the United States (Ta Nea, 2/04/08; Eleftherotypia, 2/04/08). 136 Although A. Samaras, Minister of Foreign Affairs during the early period of the Mitsotakis administration (1989-1992), President of the former Political Spring party and now a member of the Greek Parliament with the New Democracy government, has endorsed the Governments policy, he has nonetheless urged the government not to rush to a compromize solution on the name as the prospects for dissolution of the state are increased due to the domino impacts following the secession of Kosovo. Consistent with his maximalist views, Mr. Samaras said that he would vote against a composite name if the agreement came to the Greek Parliament for ratification (Eleftheros Typos, 23/03/08). While the majority of the Greek people (See Table 3) agree with Mr. Samaras on the composite name, the overwhelming majority of them (64%) want the new Republic to remain independent and only a small proportion (15%) said that they would like to see it dissolved and redistributed among neighboring states (See gallup poll, Kathimerini, 6/04/08).
135

124 adjectival determinant, that would apply erga omnes, and would have the stamp of the

United Nations; and second, to reject proposals for admission of FYROM to NATO with its provisional name or under conditions providing that the two countries would reach a mutually acceptable solution within a designated time-period..

Prime Minister C. Caramanlis and leader of the opposition, George Papandreou, discussing red lines to be drawn at the NATO Summit meeting the day before the Prime Minister departs for Bucharest (Ta Nea, 1/04/08).

2. FYROM reactions also occurred on both the civil society and the governmental levels. On the level of civil society, one should mention the poster in the Center of

Skopje and a caricature of the Prime Minister Caramanlis published in the Skopjean magazine Focus(Ta Nea, 31/03/08 and 1/04/08). The poster-flag showed a deformed Greek flag with the Christian cross transformed into a swastika and a photo of a

slavomacedonian {or Aegean refugee} family, while it also announced a photograph exhibition (03/04-03/05/08) which overlapped with the NATO summit meeting. The

caricature showed the Greek Prime Minister wearing a nazi uniform (See page 139 of this text). In an interview by Greek journalists that appeared on television, the author of the caricature (the publisher of the magazine Focus?} said thats how he visualized a Prime Minister who always says No to FYROMs applications for admission to NATO, the European Union and international organizations.

125

A poster showing the deformation/desecration of the Greek flag by ultranationalist elements in FYROM just before the convocation of the NATO Synod in Bucharest (Ta Nea, 31/03/08).

The Greek press characterized the poster-flag deformation and nazi caricature of the Greek Prime Minister as episodes of intolerance against the Greeks, though the Greek government protested via official channels the deformation of the national symbol. Through the local Greek Ambassador in Skopje, the Greek government demanded the immediate removal of the provocative flag-poster. At the same time, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Athens issued an announcement saying the specific act represents a direct affront to the national symbol of our country and its struggle against fascism and nazism. He

added, This demonstrates that those who invest in intolerance and nationalism make a major mistake. It also reaffirms, once more, the soundness of the Greek position, which stipulates as a presequisite for an alliance relationship the actual practice of good neighborly

nelations between countries and peoples. Although the posters were not immediately removed, the FYROM government (through the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Milososki) dissociated itself from these acts of intolerance and said that the practice of the government is the building of good neighbor relations. Also on the level of civil society, worthy of mention are the pronouncements of the President of the World Macedonian Congress (Todor Petrov). The WMC, an organization comparable to the World Council of Hellenes, was established in 1899 in Geneva, ceased operations a few years after its establishment, and was reactivated in the early1990s, when

126 Yugoslavia was breaking up137 Mr. Petrov, whose grandparents were born on Greek territory near the Greek-FYROM borders but according to him were forced out of Greece by the Greek state, said that Greek antimacedononism is much worse and more aggressive than antisemitism and even worse than the nazists holocaust against the Jews. Petrov, who is an economist, also said: We have a common past, we are not Slavs who have come from the Uralias He said that Alexander the Great was not Greek but Macedonian and

characterized as of no significance the fact that all the inscriptions discovered in Pella and the Vergina excavations (within Greek Macedonia) were Greek. He denied that FYROM had any territorial ambitions against Greece. On the day that the NATO Bucharest meeting started, the World Macedonian Congress organized a sit-in demonstration with candles in the memory of the victims of the Greek genocide against the Macedonians in 1948 while they called upon the FYROM government not to submit to Greek

blackmailing(Eleftheros Typos, 3/04/08).

The President of the World Macedonian Congress (WMC), Mr. Todor Petrov (Source: Eleftheros Typos, 3/04/08)

The conditions under which Slavomacedonians were pushed out of Northern Greece during and after the Greek Civil War have been described above. Also, that there were persecutions of Slavomacedonians during the Metaxas dictatorship(1936-1940) because

they used the salvomacedonia dialects has also been recognized by Greek historians. What is really astonishing about Mr.Petrovs zeitgeist are (a) the denial of the slavic origins,
The author attempted to cross-validate the journalistic information via the internet. The URL of the organization was located (www.smk-wmc.org) but over 95% of its pages were under construction, so that it has not yet been possible to validate the above information.
137

127 identity and composition of the FYROM population138 (b) the nihilization of archeological evidence by an economist and (c) the comparisons of the Greek persecutions of Slavomacedonians to the nazi holocaust against the Jews. The latter, to say the least,

subverts the meaning of genocide and represents an affront against the Jews and all other victims of genocide. Continuing with the reactions of the Skopjean civil society, I would like to focus on an interview in a Greek newspaper (Eleftherotypia, 30/03/08) of a Skopjean intellectual (Tzabir Derala) who is a writer, a publisher, a producer of video art and also President of the NGO, Human Rights and Development of Civil Society.139 Especially interesting are his interpretations of Greek antiquity and his theory for the current stalemate between the two governments. He said that Alexander the Great who could very well have been Greek, Egyptian, Indian or an ancient Macedonian- is common heritage for all the peoples of the world. The renaming of the Skopje airport is commendable if done to recognize an

historical personality but it constitutes an insult against Alexander the Great and a serious political mistake if it was done only to provoke Greek public opinion. He attributes the perpetuation of the problem to the presence of inati (Greek ), an arabic word meaning pigheadedness, obstinancy and spite, which according to him is characteristic of both peoples. From his studies of Greek philosophy and culture, Mr. Derala concludes that the Greek position deviates from the essence of ancient Greek philosphy; he does not think that the ancient Greek phisosophers would approve such a hard line against a weak country. While one could agree with the common world legacy of Alexander the Great, Mr. Deralas views overlook the geopoltical and historical forces impacting on both sides, but more singificantly, he overlooks the progress that the conservative Greek governments have made, from the maximalist positions of 1992 (againt the use of the term of Macedonia or its derivatives) to the composite positions (use of the term macedonia as long as it is
While we are not sure of Mr. Petrovs ethnic background given the fluidity of ethnic consciousness for descendants of slavomacedonians from Greek territories where children of the same family opted for either Greek or slavic identity (Cf. Danforth, 1999, pp. 236-245) , we cite once again the acknowdgement by FYROMs first President Gligorov of the slavic origins of the FYROM population and his denial of a relationship with ancient Macedonians (See footnote no. 85) In any case, Mr. Petrov seems to be an exception to the observation made earlier (See footnote 85) with regard to the educational composition of those who recognize their slavic origins. It remains to be seen if the slavomacedonian diaspora experiences qualify these general correlations. 139 Of special interest are also the responses to an interview by T. Tsakiroglou of Valentino Nikoloski, a journalist, responsible for the popular radio program Red Line of Sitel station in Skopje. Nikoloski said that a compromize for him meant a solution that would not jeopardize their national identity. At the same time, dissociating himself from any irredentist claims on Greece, he said that The Greeks are our best neighbors. We have the same culture, foods and way of life. We are not asking you to change your national feelings but just also to respect ours(Eleftherotypia, 30/03/08).
138

128 accompanied by modifier to distinquish it from Greek Macedonia)which incidentallly were predominantly the positions of the left parties in the early 1990s. In this case, the Greeks do follow the golden mean, that was also an important principle of ancient Greek philosophy.

Writer Tzambir Derala (Left) and Journalist Valentino Nikoloski (Right). According to Derala a common trait of the two peoples -spiteful stubburness- is an obstacle to a solution of the name-dispute (Elefterotypia, 30/03/2008) -

Finally, of special interest are the reactions of Skopjean politicians and government officials (Eleftheros Typos, 30/03/08). Two former politicians, the President of the

Republic St. Antov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Fretkovski during the administration of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (1994-1998), expressed their approval of M. Nimitzs final proposal (Republika Makedonjia (Skopje) ); in fact the exPresident said that even Greek politicians realize that it is the best proposal and will not reject it. Mr. Fretkovski said that FYROM has already made enough compromizes (e.g. change of constitution and flag) and cannot make any more changes. Both associated the change of their constitutional name with the loss of their ethnic identity a price they were not willing to pay for integration into NATO. On the name issue the ex-President said there was no substantial difference of opinion between the Prime Minister N. Gruevski and the President B. Crvenkovski, while the former Minister of Foreign Affairs criticized Gruevskis avoidance of the problem by threatening with a referendum. Both were optimistic that Greece would not use veto; if it did, the former President said that the situation would be terrible, in view of developments in Kosovo,while the former Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Greece will be isolated. Both former officials said that the case will return to the United Nations if Greece uses veto, with the former President adding that Macedonia will then seek a change of UN resolution 817/93 in view of the fact that 121 countries have already recognized us with our constitutional name.

129 In contrast to the above and in an interview which appeared in Newsweek (26/03/08), Gruevskis Foreign Minister(A. Milososki) took a more aggressive stand toward Greece. Specifically, he said that it is not about the name but about the Macedonian minority living in Greece and added that Greece is one of the rare countries in the EU which does not recognize the phrase minority rights. Milososki goes on to expand on the theory of Greek racism by saying that Greeks still hold on to the concept of a pure nation -one state, one nation, one religion, one culture, everything Greek. And they do not want to recognize that in Greece there is a big Turkish minority, a big Albanian minority and one small Macedonian minority. So, the name issue started in 1991 because they were afraid that independent Macedonia would somehow influence the minority rights issue in Greece. Mr. Milososki, invoking historical and hypothetical cases140, further said that they would not be willing tomorrow for Macedonians to be callled Upper Macedonians and have instead of the Macedonian language a New Macedonian language. He says, that they will continue to participate in the bilateral talks and are prepared to make a compromize, citing as an example the amendment of the constitution, to dissociate themselves from territorial ambitions Who could imagine that we could, with our 240,000 of the best-equipped soldiers in

against Greece. In this connection he adds:

8000 soldiers, {take on} the Greek military with

the region. To imagine that Macedonia has territorial aspirations against Greece is like imagining that Estonia has territorial aspirations against Russia. He cited the 1995 Interim

Accord between the two countries and expressed hope that the Greek Prime Minister would not use the veto to exclude FYROMan act that he intepreted as a veto against NATOs strategic plans for southeastern Europe.

Foreign Minister of FYROM Antonio Milososki during a phone interview with Newsweeks Ginanne Brownell a week before the NATO Summit (Left) and during more calm moments (Right) (www.mfa.gov.mk); the justaposition of the FYROM and the EU flags is a good index of FYROMs ambitions.
140

The precedent of the Luxembourg province in Belgium vs. Grand Dutchy of Luxembourg where no one makes a dispute of it and the hypothetical case of Mexico and Canada vs. United States where Mexico and Canada could both claim to be American and demand of the U.S. to change its name to Middle America.

130

What constitutes a minority within Greece was determined largely by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) between Greece and Turkey which allowed only for minorities based on religion (millet orgnization), which no doubt could be seen as a continuity of social organization under the Ottomans); this has been recognized by Greek social scientists, legal experts and intellectuals. Though the legacy of the Lausanne Treaty could be interpreted as a case of institutional racism, it is too simplistic to reduce it to the diachronically homogeneous self-mages of Greeks and overlook the historical and the current geopolitical dynamics (threats) in the Balkan region141. With the improvement of international relations in the Balkan region (including the eliminations of all vestiges of irredentism) legislations can be modernized and harmonized with international and European Union standards regarding multicultural societies. This notwithstanding, it is also simplistic to say that Greece did not recognize the new Republic with its constitutional name because of fears of influencing the so-called Macedonian minority in Greece. This overlooks the arguments of Greeks with regard to the appropriation of Greek cultural heritage, which is also implicit in the monopolization of the term Macedonia by FYROM and became a symbolic threat for Greece exactly because it was no longer within a federation but sought recognition as a new state in a family of nations. Aside from that, as I have indicated elsewhere in the text, it is a logical non-sequitor to talk about a Macedonian minority within Greece, since there are 2,5 million Greek Macedonians. If the Foreign Minister would like to talk about Greeks with a Slavomacedonian origin or slavophones with a macedonian consciousness then this
One must not forget that the Lausanne Treaty (1923) was signed at a time when the Greece was still in the phase of establishment as a nation state following the collapse of the Ottoman and the termination of the Balkan Wars that had been territorial struggles,part of the process for the consolidation of Greece as a nation state. In addition, it has to be seen in the context of the mass displacement of 1,2 million Greek refugees a collective traumatic experience for Greeks. Finally, it has to be seen in the context of the comparative treatment of the respetive minorities in Turkey and Greece following the signing of the Lausanne Treaty e.g. the successive mass persecutions and ethnocleansing in Turkey (Istanbul, Imvros & Tenedos) that led to a drastic reduction of Greek Orthodox population. In the case of Istanbul, persecutions in 1941, 1955 and 1963, reduced the population from 135,000 (in 1923) to less than 3,000 today; this is to be compared to the ghettoization of the Muslims in Western Thrace and the increase of population from 70,000 in 1923 to over 100,000 today a ghettoization that the Greek state began to challenge with abolition of laws depriving Muslim Turks of citizenship if they left the region, affirmative action (quota admissions) with regard to entrance in higher education and special educational programs in context of the European Community Framework Program. A number of these integration programs were implemented during the socialist government administrations. Finally, it should be mentioned that George A. Papandreou, aside from instituting the affirmative action quotas for the muslim minority, was among the first to recognize the right of muslim minorities to self-determination with regard to their subjective ethnic identification. The progress made with regard to the mulsim minority in Greece, however, cannot be applied to the macedonian minority; as indicated elsewhere in the text, sociologically and theoretically one could talk about turkish and slavomacedonian minorities within Greek Macedonia, but one cannot talk about a macedonian minority within Greek Macedonia, like we cannot talk about a turkish minority within Turkey or a serbian minority within Serbia or a bulgarian minority within Bulgaria.
141

131 could constitute a basis for further discussion as well as assessment of levels of consciousness. As we indicated elsewhere in the text and if one takes electoral outcomes as an index of minority consiousness (See footnote 80), the so-called macedonian minority is indeed quantitatively insignificant. And as regards the compromizes made so far by

FYROM (e.g. changing artilces of the constitution that implied territorial threats), aside from being prerequisites for admission to any international organization (therefore no compromize), serious questions have been raised if these constitutional changes have been accompanied by analogous changes in everyday practice (e.g. currency, maps in textbooks, star of Vergina in demonstrations and emblems on NGOs, airport renaming etc.).142 There is indeed a big credibility gap between constitution/legislation and practice on all levels, that makes a parody of any invokations of the 1995 Interim Accord for Greek violations. The

citing of historical precedents by the Foreign Minister to avoid constitutional change, is selective as there are also many cases (e.g. Bretagne vs. Great Britain United Kingdom, Republic of China vs. Nationalist China Taiwan etc.) where countries underwent name changes. Aside from that, one must not generalize from precedents, in view of the fact that geopolitical and historical conditions (Balkans) often generate differential sensitivities with regard to cultural and symbolic capital. Finally, the Foreign Minister expressed hopes that the Greek Prime Minister would not allow domestic politics to miss the bigger Balkan picture. He saw the possible use of the veto by Greece, a longterm ally of NATO, as sabotage of NATO strategy in the Balkans rather than a disapproval of FYROM recalcitrance regarding the name. If Greece wanted to sabotage NATO strategy, it should also veto the integration of the other Balkan/Eastern European countries. Views of Balkanologists. Relevant are also the analyses of two balkanologists, Misha Glenny and Edward.P. Joseph (International Herald Tribune, 31/03/08). They both refer to the historical bases of the name-dispute, the provocations by FYROM (e.g. renaming of airport) and its connection with Greek domestic politics (declining popularity of principal parties); both also point out to the political capital that conservative parties in the two countries can gain from the name-dispute. Also, both view the use of the veto by Greece as contributing to the destabilization of FYROM and to the exacerbation of the domino effects in the regionthreatening the 2001 Ohrid Peace Agreement between the Albanian minority and the Slavomacedonian majority. Mr. Joseph who had worked for more than a decade in
142

According to a telephone gallup conducted by Public Issue, 2-4 April 2008, over 2/3 (68%) of the Greek population saw the Skopje State as constituting a small threat for Greece, while 23% saw it as a big threat and 9% marked other responses (Kathimerini, 6/04/08).

132 the Balkans, that also included duty with NATO and the International Crisis Group (See footnote 75 and text, pp. 80-81) calls upon London, Berlin, Paris and other European capitals to join with Washington and send an urgent message to Macedonia and Greece: Accept the compromize name proposed by the United Nations Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)- or accept the blame. He goes on to say that the allies must convince Athens that protecting Greek heritage by denying its neighbor membership in NATO is a Pyrrhic victory overlooking perhaps the fact that for the Greeks the issue of cultural heritage crosscuts political party affiliations. B. Proceedings of the NATO Summit meeting. During the NATO Bucharest meeting (2-4 April 2008), whose agenda also included many other issues besides the extension of an invitation to the three Balkan countries (e.g sending pre-integration invitation to Georgia and Ukraine, setting up of anti-missile defense zone in Europe, sending troop reinforcements to Afganistan etc.), the Greek Prime Minister supported the extension of an invitation to the two of the Balkan candidates (Albania and Croatia) but did not consent with an invitation to FYROM; Mr. Caramanlis invoked NATOs constitution that excludes from membership countries that have not solved their territorial and irredentism problems with the bordering countries (Kathimerini, 6/04/08). Greeces position was overtly supported by France, Spain and Italy; in fact, President Nicola Sarcozi invoked even his Greek roots/background (mothers parents born in Thessaloniki) to demonstrate his solidarity with Greece.143 On the other hand, President Bush supported the invitation of all three Balkan countries, including FYROM on the basis of the 1995 agreement, saying that FYROM had met all the criteria for integration into NATO. Germany, Turkey, Poland, Slovenia, Romania, Lithuania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic supported the U.S. position calling for an immediate integration of FYROM into NATO. Some other member countries (e.g. Canada, United Kingdom, and Portugal) are said not to have taken an overt stand at the meeting, while others to have shown understanding for the Greek positions (e.g. Luxembourg, Iceland ) or have been circumspect in the expression of their preferences (e.g. Belgium, Hungary)(Eleftheros Typos, 3/04/08); Ta Nea, 3/04/08). Many of the members who disagreed with Greeces stand recognized
While the Greek government efforts and Sarcozis geneological roots cannot be totally discounted, various analysts have suggested that other factors also played a decisive role in the NATO members position regarding the invitation of FYROM. Among these can be mentioned Frances policy of developing an independent European Defense System, the fact that France was not among the stakeholders in the Balkan region, the common bonds of the Sarcosi and Caramanlis parties within the European Peoples Party and the impending arms deals (jet-fighters and submarines) of European countries with Greece (Ta Nea, 5-6/04/08; Eleftheros Typos, 6/04/08). Not to be discounted is also the Greek diaspora lobby in some NATO country members (e.g. Canada). However, these are working hypotheses awaiting more systematic social analysis and documentation.
143

133 Greeces right to use the veto. While no voting was actually held, since the decision is based on consensus, Greeces position, not to admit FYROM at the present time, was endorsed (either overtly or tacitly) decision/communique by a number of significant NATO members. The final which underwent the arduous multilateral diplomatic process144,

adopts the essence of the Greek position but leaves the door open for admission of FYROM as soon as the name-dispute is resolved:

We acknowledge the arduous and painful efforts made by FYROM and her commitments to the values of NATO and its participation in peacekeeping missions. We applaud the efforts it is making toward a stable, multiethnic society. In the context of the United Nations, many have worked hard to solve the name-dispute. Nonethless, the Alliance notes with regret that these meetings have not led to a successful outcome. We therefore agreed that an invitation to join will be extended to FYROM as soon as a mutually acceptable solution on the name issue has been achieved. We encourage the resumption of negotiations without delay and we anticipate a solution as soon as possible(Ethnos, 4/04/08).

U.S. President Bush addressing the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bucharest, 2-4 April 2008 (Eleftheros Typos, 3/04/08).

The formulation of the decision/communique no doubt had as a goal to minimize the negative, divisive impact on the participants and also the NATO structure. However, as one would anticipate, the non-consent of Greece to the invitation of FYROM (which is tantamount to the use of a veto), had various impacts on the main protagonists, the

144

Attempts by some NATO Member countries (e.g. Slovenia, Turkey ) to overturn the decision and to admit FYROM under the condition that the two countries could agree to a mutually acceptable solution or to leave the ratification of the decision to the national parliaments were aborted by the Greek delegation (Kathimerini, 6/04/08; Ethnos, 4/04/08).

