Exercise PEGASUS 04

Exercise Evaluation
For Ex Pegasus
16-18 September 2004
New Zealand

Evaluation Report
December 2004
Contents

Purpose p.3

Response arrangements in NZ and involvement of international p.3

partners

Exercise Pegasus Objectives p.3

Exercise Scenario and Outline p.4

Evaluation Overview p.5

Key Learning Outcomes p.5

- UN OHCA and NZ national disaster management p.5

arrangements
p.7
- Multi-agency management of events and information
p.8
- Integration of USAR and other response assets with NCMC
and CDEM Group incident management structures and
processes

Summary p.9

Appendix One: Detailed Evaluation Notes Exercise Pegasus p.10

Acronyms used in this report

CDEM Civil Defence Emergency Management

ECAN Environment Canterbury
INSARG International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
LEMA Local Emergency Management Authority
MCDEM Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
NCMC National Crisis Management Centre
NZ-RT New Zealand Response Team
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OSOCC Onsite Operations Coordination Centre
SOP’s Standard Operating Procedures
UN United Nations
UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination (team)
USAR Urban Search and Rescue

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 2

Exercise PEGASUS 04

Purpose

The purpose of Exercise PEGASUS 04 was to provide a realistic scenario in which employed and
voluntary emergency managers and first responders at international, national, regional and local
level would be brought together in a coordinated manner, in order to enhance New Zealand’s
overall performance in a future major earthquake.

Response arrangements in NZ and involvement of international partners

New Zealand has a significant potential to be impacted by a range of disasters that will exceed
our domestic ability to resource. Where New Zealand agencies have any redundant capacity it is
at a minimal level only and therefore it is necessary in medium to large-scale events to plan for
assistance from the international disaster management sector. We have developed a minimum
national capability for Urban Search and Rescue (USAR), with a built in requirement for
international support coordinated through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and managed by the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency
Management (MCDEM). This is written into the draft new National Civil Defence Emergency
Management (CDEM) Plan. A United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) team
works with the National Controller in the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) to
coordinate international rescue resources and assets coming into NZ, operating under
International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) Guidelines and standards.
Other international partners such as Australia and Pacific/Asian emergency managers could also
be involved in a national-scale disaster.

Exercise Pegasus Objectives

The key objective of Exercise PEGASUS was to test and practice interagency response and
coordination ability in a major urban disaster.

Overall exercise objectives and scope

In sponsoring and directing Exercise Pegasus, the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency
Management had two overall objectives within the context of the exercise scope:

1. Multi-agency management of events and multi-agency management of information

2. Integration of USAR and other response assets with NCMC and CDEM Group
incident management structures and processes

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 3

The Exercise focused on the exercising and management of urban search and rescue (USAR)
Task Forces and Response Teams, responding into the affected area (Canterbury), the
exercising of the international coordination of response assets into NZ through UN OCHA and
some particular goals for Environment Canterbury (ECAN) in their Pandora exercise (including
the objectives above). It was not an examination of the management of such a scenario in its
totality.

The high-level objectives of Exercise PEGASUS strands were to:

Provide a suitable culmination for the progressive OSOCC training provided to UNDAC
Pacific Team Members.

Ensure that OCHA is ready and able to establish and operate an effective OSOCC using
the UNDAC Team.

Practise MCDEM staff in coordinating national emergency response.

Identify areas where coordination between the NCMC, the Local Emergency Management
Authority (LEMA) and the OSOCC, can be improved.

Increase the realism of Canterbury Regional CDEM Group’s annual readiness exercise
(PANDORA).

Evaluate practical and policy aspects of the border management and airport reception
arrangements in place for Canterbury Region.

Test the deployment process and the operational skills of NZ-Urban Search and Rescue
Task Force 2.

Determine the effectiveness of the NZ-Response Teams operating in support of a regional

CDEM Group in a major emergency.

