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Trade, Politics and the Navy in Latin , America: The British in the Parana 1845 46
David McLean

When military conict and economic disruption in the river Plate region led to a British in 1845 46, traders from many nations followed the naval occupation of the river Parana warships upstream hoping to conduct business in the Argentine interior and with Para expedition as a guay. Since the 1920s historians have uniformly disparaged this Parana commercial failure, insisting that the foreign intruders found neither trade nor welcome among the local populations. In Argentine historiography, the episode is consistently presented as a successful assertion of national identity in the face of European imperial assault. Research here, however, demonstrates not only the expeditions economic success but, again contrary to established opinion, its military and strategic achievements, before the British government abandoned its policy of armed intervention. The Parana was eventually opened to foreign navigation by international treaties in 1853. Fashionable or not, historical detail usually reasserts itself as a challenge to generalisations about the past and in few areas do scholars try harder to reconcile such tensions than when debating the relationship between economic benet and political policy in nineteenth-century European expansion. Imperialism of free trade entered the lexicon of British historiography more than half a century ago; in that time a copious literature has provided both theoretical analyses and specic studies of economic and political interaction.1 For the rst half of the nineteenth century Britains expansion in the world has been linked to opportunities for trade: the need either for materials to feed the growth of industry or, more frequently, for markets for its manufacturers upon whose prots the prosperity of the nation increasingly depended. Thus when recession loomed or when conditions for international trade deteriorated, governments responded to effective lobbies or to the need to alleviate social distress and avoid unrest by taking a more active role in breaking down such barriers to unimpeded enterprise abroad as state monopolies or protective tariffs and in guarding
Correspondence to: Professor David McLean, Department of History, Kings College London, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK. Email: david.a.mclean@kcl.ac.uk ISSN 0308-6534 print/1743-9329 online/07/030351 20 DOI: 10.1080/03086530701523356 # 2007 Taylor & Francis

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commercial freedoms already established. In the 1830s and 1840s in particular, whether by treaty, diplomatic persuasion or by force, the merchants interest was secured in regions as diverse as Turkey, China, West Africa, Texas, Egypt and Latin America. With respect to Latin America, British naval exploits, with the French, in the river Plate in the mid-1840s have often been cited as the most blatant assertion of such interests. Platt in 1968 suggested that this was the only case of active intervention which ts the imperialism of free trade model.2 It came about, Rock in 1986 and Cain and Hopkins in 1993 maintained, because Britain and France, in the throes of severe economic depression, were conducting an aggressive drive for new foreign markets.3 The Plate estuary was certainly perceived as a region of considerable poten and Uruguay disgorged into the tial. Through this great waterway the rivers Parana Atlantic; being navigable for hundreds of miles, these river systems gave access to vast tracts of the south American interior, rich in hides with which to pay for the inow of European manufactures. The commerce of the Plate was conducted ts of Montevideo and Buenos Aires. The largely through the competing entrepo former served its Uruguayan hinterland, while the latter, by the 1840s, enforced its authority over the fourteen states which comprised the Argentine Confederation by requiring clearance for all shipping at the port of Buenos Aires. Admittedly, trade with the Plate, as with the whole of Latin America, was but a small part of Britains international commerce in the mid-nineteenth century. About a hundred British trading houses operated at Buenos Aires and Montevideo by the 1840s, with exports to the former amounting to roughly 700,000 annually between the 1820s and 1850s, while to the latter they were worth about 250,000 a year. Britains global export trade totalled 150 million in 1845. About 10 per cent went to Latin America, of which at most one fth found its way to the river Plate.4 Modest, in this context, as the value of British trade with the region was, James Murrays Foreign Ofce memorandum in 1841 has often been cited as evidence of a greater will to intervene in Latin American affairs.5 Murray urged a reappraisal of policy towards the warring regimes which had emerged there since independence and proposed a more interventionist role for diplomacy to safeguard British trade. Furthermore, as the Spanish empire dissolved in the early nineteenth century, the Royal Navy increasingly assumed the mantle of protecting Pacic and Atlantic sea lanes and, after 1821, of transporting much of the bullion accrued by merchants, legally and by contraband, away from western Mexico and Peru to Europe.6 Beyond that, the usually prompt and occasionally energetic protection given to British merchants who suffered loss or maltreatment at the hands of indigenous authorities understandably gave rise to uncertainty about where, in the minds of British governments and their representatives, support for aggrieved individuals ended and that for wider trading advantages began. The fact that naval vessels were rarely used in defence of British interests did not mean that the threat was not perceived. When British diplomats and consuls spoke of commercial rights and treaty obligations there could be no surety in Latin America that they neither held, nor could readily acquire, instructions to call upon a man-of-war to emphasise their arguments.

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Generally, however, the ofcial mind in London did not seem to worry much about Latin America beyond the need to keep its markets open and its politics independent of undue inuence from either France or the United States.7 Off the eastern seaboard, the British did aspire to stop the Brazilian slave trade but otherwise wanted little beyond a strategic maritime base in the south Atlantic, the latter achieved in 1833 with the re-occupation of the Falkland Islands.8 Murrays wider vision of alliances with Britain to help bring stability to the continent, though welcomed by some ofcials on the spot, usually had little appeal to foreign secretaries preoccupied with European affairs and wary of being drawn into the complexities of either national or international politics in the New World. Lord Palmerston, when foreign secretary, claimed that Latin American politics changed both so rapidly and so frequently that it was futile to try to regulate events and that any benet from so doing would be minimal in relation to the effort expended.9 Only when justice for its nationals was denied did the British government appear willing to use the power at its disposal. daffaires in Peru for preventing the navy In 1840 Palmerston reproached the charge from harassing Chilean shipping when a claim on behalf of a British subject wounded by Chilean soldiers remained outstanding. In the same year he asked the Admiralty to detain Peruvian vessels until another case for injury was settled.10 But even here the record was patchy. Frederick Chateld, vice-consul in central America, complained in 1844 that the navy totally neglected British interests: only fourteen warships had visited the coasts of central America in the last ten years.11 Considering the extent of Britains economic and military power, it may not be unreasonable to conclude that governments in London in the nineteenth century exercised considerable restraint in their dealings with Latin America.12 When the British had been more forceful prior to the 1840s the actions taken had usually resulted from unauthorised initiatives on the part of local ofcials or naval ofcers rather than directions sent from London. The military occupations of Buenos Aires in 1806 and Montevideo in 1807 were cases in point. Both were disowned. So too was the seizure of Peruvian bullion by British warships off Callao in 1830: despite claims outstanding against the Peruvian government, Palmerston reproached the naval commander and recalled the two vice-consuls responsible for such highhanded behaviour.13 There were, however, some precedents for ofcial intervention in Latin American politics. British diplomacy had brokered the peace between Brazil and the Argentine Confederation in 1828 which created an independent Uruguay. In 1837 Britains consul-general in Peru, Belford Wilson, succeeded in halting a Chilean invasion: three men-of-war with 500 crew lay offshore in case anyone should think the British governments attempt to mediate, and thereby to protect British property, insincere. Two years later, after the Peru-Bolivian Confederation was again invaded, Palmerston eventually overcame his reluctance to take a stand and, albeit too late, sent a warning to the Chilean government that Britains effort to promote peace might transcend diplomacy if troops were not withdrawn.14 With a war between Uruguay and the Argentine Confederation also beginning in 1839, the Foreign Ofce once more faced the dilemma of how best to secure British interests amid international hostilities.