134 multilateral negotiation process for the name and also on the NATO system though one cannot spell out the long-term ramifications on the NATO system.

C. Post-Synod assessments, impacts and actions. This section covers impacts and reactions, following the exercise of the veto by Greece, in both countries, with a more in depth analysis of impacts and reactions in FYROM. Special emphasis is given on impacts on governments and the public, as well as to the capitalization of the veto for political purposes. It concludes with an assesssment of impacts on the ongoing name process. 1. Impacts on Greece. With regard to the impact on Greece, it would be instructive to look at the reactions of political actors (government, political parties etc.) as well as the results of the various gallup polls conducted concurrently with or immediately after NATOs summit meeting. The Greek government itself, as indicated by the Prime Ministers and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs declarations and press conferences following the meeting, said that goal of Greece was not to humiliate {FYROM} but to help it as a new country to stand on its feet and saw no cause for celebration. Its decision not to consent to the invitation was seen as a necessary step in the process of an ultimate solution to the name problem and addressing FYROM the Greek government called for the immediate commencement of a new round of negotiations for the final solution (Ethnos, 4/04/08).145 What the Government saw as a success was the fact that for the first time Greeces position had now become NATOs policy and the fact that the country was not diplomatically isolated, disproving the many Cassandras. The efforts of Greek diplomacy notwithstanding, the occurrence of the Greek veto within the context of a series of other vetos (e.g. by Germany and France) to NATO enlargement toward the former USSR

countries (Georgia and Ukraine) no doubt contributed to making the Greek action less notorious/conspicuous (Kathimerini, 6/04/08; Ta Nea, 5-6/04/08). About two weeks after the application of the veto, the Greek government attempted to compensate for the harshness of the veto by adopting a carrot policy toward FYROM. In her interview to Apogevmatini (20/04/08), the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Bacoyiannis, promised generous economic assistance to FYROM once a mutually acceptable solution was found; the package would include among other things investments of about 75 million Euros in the construction of the international highway connecting Greece, FYROM
145

Political analyst S. Lygeros (Kathimerini, 6/04/08;) suggests that Greece would have serious credibility problems if the veto was not used for integration of FYROM into NATO and was invoked later for integration into the European Union in the event that no mutually acceptable solution was found by then.

135 and other EU countries via Serbia, the subsidization of business ventures and the gradual abolition of visas. The announcement of this program that would be implemented in the context of the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (ESOAB) which was initiated in 2000 by the Simitis Government (See above)- evoked the defensive reaction of the FYROM Foreign Minister who said that Greece is boasting with EU funds, but we are not merchants. We will remain Macedonians, and this fact does not depend on Greek money A communication with those responsible for the technical implemetation of ESOAB revealed the the fund sources are exclusively Greek. Although the governments timing for these declarations may not have been the most appropriate in view of the common Balkan cultural sensitivities, political analysts suggest that the Milososkis overreaction has to be understood in the context of ongoing election campaign demands (Ta Nea, 21/04/08; Eleftherotypia, 22/04/08). The Greek political party leaders made their own post-meeting assessments of the Bucharest government achievements (Ta Nea, 3 & 4/04/08; Ethnos, 4/04/08; Ta Nea, 5-6/04/08)). The official opposition party (PASOK), said that the Prime Minister did the obvious, moving within the red lines that were drawn in time by PASOK. It also saw no need to celebrate, since the goal was the solution of the name-dispute and not merely the excersise of the veto. In fact, T. Pagalos, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Simitis government, warned the hardcore supporters of the government to avoid victory celebrations as these would convey an image of Greece as a petty and small-minded nation seeking victories against an exceptionally weak nation. PASOK also expressed

dissatisfacton that a multilateral process (under the UN) had become a bilateral process between the United States and either of the two countries; it warned against the reinvolvement of the US in talks, supported the resumption under the aegis of the United Nations and repeated its position for a composite name with a geographical reference for all uses.146 The two left parties (Communist Party of Greece and the Left Alliance) also saw no cause for victory celebrations and expressed once again their disapproval for the conducting of the negotiations within US/NATO framework.The Communist party further
At the 12th Roundtable with the Government of Greece organized by the Economist in Athens (810/04/08), the leader of PASOK, George Papandreou, after having described the maltreatment of a long-term ally by the US in the name-dispute, he expressed his wishes regarding US election outcomes. The U.S. needs, a new progressive government that will get away from the complex of the Cold War or the complex that was cultivated following 9/11 and which instead of looking at the root-causes of social problems, terrorism and insecurity, responds with military means by striking at the symptons. The United States needs a government that will have the courage to contribute to the shaping of a more just world (Ta Nea, 10/04/08).
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136 added that the word veto was not actually used during the proceedings, that they could not congratulate the government since they have no idea about the specific tradeoffs at the meeting or what was Greeces position on the integration of former USSR countries in NATO, they warned against the exclusive focus on the name and the overlooking of possible tradeoffs during the meeting that would compromize the stability of the region, cause the exploitation of the Balkan peoples and lead to a resurgence of the Cold War. The Left Alliance also warned against making of asymmetric tradeoffs (e.g. regarding sending of troops to Afganistan, etc) during the Bucharest meeting and a regression to the 1994 embargo days147. The ultranationalist party (LAOS) sensing that the Government can gain political capital, even from the modicum of success at Bucharest, repeated its opposition to the composite name, the party demand for a referendum and the resumption of talks from scratch (zero basis). LAOS maximalist politics meant a resurgence of the Greek nativism of the early 1990s. However, sensing that the Caramanlis success in Bucharest may deprive LAOS of a comparative advantage, the leader of the party (G. Karatzaferis) threatened to focus on domestic economic problems and government scandals (Ta Nea, 5-6/04/08). Finally, the leader of the Democratic Renaissance, Mr. S. Papathemelis (not in Parliament), concluded that the 1995 Interim Accord was dead, advocated a return to the

1992 maximalist positions and saw the general outcomes of the NATO meeting, after the triple fiasco of Bush at Bucharest (FYROM, Ukraine/Georgia integration and Afganistan), as the eclipse of the post-1990 unipolar world and the emergence of a multipolar world (three geostrategical centers of Russia/China, EU and USA). He further said that what Brezinski had called the geopolitical alienation of America is now a realityespecially after the series of American (Bush) geo-political and economic mistakes (e.g. energy policy leading to

Possible tradeoffs for a favorable to Greece outcome on the name-dispute included among other things, the purchase of arms by Greece, participation in U.S. proposed European Anti-missile Defense System, the recognition of Kosovo, troop commitments for Afganistan, the sending of additional helicopters SINOYK as well as helicopter trainers to Afganistan, and extension of the operation area for Greek officers beyond Kabul jurisdiction. Greek participation in Afganistan up to the NATO meeting had been restricted to infrastructure reconstruction activities (hospitals, schools etc.). In the military sector, the Greek government denied the connection of future arms purchases with the name-dispute resolution or the commitment of more helicopters for Afganistan, pointing to its own increased needs for rescue missions; however, the picture is not clear with regard to Greek participation in military training of Afgan army or the helicopter pilots. Furthermore, there are also indications of Greek willingness to increase its participation in civilian reconstruction activities ( See Ethnos, 7/04/08; Ta Nea, 7/04/08).

147

137 Russias dominance, costs of Iraq war, economic recession, practices such as Guantanamo etc. that question the ethical integrity of the US etc. ) (To Paron, 6/04/08).148

Left: Prime Minister C. Caramanlis and President V. Putin after signing the bilateral South Stream pipeline agreement for the transfer of natural gas to the Balkans and Italy through Greece. Right: U.S. Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister Matthew Bryza who expressed his reservations about the energy diversification policy of Greece and the cost-effectiveness of the South Stream project Ta Nea, 2/05/08).

On the level of Greek public opinion,

three nationwide surveys were done

immediately after the exercise of veto by the Greek government (See Table 4). Although the samples in two of these surveys are somewhat small, all the surveys show overwhelming support of the Greek governments decision to veto FYROMs integration into NATO. The high percentages were no doubt due to the consensus among the Greek parties, FYROM intransigence and perhaps to the incitation of Greek anti-Americanism following the US favoritism shown toward the FYROM (including the recognition of FYROM by the Bush government) (See Question #4, Table 4). The recognition of FYROM by the US with its constitutional name in November 2004 exposed the Caramanlis government to severe

criticism from the opposition parties, on either side of the ideological spectrum (Kathimerini, 6/04/08). It is interesting that a tabulation of responses to question 4 by

political party showed higher positive reactions regarding the use of veto among the conservatives (New Democrats) and the Other parties (Greek Communist Party, the

148

In accounting for the Merkel-Sarcozi veto to Bushs proposals for enlargement toward the former USSR countries, political analyst P. Papaconstantinou had this to say about President Bushs administration: Forgetting the famous remark of the Clinton period, Its the economy stupid, the Bush administration with its fixation on politico-military voluntarism failed completely to take into account the strong energyeconomic bonds which connect Europe with its big Eastern neighbor and supplier of her energy needs. In addition, disillusioned by Bushs eight-year administration, the Europeans had no reason to become cosignatories to such a strategic importance and risky decision. They opted to wait for his successor, certain that, if nothing else, he could not be worse, and to pursue a comprehensive re-negotiation of the triangle U.S. E.U. Russia (Kathimerini,6/04/08).

138 Left Alliance and LAOS) than the socialist voters (data not shown), meaning dissilusionment regarding the allys stand and/or traditional ideological opposition of the left parties regarding US government policies.149 Table 4. Greek Public Opinion regard the Exercising of Veto against the Integration of FYROM by the Greek government
1. Do you believe the veto exercized by the Greek government was the best answer to Skopjes stand? (NASS, 3/4/08, N=600) (To Paron, 6/04/08). Yes 88,6% Perhaps Yes 7,1% Perhaps No 0,9% No 3,0% DNK/N A 0,4% Total Percent 100,0%

2. How would you judge Perhaps correct Perhaps Neither incorrect the stand of Prime Minister Mr. C. Caramanlis to use a 95% 1,0% 2,0% veto and block Skopjes integration into NATO? (Public Issue, 3-4/4/08, N=509) (Kathimerini 6/04/08). 3. Based on what you Much/quite Not so much/not at all know, heard or read, you satisfied satisfied personally how much 75,1% 23,4% sastisfied would you say you are from the result of the NATO Synodafter the use of veto by Greece? (MRB Hellas, 5-6/04/08, N=1007). 4. How would judge the Positive Perhaps Perhaps Negative decision of the PM Mr. C. positive Negative Caramanlis to go against 94,5% 2,3% 1,1% 1,8% the will of Americans for the integration of Skopje into NATO, exercising the veto in the Bucharest NATO Synod? (NASS, 3/4/08, N=600) (To Paron, 6/04/08).

DNK/ NA 2,0%

Total percent 100,0%

DNK/ NA 1,5%

Total percent 100,0%

DNK/N A 0,3%

Total percent 100%

See article by S. Goutzani on Anti-Americanism of the Greek Right (Proto Thema, 13/04/04). Goutzanis recounts a number of affronts to the Greek PM by the Bush government, starting from April 2004, one month after the conservative (center-right) party of Mr. C. Caramanlis came to power (Bush telephone call demanding that. Caramanlis come out publicly in favor of the Anan plan for Cyprus, the telephone bugging scandal, the intervention on Greek energy policies, the 2004 recognition of Skopje as Republic of Macedonia and the clearly pro-FYROM policy in the Bucharest NATO Summit meeting) stengthened the Greek PMs resolve to use the veto (The arcticle is accompanied by a sketch depicting Mr. Caramanlis as Che Guevara). Along the same lines, news analyst V. Chiotis suggests (To Vima, 4/05/08) that the reason the Greek PM during his visit to Moscow (29/04/08) signed the South Stream pipeline for the transfer of natural gas to SE Europe (competitive to the Nabucco gas pipeline, supported by the US), was not because of the comparative advantages of Greece as an energy junction, nor because the benefits would be significant for Greece, but because this was strongly requested by V. Putin who was withdrawing from the Presidency and also in order to show his displeasure against the U.S. policy in the Balkans, especially on the Skopje name-dispute.

149

139

Divergent images of Prime Minister C. Caramanlis. Left: Ultranationalist caricature of the Greek Prime Minister published in Skopje magazine Focus just before the NATO Summit meeting (Ta Nea, 1/04/08). Right: Caricature of the Greek Prime Minister by Sakis Koutsantas after the exercise of the Greek veto against the admission of FYROM into NATO and before the Greek Prime Ministers trip to Moscow to sign the bilateral agreement on the South Stream natural gas pipeline, contrary to U.S. policy reccommendations (Proto Thema, 13/04/08).

An interesting question has to do with the conversion of the Bucharest outcomes into political capital by the Greek government. It was an opportunity for the conservative Greek government, with a marginal parliamentary majority and beset by a series of scandals since the September 2007 national elections, to exploit the Bucharest achievements by holding elections. Following the meeting, the Prime Minister apprised the President of the Republic, consented to a parliamentary discussion on the Bucharest achievements and also called for a Central Committee meeting of the New Democracy party. These were interpreted by opposition politicians and political analysts as attempts to capitalize politically on the Bucharest achievements in order to increase party solidarity, to arrest defections to the ultraconservatives and to change the negative political atmosphere due to the political scandals. Indeed, the gallup polls showed an increase of party solidarity and a favorable balance of opinion change toward the Prime Minister after the Bucharest meeting among the

140 conservative voters.150 Although there were thoughts of elections among some government parliamentarians (Ta Nea, 12-13/04/08), the government opted not to exploit the situation for election purposes. Aside from the bad economic situation (inflation etc.)151 and the fact that elections are constitutionally prohibited before a year has elapsed since the last elections (To Vima, 13/04/08), the holding of Greek elections would justify Gruevskis accusations that the name-dispute was instigated by the Greek government to resolve its party problems. In addition, the diplomatic achievements at Bucharest were largely the result of Greek party consensus and the benefits could not be appropriated by the governing party (Ta Nea, 56/04/08); indeed the MRB gallup (5-6/04/08) showed high satisfaction rates with the stands of both Prime Minister C.Caramanlis (81,2%) and the leader of the official opposition G. Papandreou (71,9%) with regard to the name issue and the NATO Summit meeting. In any case, the outcomes did not constitute a victory but a decisive step in the ongoing negotiation process. Moreover, if no mutually acceptable solution were found by December 2008, the use of veto for the integration of FYROM in the European Union could provide the Greek government a geater amount of political capital for the next elections. Greek boycott of Easter lambs - the winners and the losers. Following the NATO summit meeting, an interesting Greek boycott took place that cannot be interpreted as a reprisal by Greeks for the treatment of Greek investors in FYROM (See below). Because of their competitive prices, the Greek consumers had a preference for lambs from FYROM. While this benefitted the Greek consumers, it also gave a comparative advantage to FYROM livestock owners who were incidentally predominantly of the Albanian minority. Apparently, the exercize of veto by Greece changed the climate and upset the symbiotic

relationship. The FYROM government seeking to reaffirm its national identity, attempted to pass the lamb products to Greek consumers by stamping them with Macedonia, to the chagrin of the Albanian producers most of whom could care less about the ongoing name controversy between the two countries. The result was for Greece to stop imports from FYROM causing unprecedented economic losses to the lamb producers who in turn blamed the government for its policies. The government was also criticized by AI TV network,
A nationwide gallup poll commissioned by the national newspaper, Eleftheros Typos (13/04/08) and conducted by MRB Hellas after the Bucharest meeting, reports increases in party solidarity levels by five percentage points for the governing party (73,7% to 78,6%) and about 4 percentage points (66,7% to 70,5%) for the official opposition party compared to corresponding results for March 2008 as well as a reduction of defections from the Socialist (PASOK) to the Left Alliance party (See http://www.mrb.gr) 151 J. Politis, a polical analyst made a significant relevant observation: former Prime Minister Simitis was instrumental in the integration of Greece in the European Currency Union and also the integration of Cyprus in the EU; however, his party lost the 2004 elections because of a lack of progress in solving daily problems of voters (Ta Nea, 4/04/2008).
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141 while at the same time the Union of Skopjean Consumers in a paid newspaper

advertisement expressed their gratitude to Greece for the cheaper domestic lamb prices (To Proto Thema, 27/04/08). Of course, in this symbols skirmish the Albanian livestock owners and the Greek consumers were the immediate losers. The exercise of veto by Greece also led to speculations about political costs and US reprisals. Foreign analyst E. Joseph (International Herald Tribune 31/03/08), being

anxious about the integrity of NATO said that Greece must accept M. Mimitzs final proposal (Republika Makedonjia (Skopje)) or bear the heavy political costs, alluding perhaps to the costs of destabilization in the region. Greek political analyis P. Tsimas said that political costs were minimized by the fact that the Greek veto against an American proposal was registered in the context of a broader canvass of denials by many powerful European nations to comparable proposals {meaning among other things the veto against the integration of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO}( Ta Nea 5-6/04/08). Other Greek

political correspondents suggested that the U.S. will chose to focus on what divides rather than what unites the two countries(Proto Thema, 13/04/08), while others were more specific saying that Washington will displace its anger in other fronts (e.g. revival of terrorism issue, the Cyprus and Greco-Turkish relations, Greco-Russian energy agreements etc.) (Eleftheros Typos, 6/04/08; To Vima, 6/04/08) A nationwide survey of Greek public opinion by MRB Hellas after the NATO Synod regarding among other things, the future position of the US toward Greece revealed the following: 48% said that it will become more negative, 34,1% that it will remain as negative as now, while 3,6% said it will remain as positive as now and 10,2% that it willl become more positive

(Eleftheros Typos, 13/04/08). To a relevant question addressed to the Prime Minister of Greece with regard to expected reprisals, Prime Minister Caramanlis denied that there were any shadows in Greek-US relations or even more what you said {reprisals} which any way are not part of modern logic of international relations. The question of reprisals by the U.S. (e.g. Afganistan, Cyprus, Aegean etc.) was also put to the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Matthew Bryza) during an interview in Athens on the occasion of his participation in the Economist roundtable with the Greek government. He replied: The anxiety about that reflects a deep misinterpretation or a lack of understanding of the way the U.S. formulates its foreign policy. People believe that there are conspiracies. I wish we were so well organized

142 that we can accomplish something like that! Unfortunately we cannot do it and we do not want to do it.) (To Vima, 13/04/08).152 2. Impact of veto on FYROM and reactions of various factors. In assessing the impact of the veto on FYROM, it would be instructive to look briefly at the reactions on the level of government, the domestic press, the Albanian minority and the Greek investments. According to journalistic reports, the use of the veto by Greece created shocks on all levels of FYROM society, the government and the citizens from all walks of life. The pre-NATO assurances of the US and president Bush that FYROM met all the membership criteria had raised their expectations that Greek resistance at the meeting would be overcome and neutralized by the Presidents intercessions. FYROM government looked In retrospect, Greek analysts said that the deus ex America and had

at President Bush as a

overestimated his poweroverlooking the credibility gap due to his foreign policy and the fact that he was a lame-duck president on the eve of US elections (Ta Nea, 4/04/08; Ethnos, 4/04/08; Kathimerini, 6/04/08). These factors no doubt had their impact not proposal

only on the name-dispute with Greece (e.g. NATO agreeing with Greeces

regarding the non-admission of FYROM) but also on other items of the NATO agenda as we have already pointed out which will not constitute a principal object of this analysis (e.g. NATO enlargement to include former USSR countries, troop commitments for Afganistan, European Anti-Missile Defense Zone etc.).

Left: President Bush in a demonstration of solidarity with the three candidate countries (Croatia, Albania and FYROM) before the Bucharest meeting (Ta Nea 12-13/04/08). Right: President Bush with President B. Crvenkovski and PM N. Gruevski following the exercise of veto by Greece that blocked FYROMs membership in NATO (Ethnos, 7/04/08).

The outcomes at the Bucharest meeting may indeed represent a good documentation of Mr. Bryzas statement. However, one wonders whether the escalation of provocations by Ankara shortly after the NATO Summit meeting (e.g. raising questions of jurisdiction in Aegean, concerns about the Turkish identity of the moslem minority in Greek Thrace, escalation in violations of Greek air space, postponement of the annual NATO/Greece naval exercises etc.) (See Eleftheros Typos, 18/05/08) are for internal consumption due to the longstanding confrontation between Islamists and Kemalists {Greece as a traditional scapegoat for Turkish Governments) or if they are part of an organized plan of Bushs government trying to communicate some messages to Greece because of its relative autonomy in NATO Synod and in its energy policy .