Exercise Scenario and Outline

The initiating event for the exercise was a magnitude 8.0 earthquake occurring without warning
along the Alpine Fault, at 0900 hours on Thu 16 Sep 04. This was understood to have caused
extensive damage to roading, rail, buildings and infrastructure. Significant human impact included
over 10 deaths, 500 serious injuries and 1300 lesser injuries. Poor weather and heavy rain
resulted in flood warnings across the affected regions on the 16th and 17th.

The exercise consisted of six strands of activity, all operating on the above scenario:

1. The UNDAC Team role (OSOCC coordination) on Exercise PEGASUS

2. MCDEM National Crisis Management Centre activation and operation

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 4

 3. Canterbury Civil Defence & Emergency Management (CDEM) Group Exercise
PANDORA ‘04

4. Canterbury border control and Christchurch Airport exercise

5. National USAR Task Forces exercise

6. USAR NZ-RT integration exercise

Evaluation Overview

Within the scope of Exercise Pegasus, the exercise including all six activity strands was highly
successful and afforded the first opportunity NZ has had to experience the effective working
together of national USAR rescue assets and their coordination and management in a multi-
agency environment. This was the largest exercise held in NZ in the last 10 years. All
participants (national and international) expressed the enormous value they obtained from the
exercise and NZ was praised by international exercise experts for conducting an extremely well
organised and effective programme. At the end of the exercise, the Exercise Director concluded
that Pegasus demonstrated that NZ has developed a quality, effective and integrated USAR
capability second to none and that we would provide a credible response to, and management of,
a significant structural event from today.

Detailed notes reflecting feedback from the Strand leaders can be found in Appendix One. This
material and the observations of the Exercise Director have been used to compile this report.

Key learning outcomes

1. UN OCHA and NZ national disaster management arrangements

MCDEM has written the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)
structure and process into its draft new national CDEM Plan. This means that MCDEM,
specifically the National Controller in the NCMC, will request an UNDAC trained team, made up
of individuals experienced in the coordination of international support, including rescue assets.

MCDEM, in the NCMC, as the national emergency management agency is the “LEMA” in UNDAC
terminology (not the CDEM Group as was exercised in Pegasus). The relationship between the
UNDAC team and NZ is with the National Controller and the NCMC. Normally (and not as
exercised in Pegasus) the UNDAC team will be located at the NCMC. Sub-post UNDAC liaison
personnel may be located with affected CDEM Groups, at the airport to assist with border
reception/departure and possibly out in the field if the NCMC deems necessary. During Pegasus,

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 5

the UNDAC team was primarily located in Canterbury at the Group EOC for maximum learning
and experiential involvement of the Pacific UNDAC team members, since the exercise control
and substantive exercise activity was located in Christchurch.

NZ emergency management arrangements and relationship to the UNDAC team.

The National Controller, in conjunction with the Whole of Government ODESC processes, is
responsible for the decision to call upon international assistance. The National Controller will
request an UNDAC team for the coordination of international support, including rescue assets.
Other Ministries e.g. Ministry of Health will request other international resources, services and
supplies, as per their emergency management planning and protocols. CDEM Groups do not
directly request international assets.

The exercise demonstrated that the knowledge of working with the UN processes and SOPs,
need to be developed further within MCDEM and promulgated to the sector.

UNDAC team composition

NZ has highly developed disaster management arrangements and is a developed country.

UNDAC members most relevant to assist NZ with the coordination of international assets would
need to be highly trained, skilled and experienced emergency managers. Pegasus was a
learning and developmental environment for the Pacific members of the UNDAC team. Not all
UNDAC team members would be considered suitable for the NZ disaster management
environment and discussions will be held with UN OCHA in respect of these requirements.

The UNDAC teams role.

An UNDAC team does not work independently of NZ’s national disaster management structures
and decision-making. An UNDAC team supports the National Controller’s management of the
event by assisting the National Controller with international coordination. NZ has robust
emergency legislation, planning and arrangements and while it may be overwhelmed by the
magnitude of the event, NZ will manage events at local, regional and national level. We may,
however, need to call upon a variety of assistance and may do this with the help and support of
an UNDAC team. In the first instance, such a team would be used for the coordination of
international rescue assets. Should other resources be required, they would normally be called
upon and managed by other Ministries through their bilateral and pre-planning arrangements.
UNDAC teams, however, are trained and have access through the UN processes, to a wide
range of international support, services and assets, e.g. surgical, transport, and defence assets
and other Ministries may seek the assistance of an UNDAC team for the location of other
resources.