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The war which developed in the river Plate from 1839 was, at times, hard to distinguish from the civil conict also raging within the Argentine Confederation, in consequence of which the dictator general Juan Manuel de Rosas came to assert his control of the territory from his capital at Buenos Aires. With death squads on the streets, his enemies defeated, and his hold over the inland states tightened by to trade in 1841, Rosas turned his attention to Uruguay closing the river Parana where his surviving opponents had ed and where he hoped to avenge a military defeat suffered in 1839. For this purpose, and to cripple its capital as a rival trading emporium, he supported the claims of the exiled Uruguayan general Manuel Oribe to the countrys presidency by blockading the port at Montevideo, invading with 8,000 of his best troops, destroying a Uruguayan government army in December 1842 and laying siege to Montevideo by land after February 1843. Widely regarded as an illiberal danger to all foreign commerce, Rosas now threatened not only to dominate the Argentine states but, if Montevideo fell to Oribe, to control both sides of the river Plate by virtue of the puppet regime he would install in Uruguay. As the siege of Montevideo dragged on throughout 1843 and 1844 there was a growing clamour from British commercial houses doing business in the region, and in the London press, to stop him. By the end of 1841 the British legation at Buenos Aires had twice offered its governments good ofces to Rosas to help resolve the dispute with Uruguay. Neither offer had been accepted. With trade now disrupted in the river Plate, the British and French governments co-ordinated their diplomacy and proposed a joint mediation in August 1842. Rosas, however, refused to withdraw his soldiers from outside Montevideo; his Argentine naval squadron was effectively strangling Montevideos commerce and his army was on the point of overrunning the citys dwindling defences. Convinced, nevertheless, that they could restore peace to the region, by force if necessary, an Anglo-French eet was sent to the south Atlantic in 1845 in support of a fresh political initiative. The diplomats chosen for this mission, whereby Argentine regiments were to be required to leave Uruguay as a precondition for peace negotiations, were William Gore Ouseley and Baron Anton Deffaudis. Before they could reach Buenos Aires, though, Rosas delivered what appeared to be the nal blow by routing the last Uruguayan army in the eld. With Montevideo apparently at his mercy, and believing that Britain and France would soon fall out over what to do next, Rosas was less inclined than ever to compromise.15 Ouseleys instructions, in the event of a diplomatic rebuff, were not specic; his priorities, however, were to maintain the independence of Uruguay and to work closely with his French colleague.16 Naval measures had been considered in London; these Ouseley and Deffaudis initiated once it became obvious that their negotiations with Rosas had failed. In August 1845 their combined eet closed Oribes supply ports, n Garc a at the conuence of the rivers took possession of the island of Mart and Uruguay, impounded the Argentine navy and assisted Uruguayan forces Parana to recapture the town of Colonia. In September an Anglo-French blockade was thrown onto the port and coastline of Buenos Aires and in October more than 600 British soldiers were deployed to help the 250 British and French marines already

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on the defensive lines in Montevideo. With the Uruguayan capital thereby secured, Ouseley could claim, with some justication, that he was doing no more than his instructions required. But forcing the Argentine army out of Uruguay, which he insisted was essential for protecting the latters sovereignty, required something more. Ouseley and Deffaudis therefore devised a grand strategy for carrying the war to Rosas by sending the Royal Navy to destroy Argentine fortications in the and to open the river. Parana owed up between the Argentine states of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe , Entre The Parana Rios and Corrientes, and then on to the land-locked territory of Paraguay: to force the river by a display of naval power, followed by the continued cruising there of British and French warships, would not only foster an economic revival at Montevideo and permit merchant craft of all nations to reach markets in the Argentine interior, but, most importantly from a military and political perspective, would cut off Rosass army in Uruguay and allow contact with regimes in the states up river which were unhappy with the isolation imposed upon them from Buenos Aires. It was an audacious plan whereby not only did Ouseley interpret his instructions, drawn up nine months earlier, in the widest sense, but which, at every turn, risked embarrassing could be commercially protreversals. If all went well an expedition into the Parana able and might decide the war and quickly restore peace. Given that the objectives were clear enough, gauging success or failure for the naval squadron and the otilla of might seem straightforward. trading vessels which accompanied it into the Parana Unfortunately, however, the judgements of both contemporaries and historians have long indicated otherwise. The problem is rooted in the politics and historiography which surround events in the river between October 1845 and July 1846. I Misunderstanding is inevitably compounded when errors are passed from one scholar to the next and earlier verdicts conveniently accepted. What is incontrovertible is that Captain Charles Hotham, commanding the Anglo-French squadron, destroyed Argen on 20 November 1845 thereby ushtine batteries at Vuelta del Obligado in the Parana ering merchant vessels up river. It is also unquestioned that, when British warships left , engaging newly constructed Argentine batteries at San Lorenzo on 4 June the Parana 1846, 110 merchantmen were conveyed down the river, into the Plate and towards Montevideo. With regard to the fortunes of those traders, every history of the expedition considers it to have been an economic failure. Kirkpatrick in 1931 judged it disappointing as to commercial results and Pivel-Devoto said the same in 1945.17 In 1960 Ferns wrote that commercially the venture was a asco. Sales were poor, he continued, an appraisal echoed by Morgan in 1975.18 In 1981 Lynch stated that the expedition found no promising inland markets in Entre Rios and Corrientes: as for the sales drive, the market was poor and many merchants returned with their cargoes unsold. Lynch conceded that some trade may have occurred, though in 1985 he reiterated his view that sales had been sluggish and that this attempt to inaugurate direct trade with the Argentine interior had not been well received.19 Weighty