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143 Starting with the reactions of FYROM officials, there was reportedly some differentiation between the Government and the Presidency (Ethnos, 4/04/08; To Vima, 6/04/08; Ethnos, 7/04/08; To Vima,13/04/08). The government, as represented by

Prime Minister N. Gruevski and its Foreign Minister A. Milososki, reacted in various ways. At the meeting, they threatened to withdraw, but are said to have been restrained by Bushs intervention. There followed declarations of protest with verbal threats against Greece: Gruevski said the Greece used the veto which he viewed as the heavy artillery of diplomacy rarely used in international relations, that the veto would become a boomerang against the Greek Prime Minister and that it would cost them. A. Milososki supplemented this by saying that his country {FYROM} was punished for what it is and not for what it did, adding that Greece will bear the responsibility for the danger of future destabilization (Ta Nea, 4/04/08; To Vima, 6/04/08) Other governmental reactions included a protest letter by the Foreign Minister to NATO pointing to the violation of the 1995 Interim Accord by Greece and to the injustice of the NATO decision, as well as interventions in the local Greek Embassy regarding the violation of the Interim Accord (Ta Nea, 11/04/08).153 Finally, the Government decided to accept the proposal of the main Albanian party (DUI) for early elections {set for 1 June 2008}, despite the contrary recommendations by the US, NATO, EU officials and domestic political parties154 and also talked about conducting a

The Prime Minister N. Gruevski also sent a letter of gratitude to President Bush, saying among other things For us, your country always was and will be the most important strategic partner. The fruits of your devotion and strong commitment became evident from the fact that the Republic of Macedonia met all the criteria for integration into NATO which Unfortunately, because of one members unconscionable and irresponsible behavior did not materialize during the Summit meeting, an outcome that is not in the interest of the Republic of Macedonia, the region and above all NATO. Analysts suggest that Gruevskis correspondence with Bush constituted an attempt to make political capital of the popularity of the American president during the election period (Ta Nea, 23/04/08). On the other hand, it says a lot about the independence of FYROMs future foreign policy choices within the context of the Euroatlantic institutions. 154 The domestic opposition included the official opposition parties (SDSM and the Liberal Democratic Party) as well as some coalition partners of the former government, who claimed it would further delay the necessary reforms set as benchmarks by the EU for the start of accession negotiations (International Election Observation Mission, Early Parliamentary Elections, The FYROM, 1 June 2008, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions). Although there are several factors justifying a recourse to early elections (Greek veto affecting integration process, lack of a qualified majority in legislature, the acceptance of the external recommendations would mean that the FYROM government is a marionette of foreign powers etc.), there is no doubt that the elections would foment nativistic reactions, increase the polarization between Greece and FYROM, would lead to entrechement of initial positions and complicate the ongoing negotiation process. Capitalizing on the Greek veto by holding elections, Gruevski may counteract centrifugal forces on his VMRO party due to Bucharest setbacks and might also increase party solidarity; however, unless used wisely by its leadership, the increased party solidarity can lead to a vicious cycle, perpetuating intransigence and exclusion from Euroatlantic institutions. Nonetheless, reports during the early stages of the campaign (Ta Nea 19/04/08 and 29/04/08) suggested that the Prime Minister had abandoned the ultranationist rhetoric and made a reference to the necessity for a compromize solution in the name. Whether this signifies a fundamental change accommodating to realism, and breaking the vicious circle after the NATO veto, or reflects a temporary truce due to Gentlemens Agreement between the parties or a misperception of the Greek press remains to be seen.

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144 referendum on the final version of the name. (Ta Nea, 8,11,12-13/04/08; Ta Nea, 2/05/08). In fact, the conducting of a referendum was incorporated in the VMROs election platform. There were references to various scenarios and options on the part of the FYROM Government following the Greek veto (e.g. condemnation of 1995 Interim Accord and recourse to UN, recourse to the International Court at Hague for violation of the Accord, recourse to European Court for Human Rights for minority issues etc.) but no specific course of action has been announced-probably due to the election process. However, the FYROM government, has called upon a group of experts for consultation regarding new strategies after the Greek veto. The President of FYROM (Branco Crvenkovski, who incidentally had in the past served as Prime Minister under the aegis/banner of the Social Democratic Union of

Macedonia, reportedly took more moderate, conciliatory and realistic positions immediately following the Bucharest meeting (Ethnos, 7/4/08; To Vima, 13/04/08).155 He characterized the Bucharest outcome as the worst scenario for his country and said that Greece abused the veto, leading to disillusionment and injustice. Nonetheless, he was reportedly against the early elections and the holding of a referendum for the name, but these decisions were up to the Government. He is said to have reccommended a review of policies and strategies, not to lose the opportunity presented for a solution to the name-dispute that would secure them integration in the Euroatlantic institutions. He said that the Athens veto demonstrated that what we have to do after Bucharest is not to attempt to enlist the support of all the others, but to come to a compromize with Greece The view that we can wait five,
155

In the press, President Crvenkovski was usually presented as more moderate than Prime Minister Gruevski.. One could advance various working hypotheses for this difference. The first could be to attribute it to the differences in party ideologies, with the VMRO historically being more nationalistic than the Social Democratic Union that was an offshoot of the Communist party. Another source of the difference could be the impact of biography. Political analyst A. Peloni (Ta Nea, 12-13/04/08) who noted the transformation of N. Gruevski from a moderate europeanist while a member of the Opposition party (2002-2006) to an angry Balkan, said that the answer may go back to his childhood. Mr. Gruevski was born in Skopje in 1970, but his father was born in Florina {Greek territory} and left for Yugoslavia when he was a child (8 years old). According to the latest information (www.zougla.gr; Apogevmatini 18/07/08), his grandfather, Nikolas Grouios, fell in Florina in 1940 while fighting on the Greek-Albanian front against the Italian invaders. His name is inscribed on the Heroes Monument, along with other Greeks from the village of Achlada who fell in the Balkan Wars, the Asia Minor campaign and in WWII. Gruevskis widowed grand-mother with her three underage children (among which was Gruevskis father) left for Yugoslavia in 1949, with the withdrawing Democratic Army of Greece). While there is some general information of the treatment of slavomacedonians during the Metaxas dictatorship (See historical section, p. 16), we need more systematic information on the experiences of the Grouios family in the 1940s, especially after the death of the grandfather, as well as on the conditions of the grandmothers departure (forced or voluntary departure etc.) from Greece in order to determine socialization impacts on the PM-grandchild. It is indeed a plausible hypothesis to connect the Greek background and collective experiences of some Skopjean leaders to their current political extremism/nativism (via the mechanism of relative deprivation etc.); however, one cannot underestimate the role of current election demands (i.e. internal consumption) nor the traditionally ultranationalist attitudes of the VMRO.

145 10 or 20 years for a more favorable solution has no basis since then too we shall have to confront Greece and her rights in NATO and the EU. He also called for a reasonable compromize in the name-dispute but without abandoning strategic goals (protection of the cultural, ethnic and linguistic identity). He did not specify on the nature of the compromize that he had in mind (Ta Nea, 18/04/08;To Vima, 20/04/08). Besides the presence of a Gentlemens Agreement among the parties not to make the name-dispute an issue in the campaign (To Vima, 13/04/08), there is no doubt that the governments populist election campaign would not have provided a favorable climate for more details on a compromize, especially when more details would have had ramifications for the Presidents party.

Left: The Heroes Monument in Achlada, Florina, to honor the dead who fell in the Balkan (1913) Wars, the Asian Minor campaign and the Second World War. Among them was Nikolaos Grouios ( ), Gruevskis grandfather, who fell in the Greek-Albanian front in 1940 fighting the Italian invaders (www.zougla.gr; Apogevmatini, 18/07/08). Right: Prime Minister Nicola Gruevski, the hardliner ultranationalist willing to risk exclusion from Euroatlantic institutions vs. President Branco Crvenkovski, the realist willing to compromize to secure membership in Euroatlantic institutions? (To Vima, 20/04/08).

Later on, the President sent a letter to the Secretary of the UN, pointing out the blatant violations of the Interim Accord and the Charter of the UN and the longterm impact on destablization, a letter whose confrontationa/cassandra spirit was not in harmony with his earlier compromize attitudes. No doubt, this turn-about may have been an accommodation to the demands of the election. After all, one cannot overlook his party origins and the lower popularity of his party in the gallups (Eleftherotypia, 22/04/08). In any case, President Crvenkovski reportedly undertook initiatives for consultations with party leaders, the parliament and the intellectuals for the common formulation of new strategies and the the continuation of the negotiation process.

146 With regard to the FYROM press (Ethnos, 4/04/08; Ta Nea, 5-6/04/08), first page headlines that dominated the newspapers, the day before and the day after after the Greek veto, included among others: Bush the Great struggles for Macedonia accompanied by a large photograph of President Bush in front page (Vreme, 2/04/08); Invitation for Membership, Please accompanied by a photo of Bush as Uncle Sam (Spic, 2/04/08);156 Greece, the Only Enemy of Macedonia:Violation of Interim Accord by Force (Vest, 3/04/08); Greece Obstructed our Admission to NATO (Dnevnik, 3/04/08) accompanied by reportage on the discouraging results of the summit and Greece Blocked Macedonia (Utrinvski Vesnik, 3/04/08) accompanied by text with regard to the fate of the EU integration process. The second day after the beginning of the conference, the first page

titles were milder in tone and included Greek Veto for Macedonia (Dnevnik, 4/04/08); Macedonia is not in NATO, but is next to the U.S. (Vecer, 4/04/08); First Agreement on the Name, then NATO (Utrinvski Vesnik, 4/04/08); and the sardonic title Come now, lets go for a vacation to Greece (Vest, 4/04/08). While we have no definite information on the ideological leanings of all the above newspapers, Vecher is reportedly a government newspaper,while Utrinvski Vesnik leans to the opposition. We also wonder why the oldest newspaper of FYROM, Nova Makedonija, is not on the list surveyed by Greek press and also we have no information of newspapers catering to Albanian minority157.

It is perhaps normal that President Bush would be regarded as a hero and a great benefactor by FYROM, due to his strong, vocal and consistent support of FYROMs ethnogenesis and consolidation as a nation. In fact, in the aftermath of the NATO Summit meeting, much was heard in the newscasts about recognizing his contributions by building monuments and renaming Boulevards for him. Greece has analogous experiences with the Marshall Plan and with the building of monuments recognizing President Trumans contributions during the post WWII reconstruction. While FYROMs symbolic reactions may have had their current functions for the new nation, and they may have contributed to a token reclamation of Bushs lost reputation due to the many fiascos on the domestic and international fronts, they also consolidate their roles as future protectorates and may restrict their future foreign policy options. Nonetheless, the recent history provides FYROM with the opportunity to broaden its data base for street and square names and this may have a tranquilizing impact on its neighbors. 157 According to Vlasidis (2003, p. 300), in 2000, there were circulating 11 daily newspapers, 21 weeklies and 10 biweekly newspapers and magazines in FYROM. Nova Macedonia was founded by a decision of the Presidium of ASNOM (circa 1944), and remained a state-owned newspaper, propagating the government line, until 2003, when it became privatized (http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Nova_Makedonija_(newspaper). During the decade of the 1990s (1991-1997), the state company which owned it (A.D. Nova Makedonija) also published three other newspapers, one in slavomacedonian (Vecher), one in Albanian (Flaka e Valezarimit) and one in Turkish (Birlik) as well as the weekly magazine, Puls. While we are not exactly sure of the ideological leanings of Nova Macedonia after privatization {in the 1999 presidential and 2002 parliamentary elections all the publications of the A.D. Nova Makedonija supported VMRO candidates}, Dnevnik is considered independent but leaning to VMRO-DPMNE while Utrinksi Vestnik suppurts openly SDSM (Vlasidis, 2003, pp. 300-304).

156

147 Collective and other kinds of protest of Slavomacedonians at home and abroad. First, on the level of diplomatic relations, we need to cite FYROM Ambassadors reaction at the convention of the magazine Diplomacy held in Athens. He said that he considered it an affront to receive an invitation as Ambassador of FYROM and not of the Republic of Macedonia. He also said that the solution sought by Greece is tantamout to the

abandonment of the national identity of his country. To this the representave of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece replied that the purpose of the ongoing negotiations under the aegis of the UN is to achieve a real solution so that no one is humiliated and there are no pretexts for irredentist claims (Ta Nea, 15/04/08). Second, there are reports of successive demonstrations in the center of Skopje, in favor of FYROMs constitutional name and the macedonian identity without however being followed by aggressive attacks against the Greek diplomatic services. No doubt the ongoing election campaign, the Gentlemens Agreement and the expectations for admission to NATO and the EU served to contain these types of extremist reactions, at least at home. Abroad, however, extremist elements of the Slavomacedonian community in Melbourne Australia organized demonstrations, where demonstrators carried deformed Greek flags (cross replaced by swastika) and banners that characterized Greeks as fascists and racists or showed maps of FYROM extending to Chalkidiki with Thessaloniki as its capital (Ta Nea, 27/05/08).158 Reactions of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Following the recent death of the Archibishop of Athens Christodoulos and his succession by Archibishop Ieronymos, the Greek Orthodox Church opted to restrict its activities to the pastoral role of the church; within the Greek Church, ultranationalist activities were restricted mainly to Metropolitans from Greek Macedonia. This apparently was not the case for the Autocephalous Macedonian Church which as we showed in the historical section was established in 1945 with the blessings of Tito to legitimize the new macedonian republic. In fact, an excerpt from the founding clergy-laity conference says: The Church has ethnic bishops and ethnic clergy that will safeguard the particularities of the macedonian peoples Whereas the politicians invoked Alexander the Great and the descent from Macedonians, the church hierarchy claimed historical figures such as the Byzantine Autocrat Justinian, Apostle Paul, and the Greek missionaries Methodius and Cyrillos to legitimize the new republic. The church has showed its support to the State politics on the name via a series of announcemts at crucial moments in the negotiation process. After Nimitz presented his proposals in
158

I sometimes wonder what are the reactions to these demonstrations of surviving Australian veterans who fought side by side with Cretans against the fascism and nazism in the battle of Crete.

148 February 2008, the Secretariat of the Holy Synod released an announcement which said: The Macedonian Church must emphasize especially to some circles who talk about the name of Macedonia that they have to understand that there exists a macedonian peoples, a macedonian language, a macedonian Academy and a macedonian Church. We must

especially support that so that they will not be able to doubt our macedonian ethnic identity. Later, another announcement, with analogous content was made just about a week before the NATO Synod: The Macedonian Orthodox Church, realizing that once more they are

attempting to offend its identity and also realizing the conditions in which the Macedonian nation is found, we make an appeal once more so that our name will be heard in the world and be associated with our macedonian identity (To Vima, 13/04/08).

Left: Archibishop of Ohrid Stefanos surrounded by Metropolitans of the Autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church (To Vima, 13/04/08). Right: Meeting of Prime Minister N. Gruevski with Pope Benedict on occasion of a celebration in Rome commemorating the work of St. Cyrillos one week before national elections in FYROM (Ta Nea, 26/05/08).

The next intervention/announcement which also provoked the moderate reactions by the Greek government and the ultranationalist reactions of Greek Orthodox Metropolitans from Greek Macedonia was made by the Archibishop of Ohrid Stefanou, head of the

Macedonian Church, at a ceremony in Rome commemorating the work of St. Cyrrilos and in the presence of Pope Benedict and Prime Minister N.Gruevski. He said, addressing St. Cyrrilos: Today in your place of birth {Thessaloniki} everything has become ashes and dust and there is not even a trace of a letter of your and our language. In the region, when all then spoke like you and like us, today not only they are not speaking but also the existence of this language is forbidden. This evoked Metropolitan Anthimos reaction who said that we will never accept the name of macedonia to be used by the neighboring country who has stolen and usurped it; if they want it they can come and get it (molon lave) alluding to

149 Leonidas/Spartans challenge to the Persians.159 The Greek government on its part replied that it will not get involved in the pre-election logic of FYROM and added that as long as FYROM remains hostage of the irredentist logic of the past it cannot look forward to a European and Euroatlantic future. On his part, the Archibishop of Ohrid said that his comments in Rome were misinterpreted by the Greek media and that they contained no territorial claims. In a corrected press release, he said that no one can deny that

Thessaloniki was the fatherland of the first pan-slavic letters based on the dialect of the inhabitants in the region and concluded that Thessaloniki belongs and will forever belong spiritually and culturally to us and all the slavic peoples (Ta Nea, 26, 27/05/08)..160 With regard to impact of the veto on Albanians, one scenario (To Vima, 6/04/08) was that the large Albanian minority, disappointed and frustrated by the inability of the governing Slavomacedonian party to secure membership in the Euroatlantic institutions, (and perhaps indirectly secure their minority rights) something which their mother country Albania has already accomplished, would start autonomy movements in a first phase and in a second phase seek incorporation into Albania. The information about the fomentation of such movement by neighboring countries is conflicting. On the one hand, a former Prime Minister of Kosovo is said to have recommended to the two Albanian parties (DUI and DPA) to participate in the upcoming elections on a common ticket/platform ( Ta Nea, 14/04/08).
Following the declarations by Archibishop Stefanou of FYROM regarding the disappearance of macedonianism from Thessaloniki and his claims that Thessaloniki is the cultural and spiritual home of the Slavs, there occurred a beating of two FYROM truckdrivers by Greek ultranationalist vigilantes who also removed the designation MK from the truckdrivers license plates. The episode reportedly occurred in the presence of 5 Greek police who allegedly urged on the aggressive mob ( Eleftherotypia, 2/06/08). Aside from the irredentist declarations of Archibishop Stefanou which were given wide publicity in the Greek press, there is no doubt that the heroic reactions of the Greek Macedonian metropolitans who for the Greek Macedonians constitute significant others must have also exhorted the mob reactions. 160 After the meeting with Pope Benedict, Prime Minister Gruevski said that the Republic of Macedonia has the support of the Vatican (Ta Nea, 26/05/08). Nonetheless, the Vatican is on record as refusing to consent to Prime Minister Gruevskis request (16/12/06) that the Vatican recognize FYROM by its constitutional name. In addition, the Vatican is on record as testifying to the Greek backround of Methodius and Cyrillos (See footnote 30, p. 26 of this text). Here, we might also add that the Webster New World Dictionary (Second College Addition, 1978) describes Cyril as a Greek prelate and missionary, apostle to the Slavs. Greek linguists have also maintained that the language spoken in Thessaloniki during the Methodius/Cyrillos period was Greek, and there were no slavic dialects spoken in the city; the slavic dialect into which the missionaries translated the Bible was spoken in the then Northern Macedonia (Andriotis, Cf. Babiniotis, 2000, pp. 227-228). Although the linguists themselves would have to settle the question, I wonder if the two Orthodox Christian nations could agree on the common legacy of the two Greek missionaries -their contributions to the spread of orthodox christianity among the Slavs- and view this legacy as a bridge between the two peoples. And if the Slavs want to view Thessaloniki as their spiritual fatherland, why should this generate irredentist threats among the Greeks as long as these claims are not accompanied by actual irredentist claims with the respective maps etc? We look at Jerusalem as the spiritual fatherland of Christianity and we are not about to claim it territorially. Also, westerns look at Greece as the cradle of western civilization, their spiritual ancestral land, and they are not about to claim it or take it over. Thessaloniki, being at the crossroads of the Balkans, Orthodox Christians in Greece and the slavic countries could indeed work together in making Thessaloniki a Mecca for all Orthodox Christians!!
159

150 The President of Albania (Sali Berisa) pointed to the danger of destabilization from the unsolved name-dispute and hoped that Greece would not abuse its veto or macedonia will not remain recalcitrant. Domestically, the party leaders of Albanians avoided to take a public stand while the press secretary of DUI said that the leaders of all parties should decide in common on a strategy for the name and the process of integration into NATO and EU institutions (Ta Nea, 7/04/08). However, interviews by journalists with plain citizens of the Albanian minority revealed an understanding/endorsement of the Greek vetotheir position said to be affected by Greeces approval of the integration of their mother country and the lack of substantial progress in the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. While these journalistic reports cannot be representative, a national survey conducted on 12-13 April 2008 by the Center for Research and Policy Making on a cross-section of 1100 FYROM residents, indicated radical changes occurred over a month (8-9 March 2008/12-13 April 2008) among the general and the minority population. In the general population (that also includes ethnic Albanians), the percentages against the change of the constitutional name in order to enter NATO were reduced from 83% to 60% (Ta Nea, 17/04/08) , while among ethnic Albanians the percentage who would be willing to change the consitutional name in return for NATO membership increased from 52% to 94%(See more details for survey results below).161 The impact of the Greek veto on the Greek investments/business in FYROM would be of especial interest, especially from the viewpoint of intergroup relations. As indicated in an earlier section, the Greeks were one of the largest, if not the largest, foreign investors in FYROM employing about 20,000 FYROM citizens in various sectors. Some reports (See Oikonomia, Eleftherotypia, 30/03/08) suggest that Greek investors had also applied pressures on the Caramanlis government even before the NATO summit, conveying to the Prime Minister their concerns and the need to find a solution on the name-dispute in order to secure a stable environment for investments in the region. It is said that Greek businessmen -who incidentally in their business exchanges and product promotions used the term Macedonia- feared not so much the reactions of FYROM against the Greek investors, but the fact that their investment plans had to be tabled pending a resolution of the name situation(Eleftherotypia, 30/03/08; Ethnos, 7/04/08).162 With the actual use of the veto
Center for Research and Policy Making, Macedonia: are we to change the name to enter NATO part2 (www.crpm.org.mk) 162 See Nikos Meletis (Ethnos, 7/04/08) who warns against the invokation by Greek government officials of the Greek business investments in order to solve the name, in view of the fact that for business investors the goal is profits and not the resolution of the name. Although the pure economic returns can indeed be
161

151 by the Greek government in NATO, the Greek businessmens fears for reprisals/attacks by extremist/nationalist groups, informal boycotts, the fabrication of a hostile nationalist climate and the institution of special bureaucratic requirementswere exacerbated, especially following the earlier attacks on the Greek Diplomatic Office and the swastika episodes. The Greek press reported cases of (1) vandalism against a Greek restaurant (e.g. throwing of rocks), a Greek supermarket chain (e.g. breaking of windows), cars of a Greek businessman and a Greek visitor to a local Casino (e.g. damage, drawing of swastika, appending the inscription Greek fascist), train traveling from Skopje to Greece (waggon whose seats were decorated with swastikas and the inscription greek fascists) mails (2) circulation of chain e-

urging consumers (a) to boycott Greek supermarkets, mobile phone companies and

banks163 and (b) not to select Lower Macedonia164 for their summer vacations and (3) consideration of a travel advisory for FYROM residents to avoid Greek beaches lest they fall victims of Greek ultranationalists (Ta Nea, 5-6/04/08; Kathimerini, 6/04/08; To Vima, 6/04/08; Ta Nea, 7/04/08; Proto Thema, 27/04/08). Reports also indicated a decline in business volume (30-50%) during the first days after the veto as well as a fall in travel to and from FYROM by Greeks and FYROM residents (Proto Thema, 27/04/08; Ta Nea, 29/04/08), although we do not yet have systematic controlled data. Interviews with

Greek businessmen revealed that they themselves characterized the episodes as sporadic events and as normal reactions to diplomatic events. Some also said that they had weathered worse crises (e.g. 1999-2001 Albanian insurrection) than the current one. Others said that the plain people of Skopje are peaceful, dignified and diligent, the personnel is devoted to their work and that many young people have built their careers with us(Ta Nea, 56/04/08; Kathimerini, 6/04/08; To Vima, 6/04/08). Diplomatic sources in both countries also expected that the extremist reactions and business costs would be isolated and temporary mass phenomena. There is no doubt that the Governments provision of armed protection of the Greek businesses, President Crvenkovskis intervention providing sanctuary

characterized by mutual benefits for the investor and the host country neutralizing their broader impacts- one could perhaps understand the attempts of some officials to invoke such arguments in view of the fact that the Interim Accord constituted a national policy calculated to contribute to the building of confidence that would impact positively on the name process. 163 The youth group behind the attacks is allegedly connected with Mr. N. Gruevskis party (VMRO-DPMNE). In the process of this electronic protest against the Greek businesses, the user/protesters renamed the Veropoulos supermarket (known as VERO in FYROM) as VETO. Among other things, they urged their compatriots to re-examine their collaboration with the local branches of Greek banks (National and Alpha), since in the event of a Greek embargo they could lose their savings! (To Proto Thema, 27/4/2008). 164 Meaning Northern Greece (To Proto Thema, 27/4/2008). If extremist groups adopted this term, this represents relative progress, since one of the viable alternatives for FYROM name is Upper Macedonia (Gorna Makedonija).

