DE LEON vs ESGUERRA Case Digest ALFREDO M. DE LEON VS. HON. GOVERNOR BENJAMIN ESGUERRA G.R. NO.

78059 AUGUST 31, 1987 FACTS: An original action of prohibition was instituted by Alfredo M. De Leon, as Barangay Captain of Dolores Rizal with other baranggay councilmen for the memorandum ordered by Governer Benjamin Esguerra in replacing the petitioners. On February 9. 1987, Alfredo M. De Leon received a memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 designating new officers barangay captain and barangay councilmen by authority of the Minister of Local Government granted by the 1986 provisional constitution. The Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. However, the respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the following provision: All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise pro vided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. ... and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforementioned provision of the Provisional Constitution. ISSUES: Whether or not the 1986 provisional constitution may be validly recognized? Whether or not the 1987 constitution was already in effect on February 2, 1987 the day of the actual plebiscite or February 8, 1987, its announcement? HELD: The court held that since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which it was antedated, in keeping with the dictates of justice. But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline, the aforementioned provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading: "Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Further, the record of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission further shows the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the of facial confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite." Therefore, the 1987 Constitution is deemed ratified on February 2, 1987, the actual date of the voting and not February 8, 1987, the announcement of the resolution.

Santiago Vs. COMELEC Case Digest

Santiago Vs. COMELEC 270 SCRA 106 G.R. No.127325 Mar. 19 1997 Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153 Oct. 25 2006 Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions. Issue: Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition. Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void. 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision. 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735 Petition is dismissed.

IMBONG VS FERRER Case Digest MANUEL B. IMBONG VS. JAIME FERRER AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMELEC G.R. NO. L-32432 SEPTEMBER 11, 1970 FACTS: These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales to impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly passed Resolution No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen. After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year Congress, acting as a Legislative Body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives," 1 "and that any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution." On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a Legislative Body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not RA No. 6132 is constitutional? 2. Whether or not Section 2, 5, and 8 is valid and does not prejudice the rights of individual embodied in the constitution? HELD: Issue 1: In sustaining the constitutionality of R.A. No. 4914 and R.A. No. 6132, the court explained the following: 1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the abovementioned details, except the appropriation of funds. 3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid. 4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4. Issue 2 Validity of Section 2, 5 and 8 Section 2: Apportionment of delegates Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides. The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district. The presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest available official population census, for such apportionment was presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation to effect the desired proportional representation. Section 5: Deprivation of Liberty Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive

office or position in any branch of the government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention." As observed by the Solicitor General in his answer, the overriding objective of the challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.) Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No other public officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they themselves, propose constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of the community. As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure that the proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice. Section 8: Prohibition from organization and political party support Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and dormant police power of the State and may be

lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important public interests. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits: 1. any candidate for delegate to the convention (a) from representing, or (b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization; and 2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group of whatever nature from (a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or (b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election. While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a) which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning all organization support." We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not unduly subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile discrimination against any party or group nor does it confer undue favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to all organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or professional associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among individual candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any existing organization. A person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to a political party or any other association for support. And he, as much as any candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC Case Digest RAMON A. GONZALES VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-28196 NOVEMBER 9, 1967 FACTS: Petitioner prays for the judgment of restraining the COMELEC from enforcing R.A. No. 4813 declaring the act unconstitutional and void. 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member; 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power. In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review. Issue 2 Legality of congress and legal status of the congressmen Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said threeyear period without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect. Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating Congress with a House of Representatives composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they existed at the time of said elections remained in force, we cannot see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment within the period aforementioned. Issue 3 Available alternatives to the congress In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day. Issue 4 May constitutional amendments be submitted for ratification in a General Election? There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case being a political question? 2. Whether or not the "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void? 3. Whether or not the congress may propose amendments to the constitution and at the same time call for a constitutional convention? 4. May constitutional amendments ratification at a general election? be submitted for

5. Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution? HELD: Issue 1 Jurisdiction of the court Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows,

Issue 5 - Would the submission now of the contested amendments to the people violate the spirit of the constitution? The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage and, consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the

amendments now being contested and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken place on a rather limited scale on the latest proposals for amendment, have been due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or approval of the law.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC Case Digest ARTURO M. TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-43150 OCTOBER 16, 1971 FACTS: Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1 A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18 BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention: Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows: Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971. Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case? 2. Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent

implementing acts and resolution of the Convention separately from the whole amended constitution? HELD: The court upheld the petitioner. Issue 1: Jurisdiction of the courts The Court has jurisdiction over the case. As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the present Constitution.. Accordingly, we are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes without saying that we do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case. Issue 2: Constitutionality of piecemeal amendment The Conventional Organic Resolution No.1 and subsequent acts and resolution is violative of the constitution due to the following grounds: 1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendment shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. 2. Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the

one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its other parts.. A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them,more or less they can assumed its

harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positionsin addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows: Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor. Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position. Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void. Ratio: In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC Case Digest SANIDAD VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-446640 OCTOBER 12, 1976 FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the national assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in "barangays" applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which is quoted in the footnote below. On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The questions ask, to wit: (1) Do you want martial law to be continued? (2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution. On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, commenced Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976. Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case? 2. Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?

3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission? HELD: Issue 1 Justiciability of the courts We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people. Issue 2 Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution? As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President. Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Issue 3 - Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission? It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."

Nitafan vs. CIR [GR L-78780, 23 July 1987] income tax, the Court since then has authorized the Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987. The 1973 Constitution has provided that no salary or any Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively. form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax (Section 6, Article XV) which was not present in the 1987 Constitution. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased), negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial Issue: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes. Equality of branches of government effected by Held: NO. Intent to delete express grant of exemption of income taxes to members of Judiciary The term diminished be changed to decreased and that The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of the words nor subjected to income tax be deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three branches in the government. A period (.) after decreased was made on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax. With the period, the doctrine inPerfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David is understood not to applyanymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income have been reduced in accepting service in government and modifications in provision. officers. continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David.

yet subjected to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet membersand all other employees.

the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the

Constitutional construction adopts the intent of the framers and people adopting the law.

framers. In the case at bar, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges

The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of

but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.