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 6

UNDAC team members are well trained in three additional areas. Firstly, in the coordination of
non-government agencies. Typically in disasters, many international agencies converge on the
affected country. UNDAC teams strengths, well demonstrated in many disasters, are that of
coordination of the work of these agencies, to reduce the pressure on the local agencies whose
functioning will be affected by the event. UNDAC team members are also well-trained in
reconnaissance and disaster impact assessment and in working with the media and these skills
can be used by the national emergency management agency if required.

2. Multi-agency management of events and information

Role of UN OCHA assets.

Understanding and use of the UNDAC team system was limited to those individuals specifically
involved. More work needs to be done in writing UNDAC team systems into SOPs by the
National Crisis Management Centre, all CDEMG’s and Canterbury and Auckland airport reception
centres. Generally, for international coordination to be successful, national government agencies
of foreign affairs and disaster management need to be fully aware of how UN OCHA works. This
includes the role of the Emergency Services Branch in UN OCHA; UNDAC teams, INSARAG,
Surge Capacity and the Virtual OSOCC, and in the case of NZ, how it fits in the NCMC and
Group processes. During Pegasus, had the main UNDAC team and Team Leader been located
in Wellington at the NCMC, the relationship would have worked more as it is intended to.

Utilisation of national resources

National (and international) resources are requested and managed by the National Controller and
made available to CDEM Groups. These include defence, transportation (rail, ferries, airlines).
CDEM Groups do not requisition these resources under a declaration.

Group structures
Canterbury experienced challenges which other large CDEM Groups need to carefully consider:
1. The operational response structure and particularly the relationships and span of
control between the Group and the Territorial Authorities (TAs). With 10 TA’s in
Canterbury the challenges of information management are significant. Where there
are more than four or five TA’s in a Group it is recommended that Groups look at TA
“clusters”.
2. The operational structure of the Group and TAs need to be streamlined to ensure that
management and communication structures are efficient and reliable.
3. Sustainability of a large sector structure, which is reliant on volunteers, is becoming
problematical in today’s environment. CDEM Groups need to carefully review and
consider the sustainability of such arrangements.

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Where a Group contracts to manage TA operational responsibilities, there needs to be clear
physical and system separation of Group and city/district functions to avoid confusion.

There is a need for local government CDEM Group members to make more use of the other key
agencies in the decision making process and use the established chain of command, e.g.
health/casualty problems go through Local to Group (Health Advisory Group) to DHB to Ministry
of Health in Wellington.

Management of information
Even in a relatively small-scale event, the amount of information is generated is huge. Exercise
Pegasus confirmed again that improved electronic management systems are absolutely vital to
process and manage the information received. The requirements include web-based data and
information systems, including GIS mapping.

Intelligence and Planning roles are vital within any EOC. This challenges many EOC’s around the
country. The EOC tends to get so busy dealing with the situation as it unfolds that there is little
capacity to plan ahead, anticipate problems, and produce action plans which are reactive rather
than proactive.

3. Integration of USAR and other response assets with NCMC and CDEM Group

incident management structures and processes

Use of border arrangements

Part Two – International Search and Rescue Assistance into New Zealand document proved to
be an effective tool for international USAR teams to plan their response into NZ.

Command, control and coordination of rescue assets

This was complicated and problematic in the exercise. Canterbury has planned rescue structures
and processes in place, however the many layers and separate entities caused difficulties for
coordination and communication. On the ground coordination needs to be further developed by
many Groups. Simplicity is the key. All rescue assets, including NZ-TF, NZ-RT and
International Teams should be coordinated under one position or office to ensure the
efficient management of available resources. In a large event an sub-post OSOCC may be
located alongside the affected Groups EOC. It is important that a role exists within the group that
is responsible for the overall management of rescue issues (such a role would be similar to that of
a welfare manager).