152 for economic relations (Ta Nea, 2/5/08)165, as well as the Gentlemans Agreement between the political party leaders not to make the name-dispute a central campaign issue, also contributed to restriction/isolation of extremist reactions. Not to be underestimated as factors in the moderation of mass reactions is the vital role of Greek business in the local economy and the expectations of FYROM for integration in Euroatlantic institutions. Land and air travel - the battle of symbols becomes airborne. The battle of

symbols between the two countries is not restricted to the ground, but has also been extended to airspace. Apparently, the land-based 1995 Interim Accord had no specific provisions for bilateral relations in airspace. Thus, the government of FYROM submitted a protest to the European Commission because Greece prohibited the flights of Macedonian Airlinesover its aispace, forcing the FYROM airlines to reach its destination (e.g. Cairo) via Turkey. The Commission replied that the fact that Greece has not signed the relevant accord does not legitimize the prohibition of flights (Eleftherotypia, 6/05/08) and undertook to communicate with Greek authorites to solve the problem. Aside from the detour for flights

to third countries over Greek airspace, the Greek policy seems to have had other collateral damages with regard to the FYROM negotiation process. An invitation by the Greek President, Mr. C. Papoulias, to the FYROM President, B. Crvenkovski, to attend a

conference in Athens on the Water Resource Management in Southeastern Europe that would also provide an opportunity for a high-level meeting regarding the name-dispute on the fringes of the conference- was allegedly cancelled because the FYROM President would have travelled to Athens with Macedonian Airlines. On its part the FYROM government suddenly changed the documentation procedures for Greek NATO forces traveling to their Kosovo base through FYROM by requesting individual passports. Up to then, and for the previous 8 years, passage of all NATO forces through FYROM was possible following the presentation of a name roster and a military identity card. The Greek government was forced to change routes and reach Kosovo via Bulgaria; simultaneously, it submitted a protest to NATO headquarters (Ta Nea, 4/06/08; Eleftherotypia 4 /06/08). While the reaction on the part of FYROM has also been connected to the reactions of Greek officers in NATO

A. Karanasopoulou reported that the attempts of some to create problems in the economic relations between Greece and Skopje {e.g. prohibiting the Macedonian Airlines from flights over Greek air space and FYROM cars from crossing the borders} apparently had no result. President Crvenkovski reportedly said: It is not to our interest to respond to a wrong policy with a wrong policy It is for the common interest, at least in the economic sector {italics added}, to make efforts in order to restore calm in the situation (Ta Nea, 2/05/08). Other things equal, the role of local authorities, as facilitators or moderators of aggression against ethnic or racial minorities has been well-documented in sociological literature, especially in the context of the American South.

165

153 exercises demanding the FYROM officers to participate in exercises with uniforms which do not carry the nameRepublic of Macedonia on their insignia, it has also been attributed to FYROMs needs for affirmation via bureaucratic channels (e.g. by stamping the passports with Republic of Macedonia or to demonstrate the vital importance of FYROM for NATO and speed up its integration into NATO (Ta Nea, 5/06/08). Undoubtedly, these reactions are expected to continue, if not escalate, unless a mutually satisfactory solution,

internationally ratified, is found and accepted at all levels of society by both countries. 3. The reactions of significant international actors. The relevant actions of crucial international actors the US, NATO, the EU and Russia after the exercise of veto by Greece, also need a brief recounting, to understand the subsequent dynamics. First and with regard to the U.S., the Bush government rushed to re-assure the FYROM government, not only via a series of consolation meetings at Bucharest and Zagreb, but also by bilateral agreements to secure the integrity of the country in the transitional period and prevent unpleasant developments(To Vima, 6/04/08; Ta Nea, 23/04/08). Such an agreement, that incidentally secured the presence of the US in the Balkans, was signed on 7/5/2008, allowing also for the conservative FYROM government to make political capital in the upcoming elections (Ethnos, 4/04/08; To Vima 6/04/08). Second, U.S. NATO Ambassador Victoria Newland, as a representative of the Bush government, soon after the NATO Summit, undertook a mission to FYROM to dissuade the FYROM government from the elections as that would lead to greater entrechement of ultranationalist positions but without however any success (Ta Nea, 10/04/08). Although the US would prefer to support the more realistic approach of President Crvenkovski with regard to elections, a referendum and the name process, it was reluctant to take sides and to risk distabilization of the government (To Vima, 13/04/08). Third, in a press interview to foreign correspondents, Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. D. Fried, recognized the macedonian ethnicity and the macedonian language, making simultaneously distinctions between historic macedonia (Greece) and modern macedonia (FYROM); Mr. Frieds statements evoked the immediate reaction of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, saying that the object of the negotiation process was the name and not the ethnicity or the language of FYROM. Greek reactions led to corrective reformulations on the part of the U.S. State Department (by Mr. Frieds alternate, Mr. Tom Keisy), to the effect that the U.S. as a nation recognizes nations/states and not ethnicity or language, and that any discussion on ethnicity or language should not impact in any way on the negotiation process (Ta Nea, 8/04/08, 9/04/08; Eleftherotypia,

154 8/04/08; To Vima, 13/04/08)166. Nonetheless, apart from the fact that references by Fried may reflect his own occupational socialization in U.S. services167, some diplomats suggest that Frieds statements may not have been so innocent after all (Proto Thema, 13/04/08), especially if one takes into account FYROMs red lines with respect to ethnicity and language. Although Frieds intervention may suggest differential pressures on Greece to compromize on its red lines168, there is no doubt that the Americans (i.e. Government Bush) are also applying pressures on both sides for a compromize solution as soon as possible to meet NATO timetables and safeguard President Bushs credibility and reputation.169

This correction/retraction was also made by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza in an Athens interview (To Vima, 13/04/08). In the same interview Mr. Bryza also revealed President Bushs rationale for the 2004 decision recognizing FYROM as Republic of Macedonia. He said that this was done in order to effect the outcome of the referendum and to protect the unity of the country (See Footnote 103, p. 88 of this text), amidst threats of destablization due to Kosovo independence plans. Naturally, this meant that the realpolitik of the Bush government relegated Greece, a longstanding ally, to a second if not a last priority. Mihou (2005, p. 316) claims that the threatened domino impacts were a pretext, at least it was it not the only cause, for U.S. change of policy on the name. 167 Mr. Fried also added that the macedonian language is one of the languages taught in the Foreign Service Intsitute of the State Department. However, a survey of the uses of the terms macedonian nation and macedonian language by U.S. services/agencies shows that (1) the use of these terms by such services/agencies as the State Department, the U.S. Embassy in FYROM, the Voice of America, the U.S. Aid, the CIA and the Library of Congress, antedated the references to them by Daniel Fried and (2) the documentation for the macedonian language by the Library of Congress was exclusively dependent upon Skopjean sources (See A. Chatzigeorgiou, Skopjean propapanda, bibliography for the U.S.A, Eleftherotypia, 23/04/08). 168 According to some sources (To Vima, 13/04/08), the US holds the view that Greece can more easily compromize its red lines not only because a solution of the name-dispute would contribute to regional stability but also because the greater maturity of its political structure will allow for an easier absorption of the shock waves of a painful solution 169 However, the invitation by the U.S. of FYROM to take part in a Washington Conference (Initiative against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction) with the name Republic of Macedonia led to the withdrawal of both Greece and Cyprus and was interpreted in the Greek press as reinforcing the intransigence of FYROM at a crucial stage in the negotiations, when the U.S. should have adopted a position of neutrality. The U.S. on its part, besides characterizing the conference informal, replied that as the host country of the conference, it was obligated to use the name by which it had recognized FYROM since 2004, (Ta Nea, 29/05/08, 30/05/08; To Vima, 1/06/08).

166

155

Left: U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Newland saying to President Branco Crvenkovski that the name-dispute should be resolved within a few days or weeks not months during her April 9 meeting (Ta Nea, 10/04/08). Right: U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza explaining to Vima reporter Tania Bozaninou during his visit in Athens the reasons the U.S. recognized FYROM with its constitutional name, clarifying U.S. policy regarding recognition of nationalities and languages and declaring U.S. unwillingness and inability to institute reprisals against Greece following the exercise of veto (To Vima, 13/04/08).

Toward the same direction were also the actions of NATO officials. In a special trip to FYROM following the Bucharest summit, the General Secretary of NATO, G. Schefer, dissociated himself from involvement in the UN negotiations for the name, saying its an independent process, but also gave an ultimatum to the Skopian government to come to a compromize settlement with Greece by 9 July 2008- which is the date that Albania and Croatia will sign the Protocol for Admission to NATO. Logistically, if a solution were found by then and FYROM is admitted to NATO, then it would follow the same timetable and would not have to review its integration program (Ta Nea, 17/04/08; Eleftherotypia 22/04/08). Nonetheless, doubts were expressed whether the time demands for the formation of a viable government following the FYROM elections, the loss of negotiation-time due to the elections and the timetables of the Greek government and the European Union, would allow for a compromize settlement of the dispute by July 9. It was estimated that the process of forming a government especially in view of the necessity in forming a coalition with the Albanian parties- may require from twenty days to a month. Furthermore, Greek oppositon parties (especially the left parties) had been sensitive to decisions made in the context of NATO and there were indications that the Greek government may not be so keen to an express settlement based on NATO timetables but may want a settlement during the French Presidency or in the context of UN proceedings . A milestone date, that would overcome the artificial timetable of NATO and that could also be selected for a possible settlement within the context of the UN, is September 18, the date for the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly when the Foreign Ministers of both countries will be invited to address the body (Ta Nea, 25-26/04/08; Eleftherotypia, 6/05/08).

156 In the European Union, the European Parliament voted the progress report for FYROM integration (601 for and 52 against) with all the Greek Parliamentarians except the Communists giving their positive vote on progress report- following the acceptance of a Greek amendment by the EU parliament that made the stipulation of a date for the commencement of the integration negotiations contingent upon the solution of the namedispute.170 The European Parliament called upon both of the parties (Athens and Skopje) to settle the name-dispute as soon as possible so that it will not constitute an obstacle in FYROMs European integration and will promote regional stability. With regard to the time schedule for the commencement of the integration talks, while initially they were scheduled to start December 2008, the Greek parliamentarians promoted an amendment calling for a decision by the European Council after an assessment of progress during the next EU Summit meeting (Ta Nea, 24/04/08). 4. Name-talk - content and process - during the post-Summit period. The failure to obtain a solution of the name in the context of NATO, seems to have had a negative impact on the intervention of the NATO factors in the multilateral negotiations. There followed attempts by NATO and US officials to dissociate themselves from the name process (Ta Nea, 15/04/08; To Vima, 6/04/08), paying lip service to the importance of the autonomous negotiation processs under the UN. Also, there were reactions in Greece of the opposition parties (PASOK, Left Alliance and Communist) to associating the settlement of the name-dispute with NATO processes, followed by demands to continue negotiations under the aegis of the UN. Both Athens and FYROM governments sent letters to the UN Secretary General regarding their willingness to resume the negotiations, though the correspondence of the latter was accompanied by denunciation of Greece for violation of the Interim Accord. Soon after the NATO summit meeting, there followed parallel/successive meetings by UN special mediator M. Nimitz in the capitals of the two countries as well as in New York(Ta Nea, 14/04/08). According to the UN mediator, the application of the veto had created a new dynamic, now he understood what was acceptable to each side, Skopje has the will for a solution, though he acknowledged that the election period would make

negotiations difficult for both countries and avoided setting a formal timetable (Ta Nea, 19-20/04/08; Eleftheros Typos, 20/04/08). In due course, however, it became evident to all the factors that the shuttle diplomacy and the parallel meetings in New York were not feasible, had no meaning because of the early elections in FYROM and the caretaker
170

The initial Committee Report was rejected by the EU Greek parliamentariams because the text maintained that the name should not constitute an obstacle to FYROMs European integration progress.

157 government and could have an adverse impact on the status of the UN negotiation team ( Ta Nea, 2/05/08; Eleftherotypia, 6/05/08). Although the shuttle diplomacy of the Nimitz negotiation team was temporarily suspended and Mr. Nimitz put a contraband on discussion of specific names by all the parties, there were indications (Eleftheros Typos, 20/04/08; Eleftherotypia, 6/05/08)) that secret negotiations either by Matthew Nimitz or American officials, especially because of the pressures for NATO July 9 deadline, in order to have a solution as soon as a government is formed, were going on.171 In addition, the various names alternatives became objects of discussion for news analysts and commentators who suspected government and/or the mediator preferences and surveys on the name alternatives were conducted in both countries. We turn to brief presentation of these outcomes and the accompanying problematics.

Left: G. Schefer, NATO Secretary while attempting to disentagle NATO from the name-settlement procedures gives FYROM ultimatum to reach a compromize solution before July 9, 2008 (Eleftherotypia, 22/04/08). Right:. UN mediator M. Nimitz taking advantage of the new dynamics following the Greek veto and attempting to persuade FYROM leadership to reach a compromize with Athens, before his visit to Athens to talk with the Greek government (Ta Nea, 18/04/08).

Within Greece, the public dialogue was concentrated mainly on the name of Republic of New Macedonia as the most likely choice of the UN mediator, the United States and of the Greek government, especially after the analogous examples (Mexico , New Mexico) cited by the Greek Foreign Minister in the International Herald Tribune and her contact with 10 Greek bloggers where the Foreign Minister presented the term New Macedonia as a geographical characterization (New Macedonia as part of the whole Macedonia) (Eleftheros Typos, 20/04/08; Eleftherotypia, 2/04/08)). PASOK, through its shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs (A. Loverdos) replied that it could not accept this alternative as it was not a geographical determinationan analysis that would also be
However, the EU was also pressuring for a quick solution, since Greece had threatened to use the veto to block FYROMs access pending a mutualy acceptable solution. Xavier Solana, Coordinator for EU foreign policy, speaking in the European Parliament, also expressed the hope for intensification of negotiations so that a solution can be found as soon as possible even before the end of the year when FYROM comes up for accession talks. He said: the idea exists in one of [Nimitzs } proposals to add one word -not yet known- that would constitute a positive step toward a compromize and lead to an accord between Greece and FYROM for the resolution of the name-dispute (Ta Nea, 9/04/08).
171

158 supported by Greek philologists (Ta Nea, 7/05/08). Along the same lines, Greek political analyst S. Lygeros (Kathimerini, 20/04/08) says that New Macedonia is a historical characterization, that as a part of Macedonia refers to the whole and does not invalidate the irredentist ideology of Macedonianism.172 In addition, Lygeros said that it signifies a renaissance and presupposes the presence of bonds and its not not a mere juxtaposition. On the other hand, experienced diplomats (To Vima, 27/04/08) have maintained that a cut and dry geographical characterization does not constitute the only solution; for them, the term New Macedonia has qualitative elements based on history which render the specific name a credible solution to the pending problem. On the level of Greek public opinion, one of the social surveys (See Table 5) that was done by MRB Hellas on behalf of Alpha TV, and assesses almost the whole spectrum of solutions, showed that the majority of the Greek people (58,6%) are still maximalists and continue to be against the use of the term Macedonian and any of its derivatives. A second survey done by ALCO (Proto Thema, 10/04/08) showed that two-thirds of the voters (67,7%) were against names either with a geographical or a historical determinant; most of these were probably maximalists, but this wastebasket category may also conceal other responses, including those pertaining to the constitutional name or a composite name describing the political structrure.173 However, if one focuses only on the MRB Hellas survey conducted on behalf of Alpha TV (Table 5) and compares with surveys done before the NATO Summit meeting (See Table 3), he can observe that the proportion of respondents who are for a genuinely composite name, of any type (38,3%), may have increased somewhat compared to the pre-NATO surveys. The surveys (Table 5) also show that the Greek public is more receptive to a name with a geographical determinant (e.g. Upper Macedonia) than an historical determinant (e.g. New Macedonia). The percentages who are for a name with a political structure reference that included four of the names in the Nimitzs proposal (e.g. New Republic of, Peoples Republic of, Constitutional Republic of, Independent

Specifically, Lygeros says: The New Macedonia is the wrong solution because it refers to the whole of Macedonia and not just to part of it. As such, it does not invalidate the ideology of Macedonianism, the attempt of the part (Slavomacedonians) to usurp the whole (Macedonia). A geographical characterization is necessary to elucidate exactly that the neighboring state is legitimated only as a part without any claim on the whole of Macedonia. 173 The lack of comparability not only among survey companies but also within the same survey company catering to different customers complicates diachronic and synchronic comparisons. It seems to me that both science and the customers would have more to gain if there was better comparability among surveys, simultaneously allowing the respondents a choice among all possible solution alternatives, including the constitutional name of FYROM.

172

159 Republic of... ), in accordance with the MRB Hellas survey done for ALPHA TV, was quite insignificant (3,7%). Another post-NATO summit survey also done by MRB Hellas for the newspaper Eleftheros Typos (13/04/08) but which was not exactly comparable to the above two surveys in that the respondents were asked to choose among the five alternatives proposed by Nimitz and exluded basic types of names, revealed the following distribution: Republic of Upper Macedonia (30,5%), New Republic of Macedonia (10,1%), Independent Republic of Macedonia (9,4%), Peoples Republic of Macedonia (3,4%) Constitutional Republic of Macedonia (3,2%), None of the above(30,8%), Other (6,7%), and DNK/NA (5,6%). The results of this survey also demonstrate the greater popularity of the geographically-based names for the Greek public; however, the fact that only 30,8% said none of the above a proportion perhaps tantamount to those who do not want any form of the term Macedonia in the name but which is quite low compared to most surveys during the last years where this proportion fluctuates between 60% and 75% (See Table 3). This contradiction points to the lability of survey results depending upon the question formulation (i.e. the number of alternative responses provided to the respondents).