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authorities on Latin American history have thereby all painted a remarkably consistent picture. References lead back, one to another, but ultimately are traceable to research by Cady in 1929 who rst designated the expedition a dismal failure from a commercial standpoint and decided that many of the merchant vessels returned from the with their entire cargoes untouched.20 It was pioneering work, but did Cady Parana choose his sources wisely? Cady was inuenced by Argentine historiography and a selective use of north American material, attached to both of which were political agendas. Argentine scholarship traditionally permits criticism of Rosas as an oppressor of his people yet adheres to a nationalist ideal whereby he inspired the normally quarrelsome states of the Confederation to resist an imperialist onslaught. It is likewise axiomatic that, faced with external challenge, the inland population resented the invader, fought valiantly wherever possible to defend their freedom and spurned any economic advantage to be gained as in 1911 and Caillet-Bois in 1944 saw such resistance by trading with an enemy. Sald as instrumental in bringing home to Britain and France that they could never force open internal Argentine waterways for the benet of their traders, and Irazusta took the same line in 1961.21 Levene insisted that the foreigners found no business among a loyal population up river and even Pivel-Devoto, writing from Montevideo, conceded that, while a rebellious regime in Corrientes, serving at best the interests of a collaborating elite, may have been sympathetic to aggressors in conict with Rosass government at Buenos Aires, nonetheless the people were hostile to them.22 Popular antipathy to the intruder demonstrated a bed-rock for Argentine national identity. To suggest otherwise called into question the instinctive patriotism of a proud people and reopened old divisions about federal authority versus provincial autonomy over which so much blood had been shed since independence from Spain. Although Cady both drew from and subsequently contributed to this historiographical strand, the sources on which he principally relied were not Argentine but north American. First, Cady placed reliance on reports from the river Plate appearing in the National Intelligencer in Washington. These were of questionable accuracy because the informants themselves were either merely guessing or else derived their data from notoriously pro-Rosas English-language publications in Buenos Aires. On 23 June 1846 the National Intelligencer indeed declared that the traders in the had found no prots, but it asserted this amid fallacious accounts of how Parana the whole expedition was breaking up since the warships had sustained heavy casualties and were set to abandon the river.23 Cadys other source were despatches from the daffaires at Buenos Aires, William Brent, again used selectively United States charge and with little regard for Brents credibility. Brent was an obsessive Anglophobe who saw the whole intervention as but a cover for expanding British control in south America. Without the authority of his government he had offered Rosas United States mediation in the latters dispute with the European powers and had so undermined diplomatic efforts to induce Rosas to withdraw his troops from Uruguay that the British government made an ofcial protest in Washington. But it was not only in London that Brents behaviour was questioned. Edward Hopkins, American special envoy to Paraguay in 1845, was totally

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disillusioned with his colleague. Brent was constantly being humiliated by Rosas. Certain it is that Mr. Brent is a mere child in his hands, Hopkins reported, and that with him he is utterly untted to assert or support the dignity of his position or his country.24 American citizens in Buenos Aires were demeaned by Brents fawning to the Argentine dictator. Under pressure from London and so advised by its own agent, the United States government nally faced up to Brents partisan ineptness and recalled him in June 1846. expedition. Partiality alone might have discredited Brents accounts of the Parana More damaging still to his credibility was the fact that, while the British and French diplomats and naval commanders were in Montevideo and all the shipping was orchestrated there, Brent himself was in Buenos Aires with no access to uncensored information. As late as April 1846 he conded that he still had no real knowledge as to the effectiveness of the Anglo-French blockade of the port and coast of Buenos Aires.25 in November 1845 Similarly, days after the warships actually entered the Parana Brent had still been speculating on their number and how many merchantmen had assembled at the rendezvous.26 It was only on 16 January 1846 that he felt able to report that the batteries at Obligado had been engaged even though the outcome was known in Montevideo in mid December 1845.27 Details of the expeditions progress thereafter became more sketchy still and at the end of January 1846 the steamer HMS Alecto was sent up river because nothing had been heard of the convoy, even in Montevideo, since it left Obligado to move on to Corrientes six weeks earlier. Isolated more than ever in Buenos Aires, therefore, Brent was certainly in no position to announce in mid-January that as far as the mercantile speculations have been concerned, there has been a total failure. Upon going up to Corrientes they found noone to purchase.28 Given his ignorance of events and that the convoy remained for at least a further four months, Brents assessment was trading in the Parana wishful thinking and, as an historical record, worthless. Even worse, Brents despatches to Washington had to disguise a further embarrassment; he was at loggerheads with many of his compatriots and with the American consul at Montevideo, Robert Hamilton. While Brent, Hopkins and Henry Wise, United States minister to Brazil, all tried to present their nation as supporting a sister republic in the New World against bullying European imperialists and took stands broadly consistent with the Monroe doctrine, Hamilton and other American citizens in the region were more than happy to throw in their lot with Ouseley and Deffaudis and to make money both out of the blockade at Buenos Aires and of . This should have come as no surprise to Brent. North American opening the Parana shippers had been involved in smuggling in the river Plate since the 1780s and had expanded their activities spectacularly in the early nineteenth century. The American merchant community in Buenos Aires had supported the British occupation in 1806, seeing it as an opportunity to increase business, and in 1843 one prominent American merchant, Silas Burrows, had proted, under his neutral ag, by allegedly ferrying Uruguayan soldiers and certainly smuggling fresh meat and contraband goods into Montevideo in deance of the Argentine blockade. Indeed, Brent had argued with American naval captains about the protection which, in practice, they afforded for

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such illicit trade.29 Hamilton, his consular duties aside, was a partner in the Montevideo trading house, Southgate & Co., and willingly authorised merchant craft to join the expedition. Much to the chagrin of all three American diplomats, six such Parana vessels, three named as Creole, Hannah and Cumberland, went up river with Hotham. The English know that we are from nature and principle hostile to her intervention in American affairs, Hopkins complained to Washington, but they see with joy that there is a want of unanimity amongst our ofcials.30 Hamilton should have followed the example of his Brazilian counterpart who refused to allow any Brazilian . Instead, Hamilton had sent his son, vessels to leave Montevideo for the Parana Thomas, into the river as a passenger aboard one of the British warships. Hamilton, however, did not stop there. He arranged the chartering of American merchant vessels to the British, ag and all, Hopkins discovered, whereby the owners received the value of the vessel in return for a term of four or ve years oper or elsewhere as Ouseley required. He worked with an accomplice, ating in the Parana his compatriot consul Pendrick in the Brazilian port of Rio Grande, who used his own and other ships to conduct a cattle-smuggling business supplying the beleaguered city of Montevideo where Hamilton was his consignee. Pendricks captains were known as violent men who abused their crews, but they enjoyed the implicit protection of American consular staff. His whole conduct whilst lling the ofce of consul of the U.S. was a gross outrage upon the rights of American citizens, Hopkins wrote of Pendrick. I have been told by many Americans and others, the State Department learned, that the most outrageous system of running blockades and prostituting the American ag has been carried on.31 On 29 October 1845 Rosas protested to Brent n Garc a about vessels ying the stars and stripes assembling with the convoy at Mart and informed him that such participation would be interpreted as unfriendly. Brent could only reply meekly that American craft joined Hotham at their peril and that his government would make no claims for any loss or damage incurred.32 II Accounts of the number of merchant vessels which joined the warships in the Parana vary, most likely because they did not all enter the river at the same time and because some traders were already trapped there from when Rosas had last allowed navigation as and Caillet-Bois mention between August 1844 and the early months of 1845. Sald fty merchantmen passing Obligado after the fortications were dismantled whereas another Argentine historian, Pomer, refers to ninety.33 Ouseley was quick to conrm the cosmopolitan nature of the convoy as soon as it had assembled; it was, he mused, a host of merchant vessels of all nations, and ying as wide a variety of national ags as , however, progress for he could muster.34 Against the strong current in the Parana sailing ships was slow. Aside from difculties manoeuvring, by February 1846 some of the convoy crews were also starving; indeed, so helpless had the craft become that Alecto took a number of their boats in tow towards the town of Goya in Corrientes where fresh beef and vegetables might be readily obtained. But there was no need to take the boats as far as Goya. On 17 February Alecto anchored still off the littoral of

