1.

Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639 Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date. Issue: Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal bas Held: The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could considered tantamount to slavery. The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode. "Ours is a government of laws and not of men." 2. Summary of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886). Facts Yick Wo was imprisoned for operating a laundry in a wooden building in violation of a San Francisco statute. That statute vested in the board of supervisors the discretion to grant or withhold licenses to operate laundries in wooden buildings. Yick Wo had operated the laundry in the same building for 22 years and fire wardens and safety inspectors had inspected the premises and found them safe. The board denied licenses to all ChineseAmerican applicants but denied only one of 80 non-Chinese Americans. Yick Wo was fined ten dollars and was imprisoned for failing to pay. Yick Wo sued the Supreme Court of California for a writ of habeas corpus and the Court found that the board of supervisors had acted within the scope of its authority and denied the petition. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. Issues May a city enforce an ordinance in a racially discriminatory manner? Does a law or ordinance granting a person or entity absolute discretion to grant or deny permission to carry on a lawful business violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? Holding and Rule (Matthews) No. A city may not enforce ordinances in a racially discriminatory manner. Yes. A law or ordinance granting a person or entity absolute discretion to grant or deny permission to carry on a lawful business violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. If the statute were discriminatory on its face the court would have applied strict scrutiny. In this case however the statute was not discriminatory on its face and the court looked to rational basis. The statute was ostensibly intended to reduce the risk of fire; however the court also noted that only Chinese laundries were affected by the statute. The court concluded that the statute was intended to reduce Chinese laundries rather than the risk of fire and ruled that the statute was invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. People v Lagman, et. Al, 66 Phil. 13 Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the information. The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs. In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Held: The Court held that The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

4. SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.\ MORAN, C.J.: (1949)\Nature: En Banc Decision Doctrine: Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. They form part of the law of our nation even if the

Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Facts: - A Military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President of the Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947. This is an act establishing a national war crimes office and prescribing rules and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals. - Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines from 1943-1944, is charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war". - Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American lawyers, were appointed prosecutors in behalf of USA. - Kuroda challenges the legality of the EO No. 68 and the personality as prosecutors of Hussey and Port. - Kurodas arguments were: (1)EO No. is illegal on the gound that ut wiolates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also our local laws; (2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged with crime not based on law, national or international; and (3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty. Issues/Held: (1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? [Yes it is a valid because it is based on the generally accepted principles of international law which form part of our laws.] (2) WON rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the law of the nation even if Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them? [Yes, they form part of our laws.] (3) WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case? [Yes, they can.] Ratio: (1) The order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that- The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation, all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68. (2) Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. (3) There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. Respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United States Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies.

5. CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM) v. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, Facts: This is a petition for mandamus praying for the respondent judge to continue the proceedings in a civil case which was initiated under the regime of the so called Republic of the Philippines establishd uring the Japanese military occupation in the country. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings on the ground that the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur when the American forces took over the occupation of the island from the Japanese government, had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all the judicial proceedings and judgments of the court under the Philippine executive Committee and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. Respondent further claim that lower courts have no more jurisdiction to take cognizance and continue the case in courts under a defunct government in the absence of enabling law granting authority of such courts. Respondent contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto government. The principal issues to be resolved now for the court are the following: 1. Whether judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the first government were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or occupation by the United States , 2. Whether the proclamation by Gen. MacArthur declaring that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control, has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said court 3. If the said judicial acts and proceedings were not been invalidated, will the present courts under Japanese occupation continue those proceedings pending in court The court in resolving the issue one by one shed light to the given questions. In the first issue, the court said that under international and political law, it is a legal truism that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. Another question now then needs an answer that is whether or not the government under the Japanese occupation was a de facto government. And if they were, then all those judicial proceedings remain good and valid even if there is a change of government. Several kinds of de facto government were elucidated by the court to find out what is applicable to the present case at bar. A Government de facto in a proper legal sense government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter Government de facto established and maintained by military forces this is by way of invasion and occupation of a territory of the enemy in the course of war and which is denominated a government of paramount force.

A Government de facto established as an independent government by inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state The powers and duties of de facto government of the second kind are regulated in Section III of the Hague conventions of 1907, which provides the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to re-establish and insure as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possess all the powers of a de facto government and he can suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but is enjoined to respect municipal laws in force in the country, those laws which enforce public order, and regulate social and commercial life in the country. Laws of political in nature and affecting political relations such as the right of assembly, right to bear arms, right to travel freely are considered as suspended and in abeyance during military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended it is not unusual for the invader to take the whole administration into his hands. Local courts are authorized to continue administering justice, and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts. The municipal laws of a conquered territory or the laws which regulate private rights continue in force during military occupation except so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror, he nevertheless has all the powers of a de facto government and can at his pleasure either the existing laws or make new ones. The Philippines during the Japanese occupation falls under the second kind of de facto government a civil government established by military forces of occupation. According to Halleck who wrote a book on international law, the government established over an enemys territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over theconquered and is subject to all restrictions which the code imposes. The governments by the Philippine Executive commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese military occupation being a de facto government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those government which are not political complexion were good and valid and by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium)in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by American and Filipino forces. According to that principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, does not wipe out the effects done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. In the book of Isagani Cruz, the right of postliminy says Vatel is that in which persons or things taken by the enemy are restored to the former state on coming actually into the power of the nation to which they belong. In the present concept jus postliminium now also imports the reinstatement of the authority of the displaced government once control of the enemy is lost over the territory affected. In short non-political acts performed during the occupation (civil rights) remain valid even after the occupation but acts of political automatically lose their validity upon the end of the occupation. In Nachuras book, postliminium is explained as the revival or reversion to the old laws and sovereignty of territory in the belligerent occupation once control of the belligerent occupant is lost over the territory affected. Side discussion:On the phrase processes of any other government which is the second issue of the case, still the well-known principles of international law is upheld that is all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of political complexion, of the de facto government during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereignLegal maxim, excepting that of a political nature, Law once established continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty. There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change take place and when changed it continues in such condition until the next change and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged

until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change. (Joseph H. Beale, author cases on conflict of laws and treatise on conflict of laws.Respondent judge is ordered therefore to take cognizance of and continue to the final judgment of the proceedings. Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). The court resolved three issues: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments.

In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. Summary of ratio: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

6. Ichong vs Hernandez Case Digest LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process? HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the equal protection of laws and due process. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. DUE PROCESS The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . .

To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

7. G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963 RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents. Facts: It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents for the implementation of said proposed importation. On September 25, 1963, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency;" that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency this case and to prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon the signing thereof by representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved under the American jurisprudence in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner

herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sell of the said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense. Issue: W/N the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as Commander-inChief "for military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1? Held: This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of our Government, our government agencies and/or agents. In the contracts with Vietnam and Burma, the Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. The writ of preliminary injunction The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation. However, the majority favors the negative view, for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.