Table 5. Greek Public Opinion following the Bucharest NATO Summit Meeting
1. MRB Hellas nationwide telephone survey for ALPHA TV, (N = 1007) 56/04/08 Question: In todays political situation, which of the following solutions that I will read to you comes closest to your view in order to resolve the issue surrounding the name of FYROM and find a mutually acceptable name Name which Composite Other/ Composite Composite does not name that name that name that DNK/NA. contain the contains the contains term contains term term term of of Macedonia of Macedonia Macedonia or Macedonia with a with a political its with a chronological structure derivatives determinant geographical determinant determinant 58,6% 28,8% 5,8% 3,7% 3,0%$

2. ALCO Question: After the veto, which of the following names would you accept for nationwide the states of Skopje? telephone survey Upper Macedonia New Neither of the DNK/NA (N=1000) for Macedonia two Proto Thema, 818,7% 9,2% 67,7% 4,4% 10/04/08

In the case of FYROM, and on the level of political dialogue, -among politicians or political analysts- we have no specific information as to the name talk, especially since there was a Gentlemens Agreement among party leaders to avoid the name-dispute during the

160 pre-election process. There was consultation of intellectuals and experts by the PM and the President, but we have no information as to the outcomes. There is no doubt that even if there are voices for compromize, the election climate is not conducive to their publication and open consideration. Some sources (To Vima, 27/04/08) suggest that Prime Minister N. Gruevski would not accept any solution, of the type New Macedonia, although the

President B. Crvenkovski would be more receptive to such a compromize solution as long this would not undermine national identity and language. Nonetheless, lately there are indications (Eleftheros Typos, 18/05/08) that the hardliner Prime Minister of FYROM, N. Gruevski, has confided to foreign officials his willingness to consider the adoption of the name, Gorna Macedonia (Upper Macedonia) for international uses, without a change of the constitutional name and with guarantees for the Macedonian national identity and the Macedonian language. Here it should be mentioned that this name proposal, if authentic, is the one that was almost agreed upon in 2001 by the Simitis and the FYROM (VMRO) governments (with the consent of opposition), when the Tetovo crisis broke out B. Crvenkovski then the leader of the and the name issue was overtaken by

existential priorities. In any case, the proposal, if authentic, assumes a double-name framework which comes into contradiction with the erga omnes position of the Greek government, the official opposition (PASOK) and the minority left parties. During the 2008 pre-election period, the issues that dominated the campaign were FYROMs integration into NATO and the EU and by extension the name-dispute with Greece, although according to an anonymous FYROM political analyst this was done on the level of slogans and there was no substantive dialogue (To Vima, 1/06/08). Gruevksi used nationalistic rhetoric saying he would not submit to pressures from Greece, while the opposition leader, Radmila (Randa) Sekerinska appeared willing for a compromize with Greece. The political analyst added that there was no dialogue of substance on the namedispute since all of the politicians knew that some kind of compromize is inevitable but they did not want to accept it. Along the same lines, a Skopjean journalist said the harsh rhetoric of Gruevksi is an exclusive characteristic of the election campaign; in actuality, Gruevski hopes for a compromize with Greece that will not jeopardize the identity of Macedonia. The same view was also expressed by Branco Gerovski, the director of the newspaper Spitz, who said that the Prime Minister used the patriotic pre-election rhetoric, accusing all the rest as traitors, but people have begun to understand that there is no

161 government in Skopje which will refuse to negotiate with Athens.174 Most of the Vimas informants said that Gruevski would accept a name (e.g. Republic of Macedonia Skopje or Gorna Macedonia) for international use without however a change in the

constitutional name). In post-election inteviews to the Serbian Agency Beta and the BBC Macedonian Service respectively, Prime Minister Gruevski and Foreign Minister Milososki reiterated their positions regarding the macedonian nation/ethnic identity and language, but were pessimistic about the prospects of Athens relinquishing its right to veto and reaching a reasonable compromize with FYROM (Ta Nea, 4/06/08)175.

Radmila (Randa) Sekerinska, the leader of the opposition party (Social Democatic Union of Macedonia), an Electrical Engineer,a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University {also the alma mater of C. Caramanlis}, and the first woman to take over the leadership of a major political party of FYROM (Proto Thema, 9/03/08).

Cross-sections of FYROM residents as sampled in national surveys are always more representative than the commentarires of political analysts or the sporadic extremist reactions noted after the NATO summit meeting. It would be instructive to cite two surveys done by the Center for Research and Policy Making, before and after the NATO summit meeting, on a cross-section of FYROM residents, though conclusions cannot be definite since we do not have access to the formulation of the questions: In the March (7th-9th) survey, 83% of the general population did not agree to change their constitutional name in order to become members of NATO, while the comparable proportion in the April (12th-13th) survey was reduced to 60%; on the other hand, 17% of the respondents in March survey and 40% in the April survey agreed to change their constitutional name in order for FYROM to become a member of NATO. Doing an analysis by ethnicity, the researchers noted that the

percentage of ethnic Macedonians against changing the constitutional name decreased from 95% in March to 80% in April, while the percentage of Macedonian Albanians who agreed to changes of the countrys constitutional name increased from 52% in March to

174

In televised interviews broadcast in Greece during the election campaign, the leader of the opposition, R.. Sekerinska, accused Gruevski of violating the parties Gentlemens Agreement with regard to the namedispute. 175 See also Greece Must Accept Macedonian Identity (www.balkaninsight.com).

162 94% in April. The CRPM press release published in their webpage176 noted that the Macedonian Albanians have changed their opinion. In fact, two thirds of the

respondents that would change the name of the country for Macedonias NATO membership are ethnic Albanians (bold in the original). Although there was also change of opinion among the ethnic Macedonians with respect to changing the constitutional name (increase of 15% between the two periods), the authors of the CRPM press release avoid spelling it out, lest they themselves be accused of advocating a change of the constitutional name.177 This trend toward more realism of the FYROM residents would no doubt be reinforced if the question for integration into EU is substituted for the question on NATO integration. Guarantees of composite name for Greece. A crucial issue that has been raised by political analyst S. Lygeros (Kathimerini, 20/04/08) has to do with the Greek governments position regarding the ratification of the decision by the UN security Council, even if a composite name becomes acceptable to the two parties. According to Mr. Lygeros UN resolutions are consultative and not binding for the nation members. The problem is how can Greece have quarantees that the member nations who have already recognized FYROM with its constitutional name will comply with the resolution of the UN Security Council. Logistically, this would create many demands and challenges for Greece in relation to these states, but would no doubt create tensions and frictions in all international travels and communications. Mr. Lygeros recommends that Greece demand a corresponding change in the FYROM constitution that will have at least the consensus of the two principal Slavomacedonian parties. According to Lygeros, after the shock of the Greek veto, FYROM must confront the following dilemma: on the one hand, they can keep their constitutional name and the fantasy of Greater Macedonia which that represents; on the other, there are the concrete benefits from integration into NATO now and tomorrow in the European Union. This no doubt raises the counter question if changes in the constitution can be made without changes in macedonian identity and language.

176 177

See www.crpm.org.mk As indicated throughout the text, the Albanian minority members are generally indifferent to the constitutional name, since they claim descent from Illyrians. Their more positive attitudes toward a change of the constitutional name may reflect disillusionment with progress in the Ohrid Agreement and frm the fact that their mother country was admitted to NATO and will in time also be admitted to the EU.

163

VIII. Election process and outcomes in FYROM-An index of FYROMs Future?

A. Election procedures and outcomes: Public opinion polls conducted just before the June 1 elections showed that 31,3% of the voters would vote for the Prime Ministers Nicola Gruevskis party (VMRO-DPMNE), 11,2% for the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) opposition party led by Radmila Sekerinska, 9,1% for the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) led by Ali Ahmeti and 6% for the Democratic Party of Albanians led by Menduh Thaci.178 A substantial proportion of the electorate (40%) had declared in the polls that they would not take part in the elections (To Vima, 1/06/08). Although the 2008 June 1 election results were not conclusive because of the irregularities, and they are not exactly comparable with the polls due the participation of coalitions in the actual elections179, the distribution of the votes was generally in accord with the Gallup and the 2006 election outcomes, both in terms of level of participation (56% in 2006 and 58% in 2008) and party preference. A comparison of the 2006 and the June 1, 2008 elections (See Table 6 for June 1 provisional results) suggests a reduction of popular support for the SDSM coalition and the largest of the Albanian parties - Democratic Union for Integration which during the last administration had boycotted the parliamentary process. At the same time, the June 1 results suggest a strengthening of the smaller Albanian party (Democratic Party of Albanians) that had participated in the coalition government of Gruevski and the securing of a clear parliamentary majority by Gruevskis VMRO-DPMNE party. The outcomes demonstrate that Prime Minister Gruevski really capitalized on the Greek veto, mobilizing and harvesting the nativist reflexes, by achieving the parliamentary

Journalistic sources (Ta Nea, 31/05-1/06/08) suggest that during the pre-election campaign the Prime Minister gave the green light to the DPA (who had participated in government coalition) to use the state apparatus to support his campaign. This led to confrontation and violence between the supporters of the two Albanian parties, climaxing in an armed attack against a political proccession of the DUI leader, Ali Ahmeti. The DPA leader replied that the attack on the procession was a self-inflicted act of provocation. Nonetheless, this had a boomerang impact and instead of strengthening Mr. Gruevskis coalition partner, strengthened the DUI Albanian party since secret gallups showed Mr. Ahmeti to have a 2:1 lead over Mr. Thaci. 179 There were changes in the composition of the two main coalitions for the 2008 elections. The 19-party coalition, For a Better Macedonia, included 8 new parties. Two of these new parties (Democratic Party of Turks and Democratic Party of Serbs had defected from the SDSM 2006 coalition. The 8-party coalition, Sun Coalition for Europe included 4 new parties, two of which were significant small parties; one of these (Liberal Party of Macedonia) had defected from the VMRO-DPMNE 2006 coalition and the other (New Social Democratic Party) from the ranks of 2006 independents. It will be recalled that the New Social Democratic Party had been an offshoot of the SDSM party. Finally, the 2006 three-party coalition of DUI was dissolved in the 2008 elections, and DUI participated in the 2008 elections as an independent party {See FYR Macedonia Update European Forum, www.europeanforum.net/country/macedonia for 2006 elections and Macedonia Parliamentary Election, 2008, Wikipedia-the Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Macedonian_parliamentary_election%2C_2008).

178

164 majority, according him theoretically carte blanche authority in Parliament for national issues. However, the victory was indeed a classical Pyrrhic victory for the Prime Minister, as the elections were accompanied by a series of irregularities180 and marred by episodes of violence that caused the death (1) and injuries (28) of citizens, exposing the country to the international community, questioning its readiness for integration in Euroatlantic institutions and delaying the formation of government due to the compulsory rerun elections as well as the resolution of pending issues in the domestic and international sectors (e.g.

implementation of Ohrid Agreement, settlement of name dispute, meeting criteria for EU integration, etc.)..

The prohibition signs were not sufficient to prevent violence in a number of polling stations located in the Northwest section of the country, leading to rerun elections (Eleftherotypia, 2/06/08)

The irregularities according to the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) were concetrated in the predominantly Albanian. Thus, tension and unrest were observed in
According to the preliminary report of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) that consisted of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (276 observers from OSCE) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (13 observers from PACE), the irregularities included family voting, multiple voting, ballot box stuffing, proxy voting, intimidation of Election Board members, presence of unauthorized persons in polling stations and absence of police at many polling stations contrary to law. The IEOM observers monitored voting in 1100 polling stations out of a total of 2976, counting in 111 polling stations, the transfer of Election Board results to the Municipal Election Commissions (MECs) and the tabulation of results in 71 (out of 84) MECs after the polling stations were closed. The international monitors were supplemented by 4,892 domestic observers the largest source being the NGO named MOST- which according to the IEOM contributed to the transparency in the election process. For the monitoring process, the irregularities, DUIs accounting of them and their impacts, see also Deadly Shooting Mars Macedonia (See Bihou , 2005, p. 74 for family voting whereby a Election, 2 June 2008, www.balkaninsight.com. self-declared paterfamlias can cast votes for the whole {extended} family).
180

165 only 3% of polling stations nationwide, while in the Albanian areas this proportion rose to 9%. With regard to counting problems, these were observed in 15% of the polling stations visited, while in the Albanian areas this percentage was 32% and in the rest of the areas 9%. The tabulation process was evaluated as good or very good in all but two of the 71 Municipal Election Commissions (MECs), while reports of deliberate falsification of results came only from the Tetovo MEC. The State Election Commission, which also confirmed the irregularities in the northwest area of the country, annuled the results in 22 polling stations in the northwest region of the country (about 1% of the polling stations in the country), while the Prime Minister announced that revoting would take place in the areas affected by violence in order to minimise the longterm international impacts. The climate of violence and intimidation prevalent during the elections also became more evident to international viewers from the post-election victory celebrations and street demonstrations (shootings in the air etc.) that reminded one of the Wild West.

Left to Right: Ali Ahmeti, leader of Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and Menduh Thaci, leader of the Democratic Albanian Party (DPA) casting their ballots during the June 1, 2008 national elections (Ta Nea, 2/06/08).

There is no doubt that the long-term competition between the two main Albanian parties for participation in the government181 was partly responsible for the above irregularities;
Ahmeti in an interview he gave just before the first rerun elections said that the political crisis that led to the early elections and the incidents of violence during election day were the immediate consequence of Gruevskis decision to form a government in 2006 that did not have absolute legitimacy (Ta Nea, 14-15/06/08). Although the competition betweem two main Albanian parties for power within the FYROM political system culminated in internecine violence, mutual recriminations and negative labeling (e.g. we are a party, they are a criminal organization, We are a party, they are the Chieftains) in the 2008 elections (Ta Nea, 2/06/08 & 3/06/08; Eleftheros Typos 2/06/08; Eleftherotypia, 2/06/08), it also suggests that the two minority parties do
181

166 however, there are also indications of differential media coverage during the pre-election period and of differential governmental treatment in favor of the Democratic Albanian Party (DPA) that may have also exacerbated the situation during election day. In fact, the leader of the opposition (SDSM) said that the election institutions were not only below expectations for the electoral process, but they also incited and allowed violence. The DUI leadership on the other hand characterized the election happenings as a black mark on Macedonia and accused the FYROM police as well as its Albanian rival party for the episodes of violence, leading to death and injuries of citizens; it also left open the question of recognition of the election results and whether or not it would demand a revote in the whole of Tetovo region (plus a municipality in Skopje) and not only in the 22 polling stations announced by the government (Ta Nea, 2/06/08; Eleftherotypia, 2/06/08; Ta Nea 3/06/08; Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia, Macedonian Parliamentary Elections 2008). This sense of differential treatment and victimization among the leadership and ranks of DUI led to all kinds of speculation that unless there was rectificaton of the anomalous situation, Ali Ahmeti would take to the mountains, reinforcing domino senarios, secessionist talk and the visions of Greater Albania as well as proactive efforts of mediation and pacification by the local American Ambassador Jilian Milavanovitz (Ta Nea, 3/06/08). Without question, the Ambassadors efforts were expected to bring results given the recent Security Agreement Between FYROM and the U.S., the role of the U.S. in the 2004 referendum and the popularity of the U.S. among the Albanians in the region182.

not challenge the territorial integrity of the new Republic. Whether or not this is genuine political choice or an accommodation to the demands for integration in the Euroatlantic institutions remains to be seen. Possibly, much will depend upon the policy of the Slavomacedonian governing party toward the political integration of the two Albanian parties and the Albanian minority (See also D. Charalambous & N. Chrysikakis, One city, two worlds, pp. 35-42, VIMagazino, 8/06/08 for the tensions between the two parties and integration in the larger society). 182 During a pre-election speech by Ali Ahmeti, the background of the venue was decorated by five flags (DUIs, Albanias, the European Unions, Kosovos and the U.S.s) (VIMagazino, 8/06/08). The flag of FYROM was absent. Undoubtedly, the absence of the FYROM flag could reflect discontent with regard to the progress on the Ohrid Agreement and exclusion of Ahmeti from the government coalition in 2006something that is expected to change if DUI becomes a partner of the new government.

167 Table 6. 2006 and 2008 FYROM National Election Results (Main and Rerun Elections)
Political Parties/Coalitions 2006 Elections 1 June 2008 Elections (Provisional results) % of votes Seats After 15 & 30 June 2008 Rerun Elections (Final results) % of votes Seats

Coalition For a Better Macedonia (VMRO-DPMNE etc) (Coalition of 14 parties in 2006 elections) Coalition For a Better Macedonia (VMRO-DPMNE etc) (Coalition of 19 parties in 2008 elections) Coalition Together for Macedonia (SDSM etc) (Coalition of 9 parties in 2006 electoins) Coalition Sun Alliance for a European Macedonia (SDSM etc) (Coalition of 8 parties in 2008 elections) Coalition {Democratic Union for Integration(DUI) etc} Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) New Social Democratic Party (NSDP) VMRO Peoples Party Other parties Total

% of votes 32,51

Seats 45

48,24

64

48,8

63

23,31

32

23,19

28

23,6

27

12,12

17

11,23 7,50 6,04 6,09 12,43 100,00 11 7 6 2 120 10,33 7,00%

13 13 2

12,8 8,5 6,3

18 11 1

100,00

120

100,0

120

Sources: FYR Macedonia Update, 28 November 2006 (www.europeanforum.net/country/macedonia) ; Macedonia Parliamentary Election, 2008, Wikipedia-the Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonian_parliamentary_ election%2C_1998; To Vima 1/96/08; Eleftherotypia, 3/06/08; International Herald Tribune, 16 June 2008; www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/11410/ ).

The irregularities and the climate of violence, which reportedly did not characterize the regular 2006 national elections,183 evoked the displeasure/regrets not only of the

international and domestic observers but also of all the international factors (NATO, US,

We quote: Zoran Tanevski, member of the National Electoral Commissions management commented after the {2006} elections: We can say that these general elections took place in a free, honest, democratic atmosphere, apart from some very small problems. Also the OSCE was relatively positive about the elections and said they took place in a mostly democratic manner. The OSCE did note there were some isolated cases of serious infringements, and regretted the violence and intimidation during the electoral campaign. (www.europeanforum.net/country/macedonia).

183

168 E.U.) who had reservations about the early elections, lest they impact adversely on

FYROMs integration into the Euroatlantic institutions. They all recognized the irregularities, noted the democracy deficit and pointed to the necessity for an immediate rectification by the FYROM government. In a sense, the international and domestic factors counseled against the early elections were now vindicated. who had

The elections and the

accompanying irregularities not only complicated the process of reaching a settlement on the name-dispute with Greece, by leading to an entrechment of ultranationalist attitudes but also by delaying the resumption of talks because of the problems attendant to the formation of new government. More significantly (and perhaps vital for the future of FYROM), however, was the increased levels of risk for jeopardizing FYROMs course toward the Euroatlantic institutions (and especially the European Union) and for regional destabilization (Eleftheros Typos, 2/06/08; Eleftherotypia, 3/06/08; Ta Nea, 3/06/08, 4/06/08). After the elections, talk of meeting the July 9 timetable for integration into NATO was out of the question; on the other hand, there were indications (Eleftheros Typos, 2/06/08) that Albania, as a newest NATO member would also consider the use of veto if FYROM made no progress with regard to the demands of the Albanian minority.184 The FYROM government could of course follow the customary path of externalizing and focusing the blame on the veto by Greece for all the problems attendant to the elections. Undoubtedly, the consent of Greece for the integration of Albania into NATO and the blocking of FYROM may have contributed to Albanians sense of relative deprivation and their subsequent competition for access to power in order to determine their future fate within the new Republica deprivation which might have been intensified following the declaration of the independence of Kosovo and the recognition by significant Western countries (within and outside the EU). However, from the available information, the Albanians-residents of FYROM, most of whom are indifferent to the name-dispute,185 do not blame the Greeks for exercizing the veto; in fact, if the commentary of their leadership is representative, they would have done the same if they were in Greeces position, as they too

The President of Albania, Bamir Topi, expressed his concerns for the situation in FYROM but added that the elections constitute an opportunity for the Albanians of Macedonia to demonstrate their resolution to contribute to the future of the democracy and the stability of the country (Eleftherotypia, 2/06/08). 185 Political analysts suggest that Ahmetis priorities are the creation of a federated FYROM, along the model of Switzerland or Belgium, and not the name. During negotiations for the name in 2003, he allegedly said that the name does not concern me; for all that matters you could name it Disneyland (Ta Nea, 2/06/08). This notwistanding, during discussions in the Parliament the Albanians suggested names that would be more appropriate for a multicultural society, excluding from consideration names such as Republic of Slavomacedonia.