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Entre Rios where a well-stocked estancia had been spotted. We were immediately assured of its being a friendly place by boats coming off to us, Lieutenant Lauchlan Mackinnon observed, and not only telling us all the latest news from the armies but likewise bringing huge and fat quarters of beef. All the boats we had towed up with us returned to their proper vessels loaded to the gunnel, he recorded.35 This was not the hostile reception of the invader subsequently enshrined in Argentine history. almost continuously from February until Alecto Mackinnon was in the Parana returned to Montevideo in June 1846 and his account has been used by several scholars. But reference to his chronicle has not always done Mackinnon justice. Irazusta cites Mackinnon as evidence that the populations of Entre Rios and Corrientes were suspicious of foreigners but in doing so misquotes him. Mackinnon certainly expected an unfriendly reception but, when put ashore, was pleasantly surprised. This revelation ill-suited Cadys history; the latter, however, solved that problem by simply deeming Mackinnon to be untrustworthy.36 In fact, there is much to suggest that Mackinnon was a highly credible source: he was a discerning observer who appreciated the embarrassing position into which the Royal Navy had been thrust by Ouseleys policy. In perpetrating the war in the river Plate Mackinnon acknowledged that Britain and France were possibly acting contrary to the law of nations and were certainly sustaining a regime in Uruguay which, backed nancially by unscrupulous foreign speculators, had little to commend it. Mackinnon also noted that the coastal blockade was of limited effectiveness, with many commodities, even luxury goods, remaining cheaper at Buenos Aires than they were in Montevideo so much so, he recalled, that in procuring its stores in Montevideo the navy was paying through the nose.37 Unconvinced by what was being done in the name of his country, unenthusiastic expedition and grateful only when Alecto left the river, Mackinnon about the Parana had no inclination to exaggerate its success. If the inland states of the Argentine Confederation were unwelcoming places that was not necessarily because the people spontaneously identied a foreign enemy. Hopkins, travelling overland in November 1845 in order to take Americas message of friendship to Paraguay, confessed that it would have been insane for him to have attempted the journey alone. For ten years past the whole area had witnessed war and outrages of every description; even with a trusty companion he slept in his saddle, so great was the need for vigilance.38 Mackinnon was suddenly confronted with the same prospect three months later when Alecto ran aground and he was ordered to ride over eighty miles with urgent despatches to Hothams headquarters in the town of Corrientes. Terried and alone, he was soon confronted by a bunch of gauchos escorting the commandant of a nearby village. They were extremely civil and obliging, Mackinnon recorded with relief: not only did the village provide horses for Mackinnons journey but the commandants son and a burly friend accompanied the young lieutenant to his destination. As for Alecto, still struggling to get off a sandbank, the commandant asked to be allowed a courtesy visit and offered to supply its crew with as much beef as they wished, refusing any payment. As they approached Corrientes, where news had clearly spread fast, the local soldiery

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and townsfolk turned out and mobbed us, Mackinnon noted with astonishment.39 Having delivered his despatches and met the governor, he then explored the backstreets and market of the town in complete safety before returning downriver to Alecto in one of Hothams boats. Mackinnon was understandably anxious, but even a week before his sojourn overland evoked no sense of hostility. On there had been signs that British naval vessels in the Parana 12 February 1846, forced into a deep-water channel close to the Entre Rios shoreline, Alecto encountered a party of armed horsemen all of whom had very clear shots and the potential to do the ship some damage while it was so hopelessly exposed. Yet, as the ships ofcers soon realised, they were not at all unfriendly. By 25 February Alecto had made it up to Corrientes where the whole population turned out to cheer the novelty of a modern steamer. Crowds lined the banks and in the town every rooftop and window was crammed with spectators. As soon as the heat of the day had passed, the people began to swarm on board and speedily the whole vessel was thronged, Mackinnon rejoiced; the gun room was opened to visitors and cherry brandy was served to all. Ashore and cigars. in the town again, he was frequently invited into houses and regaled with mate On 27 February Alecto held another open day, attended rst by the governor, dignitaries and their families, but then, as before, by hoards of local people. The vessel was literally crammed; engine room, cabins, paddle-boxes, and in fact every place capable of holding a human being, Mackinnon wrote. But such times could not last: Alecto was soon ordered back down to Goya and beyond. Goya, he knew, was the last place where we could expect and Buenos Aires boastto land with safety. Fifty miles below lay the territories of Santa Fe ing newly fortied positions. Well stocked with food and supplies, on 6 March the little warship was on its way again leaving the friendly country behind us.40 Favourable receptions among the populations of the interior were not restricted to the warships. The expedition also brought much welcomed opportunities to trade and , in the end were not to be the merchantmen, having struggled so far up the Parana disappointed. The reason for that was not hard to nd even in the sources and histories which have sought to disparage the expeditions commercial results. Hopkinss assessment of Paraguay in November 1845 applied equally to the states of Corrientes and Entre Rios: the energy of the country is festering to death and her productions rotting in the warehouses.41 In return for American and European manufactures, could supply the world with precious metals, the upper reaches of the Parana leather, horn, tallow, tobacco, rice, sugar, molasses, cocoa, India rubber, wax, dyestuffs as well as medicinal ingredients such as Peruvian bark, sarsaparilla and a range of herbs. There were 700,000 hides awaiting shipment in Corrientes alone, one correspondent of the Morning Herald wrote from Buenos Aires in April 1846. Caillet-Bois conrmed that large stocks of hides had accumulated in Corrientes .42 Hamilton eagerly anticipated any opportunity to since Rosas closed the Parana trade there as early as August 1845: if the British forced the river, he advised Wise, then Entre Rios and Corrientes will be enabled to nd a market for their produce at Montevideo.43 By the spring of 1846 trade was easy for American merchants, as for others who had followed Hotham the more so after the capture of the armed Argentine whaleboats which Rosas had licensed as privateers to harass unprotected