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The base of operations for rescue needs to have effective communications with the EOC, along
with a liaison person located in the Group EOC. Once effective communication between the
rescue groups (international, NZ TF and NZ RT) was established in Pegasus, it proved to be very
successful. The combined resource was impressive and effective.

Interaction between USAR Task Forces and Response Teams

UNDAC team members and USAR Task Force personnel were significantly impressed by the
diverse and competent range of skills (medical, swiftwater, rope and canine search) offered by
volunteer USAR response teams (RT). Both TF and RT personnel reported that it was valuable
working with each other as it assisted in clarifying their respective roles. (It was noted that RTs
need to enhance their capability to initially setup and manage sites, allowing TF to be focused on
specialist rescue within sites). Task Forces indicated that the support from Response Teams was
of great operational use and the exercise confirmed that the national integrated USAR response
model of TF and RT will certainly add value to the rescue response of any CDEM Group.

Summary

Exercise Pegasus proved to be a significant learning experience for all the strands and with
respect to overall management of the event. Each strand leader and participants will take the
lessons learnt and review systems and training. Future such exercises are being developed and
written into the MCDEM draft National Exercise Programme and the NZ USAR project.

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 9

Appendix One

Detailed Evaluation Notes, Exercise Pegasus

Detailed evaluation notes below consist of comments and feedback from the exercise strands of
Pegasus. They have been compiled from the reports received from strand leaders. The full
exercise reports are available in a companion document titled “Exercise Pegasus, Strand
Feedback”.

Comments have been grouped by topic and strand area. Several strands forwarded comments
and suggestions that were similar, such feedback has been detailed only once.

NCMC and UNDAC

1. Lack of understanding as to role and position of UNDAC in NZ system

• No pre-defined understanding of how the UN and UNDAC fits into the NCMC system.
• The role of the NCMC also does not appear to be well understood by UNDAC.
• The role of the UNDAC representatives present in the NCMC was unclear to themselves
and to NCMC staff.
• At national and group level there was not sufficient understanding of the United Nations
systems including UNDAC and INSARAG.
• The deployment of an UNDAC Team into a developed country without UN
Representation poses a new set of issues, which need to be addressed.
• It is necessary to understand the value that the UNDAC team adds to New Zealand
compared to that of an undeveloped country. The question needs to be asked “what
evaluation role do the UNDAC team deliver that is not covered by the response capability
of New Zealand?” Is the UNDAC team adding a level of complication to the national
response that is not necessary?

2. Need for process development around UNDAC role

• Logs in NCMC needs to pre define UN links.
• UNDAC role in Wellington needed to be more clearly defined. Would team leader be in
capital or main OSOCC in capital?
• The absence of SOP’s for the UNDAC role and link with the NCMC complicated effective
understanding and utilising this resource from a national perspective.
• Pre-defined process for managing official international requests to be defined in
conjunction with MFAT.
• Initial problems to establish contact with the UNDAC team in Christchurch delayed
effective handling of international issues.
• Communication/consultation with the NCMC were little and irregular, few requests were
received.
• The UNDAC relationships between the NCMC and OSOCC did not work well.
• The relationship between the Airport Reception centre, OSOCC and GECC need
clarification. Access to/orientation on OSOCC and Relief Web is required from a NCMC
point of view. The finalisation of SOP’s in this regard will contribute to resolving this.

3. More agencies are required to be involved

• A more direct involvement by Foreign Affairs and Trade under this scenario seems
indispensable. NCMC would require more liaison staff from MfAT and MoH.
• Capability of Red Cross to provide information in the international context needs to be
clarified.

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4. NCMC General
• Strategic analysis of information received within the NCMC is required to provide ODESC
with impact analysis on country, economy etc.

Border control issues

• Part Two – International Search and Rescue Assistance into New Zealand document
proved to be an effective tool for international USAR teams to plan their response to NZ.
Some inclusions have been identified that will strengthen the document and provide more
(see To Do).
• It is noted that the ability to manage the handling of large equipment caches was not
tested, however appropriate areas for this have been identified in Chch.
• Actual customs/immigration processing was not tested – would be useful to do this at
some stage.
• There was a lack of understanding of UN roles and responsibilities around border control.
• From the Group ECC perspective, the border control arrangements went well with the
ECC knowing in a timely manner what was coming through.