184

169 question FYROMs claims to Macedonian antiquity. Thus, before the FYROM government faults Greece, it should also take into account the progress Greece has made since 1992 in accepting a compromize on the name-dispute and its own intransigence and desire to monopolize the term Macedonia. More significantly and relevantly, however, it should reflect on the following: First, on its policy toward the integration of the Albanian minority and the progress that the government has made in implementing the Ohrid Agreement {See DPAs demands as a cause of withdrawal from government before NATO summit meeting); second, it should also reflect on the inequitable treatment of the two Albanian parties in the formation of national government both during the 2002-2006 period and during the snap elections and, lastly, on the failure to take into consideration the geopolitics following the declaration of Kosovo independence. An analysis of election statistics a week after the main elections (Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia) revealed that the number of polling stations where re-run elections would be held were not only 22 (1% of polling stations) but 186 (6,25%).186 Another development reported by Wikipedia is the post-election announcement by the Party for Democratic Prosperity(PDP), which in 2006 coalesced with Ahmetis DUI party, that it will merge with Thacis Democratic Party of Albanians.187 According to Wikipedia this would effectively make DPA the leading Albanian party and increase its chances in the re-run elections. The re-run elections were expected to affect the proportions of the Albanian parties, as the irregularities were observed principally in the Albanian districts and not to have an impact on the distribution of votes of the two principal coalitions or Gruevskis clear parliamentary majority. Actually, two re-run elections took place, the first on June 15, in 186 polling stations and the second on June 29 in 15 polling stations, due to a continuation of regularities in the 15 polling stations. Following the first re-run elections, 48,8% of the vote and 63 seats went to Premier Gruevskis VMRO-DPMNE party and 23,6% and 27 seats to the Social Democratic Union; DUI received 12,8% of the popular vote and DPA 8,5% of the popular vote; the projection in seats was for 18 for DUI, 11 for DPA and 1 seat for a small party. The second re-run elections did not alter the distribution of seats among the various
186

See Macedonia Parliamentary Election, 2008, Wikipedia-the Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Macedonian_parliamentary_election%2C_2008. Yet a more recent source (Eleftheros Typos, 8/06/08 or http://e-tipos.com.newsitem?id=39612) says that the State Election Commission decided to hold re-run elections on 15 June 2008 in 193 polling stations; this corresponds to about 170,000 voters or about 10% of the electorate. The DPA has challenged the SEC decision in the Supreme Appeals Court charging that the SEC decided to have re-runs in polling stations where DPA had received majority vote. The decision of the Court was expected within 48 hours.
However, according to Wikipedia, PDP had seceded from the DUI coalition and had joined Gruevskis governing coalition since June 2007 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonian_parliamentary_election%2C_2006)
187

170 parties (International Herald, 16/06/08; www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/11119/{or 11448 or 11227 or 11294} . DUI was strenghened not only in comparison to the June 1 2008 elections, but also in comparison to the 2006 elections, when it took part in the elections as a coalition. Thus, overall, and taking into account all the electoral procedures, the two victors in the national election were Gruevskis and Ahmetis parties and the last minute coalitions had no positive impact on DPAs chances, increasing Ahmetis probabilities for participation in a coalition government188.

Victory celebrations by the leader of the VMRO-DPMNE party, Nicola Gruevski, following the June 1, 2008 national elections (To Vima, 8/06/08) and by the leader of the DUI, Ali Ahmeti, following the June 15 re-run elections in 186 polling stations (Ta Nea, 17/06/08).

B. Post-election assessments and prospects for a solution of the name-dispute. According to Atanas Kirovski, a journalist/political analyst in FYROM, the elections were a sort of referendum for the European Union; he maintained that the electorate would have voted the Social Democratic Union if they wanted to compromize on the name in order to enter the European Union since the SDSMs political platform included compromize for the sake of Euroatlantic institutions. Thus, the electoral outcomes showed that the people of Macedonia prefer to sacrifice the European Union rather than their identity. Finally, he said that for the common people NATO is more important to them than the European Union because it guarantees stability(To Vima, 8/06/08). Whether NATO or EU will contribute more to the long-term economic stability of the country is a serious question; both political and economic stability are interrelated factors and both are necessary for progress in the other sector. In any case, I doubt if the elections were a clear-cut referendum for the
Gruevskis traditional coalition partner, the Democratic Party of Albanians of Menduh Thaci, boycotted the constitutive parliamentary session, accusing DUI, the rival Albanian party, of fraud during the June 15 vote re-run (www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/11227/). Although one would have to wait for the final report of the international observers (the IEOM) to assess Thacis charges, the initial report of the IEOM suggests that the irregularities of June 1 were responsible for the elevated proportions of DPA.
188

171 European Union, since there was little ideological difference between the political parties with regard to integration in the European Union, and the long-term policies of all governments after the declaration of independence, including the previous Gruevski government, had as a strategic goal European integration. Although we have to wait for the systematic and objective social analysis of the relative contribution of various factors (progress toward the EU, the policy on the name, economic factors, unemployment etc.) to voting189, there is no question that Gruevskis electoral victory could be interpreted as a mandate for more nativistic and maximalist policies regarding the name-dispute.190 Having won a comfortable parliamentary majority he could proceed to the formation of a government, using personnel exclusively from the parties constituting his own coalition. Theoretically, he did not have to form a coalition with the Social Democratic Union or any of the two Albanian parties who are more open to a compromize solution with Greece in order to obtain access to the Euroatlantic institutions. Actually, the formation of a coalition with one of the Albanian parties (DUI or DPA) was inevitable to forestall the ghettoization of Albanians and to prevent another Albanian insurrection and destabilization of the country. Having learned from his past mistakes, Gruevski opted to form a coalition with DUI, the Albanian party which received the majority of Albanian votes in the June 2008 elections and the party which had boycotted parliamentary procedures in 2007 because the formation of the previous government violated the spirit of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement.191 It remains to be seen if the politics of DUI for the Euroatlantic integration, the multicultural society and a compromize with Greece on the name-dispute would impact on the more maximalist/nativist

Generally, the domestic economic factors (e.g. employment, inflation etc.) play a more important role in voting than foreign policy (e.g. progress toward NATO and EU, name-dispute with Greece etc.). The FYROM elections provide an excellent opportunity for social scientists to assess the comparative weight of the various factors on FYROM voting behavior. 190 Naturally, the fact that about 42% of the electorate (2% less than in 2006) abstained from voting does not allow us to speak of a strong mandate for the Prime Minister. However, no definite conclusions can be made with regard to the meaning of the abstentions, until more is known about the motivations (e.g. confidence in Gruevskis victory, perception of no ideological differences among the two principal parties, voter alienation because great powers make decisions, perception of unfair elections ) and the class and ethnic composition of the abstainers. 191 According to some Greek political analysts, the worst nightmare for Gruevski would be to be obligated to form a coalition government with Ali Ahmeti, who has good relationships with the Americans and the Albanians of Kosovo and who knows very well what to demand for his people: full equal rights, implementation of Ohrid Agreement and a federation In short, a constitutional reform that would transform the Republic of Macedonia into a Federation of Macedonia, in this way solving perhaps and the problem of the name (Ta Nea, 31/05-1/06/08). Leaving aside for the moment the issue of the name, the Prime Minister indeed may have to form a coalition with Ahmeti, if not with both of the Albanian parties, even if he has to risk a constitutional change and the formation of a federationespecially if the alternative is a breakdown of the new Republic.

189

172 orientations of VMRO-DPMNE regarding the name-dispute. Much will depend upon the political bargaining that took place between the two parties in the coalition government. The worst scenario from the Greek perspective, but not necessarily from the perspective of the Albanians, is one of cooptation of DUI, with the Gruevski government making the

maximum of concessions to DUI (except for federation) with regard to full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, as long as DUI agrees to support Gruevskis maximalist policy on the name-dispute. In other words, Ahmeti may have given carte blanche to Gruevski to carry on this maximalist policies regarding the name. Gruevskis activities during July (e.g. letters to the Greek PM, the officials of the EU and the Secretary-General of the UN regarding Macedonian language, macedonian minority in Greece, restoration of properties and citizenship to Aegean refugees etc) may be interpreted within this context of political bargaining and compartmetalization of competencies (See also text below for these new issues). However, the long-term viability of this scenario may be questioned, in view of the threatened Greek veto to accession in the Euroatlantic institutions which constitutes a basic aim of all the parties and especially of the Albanian who expect their rights to be safeguarded within the Euroatlantic insitutions.192 To a question by the Serbian Beta Press Agency as to what extent the election victory opens the road for settlement of the name-dispute, Prime Minister Gruevski replied that the settlement cannot be resolved by one party but will constitute a common platform of the government and the opposition.(Ta Nea, 4/06/08). It remains to be seen whether Gruevski with a clear mandate will accept the challenge and the opportunity to cooperate not only with all of the Albanian parties to solve the domestic minority problems but also with the main opposition party of the Slavomacedonians (the SDSM) to come to a compromize with its neighbor on the name-dispute and consolidate further its international status. The alternative is the exploitation of the mandate, the entrenchment into maximalist and
Yet, according to Branco Gerovski, director of the Spitz newspaper, Gruevskis argument is that Macedonia will conform to all the EU criteria for integration and that the name is not one of them. We do whatever is asked of us and hope that Europe will eventually understand (To Vima, 15/06/08). The relevant question, however, is whether FYROM can make Greece who has the power to veto to understand. Along the same lines, the Foreign Minister of FYROM, A. Milososki, in a presentation he made before the Institute of International Relations, Friends of Europe in Brussels (24 June 2008) where the European prospects of Western Balkan countries were discussed, said that FYROM will participate in the new round of talks for the resolution of the name-dispute with determination and with recourse to a language using arguments to support the maintenance of the national name. He also expressed concern for the abuses by a particular member-state of the European Union with regard to the name-dispute meaning of course Greece. Here it is necessary to add that progress on the name via the achievement of a mutual compromize also became a criterion for accession in the EU during the final Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Luxembourg following Greeces insistence and the agreement of other EU countries over Slovenias objections (http://news.pathfinder.gr/world.balkans/482117.html).
192

173 pseudonativist politics leading to a restoration in the Balkans of Emver Hotzas Albania which had good relations only with Communist China. The new challenge, however, entails more than just cooperation on the part of PM Gruevski with the other parties in FYROM Parliament. 193 For all practical purposes the election process led to a slow-down of the name talks under the aegis of the UN; in addition, the process was further slowed down due to the irregularities and the need for the two re-run elections.194 Following the first re-run elections (June 15), when the electoral outcomes had become almost finalized the shuttle diplomacy was resumed, with successive meetings taking place between Nimitz and the two negotiators in New York and between Nimitz and the two governments in Athens and Skopje on June 26 and 27, respectively. We have no information as to the details of these meetings; the press makes a reference to two prevailing names, New Macedonia (Nova Macedonia) and North Macedonia, the former allegedly representing the choice of the the U.S. in the context of a double-name solution with the maintenance of the constitutional name and the the terms macedonian national identity and language, while the latter alledgedly being proposed by Nimitz without however specifying the breadth of its application (double-name or erga omnes) (Ta Nea, 21-22/06/08; To Vima, 22/06/08; Balkan Insight, 24/06/08)195. The discussions during these meetings, reportedly, had as an object the breadth of

application of various already proposed solutions as well as guarantees and conditions for a compromize agreement (e.g. recognition of ethnicity and language, change of FYROM constitution, conducting of a referendum in FYROM etc.) (To Vima, 22/06/08). Other sources suggest that Nimitz will propose the constitutional name to remain for use inside the
Accepting the new challenge would mean greater degree of introspection on the part of PM Gruevski as to the fundamental causes and actors in this name-dispute. In an interview he gave to the local MIA news agency, he accused PM C.Caramanlis of stalling the name talks and the Greek negotiator of arrogance saying what will pass and what wont; he also reaffirmed his position on the necessity of a referendum in case of a compromize agreement, claiming at the same time that Greek people in 30 or 40 years will be ashamed of their politicians acts against neighboring Macedonia (www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/11241/ ). While the attack against the Greek negotiator, who in practice is an organ of his government, is a punch under the belt, the PM should become aware that the Greek people at least as polls suggest are overwhelmingly against a compromize and that the Greek politicians (with a few exceptions) are risking their political careers. The shame and the anger against nationalist FYROM politicians will most likely follow when the FYROM citizens begin to realize that they have been misled by politicians for two generations regarding their history and ancestral origins and that they have no exclusive right to the monopolization of the macedonian name. 194 The drawn-out election process as well as the demand of the Greek government for the formation of the FYROM government before the formal resumption of negotiations- essentially made impractical the achievement of a solution by July 9, 2008the landmark deadline for the formal signing of the Protocol for the admission of Albania and Croatia in NATO. During a meeting in Berlin (June 24) between the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice with Foreign Minister Dora Bacoyiannis on the sidelines of an international conference of donors for Palestine, Ms. Bacoyiannis said that the question of the July 9 timetable never came up for discussion (Eleftherotypia, 25/06.08). 195 See www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/11269/.
193

174 country and also appear in the passports as guarantees of their national identity and language, which have been salient concerns for FYROM while FYROM would add a geographical adjective to its name for use in international and bilateral relations(To Vima, 29/06/08).196 While we have to wait to determine the validity of these reports regarding Nimitzs intentions, one would be surprised if Nimitz would promote a double-name proposal (constitutional name for inside and composite name for international use) that has already been rejected by Greece or if he would recommend the printing of the constitutional name on the passports since passports constitute documents for international usage. In any case, Greece re-iterated once again its steady position (composite name with a geographical adjective, that may also include New Macedonia in a broader sense, for all uses including the interior, with the guarantee of the UN Security Council) while adding two new

conditions to the agreement: no referendum and a constitutional amendment (Eleftheros Typos, 22/06/08). The Greek demands/red lines were communicated to the UN mediator M. Nimitz duirng the June 26 meeting with Greek Foreign Minister D. Bacoyiannis (Ta Nea, 27/06/08), and it is assumed that they were also communicated to the FYROM government during the mediators June 27 visit to Skopje. The negotiation process, however, became more complicated and was threatened by derailment, when after Nimitzs first visit to FYROM following the elections (June 27) the Gruevski government also requested of Nimitz to look at the problem of minorities in Northern Greece and put on the negotiation table the issue for restoration of property to the some 100,000 ethnic macedonians who fled Greece during the Greek Civil War (194649)197. This was followed up later by letters of Prime Minister Gruevski to Prime Minister C. Caramanlis, to President J. Barozo of the EU and to the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki Moon regarding minority rights in Greece, the property and Greek citizenship rights of the Aegean Refugees (Ta Nea, 15/07/08, Ta Nea 22/07/08; Eleftherotypia 23/07/08; Apogevmatini, 29/07/08)). Despite the objections of the main opposition party198, the
196

See www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/11421/ (30 June 2008) that is based on reports by Nova Makedonija following M.Nimitz to Skopje on 27/06/08. 197 See www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/11503/ . The official estimates of those who fled are about 50,000 (See pp. 16, 36 of this text). See also Alexis Iraklidis (Ta Nea, 3/07/08) for the skeletons in the closet of both Greece and FYROM. He says that there was persecution during the interwar years {Metaxas dictatorship} and expropriation of property of those slavomacedonians who fled to eastern Europe but on the other hand, some of the Slavomacedonian who fled there had also collaborated with the occupation forces during WWII {Nazis and the Bulgarians}. 198 The objections of the Opposition had more to do with the means andt with potential dangers of starting a public dialogue that would give substance to non-existent issues and the bilateralization of the multilateral negotiations (Proto Thema, 20/07/08; To Vima, 20/07/8) than with the actual content of the PM response with which the opposition party was in agreement.

175 Greek Prime Minister replied to Gruevski reminding him of the UN mandate, the decisions of NATO and European Union, denying the existence of a macedonian minority in Greece, charging him with interference in domestic affairs199 and referring him to the European Court for Human Rights if he has a problem with properties (Ta Nea, 19-20/07/08); the PM reply was also accompaned by letters by the Greek Foreign Minister to the UN, NATO and EU, briefing them of Gruevskis attempts to divert attention from the name-negotiations(Proto Thema, 20/07/08). On his part, President Barozo replied that the EU had no mandate to occupy itself with such issues that are the responsibility of the member-states, expressed his regrets for the existence of such problems between FYROM and a neighboring member-state and added that it was of the utmost importance for a country whose aim is integration in the EU to approach such problems with a more constructive and cooperative spirit, open to dialogue and with a disposition to resolving the problem (Proto Thema, 27/07/08). We expect the UN reply to be comparable, in order not to violate the UN mandate. Finally, both the State Department (via Mr. M. Bryza) and the UN mediator, themselves, advised the new FYROM government to focus on the solving name-problem and not raise other conflicting issues at this stage of the negotiations, though it should be mentioned that the statements of the both the State Department and Mr. Nimitz in the past regarding the need to guarantee the macedonian ethnicity and language in case of a compromize by FYROM may have been an impetus for the young Prime Minister, especially after the popular mandate he received in the recent elections (Eleftherotypia, 23/07/08; Proto Thema, 27/07/08).200
Here, there is an allusion to the 1992 amendments FYROM made in its new Constitution, to reassure Greece and Bulgaria that FYROM would not interfere in the internal affairs of the neighoring countries. The new campaign for the protection of the macedonian minority proves that the amendments were not sufficient and may need overhauling (See also Tzonos, 1994, p. 55-57). However, ignoring their own constitution was not the only excess. FYROM also violated the 1995 Interim Accord (Article 7) when it failed to discourage a private educational organization in FYROM from naming the university departments of the Westminister College that they purchased from using names from the ancient Macedonians (e.g. Department of H/YAlexander the Macedon, Department of Fine Arts and Design- Philip the B); this action evoked a protest reaction on the part of the Greek Minister of Education to his British counterpart and the EU Education Commissioner (Apogevmatini, 18/07/08; Ta Nea, 18/07/08). 200 Following the NATO Summit that blocked FYROMs membership and with the prospects of using veto once again to block FYROMs admission to the European Union, one wonders if the latest Gruevski initiatives (letters to PM Caramanlis, EU President Barozo, UN Secretary-General Nations, naming of Westminiser College departments etc.) are not a form of shadow boxing that get them nowhere except to pacify the electorate and prepare them for an inevitable compromize. While one should not underestimate the importane of this function, they may also have more proactive goals. In the Greek press, this barrage {or blitzkrieg) of letters is referred to as correspondence diplomacy. Political analyist A.Athanasopoulos (To Vima, 20/07/08) compared it to a tactic used by former PM of Turkey,Tansu Tsiler, when she tried to overload the GrecoTurkish agenda with new issues (e.g. grey zones in the Aegean) so that when the time of the final negotiations came, there would be a lot of cards on the table of diplomatic poker. Following the same tactics, Skopje believes that the single name issue will be devaluated in importance and perhaps persuade Greece to compromize its red lines on the name dispute. But even if there is no compromize on the name, there still remains hope fo concessions on another one of the many issues they have put on the negotiating table.
199

176

IX. A Note on the constitution, the name and the question of Macedonianlanguage and national identity.

A recurrent concern of FYROM officials, either of the Government or the President, especially after the exercise of the veto by Greece, is the safeguarding/guarantee of their national identity and national language. It will be recalled that Bulgaria has not recognized either a macedonian ethnicity or a macedonian language, believing the slavomacedonians are predominantly of Bulgarian background and that the macedonian language is largely Bulgarian (See pp. 27-29 of this text). While Greece also does not recognize macedonian ethnicity and language, the Greek government has not made these controversial questions part of the negotiation process. FYROM is reportedly willing to come to a compromise with Greece as long as Greece and the international community recognize their macedonian nationality and their macedonian language. They are resistant to adopt an erga omnes solution for the new name (for international and domestic uses) because this would also require a change of their constitutional name, which they equate with national identity. In other words, they would prefer a double-name, that would at least not require them to change their constitution. As a sociologist, I maintain that national identity is a multidimensional concept that cannot be contained or exhausted in a formal constitution which is a legal document, not always necessary. In fact, there are countries (e.g. United Kingdom) that do not have a formal constitution; yet no one could say that the citizens of these countries do not have a national or an ethnic identity that differentiates them from other nations or ethnic groups. As a multidimensional concept national identity is constituted of objective characteristics, including cultural values, institutions, customs, symbols, historical experiences, language, behavioral styles and national character {which can be studied by ethnographers and cultural anthropologists} but it can also be comprised of subjective dimensions that include collective consiciousness and self-identification processes {which are in the domain of social psychology}. While the objective and the subjective dimensions may be interwoven dialectically and reinforce national identity, especially if the objective dimensions are exclusive characteristics of a people, the objective dimensions are not always necessary for the presence of national identity. Two examples that can be given include the Jews and third-generation immigrants. Many modern Jews have abandoned the traditional Hebrew customs, institutions and language; yet on a subjective, level of consciousness they

177 identify with the historical experiences of the Jews and identify themselves as Jews. The same processes are often noted in third-generation immigrants of any ethnic backround who may have been acculturated to the host society and have forgotten their customs and their mother language but continue to identify on the level of consciousness with the mother country as they visualize it. The images they have of the past, whether real or imagined, act as a community reference group which can determine their current psychology and behavior. While the case of FYROM may represent an extreme case of social historical reconstruction, all societies usually engage in historical reconstruction, as they idealize their historical experiences. In a way, the subjective level of consciousness, which is considered as private domain and where the public domain (e.g. national or international laws) cannot intervere, is in the final analysis, the most crucial element in national identity. What does this theoretical discussion have to do with the name-controversy between the two countries? I maintain that FYROM can indeed change its constitutional name, adopting one of the composite names, either geographically-based (e.g. Gorna Macedonia, North Macedonia) or historically-based (New- or Nova Makedonija) names, without relinquishing its national identity. The composite name would be used for all legal purposes (e.g. designating residence and citizenship for all residents of FYROM regardless of ethnic background). However, on the level of subjective collective consciousness (identificaton as a nation which refers to a collective identity of a people regardless of place of residence), Greece could not prohibit the application of self-determination principle. The decision of the European Court with regard to the Turkish-speaking minority in Thrace can be a precedent with regard to self-identification.201 In this case, the Slavomacedonian residents of FYROM could call themselves Makedonski (Macedonian), following Prof. Iraklidis proposal, while other ethnic groups/minorities could use corresponding self-designations

The European Court for Human Rights overruled the Greek Court of Appeals decision to dissolve two associations in Greek Thrace as it violated article 11 of the European Convention for Human Rights which protects the right to assembly and free association. The decision of the Greek Court was based on the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) which recognized only a religious minority (i.e Muslim) and not an ethnic (Turkish) minority. The European Court concluded that the use of the term turkish in itself cannot automatically constitute a threat in a democratic society, even when it aims to established the existence of a minority, especially since there was no evidence that the members of the dissolved Turkish associations had exhorted others to the use of violence or to insurrection challenging the territorial integrity of Greece. The European Court Decision (27/3/08) was unanimous and its composition also included Cypriot Judge G. Nikolaou and a Greek Judge, Prof. Petros Pararas (See http://cm.greekhelsinki.gr; To Vima, 20/04/08). Nonetheless, there are indications (Eleftheros Typos, 22/06/08) that the Greek Government after a long-term consideration decided to challenge the European Court Decicion, although its acceptance would give it an opportunity to leave behind an obsolescent legalistic conceptualization of minority and at the same time recognize the existence of other ethnotic groups within the Greek muslim community.