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merchant craft. Seeing a chance to swell its coffers, the government of Corrientes quickly doubled its import tariff and raised the duty imposed on exported hides. This was unfair, the supercargoes complained. Hotham was petitioned to make it plain to the Corrientes authorities that if the duties were not returned to their original levels then the convoy would pass on to Paraguay and do business there.44 Hundreds of miles inland, communication with Montevideo was sporadic and the exploits of the expedition thereby remained largely a matter of rumour. As late as April 1846 there was no certainty of any commercial success and even at the beginning of June the correspondent of a Philadelphia newspaper wrote from Montevideo that the convoy have made a losing concern of it.45 Up river, however, another naval drama was was slowly unfolding. A motley collection of merchantmen wishing to leave the Parana given a place for rendezvous in May four miles north of Argentine batteries commanding the river at San Lorenzo. They were of all nations and all sizes, Hotham observed; more to the point, they were lumbered with enormous deck-cargoes.46 Trade, in the early months of 1846. Some of it arose indeed, had been brisk in the Parana from distress sales as British and American ranchers liquidated their stock and saw the convoy with its armed escort as a last chance to get out what they could. But in Goya again at the end of April, Mackinnon also noted how, as elsewhere in Corrientes, merchants were frantically exchanging the European and American goods brought up river for local produce and were loading their vessels. On 6 May he watched anxiously as several of the tail of the convoy were left at Goya, some of them on shore, which rendered it doubtful whether they would all make their appearance at the appointed rendezvous.47 On 4 June the 110 merchantmen present were nally marshalled into line as the men-of-war began bombarding the Argentine guns. Distracted by this and by rockets shot from an island mid-stream, the Argentine re became scattered and in e and without casualties Hotham whisked the convoy past on a rushing le the me current. Strange to say, it was at this moment of greatest danger that the commercial outcome of the expedition became apparent. So heavily laden were the trading craft that their crews often could not control them. A French vessel, hopelessly entwined in a mat of weed and debris, was salvaged only when sailors from two British steamers ejected its piles of hides, thereby lightening the vessel sufciently to tow it clear. When the barque Caledonia, out of Hull, ran aground with one Paraguayan and two Uruguayan schooners on sandbanks under , wool, amber, yerba Argentine re desperate efforts to ofoad their heavy hides, mate and tobacco failed and the vessels were eventually burnt. A further Paraguayan ship was disabled and drifted until Alecto boarded her and forced a panic-stricken crew to drop anchor, thereby saving both the vessel and its valuable hides. So many bales of Paraguayan tea were dumped in the river to reduce ships weight that the ofcers of Alecto helped themselves as they oated past and Argentine gunners on the cliffs above mistook them for the bodies of sailors killed and reported the supposed accuracy of their re accordingly. Hoping to remain as inconspicuous as possible, most craft hoisted their ags only after they were out of range but not so the Americans, one merchant boasted.48 That almost proved a disaster. When Creole limped into Philadelphia in August 1846 she carried a 13-pound cannon ball cushioned in a stack of hides.

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Creole was indicative not only of the convoys luck but also of its commercial fortunes and, when enthusiastically describing its cargo of hides, yerba and tobacco, the Philadelphia press reproduced a letter from a correspondent in Montevideo who had watched some of the vessels enter port prior to 14 June 1846. There is not such a large quantity of hides come down as was expected, he reected, but there is a large quantity of yerba, tobacco, and wool. Salt hides none. Small quantity of tallow, packed beef, one cargo horse hair, a great deal of timber and etc.49 Hamilton was also waiting in Montevideo for Creole and the other vessels to return. Creole, he wrote to Wise, brought down from Corrientes 17,000 hides costing only six and a half cents per pound which ought to leave a prot in the U.S. of at least $20,000; the cargo she carried up netted out cost and charges.50 But this was only half the story. Only the larger vessels from the convoy had returned to Montevideo by 14 n Garc a and, as the bulk of June; the rest had to shelter from bad weather at Mart the convoy came in, trade began to revive spectacularly in Montevideo. The immense arrival of produce from Corrientes and elsewhere was just beginning to produce most benecial results in business generally, The Times reported by way of correspondence leaving the port in mid-July.51 For the time being, Montevideo no longer had the air of a city under siege. Although he had never doubted it, Hamilton wrote elatedly that the Parana expedition has, contrary to expectation, turned out a lucrative business.52 Deffaudis reported to Paris in similar vein. He had estimated that 350,000 hides might be ; in fact, by mid-July 1846 the total was nearer 450,000 and traded for in the Parana his assumptions regarding other commodities required adjustment in proportion. venture proved to be that a group of traders was conSo worthwhile had the Parana sidering another expedition, at their own risk and without escort, relying for security only on the fact that British and French warships would still be cruising in the river. The jump in the customs receipts at Montevideo from a monthly average of about 10,000 Spanish dollars before June 1846 to about 115,000 afterwards was astonishing; almost all of this, Ouseley insisted, was due to the great importation from the Parana and Entre Rios. More than 500,000 worth of produce had been shipped out of the and many commercial men believed that there were still considerable quanParana tities detained in Paraguay, Corrientes and Entre Rios.53 When Hotham later recalled his feat of bringing so many merchantmen safely out of the river in 1846 he conrmed that his squadron left behind sufcient cargo for a second convoy.54 III In a sense it was ironic that Ouseley and Deffaudis should have occasion to applaud the commercial achievements of the expedition for, in planning it, the trade of the Parana had never been their primary concern. For them, extending opportunities for commerce to all nations was a respectable cover for what they hoped would prove a deci not only threatened the sive military strategy. Having their warships in the Parana supply line for Oribe and his allies surrounding Montevideo but also offered material as well as political support for the regimes inland which were at war with or in revolt