OSOCC issues

1. Provision of liaison persons essential

• Whenever the OSOCC and/or USAR Teams are active in NZ a liaison person will be
required in the NCMC. This person should preferably be familiar with the NZ response
structures.
• LEMA liaison officer in OSOCC would have been useful.
• Local USAR TF representative is recommended for UNDAC OSOCC once it is
established.

2. Role clarification required

• LEMA requires improved understanding of role of NCMC – e.g. funding responsibility.
• In the NZ context OSOCC should focus on the deployment of USAR teams only. Other
issues like surgical assistance will be triggered by Ministry of Health arrangements.
• Appeared to be some confusion over links between OSOCC and Ecan.
• Command and/or control over rescue assets were not clear from the view of the OSOCC.
• The role of the UNDAC and the operations of the OSOCC are now better understood by
members of the NST and evaluators through their interaction during the exercise. This
understanding will be of great value on future occasions when NZ USAR resources are
utilised through an OSOCC structure.

3. General
• The 3 days OSOCC training was invaluable for SIDS UNDAC members.
• Difficult to establish effectiveness of OSOCC within the exercise setting.
• In the real event other factors would have had a huge influence on the operation of the
OSOCC, which were not evident during the exercise, these are coordination of Non
Government Organisations (NGO), media response and other international assistance
provided.
• Attendance by USAR management personnel at the OSOCC and the opportunity to
discuss issues directly with UNDAC staff has led to a sound understanding of the roles
and responsibilities of USAR management within the OSOCC which will provide valuable

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 11

 insight into support and resource integration at future events where international aid is
deployed.
• Members from UNDAC were suitably impressed with the diverse and competent range of
skills (medical, swiftwater, rope and canine search) offered by voluntary USAR response
teams.

USAR Team issues

1. Representation required
• Experienced Media Liaison Officer is required for major deployments.
• NST must have representative for OSOCC.
• The National Support Team (NST) should have been co-located with Rescue
Headquarters.
• Members of the USAR National Support Team were fully involved in working with the
other agencies within the Canterbury CDEM group at the EOC. Some suggestions for
improving inter-agency communications and response coordination have been proposed
by the NST representatives.

2. Location issues
• NST needs to move from EOC to OSOCC once established.

3. General
• The working relationships between the USAR teams and NZ-RT’s were enhanced by the
exercise.
• The exercise was beneficial in enhancing the working relationships between the
management of all NZ TF’s.
• USAR management within New Zealand is now far better prepared to meet a serious,
widespread event than prior to Exercise Pegasus.
• Lack of information channelled to and from EOC to ICP and TF management.

Ecan EOC issues

• There is a key issue regarding the Area Headquarters structure. The span of control of
11 area headquarters working into the CCC EOC is too large to be effectively handled.
The span needs to be reduced and the capabilities of Area Headquarters, who currently
oversee populations in excess of 30,000 people each, need to be expanded so that they
can deal with more situations themselves and only the more serious issues reach the
CCC EOC. The CCC EOC can then concentrate on those more serious issues and the
longer term rather than the immediate.

Response Team issues

1. Role issues
• The management of mobilising USAR Response Teams to the point of control hand over
to Canterbury CDEM Group was successful.
• RTs reported that it was useful working with Task Forces as it assisted in clarifying their
role which is sometimes unclear.
• RTs need to enhance their capability to setup and manage incidents, allowing TF to be
focused on specialist rescue within incidents, freeing up this resource to improve the
survivability of buried victims.