201

178 (e.g. Albanian, Bulgarian,Turk, Roma, Vlach etc.)a situation that would also attest to the multicultural composition of FYROM. With regard to the language (the macedonian), there is no question that FYROM officials have associated the macedonian language with their national identity; perhaps because since 1944 this language has been identified with the struggles of the Peoples Republic for Macedonia for ethnogenesis and has also been the medium for the socialization of two generations of citizens. However, as was shown in the historical section, the macedonian language was based on a slavic dialect spoken in the central region of todays FYROM and has nothing to do with ancient Macedonian dialects or the Greek language spoken in Greek Macedonia (Northern Greece). The macedonian language spoken in FYROM is more akin to Serbo-bulgarian languages. The development of the slavic dialect into the mature and viable macedonian language was more of a political decision serving the geopolitical interests of the nascent Yugoslav Federation (in 1944) than a natural dialectical process corresponding to the sociolinguistic structures of the ancient macedonian or modern Greek. Theoretically, since the construction and development of this new language was a political act, there could be a rectification by a political act, i.e. by accepting a designation that corresponds more to the actual linguistic roots (e.g bulgaroserbian or neoslavic). If this is not possible, for sociological and political reasons202, then some compromize designation is needed. Perhaps the term makedonski or some structurally appropriate term that takes into account the defacto situation, the sensitivities of the Greek side, the multilingual composition of FYROM and also does not deny the slavic background of the majority of FYROM citizens203, could be agreed upon. However, as the US government was forced to retract and said that it does not recognize ethnicities or

After the socialization of two generations with the macedonian language, that has also become de facto recognized in some international fora, due to the Skopje propaganda and also the lack of an aggressive language policy on the part of the successive Greek governments (See pp. 27-29 of this text), it might be difficult for FYROM politicians to admit that the language they were using to socialize the new generations since 1944 was a misnomer. Perhaps the geopolitical pressures on the then Yugoslavia Federation (e.g. consolidation of new federation, struggle against fascism etc.) and also on Greece (strengthening of neutralism against communism etc.) all contrived to the establishment of the new social and linguistic construction. Now, with the termination of the Cold War, the emergence of new nations and the prospects for integration in the EU (which means an end to irredentist claims), there is a new environment for introspection, acceptance of ones linguistic roots and rapproachement with the Balkan neighbors. 203 While exploring the historical, cultural and other dimensions of the Macedonian Question, I discovered a tendency among the Slavomacedonians, especially in the diaspora, to deny their slavic origins and to construct an image of Macedonians as an elect people by attempting to demonstrate an exclusivity and a continuity from antiquity to modern times. Understanding the dynamics of FYROM ethnogenesis and consolidation as a new nation, perhaps the time has come for slavomacedonians to acknowledge and recognize their slavic roots. It is a necessary step toward collective social maturity and social health, that would also contribute to better relations with neighbors.

202

179 languages, and the political decision may further exacerbate the confusion in the

classification systems of Balkan linguists (Delopoulos, 1992, pp. 272-273) and to prevent the further balkanization of balkan linguistics, the decision should not be left to the politicians, but to the linguists themselves since the question of linguistic origins is primarily a scientific and not a political question. Perhaps a convention of linguists (World or Balkan region?), under the aegis of UNESCO, could resolve this pending problem. The final agreement on the name under the aegis of the UN mediator could perhaps contain such a provision. It is apparent that the questions of national identity and language are very complex arduous processes, not often subject to simple legalistic resolutions. Resolving them may require longer time-tables than the resolution of the name-dispute, thus prolonging the odyssey for the two countries and the international community. In this sense, the decision of the Greek government and the UN mediator, despite the initial proposals of American diplomats and pressures from FYROM for guarantees, to exclude the issues of identity and language from the ongoing negotiations for the name-dispute constitutes a practical and sound judgement, though there is a risk of Greece for de facto acceptance of the situation with regard to national identity and the macedonian languageperhaps risks worth taking for the gains in reconciliation and regional stabilization and for Greece restoring its protagonist role in the Balkans.

X. Conclusions and Proposals: Return to Ithaca without Violence

During the past 17 years, since the declaration of independence by the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, several names or combinations of names have been proposed formally in the context of EU negotiations (e.g. Pinheiro) or in the context of the UN negotiation teams (Vance Owens or M. Nimitz), but also by politicians of various parties as well as by social scientists and journalists. In Table 7, an attempt is made to categorize these names, to note where possible the source of the name (i.e. the godfather or

godmother) and finally to comment on the possible advantages and disadvantages for the two parties and for international relations. It should be noted that the list is not exhaustive of all names or combinations of multiple names proposed. Although most of these names, if adopted, would require constitutional changes on the part of FYROM, the legal ramifications of the various alternatives will be left to the legal experts.

180

Table 7. The classsification of proposed names for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia other than its constitutional name
Names with an ethnic reference Names with Latin/Slavic characteristics Names of an ornamental/ tautological Character Names with a historical reference Names with Geographical reference Slavomacedonia, Slavomakedonija, Macedonoslavia

Republika Makedonija, Republika Makedonija Skopje (residents = Makedonski), Sovereign/Independent Republic of Macedonia, New Republic of Macedonia, Peoples/Democratic Republic of Macedonia, Constitutional Republic of Macedonia.

Republic of Dardania (ancient), Paionia (ancient), Illyria (Ancient), New Macedonia, Nova Makedonija, Novamakedonija, Novomakedonija, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia North Macedonia, Upper Macedonia, Central Macedonia, Skopje-Macedonia, Macedon Republic of Skopje, Macedonia Republic of Vardar, Vardarska Republika, Republic of Vardar, Gorna Makedonija, Republic of Upper Macedonia, Republika Makedonija Skopje, Republic of Skopje, Republic of Macedonia (Skopje). Double: Republic of Macedonia for International organizations and bilateral Multiple (double or relations with third countries and FYROM or other composite name (e.g. New, triple ) names North, Gorna/Upper Macedonia) for relations with Greece; a compositie name (e.g. New, North or Gorna/Upper Macedonia, Novamakedoniya) for international organizations/institutions and bilateral relations with all countries including Greece and Republic of Macedonia for FYROM(internal use). Triple: Republic of Macedonia for FYROMs bilateral relations with third countries; New, North, Gorna/Upper Macedonia or Novamakedoniya for Greece and Republika Makedonija (Latin or Slavomacedonian version for international organizations)

1. Names with an ethnic reference. Although this category of names would be most acceptable for Greece, regardless of the position of the qualifier204, it must be discounted from consideration. This proposal does not respect the current multicultural and multi-ethnic composition of FYROM, with a high percentage (25%-30%) of Albanians who do not identify with the Slavs and claim descent from the Ancient Illyrians. Furthermore, such names could evoke irredentist claims on FYROM from neighboring slavic nations. Both of these could have repercussions for the stability of the new Republic.
Macedonoslavia was proposed by Rigas Rigopoulos because there is no risk it will lose the first component, it dissociates FYROM from any connection with antiquity, it guards against irredentism and also it is familiar to the residents (e.g. variation of Yugoslavia). Rigopoulos recognizes the possible objection by the minorities (e.g. Albanians and Muslims) but says that they too were accustomed to a comparable name for many years when they lived in the Yugoslavia Federation (www.softlab.ece.ntua.gr/~markatos/gr_pol_02.b.htm).
204

181
2.

Names with Latin/Slavic characteristics. While we are not sure of the

paternity of the original proposal (said to have circulated since 1992), the Latin version of the Republic of Macedonia, Republika Makedonija, was proposed by the International Crisis Group in 2001, along with another name (Upper Macedonia) for use by Greece. While this is a double-name formula (see below) this paragraph will focus on the possibilities of using Republika Makedonija for all uses. The adoption of Republika Makedonija, along with a name for the residents of the Republic (Makedonski), for all uses, has been supported and documented by A. Iraklidis, professor of international relations (Ta Nea, 21/2/2008)205 According to Iraklidis, this version essentially carries the connotation of slavomacedonians which was Greek policy up to 1991. The translation of the constitutional name into Latin theoretically represents a minor modification, at least in spelling and pronounciation, and does not. require a major change of the constitution, since it could be considered as a rendition of the constitutional name in Latin. However, the FYROM Academy of Sciences and Arts objected to the using of the Latin version of the constitutional name because (1) Latin is not the language used in FYROM or other countries which use the Cyrillic alphabet (2) it would be an anomaly as it would be the only member-state of the UN whose name would not be translated in other languages (e.g. Republic of Macedonia in English) and (3) it would cause confusion since states which use the Latin alphabet (e.g. U.S., Spain, Italy etc.) pronounce differently the letter J (Tziambiris, 2003, p. 289). But

even if there was a possibility that the FYROM government itself would accept such a version (the Republika Macedonija) there is no guarantee that it would be acceptable to the Greek government. Translating the constitutional name into Latin does not mean it will prevent the monopolization of the name Macedonia or stop irredentist propaganda. Finally, there is no quarantee for Greece that in international practice (international organizations etc) the Latin versions, Republika Makedonija and

Makedonski, will not be translated into Republic of Macedonia and Macedonians respectively in order to avoid some of the problems noted by the FYROM National

In an article (Ta Nea, 21/02/2008), following the Athens meeting under UN Special Envoy, Professor Alexis Iraklidis, proposed a latin version (Republika Makedonija) as a name for all uses (erga omnes), basing his argument, among other thing, on the historical fact that after 1913 Greek Macedonia had a heterogeneous population, initially consisting of Muslims, Grecophones, and slavophones, and, currently, consisting predominantly of refugees or descendants of refugees. This, according to the author may account for the regions exaggerated insecurity and sensitivity with regard to the name. This approach, however, overlooks the fact that the question of Macedonia is not a regional issue for the Greeks, since the Macedonian history and culture constitute an integral part of national Greek consiousness since antiquity

205

182 Academy of Arts and Sciences. Aside from that, as Iraklidis acknowledges, the Albanians {who claim descent from ancient Illyrians} might object to the label Makedonski which refers to slavomacedonians. The problem would be solved if makedonski describes ethnicity (refer only to the slavomacedonian residents) and not residence but then what legal term would all the inhabitants of FYROM use to describe their residence and citizenship? 3. Names of an ornamental/tautological character. These are four of the five alternative names proposed by M. Nimitz during the second meeting (19/2/08) of the UN negotiating team in Athens. For FYROM, the four proposals made by Nimitz may be acceptable since they would not require radical changes in their constitutional name and their claims to national identity. For Greece and international relations, however, they have no pragmatic added value, except to obscure and camouflage the problem. They qualify the form and the structure of government and not the status of

Macedonia. They are merely redundant misplaced modifiers of the term Republic, not of Macedonia and are more likely to introduce semantic confusion in political sociology as most Republics in the modern European world constitutional, and democratic. are independent,

While Greek Macedonia is not now an

independent or constitutional republic and could contrast with the corresponding Nimitz alternatives, it is also not a Republic; the New Republic of Macedonia possibly contrasts with the ancient city-state of Macedonia, and could theoretically make this a more viable option but there are practical problems with this proposal. The name,

Peoples Republic of Macedonia, aside from being the first name that FYROM adopted when it became part of the Yugoslav Federation in 1944, it takes us back to the

Peoples Republics of the Communist World which were bureaucratic dictatorships and not actually the peoples. Most important, however, these proposals do not constitute viable choices for Greece, since the modifier will in practice fall in disuse and there will remain Republic of Macedonia. Finally, in an alphabetical order of the countries in international organizations and meetings, the order will be based on the noun (macedonia) and not the modifer (constitutional, democratic etc.)a danger also immanent in geographic and historical modifiers.206
206

In this category, we could also subsume the proposed name Federated Republic of Macedonia in case FYROM becomes a Federation following pressures of the Albanian political parties (See footnote 191). While the hypothetical Federated Republic of Macedonia may be more appropriate in a multicultural society, from the perspective of Greece it shares most of the disadvantages of the Nimitz proposals in this category, aside from the negative historical associations the term federation has in Balkan history.

183 4. Names with an historical basis (e.g. Republic of Dardania, Republic of Paionia, Republic of Illyria, Republic of New Macedonia or Republika Novamakedoniya). Dardania is the name of the ancient region where Skopje is located, Paionia is the name of the ancient region that corresponds to FYROM207 and Illyria is an ancient region inhabited by Illyrians from whom the Albanians in FYROM claim descent (See map, p.32 of this text ). Though these ancient geographical names (Dardania and Paionia) would be most acceptable to Greece, they are not acceptable to FYROM because of its multicultural composition. Besides that, they have not been proposed by them, nor does it seem that the FYROM slavomacedonians have any strong collective representations with regard to these historical names. On the other hand, Republic of New Macedonia (or its latin alternatives), implies that there is a historical connection with the Macedonian metropolis, the statement of FYROMs Foreign Minister notwithstanding. While some Greek conservative might object to this version exactly because of the implicit historical connection, it has comparative semiotic advantages . Greek Macedonia where also were discovered the archeological evidence (Vergina etc) retains the ancient cultural heritage. As said above, the founding President of the Republic of Macedonia as well as educated Slavomacedonians recognize that modern slavomacedonians have no historical connection to ancient Macedonians. Nonetheless, historical connections to Macedonia after the arrival of Slavs in the region that may be reduced to common legacies and at times common boundaries during the Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern eras cannot be excluded. In fact, a recognition of these historical bonds could promote reconciliation and solidarity among the Balkan peoples, the reservations of Mr. Lygeros notwithstanding. Moreover, the nameRepublic of New

Macedonia, aside from its coincidence with the name of an historical national newspaper (Nova Makedonija)208, was one of the composite alternatives of the 1992 Pinheiro package that the Gligorov government had reportedly accepted but the Greek side rejected because of its then maximalist positions. It is a most viable alternative for all uses, as there is a plethora of historical precedents around the world (e.g. New England, New York, New Zealand, New South Wales, New Caledonia, New Smyrna & New Ionia in Greece etc) which resulted from colonization, re-settlement or ethnotic
207 208

See interview of classicist, Richard Stoneman (Tachydromos, 26/07/08, pp. 18-21). Nova Makedonija was published by a state-controlled publishing entreprise by the same name, which among other things also published three other newspapers, one in slavomacedonian (Vecher), one in Albanian (Flaka e Valezarimit) and one in Turkish (Birlik) and a weekly magazine, Puls (Vlasidis, 2003, p. 301). Apparently, the founders of the state-publishing establishment judged correclty that Nova Makedonija was a title that could embrace all ethnic groups in a multicultural society.

184 forms of conflict in the country of origin. The name New Macedonia may also be more appropriate for a multiethnic and polyglot nation than the simple Macedonia, as the multicultural composition represents new challenges for integration. Most important, it is most appropriate if one regards the new Republic as a unique social and cultural

construction/reconstruction in modern Balkan history a social experiment on a macrosociological level - with a new syncretic language, that has nonethless become a functional and viable society, especially after shedding off the vestiges of irredentism. Theoretically, the residents can be called Neomacedonians at least as a designation of residence and citizenship- but not ethnicity that has to do with the ethnotic background of the residents. Even here, the ethnotic labels (e.g. Makedonski, Albanian, etc) could be used in a complementary depending upon personal choice. 5. Names with a geographical reference. Most of this group of names fall in the composite name category. Some of these that are not composite, but contain only the term Vardar but not Macedonia (e.g. Republic of Vardar), would naturally be most acceptable to Greece, the objection of former Greek President Ch.Sartzetakis regarding the irredentist potential of the Vardar name notwithdanding. In fact, the region that we now call FYROM was before 1944 called Vardarska Banovina. The related category that contains Vardar and also Macedonia (e.g. Macedonia Republic of Vardar) is a real composite solution, that was originally proposed by the former President of Left Alliance party, Leonidas Kyrkos, in the early 1990s. However, this specific category of names has not been a choice of FYROM. A second category of composite-geographic names is the one that includes the capital of FYROM (e.g. Macedon Republic of Skopje, Republika Makedonija Skopje and Republic of Skopje) that constituted part of M. Nimitzs 2005 and 2008 proposals. The last of these (Republic of Skopje) had been common practice among the Greeks but was not acceptable to FYROM while the other version {Republic of Macedonia Skopje or Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)} was reportedly more acceptable to FYROM, especially in the late 1990s and also in the early 2008 following the rejection of the Nimitz proposals. Nonetheless, the second category of alternatives is not acceptable from the point of view of international practice. Can one imagine the names, Republic of Greece Athens , Republic of France Paris or the Republic of Paris, as the name of a nation? The ludicrous nature of these proposals (especially the case where the name of the capital becomes the name of the country), which takes us back to ancient citystates, was also noted by the former Minister of Culture of France, Jacques Lang (Ta

185 Nea, 20/5/93) who said we need new ideas that respect the sensitivities of both peoples. Aside from that, the danger with this category of composite names (e.g. Republic of Macedonia Skopje or Republic of Maceedonia (Skopje) is that the suffix and the text in parentheses will most likely fall into disuse and there will remain only the constitutional name, an alternative acceptable to FYROM but definitely not acceptable to Greece.209 Finally, a third category of geographical names that could be acceptable to Greece as genuinely composite geographic names includes such alternatives as North Macedonia or Upper Macedonia/Gorna Macedonija. Although North

Macedonia (vs. South {Greek} Macedonia) would be a generally acceptable name, the historical association with conflict, division, violence and irredentism (e.g. North vs. South Korea, Ireland vs. Northern Ireland, the Southerners and the Northerners in the U.S.) may render it less less acceptable. The other version, Upper Macedonia (or Gorna Makedonija) was also included in the Nimitz February 2008 proposals and was reportedly accepted in 2002 by the FYROM leadership but was relegated to low priority due to Albanian insurrection. It is also a name that usually is not historically associated with ethnotic/civil violence). Nonetheless, there have been some objections of organizations/writers from both sides with regard to the use of the name Upper Macedonia. First, there was Elly Pappas objection because in antiquity and within the Western Macedonia region that now lies within Greece there was an area designated as Upper Macedonia and according to her this would create confusion in international communication (See Footnote 67). Second, the solution implies a dichotomous situation (Upper vs. Lower Macedonia} that overlooks the existence of a Bulgarian Macedonia (so-called Pirin Macedonia) which constituted 10% of the Macedonian territory after the 1913 partition and which theoretically can also claim such appelation.210 Third, in a response to the
209

Journalistic sources (Ta Nea, 26/3/2008) report that the combination Republika Makedonija Skopje or Republika Makedonija (Skopje) was resurrected as a viable alternative during the 25/3/08 multilateral meeting in New York. In a post-meeting press interview, the UN mediator said that both must make a compromize. Somehow, and if we use the language of modern information technology (e.g. bytes, kilobytes, megabytes and gigabytes) to assess the magnitude of the compromizes that the two countries are called upon to make, it appears that the UN mediator has not been made to understand that Greece by accepting a composite name with a genuine geographical reference has made a megabyte compromize while the compromize expected of FYROM if Nimitzs latest proposal is accepted is of a bytes magnitude. 210 Central Macedonia or Rebublic of Central Macedonia, in relation to the other two regions of Macedonia (Greek and Bulgaria) have also been proposed as names for FYROM; such names, however, would cause confusion since the 2008 Nimitz proposal recognizes that Greek Macedonia itself is divided into three subregions, Eastern, Central and Western Macedonia.

186 name proposals made by the International Crisis Group in 2001, among which was also included the use by Greece of the name Upper Macedonia and its inhabitants as Upper Macedonians, the FYROM Academy of Sciences and Arts said that there was no such precedent in international relations and also that that would imply the denial of the inhabitants macedonian identity (Tziambiris, 2003, pp. 289-290). None of the three objections however constitutes a strong counterargument for the use of Upper Macedonia. intellectuals Pappas misunderstanding may be restricted to a small circle of without impacting on contemporary international travel and

communications. With regard to Bulgarian claims, Bulgaria has been concerned more with Bulgarian identity and not macedonian, and would not complicate matters. Finally, contrary to the assessments of the National Academy of Science and Arts of FYROM, the terms Upper Macedonia (or North Macedonia) may be used to designate legal residence/citizenship and not ethnicity/an ethnotic group which has to do with collective self-identification processes. Thus, the slavomacedonians of Upper Macedonia (or North Macedonia) can continue to view themselves as Makedonski, the Albanians as Albanians etc. The Koreans from North and South Korea, except from some political/economic differences, are still ethnoculturally Koreans.