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against Rosas. As with its commercial outcome, so once more the existing historiogra expedition as an embarrassing failure. But even in its phy condemns the Parana strategic and military objectives did Hothams venture really accomplish so little? Ouseley and Deffaudis calculated that the outcome of the war in Uruguay depended de Urquiza. If he could be peron the actions of the governor of Entre Rios, Justo Jose suaded to join with Corrientes and Paraguay, recently allied in war against Buenos Aires, and to end his support for Oribe, then Rosas would face a tide of revolt within the Argentine Confederation led by a general of great talent. Deeply resentful of the way in which Rosas had closed off the riparian states from international trade and aspiring to overthrow the tyrant at Buenos Aires when opportunity allowed, Urquiza nonetheless faced accusations of treachery if he openly sided with foreigners and Argentine historians ever since have sought to question or defend his nationalist credentials within that framework. From Urquizas perspective, of course, the presence was a veiled threat of reprisal as well as of British and French men-of-war in the Parana a hint of support, and once the expedition sailed in November 1845 Urquiza broke with Oribe and withdrew his remaining Entre Rean troops from Uruguay. Urquizas neutrality was plain when he sent ofcials to Montevideo to meet with Ouseley and Deffaudis in June 1846 and when, within weeks and to Rosass fury, he came to an accommodation with the rebellious regime in Corrientes.55 expedition. As early as Ouseley never disguised the political dimension to the Parana July 1845 he advised his government that we must not discourage the detachment of Corrientes and Entre Rios from the Argentine Confederation.56 Not only that, but an integral part of Hothams mission was to journey on to Paraguay and to enter into discussions, at Ouseleys behest, with the nations president. Together, Corrientes and Paraguay could raise more than 60,000 men, Hotham estimated; he even saw international realignment in this part of south America whereby Corrientes and Entre Rios would eventually sever ties with Buenos Aires and form, with Paraguay, a new republic. The moment is remarkably opportune, he wrote assuringly from Corrientes on 31 January 1846: the de facto independence of Paraguay is menaced; now she will gladly seek those European alliances to which a year ago she was indifferent.57 In response to Hothams discussions n the president sent two political agents down river to meet with government at Asuncio ofcials in Montevideo, both conveyed aboard Alecto in March 1846. Here, for Ouseley and Deffaudis, was the ultimate prize: a regrouping of the Platine states which might ensure that the tributaries of the river Plate were kept open to international commerce and, more immediately, would overthrow Rosas and secure the independence of Uruguay. Meeting with Urquizas representatives, Ouseley confessed that I did not discourage the idea of a nal separation from the Argentine Confederation.58 it was clear that once alongside the Aboard the warships ascending the Parana shoreline of Entre Rios there was little to fear. For some reason, not clearly explained or publicly understood, Mackinnon recorded, the governor of this province, general Urquiza, although a nominee of Rosas, did not take an active part to keep the convoy back.59 In April 1846 Mackinnon was again struck by how vulnerable the ships were to shots red from cliff tops along the coast of Entre Rios, yet none was ever heard. Ouseley wrote to London in May that Urquiza had given a furlough to the greater

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part of his army and now encouraged merchantmen out of Montevideo to trade directly with Entre Rios without prior clearance at Buenos Aires. Hotham, above all, was acutely aware of the importance of Urquizas compliance: indeed, without it he felt that the naval expedition would have been nigh impossible. Looking back on Urquizas conduct, Hotham reminded the Admiralty that in 1845 he allowed the unopposed by artillery squadron under my command to sail up and down the Parana on his side of the river and although holding positions of strength sufcient to have rendered our efforts abortive, limited his resistance to an interdiction of landing. I might multiply instances of his good will to trade in general, Hotham concluded;60 in short, it suited the interests of both men to avoid a confrontation. Ouseley highlighted the expeditions strategic success in April 1846. In short, it had expedition obliged Urquiza to abandon the war in Uruguay; specically, the Parana caused the withdrawal of general Urquiza and thus diminished the Argentine army by 5 or 6,000 men.61 Furthermore, Urquizas neutrality after November 1845 also encouraged Ouseley and Deffaudis in their plan to send arms and military supplies to support n in January the armies of Paraguay and Corrientes. This topic soon arose at Asuncio 1846. My son communicated to me by letter from Corrientes a matter of some importance being that you had offered to supply Paraguay with arms, the president told Hotham. Can that be done? Hotham retreated from any promise of direct supplies. However, he replied, if you require our help, no doubt we can assist you, and at Rio they are to be purchased extremely reasonably.62 It was widely believed in Buenos Aires that the British and French navies were gun-running to Rosass enemies and what Mackinnon witnessed certainly gave grounds for suspicion. Alecto set off from Montevideo at the end of March towing three heavily-laden schooners. Two carried , but the third transported soldiers from Montevistores for the squadron in the Parana deo sent to join the ght in Corrientes. Inevitably, Hotham was best placed to judge the expeditions work and indeed its reception, not only by the political leadership but also among the populace. In Paraguay we were almost borne on the shoulders of the people, he revealed. There and in Corrientes, he continued, the cry was everywhere general when will the convoy arrive and what do they bring. From the highest to the lowest I met with but one feeling. The inhabitants of the province of Entre Rios also entertain the strongest desire for free commercial relations, he concluded, and once the river had been forced they began an extensive trade with Montevideo.63 Hotham returned to Montevideo a hero in June 1846. He had, it seemed, turned the tide of the war. IV With the possible exception of the unsanctioned occupations of Buenos Aires and Montevideo in 1806 07 there was no precedent for British intervention in Latin American affairs on the scale witnessed in the river Plate in the mid-1840s and certainly no other case in the nineteenth century where diplomatic agents and naval ofcers acted so forcefully in consequence of instructions. Back in London, however, by late 1845 the view at the Foreign Ofce was that by landing troops in Mon Ouseley had far tevideo and by sending the Royal Navy to force open the river Parana

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 365

exceeded his authority. Sent to restore peace, Ouseley had instead extended the war in a partisan fashion and thereby brought even more disruption to international trade in the region than had existed prior to his mission. Even while the expedition was still the British government sent another diplomat to negotiate a comproin the Parana mise with Rosas. Confronted by complaints from both British and foreign merchants whose livelihoods depended on the trade of Buenos Aires and increasingly suspicious of French duplicity and colonial ambitions in Uruguay, the Foreign Ofce recoiled from its intervention policy and effectively left the defenders of Montevideo to their fate.64 In 1847 Ouseley was recalled and the British blockade of Buenos Aires was lifted. Nevertheless, aided by French subsidies, Uruguayan troops and foreign volunteers held out until 1851 when Urquiza at last felt condent of challenging for mastery of the Argentine Confederation. Leading a military coalition from Entre Rios, Corrientes and, crucially, Brazil, Urquiza relieved the siege at Montevideo and forced the surrender of the Argentine army. In February 1852 the same coalition deposed Rosas at Buenos Aires. All this, of course, was without any contribution from the British whose armed intervention, in hindsight, appeared to have been futile. Ouseley was understandably indignant at his treatment in 1846 and 1847 and considered himself to have been made the scapegoat for an embarrassing volte-face in British government policy. Whatever the overall judgement on Britains efforts to restore peace to the region, Ouseley was always popular in Montevideo where his actions in 1845 had been instrumental in averting disaster. Holding the city, though, was never enough for Ouseley and Deffaudis. Believing it to be consistent with their governments wishes, even if not specically provided for in their instructions, they intended to deliver Uruguay from Rosass clutches by seizing the initiative and taking the war into the Argentine interior. It was not their enterprise which had failed, they argued: it was politicians in Europe, and especially in London, who had lost their nerve and lacked a proper sense of urgency. Deffaudis, whose initial instructions from Paris in 1845 had been identical to those issued to Ouseley, rebuked the French government in July 1846 for refusing to acknowledge that since the littoral then at of the state of Buenos Aires extended along the lower reaches of the Parana least that portion of the river had to be patrolled by allied warships in order to intercept Oribes military supplies. Only by controlling the river, he implored, did the two diplomats neutralise Urquiza and conne his troops to Entre Rios.65 Indeed, Ouseley conrmed, as soon as it became known that the British government had disapproved expedition Urquizas attitude began to change. Beyond these political conthe Parana siderations, however, reopening trade with the inland states had revitalised the economy of Montevideo and offered the prospect of prosperity to the populations of Entre Rios, Corrientes and Paraguay. The only maritime operation that has been , Ouseley insisted effective and important in its results is the expedition up the Parana 66 in April 1846. That his own government had thrown him over and reneged on the armed intervention never dimmed the judgement of Ouseley and his supporters that expedition was anything other than a triumph. the Parana For many naval men, action in the river Plate was difcult to understand. Unaware, of course, of whether Ouseley was in breach of his instructions or not, some saw it in any