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 12

 • There was some inappropriate allocation of specialist resources to incident types (poor
matching of task vs capabilities).
• Response team coordinator should be linked to the TFL for coordination purposes.
• Confusion was evidenced over the role of RTs by TF management, as there was a
perception that RTs would stay and hand over incidents to response teams. This raises a
number of issues:
o Firstly, the RTs are more likely to carry out hasty searches and mark buildings
that require TF level intervention – this protocol is defined in the INSARAG
guidelines.
o Secondly, Task Forces are too scarce and specialised to be allocated to assume
incident management. They should be requested for specialist rescues and
tasked accordingly by the Operations Manager and then released for other
incidents for major level events. It was noted that Task Forces did not wear any
CIMS jerkins making it often difficult to clearly identify the incident management
team on some occasions.

2. Ability enhancement
• Task Forces indicated that the support from Response Teams when they were available
was of much operational use and it appears that, even with only 8 response teams, the
national response team model will certainly add value to any group level emergency.

2. Documentation
• The National Crisis Management Centre SOP for USAR Response Team Mobilisation
was tested in the field for activating teams and was found easy to use.

3. Exercise issues
• Group Situation Reports were not made available to Response Teams as previously
discussed at pre-exercise management meetings.
• Rescue team exercise staffing including local site directing staff, casualty actors and
support crew was under resourced and caused additional workload on staff.

Communications issues

1. Lack of capacity in real event

• The question of communications under scenario circumstances is unavoidable as the
existing VHF radio capability would not be able to fulfil the requirement under this
scenario. The MCDEM alternate communication project is currently on hold pending the
National Crisis Management Information System outcome, in the mean time a critical void
exists that requires consideration.
• There is an urgent need to introduce an information management system, as distinct from
an information reception and sending system, to effectively manage the enormous
amount of information that is being received.

2. Comprehension issues
• The issue of the lack standardised data in respect of report formats, GIS, symbols,
acronyms etc once again proved a stumbling block in effective communication and
coordination.
• Communication linkages and understanding of role between LEMA and OSOCC to be
clarified.

3. Communication flows
• The various layers of management established by the Canterbury CDEM did not allow
the flow of information required for effective management of an event of the magnitude of

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 13

 the exercise. Co-location of the response teams and TF resources and communications
centres would enable a more efficient management of available resources at future
events of this nature.
• The functional link between Environment Canterbury (ECan) and the NCMC was
adequate and responses timely given the limitations of the exercise.
• Too many links in communications chain hampered efficiency of operations.
• There was benefit to hold teleconferences with RT Leaders during exercise just to touch
base and see if there were any issues – this could be a good idea during actual
operations.
• Management of intelligence from field to EOC in regard to USAR was inadequate
throughout exercise.

4. Radio issues
• There were significant radio communication problems experienced using ESB164 as the
regional dispatch channel for response teams. This requires further technical
investigation, however it was noted that ES41 used by exercise management performed
reasonably well in contrast. Busy phone signals were often received or phones not
answered by both Rescue HQ and Sockburn. There was also inconsistent use of Radio
Call Signs with Sockburn being called Sockburn, Sockburn Reporting Centre and other
names. Response Teams has been previously issued approved radio call signs
(“response team two”) and these were changed and used inconsistently by Sockburn
who occasionally referred to them as “rescue team three” etc.
• The use of Personal Radio Service (PRS – UHF CB) by many response teams
highlighted frequent interference and poor quality of communications. The designation of
a national ES tactical frequency for USAR should be considered.

Exercise Management Issues

1. Exercise structure/planning
• The exercise focus on Canterbury and further on search and rescue in particular as
opposed to the total impact on the entire area and infrastructure limited the NCMC’s
capability to analyse and advise on the event from a strategic point of view. It can for
instance be expected that for an event of this scale the question of the declaration of a
national state of civil defence emergency will arise, however in this case the NCMC
simply did not have sufficient information to advise on this.
• There were issues from time to time with notional becoming muddled with real. The real
exercise requirements to have a team at a particular point at a particular time did
introduce some artificiality but the overall result was very pleasing.

To Do/Recommendations

1. NCMC tasks
• National declaration assessment checklist to be developed.
• Develop an SOP for UNDAC involvement in NZ and NCMC.
• Liase with MFAT to be more involved in international issues.
• Move towards standardisation of data eg situation reports to ease flow of information.
• NCMC SOPs need to include procedures for requesting and receiving international
assistance. This assistance could include, USAR Assets, medical resources, other
equipment and funding which has been channelled through UN OCHA.