6. Multiple names. In this case, there are various combinatiions and permutations for the naming process, each more or less favorable to the two parties. Below follow some illustrations of double-name solutions and an explication of corresponding advantages and disadvantages, focusing on some sociological impacts and once again leaving the question of the constitutional changes to international legal experts.

(a). A double name solution favorable to FYROM. According to FYROM, as of February 2008, over 120 countries had recognized FYROM with its constitutional name. The FYROM government also maintained that there was no problem in the relations with most of these countries; the only problem was how Greece would call them. This means that FYROM wants a double name, i.e. its constitutional name for all kinds of international uses (organizations and bilateral relations with third countries) and another name for its bilateral relations with Greece (e.g. FYROM or Gorna- or

187 New- or Upper Macedonia etc.) depending upon an agreement.211 Athough this combination would probably not require change in FYROMs constitution, after the use by FYROM of the term Macedonia in all situations (including in its relations with Greece), this is the next worst senario for Greece, since it is the international domain that is of central importance in the matters of national identity. Although this combination might be more favorable to FYROM, several questions can be raised on a practical level if this formula is adopted. Specifically, what about travel between two countries? Would FYROM travelers abroad need two passports, one for international organizations and the third countries and one for travel to Greece or would they have one passport with all the countries and an asterisk on Greece saying it recognizes FYROM in accordance with its composite name whatever that will be? More important perhaps, what about the quality of interaction between the Greeks and FYROM citizens in international contexts (international organizations, international fora, international exhibits, international athletics, international tourism, etc.)? The potential for friction, confrontation will always be presentsomething that will also impact on the proceedings and interpersonal relationships. Finally, the lack of consideration for the sensitivities of Greece and the attendant frictions that will be inevitable in their official and everyday relationships neighbornliness. somehow do not harmonize with the concepts of

(b). Double name solution favorable to Greece.

Contrary to FYROMs

assessment, the name-dispute is not only a bilateral problem with Greece, since most of the EU countries, the international organizations and several other countries have not recognized FYROM with its constitutional name. A more palatable double-name

version for Greece would be a composite name (e.g. New -, North- or Upper Macedonia) for all international purposes (international organizations and bilateral relations with all countries,including Greece) and the constitutional name for internal uses (public administration etc.). However, in this case, FYROM would be the loser since as we said above the international domain counts for matters of national identity. In addition, there would be a tendency on the part of FYROM citizens who take part in international meetings to use their constitutional name (to protest or because of habit)
211

The proposal made by the International Crisis Group in 2001, to adopt the Latin version of FYROMs constitutional name (Republika Makedonija) for all uses and Upper Macedonia for use only with Greece, can also be classified in this category.

188 rather than the composite name, with the attendant frictions and consequences mentioned above. Nonetheless, the losses for FYROM of this combination are not comensurate to those of Greece in the above double-name senario since Greece by proposing a composite name does not demand exclusiveness in the use of the term Macedonia in international relations. The Slavomacedonian FYROM citizens could call themselves Makedonski (subjective ethnic consciousness), regardless of the adjective (New, North, Upper etc) modifying the term Macedonia for international uses. As we said above, the fact of the existence of North and South Korea (or Ireland and North Ireland) does not preclude the citizens from both sides calling themselves Koreans (Irish).

(c). A compromize double-name solution. An intermediate version would be to choose a composite name (e.g. Upper or New Macedonia) for international organizations and bilateral relations with Greece while the third countries would have the right of choosing either the composite name or the constitutional name, e.g. those which have already recognized FYROM with its constitutional name would continue to use the

constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia) in their relations with FYROM while those who have recognized FYROM as FYROM would adopt the composite name (Upper or New Macedonia) in their relations with FYROM. Theoretically, but not practically, the UN could start from scratch and let all of the UN members choose between the constitutional and the proposed composite name. If this is done, there is no guarantee that the outcome will deviate from the present de facto situation. In any case, some countries would use Republic of Macedonia in their relations with FYROM while the rest (including Greece) will use Upper or New Macedonia, while FYROM itself will use the composite name in its relations with international organizations and its constitutional name within the country. Although in this

alternative, both the countries win and both lose (that is we do not have a zero-sum situation), this solution does not prevent the problems already mentioned with regards to travel documents and the tensions in various social contexts. In fact, the problems could become exarcerbated by creating a greater amount of international bureaucracy and two categories of nations for the citizens of FYROM which might impact on their commercial and other types of relations.

189 Review--cutting the Gordian Knot. Seventeen years after the declaration of the independence of the Republic of Macedonia the conflict between Greece and FYROM over the name a conflict largely over symbols and cultural heritage- remains still unsolved. The basic reason for the lack of progress toward a solution is that the governments of both countries have held at different times maximalist positions and have been reluctant to take risks because of political costs. For a decade, Greece would not endorse a name with the term Macedonia or its derivatives, although at times there were signs of a compromize on the part of FYROM. Then, around 2000, when the socialist government was in power, Greece openly abandoned its maximalist policy and became more willing to adopt a

composite name with a geographical determination. Finally, in 2007, the new Greek government of the conservativeNew Democracy party decided to officially accept a composite name, publicizing its decision so that all parties to the dispute and the international organizations become aware. While both major parties abandoned the 1992 maximalist positions, it is noteworthy that the conservative governmnent shifted its position from the maximalist position in 1992 that would not accept at all the term Macedonia in the new Republics name (party leaders summit meeting under the presidency of C. Caramanlis, a Macedonian and the uncle of the present Prime Minister) to a compromize position willing to accept derivatives of the term Macedonia which in the early 1990s was the position of the Left Alliance and the Greek Communist Parties. For the conservatives as a whole, this was indeed a great leap forward and at the same time a political risk in view of the fact that almost all the public opinion surveys show the overwhelming majority of the Greek constituency being against a composite name and despite the opposition from its own ultraconservative deputies and the ultranationalist parties inside and outside the Parliament which continue to advocate maximalist solutions. On the other hand, FYROM officials respond by saying that they are the ones who have made concessions and they enumerate a number of them, including abandoning the national flag with the Vergina sunburst symbol and amending two articles in its constitution to remove irredentism and discourage propaganda regarding the minorities.212 However, the Greeks could very well respond that these were not necessarily concessions to Greece, but
According to Sfetas & Kentrotis ( 1994, pp. 56-57) the amendments represent progress, however they are not exhaustive since the preamble to the Constitution of FYROM makes reference, among other things, to the historic decisions of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the Peoples Liberation of Macedonia{1944} which specifically calls for the union of the Macedonian brothers and the liberation of the other departments of Macedonia. See also Th. Tzonos (1994, pp. 50-57) for the irredentism in the preamble and also the inefficacy of the 1992 amendments. I wonder what is the need of the first sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 49 (that refers to concern with the rights of Macedonian people in neighboring countries) when the neighbors themselves do not recognize the existence of macedonian minorities within their territories.
212

190 general prerequisites for membership in the United Nations or other International Organizations; in addition, concessions surrounding Alexander the Great or the Macedonian history/symbols were also not really concessions since the overwhelming majority of antiquity scholars, the Yugoslav historiography and also historical FYROM government officials themselves (e.g. K. Gligorov) have denied any connections of the Slavs with Ancient Macedonians. Finally, despite the so-called changes in its constitution and the signing of the Interim Accord, FYROM has not ceased in actual practice in its provocative actions and irredentism. Here one could mention the renaming of its national airports, not discouraging the cultural imperialism of educational organizations which appropriate Greek cultural symbobls (case of Westminister College in London) and contintuing to raise

questions of macedonian minority in Greece. In other words, FYROM is called upon to make authentic concessions exactly on its constitutional name, to stop the

monopolization of the term Macedonia, to translate into practice the new amendments it made to its constitution (if not change them further) and to shed off all the implications of irredentism endemic in Balkan history. This notwithstanding, the FYROM government has refused to change the countrys constitutional name. It has equated the constitutional name with its national identity, although, as we have said above, national identity is a more complex social and psychological phenomenon that is not reduced to a countrys constitutional name. As mentioned above, there are countries (e.g. United Kingdom), which have no written constitution but certaintly have a national or ethnic identity. In addition, FYROM has invoked the argument that most of the UN members countries (among which are most permanent members of the Security Council) have recognized it with its constitutional name and that the problem is only a bilateral problem with Greece. There is no doubt that the recognition of FYROM with its constitutional name on a bilateral level, as well as by a number of the contemporary Great Powers members of the UN Security Council (Russia, China, US) -in their competition for spheres of influence and protectorates in the Balkanshas contributed to FYROMs intransigence and entrenchement into maximalist attitudes and often times to arrogant attitudes toward its southern neighbor, a neighbor which is one of the largest -if not the largest- investor in FYROM and has supported consistently and wholeheartedly the independent existence of FYROM especially during moments of crisis.213

213

This notwithstanding, one cannot overlook the expressed willingness by Russia to change its position and to accept the recommendations of the UN negotiation team.

191 In a sense, we have been living the situation of an international Gordian Knot during the past 17 years. It is perhaps unfortunate that we do not have Alexander the Great with us to act as a mediator in this long-term conflict over names, culture, and symbols that has occuppied the two peoples, their diplomatic services and the international community for close to two decadesa conflict with odyssean dimensions not only in terms of time but also in terms of the competing suitors for the name Macedonia.214 Within Greece, those

concerned with domestic and other international issues warn about the dangers of skopianizing politics, ignoring many other international and domestic priorities. Perhaps, there are corresponding voices within FYROM who also talk of the macedonization of politics. The longterm preoccupation of both countries with the name-dispute,which apparently is of vital significance for both countries but which could be resolved in no time if they both realize that neither has a right to monopolize the term Macedonia, has prevented both countries from giving attention to other vital issues of equal importance to themselves or to the region. Unfortunately, up to now, the different generations of UN, EU, NATO and US mediators have not had any success in breaking the Gordian Knot and solving the problem. In fact, at times during this drawn out process, the policies of some of the above tightened more the knot. Although the efforts of these mediators may eventually effect an outcome, especially if the two sides decide its time to compromize, it will be an outcome that will have been the product of power pressures and twisting of the arms of the two nations (despite denials to the contrary) by the big powers, an outcome that will serve primarily the interests of geopolitics and not necessarily the interests of the two neighboring nations and their peoples at home and abroad or the interests of world peace in the long-run. Alexis Iraklidis (To Vima, 6/04/08) talks about the need for a paradigm shift (in a Kuhnian sense) in the bilateral relations between the two countries, suggesting at the same time direct talks between the two countries, without recourse to mediators, that would culminate in a positive sum solution (both sides winners).215 I think that the paradigm shift that will also break the Gordian Knot, and will solve the Macedonian Question once and for all, must involve not only direct interaction and cooperation of the two nations/neighbors, but will also require that both of the protagonists and their constituencies undergo a
214

Lets hope that this conflict is resolved before the Archeologists discover the remains of Alexander the Great and the struggle starts again from scratch!! 215 In this connection, I was presantly surprised to hear Matthew Bryza, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, in a press interview in the U.S., following the NATO conference, urge the Greek and FYROM leaders not to wait for Prometheus to give them the fire but to take initiatives themselves in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the long-standing problem.

192 process of introspection and a revolution on the level of collective consciousness and socialization processes.

Alexander cuts the Gordian Knot by Jean-Simon Berthelemy (1743-1811).

On the one hand, FYROM officials, journalists, intellectuals, NGOs and the plain citizens must come to understand that they cannot monopolize the name, Macedonia, since the slavomacedonian populations of FYROM have no direct historical connection with ancient Macedonia and since most of historical Macedonia became an integral part of Greece after the 1913 partition. Furthermore, they need to accept the fact that the Republic of Macedonia had no legal status before 1944 (the region was known as Vardarska or South Serbia/Slavia) and was largely a social construction first of Moscow and later of Belgrade (under Tito) to promote their geopolitical and irredentist interests in the Aegean. It was primarily a social construction of the Comintern, principally an outcome of bureaucratic demands from above rather than a social movement from below. The new social construction was legitimated primarily by appropriating the common legacies of Greece and Bulgaria and by the adoption of a constructed language that was labeled macedonian for the same geopolitical reasons and secondarily by the indigenous autonomy movements that had taken place during the late 19th and early 20th Centuries in the territory now occupied by FYROM. The demands of the subsequent Cold War and the balance of terror between East and West functioned as an incubation and growth period for this new sociological and cultural reality. However, regardless of the geopolitical motivations for ethnogenesis and the

193 cultural borrowings which are normal in regions with common territories and cultural legacies, the truth is that the new social construction has become from a sociological perspective a viable social organization and culture. In a sense, the new social

construction can be viewed as a success in social experimentationespecially if it sheds off the irredentist symbolization and does not insist on monopolizing the name of Macedonia. In addition, this new sociocultural reality has constituted the basis for the socialization of more than three generations (if one counts from 1944) and for more than five generations if one counts from the onset of autonomist movements in late 19th and early 20th Centuries.216 The above notwithstanding, even if one accepts the sociological reality of the new social construction and the socialization of three to five generations of FYROM citizens with the macedonian identity, it would be extraordinarily presumtuous, to put it mildly, for FYROM officials, social scientists, writers, journalists and plain citizens, to expect the Greeks and especially the 3 million in the region of Greek Macedonia -- to overlook the fact they have have been socialized with the Macedonian identity for over 2500 years (85 generations). And here we are not talking about continuity in the DNA, but cultural/psychological contintuity, as nobody in the Balkan region can talk about continuity in the DNA associated with specific nation states. In this process of retrospection and introspection by the Skopjeans, the principal resonsibility lies in the government officials and the community of intellectuals, both of which were instrumental in the establishment and/or legitimation and perpetuation217 of the myth of contintuity with ancient macedonians- a myth which may have had its ideological functions in the 1940s but which today brought the new Republic in confrontation with its southern neighbor but it also threatens to isolate FYROM from the Euroatlantic institutions. The government officials, especially after the clear popular mandate given them by the June 2008 elections have a choice between following the logic of political costs, ultranationalism that would lead them to isolationism or following the path of statesmanship, transcending the logic of
216

political costs, measuring up to the domestic and external challenges,

As a social psychologist, I have often wondered if the instrasigence, ultranationalism and on occasion arrogant stance of young FYROM government officials who are 3rd generation (if we count from 1944), also reflect the operation of processes of cognitive dissonance, i.e. overt attempts to validate an identity that is based on common legacies, the fluidity of ethnic identities in the Balkans, the novelty and methodology of ethnogenesis. 217 Although the intellectual and academic communities of both countries share the responsibility for the longterm impasse in the Macedonian Question, I have a feeling that the intellectual and academic community of FYROM has played very well its technocratic role and has not told the whole truth to the new generations regarding their ethnic origins, their history, their language and their national identity.

194 recognizing the common legacy of Macedonia after the arrival of Slavs in the region, and facilitating the integration of FYROM in the Euroatlantic institutions.218 Measuring up to the challenges on the part of FYROM government officials also entails a realization that

Greeces position, which is not dogmatic but flexible since it has accepted a composite name, is a matter of principle, agreed upon by almost all the parties and not dependent on current domestic economic, political or social problems. On its part, the intellectual community of FYROM, which is theoretically less subject to political costs than the government officials, is called upon to take a leading role in this retro-introspective analysis, to recognize the common legacies and the common traumatic experiences of the peoples in Macedonia, to account for the social conditions that led to the emergence of national myths in the 19th and 20th centuries and to construct new myths to support the viability of the new Republic, during its transformation from a constituent Republic of a federation to an independent nation within the family of nations, while at the same time respecting the history, the culture, the language and civilization of neigboring countries. The Greeks, on the other hand, who hold on to anachronistic and ultranationalist maximalist stances, are against a compromize/composite name and who according to public opinion polls constitute the majority of the population, also need to realize and accept some truths. First, that Greece also cannot monopolize the name of Macedonia, at least not in a territorial sense, since after the Balkan Wars (1913), the territory of Macedonia was partitioned mainly into three sections (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece), despite the fact that the largest part of historical macedonia was annexed by Greece. Second, that it must accept mea culpas, not only for the ultraright conservatives (Metaxas dictatorship ,etc.) but also for the Greek Communists, who in their own ways -the ultraconservatives by persecution of slavomacedonians, the Communists by creating false expectations for an independent Macedonia in a Balkan federation- contributed to the macedonianism of the slavomacedonians both in FYROM and in the diaspora. Third, it must accept mea culpas for the successive Greek governments during: (a) the 1944-1990 period for their tolerance and complacency regarding the Peoples Republic of Macedonia and (b) the 1990s for their maximalist policies and attitudes, which, among other things, have also contributed to the generation and to the prolongation of the name problem.
218

Finally, the Greeks must also

The new government has a challenge before it. However, after the formation of government following the new mandate, there are some signs (e.g. the barrage of propaganda letters to EU and international organizations, the arrest and imprisonment of an opposition leader, and the boycotting of the Parliament by the two opposition parties, DPA and SDSM) (Ta Nea, 18/07/08; Eleftherotypia, 29/07/08; Apogevmatini, 29/07/08) which indicate that the new Gruevski government may not respond to the challenges and follow the conventional ultranationalist path to isolation.

195 realize that despite the hellenic roots and cultural identity of Alexander the Great, they cannot monopolize his historical legacy, in view of the fact that Alexander the Great was a world conqueror who not only spread the hellenic culture in the then world but was also open to the impacts of other cultures, as he showed in his own personal life and the life of his soldiers (e.g. intermarriage)often times to the astonishment of his officers and soldiers. Theoretically, the legacy of Alexander the Great can be shared by all descendants of civilizations that Alexander the Great conquered (from Greece to India), and so much the more by those who had even a tangential territorial connection with historical Macedonia.219 The Greeks have done their part in cutting the Gordian Knot, by moving from a maximalist to a composite policy during the past 17 years. The new FYROM government on its part has the opportunity, especially after the clear mandate it received in the June 2008 elections, to complete this process of cutting the Gordian knot, by abandoning its own maximalist positions and meeting Greece half-way, and by seeking a compromize solution where neither country monopolizes the term Macedonia. Thus working together, they can contribute to solving the Macedonian Question, once and for all220, and setting a new course for bilateral and regional relations within the loose federation of the European Union. A name proposal: the case for Republic of New Macedonia. In concluding this work, which started out as a contemporaneous sociological analysis but culminated in a more in-depth historical adventure, I would like to summarize the prerequisites for a more viable solution and suggest a name that respects the historical sensitivities of the peoples in the region and opens up new horizons for mutual cooperation and progress. A resolution of the name-dispute besides safeguarding against a monopolizization of the term Macedonian must also respect the historical and current cultural realities, must not be offensive to both parties, must respect the multicultural composition of FYROM, must be unambiguous, must have viability, must respect the movement of FYROM citizens for a national identity, must avoid divisive collective representations. Finally, it must prevent frictions in either bilateral or multilateral international relations. This means that double-name formulas, even the

According to historian John K. Holevas (1994, p. 28) Alexander the Great was an idiosyncratic type of conqueror. To document this he quotes Charles Montesqieu (1689-1755)who in his monumental work, Lesprit des lois, says the following about him: There is a conqueror whose death was mourned by all the nations that he conquered; there is a usurper who was lamented by the Royal House that he abolished {means the family of Dareios, King of the Persians}. History refers no like phenomenon for any other spearman. Holevas adds that: Alexander the Great was not only a conqueror; he was also an acculturator, a liberator and the one who abolished the characterization of barbarian for the non-Greeks.
220

219

196 compromize version outlined above, would cause double-trouble, should be rejected outright and a single name be adopted by both countries for all uses (erga omnes). Also to be avoided are single names that contain the modifiers North/South before the term Macedonia, due to the negative loading of these terms historically and internationally, but also because Bulgarian Macedonia could use such a designation. The proposed alternatives which come closer to meeting the criteria for an authentic composite name are those that include the term Macedonia and simultaneously have a geographic or historical reference. Such names are New Macedonia, Nova

Makedonija, Novamakedonija and Gorna Makedonija or Upper Macedonia. They have been proposed at various time by mediators and some of these had almost been accepted, were it not for the maximalist ultranationalist policies of the two sides who were reluctant to risk political costs and/or certain other internal existential events in FYROM which had taken priority. Though any of the two categories of name (historically and geographically-based) would be viable alternatives, I personally would give priority to terms such as Republika Novamakedonija or Republic of New Macedonia, especially the latter, taking into consideration the objections of the FYROM Academy of Sciences and Arts of FYROM with regard to Latin names. In this way, Greek Macedonia retains the collective representations of ancient Macedonia while the new Republic represents a new departure, a new composition of ethnicities, a new social experiment in the birth of societies and cultures, maintaining at the same time historical connections and bonds with Macedonia during the Byzantine, the Ottoman and the 20th Century periods. Nicholas Petropoulos, Ph.D. Sociologist 10 August 2008

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