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case as a distraction from the moral imperative of suppressing the Brazilian slave trade while others sensed that Britain was degraded by ghting on behalf of a regime in Montevideo dominated by foreign speculators in the course of which Argentine territory was unlawfully violated and its internal politics manipulated. Hearing of fresh diplomatic proposals for peace in the region in July 1846, Mackinnon expressed quiet satisfaction: everyone concerned, he noted, is quite tired of warfare against the wretched people of La Plata.67 A fellow naval ofcer evinced great relief when his ship was redeployed later that year: Thank God! We are fairly out of the river Plate, its dirty waters, and no less dirty and disgraceful work.68 But unpopular did not mean unsuccessful, as Hotham was aware. With Rosass power waning in 1851 and the prospect of negotiations which might to the trade of all nations, Hotham was quick lead to a permanent opening of the Parana to reiterate his offer to serve as an ofcial envoy. Writing to the Admiralty in 1851, he reafrmed the economic potential of the riparian states which ve years earlier he had seen with his own eyes. A trade, he urged, which gave full employment to 140 or 150 merchant vessels during the few months of the English and French occupation is not to be despised.69 Invariably willing to press opportunities for opening the worlds navigable rivers to unrestricted commerce, the British government agreed. A year later Urquizas regime in the Argentine Confederation recognised the major tributaries of the river Plate as on international waterways and by the end of 1852 Hotham was back in the Parana another mission to Paraguay. Old ties were not forgotten. Hotham took Ouseleys son and, as if in recognition of American participation in his original as his attache daffaires at Buenos Aires to accompany him expedition, invited the American charge too. As for Ouseley, he was knighted in 1852 and soon afterwards it was acknowledged, at least privately, that much of the criticism heaped on him when recalled in 1847 had been unjust. Hotham concluded an Anglo-Paraguayan agreement in March 1853, facilitating also treaties between Paraguay and France, the United States and Sardinia. Within weeks he had signed a further convention with the Argentine authorities guaranteeing to Paraguay and to markets in the Argentine access for British traders up the river Parana interior.70 Had Ouseleys bold vision of 1845 been adhered to, his supporters responded, those longer-term benets for trade and to the region might have materialised earlier.71 in Politically inspired though the expedition was, the commerce conducted in the Parana 1846 had unquestionably revealed a widespread enthusiasm for trade and contact with the British however unwelcome, for some, that message might be. Notes
[1] Stemming largely from Gallagher and Robinson, The Imperialism of Free Trade. More recent coverage is by Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism; Porter, The Oxford History of the British Empire; Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire; and Owen and Sutcliffe, Studies in the Theory of Imperialism. More succinct are Cain, Economic Foundations; Porter, European Imperialism; and Louis, Imperialism. [2] Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics, 323. [3] Rock, Argentina, 111; Cain and Hopkins, Imperialism, 99n. An interpretation suggested earlier also by Morgan, French Policy in Spanish America, 313.

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 367

[4] British trade with Latin America has been evaluated differently over the years. The recent estimates most cited are by Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade. These are discussed in Miller, Britain and Latin America, 71 78. See also Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 28 31. [5] British commercial policy has been extensively investigated in Williams, British Commercial Policy. For possible linkage between the 1841 memorandum and British activity in Latin America, see also discussion by Miller, Britain and Latin America, 51; Mathew, The Imperialism of Free Trade, 565; Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics, 32122; and Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 25355. [6] The Royal Navys role off the west coast of central and south America has been explored in detail by Mayo, Consuls and Silver Contraband; and Gough, Specie Conveyance. Admiralty records, however, do not reveal comparable activity in the river Plate. [7] A concept analysed in Mayo, The Impatient Lion. [8] Britains strategic interest in the south Atlantic is considered extensively in Gough, Sea Power and South America, The Falkland Islands and The British Reoccupation and Colonisation of the Falkland Islands. [9] Morgan, French Policy, 313. [10] Wu, Generals and Diplomats, 91. [11] Gough, Specie Conveyance, 423. [12] A conclusion reached by Bethell, Britain and Latin America, 12. Extensive analysis of the British in Latin America is also to be found in Miller, Britain and Latin America; Bethell, Spanish America after Independence; and Platt, Business Imperialism. More specic to the river Plate are Winn, British Informal Empire in Uruguay; and Ferns, Britains Informal Empire in Argentina. [13] See Wu, Generals and Diplomats, 36 52. [14] British diplomacy with respect to the Peru-Bolivian Confederation is discussed in Mathew, The Imperialism of Free Trade, 567; and more extensively in Wu, Generals and Diplomats, 76 87. See also Miller, Britain and Latin America, 51. [15] Events in the river Plate and the background to the warfare which engulfed the region in the midnineteenth century are most recently analysed in McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire and Garibaldi in Uruguay. For the career of Juan Manuel de Rosas and the internal struggles of the Argentine Confederation, see Lynch, Argentine Dictator and The River Plate Republics. [16] French policy towards Latin America generally is explained in Morgan, French Policy. For French activity in the river Plate see also Morgan, Orleanist Diplomacy. The more specic theme of relations with the British is explored in Morgan, Anglo-French Confrontation. [17] Kirkpatrick, A History of the Argentine Republic, 155; Pivel-Devoto, Historia, 145. [18] Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 274; Morgan, Anglo-French Confrontation, 327. [19] Lynch, Argentine Dictator, 283, and River Plate Republics, 346. [20] Cady, Foreign Intervention, 158. as, Historia, IV, 261 62; Caillet-Bois, Historia, 433 34; Irazusta, Vida Politica, V, 138. See [21] Sald oz-Azpiri, Rosas frente al imperio ingles. also Mun [22] Levene, Historia, II, 251; Pivel-Devoto, Historia, 145. [23] National Intelligencer, 23 June 1846. [24] Hopkins to Wise, 27 March 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 332 35. [25] Brent to Buchanan, 4 April 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 350 58. [26] Brent to Buchanan, 14 Nov. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 303 12. [27] Brent to Buchanan, 16 Jan. 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 314 16. [28] Brent to Buchanan, 16 Jan. 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 317 18. [29] The history and extent of smuggling by north American shippers and merchants in the river Plate and Brents disagreements with American naval ofcers there is revealed in Cooney, Doing Business in the Smuggling Way; and Randall, Captains and Diplomats. [30] Hopkins to Buchanan, Feb. 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, X, 80 85.