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 14

2. International relationships tasks
• Determine whether the UNDAC response is an appropriate response in the NZ
environment.
• National Governments, in particular emergency management and foreign affairs
departments need to have an understanding of UN systems. This includes the role of the
Emergency Services Branch in UN OCHA; UNDAC, INSARAG, Surge Capacity and
VOSOCC.
• Clarify role and links between UNDAC and USAR.
• The ECC perspective is that any shortfalls in the Group area should be reported back to
Wellington with any decisions as to what overseas support would be sought being made
there, not the LEMA.
• Clarify funding arrangements in emergency situations to the CDEMGs.
• Add to the ‘Part Two – International Search and Rescue Assistance into New Zealand
document’ with addition of:
o An annex detailing what is UNDAC. OSOCC, INSARAG and why it is included in
these activities and how they integrate into local EM systems.
o A strong statement as to why USAR provider countries must comply with this
document as it will facilitate a speedy and seamless entry into NZ
o Include more information about foodstuffs and medical cache – need for detail
o MAF are to develop a separate summary declaration form for each team.
• Were an OSOCC to be deployed to Christchurch for a similar situation in the future, the E
Can Group recommends the following:
o A strong element be left in Wellington to work with the NCMC in determining what
overseas support is to be sought through the UN.
o The usual team deploy to the airport for border reception etc.
o That element of the OSOCC involved with rescue teams, in this case much of the
OSOCC, be co-located with Rescue Headquarters, not the Group ECC as
occurred.
o A small liaison element be located at the Group ECC. (Dependent upon the scale
of the UN presence that liaison element may not be necessary. The presence in
the rescue Headquarters sufficing.)

3. USAR/Response Teams tasks

• Update the National USAR Response Team Alert to include an action for teams who
failed to respond to the alert ie. follow up phone call directly.
• More work to be done towards understanding respective roles and capabilities of
responding teams.
• Training for TF management and administration personnel in comms links between field
and EOC is required (tools exist).
• An issue for future resolution is that of the commitment of response team members who
are members of Task Forces. There is no benefit for Task Forces to have personnel who
do not fully support the USAR training and deployment requirements and because
technician numbers are limited, perhaps other roles within Task Forces should be
considered for such personnel.
• In order to overcome minor deficiencies displayed or encountered by NZRTs in
supporting TF’s further training and development in CIMS would be advantageous.
Guidelines for incident management of USAR operations would be useful. Access to
some of the CAT3 modules would also assist RT leaders in their professional
development and again strengthen networking opportunities.
• Increase pre-event meetings/briefings held with Team Leaders from both RTs and TFs to
ensure pre-event rapport is established.
• Important to establish more non-exercise training to grow further opportunities for RTs
and TFs to work closer together more frequently.

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 15

 • The decentralised coordination of all rescue assets caused significant coordination and
information management issues. All rescue assets, including NZ-TF, NZ-RT and
International Teams should be under one position or office.
• It is suggested that in a regional level event that local NZ-RTs would be an excellent
resource to provide liaison to international teams.
• The USAR TF web based management system was very favourably commented upon
and certainly in Canterbury the Group would be very interested in having something
similar for the deployment of local teams. It is suggested that consideration been given to
extending the use of the USAR TF system.

4. Training
• In addition to the 18 month UNDAC Pacific Team Refresher it is suggested that a more
focussed group within the team membership undertake more regular OSOCC
continuation training.
• The establishment of a New Zealand “limited” UNDAC Mission Module be established as
a matter of urgency.

5. OCHA
• Consideration be given To UN OCHA ESB FCSS establishing further guidance for
UNDAC Team deployments into developed countries.

6. Resourcing
• Operating on the scale that occurred on the exercise, improved electronic management
systems are needed to process and manage the information received. There is also a
need for a web based information system, including GIS maps that people can “drill-
down” into to get the information that they need.

Exercise PEGASUS 04 Evaluation Report 16