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[31] Ibid. [32] Arana to Brent, 29 Oct. 1845, and Brent to Arana, 27 Nov. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 299 300, 312 14. as, Historia, IV, 253; Caillet-Bois, Historia, 430; Pomer, Conictos, 69. [33] Sald [34] Ouseley to Canning, 13 Nov. 1845, FO 6/106; and Ouseley to Aberdeen, 31 Oct. 1845, FO 6/ 105, The National Archives, London. [35] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 101 02. [36] Irazusta, Vida Politica, V, 137; Cady, Foreign Intervention, 157n. [37] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 12; II, 47, 95 97. [38] Hopkins to Buchanan, 10 June 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, X, 91 95. [39] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 111, 146. [40] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 76, 168 69, 171, 182, 193. [41] Hopkins to Buchanan, 31 [sic] Nov. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, X, 63 76. [42] Morning Herald, 27 June 1846; Caillet-Bois, Historia, 429 30. [43] Hamilton to Wise, 10 Aug. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 304 05. [44] Morning Herald, 27 June 1846. [45] Morning Herald, 29 Aug. 1846, reproducing correspondence from the United States Gazette. [46] The Times, 23 Sept. 1846, reproducing Hotham to Ingleeld, 7 June 1846. [47] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 268 69. [48] National Intelligencer, 1 Sept. 1846. [49] Morning Herald, 17 Aug. 1846, reproducing correspondence from the Philadelphia North American. [50] Hamilton to Wise, 9 June 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 347. [51] The Times, 23 Sept. 1846. [52] Hamilton to Wise, 9 June 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 347. [53] Deffaudis to Guizot, 14 July 1846, and Ouseley to Aberdeen, 12 Aug. 1846, FO Condential Print, 260; Morning Herald, 11 Sept. 1846. Montevidean customs receipts are cited in ricos, II, 200 01. See also Braconnay, La Legion Francesa, 244. Acevedo, Anales Histo [54] Hotham to Malmesbury, 20 Feb. 1852, FO 59/2. [55] For the career and politics of Urquiza and his antagonism towards Rosas see Bosch, Urquiza and Los Tratados. [56] Ouseley memorandum, 5 July 1845, FO 6/104. [57] Hotham to Ingleeld, 31 Jan. 1846, DD HO 10/7, Hotham Papers, University Library, Hull. [58] Ouseley to Aberdeen, 6 June 1846, FO 6/119. [59] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 18 19. [60] Hotham to Baring, 13 June 1851, NP5/1/3/6, Northbrook Papers, ING Baring, London. [61] Ouseley to Aberdeen, 16 April 1846, FO 6/117. [62] Hotham to Ingleeld, 31 Jan. 1846, Hotham Papers, DD HO 10/7. [63] Hotham to Auckland, 29 Sept. 1846, Hotham Papers, DD HO 10/8. [64] For analysis of the British governments changing attitude towards the intervention in the river Plate see McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire, 78 81, 86 100. [65] Deffaudis to Guizot, 25 July 1846, enclosed in Ouseley to Aberdeen, 12 Aug. 1846, FO Condential Print, 260. [66] Ouseley to Aberdeen, 7 April 1846, FO 6/117. [67] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, II, 56. [68] Diary, 13 Nov. 1846, FIT/3, Fitzgerald Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. [69] Hotham to Baring, 30 June 1851, Northbrook Papers, NP5/1/3/6. [70] For the opening of Paraguay to international trade see Tate, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth Century; and Williams, The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic. See also Kiernan, Britains First Contacts with Paraguay. [71] See Hadeld, Brazil, the River Plate, and the Falkland Islands, 238, 343.

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 369

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Mayo, J. The Impatient Lion: Britains Ofcial Mind and Latin America in the 1850s. IberoAmerikanisches Archiv 9 (1983): 197 223. . Consuls and Silver Contraband on Mexicos West Coast in the Era of Santa Anna. Journal of Latin American Studies 19 (1987): 389 411. Miller, R. Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. London: Longman, 1993. Morgan, I. Anglo-French Confrontation and Co-operation in Spanish America, 1836 1848. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1975. . French Policy in Spanish America: 1830 1848. Journal of Latin American Studies 10 (1978): 309 28. . Orleanist Diplomacy and the French Colony in Uruguay. International History Review 5 (1983): 201 28. oz-Azpiri, J. Rosas frente al imperio ingles: historia intima de un triunfo argentino. Buenos Aires, Mun 1960. Owen, R. and B. Sutcliffe, eds. Studies in the Theory of Imperialism. London: Longman, 1972. Pivel-Devoto, J. Historia de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay, 1830 1930. Montevideo, 1945. Platt, D. C. M. Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815 1914. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. . Latin America and British Trade 1806 1914. London: A & C Black, 1972. . ed. Business Imperialism, 1840 1930. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. Pomer, L. Conictos en la Cuenca del Plata en el siglo XIX. Buenos Aires, 1984. Porter, A. European Imperialism, 1860 1914. London: Macmillan, 1994. . ed. The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. 3, The Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Randall, R. Captains and Diplomats, Americans in the Rio de la Plata, 1843 1846. The American Neptune 46 (1986): 230 39. Rock, D. Argentina, 1516 1982. London: I. B. Tauris, 1987. as, A. Historia de la Confederacio n Argentina. 5 vols. Buenos Aires, 1911. Sald Tate, E. Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth Century: The Case of Paraguay, 1811 1870. Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv 5 (1979): 39 70. Williams, J. B. British Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion 1750 1850. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Williams, J. H. The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 1800 1870. Austin, TX: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1979. Winn, P. British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century. Past and Present 73 (1976): 100 26. Wu, C. Generals and Diplomats: Great Britain and Peru 1820-40. Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies, 1991.